Rationality: What it is, why it seems scarce, and why it matters

[Analytics]

With the possible exception of Yuval Noah Harari, Steve Pinker is my favorite contemporary thinker. His latest book is called Rationality: What it is, why it seems scarce, and why it matters. Highly recommended.

I’ve been thinking about this book and a recurring theme of my conversations with @smac97. Whenever I answer his questions "Thoughts?" I expect to be reproached for allegedly being too arrogant that I’m right and thereby implying that people who see things differently are dumb, followed by his hackneyed adage that “reasonable minds can disagree.” I am 100% with Pinker in ascribing to modernism and enlightenment thinking, while Smac has a postmodern bent who regularly disparages me with words like “scientism” and “fundamentalism.”

When I first read the following, it made me think of Smac:

Quote

Now, arguments for truth, objectivity, and reason may stick in the craw, because they seem dangerously arrogant: “Who the hell are you to claim to have the absolute truth?” But that’s not what the case for rationality is about. The psychologist David Myers has said that the essence of monotheistic belief is: (1) There is a God and (2) it’s not me (and it’s also not you). The secular equivalent is: (1) There is objective truth and (2) I don’t know it (and neither do you). The same epistemic humility applies to the rationality that leads to truth. Perfect rationality and objective truth are aspirations that no mortal can ever claim to have attained. But the conviction that they are out there licenses us to develop in ways that are impossible for any of us individually.

The rules are designed to sideline the biases that get in the way of rationality: the cognitive illusions built into human nature, and the bigotries, prejudices, phobias, and -isms that infect the members of a race, class, gender, sexuality, or civilization. These rules include the principles of critical thinking and the normative systems of logic, probability, and empirical reasoning.

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (pp. 40-41). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Depending upon the context, people  are both naturally rational and naturally irrational. We are good at figuring out problems in certain contexts, but our thinking can be seriously flawed in others. Can rational people disagree? About some things to some extent. Sure. But that doesn’t mean that the contradictory truth-claims espoused by different people are equally supported by reason. It doesn’t mean that we can’t use reason to rightly have very high credence in something, even if an otherwise “reasonable person” disagrees. Must one really preface every statement with “in my mere humble opinion” and postface every statement “but reasonable minds may disagree”? No.

But what is rationality? This is a part of Pinker’s argument that is surprising, and might even support Smac’s point. Pinker asserts:

Quote

A definition that is more or less faithful to the way the word [rationality] is used is “the ability to use knowledge to attain goals.” Knowledge in turn is standardly defined as “justified true belief.”… A rational agent must have a goal, whether it is to ascertain the truth of a noteworthy idea, called theoretical reason, or to bring about a noteworthy outcome in the world, called practical reason (“what is true” and “what to do”).

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (p. 36-37). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

This makes me wonder. When one presumably rational mind states that the story of Noah and the flood is fundamentally a myth while another presumably rational mind states that it is based on a true story, is the real issue that they have different goals?

My goal is a simple, plain vanilla theoretical reason—I want to get to the truth of the matter of whether there was a guy named Noah who built an ark to escape with some animals from a flood. I suspect that my interlocutor might have a different goal that is actually a practical goal—to maintain his faith in his belief structure and community, to grow his faith in God, or whatever. Our respective rights to choose our own goals is something that we can agree on. And if we have different goals, rationality can take us to different places.

But in any case, I will reaffirm that if the presumptive goal of an argument here is to approach the actual truth of something, correctly applying the tools of reason should cause our collective belief to converge towards the truth. If different people come to different conclusions, and especially if those conclusions are correlated with belonging to different faith or sociological groups, then we have reason to strongly suspect something other than reason is driving the difference in opinions. Some reasoning is better than others, and we ought to focus on the quality of the contenders’ arguments rather than whether or not we’re hurting the other guy's feelings by having a strong credence in our own opinion.

Can rational minds disagree? Yes. Likewise, rational minds can believe irrational things.

[bluebell]

3 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Depending upon the context, people  are both naturally rational and naturally irrational. We are good at figuring out problems in certain contexts, but our thinking can be seriously flawed in others. Can rational people disagree? About some things to some extent. Sure. But that doesn’t mean that the contradictory truth-claims espoused by different people are equally supported by reason. It doesn’t mean that we can’t use reason to rightly have very high credence in something, even if an otherwise “reasonable person” disagrees. Must one really preface every statement with “in my mere humble opinion” and postface every statement “but reasonable minds may disagree”? No.

 

In reference to the bold, I think a more accurate ending to that sentence would be "even if other people have also used reason to rightly have a very high credence in their conclusions."  That's what "reasonable people can disagree" means.

It's a way to acknowledge that our biases and personal experiences inform how we use our reason and that reason or rationality does not exist in a bubble.  Because of that, depending on the perspective, two seemingly contradictory things can both be successfully argued to as rational.

Quote

This makes me wonder. When one presumably rational mind states that the story of Noah and the flood is fundamentally a myth while another presumably rational mind states that it is based on a true story, is the real issue that they have different goals?

Probably.  Different biases always created different agendas.

Quote

But in any case, I will reaffirm that if the presumptive goal of an argument here is to approach the actual truth of something, correctly applying the tools of reason should cause our collective belief to converge towards the truth.

What are the tools of reason?  Can reason teach us historical truth, for example? 

As a very amateur trained historian, my answer would be 'oh heck no'.  All history is interpretation and you can't reason truth out of the evidences left behind because the picture will always be incomplete, no matter how much evidence there is.  Ask mfb (our resident philosopher) this question about using reason to find truth and his head will probably explode.  

Quote

Can rational minds disagree? Yes. Likewise, rational minds can believe irrational things

I think a better statement is "rational minds do believe irrational things" since none of us are 100% rational all the time. 

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

With the possible exception of Yuval Noah Harari, Steve Pinker is my favorite contemporary thinker. His latest book is called Rationality: What it is, why it seems scarce, and why it matters. Highly recommended.

I’ve been thinking about this book and a recurring theme of my conversations with @smac97. Whenever I answer his questions "Thoughts?" I expect to be reproached for allegedly being too arrogant that I’m right and thereby implying that people who see things differently are dumb, followed by his hackneyed adage that “reasonable minds can disagree.” I am 100% with Pinker in ascribing to modernism and enlightenment thinking, while Smac has a postmodern bent who regularly disparages me with words like “scientism” and “fundamentalism.”

When I first read the following, it made me think of Smac:

Depending upon the context, people  are both naturally rational and naturally irrational. We are good at figuring out problems in certain contexts, but our thinking can be seriously flawed in others. Can rational people disagree? About some things to some extent. Sure. But that doesn’t mean that the contradictory truth-claims espoused by different people are equally supported by reason. It doesn’t mean that we can’t use reason to rightly have very high credence in something, even if an otherwise “reasonable person” disagrees. Must one really preface every statement with “in my mere humble opinion” and postface every statement “but reasonable minds may disagree”? No.

But what is rationality? This is a part of Pinker’s argument that is surprising, and might even support Smac’s point. Pinker asserts:

This makes me wonder. When one presumably rational mind states that the story of Noah and the flood is fundamentally a myth while another presumably rational mind states that it is based on a true story, is the real issue that they have different goals?

My goal is a simple, plain vanilla theoretical reason—I want to get to the truth of the matter of whether there was a guy named Noah who built an ark to escape with some animals from a flood. I suspect that my interlocutor might have a different goal that is actually a practical goal—to maintain his faith in his belief structure and community, to grow his faith in God, or whatever. Our respective rights to choose our own goals is something that we can agree on. And if we have different goals, rationality can take us to different places.

But in any case, I will reaffirm that if the presumptive goal of an argument here is to approach the actual truth of something, correctly applying the tools of reason should cause our collective belief to converge towards the truth. If different people come to different conclusions, and especially if those conclusions are correlated with belonging to different faith or sociological groups, then we have reason to strongly suspect something other than reason is driving the difference in opinions. Some reasoning is better than others, and we ought to focus on the quality of the contenders’ arguments rather than whether or not we’re hurting the other guy's feelings by having a strong credence in our own opinion.

Can rational minds disagree? Yes. Likewise, rational minds can believe irrational things.

This post seeks what has never been successfully defined, and imo cannot BE defined, a definition of word "true" and it's slippery partner "rational". 

2500 years of western philosophy have failed to produce a satisfactory solution, and Pinker's rehash of all that has gone before certainty changes nothing but carry forth his personal myth.

I mean really - a guy who goes out of his way to look like Einstein? He's GOTTA be smart, right?

Sorry sports fans, but I am staying out of this exercise in futility.

I know you are all bitterly disappointed.  🧐🤪😥😉😉

https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/pinkers-pollyannish-philosophy-and-its-perfidious-politics/

 

Edited December 2, 2021 by mfbukowski
Saving "Reason" from idiocy

[Navidad]

I might chime in that I believe that binarism is the poisonous fruit of the day and the enemy of rationality and truth. I do not coddle with the idea of "either or" very much. That limits reasoned conclusions. I also am not a fan of certainty. It does all the same things that binarism does and more. I am not a fan of onlyism, which by its very nature creates dogma. Dogma creates duty, which all too often leads to destruction (see MMM as the classic example).  Binarism, certainty, and onlyism forces a person into rankism, which eliminates most rationale discourse and renders all others as less than. Combine all of these with Johari blind spots and rationale discourse goes out the window.

I value multi-option problem solving - I probably learned that as a district senior administrator. I value uncertainty because that always leads me to think deeper. I don't value onlyism because it is virtually always untrue. Elijah had a bout with onlyism in I Kings 19. God had to remind Elijah he had another 7,000 who had not forsaken Him in Israel. So it almost always is.....Certainty shuts the door to exploring for the more. that isn't good. I hope it is ok to attach something I put on Facebook this morning. I often share my thoughts on a particular day there. This is what I have been thinking today and some of it fits in with the theme of this thread.

 

[MiserereNobis]

14 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Sorry sports fans, but I am staying out of this exercise in futility.

Here's my sports chant for you:

POST -- THE -- VID-E-O!!

POST -- THE -- VID-E-O!!

😁

[smac97]

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

I’ve been thinking about this book and a recurring theme of my conversations with @smac97. Whenever I answer his questions "Thoughts?" I expect to be reproached for allegedly being too arrogant that I’m right and thereby implying that people who see things differently are dumb, followed by his hackneyed adage that “reasonable minds can disagree.”

Well, that's usually because your comments usually include A) declarations that your perspective is borne of incontrovertible "fact" and the rest of us are reliant on things like "mental gymnastics" (which sure comes across pejoratively).

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

I am 100% with Pinker in ascribing to modernism and enlightenment thinking, while Smac has a postmodern bent who regularly disparages me with words like “scientism” and “fundamentalism.”

Not really.  From Wikipedia:

Quote

Postmodernism is a broad movement that developed in the mid-to-late 20th century across philosophy, the arts, architecture, and criticism, marking a departure from modernism. The term has been more generally applied to describe a historical era said to follow after modernity and the tendencies of this era.

Postmodern thinkers frequently describe knowledge claims and value systems as contingent or socially-conditioned, framing them as products of political, historical, or cultural discourses and hierarchies.

I am a Latter-day Saint.  I believe knowledge comes from the cumulative experience of mankind, but that most of the most important stuff, the moral issues, are to be found via revelation from God.  Kinda hard to characterize this as "postmoderinst."

Quote

These thinkers often view personal and spiritual needs as being best fulfilled by improving social conditions and adopting more fluid discourses, in contrast to modernism, which places a higher degree of emphasis on maximizing progress and which generally regards the promotion of objective truths as an ideal form of discourse.

I'm in favor of both "improving social conditions" and "maximizing progress" and promoting "objective truths" (though I think we'll generally approximate, rather than fully attain, such truths, "for we walk by faith, not by sight" and all that).

Quote

Postmodernism is generally defined by an attitude of skepticism, irony, or rejection toward what it describes as the grand narratives and ideologies associated with modernism, often criticizing Enlightenment rationality and focusing on the role of ideology in maintaining political or economic power.

Again, kinda hard to square this stuff with my life as a believing Latter-day Saint.

Quote

Common targets of postmodern criticism include universalist ideas of objective reality, morality, truth, human nature, reason, science, language, and social progress.

Same here.  

Quote

Accordingly, postmodern thought is broadly characterized by tendencies to self-consciousness, self-referentiality, epistemological and moral relativism, pluralism, and irreverence.

"Moral relativism?"  Nope.

"Irreverence?"  Nope.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

When I first read the following, it made me think of Smac:

Quote

 

Now, arguments for truth, objectivity, and reason may stick in the craw, because they seem dangerously arrogant: “Who the hell are you to claim to have the absolute truth?” But that’s not what the case for rationality is about. The psychologist David Myers has said that the essence of monotheistic belief is: (1) There is a God and (2) it’s not me (and it’s also not you). The secular equivalent is: (1) There is objective truth and (2) I don’t know it (and neither do you). The same epistemic humility applies to the rationality that leads to truth. Perfect rationality and objective truth are aspirations that no mortal can ever claim to have attained. But the conviction that they are out there licenses us to develop in ways that are impossible for any of us individually.

The rules are designed to sideline the biases that get in the way of rationality: the cognitive illusions built into human nature, and the bigotries, prejudices, phobias, and -isms that infect the members of a race, class, gender, sexuality, or civilization. These rules include the principles of critical thinking and the normative systems of logic, probability, and empirical reasoning.

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (pp. 40-41). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

 

I really like this.  It contrasts with folks coming to this board and presenting their opinions as "fact" to be "realize{d}" and "accept{ed}," and how people who disagree with them are using "mental gymnastics" (which comes across as a disparaging comment about their intelligence and character).

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Depending upon the context, people  are both naturally rational and naturally irrational. We are good at figuring out problems in certain contexts, but our thinking can be seriously flawed in others. Can rational people disagree? About some things to some extent. Sure.

Agreed.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

But that doesn’t mean that the contradictory truth-claims espoused by different people are equally supported by reason.

Again, I agree.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

It doesn’t mean that we can’t use reason to rightly have very high credence in something, even if an otherwise “reasonable person” disagrees.

I agree.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Must one really preface every statement with “in my mere humble opinion” and postface every statement “but reasonable minds may disagree”? No.

I agree.

But that is a far cry from summarily declaring one's position to be "science," to be "fact" that others should "realize" and "accept," and so on.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

But what is rationality? This is a part of Pinker’s argument that is surprising, and might even support Smac’s point. Pinker asserts:

Quote

 

A definition that is more or less faithful to the way the word [rationality] is used is “the ability to use knowledge to attain goals.” Knowledge in turn is standardly defined as “justified true belief.”… A rational agent must have a goal, whether it is to ascertain the truth of a noteworthy idea, called theoretical reason, or to bring about a noteworthy outcome in the world, called practical reason (“what is true” and “what to do”).

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (p. 36-37). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

 

This makes me wonder. When one presumably rational mind states that the story of Noah and the flood is fundamentally a myth while another presumably rational mind states that it is based on a true story, is the real issue that they have different goals?

I think the real issues are A) the quality and quantity of the evidence, and B) the presuppositional lens each individual uses to view such evidence.

The historical reality of the Tower of Babel (in general rather than specific terms) is a question of fact.  Whether it actually happened or not is an unknown.  There is no way to definitively say it did or did not happen.  The evidence regarding it is scant.  But the same can be said for virtually all ancient events, so the conclusion one reaches is going to be much more about the presuppositional lens he uses to view that evidence.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

My goal is a simple, plain vanilla theoretical reason—I want to get to the truth of the matter of whether there was a guy named Noah who built an ark to escape with some animals from a flood.

Sounds good.  We all aspire to this.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

I suspect that my interlocutor might have a different goal that is actually a practical goal—to maintain his faith in his belief structure and community, to grow his faith in God, or whatever.

Well, no.  I think you do others a disservice when you reserve pure motives for yourself ("I want to get to the truth of the matter") but impute impure motives onto them.

If you can bring yourself to concede that people who have reached differing conclusions about Noah have also "want{ed} to get to the truth of the matter," then that's great.

My sense, though, is that you have not, and cannot, concede this.  For you, our motives are suspect.  Your motives or pure, ours are ulterior.  And so on.  That's the vibe I get from your posts, anyway.  I'm open to correction/clarification.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Our respective rights to choose our own goals is something that we can agree on. And if we have different goals, rationality can take us to different places.

Right.  But you are framing the situation as A) your "goal" is "to get to the truth of the matter," and B) other people who disagree with you have - as you put it - "a different goal" (different from, it seems "get{ting} to the truth of the matter").

You are framing yourself as a truth-seeker, and those who have different perspectives from yours as not being truth-seekers.  This leaves you free to label yourself as honest and truth-seeking and rational, and people like me as . . . not these things, as having "a different goal" than these things.

You'll understand why i find this paradigm . . . flawed.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

But in any case, I will reaffirm that if the presumptive goal of an argument here is to approach the actual truth of something, correctly applying the tools of reason should cause our collective belief to converge towards the truth.

In an ideal world, yes.

Alas, we don't live in that world.  We have flaws and gaps in our knowledge.  We have biases and emotions.  We have conflicts of interests.  We have varied opinions and ideologies.  We are not automatons, and therefore cannot fully differentiate between objective fact and opinion.  And many of the great questions about "truth" are moral, and therefore not really subject to empirical testing.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

If different people come to different conclusions, and especially if those conclusions are correlated with belonging to different faith or sociological groups, then we have reason to strongly suspect something other than reason is driving the difference in opinions.

Yep.  We see this all the time in supposedly "objective" scientific disciplines.  Scientists have differences of opinions about the same datasets all the time.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Some reasoning is better than others, and we ought to focus on the quality of the contenders’ arguments rather than whether or not we’re hurting the other guy's feelings by having a strong credence in our own opinion.

Sure.  This can and does include addressing presuppositions upon which arguments are built.

40 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Can rational minds disagree? Yes. Likewise, rational minds can believe irrational things.

Agreed.

Thanks,

-Smac

[mfbukowski]

☹️

The reason postmodernism exists is because alleged "Modernism", from the 16 and 17 hundreds is self contradictory.

It, like logical positivism, cannot define truth or reason, while yet insisting that we accept its premises based on faith alone.

We cannot know reality in itself, only our experiences of it

 

Edited December 2, 2021 by mfbukowski
Preservation of sanity

[teddyaware]

3 hours ago, Analytics said:

With the possible exception of Yuval Noah Harari, Steve Pinker is my favorite contemporary thinker. His latest book is called Rationality: What it is, why it seems scarce, and why it matters. Highly recommended.

I’ve been thinking about this book and a recurring theme of my conversations with @smac97. Whenever I answer his questions "Thoughts?" I expect to be reproached for allegedly being too arrogant that I’m right and thereby implying that people who see things differently are dumb, followed by his hackneyed adage that “reasonable minds can disagree.” I am 100% with Pinker in ascribing to modernism and enlightenment thinking, while Smac has a postmodern bent who regularly disparages me with words like “scientism” and “fundamentalism.”

When I first read the following, it made me think of Smac:

Depending upon the context, people  are both naturally rational and naturally irrational. We are good at figuring out problems in certain contexts, but our thinking can be seriously flawed in others. Can rational people disagree? About some things to some extent. Sure. But that doesn’t mean that the contradictory truth-claims espoused by different people are equally supported by reason. It doesn’t mean that we can’t use reason to rightly have very high credence in something, even if an otherwise “reasonable person” disagrees. Must one really preface every statement with “in my mere humble opinion” and postface every statement “but reasonable minds may disagree”? No.

But what is rationality? This is a part of Pinker’s argument that is surprising, and might even support Smac’s point. Pinker asserts:

This makes me wonder. When one presumably rational mind states that the story of Noah and the flood is fundamentally a myth while another presumably rational mind states that it is based on a true story, is the real issue that they have different goals?

My goal is a simple, plain vanilla theoretical reason—I want to get to the truth of the matter of whether there was a guy named Noah who built an ark to escape with some animals from a flood. I suspect that my interlocutor might have a different goal that is actually a practical goal—to maintain his faith in his belief structure and community, to grow his faith in God, or whatever. Our respective rights to choose our own goals is something that we can agree on. And if we have different goals, rationality can take us to different places.

But in any case, I will reaffirm that if the presumptive goal of an argument here is to approach the actual truth of something, correctly applying the tools of reason should cause our collective belief to converge towards the truth. If different people come to different conclusions, and especially if those conclusions are correlated with belonging to different faith or sociological groups, then we have reason to strongly suspect something other than reason is driving the difference in opinions. Some reasoning is better than others, and we ought to focus on the quality of the contenders’ arguments rather than whether or not we’re hurting the other guy's feelings by having a strong credence in our own opinion.

Can rational minds disagree? Yes. Likewise, rational minds can believe irrational things.

Even the most intelligent and learned of rational human beings understand too little about the nature of reality and the mysteries of existence to be depended upon as guides to learn what is true, real and beneficial what is not. Hence the need for the Holy Spirit, a being who really does fully comprehend all there is to know about the true nature of reality and the mysteries of existence to guide men into all truth. If mortal, rational men were omniscient and omnipotent in the same way God is, their reasoning and judgement could be depended upon.

Edited December 2, 2021 by teddyaware

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

Well, that's usually because your comments usually include A) declarations that your perspective is borne of incontrovertible "fact" and the rest of us are reliant on things like "mental gymnastics" (which sure comes across pejoratively).

Not really.  From Wikipedia:

I am a Latter-day Saint.  I believe knowledge comes from the cumulative experience of mankind, but that most of the most important stuff, the moral issues, are to be found via revelation from God.  Kinda hard to characterize this as "postmoderinst."

I'm in favor of both "improving social conditions" and "maximizing progress" and promoting "objective truths" (though I think we'll generally approximate, rather than fully attain, such truths, "for we walk by faith, not by sight" and all that).

Again, kinda hard to square this stuff with my life as a believing Latter-day Saint.

Same here.  

"Moral relativism?"  Nope.

"Irreverence?"  Nope.

I really like this.  It contrasts with folks coming to this board and presenting their opinions as "fact" to be "realize{d}" and "accept{ed}," and how people who disagree with them are using "mental gymnastics" (which comes across as a disparaging comment about their intelligence and character).

Agreed.

Again, I agree.

I agree.

I agree.

But that is a far cry from summarily declaring one's position to be "science," to be "fact" that others should "realize" and "accept," and so on.

I think the real issues are A) the quality and quantity of the evidence, and B) the presuppositional lens each individual uses to view such evidence.

The historical reality of the Tower of Babel (in general rather than specific terms) is a question of fact.  Whether it actually happened or not is an unknown.  There is no way to definitively say it did or did not happen.  The evidence regarding it is scant.  But the same can be said for virtually all ancient events, so the conclusion one reaches is going to be much more about the presuppositional lens he uses to view that evidence.

Sounds good.  We all aspire to this.

Well, no.  I think you do others a disservice when you reserve pure motives for yourself ("I want to get to the truth of the matter") but impute impure motives onto them.

If you can bring yourself to concede that people who have reached differing conclusions about Noah have also "want{ed} to get to the truth of the matter," then that's great.

My sense, though, is that you have not, and cannot, concede this.  For you, our motives are suspect.  Your motives or pure, ours are ulterior.  And so on.  That's the vibe I get from your posts, anyway.  I'm open to correction/clarification.

Right.  But you are framing the situation as A) your "goal" is "to get to the truth of the matter," and B) other people who disagree with you have - as you put it - "a different goal" (different from, it seems "get{ting} to the truth of the matter").

You are framing yourself as a truth-seeker, and those who have different perspectives from yours as not being truth-seekers.  This leaves you free to label yourself as honest and truth-seeking and rational, and people like me as . . . not these things, as having "a different goal" than these things.

You'll understand why i find this paradigm . . . flawed.

In an ideal world, yes.

Alas, we don't live in that world.  We have flaws and gaps in our knowledge.  We have biases and emotions.  We have conflicts of interests.  We have varied opinions and ideologies.  We are not automatons, and therefore cannot fully differentiate between objective fact and opinion.  And many of the great questions about "truth" are moral, and therefore not really subject to empirical testing.

Yep.  We see this all the time in supposedly "objective" scientific disciplines.  Scientists have differences of opinions about the same datasets all the time.

Sure.  This can and does include addressing presuppositions upon which arguments are built.

Agreed.

Thanks,

-Smac

Oh my gosh, we actually agree!

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, MiserereNobis said:

Here's my sports chant for you:

POST -- THE -- VID-E-O!!

POST -- THE -- VID-E-O!!

😁

No video for YOU! 🧐

[Analytics]

3 hours ago, bluebell said:

In reference to the bold, I think a more accurate ending to that sentence would be "even if other people have also used reason to rightly have a very high credence in their conclusions."  That's what "reasonable people can disagree" means.

It's a way to acknowledge that our biases and personal experiences inform how we use our reason and that reason or rationality does not exist in a bubble.  Because of that, depending on the perspective, two seemingly contradictory things can both be successfully argued to as rational.

I would suggest that to the extent our biases and personal experiences cause our evaluation of the evidence to diverge, we are failing to achieve the ideal of rationality.

3 hours ago, bluebell said:

What are the tools of reason?  Can reason teach us historical truth, for example? 

The tools Pinker thinks are most important include logic, probability, critical thinking, Bayesian reasoning, rational choice theory, signal detection and statistical decision theory, regression theory, and game theory. 

3 hours ago, bluebell said:

As a very amateur trained historian, my answer would be 'oh heck no'.  All history is interpretation and you can't reason truth out of the evidences left behind because the picture will always be incomplete, no matter how much evidence there is.  Ask mfb (our resident philosopher) this question about using reason to find truth and his head will probably explode.  

I think a better statement is "rational minds do believe irrational things" since none of us are 100% rational all the time. 

This comes across as too post-modern for me. I believe that the truth is out there. Most of it is utterly unavailable (e.g. what did Jesus have for breakfast on December 2, A.D. 29.?). But some truth is attainable (e.g. was Jesus of Nazareth a real-world historical figure?). Nobody is 100% rational all the time. Of course. But it is an ideal we can strive for.

[Analytics]

3 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

This post seeks what has never been successfully defined, and imo cannot BE defined, a definition of word "true" and it's slippery partner "rational". 

2500 years of western philosophy have failed to produce a satisfactory solution, and Pinker's rehash of all that has gone before certainty changes nothing but carry forth his personal myth.

Well, since Pinker chaired the usage panel of the American Heritage Dictionary for eleven years, I'd say his definition is better than most. And since one of the major points of his recent books is to reject the postmodernism you embrace, it's no surprise you disagree on this point.

3 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

I mean really - a guy who goes out of his way to look like Einstein? He's GOTTA be smart, right?

Pinker looks nothing like Einstein. Einstein looked like a character in a Charlie Chaplin movie who was electrocuted. In contrast, Pinker's "hair has long been the object of admiration, and envy, and intense study", was nominated by acclamation as the first member of the Luxuriant Flowing Hair Club for Scientists (LFHCfS)." (Steven Pinker - Wikipedia)

In addition to his opulent hair, he is a professor at Harvard and a member of the National Academy of Sciences. Call him what you must, but the guy ain't dumb.

[CV75]

4 hours ago, Analytics said:

With the possible exception of Yuval Noah Harari, Steve Pinker is my favorite contemporary thinker. His latest book is called Rationality: What it is, why it seems scarce, and why it matters. Highly recommended.

I’ve been thinking about this book and a recurring theme of my conversations with @smac97. Whenever I answer his questions "Thoughts?" I expect to be reproached for allegedly being too arrogant that I’m right and thereby implying that people who see things differently are dumb, followed by his hackneyed adage that “reasonable minds can disagree.” I am 100% with Pinker in ascribing to modernism and enlightenment thinking, while Smac has a postmodern bent who regularly disparages me with words like “scientism” and “fundamentalism.”

When I first read the following, it made me think of Smac:

Depending upon the context, people  are both naturally rational and naturally irrational. We are good at figuring out problems in certain contexts, but our thinking can be seriously flawed in others. Can rational people disagree? About some things to some extent. Sure. But that doesn’t mean that the contradictory truth-claims espoused by different people are equally supported by reason. It doesn’t mean that we can’t use reason to rightly have very high credence in something, even if an otherwise “reasonable person” disagrees. Must one really preface every statement with “in my mere humble opinion” and postface every statement “but reasonable minds may disagree”? No.

But what is rationality? This is a part of Pinker’s argument that is surprising, and might even support Smac’s point. Pinker asserts:

This makes me wonder. When one presumably rational mind states that the story of Noah and the flood is fundamentally a myth while another presumably rational mind states that it is based on a true story, is the real issue that they have different goals?

My goal is a simple, plain vanilla theoretical reason—I want to get to the truth of the matter of whether there was a guy named Noah who built an ark to escape with some animals from a flood. I suspect that my interlocutor might have a different goal that is actually a practical goal—to maintain his faith in his belief structure and community, to grow his faith in God, or whatever. Our respective rights to choose our own goals is something that we can agree on. And if we have different goals, rationality can take us to different places.

But in any case, I will reaffirm that if the presumptive goal of an argument here is to approach the actual truth of something, correctly applying the tools of reason should cause our collective belief to converge towards the truth. If different people come to different conclusions, and especially if those conclusions are correlated with belonging to different faith or sociological groups, then we have reason to strongly suspect something other than reason is driving the difference in opinions. Some reasoning is better than others, and we ought to focus on the quality of the contenders’ arguments rather than whether or not we’re hurting the other guy's feelings by having a strong credence in our own opinion.

Can rational minds disagree? Yes. Likewise, rational minds can believe irrational things.

I think the differences in rationality between people is three-fold: bias (which is often non-rational and unrecognized as a factor), types of rationality and the “modules” of thought comprising rationality. I also think that goals and intent, as well as the choice of many tools and schools of thought to carry them out, arise from the rational process.

The conclusion that some reasoning is better than others depends on the standard one sets up from their own rationality and their level of subjectivity to being influenced by others.

[OGHoosier]

31 minutes ago, CV75 said:

 

The conclusion that some reasoning is better than others depends on the standard one sets up from their own rationality and their level of subjectivity to being influenced by others.

I believe this is correct. Philosophically speaking, human rationality has lead us to a multitude of divergent conclusions on many matters, many of which were promulgated by individuals of good will and rigorous thinking. I thus find it myself incapable of believing that any one person's rational conclusions can authoritatively be taken to be "the right conclusion" or "the way to think", which thus leaves us in need of some other standard if we are to hold a standard of "rationally derived truth." 

I bristle at the allegation that the disagreement of two rational beings entails that one is being irrational, for I see no reason to believe that "properly-exercised" rationality will lead everyone to the same conclusion on the same body of information. We have no reason to believe that save for the claim that rationality is self-evident, which is cold comfort in a world so full of contingency as ours. Hume's work on the problem of induction follows similar lines. Even granting that proper rationality would lead all to the same inevitable conclusions, if you cannot persuade your interlocuter to your satisfaction, then your arrogation of the honor of being correct is not particularly meaningful. 

[bluebell]

51 minutes ago, Analytics said:

I would suggest that to the extent our biases and personal experiences cause our evaluation of the evidence to diverge, we are failing to achieve the ideal of rationality.

How so? 

We cannot step outside of our experiences; they are one of the main ways that we gather evidence which we use to discover truth.  It is impossible to directly observe the world as it is because we can't see it as it is-we see it as our brains interpret it through the filters our brains have developed.  

Quote

The tools Pinker thinks are most important include logic, probability, critical thinking, Bayesian reasoning, rational choice theory, signal detection and statistical decision theory, regression theory, and game theory

I've got nothing against Pinker or his tool chest, but it does make me ask, how can we know that the tools that Pinker things are most important, actually are most important? 

Quote

This comes across as too post-modern for me. 

Because you've looked at the evidence and from your perspective, post-modern doesn't work.  I have no problem with that, as long as it's understood that that is a belief and not truth.

Quote

But some truth is attainable (e.g. was Jesus of Nazareth a real-world historical figure?)

How can we know, only from the evidence that is left today, that Jesus of Nazareth was a real-world historical figure?  All we have are writings, most from people who also say He was the Son of God.  It's hard to use them as evidence of His existence and at the same time deny the evidence they provide for His divinity as not being believable or reliable.   

[Kenngo1969]

7 minutes ago, bluebell said:

... We cannot step outside of our experiences; they are one of the main ways that we gather evidence which we use to discover truth.  It is impossible to directly observe the world as it is because we can't see it as it is-we see it as our brains interpret it through the filters our brains have developed. ...

1. Quoted for Truth.
2. @mfbukowski, perhaps the aforequoted excerpt is evidence that your evangelizing in favor of a pragmatic approach to things having to do with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is having (and has had) more of an impact than you realized, no?

[Calm]

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

Pinker looks nothing like Einstein. Einstein looked like a character in a Charlie Chaplin movie who was electrocuted. In contrast, Pinker's "hair has long been the object of admiration, and envy, and intense study", was nominated by acclamation as the first member of the Luxuriant Flowing Hair Club for Scientists (LFHCfS)." (Steven Pinker - Wikipedia)

An Einstein with a perm and a rogaine prescription.   It is a gorgeous head of hair. 

Edited December 2, 2021 by Calm

[Kenngo1969]

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

No video for YOU! 🧐

Soup Nazi!

[Robert F. Smith]

7 hours ago, Analytics said:

.................

I’ve been thinking about this book and a recurring theme of my conversations with @smac97. Whenever I answer his questions "Thoughts?" I expect to be reproached for allegedly being too arrogant that I’m right and thereby implying that people who see things differently are dumb, followed by his hackneyed adage that “reasonable minds can disagree.” I am 100% with Pinker in ascribing to modernism and enlightenment thinking, while Smac has a postmodern bent who regularly disparages me with words like “scientism” and “fundamentalism.”

When I first read the following, it made me think of Smac:

In the midst of this moot court smac-down, it might be well to reflect on the actual fact that the best scientists frequently disagree on the basics.  Moreover, some eastern thinkers give very little credence to western rationality -- I'm thinking here of The Tao of Physics.

7 hours ago, Analytics said:

Depending upon the context, people  are both naturally rational and naturally irrational. We are good at figuring out problems in certain contexts, but our thinking can be seriously flawed in others. Can rational people disagree? About some things to some extent. Sure. But that doesn’t mean that the contradictory truth-claims espoused by different people are equally supported by reason. It doesn’t mean that we can’t use reason to rightly have very high credence in something, even if an otherwise “reasonable person” disagrees. Must one really preface every statement with “in my mere humble opinion” and postface every statement “but reasonable minds may disagree”? No.

.......................

This makes me wonder. When one presumably rational mind states that the story of Noah and the flood is fundamentally a myth while another presumably rational mind states that it is based on a true story, is the real issue that they have different goals?

My goal is a simple, plain vanilla theoretical reason—I want to get to the truth of the matter of whether there was a guy named Noah who built an ark to escape with some animals from a flood. I suspect that my interlocutor might have a different goal that is actually a practical goal—to maintain his faith in his belief structure and community, to grow his faith in God, or whatever. Our respective rights to choose our own goals is something that we can agree on. And if we have different goals, rationality can take us to different places.

It might be well to first try to avoid the Dunning-Kruger effect by ascertaining the actual nature of this question:  Is the question motivated by the silly notion that Genesis is a science or history text?  This is most often the primary source of misunderstanding by both rationalists and religionists, who come to the text without any preparatory context.  People who cannot even distinguish one genre of literature from another are unlikely to get to first base in any discussion of the text.  If, in addition to that, they are unfamiliar with the plethora of other Great Flood stories worldwide, they will likely not have a satisfying or enlightening discussion.

7 hours ago, Analytics said:

But in any case, I will reaffirm that if the presumptive goal of an argument here is to approach the actual truth of something, correctly applying the tools of reason should cause our collective belief to converge towards the truth. If different people come to different conclusions, and especially if those conclusions are correlated with belonging to different faith or sociological groups, then we have reason to strongly suspect something other than reason is driving the difference in opinions. Some reasoning is better than others, and we ought to focus on the quality of the contenders’ arguments rather than whether or not we’re hurting the other guy's feelings by having a strong credence in our own opinion.

Can rational minds disagree? Yes. Likewise, rational minds can believe irrational things.

Set your sights as high as you are able, you are going to be disappointed.  We muddle through this life, doing the best we can, which will always be less than satisfying to the strict rational mind.  Humans are instinctive and irrational animals.  That will never change.  Sorry . . .

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, Kenngo1969 said:

Soup Nazi!

😉

[Analytics]

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

Well, that's usually because your comments usually include A) declarations that your perspective is borne of incontrovertible "fact" and the rest of us are reliant on things like "mental gymnastics" (which sure comes across pejoratively).

While on occasion I've relayed what mainstream science says on a topic, I've never declared that my perspective is "borne of inconvertible fact." 

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

Not really.  From Wikipedia:

I am a Latter-day Saint.  I believe knowledge comes from the cumulative experience of mankind, but that most of the most important stuff, the moral issues, are to be found via revelation from God.  Kinda hard to characterize this as "postmoderinst."

Well, @mfbukowski is a Latter-day Saint too, and he thinks Richard Rorty's postmodern neopragmatism is indistinguishable from Mormon belief (but we can both agree that he is a bit out there). My point isn't and wasn't that you are postmodernism personified in every aspect of your life. Rather, it is that you seem to grab onto a few postmodern beliefs when doing so fits your aims. Specifically, the way you use the catchphrase "reasonable minds can disagree" seems designed to avoid engaging with arguments you know you'd lose, and is basically a postmodern attack on rationality that leaves us effectively in a perpetual state of epistemological relativism and obscurantism. You might not subscribe to postmodern thought generally, but you seem to want others to subscribe to postmodern values by politely pretending that your beliefs are just as valid as anybody else's.

If you think your beliefs really are as rational as mine, we could have a rational discussion about it and use the tools of rationality to evaluate the actual evidence. The problem is that as you just conceded, your most important beliefs aren't based on rationality, they are based on "revelation from God."

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

But that is a far cry from summarily declaring one's position to be "science," to be "fact" that others should "realize" and "accept," and so on.

Science is science. Even the parts of science that are incompatible with your religious beliefs.

Let's take a specific example. I believe that what I've said in the past that you found most offensive is that revelation, spirits, etc. all contradict the known laws of physics. I've claimed that it isn't just that physics hasn't found evidence of these things. I've claimed that effective quantum field theory--the most robust theory in all of science, positively demonstrates that such things can't exist. If such things did exist, they would have manifest themselves in specific experiments that have been exhaustively performed. The state of the world is that one of the following two things must be true:

• Effective quantum field theory is fundamentally wrong, despite all of the evidence indicating the opposite within the energy levels, time intervals, and distances in space that are applicable.
• Spirits, revelation, etc. really don't exist.

Pinker actually touches upon this in a slightly different context. When discussing the replicability crisis in psychological research and how proper Bayesian reasoning can help avoid such problems, he gives an example of a eminent psychologist who published a paper in a prestigious journal that claimed he'd demonstrated some students had ESP and could predict some images that were hidden behind a screen. Pinker said:

Quote

 

Not surprisingly, the effects failed to replicate, but that was a foregone conclusion given the infinitesimal prior probability that a social psychologist had disproven the laws of physics by showing some undergraduates some porn. When I raised this point to a social psychologist colleague, he shot back, “Maybe Pinker doesn’t understand the laws of physics!” But actual physicists, like Sean Carroll in his book The Big Picture, have explained why the laws of physics really do rule out precognition and other forms of ESP.

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (p. 160). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 

 

That is the reality of where we are with science--the laws of physics really do rule out spirits, revelation, and such. You don't have to accept what science says on the matter, but you are missing the point when you say "rational minds can disagree." The issue isn't whether rational minds disagree. The issue is whether there is a rational argument that Sean Carroll is wrong. So far, I haven't seen anybody engage his actual arguments on this specific point.

It's important to understand what Carroll is actually claiming. In his own words:

Quote

I’m not claiming that we know everything, or anywhere close to it. I’m claiming that we know some things, and that those things are enough to rule out some other things.

Carroll, Sean. The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself (p. 155). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 

So what's your rational basis for claiming that science doesn't know the specific things that Carroll says it knows? 

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

I think the real issues are A) the quality and quantity of the evidence, and B) the presuppositional lens each individual uses to view such evidence.

The historical reality of the Tower of Babel (in general rather than specific terms) is a question of fact.  Whether it actually happened or not is an unknown.  There is no way to definitively say it did or did not happen.  The evidence regarding it is scant.  But the same can be said for virtually all ancient events, so the conclusion one reaches is going to be much more about the presuppositional lens he uses to view that evidence.

I disagree. The problem with the story of the Tower of Babel is that almost all of the details of it are scientifically impossible. There wasn't a single language, and God didn't confound that language to prevent anybody from building a tower to heaven.

In all likelihood, sometime in the first or second millennium B.C., a Hebrew storyteller heard about the magnificent architecture in Babylon, so he made up a story about building a tower in Babylon that was integrated with the Mesopotamian stories about a global flood that they inherited. Others liked the story, so it was passed down. That's it. Speculations of real-world history that goes beyond that are simply fanciful.

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

Well, no.  I think you do others a disservice when you reserve pure motives for yourself ("I want to get to the truth of the matter") but impute impure motives onto them.

I didn't impute motives on anyone. I specifically said, "Our respective rights to choose our own goals is something that we can agree on."

If your goal is theoretical in nature--to simply figure out the truth of the matter, that's great! However, when your method to achieve that goal includes things like "revelation from God" that blatantly contradict the methods of rationality, it's proving my point about which one of us is even attempting to employ the normative tools of rationality and which one of us is abandoning those tools when they don't lead to the desired beliefs. 

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

If you can bring yourself to concede that people who have reached differing conclusions about Noah have also "want{ed} to get to the truth of the matter," then that's great.

Sure. But if their goal is wanting to get to the truth of the matter, but their methods rely upon things that rationality has thoroughly discredited, you can't say their beliefs are "rational," given what that word actually means. Maybe their beliefs are "based on revelation from God" and maybe they are even true, but they aren't rational.

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

My sense, though, is that you have not, and cannot, concede this.  For you, our motives are suspect. 

It's shocking how much you misunderstand me.

You want to get to the absolute truth of the matter. That is what you care about more than anything else. Great to hear.

But in the pursuit of this goal, you adulterate the normative rules of rationality and base your beliefs partially on "revelation from God." And you are offended that I claim "revelation from God" has been thoroughly discredited by the tools of rationality. You think I'm intolerably arrogant to claim I've learned that. Isn't that basically where we are at?

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

You are framing yourself as a truth-seeker, and those who have different perspectives from yours as not being truth-seekers.  This leaves you free to label yourself as honest and truth-seeking and rational, and people like me as . . . not these things, as having "a different goal" than these things.

My point isn't to judge you. You are really concerned with feeling respected and feeling that we are two "rational minds" that disagree about some unknowable things. My point is simply that science has proven to a surprisingly high degree of certainty that what people call "revelation from God" isn't authentic and isn't even plausible. You take it personally when I point that out, and respond with insults such as "scientism" and "sole arbitrator of the truth" rather than engaging with the science to which I refer.

You are free to do whatever you want. I'd kindly ask you to learn about the science.

Or not. It's your choice. I'm not here to disparage people who are less interested in science than I am. I'm just relaying to you what science has figured out. You can ignore it, learn about it, or be offended at me for knowing about it. Your choice. It's all good.

3 hours ago, smac97 said:

And many of the great questions about "truth" are moral, and therefore not really subject to empirical testing.

Surprisingly, that isn't true either. In the words of Pinker:

Quote

In fact, it is not hard to ground morality in reason. Hume may have been technically correct when he wrote that it’s not contrary to reason to prefer global genocide to a scratch on one’s pinkie. But his grounds were very, very narrow. As he noted, it is also not contrary to reason to prefer bad things happening to oneself over good things—say, pain, sickness, poverty, and loneliness over pleasure, health, prosperity, and good company. O-kay. But now let’s just say—irrationally, whimsically, mulishly, for no good reason—that we prefer good things to happen to ourselves over bad things. Let’s make a second wild and crazy assumption: that we are social animals who live with other people, rather than Robinson Crusoe on a desert island, so our well-being depends on what others do, like helping us when we are in need and not harming us for no good reason.

This changes everything. As soon as we start insisting to others, “You must not hurt me, or let me starve, or let my children drown,” we cannot also maintain, “But I can hurt you, and let you starve, and let your children drown,” and hope they will take us seriously. That is because as soon as I engage you in a rational discussion, I cannot insist that only my interests count just because I’m me and you’re not, any more than I can insist that the spot I am standing on is a special place in the universe because I happen to be standing on it. The pronouns I, me, and mine have no logical heft—they flip with each turn in a conversation. And so any argument that privileges my well-being over yours or his or hers, all else being equal, is irrational.

When you combine self-interest and sociality with impartiality—the interchangeability of perspectives—you get the core of morality. You get the Golden Rule, or the variants that take note of George Bernard Shaw’s advice “Do not do unto others as you would have others do unto you; they may have different tastes.” This sets up Rabbi Hillel’s version, “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.” (That is the whole Torah, he said when challenged to explain it while the listener stood on one leg; the rest is commentary.) Versions of these rules have been independently discovered in Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Baháí, and other religions and moral codes. These include Spinoza’s observation, “Those who are governed by reason desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of humankind.” And Kant’s Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” And John Rawls’s theory of justice: “The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance” (about the particulars of one’s life). For that matter the principle may be seen in the most fundamental statement of morality of all, the one we use to teach the concept to small children: “How would you like it if he did that to you?”

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (pp. 67-68). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 

[mfbukowski]

22 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Well, @mfbukowski is a Latter-day Saint too, and he thinks Richard Rorty's postmodern neopragmatism is indistinguishable from Mormon belief (but we can both agree that he is a bit out there). My point isn't and wasn't that you are postmodernism personified in every aspect of your life. Rather, it is that you seem to grab onto a few postmodern beliefs when doing so fits your aims. Specifically, the way you use the catchphrase "reasonable minds can disagree" seems designed to avoid engaging with arguments you know you'd lose, and is basically a postmodern attack on rationality that leaves us effectively in a perpetual state of epistemological relativism and obscurantism. You might not subscribe to postmodern thought generally, but you seem to want others to subscribe to postmodern values by politely pretending that your beliefs are just as valid as anybody else's.

You know nothing about my life, and  my beliefs. The Noah story can be seen as "true" from two different mutually exclusive points of view, held by one person

It could be seen as historical fact AND/OR a useful fable about God saving his people, simultaneously.

Wittgenstein makes this point with his rabbit/ duck illusion.

Both of these apparently opposed statements can be simultaneously true

"This is a picture of a duck"

"This is a picture of a rabbit"

Which is true?

This is about seeing "reality" differently.

We all do.

Edited December 3, 2021 by mfbukowski

[webbles]

22 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Pinker actually touches upon this in a slightly different context. When discussing the replicability crisis in psychological research and how proper Bayesian reasoning can help avoid such problems, he gives an example of a eminent psychologist who published a paper in a prestigious journal that claimed he'd demonstrated some students had ESP and could predict some images that were hidden behind a screen. Pinker said:

Quote

 

Not surprisingly, the effects failed to replicate, but that was a foregone conclusion given the infinitesimal prior probability that a social psychologist had disproven the laws of physics by showing some undergraduates some porn. When I raised this point to a social psychologist colleague, he shot back, “Maybe Pinker doesn’t understand the laws of physics!” But actual physicists, like Sean Carroll in his book The Big Picture, have explained why the laws of physics really do rule out precognition and other forms of ESP.

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (p. 160). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 

 

That is the reality of where we are with science--the laws of physics really do rule out spirits, revelation, and such. You don't have to accept what science says on the matter, but you are missing the point when you say "rational minds can disagree." The issue isn't whether rational minds disagree. The issue is whether there is a rational argument that Sean Carroll is wrong. So far, I haven't seen anybody engage his actual arguments on this specific point.

If Pinker has been able to truly rule out ESP, then why do scientists still study it?

[Analytics]

I would suggest that to the extent our biases and personal experiences cause our evaluation of the evidence to diverge, we are failing to achieve the ideal of rationality.

2 hours ago, bluebell said:

How so? 

We cannot step outside of our experiences; they are one of the main ways that we gather evidence which we use to discover truth.  It is impossible to directly observe the world as it is because we can't see it as it is-we see it as our brains interpret it through the filters our brains have developed.  

The normative tools of rationality are intended to compensate for these things. If two people are diverging on "the truth" because they are both failing to control their respective confirmation bias, then they are both failing at their objective of being rational.

We can't step outside our own experiences. But in principle we can observe more carefully. We can think about things more carefully. We can be more logical. The following quote seems applicable:

Quote

 

But for all the vulnerabilities of human reason, our picture of the future need not be a bot tweeting fake news forever. The arc of knowledge is a long one, and it bends toward rationality. We should not lose sight of how much rationality is out there. Few people in developed countries today believe in werewolves, animal sacrifice, bloodletting, miasmas, the divine right of leaders, or omens in eclipses and comets, though all were mainstream in centuries past. None of Trump’s thirty thousand falsehoods involved occult or paranormal forces, and each of these forces is rejected by a majority of Americans.61 Though a few scientific issues become religious or political bloody shirts, most do not: there are factions that distrust vaccines, but not antibiotics; climate change, but not coastal erosion.62 Despite their partisan biases, most people are pretty good at judging the veracity of headlines, and when they are presented with clear and trustworthy corrections of a false claim, they

Pinker, Steven. Rationality (pp. 309-310). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 

 

2 hours ago, bluebell said:

I've got nothing against Pinker or his tool chest, but it does make me ask, how can we know that the tools that Pinker things are most important, actually are most important? 

That's a really good question that can be rationally analyzed. Rationality's ability to interrogate itself is one of its strengths. If you like that question, you might like the book.

[mfbukowski]

5 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Specifically, the way you use the catchphrase "reasonable minds can disagree" seems designed to avoid engaging with arguments you know you'd lose,

CFR

Best wishes on proving that I would lose such arguments. Says who? Who is the judge?

After all, there is only one truth, right?

Also please show me using that phrase. I believe I have never used it.