Justifying Hallucinations as "Reality"

[mfbukowski]

6 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Thanks. I always worry in these discussions of either explaining too much and coming off as pedantic and patronizing or not explaining enough so people think you're just speaking mumbo jumbo no one can follow.

You know I love you but I'll take door number one.  More on the second P though than the first.

 

[mfbukowski]

9 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Not quite sure what you're saying here. The medieval debate between Scotus and his follower with Ockham and his followers over nominalism was the question of the reality of properties independent of minds. More or less it's getting at the point that for Ockham things like blue don't exist independent of me mentally associating blue things. So there are no properties of blueness independent of things that have properties. So to say that visions have no properties or substance is to say they are fictions with no connection to real world events outside of the mind. 

Relative to our discussion though the event of a vision has to include not just the mental phenomena of the vision but it's causal history. So the debate really is over the cause of the vision and what it represents.

As I said there's a certain kind of correspondence but it's the correspondence of object to interpretant in a sign and not the correspondence of internal representation to external reality. So it's significantly different from Descartes'. 

Epistemologically it's different too since the issue isn't correspondence in mind between representation and reality but inquiry and reality imposing stability on beliefs. I'm not sure I'd call this old fashioned since effectively it's the same as Derrida's epistemology - again I'd point to the interview at the end of Limited Inc there. (Page 150 is the key passage) Effectively I'd say Peirce's conception is more Nietzschean and is the selection by greater powers. Derrida makes a big deal of that relative to his own views while denying the common relativist or nihilist interpretation of his views on matters like truth, reference, or so forth. So I'd argue he was ahead of his time and more radical than even Nietzsche.

I'd distinguish between what I'd call the Idea in the Kantian sense (which I actually don't buy) and the things represented. Put an other way, even Kantians make a distinction between space and time as the synthetic a priori that enables thought and the structures within the universe described by physics. They might say space/time as substance in itself is the ultimate reference and unknowable. But they'd still make a distinction between the two.

An obvious argument against equating the two is that the Kantian categories are different from the non-euclidean conception of space time that physicists hold.

That's helpful. I'm not sure such things are ultimately necessary for our discussion, but I'll avoid critiquing along those lines.

I should note that Peirce starts with Kant but rejects the notion of the in-itself and then turns the categories into his trichotomy or logic. So there's only three irreducible categories that structure everything. So I don't think Peirce misses this but rather it's key to his philosophy. And phenomenology is very important in his thought. But I'll avoid the history unless anyone else wants to hear it. <grin>

Perhaps you did not read my post?

My first comment was my interpretation of what Peirce said in his quote and did not require anything about medieval philosophy.  I really didn't ask anything about Ockham that I can see.

Quote

Relative to our discussion though the event of a vision has to include not just the mental phenomena of the vision but it's causal history. So the debate really is over the cause of the vision and what it represents.

In light of Hume, how does anyone define "causal history"?

So then it appears- 18 pages later- that visions do not have causal histories for Peirce and therefore they are not "real"?  I was trying to give him a break by making them at least "events" and therefore "factual" in some sense.

Ah yes thanks- I forgot about the Derrida.

Notice the Kant reference in my post was about a paragraph DESCRIBING Kant's objective and was not about Kant's philosophy directly- just what he was trying to accomplish.

I said that that DESCRIPTION pretty much summarizes my actual personal position.  So the Kant discourse was not necessary either.

The "Germanic view" is necessary to the discussion because I think it is a good explanation of how God's consciousness works.  I find that very relevant.

I also (obviously I think) reject the "thing in itself".

I do not believe categories structure anything but we structure categories as part of how our mind works.  That is the "Germanic view"  Do you really want references or a list of philosophers who essentially said that?

I know you are trying to teach the two or three people who will actually get this far in the thread all about every nuance in the history of philosophy but you seem to be ignoring the point of the thread while doing so.  Perhaps you could start a thread on the history of philosophy so you could teach a course in it?

Edit- On the other hand, thanks for the Derrida paper!!

 

 

Edited April 27, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

You know I love you but I'll take door number one.  More on the second P though than the first.

Sorry, really wasn't my intention. Like I said a difficult balancing act.

To your other points, Peirce's points about realism really are the medieval debate. It's very hard to understand Peirce's position without understanding his fixation on nominalism. That's why I brought it up. 

Regarding causality, because Peirce changes this to semiotics with causality being one manifestation this isn't that big a problem. I'd say for Hume the real issue is induction and that the problem of causation comes out of that. Peirce's solution to this is the combination of the three logics: abduction, induction and deduction. Even though abduction wasn't formalized in Hume's time all indications are he'd have hated it despite it's role in science. 

Regarding visions, Peirce doesn't have evidence for them so he disbelieves. i.e. he never had a vision he thought could correlate to much.

The "Kant discourse" was in reference to you seeing Peirce as old stuff. My point was that while Peirce's views largely are a modification of Kant, they are in many ways important modifications that anticipates much of late 20th century philosophy. Derrida was just one example of that. Quine might be an other.

I confess I'm not sure of your point on the structure bit. My point was just about how Peirce did something new and novel.

Edited April 27, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

Sorry, really wasn't my intention. Like I said a difficult balancing act.

To your other points, Peirce's points about realism really are the medieval debate. It's very hard to understand Peirce's position without understanding his fixation on nominalism. That's why I brought it up. 

Regarding causality, because Peirce changes this to semiotics with causality being one manifestation this isn't that big a problem. I'd say for Hume the real issue is induction and that the problem of causation comes out of that. Peirce's solution to this is the combination of the three logics: abduction, induction and deduction. Even though abduction wasn't formalized in Hume's time all indications are he'd have hated it despite it's role in science. 

Regarding visions, Peirce doesn't have evidence for them so he disbelieves. i.e. he never had a vision he thought could correlate to much.

The "Kant discourse" was in reference to you seeing Peirce as old stuff. My point was that while Peirce's views largely are a modification of Kant, they are in many ways important modifications that anticipates much of late 20th century philosophy. Derrida was just one example of that. Quine might be an other.

I confess I'm not sure of your point on the structure bit. My point was just about how Peirce did something new and novel.

DUDE!  Ya done it!

Peirce does not have evidence for visions so he disbelieves.

I am not sure how any Mormon can use that epistemology

Thanks- now I get it!  I gotta check out the three logics more but you put me on track so I am happy!

Maybe this will help the structure part- the writer here is one of my favorite Profs, Robert Solomon, yet another atheist who didn't realize he was teaching me about God

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_C._Solomon

Here he is talking about Kants synthetic a priori, but look more at the PROCESS going on of a human mind structuring reality- again- the process, not whether or not the theory works but the process.

Here he speaks about "things" but I would make it about qualia-  how the mind structures a thing called a house out of qualia.  To me, this is the idea we have of our intelligence organizing things out of "matter unorganized".  Step 1 is organizing the chaos of, say, photons hitting our eyes and making that "qualia" (raw feels or a raw pre-linguistic experience) then organizing the qualia -  the "set of experiences" here- into a "house".

Edited April 27, 2017 by mfbukowski

[Calm]

"DUDE!  Ya done it!"

[clarkgoble]

8 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Peirce does not have evidence for visions so he disbelieves.

I am not sure how any Mormon can use that epistemology

Because the individual Mormon has evidence. So I don't see how that affects his epistemology since the contexts are different. BTW - I've said the above several times through this thread.

For Solomon, I have several of his Hegel oriented books. I'd say that this is a place where Hegel and Peirce are quite similar in ways. But I'll skip the explanation of how.

Edited April 27, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

25 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Because the individual Mormon has evidence. So I don't see how that affects his epistemology since the contexts are different. BTW - I've said the above several times through this thread.

For Solomon, I have several of his Hegel oriented books. I'd say that this is a place where Hegel and Peirce are quite similar in ways. But I'll skip the explanation of how.

Yes I know how.

Yes, you have said that, but would Peirce say the Mormon had evidence? 

Of course I know that's not relevant to your personal belief but I'm just curious but Peirce. 

[clarkgoble]

45 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Yes, you have said that, but would Peirce say the Mormon had evidence? 

If it's private evidence he wouldn't be able to know if they did. Contra James he didn't think false states such as drug induced visions were legitimate. 

Peirce is critical of Hume in this area of divine intervention, thinking he just added the bit about miracles to be popular.  Peirce speaking of miracles said,

"For my part, I do not see how we can ascertain a priori whether miracles (be they violations of the laws of nature or not) and special providences take place or not. In so far Hume is entirely in the right. It is simply a question of evidence. His argument has a certain weight. If there are no miracles nowadays, there is a strong presumption against those which took place amidst a rabble of Galileans. But are there no miracles nowadays? I do not feel so sure of it. There is Mrs. Piper and Perry. I do not think it rational not [to] think, for us who know Perry, that that case is of tremendous, almost conclusive, weight. There is the blood of St. Januarius which Sir Humphrey Davy—of his own motion, and not forced into it at all—undertook to investigate and was given every facility he could think of, and who declared he could not find the least symptom of fraud about the thing. Take such men as Sir William Crookes and Lord Rayleigh—well even Hodgson—one must confess the case is very strong; so strong that but for one circumstance I should unhesitatingly accept it. That circumstance is that every surprising discovery of science—as for example when Becquerel found those photographic plates which he had put away in a drawer to be affected by the uranium salt that was wrapped up in black paper and accidentally laid upon them—every such event, is soon followed by others closely connected with it, so that all possible doubt is swept away together with all surprise at the occurrence. Miracles, on the contrary, are always sui generis. The only ones that were not so, the falling of stones out of the heavens, lost all their prestige when it was found how common the occurrence was. The isolatedness of the miracle is really no argument against its reality. It is nearly the same with works of great genius. You have Rafael and Michelangelo together, and then for a long time nothing surprising. Dante stands all alone. Byron was unparalleled before or since; for A. de Musset is surely not to be compared with him. Indeed every branch of art and science can furnish such examples. The isolation, then, is no argument against miracles, but it effectively prevents our ever having sufficient evidence of them. I must confess that the gospel miracles appear at this date very far from impressive. It is curious that Origen, no further from Jesus in history than we from the expulsion of James II from England, should have found them so difficult to believe."

The argument is basically that to know a miracle (including visions) is a miracle requires a repetitive nature otherwise chance is a possible explanation. While he isn't sure if there are miracles, it's the lack of encountering repetitive phenomena that is the problem. By his logic if you had repetitive intervention then you could know.

Edited April 27, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

If it's private evidence he wouldn't be able to know if they did. Contra James he didn't think false states such as drug induced visions were legitimate. 

Peirce is critical of Hume in this area of divine intervention, thinking he just added the bit about miracles to be popular.  Peirce speaking of miracles said,

"For my part, I do not see how we can ascertain a priori whether miracles (be they violations of the laws of nature or not) and special providences take place or not. In so far Hume is entirely in the right. It is simply a question of evidence. His argument has a certain weight. If there are no miracles nowadays, there is a strong presumption against those which took place amidst a rabble of Galileans. But are there no miracles nowadays? I do not feel so sure of it. There is Mrs. Piper and Perry. I do not think it rational not [to] think, for us who know Perry, that that case is of tremendous, almost conclusive, weight. There is the blood of St. Januarius which Sir Humphrey Davy—of his own motion, and not forced into it at all—undertook to investigate and was given every facility he could think of, and who declared he could not find the least symptom of fraud about the thing. Take such men as Sir William Crookes and Lord Rayleigh—well even Hodgson—one must confess the case is very strong; so strong that but for one circumstance I should unhesitatingly accept it. That circumstance is that every surprising discovery of science—as for example when Becquerel found those photographic plates which he had put away in a drawer to be affected by the uranium salt that was wrapped up in black paper and accidentally laid upon them—every such event, is soon followed by others closely connected with it, so that all possible doubt is swept away together with all surprise at the occurrence. Miracles, on the contrary, are always sui generis. The only ones that were not so, the falling of stones out of the heavens, lost all their prestige when it was found how common the occurrence was. The isolatedness of the miracle is really no argument against its reality. It is nearly the same with works of great genius. You have Rafael and Michelangelo together, and then for a long time nothing surprising. Dante stands all alone. Byron was unparalleled before or since; for A. de Musset is surely not to be compared with him. Indeed every branch of art and science can furnish such examples. The isolation, then, is no argument against miracles, but it effectively prevents our ever having sufficient evidence of them. I must confess that the gospel miracles appear at this date very far from impressive. It is curious that Origen, no further from Jesus in history than we from the expulsion of James II from England, should have found them so difficult to believe."

The argument is basically that to know a miracle (including visions) is a miracle requires a repetitive nature otherwise chance is a possible explanation. While he isn't sure if there are miracles, it's the lack of encountering repetitive phenomena that is the problem. By his logic if you had repetitive intervention then you could know.

Thanks for the link-  that helped a lot

OK good- glad we finally got somewhere from my perspective.   Thanks for being the nail for my hammer.  

It was worth the journey

The reason I like James and Dewey and Rorty of course is that their view accommodates these kinds of beliefs better but I also understand why you like Peirce and I think Peirce would be easier to teach to those raised with Cartesianism because he still has a way to know a "world out there" that signs point to.

But for me, my brand of anti-realism is just already there with no need to tweak definitions of "evidence"- so I see strengths in both sides.  To understand my way, you have to be schooled in a new way of seeing- though ultimately I think once you see it- you are just THERE.  Some on this board totally get it though they had never heard of such things before.

On the other hand for others I can see how Peirce would work better.  And I see the relevance for Peirce in other areas as well where Dewey and the boys don't work- where Peirce's logic is stronger for those purposes.

But it's still all the pragmatic maxim in one form or other.   I kinda like all my maxims to be weak though.  It's a little hard to get words to work perfectly in all situations.

 

Edited April 27, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

Well again I'd quibble over the term Cartesian applied to Peirce (or myself) as I just don't think it applies. It's an externalist ontology so there is no "world out there." There's just the universe. But again I'll avoid being mistook for pendantry and being patronizing.

How much closer Dewey is to Peirce or the Rorty might be an other debate. But probably not one I'm expert enough to conduct. One of several books I have that argues for a more Peircean reading of Dewey is Hildebrand's Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism. I can't recall if I've brought it up here before. But it's one of my "must read" books on pragmatism I recommend. He engages vigorously with Putnam and Rorty, and I'll fully confess it's very influential in how I read Rorty.

What I think Peirce (and this Peircean-like reading of Dewey) offer most is a good explanation of the goals and activities of the physical sciences. 

Edited April 27, 2017 by clarkgoble

[Ahab]

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

But for me, my brand of anti-realism is just already there with no need to tweak definitions of "evidence"- so I see strengths in both sides.

To understand my way, you have to be schooled in a new way of seeing- though ultimately I think once you see it- you are just THERE.  Some on this board totally get it though they had never heard of such things before.  

I wonder if there are other ways of learning about things, other than the 2 ways you seem to recognize now.

Paul in Hebrews 11:1 says faith is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen", and then goes on to correlate various personal testimonies of people who had learned by faith of what they had not seen and were not made of things which do appear.

Do you see all of this being in harmony somehow with our ability to learn about things, whether they are "out there" or "in here" or wherever they are, including not only what we can see but what we can not see, sometimes, as well?

[clarkgoble]

22 minutes ago, Ahab said:

Paul in Hebrews 11:1 says faith is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen", and then goes on to correlate various personal testimonies of people who had learned by faith of what they had not seen and were not made of things which do appear.

It's hard to read Hebrews 11 without thinking of Alma 32. However I think the way both Alma and Paul are using the word faith is different than how most people use it. The typical use is "belief without evidence." i.e. wishful thinking. Paul, as I read him, is talking about obedience to God's word even when we don't know the end. As I mentioned in my discussion of Alma 32 at Times and Seasons part of this is tied to things being incomplete and only fully showing themselves in the future. Thus faith isn't intellectual assent to belief without evidence. Rather its treating things, like God's word, as how they show themselves to be assuming they will continue to truly show themselves as that in the future. It's inherently about action more than intellectual belief. 

We learn, but the way we learn is through how these things show themselves in our experiences as we engage with them. But fundamentally what it is about is acting in trust.

So when we talk of learning by faith, I think we have to be clear what we mean by that. The unseen things we come to know still are known by experience in this view. God's word, as N. T. Wright points out, isn't limited to a set of theological propositions "but as a strange personal presence, creating, judging, healing recreating..." (Scripture and the Authority of God) In LDS terms we'd call this the divine presence we have by the gift of the Holy Ghost.

Edited April 27, 2017 by clarkgoble

[Ahab]

1 minute ago, clarkgoble said:

It's hard to read Hebrews 11 without think of Alma 32. However I think the way both Alma and Paul are using the word faith is different than how most people use it. The typical use is "belief without evidence." i.e. wishful thinking. Paul, as I read him, is talking about obedience to God's word even when we don't know the end. As I mentioned in my discussion of Alma 32 at Times and Seasons part of this is tied to things being incomplete and only fully showing themselves in the future. Thus faith isn't intellectual assent to belief without evidence. Rather its treating things, like God's word, as how they show themselves to be assuming they will continue to truly show themselves as that in the future. It's inherently about action more than intellectual belief. 

We learn, but the way we learn is through how these things show themselves in our experiences as we engage with them. But fundamentally what it is about is acting in trust.

Not quite how I understand Paul and Alma, or what faith is all about.

Joseph Smith substituted the word assurance for Paul's use of the word evidence and I agree that is a better word for what we actually get when we receive faith from God, which is what Paul was talking about. When we aren't sure about something we can go to God for his counsel and guidance and what we get is usually God's assurance that something is true, or applicable, or what he approves of, etc.  We can also receive assurances from other people, or assure ourselves of some things too, and those assurances aren't necessarily in harmony with what God would assure us of, but Paul and Alma were not talking about those types of assurances.

[clarkgoble]

"Faith comes by hearing the word of God through the testimony of the Servants of God, that Testimony is always attended by the Spirit of prophecy & Revelation." (Joseph Smith, June 27, 1839) It's that essential connection with the divine presence and the related gifts that I think Wright was speaking of. 

[Ahab]

10 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

"Faith comes by hearing the word of God through the testimony of the Servants of God, that Testimony is always attended by the Spirit of prophecy & Revelation." (Joseph Smith, June 27, 1839) It's that essential connection with the divine presence and the related gifts that I think Wright was speaking of. 

Wright? Did you mean Joseph?

[clarkgoble]

10 minutes ago, Ahab said:

Wright? Did you mean Joseph?

No, I was referring to the N. T. Wright quote I gave which was part of his discussion of faith in Hebrews 11. To my eyes Joseph held pretty much the same view. Faith gives us assurance due to the revelatory component. Further our assurance grows because of how the thing we have faith in shows itself.

So following that example from Yoram Hazony I quoted over at T&S, a true road shows itself to be true as we walk along it and see it seems to be going as expected. That gives us assurance. In this sense faith in God always has this connection to the spirit, to God's presence, and to God showing himself to be the type of person he represents himself as.

When faith gets treated as intellectual assent all those elements of trust as a kind of action get missed. Further it then leads to horrible misunderstandings such as the eternal faith vs. works debate. That debate only makes sense if faith is taken as mere intellectual or worse verbal assent. If faith is inherently and irreducibly tied to action then there is no conflict.

Edited April 27, 2017 by clarkgoble

[Ahab]

3 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

No, I was referring to the N. T. Wright quote I gave which was part of his discussion of faith in Hebrews 11. To my eyes Joseph held pretty much the same view.

Hmm. Okay I don't know about the Wright part but I feel God's assurance that the statement is true.

[mfbukowski]

10 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Well again I'd quibble over the term Cartesian applied to Peirce (or myself) as I just don't think it applies. It's an externalist ontology so there is no "world out there." There's just the universe. But again I'll avoid being mistook for pendantry and being patronizing.

How much closer Dewey is to Peirce or the Rorty might be an other debate. But probably not one I'm expert enough to conduct. One of several books I have that argues for a more Peircean reading of Dewey is Hildebrand's Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism. I can't recall if I've brought it up here before. But it's one of my "must read" books on pragmatism I recommend. He engages vigorously with Putnam and Rorty, and I'll fully confess it's very influential in how I read Rorty.

What I think Peirce (and this Peircean-like reading of Dewey) offer most is a good explanation of the goals and activities of the physical sciences. 

Of course I never said either you or Peirce were Cartesians.  Again one of those things that get blown up over three posts without going back to see what was really said.  I said Peirce would be easier to teach to Cartesians and that might be why you like it.  

I don't worry much about who is closer to which philosopher.  I also prefer to read what philosophers have written rather than read about them.  But I will look it up, thanks.

And yes I am sure that Peirce would be very good at explaining the goals of science.  He sees things as a scientist would- that seems pretty clear.

I think that is why Cartesians would like him

[USU78]

On 4/7/2017 at 7:29 PM, Robert F. Smith said:

We can only accept the purely subjective experiences we have and hope for the best -- including our subjective experiences with the sacred, hoping that we are not victims of hallucinations.

Sounds kinda like faith, don't it?

[mfbukowski]

10 hours ago, USU78 said:

Sounds kinda like faith, don't it?

Like planning to go to Harvard Law when you are in high school- substance of things hoped for but not seen (yet)

These atheists make huge personal decisions based on faith and emotions every day of their lives.  Make an investment?  No difference!

Weigh it out in your mind and see how it feels, but then you have to jump to make anything happen.  NO difference with what we do in acting on testimony.   All this stuff about "evidence" ultimately boils down to a gut decision that feels good after all the alleged (but always prejudiced) "evidence" is in.  Roll the dice and it works for you or it doesn't.

 

[mfbukowski]

On 4/7/2017 at 6:29 PM, Robert F. Smith said:

We are first and foremost prisoners of our senses (sight, smell, taste, touch, hearing, etc.), which do not give us immediate access to reality, but only a version or interpretation of reality.  Second, we are prisoners of our language, which has only a limited capacity to describe what our senses tell us -- all of it subjective, and a method of symbolizing what our socio-cultural upbringing has ingrained in us.  We try to represent reality as best we can, and we are often frustrated that we cannot get full agreement from other humans as to what reality really is.  We are in Plato's Cave, seeing only shadows on the wall, unable to access the really real.  Or by St Paul's description we see only through a glass darkly -- at least in this life.

It is a dilemma, but that is part of our human condition.  We can only accept the purely subjective experiences we have and hope for the best -- including our subjective experiences with the sacred, hoping that we are not victims of hallucinations.

The problem with even Plato was that he still thought this analogy was "the way it really is"- it was an intellectual model of "the way things are"  There ARE images OF SOMETHING.

But the bottom line is that we cannot even really know THAT with certainty.

So we bracket any questions about all that and deal with what presents itself in human experience which Plato would see as "shadows", and others think the shadows are "signs" pointing to something else

This is the extremely fine line the anti-realist walks.  Move an inch to one side in explaining this and you are a Platonist- and many times I sound like one here.  Move an inch to the other side and you are a relativist and many times I sound like one here

Seeing all phenomena as just that is virtually impossible to describe because once you enter language immediately the "signs" start buzzing around like mosquitoes because every word has been interpreted in Cartesian Dualism for so long.  They seem to point to "things" that are just as elusive as their images are.

Perhaps we now understand these ideas now better because of things like internet "phishing".  Respond to an ad for a widget or respond to a friend in trouble and you might be sending thousands of dollars to Nigeria.  If a news story appears, it has to correspond perfectly to "what really happened"- right?

Like never before this epistemological problem of what is "real" and how we determine what is "real" is more relevant than ever- at least as an analogy for the epistemology here.

Go to your bank site to check your balance- is it really your bank site?

And yet we act on faith daily that things are as they seem, and we mitigate our actions accordingly.  We were cleaning out some of my deceased mother's papers the other day and we noticed that her social security number appears routinely on bank statements, bills, all over the place.  How times have changed!

The line in my siggy that I always refer to is the best formulation in words I have seen so far, but people do not understand that either.  "Seeing through a mirror darkly" is also one for the ages.  But a mirror reflects SOMETHING and even that takes it too far.

What you see in a mirror is still an image created within your mind, but you better not try to walk through it, or you could get cut to pieces.  So even SAYING that what you "see in a mirror darkly is an illusion" doesn't work well if you decide to ignore the illusion, you will soon find a true slice of reality by getting sliced yourself if you try it.

So as a good definition for "things as they are" even the "through a glass darkly" doesn't make it.

So for me the best way out if it is through Wittgenstein.

Only fools try to say what cannot be said.  Just know that illusions, for all we know, are as real as anything.  Try to shake the hand of the person who might be a mirror, and if you feel something hard and cold and smooth, it's time to move on until you find what feels right.

Yes that is an experimental process- no argument there. 

But still Peirce would not accept what we would call "spiritual evidence" as evidence in his schema

That great Pragmatist Alma, on the other hand not only finds it to be "evidence" but the "seed becoming sweet" is ALL the evidence required.

Big difference!

[mfbukowski]

On 4/27/2017 at 3:00 PM, clarkgoble said:

It's hard to read Hebrews 11 without thinking of Alma 32. However I think the way both Alma and Paul are using the word faith is different than how most people use it. The typical use is "belief without evidence." i.e. wishful thinking. Paul, as I read him, is talking about obedience to God's word even when we don't know the end. As I mentioned in my discussion of Alma 32 at Times and Seasons part of this is tied to things being incomplete and only fully showing themselves in the future. Thus faith isn't intellectual assent to belief without evidence. Rather its treating things, like God's word, as how they show themselves to be assuming they will continue to truly show themselves as that in the future. It's inherently about action more than intellectual belief. 

We learn, but the way we learn is through how these things show themselves in our experiences as we engage with them. But fundamentally what it is about is acting in trust.

So when we talk of learning by faith, I think we have to be clear what we mean by that. The unseen things we come to know still are known by experience in this view. God's word, as N. T. Wright points out, isn't limited to a set of theological propositions "but as a strange personal presence, creating, judging, healing recreating..." (Scripture and the Authority of God) In LDS terms we'd call this the divine presence we have by the gift of the Holy Ghost.

And see frankly this is where I think you have problems with using Peirce as some kind of model for LDS theology- IF you are doing that- hard to tell

For Peirce, at least as I understand your explanation OF Peirce, the Holy Ghost does not count as "evidence" yet YOU count it as "evidence"

The problem is that I don't understand your philosophical justification for using Peirce as a model for truth and epistemology.

Of course you may have your own tweak to Peirce as I tweak Rorty to create a cohesive view, and if you have it, I would like to see it.

I mean between James, Dewey and Rorty, I have a lot of ways to justify visions epistemologically but I am not seeing that at all in Peirce.  He himself you say, would not see visions as "evidence" if I got that right.

But maybe as usual I am being a bit myopic in looking for my nail.

 

Edited April 29, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

And see frankly this is where I think you have problems with using Peirce as some kind of model for LDS theology- IF you are doing that- hard to tell

For Peirce, at least as I understand your explanation OF Peirce, the Holy Ghost does not count as "evidence" yet YOU count it as "evidence"

Peirce doesn't have any evidence of the Holy Ghost. As I've said repeatedly for those with those experiences it works fine in a Peircean model. You are conflating the evidence Peirce personally had with how his epistemology deals with evidence. Peirce also didn't have evidence for black holes. That doesn't imply black holes are a problem for his epistemology.

Peirce distinguishes the inner or private from the general world simply by the existence of error. "Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ego of pure apperception." (CP 5.235) It is from that distinction that we create the idea of a self. 

But really your point only works if for something to count as evidence it must count as evidence for all. But of course that is easily falsified by merely pointing to things I know which no one else does. Peirce is completely fine with private understanding. (See for instance CP 6.307 which I can quote if necessary) 

Quote

The problem is that I don't understand your philosophical justification for using Peirce as a model for truth and epistemology

1. In experience I find belief is non volitional. (I can't make myself believe the sky is red and not blue by force of will)

2. That which I can not doubt I must treat practically as true.

3. Reality acts on me and changes my beliefs. (It is the blue sky acting on me that makes me believe it is blue)

4. Over time reality thus makes me disbelieve false beliefs and believe true beliefs if I inquire rigorously regarding the objects in question.

5. Knowledge can't entail infallibility since I am often wrong even on things I think I know.

6. The key question of knowledge thus isn't justification as in a math proof but why beliefs change or remain stable.

7. Stable beliefs that persist through continued rigorous inquiry I must treat as knowledge yet simultaneously acknowledge might be wrong.

Put simply knowledge is the selection by greater forces.

"Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion." (CP 5.407).

The dispute in religious knowledge is really a dispute over whether private or semi-private experiences happened. To merely point to someone without an experience says nothing about those who have the experience. To the degree that a class of experiences is real then many who inquire will have those experiences and be led to the same conclusions. Given enough time either a sufficient people will have those experiences or else people will discover the experiences didn't happen. All that depends upon repetition of the general form of the experience.

Edited April 29, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

21 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

"Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion." (CP 5.407).

You were quoting Peirce here of course.

So if Mormonism is true, why do so many dispute that?

How can this approach show Mormonism to be "true"?  I suppose the force outside themselves would be the Holy Ghost- on the classic view and they are just not seeing reality and are deluded if they are not Mormon?  Is that your position?

Somone else please jump in here and whap me upside the head if I am just being dense which is a distinct possibility.

Edited April 29, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

8 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

I was doing well with this until I came across the idea that people could discover that an experience "didn't happen"

I have no clue what this means, please expand.  Or maybe my asking this didn't happen.  

Didn't happen the way I believed they happened. So I'm talking not just the experience but how the experience is represented and it's connection to the other things.

An other way to put it is that there's internal inconsistency in the experience. So if I see something as a person that's a legitimate experience but if what was seen in the experience was an old log that looked like a person then how the log presents itself in the experience isn't accurate. All depends upon whether you use a more internalist language or externalist language.

Edited April 29, 2017 by clarkgoble