mfbukowski Posted September 24, 2022 Posted September 24, 2022 (edited) 14 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: I think we do have wisdom literature of a sorts - but its not really a modern genre, just as anciently, there wasn't much in the way of the novel. In particular, our hymns are a part of that literature. However, we don't have Wisdom literature as a genre in our modern scriptures or as part of our conference talks. This isn't to say that people can't read some of our scriptural texts as Wisdom literature (just as anyone could read Cinderella as biography). So yes, this is part of that reason. 14 hours ago, mfbukowski said: If we all did that,the need for apologetics would disappear. We could pick and choose what we want to pick as literal. We would appear as reasonable folks to the rest of the world and get converts. Nah. It makes too much sense. Gotta stick with a 6 day creation, no evolution and a literal flood. Or some would swear up and down that those make a difference [Sarcasm? Hmm...] 13 hours ago, SeekingUnderstanding said: It was a valiant effort. Too hard for some of us. OK thanks for bringing that up. There I go being cryptic again. Wikipedia says THIS is "wisdom literature" Quote Wisdom literature is a genre of literature common in the ancient Near East. It consists of statements by sages and the wise that offer teachings about divinity and virtue. Although this genre uses techniques of traditional oral storytelling, it was disseminated in written form. Wikipedia This type of literature usually does not contain heavy doctrine, but is about wise sayings, anecdotes etc really acceptable to pretty much all cultures. It's storytelling. Perhaps like the prodigal son- good advice, good examples, but not meant to be particularly doctrinal. The books of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Job, etc But as Ben suggests, we really do not have much of this genre in modern revelation. I suggested that that might be a good thing, that seeing scripture as philosophical primarily and history secondarily might eliminate the need for arguing about things like the origins of the plates- ie: in my opinion we should be concentrating more on the spiritual content of the scritptures rather than on their history. If we did that, then all the alleged need for these endless discussions about "truth" of scriptures without ever actually talking about what it means for scripture to be "TRUE" in the first place would disappear. The presumption seems to think that scripture can only be "true" if it has a historic base, but I look at it as if it is "true" if it develops a fruitful belief which is "sweet" to us, as it says in Alma. It SHOULD be about good advice, moral behavior and how to progress in Godliness, not about the chemical composition of some allegedly golden plates. I was being sarcastic in suggesting that it might be better to go back to fundamentalist stories which would PERHAPS force us to see the poetry instead of coming up with half "truths", seeing scriptures AS IF it is wisdom literature- irrelevant if it is "fiction" or "non fiction" but simply a paradigm believed to be best - because it is the Plan of Happiness and justifiable by both philosophy AND Alma 32. It is as true as science- science also provides useful paradigms that improve our lives- just in a different context. So was it serious or sarcasm? I was truly not sure myself. Anyway I am going to do a thread here in a couple of days about how I see this, written in a style for folks with no philosophy brainwashing, uh, training. Did this help a tiny bit? I can see how totally unintelligible I can be- thanks! After all this time I speak jargon instead of normal English Better? A little? Edited September 24, 2022 by mfbukowski Changed "intelligible" to "unintelligible" typo 1
smac97 Posted September 25, 2022 Posted September 25, 2022 (edited) On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: I don't think I am misreading you. You have repeatedly misstated my position, and attributed to me things I have neither said nor believe. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: I am simply stating what should be obvious. You are stating your opinion, which is fine. Whether it "should be obvious," however... On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: The 'evidences' you reference allow for the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon. They establish that it could happen. Yes. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: But they don't really provide any evidence that it did happen. Evidences ("they") do not "really provide any evidence?" On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: By the same token, the critic who spends time looking for parallels and ideas found in the Book of Mormon in sources contemporary with Joseph Smith would - under your model of understanding - be presenting evidence of the modern fabrication of the text. It has been a while since I have read Hamblin's comments about parallels (here and here), including his assessment of Nibley's approach. I have also briefly reviewed Brant Gardner's comments (here). And, of course, your 2013 contributions. Your "cautions and criticisms" certainly merit attention. That said, whether such contrary evidences, arguments, etc. are meritorious, whether they have probative weight, is something to be examined. You seem to be implying that there is (or will be) some sort of symmetry resulting from these two disparate efforts ("looking for parallels and ides" that tend to make ancient origins A) more probable (my assessment) or B) less probable (the assessment of "the critic")). Is that a fair statement of your position? If so, the problem with that postulation is that I simply don't think any such symmetry is in view. This is a point that Daniel Peterson has made quite a few times. And on this board, Ryan Dahle (see, e.g., here). I have read quite a bit of materials from FAIR, FARMS, Interpreter, Book of Mormon Central, and from various scholars and writers who have weighed in on various aspects of the Book of Mormon as an ancient text (Sorenson, Hamblin, Welch, Skousen, Tvedtnes, Peterson, Anderson, Oaks, Jackson, Brown, Lindsay, Roper, Gardner, Midgley, Aston, and so on). I have considered their arguments and their assessments of various types of evidence and have found them to be, in the main, quite good. What I have not found, however, is a corollary and symmetrical compilation of materials from "critics" who are presenting evidence-based arguments against the Book of Mormon as an ancient text. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: And I would argue in the same way that it merely argues that there could be a way for such a text to be produced - but it doesn't make an effective argument that this was the way that the Book of Mormon was produced. Perhaps that helps explain it better. Not really. "It doesn't make an effective argument" is not an argument, it is a conclusory assertion. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: For me, this is the underlying concern. I am always reminded a bit in discussions like this of something written by Larry Hurtado in his book Lord Jesus Christ. There he discusses how what he terms the "pre/anticritical and the history-of-religion approaches" to religious history. In a way I see that here. By claiming that these kinds of secondary evidences amount to something significant in establishing the truth of the narratives of the Book of Mormon, you also have to allow that other kinds of secondary evidences amount to something significant in establishing the claims that the Book of Mormon as a modern fraud. I have no problem with allowing for this possibility. There is certainly evidence and argument against the Book of Mormon being an ancient text. But I don't think it is symmetrical to what the Latter-day Saints have put out. Moreover, it seems like the critics are hardly even trying anymore, and are instead taking an approach that summarily dismisses and sidesteps, rather than engages, the arguments supporting the Book of Mormon as an ancient text. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Both sides using the same principles but on opposite sides of the debate - and both making claims that I don't believe can be effectively demonstrated. I don't see much commonality in the "principles" used by the critics. As for whether an argued position has been "effectively demonstrated," that brings us back to the point I raised previously about presuppositions. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: This is the issue I have. In a similar way, people have used Bayes' theorem to prove 'conclusively' that God exists and that God doesn't exist. But I am not doing that. Nor is Peterson, or Welch, or Hamblin, or Elder Maxwell, or Elder Holland, nor anyone else. Nobody is claiming that ancillary evidences about the ancient origins of the "prove" the origins of the Book of Mormon, "conclusively" or otherwise. Rather, these folks are submitting reasoned and evidence-based argument on a given topic (such as NHM) that lend credence, lend "plausibility," to the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon. No claimed "smoking gun." Rather, aggregated evidences that have a tendency to make the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon more probable, more "plausible," than they would be without the evidences. Reaching a conclusion about a disputed point is rarely going to have a single piece of conclusive "proof." Hence Pres. Oaks' observation about "so-called proofs" on the one side and "material of a comparable nature to defend" on the other. Hence Elder Maxwell's comments about a "convergence of discoveries" and the coming forth of "plausible evidence{s}." Hence his encouragement that we "be articulate for while our defense of the kingdom" because "the absence of thoughtful response may cause fledglings among the faithful to falter." On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Both sides believe that the principle of Bayes' theorem can provide evidence for this conclusion. It is the shared assumption that is flawed (leading to bad conclusions). I see this a lot in Mormon apologetic and in anti-Mormon polemic. With respect, I don't think so. I think apologetic approaches are less Bayesian, and are instead substantially more akin to a lawyer accumulating and presenting evidence in a trial. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote I acknowledge that. But "all simply coincidence" becomes less tenable as more data/evidence comes in. So to say that this data has no probative value at all is, I think, misguided. I don't think so. And perhaps we will simply have to settle for disagreement. It looks that way. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote I am not trying to shift from "impossible" to "impossible," but rather from "possible" to "more possible" and "more probable." Then you are failing. As you said, I guess we'll have to agree to disagree. I think the cumulative body of evidence and argument from Latter-day Saint scholars is not, in your words, conclusive proof. But it does have probative weight. While still ancillary and supplemental, I think it is quite helpful. Persuasive. Illuminating. I think we have very divergent approaches to the concept of "evidence." I'm okay with that. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: This is really another part of why this sort of thinking fails. You can't tell me how probable proposition A is. You can't tell me how probably proposition B is. How can you realistically suggest that A + B makes something more probable than merely A or B alone? As I have noted previously, we lack the capacity to objectively and empirically "assign relative degrees of likelihood" to all sorts of things. If Proposition A is "Jesus Christ is the Son of God," how do you go about establishing the Bayesian probability for it? If Proposition B is "The Book of Mormon was translated from an ancient text 'by the gift and power of God' by Joseph Smith," how do you go about establishing the Bayesian probability for that? I just don't see this approach as workable in evaluating most religious truth claims. Moreover, I don't even know what the "standard of evidence" is for the "probabilities" of questions of faith, such as the divinity of Jesus Christ or the antiquity and revelatory status of the Book of Mormon. In the law, there are generally three common standards used in court: Preponderance ("more likely to be true than not true"), Clear and Convincing ("a higher level of burden of persuasion than 'preponderance of the evidence,' but less than 'beyond reasonable doubt' ... evidence ... {that is} highly and substantially more probable to be true than not and the trier of fact must have a firm belief or conviction in its factuality"), and Beyond Reasonable Doubt ("the highest standard used as the burden of proof in Anglo-American jurisprudence ... a proof having been met if there is no plausible reason to believe otherwise ... proof of such a convincing character that one would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of one's own affairs ... it does not mean an absolute certainty"). In other contexts, the standard of evidence (all less than "preponderance") : Some Evidence (" i.e., 'a modicum of evidence'), Reasonable Indications ("substantially lower than probable cause; factors to consider are those facts and circumstances a prudent investigator would consider, but must include facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending violation; an objective factual basis must be present, a mere 'hunch' is insufficient"), Reasonable Suspicion ("a low standard of proof to determine whether a brief investigative stop or search by a police officer or any government agent is warranted"), Reasonable to Believe ("applies only to vehicle searches after the suspect has been placed under arrest ... police officers are allowed to go back and search a vehicle incident to a suspect's arrest only where it is 'reasonable to believe' that there is more evidence in the vehicle of the crime for which the suspect was arrested"), Probable Cause ("a higher standard of proof than reasonable suspicion ... {used} to determine whether a search, or an arrest, is unreasonable ... 'a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found'"), and Some Credible Evidence ("one of the least demanding standards of proof ... used as a legal placeholder to bring some controversy before a trier of fact, and into a legal process ... on the order of the factual standard of proof needed to achieve a finding of 'probable cause' used in ex parte threshold determinations needed before a court will issue a search warrant ... a lower standard of proof than the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard ... does not require the fact-finder to weigh conflicting evidence, and merely requires the investigator or prosecutor to present the bare minimum of material credible evidence to support the allegations against the subject, or in support of the allegation"). In my 18 years of litigation, I have not once heard a judge assess evidence and reach a conclusion based on Bayesian probabilities. Instead, the judge - who is afforded significant discretionary latitude - makes "findings of fact" based on a reasoned evaluation of admitted evidence. Of course, the "standards of evidence" used in legal proceedings are far from a perfect fit when addressing questions of faith. But I think they are helpful in a limited sense, and more feasibly deployed by John Q. Investigator or John Q. Latter-day Saint than probability theory and Bayesian modeling. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: And again, if this is acceptable, every time a critic of the Book of Mormon finds another possible source for some piece of text or some idea, doesn't that make their ultimate claim "more possible" and "more probable". That depends on the quality of the evidence. Not all evidence is created equal. You seem to take a substantially more black-or-white, yes-or-no, possible-or-impossible, all-or-nothing approach to examining evidence on a disputed issue. If that works for you, good. But I think there are plenty of other people who take a more organic and "human," and less mechanistic, approach to evaluating questions of faith. I am not persuaded that such questions lend themselves to being answered in Bayesian terms. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: In the heart of a semantic argument, can you even really claim that something is "more possible"? Yes. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Could that be just a little bit like being "more pregnant"? Not really. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Either something is possible or it isn't. See my comment above about a "black-or-white, yes-or-no, possible-or-impossible, all-or-nothing approach to examining evidence on a disputed issue." Virtually nobody is saying that it is "impossible" that God exists, or that Jesus Christ is His Son, or that the Book of Mormon is a translation of an actual and tangible ancient record engraved on gold plates. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: What you are actually doing isn't moving something to "more probably" but moving something from "could be possible" to "more likely to be possible". That's the distinction I am trying to draw here. By way of clarification, I am suggesting that the evidence, as accumulated and assessed and explained by Latter-day Saint scholars and writers, is doing the moving. My suggestion is that this accumulated evidence has, in the wording of Rule 401, a "tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote Quote NHM isn't evidence. It requires as a starting point that we read the text in a certain way - All evidence requires that. No. It doesn't. Yes, it does. Evidence is just data. In a book, in a recorded statement. An artifact. It has no probative weight until it is evaluated and construed by the factfinder "in a certain way." On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Evidence that isn't tied into something that is literary doesn't involve a literary interpretation. But it does require some sort of "interpretation." A few weeks ago I lost a case. Pretty disappointing. It centered on a document my clients (two brothers) had signed 20+ years ago, together with their sisters, pertaining to a jointly-held piece of real estate. It was a single-page document. Typed. In English. At the bottom were the signatures of the five siblings and their mother. It was captioned as a "Canyon Division Agreement" (the property in question is located in Provo Canyon). My argument was that this document was a valid and enforceable contract. The opposing side argued that it was not. So we conducted depositions of all five siblings, reached a consensus as to the the authenticity and unaltered status of the document and its signatures, and so on. We were mostly in agreement as to what the document was (the "findings of facts"), but we disagreed sharply as to whether it was a contract (the "conclusions of law"). In the end, the judge felt that the evidence my clients presented was insufficient to establish that the parties intended the document to be a contract. So we lost. Them's the breaks. Nowhere did either side, or the judge, address the document in terms of Bayesian theory. Instead, we reviewed the document, the signatures, the deposition testimony, etc., and we argued principles of law and how they should be applied to the document. The judge weighed the evidence, and reached a decision. In weighing the evidence, he interpreted the evidence. He construed it "in a certain way" (in accordance with Utah law governing the formation of contracts). All evidence has to be interpreted or construed. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: All evidence may need to be interpreted - but textual interpretation is a very different animal from say a forensic analysis of a crime site. I agree. Evidentiary analysis as pertaining to a contract dispute is going to vary from a "battle of the experts" in a medical malpractice case. In the end, though, all evidence needs to be construed/interpreted "in a certain way." On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: I continue to stand by my assertion that these are not evidence that the Book of Mormon was translated from an ancient set of gold plates. And I stand by my assertion that they are. I guess we can agree to disagree. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: NHM isn't evidence. Yes, it is. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: The Seal of Mulek is not evidence that the Book of Mormon was translated from ancient gold plates Yes, it is. It is not sufficient or dispositive evidence, but it is evidence. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: (the number of times that Chadwick uses the conditional "if" in his argument is really extraordinary). Actually, I like the self-imposed constraints that many (most?) Latter-day Saint scholars utilize when examining evidence. It bespeaks caution and prudence in not wanting to exceed or overstate the probative value of the evidence in view. As an alternative to the Seal of Mulek, I ask that you consider Stela 5, Izapa (which I find to have little or not evidentiary value relative to the Book of Mormon) : Quote The stela Documented by Smithsonian archaeologist Matthew W. Stirling in 1941, Stela 5 is composed of volcanic andesite and weighs around one-and-a-half tons.[4] Stela 5 presents the most complex imagery of all the stelae at Izapa.[5] Researcher Garth Norman, for example, has counted "at least 12" human figures, a dozen animals, over 25 botanical or inanimate objects, and 9 stylized deity masks. Like much of Izapan monumental sculpture, the subject matter of Stela 5 is considered mythological and religious in nature[6] and is executed with a stylized opulence. Given the multiple overlapping scenes, it appears to be a narrative.[7] Interpretation Mesoamerican researchers identify the central image as a Mesoamerican world tree, connecting the sky above and the water or underworld below.[8] Linda Schele and Mary Ellen Miller further propose that the stela records a creation myth, with barely formed humans emerging from a hole drilled into the tree's left side. The associated seated figures are completing these humans in various ways.[9] Julia Guernsey Kappelman, on the other hand, suggests the seated figures are Izapa elites conducting ritual activities in a "quasi-historical scene", which is framed by, and placed in the context of, the "symbolic landscape of creation".[10] Alternative interpretations Based on parallels with traditions originating in the Old World, a few researchers have linked the stone to theories of pre-Columbian trans-oceanic contact. Mormon theorist M. Wells Jakeman proposed that the image was a representation of a tree of life vision found in the Book of Mormon.[11] Jakeman's theory was popular for a time among Mormons, but found little support from Mormon apologists.[12] Julia Guernsey wrote that Jakeman's research "belies an obvious religious agenda that ignored Izapa Stela 5's heritage".[13] See also this 1988 assessment from Alan K. Parrish: Quote This investigation will examine the question of whether Stela 5, Izapa could be a depiction fulfilling that expectation. Background on Izapa Izapa is of the preclassic period, approximately 300 B.C.–A.D. 300. [1] It was inhabited between the times of the Olmec and the Mayan civilizations. ... Interpretation and Analysis of Izapa Stela 5 While many have praised the quality and significance of Izapa and its monuments, few have tried to interpret its art. Stela 5 is recognized as the most complex stela, bearing the most important message. Some brief interpretations give an indication of the difficulty of determining its message. ... The Jakeman Study In 1946, M. Wells Jakeman filled a newly created BYU Chair of Archaeology at the recommendation of Elder John A. Widtsoe of the Council of Twelve Apostles. That December he was made chairman of the new Department of Archaeology at BYU. Dr. Jakeman received a Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley in 1938 in the field of ancient history and Near Eastern archaeology. His dissertation was entitled The Maya States of Yucatan, 1441–1545. He had received his MA in history with an emphasis on ancient and Near Eastern history—biblical archaeology at the University of Southern California and his BA in history from the University of Utah, magna cum laude. [14] ... The newly discovered Stela 5 captured the curiosity of Dr. Jakeman through its similarities to both the ancient Near East and the Book of Mormon. After considerable research he was prepared to present some courageous possibilities. Much of what he concluded was based on the reliability of the connections he found between Stela 5, similar ancient Near Eastern representations, and the tree of life accounts in the Book of Mormon. ... In the first report he noted twenty-three correspondences between the Izapa carving and ancient Near Eastern representations of the tree of life or related art conventions. ... Jakeman based his proof of historical connection between Stela 5 and ancient Near Eastern cultures on the principles established by Kroeber. With a valid connection to the Old World religious art, interpretation of Stela 5 was greatly enhanced. He found numerous connections between Stela 5 and the written accounts of the tree of life visions in 1 Nephi. ... ... Conclusion Izapa, especially Stela 5, is widely recognized for the valuable religious inscriptions on its monuments. Izapa also appears to coincide with both Book of Mormon dating and location, and therefore has drawn the attention of Church members with an interest in archaeological evidences of the Book of Mormon. See also this 1999 assessment by Stewart W. Brewer: Quote Criticism of the Jakeman Interpretation Even before Norman’s revision of Jakeman’s view, critics had challenged Jakeman’s original thesis. Opposition came from both LDS and non-LDS scholars. Sometime late in 1958, a typewritten seven-page paper by Hugh Nibley, professor of ancient scripture at BYU, circulated on, and presumably off, the BYU campus. In it Nibley sarcastically attacked all the major methodological and epistemological underpinnings of Jakeman’s treatment of Stela 5. His first complaint was that “Mr. J’s” argument was based on an inadequate visual rendering of the stela. Instead of building his case on an independent draftsman’s drawing,“the author’s loving hand, guided by a wishful eye has actually created the only evidence available to the reader for testing the author’s theories. Again and again the reader is asked to accept as evidence Mr. J’s description of dim details which he (and, as far as the reader knows, he alone) has been able to descry with a magnifying glass.”26 Among other criticisms, Nibley claimed that Jakeman: Failed to consider whether the claimed similarities to Near Eastern art could also be found in, say, the Far East; even more fatally, it was said, he failed to compare the scene on the stela with Mesoamerican art but instead analyzed it in terms of what and how “we [subjectively] might expect an ancient artist” to represent; arbitrarily discerned for himself evidence that nobody else could see, meanwhile ignoring or explaining away contrary evidence; made gross errors in elementary matters of linguistic and iconographic analysis; did not subject his work to any peer review by fellow scholars but published it himself with unjustified and ungraceful fanfare; salted his argument with a multitude of “probablys,” “evidentlys,” and “apparentlys” to make it look dispassionate while they really served to convert his unfounded speculations into “facts” in the eyes of the unwary reader; repeatedly violated the law of parsimony; that is, he proposed complicated and unlikely interpretations when simpler ones would have explained the evidence. ... In 1966 John L. Sorenson, in a review article that contained some cautions about LDS publishing on the Book of Mormon without more than off-handed reference to Jakeman’s work, acknowledged Jakeman’s role in training virtually all the Latter-day Saint scholars who were then engaged in research involving the Book of Mormon in ancient America. But Sorenson warned of “uncontrolled [cross-cultural] comparison” and the “absurd conclusions” that frequently result from using improper methods in comparing art and culture. He went on:“Particularly, it leads to over-ambitious interpretations of shared meaning and historical relationship, as in Jakeman’s previous pseudo-identifications of ‘Lehi’ (and other characters from the Book of Mormon) on an Izapa monument.”29 ... Other critics, both in and outside the church, have continued to doubt Jakeman’s proposal. In 1993, after a period of years without critical comments by anyone, William Hamblin offered a cautious but valuably insightful view of the whole affair, stating that while the connection between Stela 5 and Nephi’s record seems to be somewhat insubstantial, this parallel, or lack thereof, does not affect the veracity of the Book of Mormon itself. But see John E. Clark, also in 1999: Quote John E. Clark (1999): "My purpose here is to present the latest drawing of this monument, to discuss how this drawing was made, and to suggest its implications for the Lehi hypothesis" John E. Clark, "A New Artistic Rendering of Izapa Stela 5: A Step toward Improved Interpretation," Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 8:1 (1999): For the past 46 years, the carved stone monument known as Izapa Stela 5 from southernmost Mexico has been discussed as a possible depiction of Lehi's dream reported in 1 Nephi 8. From this the stela has come to be known in some Latter-day Saint circles as the "Lehi stone." My purpose here is to present the latest drawing of this monument, to discuss how this drawing was made, and to suggest its implications for the Lehi hypothesis. This brief article is not meant to be the final word on the matter. In fact, I will avoid talking about most of the technical details and only highlight the most significant features of the scene on the stone in order to assess the implications of recent study. —(Click here to continue) [2] More from FAIR: Quote Question: Does Izapa Stela 5 depict Lehi's vision of the Tree of Life in the Book of Mormon? Extreme caution should be used in invoking Izapa Stela 5 as evidence for the Book of Mormon's historicity Some Church authors have used Izapa Stela 5 as evidence for the Book of Mormon. However, at present, extreme caution should be used in invoking Izapa Stela 5 as evidence for the Book of Mormon's historicity. Advances in our understanding of Mesoamerican art and iconography have led most LDS researchers with knowledge of the relevant disciplines to be very skeptical about a direct link between the stela and the Book of Mormon. The history of the stela in LDS thought and writing is available here. We note that while some LDS members embraced this connection, other scholars (such as Hugh Nibley and John L. Sorenson) disagreed with its use even during this idea's "heyday." And this 2015 presentation by Brant Gardner: Quote What I am suggesting is that we need to move that type of comparison to the next level of iterative analysis. Pearson noted that while developing an argument for the relationship between two or more languages that there are likely to be false starts. We can expect no different as we examine New World history against the Book of Mormon. What is required is the same thing that is required of historical linguistics. When we discover a false start, we remove those pseudo-cognates and continue refining the models. Perhaps the most well-known false starts in placing the Book of Mormon in the real world are the stela known as the Tree of Life stone and the story of the Mesoamerican great white god, Quetzalcoatl. ... M. Wells Jakeman interpreted Izapa Stela 5 as not only a tree of life, but as a detailed representation of the Lehi’s dream of the tree of life. The possibility of a tangible artifact specifically related to the Book of Mormon fired the imagination of the general LDS community. Hanging on my wall is a small plaster rendition of Izapa Stela 5 that I believe was produced by a Southern California Relief Society. In spite of the continuing popularity of what has also been called the Lehi Stone, Hugh Nibley argued against Jakeman’s correlations.[7] As better drawings of the eroded stela have become available, and as the scenes on the stela are compared to other scenes from the same site, it has become apparent that Jakeman’s reading was based on an inaccurate rendition of the drawing, a misapplication of Central Mexican naming conventions from the codices to this early stone from a different culture, and a failure to compare scenes in the stone to the other stelae in the area. In spite of the strong evidence that Stela 5 has nothing to do with the Book of Mormon, the LDS community has been very slow to abandon this favorite piece of evidence. Nevertheless, if we are to build a strong web of interlocking evidence, incorrect correspondences such as the claim that Izapa Stela 5 represents Lehi’s dream must be set aside. That is an important part of the process of the iterative building of the case. Sometimes the correspondences get better. Sometimes they fall apart entirely. The second popular proof of the Book of Mormon that we must set aside is the idea that there is anything in the Quetzalcoatl legends that is a remembrance of the Book of Mormon. I began my personal campaign change opinions about this material in 1986.[8] Unfortunately, that information has become much more popular in non-Mormon and even anti-Mormon circles than among members. The LDS myth about the myth appears to almost as strong as it ever was. Even John L. Sorenson’s recent Mormon’s Codex perpetuates the idea that Quetzalcoatl encodes some correlation to the story told in 3 Nephi.[9] I like this. A vigorous and substantive assessment by the Latter-day Saints, including candid critiques that lean away from our preferences. More from Gardner: Quote The issues with the ways that LDS authors have used both Izapa Stela 5 and the Quetzalcoatl material tells us that as we work toward more precision in our correlations between history and the Book of Mormon that there are times when we will find that we have wandered down a few dead end streets. That certainly does not mean that we haven’t been able to shine even more light on and broaden some of the roads that we had previously examined. This is, I think, a good example of Latter-day Saints weighing evidence. Not in terms of Bayesian probabilities (though Bruce Dale and Brian Dale gave this approach a go in 2019 as pertaining to "positive and negative correspondences between the Book of Mormon and the Maya"), but more like a factfinder, an investigative journalist or a lawyer or a judge, evaluates and compares evidence and reaches conclusions based thereon. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Realistically, I realize that I have no chance of getting you to change your opinions. I'm not quite sure as to the basis for your seeming derision. I have listened to what you have to say. As for "getting {me} to change {my} opinions," I hadn't thought of this discussion as having that particular objective. It could be a byproduct, but I thought we were simply exchanging viewpoints. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: Your list of quotes doesn't impress me. I wasn't looking to impress you. I was rebutting what I felt were your mischaracterizations of my position. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: It is fascinating that after asserting a very narrow definition of "plausibility" I don't think I did that. To the contrary, I think was proposing a fairly expansive application of the term. I cited a variety of varied definitions of the term which I felt were workable. On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: that you have provides lots of examples with it being used more broadly in the way that I am critical of. Well, perhaps you are not understanding my position, as I presented those "lots of examples" to substantiate that "I am using 'plausible' in a very normative sense of the word" (that is, in the same way as Peterson, Pres. Oaks, Elder Maxwell, FAIR, Lewis, etc., which uses are "broad"). On 9/23/2022 at 7:50 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: At the same time, I think that I have adequately made my point. At any rate, I am tired, and its late, and I am off to bed. Okay. If I have offended you, I apologize. Thanks, -Smac Edited September 26, 2022 by smac97 3
Benjamin McGuire Posted September 25, 2022 Author Posted September 25, 2022 9 hours ago, smac97 said: Well, you have repeatedly misstated my position, and attributed to me things I have neither said nor believe. You see, here is the crux. I don't believe that you are in fact saying things that you believe. And that has been my point all along. People saying one thing and meaning something completely different. In this case, you make it more obvious in the semantic argument that you make - you look through dictionaries to find the definition that you like (that you use to try to refute my point) but then you quote all sorts of sources that don't make this distinction and use the term with the other definition from the dictionaries in mind. So I am not misstating what you write - and I believe that you are dissembling over what you mean. 9 hours ago, smac97 said: Evidences ("they") do not "really provide any evidence?" Precisely. I was using the term "evidences" here because it was convenient. The evidences you provide (is that clearer) are only evidence that it could have happened (useful against claims that it couldn't have happened - or that it is impossible) but are not useful as evidence that it did happen - so they are evidence of a certain kind of claim (the claims of possibility) but cannot be used for other kinds of claims (like the claim of plausibility). Is that clearer? 9 hours ago, smac97 said: That said, whether such contrary evidences, arguments, etc. are meritorious, whether they have probative weight, is something to be examined. Sure. I'll grant that. But as I just noted, what you routinely do is to change the argument that they are being examined in the context of. These things are certainly all probative if our question is about whether the narratives of the Book of Mormon (it's origin narratives are possible). They aren't probative if our question is whether or not those narratives are factually accurate. 9 hours ago, smac97 said: You seem to be implying that there is (or will be) some sort of symmetry resulting from these two disparate efforts ("looking for parallels and ides" that tend to make ancient origins A) more probable (my assessment) or B) less probable (the assessment of "the critic")). Is that a fair statement of your position? Using the methodology that you put forward, I am saying that there is in fact such symmetry. (I am not saying that the method is a good method or useful in this context - I think it is not useful). 9 hours ago, smac97 said: Nobody is claiming that ancillary evidences about the ancient origins of the "prove" the origins of the Book of Mormon, "conclusively" or otherwise. Rather, these folks are submitting reasoned and evidence-based argument on a given topic (such as NHM) that lend credence, lend "plausibility," to the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon. No claimed "smoking gun." Rather, aggregated evidences that have a tendency to make the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon more probable, more "plausible," than they would be without the evidences. I don't actually agree with you. I think that this sort of thing gets used all the time here (by you among others) as a substitute for proof. And this is part of the reason why I discount your attempt to more narrowly define the word plausible. Aggregated evidences of possibility don't actually increase the plausibility of the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon. This is just the nature of probabilities. However - I want to point something out that you do again here (and keep claiming that you don't). Without such evidences (of possibility) we could assume that the origin narratives were impossible. So you once again compare the impossible with the possible. The moment that we make the argument that something could happen as opposed to the idea that it couldn't have happened, we have already given it some sort of greater chance - because anything is greater than nothing. But this doesn't make the narratives likely or even plausible. By the same token, the parallel is also true. The apologist wants to argue that Joseph Smith couldn't have been the author (that this would be impossible) for a range of reasons. The critic then makes the same argument - by showing that it could be possible for Joseph Smith to have access to X, Y, and Z, which he then used to write the Book of Mormon, they attempt to move the Joseph Smith authorship model into the realm of possibility. Which, if we use your approach means that the aggregated evidence of modern authorship has a tendency to make the modern authorship claims "more probable, more 'plausible' than they would be without the evidences." In fact, none of their arguments add any weight to the real question of whether or not Joseph used sources X, Y, and Z to produce the Book of Mormon. 9 hours ago, smac97 said: As I have noted previously, we lack the capacity to objectively and empirically "assign relative degrees of likelihood" to all sorts of things. And as I have noted previously, we have the capacity to objectively and empirically "assign relative degrees of likelihood" to all sorts of things. This distinction isn't the issue. The issue is when we deal with things that we lack the capacity to objectively and empirically assign relative degrees of likelihood to, how do we make actually realistic assignments of likelihood rather than just making stuff up. Almost always, when we have people calculating the likelihood of things from a religious point of view (existence of God, evolution, etc) they are just making things up. And really, this is what the word "subjective" means (what you have once you exclude the objective and empirically assigned likelihoods). I know of very few apologetic arguments that actually attempt to perform a non-subjective approach. One would be the statistical analysis of chiasm in the Book of Mormon. 9 hours ago, smac97 said: See my comment above about a "black-or-white, yes-or-no, possible-or-impossible, all-or-nothing approach to examining evidence on a disputed issue." You are misapplying all of it here. Can something be twice as impossible as something else? Even if each piece of your 'evidence' reduces the likelihood of impossibility, it doesn't ever get past "completely possible." Being possible isn't the same as being plausible. We could eliminate every argument that it would be impossible - every single one, and we still wouldn't be able to argue that it did in fact happen. 10 hours ago, smac97 said: A few weeks ago I lost a case. Pretty disappointing. It centered on a document my clients (two brothers) had signed 20+ years ago, together with their sisters, pertaining to a jointly-held piece of real estate. It was a single-page document. Typed. In English. At the bottom were the signatures of the five siblings and their mother. It was captioned as a "Canyon Division Agreement" (the property in question is located in Provo Canyon). My argument was that this document was a valid and enforceable contract. The opposing side argued that it was not. So we conducted depositions of all five siblings, reached a consensus as to the the authenticity and unaltered status of the document and its signatures, and so on. We were mostly in agreement as to what the document was (the "findings of facts"), but we disagreed sharply as to whether it was a contract (the "conclusions of law"). In the end, the judge felt that the evidence my clients presented was insufficient to establish that the parties intended the document to be a contract. So we lost. One of my brothers is a lawyer. He told me a while back that in general, he won 10 percent of the cases he should never have won, and he lost 10 percent of the cases that he never should have lost. Your anecdote isn't really all that meaningful to me. I have never seen a court case in which lawyers were keen to present all the evidence. Their obligation isn't to the truth, it is to their client. 10 hours ago, smac97 said: In the end, though, all evidence needs to be construed/interpreted "in a certain way." Yes, but literary evidence is interpreted twice. Once when it is read, and again when it is applied to a specific issue. There is always at least one additional layer of interpretation that occurs with literature that isn't necessary for other types of evidence. So I'll repeat myself. NHM isn't evidence for the narratives of the origins of the Book of Mormon. The seal of Mulek isn't evidence for the narratives of the origins of the Book of Mormon. And so on. Probably this will just result in the "no it isn't, yes it is, no it isn't, yes it is loop so familiar to us from Bugs Bunny and Elmer Fudd. It remains obvious (at least to me) that this is an illicit transfer from one argument to another - and that for the most part, this transfer revolves around the concept of impossibility. 10 hours ago, smac97 said: I have listened to what you have to say. You haven't. In fact, you have largely been denying what I have said. Over and over again.
The Nehor Posted September 25, 2022 Posted September 25, 2022 This reminds me of C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien and Hugo Dyson discussing whether the story of Jesus was myth into the wee hours of the morning. Lewis wrote to his childhood friend: Quote Now what Dyson and Tolkien showed me was this: that if I met the idea of sacrifice in a Pagan story I didn’t mind it at all: again, that if I met the idea of a god sacrificing himself to himself . . . I liked it very much and was mysteriously moved by it: again, that the idea of the dying and reviving god (Balder, Adonis, Bacchus) similarly moved me provided I met it anywhere except in the Gospels. The reason was that in Pagan stories I was prepared to feel the myth as profound and suggestive of meanings beyond my grasp even tho’ I could not say in cold prose ‘what it meant’. Now the story of Christ is simply a true myth: a myth working on us in the same way as the others, but with this tremendous difference that it really happened. 1
Thinking Posted September 25, 2022 Posted September 25, 2022 A simple definition of plausible: Something is plausible if we aren't surprised when it happens.
mfbukowski Posted September 25, 2022 Posted September 25, 2022 3 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: Yes, but literary evidence is interpreted twice. Once when it is read, and again when it is applied to a specific issue. There is always at least one additional layer of interpretation that occurs with literature that isn't necessary for other types of evidence. Throw in a little Wittgenstein and the number of "layers of interpretation" can push toward the incalculable making "correspondence to reality" in evidence a myth!
smac97 Posted September 26, 2022 Posted September 26, 2022 (edited) On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: You see, here is the crux. I don't believe that you are in fact saying things that you believe. And that has been my point all along. People saying one thing and meaning something completely different. In this case, you make it more obvious in the semantic argument that you make - you look through dictionaries to find the definition that you like (that you use to try to refute my point) but then you quote all sorts of sources that don't make this distinction and use the term with the other definition from the dictionaries in mind. So I am not misstating what you write - and I believe that you are dissembling over what you mean. Well, then it looks like our conversation is coming to a close. Not only are you mischaracterizing what I think and believe, you are now publicly accusing me of lying about what I think and believe. We can't really have a good faith conversation under those auspices. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: And that has been my point all along. People saying one thing and meaning something completely different. Does that apply to you as well? On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: In this case, you make it more obvious in the semantic argument that you make - you look through dictionaries to find the definition that you like I quoted a large number of definitions, noted that "plausible" had a variety of connotations, and then explained which connotations I have in mind when I use to the term. Those connotations seem to vary from your usage of the term. You: "Lately, I have seen the word ‘plausibility’ thrown around a lot. It is, more or less, a synonym for the word ‘likelihood’ - but that's not really how it seems to get used here. In general, we run into several problems with its usage and in these discussions about religion. When we deal with the idea of plausibility (and plausibility bias), we run into several problems. So, let me put forth a few thoughts..." You started this thread with references to semantics ("the word 'plausibility'" ... "more or less, a synonym for the word 'likelihood'" ... "that's not really how it seems to get used here," ... "we run into several problems with its usage"). On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: (that you use to try to refute my point) Not so much "refute" as "mildly and respectfully disagree." On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: but then you quote all sorts of sources that don't make this distinction and use the term with the other definition from the dictionaries in mind. Again, you: "Lately, I have seen the word ‘plausibility’ thrown around a lot. It is, more or less, a synonym for the word ‘likelihood’ - but that's not really how it seems to get used here. In general, we run into several problems with its usage and in these discussions about religion. When we deal with the idea of plausibility (and plausibility bias), we run into several problems. So, let me put forth a few thoughts..." You referenced the "usage" of the word "plausible," including that you construed it as being "more or less, a synonym for the word 'likelihood,'" so I thought it would be helpful to lay out some dictionary definitions, as it could clarify how one person's "usage" of the term might legitimately differ from another's. By way of further illustration, let's look at the synonyms for "plausible" ("adj.reasonable, believable") : Quote SYNONYMS FOR plausible conceivable credible logical persuasive possible probable tenable valid creditable like enough likely presumable smooth sound supposable very likely And here: Quote Similar and opposite words From Oxford Languages adjective (of an argument or statement) seeming reasonable or probable. Similar credible reasonable believable likely feasible probable tenable possible conceivable imaginable convincing persuasive cogent sound rational logical acceptable thinkable smooth-talking smooth-tongued smooth glib specious verisimilar colorable Most (but not all) of these seem broadly congruent with my understanding and usage of the term. I have also provide many other examples from other persons (whom are reasonable and intelligent people) who - in my view - are using the "plausible" in much the same way I construe the term. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: So I am not misstating what you write Yes, you are. I have it on pretty good authority that Spencer Macdonald has read your paraphrases/characterizations of his position and finds them to be inaccurate. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: - and I believe that you are dissembling over what you mean. In the end, I can't speak as to what you "believe." But I am the world's leading authority on what I think. You have never met me, and I don't think we have ever conversed before, yet you presume to not only mischaracterize what I mean, but also to publicly accuse me of lying about what I mean. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote Evidences ("they") do not "really provide any evidence?" Precisely. I was using the term "evidences" here because it was convenient. The evidences you provide (is that clearer) are only evidence that it could have happened (useful against claims that it couldn't have happened - or that it is impossible) but are not useful as evidence that it did happen - so they are evidence of a certain kind of claim (the claims of possibility) but cannot be used for other kinds of claims (like the claim of plausibility). Is that clearer? No. I get that you really really want to rarify and peculiarize the meaning of "plausible" so as to eliminate usages of the term which, for reasons I don't quite understand, you find problematic. I have, in some ways, disagreed with that effort, and have sought to explain and illustrate how evidences pertaining to religious truth claims can be reasonably characterized as making those claims more "plausible." Several years ago a friend of mine and I co-authored a "case note" (an article presenting an overview and analysis of a legal case) about two then-recent Supreme Court decisions. We submitted it for publication in the Utah Bar Journal, but then my employer at the time notified me that they did not want me to publish law articles while I worked for them, so my friend had it published under his name (he was not happy about it, as I had done a lot of the work, but I talked him into it). Interestingly enough, the article had to do quite a bit with the concept of "plausibility" (in a legal setting, anyway). From the article (bolded/italicized emphases added) : Quote The Evolution of Rule 8, F.R.C.P. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted this requirement in Conley v. Gibson and held that a complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The Conley standard has governed federal civil suits for over fifty years. Under Conley, plaintiffs have had the luxury of crafting general, simple pleadings and with predictability and reliability overcome most Rule 12 motions. Then, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated Conley, saying that its “‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.” The Court then introduced a new “plausibility” standard: While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true . . . Asking for plausible grounds does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects Rule 8(a)(2)'s threshold requirement that the "plain statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 556. In other words, plaintiffs must "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" in order to survive. Id. at 547. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must therefore be granted unless the pleading reaches a level of "plausibility." Id. at 546. Initial reactions to Twombly were mixed, perhaps partly due to the Supreme Court's express denial that it created a heightened pleading standard. See id. at 569 n.14 ("We do not apply any 'heightened' pleading standard..."). For example, Keith Bradley, writing in the Northwestern University Law Review, suggested that "'[p]lausibility' is an element of a certain kind of antitrust conspiracy claim, not a standard for pleadings in general." 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 117, 122. Within two short years, Mr. Bradley was proven to be mistaken. In May 2009, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) applied Twombly to all federal court pleading requirements. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court noted that the lower court had relied on Conley's "no set of facts" analysis, which had subsequently been "retired" and replaced by Twombly's "'plausibility standard.'" Id. at 1944 (citations omitted). The Court also expressly stated that its decision in Twombly “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’” Id. at 1953. This new “Twombly/Iqbal” pleading standard is not a model of clarity: [A] pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”...[T]he pleading standard [under] Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will...be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Iqbal, at 1949-1950 (citations omitted). This two-prong analysis deserves further scrutiny: New Rule 8 Pleading Requirements: First Prong: A Complaint Must Contain More Than “Unadorned,” But Less Than “Detailed,” Factual Allegations. Plus “Factual Allegations” v. “Conclusions of Law.” To satisfy the first prong of the new Twombly/Iqbal analysis, a Complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must include more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Practitioners should therefore take heed to augment recitation of the elements of a cause of action with factual allegations. They must also eschew confusing “facts” with “mere conclusory statements,” because while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 1949 (internal citations omitted). Unfortunately, the distinction between “questions of law” and “questions of fact” is unclear. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive,” and that it has “yet to arrive at a rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (internal citations omitted) (quoted in Gonzalez v. Kay, 08-20544 (5th Cir. 2009)).[i] The Supreme Court has also noted that the decision to label an issue a “question of law,” a “question of fact,” or a “mixed question of law and fact” is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis. At least in those instances in which Congress has not spoken and in which the issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question. Miller, 474 U.S. at 113-114 (citations omitted).[ii] The Court went on to take unto itself the duty to make the “fact/law distinction” in some instances (such as First Amendment libel cases requiring proof of actual malice, or where the trier of fact has “perceived shortcomings…by way of bias or some other factor…”), while in other circumstances leaving that duty to the trial court (such as credibility of witnesses and juror bias). Id. at 114 (citations omitted). How federal district and circuit courts are supposed to sort all this out is indeed “elusive.” Miller, 474 U.S. at 113. Some have simply thrown in the proverbial towel. See, e.g., Florida Progress Corp. and Subsidiaries v. C.I.R., 348 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (“[W]e too are unable to articulate a guiding principle that will ‘unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion…’”). Others have concluded that “[s]ince a judge looks in vain for any guidance on this question in the summary judgment cases, it would appear that he is unfettered in approaching the issue analytically and pragmatically.” County Photo Compositing Corp. v. Pawlick, 1984 Mass. App. Div. 183 (1984) (citing United States v. J.B. Williams Company, Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 430-31 (2nd Cir. 1974); see also Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1978). However, a few analytical frameworks for the “fact/law distinction” have been proposed. For example, the Third Circuit has suggested the following: The Supreme Court has written that “we [do not] yet know of any ... rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.” However, a practical test [] for determining whether a question is of fact, of law, or of both fact and law, is as follows. A question of fact can be answered solely by determining the facts of a case (without any need to know the law relevant to the case). A question of law can be answered solely by determining what relevant law means (without any need to determine the facts of a case). A mixed question of fact and law can only be answered by both determining the facts of a case and determining what the relevant law means. For example, imagine that a man is appealing his conviction under a law that states "it is a crime to be tall." What kind of question is: "Was the trial court correct to find the man `tall'?" Can we answer it solely by determining the facts of the case? No, because even if we know the fact that the man is five feet ten inches, we do not know if he is "tall" in the sense that Congress intended the word "tall" to mean. Can we answer it solely by determining what the relevant law means without knowing the man's height? No, because even if we know that the statute defines "tall" as "six feet or taller," we do not know how tall the man is. Thus, we have a mixed question of fact and law. Once we know the facts of the case (that the man is five feet ten inches tall), and what the relevant law means (it is a crime to be six feet tall or taller), we can answer "no" to the question "Was the trial court correct to find the man `tall'?" Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 269 (3rd Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Elsewhere, the Eighth Circuit has promulgated an analysis “focused on whether the question at issue required the application of a technical, legally oriented standard or whether it required the application of a non-technical, factually oriented standard.” Nodaway Valley Bank v. Continental Cas. Co., 916 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The First Circuit has also suggested some broad parameters: We are cognizant that the line between “facts” and “conclusions” is often blurred. But, there are some general parameters. Most often, facts are susceptible to objective verification. Conclusions, on the other hand, are empirically unverifiable in the usual case. They represent the pleader's reactions to, sometimes called “inferences from,” the underlying facts. It is only when such conclusions are logically compelled, or at least supported, by the stated facts, that is, when the suggested inference rises to what experience indicates is an acceptable level of probability, that “conclusions” become “facts” for pleading purposes. Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, (1st Cir. 1989) (overruled on other grounds in Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004)). These various ideas will likely experience renewed scrutiny now that the Supreme Court has based part of the Twombly/Iqbal analysis on a “fact/law distinction” that, at present, lacks any coherent guidelines. Second Prong: Assessing “Plausibility” Based on “Judicial Experience and Common Sense.” The second prong in the Twombly/Iqbal analysis requires a complaint to state “a plausible claim for relief” in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). “[F]acial plausibility” is shown “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (citation omitted). Here the Supreme Court describes a spectrum in which legal claims may come to rest on factual “possibility,” “plausibility” or “probability.” In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a claim move “across the line” from mere “possibility” (or “conceivability”) to “plausib[ility].” Id. at 1952 (citation omitted). A claim need not go beyond this area of the spectrum (into the “probability” area) in order to defeat a motion to dismiss. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 1949. A trial court’s assessment of a claim’s plausibility is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted). [i] The U.S. Supreme Court did, however, describe two “well established principles” on this point: “For example, that an issue involves an inquiry into state of mind is not at all inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact….Equally clearly, an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question.” Miller, 474 U.S. at 451 (citations omitted). [ii] The Supreme Court has ostensibly described a mixed question of law and fact as “questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19, (1982). I don't see much daylight between my generalized usage of "plausible" and its use by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, I think Daniel Peterson, Dallin H. Oaks, Neil A. Maxwell, etc. have also utilized the term in ways quite similar to mine. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote Quote By the same token, the critic who spends time looking for parallels and ideas found in the Book of Mormon in sources contemporary with Joseph Smith would - under your model of understanding - be presenting evidence of the modern fabrication of the text. That said, whether such contrary evidences, arguments, etc. are meritorious, whether they have probative weight, is something to be examined. Sure. I'll grant that. As an abstraction. But the point I (and Ryan Dahle, and Daniel Peterson, and several others) have raised is that the critics have not done this. As I noted earlier: "What I have not found, however, is a corollary and symmetrical compilation of materials from 'critics' who are presenting evidence-based arguments against the Book of Mormon as an ancient text." On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: But as I just noted, what you routinely do is to change the argument that they are being examined in the context of. I don't know what you are referencing here (at least, I think I don't know - I need to check with that Ben McGquire fellow to ascertain if I am being "dissembling" about what I think). On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: These things are certainly all probative if our question is about whether the narratives of the Book of Mormon (it's origin narratives are possible). They aren't probative if our question is whether or not those narratives are factually accurate. With respect, I disagree. Let's look at what the Supreme Court said above: "{A} plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true . . . Asking for plausible grounds does not impose a probability requirement." "{P}laintiffs must 'nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" Applying these concepts here: Apologetic arguments and evidences can help the reader of the Book of Mormon move beyond "the assumption" that the text is "true." Apologetic arguments and evidences provide contextualizing information that can help an individual find "plausible grounds" for accepting the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon, even if these grounds are not necessarily equivalent to "a probability." Apologetic arguments and evidences help "nudge" the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon "across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Apologetic arguments and evidences help the Book of Mormon obtain "facial plausibility." that is, they can help the reader "draw the reasonable inference" that the claimed origins are true and correct. Apologetic arguments and evidences can help a reader to proceed past "a sheer possibility" that the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon are truel On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Using the methodology that you put forward, I am saying that there is in fact such symmetry. And I am, with respect, disagreeing with that assertion. As I have noted previously: "Of course, the critics/opponents of the Church are not obligated to provide a coherent counter-explanation for The Book of Mormon. But the point is, they have not been able to. We're coming up on nearly 200 years since the original publication of the text, and yet when the chips are down, and when a well-informed person like Daniel Peterson (or Ryan Dahle) argues for the plausibility of the LDS position, we don't get reasoned responses and rebuttals. We get glib sarcasm. We get curt dismissals. We get anything but an engagement of the evidence." As you seem to have found a "symmetrical" counter-explanation for origins of the the Book of Mormon (symmetrical, that is, to the claimed - and increasingly buttressed by substantial apologetic arguments and evidences - origins as espoused by the Church), please it (or them) out. I am quite willing to examine such counter-explanations. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote Nobody is claiming that ancillary evidences about the ancient origins of the "prove" the origins of the Book of Mormon, "conclusively" or otherwise. Rather, these folks are submitting reasoned and evidence-based argument on a given topic (such as NHM) that lend credence, lend "plausibility," to the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon. No claimed "smoking gun." Rather, aggregated evidences that have a tendency to make the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon more probable, more "plausible," than they would be without the evidences. I don't actually agree with you. Quelle surprise. I'm a liar, after all. We must rely on you to tell the world what my thoughts and beliefs really are. According to you, I am "{not} saying things that {I} believe" and am "dissembling over what {I} mean." On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: I think that this sort of thing gets used all the time here (by you among others) as a substitute for proof. Broadly, yes. As to the divinity of Jesus Christ, the day will come when we have "proof." When "every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess {at Judgment Day that Jesus Christ is our Lord}." (Mosiah 27:31). Until then, however, we "see through a glass, darkly," (1 Cor. 13:12) and "walk by faith, not by sight." (2 Cor. 5:7.) I think our responsibility as Latter-day Saints is to find ways to strengthen our faith. I don't think we do that by insisting only on definitive/dispositive "proof." We instead must rely first and ultimately on revelatory confirmations, along with congruent behaviors ("if you believe all these things see that ye do them" (Mosiah 4:10). However, I also think we can and should investigate and consider ancillary evidences and arguments such as are presented by apologists and scholars. Me from last year: Quote There are lots of things for which "empirical evidence" (generally defined as "the information received by means of the senses, particularly by observation and documentation of patterns and behavior through experimentation") is in short supply, or else is subject to various challenges in terms of provenance, interpretation, application and meaning, etc. By way of example: I have my wallet with me today. Where am I keeping it right now? On my desk? In my computer bag? In the back pocket of my pants? In the front? Right? Left? If you were to come back to this thread on March 10, 2026 and read these questions, what sort of "empirical evidence" do you think you could locate to answer them? ... I attribute some of my current beliefs to having been raised in the Church. But I have also spent much of my adult life examining the evidence for and against the truth claims of the Church of Jesus Christ. I have also had many deeply spiritual experiences in relation to the doctrines of the Restored Gospel. These spiritual experiences, as well as the evidences cited by DCP and others, are some of the variables that "shape the personality preferences that, in conjunction with numerous social and cultural influences" to lead me to my beliefs. So it's not "evidence rather than" these other things. It's "evidence in addition to and in tandem with" these other things. ... I think the truth or falsity of the claims of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints cannot, and ought not, begin with and focus solely on a debate about scholarly evidence. I think that if someone is interested in The Book of Mormon, their primary focus should be seeking a spiritual witness of it. Ancillary evidences are nevertheless helpful. I like these comments by Daniel Peterson: Quote Of course, scholarship does not replace spiritual witness as a source of testimony. As Elder B. H. Roberts (1857–1933) of the Seventy said: “The power of the Holy Ghost … must ever be the chief source of evidence for the Book of Mormon. All other evidence is secondary. … No arrangement of evidence, however skillfully ordered; no argument, however adroitly made, can ever take its place.” Yet scholarship has a definite place even in spiritual matters. The Lord said in an 1829 revelation through the Prophet Joseph Smith to Oliver Cowdery, “Yea, behold, I will tell you in your mind and in your heart, by the Holy Ghost” (D&C 8:2; emphasis added). In 1832 the Lord said to the Prophet Joseph Smith, “Seek learning, even by study and also by faith” (D&C 88:118). As one writer observed: “What no one shows the ability to defend is quickly abandoned. Rational argument does not create belief, but it maintains a climate in which belief may flourish.” The truthfulness of the Restored Gospel must be predominantly and fundamentally ascertained through faith. Through studying, pondering, and prayer. Through inspiration from God. All other evidences are helpful, but secondary. Supportive, but not foundational. Again, no smoking gun. Nobody is claiming that. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: And this is part of the reason why I discount your attempt to more narrowly define the word plausible. I found most of the definitions and connotations found in a variety of dictionaries to be compatible with my use of the term. So I don't think my usage is "narrowly define{d}." On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Aggregated evidences of possibility don't actually increase the plausibility of the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon. In the real world, people use aggregated evidences all the time. Lawyers and judges speak of things like "quantum of evidence," "great weight of evidence," and so on. The most singular iconographic representation of the U.S. legal system is the blindfolded Lady Justice and her scales: Quote The personification of justice balancing the scales dates back to the goddess Maat,[4] and later Isis, of ancient Egypt. The Hellenic deities Themis and Dike were later goddesses of justice. Themis was the embodiment of divine order, law, and custom, in her aspect as the personification of the divine rightness of law. Lady Justice is most often depicted with a set of scales typically suspended from one hand, upon which she measures the strengths of a case's support and opposition. The Greek goddess Dike is depicted holding a set of scales. Bacchylides, Fragment 5 (trans. Campbell, Vol. Greek Lyric IV) (Greek lyric c. 5th B.C.): If some god had been holding level the balance of Dike (Justice). The scales represent the weighing of evidence, and the scales lack a foundation in order to signify that evidence should stand on its own. "The scales represent the weighing of evidence." Note that the scales have two bowls suspended by chains hanging at the ends of a fulcrum. As resolving a legal dispute is an inherently human endeavor, we seldom have definitive/dispositive "proof" (if we did have such ready access, Lady Justice would not need scales). The judge must therefore weigh the evidence for an against the disputed issue. The "evidence" is almost always aggregated, like individual weights added to one side of the scales or the other. The judge may not allow this or that piece of evidence on the scales at all (most hearsay statements, for example, are excluded under the Rules of Evidence throughout the U.S.). Alternatively, the judge may allow the piece of evidence to be placed on the scales, but decline to give it much "probative weight" (for example, a witness statement from someone with an established track record of dishonesty be technically admissible, but given little or no weight by the judge). So I think aggregated evidences can increase plausibility. The quality of the evidence is a vital consideration, of course. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: This is just the nature of probabilities. However - I want to point something out that you do again here (and keep claiming that you don't). Without such evidences (of possibility) we could assume that the origin narratives were impossible. Yes, we could assume that. Many people do. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: So you once again compare the impossible with the possible. I don't think so. Again: I am not trying to shift from "impossible" to "impossible," but rather from "possible" to "more possible" and "more probable." On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: The moment that we make the argument that something could happen as opposed to the idea that it couldn't have happened, we have already given it some sort of greater chance - because anything is greater than nothing. As a broad abstraction, yes. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: But this doesn't make the narratives likely or even plausible. Again, in the abstract, yes. That's why I think it is important to move beyond abstractions and get to examining evidences and arguments. These do make a claim more or less likely/probably/plausible. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: By the same token, the parallel is also true. The apologist wants to argue that Joseph Smith couldn't have been the author (that this would be impossible) for a range of reasons. The critic then makes the same argument - by showing that it could be possible for Joseph Smith to have access to X, Y, and Z, which he then used to write the Book of Mormon, they attempt to move the Joseph Smith authorship model into the realm of possibility. Sure. I am quite open to arguments about "the Joseph Smith authorship model." I acknowledge that this is in "the realm of possibility." But being merely "possible" is not sufficient, so we need to progress beyond that in our assessment. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Which, if we use your approach means that the aggregated evidence of modern authorship has a tendency to make the modern authorship claims "more probable, more 'plausible' than they would be without the evidences." If the "aggregated evidence of modern authorship" has more probative weight, then you would have a point. But in my view, it doesn't, so you don't. Again: "Of course, the critics/opponents of the Church are not obligated to provide a coherent counter-explanation for The Book of Mormon. But the point is, they have not been able to. We're coming up on nearly 200 years since the original publication of the text, and yet when the chips are down, and when a well-informed person like Daniel Peterson (or Ryan Dahle) argues for the plausibility of the LDS position, we don't get reasoned responses and rebuttals. We get glib sarcasm. We get curt dismissals. We get anything but an engagement of the evidence." On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: In fact, none of their arguments add any weight to the real question of whether or not Joseph used sources X, Y, and Z to produce the Book of Mormon. Well, I would have to see those arguments and assess whether they "add any weight" or not. I am quite willing to evaluate evidences and arguments on both sides of the debate. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote Quote This is really another part of why this sort of thinking fails. You can't tell me how probable proposition A is. You can't tell me how probably proposition B is. How can you realistically suggest that A + B makes something more probable than merely A or B alone? As I have noted previously, we lack the capacity to objectively and empirically "assign relative degrees of likelihood" to all sorts of things. If Proposition A is "Jesus Christ is the Son of God," how do you go about establishing the Bayesian probability for it? If Proposition B is "The Book of Mormon was translated from an ancient text 'by the gift and power of God' by Joseph Smith," how do you go about establishing the Bayesian probability for that? I just don't see this approach as workable in evaluating most religious truth claims. And as I have noted previously, we have the capacity to objectively and empirically "assign relative degrees of likelihood" to all sorts of things. I am certainly willing to consider whatever you have in mind. If you think the divinity of Jesus Christ can be objectively and empirically assessed and "assigned" a "relative degree" of "likelihood," then I'd like to see that. Merely asserting that it can be done doesn't do much for me. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: This distinction isn't the issue. I think it is very much an issue. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: The issue is when we deal with things that we lack the capacity to objectively and empirically assign relative degrees of likelihood to, how do we make actually realistic assignments of likelihood rather than just making stuff up. By examining evidence. Nobody "made up" the NHM altar, or Wadi Sayq/Khor Kharfot, or the Seal of Mulek, tumbaga, sheum, cement, and so on. Richard L. Anderson was not "just making stuff up" when he wrote Investigating the Book of Mormon Witnesses. Jack Welch wasn't "just making stuff up" about chiasmus in the Book of Mormon. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Almost always, when we have people calculating the likelihood of things from a religious point of view (existence of God, evolution, etc) they are just making things up. Which, if so, rather militates against your Bayesian approach to such things. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: And really, this is what the word "subjective" means (what you have once you exclude the objective and empirically assigned likelihoods). I know of very few apologetic arguments that actually attempt to perform a non-subjective approach. One would be the statistical analysis of chiasm in the Book of Mormon. Virtually all lawsuits in the United States are not determined by "objective and empirically assigned likelihoods." Most are determined by the admission, weighing and consideration of evidence for and against a given proposition, with the factfinder reaching a conclusion in a hopefully dispassionate manner. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote See my comment above about a "black-or-white, yes-or-no, possible-or-impossible, all-or-nothing approach to examining evidence on a disputed issue." You are misapplying all of it here. Can something be twice as impossible as something else? No. But something can be more likely/probable/plausible than something else. Years ago I participated in a trial based on a disputed lease of a commercial building near Ogden, Utah. I represented the landlord. The tenant, we argued, breached the lease by A) failing to pay rents and then B) moving out well before the end of the lease term. The tenant did not dispute either of these, but he argued he was entitled to not pay rent because the facility - a large metal industrial building - had "flooded," which forced him to move out. The lawyers did what lawyers do: gather and examine evidence. We deposed the tenant. We reviewed photos of the property taken on the day of the alleged "flood." We hired an surveyor-engineer who surveyed the interior, exterior and surrounding acreage of the industrial building. We located meteorological/weather records for the day in question to see how much precipitation had fallen in the area on the day of the alleged flood. At trial, we submitted a bunch of evidence in support of our position, and the other side presented their arguments as well. The highlights: Deposition testimony from the defendant stating that the "flood" had caused 18 inches of standing water inside the entirety of the interior of the building. He also said that the flood (which supposedly happened in early February) happened because there was a massive snowstorm in the evening, and the next morning the sun came out and melted all the accumulated snow on the roof of the building, which then flowed into the building and became standing water until it dissipated later in the day. The surveyor testified that the interior of the building (partly concrete and partly bare earth) had three low spots where, at most, 1 to 1.5 inches of water could accumulate, accounting for only a very small percentage of the total interior floor of the building. The surveyor also testified that the building was elevated relative to its exterior and the surrounding area, and also that the building's walls were simply unsealed, uninsulated corrugated steel (it was in pretty poor shape), such that any water that somehow accumulated inside the building would first accumulate in the low areas noted above, and would then necessarily flow toward sides of the building and then outside to lower-lying adjacent areas. We presented evidence that in Utah, 10-12 inches of snow is typically equivalent to one inch of melted water. We presented evidence that the snowstorm on the day in question had, in the Ogden area, left 1-2 inches of snow in some places and only trace amounts of snow in others. We also presented evidence of the average temperature in the area on the day of the "flood" (low 40s by the afternoon, I believe). We presented photos my client took of the property on the day of the flooding. They showed some accumulated water in the low spots (perhaps 30 square feet total, out of, I believe, 8,000 square feet of floor space). We presented evidence that the defendant had already leased a separate industrial space in the area prior to the move (with a better electrical system and cheaper rent). We presented evidence that the defendant's business (pelletizing surplus milk powder into cattle feed, as the defendant had purchased thousands of tons of the stuff at a government auction because it was no longer fit for human consumption) had possibly been altered by him. We had some evidence (not the strongest, TBH) that he had decided to ship the milk powder overseas (the Philippines) because he stood to make a lot more from selling it overseas rather than pelletizing it. The defendant, having heard the testimony of our surveyor, took the stand and testified that the storm was extremely severe and had left was 8-11 feet of accumulated snow on the roof of the building, and then it all melted and all drained into the interior of the building and became standing water for many hours. The defendant also disputed that the photos my client had taken were on the day of the flood. This was a bench trial, so the judge rendered a verdict. He examined the evidence and found, based on the submitted evidence, that A) the lease was valid and enforceable, B) that while some small amount of water may have entered the building on the day in February, it did not amount to a "flood" of 18 inches of standing water, C) the claim of 18 inches of standing water was not credible, D) the defendant therefore did not have grounds to unilaterally and prematurely terminate the lease, and E) the defendant and breached the lease, and F) the plaintiff was entitled to damages. None of this process involved invocation of Bayesian theory, nor were the parties and the judge "just making things up." Instead, both sides collected and submitted evidence, and the judge found that our assessment of the facts and the law was more likely, more "plausible," than the defendant's alternative and contravening assessment. The exercise was not about differentiating "possible" from "impossible," but rather about ascertaining which of the two competing narratives were more likely/plausibly reflective of what had actually happened. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: One of my brothers is a lawyer. He told me a while back that in general, he won 10 percent of the cases he should never have won, and he lost 10 percent of the cases that he never should have lost. So 80% of the time he won when he should have won, and lost when he should have lost? Yeah, that sounds about right. The legal system ain't perfect. You go to court with the facts and evidence you have, not the facts and evidence you would like to have. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Your anecdote isn't really all that meaningful to me. Well, of course. I'm lying, after all. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: I have never seen a court case in which lawyers were keen to present all the evidence. Their obligation isn't to the truth, it is to their client. Lawyers are not impartial, but we do have professional and ethical guidelines. Meanwhile, the factfinder's obligation is "to the truth." Hence Lady Justice's blindfold. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: So I'll repeat myself. NHM isn't evidence for the narratives of the origins of the Book of Mormon. Yes, it is. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: The seal of Mulek isn't evidence for the narratives of the origins of the Book of Mormon. Yes, it is. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Probably this will just result in the "no it isn't, yes it is, no it isn't, yes it is loop so familiar to us from Bugs Bunny and Elmer Fudd. The difference is that I think I have rationally laid out my argument and reasoning as to why I think these things constitute "evidence," whereas you have resorted to insults, mischaracterizing my position and accusing me of lying about what I think and believe. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: It remains obvious (at least to me) that this is an illicit transfer from one argument to another - and that for the most part, this transfer revolves around the concept of impossibility. "Illicit." Yeesh. I think reasonable minds can (and often do) disagree about all sorts of things, including important things. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: Quote I have listened to what you have to say. You haven't. Right. I forgot. I'm a liar. And you are better positioned than I am to know whether I have listened to you or not. On 9/25/2022 at 9:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: In fact, you have largely been denying what I have said. Over and over again. I have been disagreeing with some of what you have said. This quote (falsely attributed to Aristotle, it seems) comes to mind: “It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.” I aspire to this. I also seek to get as close to, and as much of, as this as possible: "{T}ruth is knowledge of things as they are, and as they were, and as they are to come." (D&C 93:24.) Your uncharitable, uncivil, presumptuous, boorish declarations about me notwithstanding, I am stating what I actually think and believe. I have no incentive to be "dissembling over what {I} mean," as this is just a message board, and I have never met you and likely never will (given your behavior here, perhaps that's for the best). I started participating in this thread because you had said some interesting things, and because I agreed with some and not with others. We have, unfortunately, ended up with you holding me in very low regard. I don't think I have said anything to deserve such disparagements as you have leveled (publicly), but this is just a tiny corner of the Internet, and so your slurs don't mean much. Thanks, -Smac Edited September 26, 2022 by smac97 1
mfbukowski Posted September 26, 2022 Posted September 26, 2022 On 9/25/2022 at 8:59 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: You see, here is the crux. I don't believe that you are in fact saying things that you believe. And that has been my point all along. People saying one thing and meaning something completely different. In this case, you make it more obvious in the semantic argument that you make - you look through dictionaries to find the definition that you like (that you use to try to refute my point) but then you quote all sorts of sources that don't make this distinction and use the term with the other definition from the dictionaries in mind. So I am not misstating what you write - and I believe that you are dissembling over what you mean. Precisely. I was using the term "evidences" here because it was convenient. The evidences you provide (is that clearer) are only evidence that it could have happened (useful against claims that it couldn't have happened - or that it is impossible) but are not useful as evidence that it did happen - so they are evidence of a certain kind of claim (the claims of possibility) but cannot be used for other kinds of claims (like the claim of plausibility). Is that clearer? Sure. I'll grant that. But as I just noted, what you routinely do is to change the argument that they are being examined in the context of. These things are certainly all probative if our question is about whether the narratives of the Book of Mormon (it's origin narratives are possible). They aren't probative if our question is whether or not those narratives are factually accurate. Using the methodology that you put forward, I am saying that there is in fact such symmetry. (I am not saying that the method is a good method or useful in this context - I think it is not useful). I don't actually agree with you. I think that this sort of thing gets used all the time here (by you among others) as a substitute for proof. And this is part of the reason why I discount your attempt to more narrowly define the word plausible. Aggregated evidences of possibility don't actually increase the plausibility of the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon. This is just the nature of probabilities. However - I want to point something out that you do again here (and keep claiming that you don't). Without such evidences (of possibility) we could assume that the origin narratives were impossible. So you once again compare the impossible with the possible. The moment that we make the argument that something could happen as opposed to the idea that it couldn't have happened, we have already given it some sort of greater chance - because anything is greater than nothing. But this doesn't make the narratives likely or even plausible. By the same token, the parallel is also true. The apologist wants to argue that Joseph Smith couldn't have been the author (that this would be impossible) for a range of reasons. The critic then makes the same argument - by showing that it could be possible for Joseph Smith to have access to X, Y, and Z, which he then used to write the Book of Mormon, they attempt to move the Joseph Smith authorship model into the realm of possibility. Which, if we use your approach means that the aggregated evidence of modern authorship has a tendency to make the modern authorship claims "more probable, more 'plausible' than they would be without the evidences." In fact, none of their arguments add any weight to the real question of whether or not Joseph used sources X, Y, and Z to produce the Book of Mormon. And as I have noted previously, we have the capacity to objectively and empirically "assign relative degrees of likelihood" to all sorts of things. This distinction isn't the issue. The issue is when we deal with things that we lack the capacity to objectively and empirically assign relative degrees of likelihood to, how do we make actually realistic assignments of likelihood rather than just making stuff up. Almost always, when we have people calculating the likelihood of things from a religious point of view (existence of God, evolution, etc) they are just making things up. And really, this is what the word "subjective" means (what you have once you exclude the objective and empirically assigned likelihoods). I know of very few apologetic arguments that actually attempt to perform a non-subjective approach. One would be the statistical analysis of chiasm in the Book of Mormon. You are misapplying all of it here. Can something be twice as impossible as something else? Even if each piece of your 'evidence' reduces the likelihood of impossibility, it doesn't ever get past "completely possible." Being possible isn't the same as being plausible. We could eliminate every argument that it would be impossible - every single one, and we still wouldn't be able to argue that it did in fact happen. One of my brothers is a lawyer. He told me a while back that in general, he won 10 percent of the cases he should never have won, and he lost 10 percent of the cases that he never should have lost. Your anecdote isn't really all that meaningful to me. I have never seen a court case in which lawyers were keen to present all the evidence. Their obligation isn't to the truth, it is to their client. Yes, but literary evidence is interpreted twice. Once when it is read, and again when it is applied to a specific issue. There is always at least one additional layer of interpretation that occurs with literature that isn't necessary for other types of evidence. So I'll repeat myself. NHM isn't evidence for the narratives of the origins of the Book of Mormon. The seal of Mulek isn't evidence for the narratives of the origins of the Book of Mormon. And so on. Probably this will just result in the "no it isn't, yes it is, no it isn't, yes it is loop so familiar to us from Bugs Bunny and Elmer Fudd. It remains obvious (at least to me) that this is an illicit transfer from one argument to another - and that for the most part, this transfer revolves around the concept of impossibility. You haven't. In fact, you have largely been denying what I have said. Over and over again. Everybody knows dictionaries are for starting church talks. Only 1
SeekingUnderstanding Posted September 26, 2022 Posted September 26, 2022 4 hours ago, smac97 said: And I am, with respect, disagreeing with that assertion. As I have noted previously: "Of course, the critics/opponents of the Church are not obligated to provide a coherent counter-explanation for The Book of Mormon. But the point is, they have not been able to. We're coming up on nearly 200 years since the original publication of the text, and yet when the chips are down, and when a well-informed person like Daniel Peterson (or Ryan Dahle) argues for the plausibility of the LDS position, we don't get reasoned responses and rebuttals. We get glib sarcasm. We get curt dismissals. We get anything but an engagement of the evidence."
Stargazer Posted September 26, 2022 Posted September 26, 2022 (edited) On 9/23/2022 at 6:13 PM, smac97 said: But there are other technologies in TOS/TNG that, at the time, seemed implausible. "Transporter" technology, for example, was actually formulated to save money by the TV studio by avoiding spending money on visual effects involving spaceship landings. This technology grew to be a staple of the franchise, but was it plausible? Is it plausible now? It is, it seems, a mixed question: This is not a thread about plausible technologies, so I'm clearly off-topic, but science-fiction writer Greg Bear proposed that every subatomic particle in the universe carries within itself information on its status, including where in the universe it is located, among other things. There may be a way to access that information and edit it, and thus it may be possible to transport objects from one place to another simply by accessing this "privileged band" and changing the space-time coordinates of a particle or a group of particles to somewhere other than where they are. I once had an email conversation with him in which he said that the idea was not original with him, but that he had gotten it from the work of an early 20th century physicist who had speculated about the idea. He named the physicist, but I lost the conversation long ago and I don't remember. Bear used the idea in at least three novels, the two novels of his "Forge of God" series, and "Moving Mars." I bring this up because of the question "How did Moroni show up in Joseph Smith's bedroom? Was he transported there?" Edited September 26, 2022 by Stargazer 1
smac97 Posted September 26, 2022 Posted September 26, 2022 42 minutes ago, SeekingUnderstanding said: Okay. Are you seeing in this post "a coherent counter-explanation for The Book of Mormon?" Thanks, -Smac
SeekingUnderstanding Posted September 27, 2022 Posted September 27, 2022 (edited) 20 minutes ago, smac97 said: Okay. Are you seeing in this post "a coherent counter-explanation for The Book of Mormon?" Thanks, -Smac Rather this portion: “We're coming up on nearly 200 years since the original publication of the text, and yet when the chips are down, and when a well-informed person like Daniel Peterson (or Ryan Dahle) argues for the plausibility of the LDS position, we don't get reasoned responses and rebuttals. We get glib sarcasm. We get curt dismissals. We get anything but an engagement of the evidence.” Though Nevo’s postion (which I believe is Joseph wrote it) seems reasonable to me. Jarman also has his own theory of a manuscript that Joseph had. I’m not sure what you are looking for in “a coherent counter-explanation”. It seems like the word “coherent” is doing a lot of work for you there, similar to the word “true” in “no true Scotsman”. Edited September 27, 2022 by SeekingUnderstanding
Analytics Posted September 27, 2022 Posted September 27, 2022 5 hours ago, smac97 said: And I am, with respect, disagreeing with that assertion. As I have noted previously: "Of course, the critics/opponents of the Church are not obligated to provide a coherent counter-explanation for The Book of Mormon. But the point is, they have not been able to. We're coming up on nearly 200 years since the original publication of the text, and yet when the chips are down, and when a well-informed person like Daniel Peterson (or Ryan Dahle) argues for the plausibility of the LDS position, we don't get reasoned responses and rebuttals. We get glib sarcasm. We get curt dismissals. We get anything but an engagement of the evidence." I suppose this has something to do with Kuhn and how our paradigms affect the way we see evidence, but I'm having a really hard time understanding your point of view here. What's incoherent about, say, David P. Wright's analysis? Professor wright has superlative qualifications to analyze the Isaiah chapters in the Book of Mormon. It turns out that Joseph Smith was right about some things--many verses of the KJV Bible are in fact not translated correctly. But here's the problem: when you compare the known KJV translation errors to the BoM, it becomes transparently obvious that Joseph Smith wasn't accurately translating an ancient, pristine manuscript. Rather, he was duplicating the errors in the KJV translation, and messing up other passages that were in fact translated fine in the KJV. The pattern for what was changed and how it was changed points to it being the work of a 19th century American. In the words of Professor Wright: Quote The simplest and most logical explanation is that the BM Isaiah derives directly from the KJV text with some secondary modifications and does not derive from an ancient text through translation. The larger net of evidence supports this conclusion. Other studies have demonstrated the use of the KJV in the composition of the BM. Stan Larson has shown that the "Sermon on the Mount" materials in 3 Nephi 12:1-14:27 are a revision of the KJV Matthew 5:3-7:27.112 One can add to his insights the observation that several of the variants there are connected with words italicized in the KJV.113 In another study I have shown that Smith used the New Testament epistle to the Hebrews in composing Alma 12-13.114 This is an anachronism in the BM text, and the language of the parallels reflects the KJV formulation. Smith's revision of the Bible also lends credence to the conclusion here. This work was not a "translation," even though so termed by Smith, but a reworking of the KJV. Though in places it has more substantial plusses than the BM Isaiah (chapter-length sometimes), its basic character is the same as the BM Isaiah. Many variants are associated with italics, develop from English polysemy, contradict Hebrew and Greek language and style, smooth out contextual and theological difficulties, and explain unclear words and ideas. The JSR, too, has more plusses than minuses. It is also noteworthy that work on the JSR began almost immediately after work on the BM. When the BM Isaiah is seen to be a revision of the KJV, the chronological proximity of the two works makes perfect sense. One can even conclude that work on the BM Isaiah was the training ground for work on the JSR. More broadly, the conclusion of this paper is supported by--and in turn supports--arguments that show that the whole of the BM is not an ancient work but a composition by Smith himself.... https://user.xmission.com/~research/central/isabm6.html#conclusions Coherent explanations of the Book of Mormon include the theory that Joseph Smith wrote it, or that somebody else that lived in his time and place wrote it. In contrast, the idea that a large civilization of Jews who anachronistically believed in 19th-century American protestant Christianity and lived in Mesoamerica for 1,000 years before they disappeared without an archeological trace but wrote down their history on anarchistic golden plates that they buried in New York so that Joseph Smith could translate them by looking at a stone in a hat before an angel took the plates away seems to be the least coherent explanation of the Book of Mormon imaginable. 1
SeekingUnderstanding Posted September 27, 2022 Posted September 27, 2022 17 minutes ago, Analytics said: Jews who anachronistically believed in 19th-century American protestant Christianity and lived in Mesoamerica for 1,000 years Which coincidentally was a popular theory for Native American origins in Joseph’s day.
smac97 Posted September 27, 2022 Posted September 27, 2022 1 hour ago, Analytics said: I suppose this has something to do with Kuhn and how our paradigms affect the way we see evidence, but I'm having a really hard time understanding your point of view here. What's incoherent about, say, David P. Wright's analysis? Professor wright has superlative qualifications to analyze the Isaiah chapters in the Book of Mormon. It turns out that Joseph Smith was right about some things--many verses of the KJV Bible are in fact not translated correctly. But here's the problem: when you compare the known KJV translation errors to the BoM, it becomes transparently obvious that Joseph Smith wasn't accurately translating an ancient, pristine manuscript. Rather, he was duplicating the errors in the KJV translation, and messing up other passages that were in fact translated fine in the KJV. The pattern for what was changed and how it was changed points to it being the work of a 19th century American. In the words of Professor Wright: Quote The simplest and most logical explanation is that the BM Isaiah derives directly from the KJV text with some secondary modifications and does not derive from an ancient text through translation. The larger net of evidence supports this conclusion. Other studies have demonstrated the use of the KJV in the composition of the BM. Stan Larson has shown that the "Sermon on the Mount" materials in 3 Nephi 12:1-14:27 are a revision of the KJV Matthew 5:3-7:27.112 One can add to his insights the observation that several of the variants there are connected with words italicized in the KJV.113 In another study I have shown that Smith used the New Testament epistle to the Hebrews in composing Alma 12-13.114 This is an anachronism in the BM text, and the language of the parallels reflects the KJV formulation. Smith's revision of the Bible also lends credence to the conclusion here. This work was not a "translation," even though so termed by Smith, but a reworking of the KJV. Though in places it has more substantial plusses than the BM Isaiah (chapter-length sometimes), its basic character is the same as the BM Isaiah. Many variants are associated with italics, develop from English polysemy, contradict Hebrew and Greek language and style, smooth out contextual and theological difficulties, and explain unclear words and ideas. The JSR, too, has more plusses than minuses. It is also noteworthy that work on the JSR began almost immediately after work on the BM. When the BM Isaiah is seen to be a revision of the KJV, the chronological proximity of the two works makes perfect sense. One can even conclude that work on the BM Isaiah was the training ground for work on the JSR. More broadly, the conclusion of this paper is supported by--and in turn supports--arguments that show that the whole of the BM is not an ancient work but a composition by Smith himself.... https://user.xmission.com/~research/central/isabm6.html#conclusions As FAIR notes: Quote The 21 chapters of Isaiah which are quoted (Chapters 2-14, 29, and 48-54) either partially or completely, represent about one-third of the book of Isaiah, but less than two and one-half percent of the total Book of Mormon. We also find that more than half of all verses quoted from Isaiah (234 of 433) differ from the King James version available to Joseph Smith.[6] Perhaps it may be said that the Book of Mormon follows the King James (Masoretic) text when the original meaning is closer to how the King James renders the passages in question. Additionally, we often find differences in Book of Mormon Isaiah texts where modern renderings of the text disagree.[7] One verse (2 Nephi 12:16), is not only different but adds a completely new phrase: "And upon all the ships of the sea." This non-King James addition agrees with the Greek (Septuagint) version of the Bible, which was first translated into English in 1808 by Charles Thomson. [8] Such a translation was "rare for its time."[9] The textual variants in the two texts have theological import and ancient support. John Tvedtnes has documented many in this study of the Isaiah variants in the Book of Mormon. A critic, David Wright, responded to Tvedtnes and Tvedtnes’ review of that critic’s response can be found here. ... If Joseph or anyone else actually tried to plagiarize the Book of Mormon, critics have failed to show the source of the remaining 93% (when all similar texts are removed). A 100% non-biblical book of scripture wouldn't have been much more difficult to produce. To be sure, Wright's critique is important, there are still a lot of questions about the Isaiah quotations that don't seem to be answered by "Joseph wrote it." The sheer number of variants are, I think, significant. There is also the assessment by Tvedtnes that "there are more {variants} favoring the Book of Mormon than the KJV, while most favor neither," the new phrase referenced above ("And upon all the ships of the sea"), Hoskisson's evaluation of an apparent Hebraism (in 2 Nephi 12:2) and its absence, Kyler Rasmussen's Bayesian analysis (concluding that "the issues surrounding comparisons with the King James aren’t as cut and dried as we’d be tempted to think" because "{t}he Book of Mormon doesn’t simply copy and paste the King James text, as some critics imply, and a critical analysis of its variants isn’t as decisive as some might expect," and "{t}he evidence in this area is complex and difficult, providing no obvious silver bullet to either side"), Robert Boylan's suggestion of 2 Nephi 27 as a "midrash of sorts," the observations of Boylan, Tvedtnes and Robert F. Smith regarding “Ramath” in 2 Nephi 10:29, Boylan's commentary on Wright's approach to 2 Nephi 13:10, and so on. Tvedtnes concludes: "One of the more remarkable linguistic evidences for the authenticity of the Book of Mormon as a translation from an ancient text lies in the Isaiah variants found in it." 1 hour ago, Analytics said: Coherent explanations of the Book of Mormon include the theory that Joseph Smith wrote it, or that somebody else that lived in his time and place wrote it. That's a conclusory explanation, but not really a "coherent" one. It leaves unaddressed all sorts of countervailing evidence. 1 hour ago, Analytics said: In contrast, the idea that a large civilization of Jews who anachronistically believed in 19th-century American protestant Christianity and lived in Mesoamerica for 1,000 years before they disappeared without an archeological trace but wrote down their history on anarchistic golden plates that they buried in New York so that Joseph Smith could translate them by looking at a stone in a hat before an angel took the plates away seems to be the least coherent explanation of the Book of Mormon imaginable. I made the following observation back in 2016 (in response to a similar derisively deck-stacked characterization of the Book of Mormon) : Quote Quote Angels giving plates of Gold to one person and that person using stones and or a thing called the Urim and Thummim to translate the book from some unknown language are fantastical claims and not events that are common nor really able to be demonstrated with much evidence. True enough. There are facets of the Church's explanation as to the origins of The Book of Mormon that are essentially matters of faith. But then we have the testimonial evidence of the Three Witnesses. And the Eight. And the character of those men. And their behavior subsequent to being estranged from Joseph Smith (and hence would be very motivated to disavow the "fantastical claims" you mention, yet they did not). And then there are the textual evidences. Lots of them. And the complexity of the text. And the internal chronological and geographic consistency. And the short time frame in which the text was produced. The ironic thing, really, is that as contemptuous as you are about the quantum of evidence in favor of the LDS Church's position on the origins of The Book of Mormon (you suggest that it is not supported by even "a simple low level bar of plausibility"), the alternative theories proposed by the critics are apparently even less plausible, so much so that folks like Cinepro (and, I suspect, you) will not commit to any of them or present theories of your making. At least the Mormons are taking the field. At least they are engaging in assessment of the evidence and defending their position based on it. Folks like you, on the other hand, are throwing their hands up in the air and insisting that the origins of the text are . . . well, you have no explanation, and instead buy into the "reasoning," such as it is, exemplified by this statement from Dale Morgan: Quote With my point of view on God, I am incapable of accepting the claims of Joseph Smith and the Mormons, be they however so convincing. If God does not exist, how can Joseph Smith’s story have any possible validity? I will look everywhere for explanations except to the ONE explanation that is the position of the church. Not a lot of reasoning in that. Not much of an assessment of the evidence. And also this (from 2019) : Quote Quote A lot of what ifs...but all you and others have is that you have faith that it's true, right? At least that's what I've been told. I have faith because I have examined the evidence and received spiritual promptings confirming the divinity of the Restoration. For me, the ultimate source of knowledge is the Spirit, but the catalyst through which that source is made manifest is the Book of Mormon. It has to be accounted for. The statements of the witnesses have to be accounted for. The text of The Book of Mormon exists. The LDS Church has presented an explanation as to how that text came to exist. Just ask any missionary. In contrast, critics and dissidents have presented alternative explanations as to the origins of the text. That is certainly their prerogative. But at that point they are the ones making a claim. They are the ones asserting that the Church's teachings about the origins of the book are factually false. They are the ones making assertions about naturalistic or quasi-religious-but-still-rejecting-the-Church's-position explanations for The Book of Mormon. The "Inspired Fiction" theory is an example of such countervailing explanations for the existence and content of the text, as is the Spaulding-Rigdon Theory (and other "multiple author" theories), the "Joseph Smith as the sole author" theory, the "View of the Hebrews" theory, Grant Palmer's "The Golden Pot" theory, "The Late War" theory, and so on. So the problem arises when critics and dissidents A) reject the LDS Church's explanation for the Book of Mormon (their prerogative, but bear with me...), B) present an alternative naturalistic (or the oh-so-weird hybrid of fraudulent and inspired) explanation, C) fail to substantiate or provide evidence for such alternative explanations, and D) complain about being mistreated when they are called on their poor reasoning, lack of evidence, etc. I have found these countervailing theories to be very flawed in, to the extent such things exist, their reasoning, their assessment of relevant evidence, and so on. Conjecture and evidence-free speculation predominate. For example, some of the "Inspired Fiction" folks positively twist themselves up in knots trying to explain how Joseph Smith was a "pious fraud" who was inspired by God to write the plates, but who also fabricated a fake set of plates, who lied to or colluded with the Witnesses about presenting false testimonies about these plates, who spent the rest of his life lying about the plates and the origins of The Book of Mormon, and also about how Joseph Smith was alternatively insane or profoundly mentally ill when he did all of these things (hence the "pious fraud" moniker), and also about how all the prophets and apostles from Joseph Smith to now have either been complicit in perpetuating this massive fraud or else have been collectively and uniformly duped and deceived by it, and that God is somehow the author and instigator of this massive web of lies and deceit. So yes, when the Church presents claims about The Book of Mormon, then the Church has duty to substantiate its position on that issue. In this I think the Church and its members have done a rather good job of A) focusing on having "the Spirit" be the primary means of conversion, while also B) marshaling some quantum of secondary, non-dispositive "evidence" (the Witness statements about the Plates, textual evidences, Skousen's work, etc.). Likewise, when critics and dissidents present alternative claims about The Book of Mormon, then it is their duty to substantiate their positions on that issue. In this I think they have . . . not done very well at all. Again, the text of The Book of Mormon exists. It should be accounted for. In 2004 Daniel Peterson wrote an excellent article on this issue: "'In the Hope that Something Will Stick': Changing Explanations for The Book of Mormon". It's worth a read. Essentially, he posits that the Church's position is that The Book of Mormon is a translation, through divine means, of an ancient historical text. He further posits that the critics' position is that The Book of Mormon is a fraud, that it is not a translation of an ancient historical text. Well, if that's their position, then I think they need to defend it. I think they have done a poor job of this so far. Of course, the critics/opponents of the Church are not obligated to provide a coherent counter-explanation for The Book of Mormon. But the point is, they have not been able to. We're coming up on nearly 200 years since the original publication of the text, and yet when the chips are down, and when a well-informed person like Daniel Peterson (or Ryan Dahle) argues for the plausibility of the LDS position, we don't get reasoned responses and rebuttals. We get glib sarcasm. We get curt dismissals. We get anything but an engagement of the evidence. This is part of why Daniel Peterson "can't manage to disbelieve," and why he suggests to critics (correctly, in my view) that "it’s intellectually incumbent upon people like that to, come on, give us an answer to this. Otherwise it’s like guerrilla warfare. You attack and attack and attack, you always withdraw, you never defend territory. You never have to stake out your own explanation, which then will be subject to criticism and attack." This is likely why Ryan Dahle seems to be suggesting, in the absence of a coherent counter-explanation re: historicity, "the evidences in favor of faith are collectively better than the current competing arguments." This is likely why Daniel Peterson's trenchant assessment of the various competing (and contradictory) naturalistic explanations for The Book of Mormon merits some real consideration: Quote The recent American Apocrypha further illustrates the apparent inability of Book of Mormon critics to agree on much of anything except that the Book of Mormon is false. Only a few months ago, in fact, one of the editors of American Apocrypha explicitly, huffily, and repeatedly refused to answer a simple question as to whether Joseph Smith believed that he possessed metal plates or knew that he did not-which seems the kind of question that any skeptic’s fundamental theory of Book of Mormon origins must answer very early on. He would not, he said, lower himself to thinking in such simple-minded categories. ... But then we read Scott Dunn’s essay, according to which Joseph Smith created the Book of Mormon by a process of automatic writing. It just flowed out of him. Joseph was dissociative but sincere, and Dunn vigorously denies that “conscious fraud” was involved. In fact, the dictation process was probably scarcely “conscious” at all, in any normal sense of the word. If Dunn is right, Firmage and Vogel are wrong. Mutually contradictory accounts are not mutually reinforcing. Quite the contrary. They weaken each other. Imagine a murder case in which one witness for the prosecution definitively states that he clearly saw the defendant, Mr. John Jones, who was wearing his characteristic Stetson cowboy hat, empty a six-shooter into the head of the victim, Miss Roberta Smith, at point-blank range, as she stood by the hot dog stand on the beach. A second prosecution witness declares that he saw the defendant, Mrs. Joanna Jones, striding briskly out of the twenty-seventh floor restaurant where the murder took place, with a fashionable black beret on her head. The prosecution’s forensic pathologist, meanwhile, announces his expert verdict that, from the marks on Mr. Robert Smith’s throat, the victim died of strangulation. With evidence of that character, the prosecution wouldn’t even bother to seek an indictment, and could never even in its remotest fantasies dream of conviction. See also here (also by Dr. Peterson). See also this link for some additional thoughts I have posted previously. Thanks, -Smac 1
Analytics Posted September 27, 2022 Posted September 27, 2022 17 minutes ago, smac97 said: As FAIR notes: To be sure, Wright's critique is important, there are still a lot of questions about the Isaiah quotations that don't seem to be answered by "Joseph wrote it." The sheer number of variants are, I think, significant. There is also the assessment by Tvedtnes that "there are more {variants} favoring the Book of Mormon than the KJV, while most favor neither," the new phrase referenced above ("And upon all the ships of the sea"), Hoskisson's evaluation of an apparent Hebraism (in 2 Nephi 12:2) and its absence, Kyler Rasmussen's Bayesian analysis (concluding that "the issues surrounding comparisons with the King James aren’t as cut and dried as we’d be tempted to think" because "{t}he Book of Mormon doesn’t simply copy and paste the King James text, as some critics imply, and a critical analysis of its variants isn’t as decisive as some might expect," and "{t}he evidence in this area is complex and difficult, providing no obvious silver bullet to either side"), Robert Boylan's suggestion of 2 Nephi 27 as a "midrash of sorts," the observations of Boylan, Tvedtnes and Robert F. Smith regarding “Ramath” in 2 Nephi 10:29, Boylan's commentary on Wright's approach to 2 Nephi 13:10, and so on. Tvedtnes concludes: "One of the more remarkable linguistic evidences for the authenticity of the Book of Mormon as a translation from an ancient text lies in the Isaiah variants found in it." I find Wright's critique to dominate in this space--his qualifications surpass Tvedtnes's, and his analysis comes across as more competent, thorough, and unbiased. Ultimately, all humans have strong confirmation biases and want to pick experts (and evidence and arguments) based on whether or not we like their conclusions. The tools of skepticism are designed to cut through confirmation bias. In contrast, the tools of faith are designed to reinforce confirmation bias (e.g. "even if ye can no more than a desire to believe, let this desire work in you.") 17 minutes ago, smac97 said: That's a conclusory explanation, but not really a "coherent" one. It leaves unaddressed all sorts of countervailing evidence. The question is what hypothesis best explains the totality of the evidence. For you, is believing in the Book of Mormon a matter of revelation and faith, or is it a matter of proper scientific analysis that leads to the only "coherent explanation" of the evidence? You seem to be saying the latter. Do I misunderstand you? 1
Benjamin McGuire Posted September 27, 2022 Author Posted September 27, 2022 19 hours ago, smac97 said: Your uncharitable, uncivil, presumptuous, boorish declarations about me notwithstanding, I am stating what I actually think and believe. I have no incentive to be "dissembling over what {I} mean," as this is just a message board, and I have never met you and likely never will (given your behavior here, perhaps that's for the best). I started participating in this thread because you had said some interesting things, and because I agreed with some and not with others. We have, unfortunately, ended up with you holding me in very low regard. I don't think I have said anything to deserve such disparagements as you have leveled (publicly), but this is just a tiny corner of the Internet, and so your slurs don't mean much. Realistically, this conversation has come to and end. I'll agree with you on one point: 19 hours ago, smac97 said: Well, of course. I'm lying, after all. Actually, I don't agree with that assessment at all. To claim that you were lying, I would have to believe that you don't believe what you are saying. I certainly believe that you believe what you are saying. I also think that you have a tendency (as your profession requires) to place winning the argument over discovering the truth. You haven't addressed my issue. You may think so, but you haven't. I'll illustrate, add a couple of comments and leave you to have the last word: 18 hours ago, smac97 said: Applying these concepts here: Apologetic arguments and evidences can help the reader of the Book of Mormon move beyond "the assumption" that the text is "true." Apologetic arguments and evidences provide contextualizing information that can help an individual find "plausible grounds" for accepting the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon, even if these grounds are not necessarily equivalent to "a probability." Apologetic arguments and evidences help "nudge" the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon "across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Apologetic arguments and evidences help the Book of Mormon obtain "facial plausibility." that is, they can help the reader "draw the reasonable inference" that the claimed origins are true and correct. Apologetic arguments and evidences can help a reader to proceed past "a sheer possibility" that the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon are truel Applying these concepts: Critical arguments and evidences can help the reader of the Book of Mormon move beyond "the assumption" that the text is "false." Critical arguments and evidences provide contextualizing information that can help an individual find "plausible grounds" for accepting a modern origins of the Book of Mormon, even if these grounds are not necessarily equivalent to "a probability." Critical arguments and evidences help "nudge" the belief in a modern origin of the Book of Mormon "across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Critical arguments and evidences help the Book of Mormon as a modern text obtain "facial plausibility." that is, they can help the reader "draw the reasonable inference" that the claimed origins are lies. Critical arguments and evidences can help a reader to proceed past "a sheer possibility" that the claimed origins of the Book of Mormon are lies! You see how easy this is? You suggest at one point that "I don't think so. Again: I am not trying to shift from 'impossible' to 'impossible,' but rather from 'possible' to 'more possible' and 'more probable.' " Possibility has a cap. Once something is 100% possible, it doesn't make much sense to discuss the ways in which it could be 105% possible. Our language allows us to make nonsensical statements. We could say that something is "completely unique." The implication is that something could be other than "completely unique" which means that we didn't consider it to be truly unique to begin with. We might say that "it is impossible to jump from the ground to the top of that building" and then pointing to a second (even taller) building to say that "it is even more impossible to jump from the ground to the top of that taller building". But, if it is impossible (with 100% certainty) to jump to the top of the first building, it isn't any more impossible to jump to the top of the second building. They are equally impossible. When you talk about moving something from 'possible' to 'more possible' it fits into this category. If something is 100% possible, then adding an additional statement of possibility can't make it 'more possible,' it can at best make it only make it equally possible. If it isn't possible to begin with, then we can certainly reject arguments for the impossibility and the degree to which we do so may make something more possible. But we can only do this until we are arguing that it is actually possible. Aggregating evidences may work well in the environments you work in, but it doesn't work well mathematically. Why? Because probability (in terms of likelihood) is multiplicative (this feature is abused by those trying to prove the existence of God for example). The book that was linked earlier - The Improbability Principle explains it like this: Quote Consider the following scenario: John initially took a degree in mathematics, and followed it with a PhD in astrophysics. After that, he worked in the physics department of a university for a while but then found a job in the back room of an algorithmic trading company, developing highly sophisticated statistical models for predicting movements of the financial markets. In his spare time he attends science fiction conventions. Now, which of the following do you think has the higher probability? A: John is married with two children. B: John is married with two children, and likes to spend his evenings tackling mathematical puzzles and playing computer games. Many people answer B. In fact, the set of people described by the characteristics in B is a subset of those described by the characteristics in A: for John to have the characteristics of B, he has those of A and more . It follows that the probability that John is described by B cannot be larger than the probability that he’s described by A. By the same token, if we use these propositions: A: Joseph Smith translated the Book of Mormon with divine assistance. B: Joseph Smith translated the Book of Mormon with divine assistance and Lehi led his family from Jerusalem to the region identified archaeologically as NHM and then further to the location called Wadi Sayq. Which has the higher probability? A has the higher probability. Why? Because even if the probability of Joseph Smith translating the Book of Mormon is 100%, it can only be reduced by the likelihood that the identification of NHM with Nahom, and the identification of Wadi Sayq with the place the Book of Mormon calls "Bountiful". If each of the three parts individually have a 100% chance, then the best case scenario is that the likelihood moves from 100% to 100%. But if we determine that the A is 100 percent likely, and that the NHM identification is only 80% likely, and that the identification of Wadi Sayq with Bountiful is 80% likely, then the likelihood of B is 64%. Every time we add one of your evidences, it makes the aggregate less likely. And if all of the evidences are 100% likely, it doesn't change the likelihood of the original proposition. In other words, mathematically, none of the aggregated evidence is able to tell us anything about that first proposition. If each piece of your evidence has a likelihood, the likelihood for each piece is less than or equal to one ( <= 1). When we aggregate evidences we multiply those likelihoods together. This means that the likelihood of an aggregate of evidences is always less than or equal to the lowest likelihood of the individual likelihoods that have been aggregated together. Even if we cannot assign real values to these likelihoods, in abstract, the aggregation of likelihoods always provides a lower likelihood not a larger one. But, as the author of the text I quoted suggests, most people interpret this in the other direction. And this is because or brains like post-hoc explanations. The critic fares no better in this analysis. They of course, start with the premise that divine assistance for Joseph Smith and the Book of Mormon is impossible. So, if these evidences are not able to tell us anything about the original premise, what can they tell us? Well, the NHM and Wadi Sayq evidences can be used to argue that when we read the text a certain way and interpret what we know of modern and historical regional geography, that we can match our interpretations to produce a potential path that Lehi took from Jerusalem to the Ocean. What is the likelihood of this? It's probably reasonably low given all of the interpretation going on. But, it creates a possibility that the narrative could reflect an historic journey. The Seal of Mulek? The same sort of thing. How low is that probablility? One way to think about this might be to look at Chadwick's article about the Seal of Mulek and count up the number of places where probability is invoked using the word "if" - Quote were persons such as Malkiyahu, designated in the Bible or on stamp seals as ben hamelek, actually biological sons of kings? If so, ... If the title ben hamelek were a designation for a royal official ... If ben hamelek could refer to a male of the royal family other than a king's biological son ... If Maaseiah were nothing more than a generic court official, ... If Jeremiah 38:6 refers to any king other than king Zedekiah ... If, therefore, Malkiyahu were the first son of Zedekiah, ... And if that is true, it is entirely possible that Malkiyahu the son of Zedekiah could have been the Mulek of whome the Book of Mormon reports. Other men in Judah with the ben hamelek title are known to have possessed multiple stamp seals, and if Malkiyahu/Mulek did also ... So, to paraphrase, this evidence depends to some extent on the idea that ben hamelek refers only to a biological son of the king (and not to royal officials or other male members of the royal family), on the idea that Jeremiah 38:6 refers specifically to King Zedekiah, and on the idea that Malkiyahu is the first son of King Zedekiah. It would further be helpful if Malkiyahu had multiple stamp seals identifying himself in this way. This is a lot of conjecture - especially to arrive at the point where others might call this evidence that Joseph Smith, with divine assistance, produced the Book of Mormon. It might be like a court case where a person was shot with a 9mm handgun. And the prosecutor argues - well, if the accused had a 9mm handgun, and if he was in the vicinity of the shooting, and if he pulled the trigger, then he is guilty of killing the other man. That is also a lot of ifs. No one would consider the fact that he could have had a gun, that he could have been in the vicinity of the victim at the time of death, that he could have pulled the trigger to be evidence of anything without some sort of indication that in fact he was there, that he had the gun, and that he pulled the trigger. That would all be evidence. What evidence do we have that Lehi was at Wadi Sayq? This doesn't mean that we don't have evidence for the production narratives of the Book of Mormon. We have the narratives themselves. We have our witnesses. We have a bunch of other stuff - all of that can be considered evidence (which can be both used and contested). And using that evidence we can discuss (as lawyers do, I suppose) which narrative is more convincing in the light of that evidence. The problem that I see is how these arguments are used. Typically (as you noted earlier) this is all part of a larger dialogue. The critics make the claim that Joseph pulled all of this from his environment. The apologist will claim that it would be impossible for Joseph Smith to have taken these kinds of details from his environment. And so we get into the discussion about maps available in the time of Joseph Smith that indicated details like Nehem (NHM) or the location of Bountiful. So we can find several essays that deal with this question - and from the apologist's arguments we also see the idea that even if these maps existed, Joseph would be unlikely to have access to them. But these issues are secondary at best to the question of proposition A. The likelihood that Joseph Smith translated the Book of Mormon with divine assistance (or simply read it - it doesn't matter for this discussion) isn't dependent on any of these other things. It can be true and our identification of NHM as Nahom or of Wadi Sayq as Bountiful are completely irrelevant. These issues are not evidence for the question of whether or not Joseph Smith produced the Book of Mormon with divine assistance unless we make a second argument that that is required to make these things relevant - and they become possible evidence for that second argument. That second argument (and we see this in your comments) is almost always involved with the possibility or impossibility of Joseph's "getting it right" on his own. You argue that the critic has to engage all of the apologists arguments. Why? The apologetic arguments don't really relate to the premise any more than the critics arguments relate to the premises of a believer. Many of the critics will simply state that the whole angel thing is an impossibility. Meaning that it doesn't matter what you attach to that argument, it will remain a dead argument - it will still be impossible (and this is the point of the Holmes quote - once the one explanation is impossible, the alternative, no matter how unlikely, must be true). These two sets of arguments will never come together because of this. We will always get stuck arguing about the merely possible instead of the merely likely. And neither side will have any particular vested value in discussing what part of their own theory could simply be coincidence ... At any rate, I have tried again. Feel free to have the last word. 1
smac97 Posted September 27, 2022 Posted September 27, 2022 1 hour ago, Benjamin McGuire said: At any rate, I have tried again. Feel free to have the last word. Nah. I'll leave it to you. -Smac
JarMan Posted September 28, 2022 Posted September 28, 2022 While we're mentioning things that apologists get wrong, I'll pile on here by mentioning a couple of logical fallacies relevant to the OP that apologists often use. 1) When a certain criticism of x is shown to be invalid, it's implied or directly stated that this strengthens the case for x. Bad or invalid arguments against x say nothing whatsoever about the truth of x. This often occurs, for example, when pointing out all of the things critics have "gotten wrong" about the Book of Mormon. As if the longer the list, the stronger the case for the Book of Mormon. Stop doing this. 2) Comparing the relative likelihood of a supernatural explanation of x with a natural explanation. There is no such thing as an empirical likelihood or probability of a supernatural occurrence. This type of comparison is meaningless; it is a category error. For instance--it would have been very difficult for Joseph Smith to have created the Book of Mormon, so the more likely explanation is that it was revealed to him by God. I've use this one myself. It's tantalizing, but ultimately fallacious. 1
Ryan Dahle Posted September 28, 2022 Posted September 28, 2022 (edited) 13 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: This doesn't mean that we don't have evidence for the production narratives of the Book of Mormon. We have the narratives themselves. We have our witnesses. We have a bunch of other stuff - all of that can be considered evidence (which can be both used and contested). And using that evidence we can discuss (as lawyers do, I suppose) which narrative is more convincing in the light of that evidence. The problem that I see is how these arguments are used. Typically (as you noted earlier) this is all part of a larger dialogue. The critics make the claim that Joseph pulled all of this from his environment. The apologist will claim that it would be impossible for Joseph Smith to have taken these kinds of details from his environment. And so we get into the discussion about maps available in the time of Joseph Smith that indicated details like Nehem (NHM) or the location of Bountiful. So we can find several essays that deal with this question - and from the apologist's arguments we also see the idea that even if these maps existed, Joseph would be unlikely to have access to them. But these issues are secondary at best to the question of proposition A. The likelihood that Joseph Smith translated the Book of Mormon with divine assistance (or simply read it - it doesn't matter for this discussion) isn't dependent on any of these other things. It can be true and our identification of NHM as Nahom or of Wadi Sayq as Bountiful are completely irrelevant. These issues are not evidence for the question of whether or not Joseph Smith produced the Book of Mormon with divine assistance unless we make a second argument that that is required to make these things relevant - and they become possible evidence for that second argument. That second argument (and we see this in your comments) is almost always involved with the possibility or impossibility of Joseph's "getting it right" on his own. You argue that the critic has to engage all of the apologists arguments. Why? The apologetic arguments don't really relate to the premise any more than the critics arguments relate to the premises of a believer. Many of the critics will simply state that the whole angel thing is an impossibility. Meaning that it doesn't matter what you attach to that argument, it will remain a dead argument - it will still be impossible (and this is the point of the Holmes quote - once the one explanation is impossible, the alternative, no matter how unlikely, must be true). These two sets of arguments will never come together because of this. We will always get stuck arguing about the merely possible instead of the merely likely. And neither side will have any particular vested value in discussing what part of their own theory could simply be coincidence A major disconnect for me is that your characterization of the assumptions and arguments on both sides of the debate seems extreme to begin with. For instance, I feel pretty confident that Joseph Smith didn't create the chiastic structures in the Book of Mormon, but I definitely wouldn't say it is categorically impossible for him to have produced them. I just think it highly doubtful that he did. Likewise, I don't think that most people on the other side of the debate really think it is categorically impossible for an angel (if such a thing exists) to direct a farmer to an ancient record. They just find that proposition highly unlikely and haven't yet found anything to convince them otherwise. Thus, this whole "impossible" business that you are propounding just doesn't seem like a helpful starting framework. More importantly, however, is that (at least from my perspective) the debate really isn't for those on the extreme ends. It is for those in the middle. And there is a wide spectrum of beliefs and dispositions and starting assumptions held by those in the middle. Thus, your critique of why these arguments are fundamentally flawed (i.e., because their major lines of evidence will never be convincing to those on the extreme opposite ends of the debate) seems to misunderstand whom the arguments are actually aimed to persuade. Final point: When I assess any argument for or against the Book of Mormon's authenticity, I always try (to the best of my ability) to first assess that piece of evidence on its own terms. Only then do I attempt to assign its relative weight amidst the complex array of competing lines of evidence. This automatically opens up two different levels of assessment that I think can be useful. If an argument is fairly strong or useful in isolation and only fails to be persuasive because the counter-argument is exceedingly compelling (to a given individual's perspective), that is a pretty good sign that the first argument was indeed based on meaningful evidence. I recognize that this rationale validates all sorts of arguments against the Book of Mormon in the sense that it legitimizes them as "evidence." And I'm okay with that. In fact, it seems to be a very good thing. Because then I actually have to carefully look at such arguments and assess them in a serious manner on their own terms, without just dismissing them because I already have my mind made up based on apriori assumptions that are extraneous to the data in question. In lots of cases I can say, "Yes, that seems to be pretty good evidence. Nice work critics. It ultimately doesn't convince me, but I understand why you are persuaded by that piece of data." Dismissing such arguments (i.e., labeling them as "non-evidence") by adopting a highly prohibitive statistical definition of "plausible"--one which is not only irrelevant to most off the available evidence on either side of the debate but also which is ramped up even further by unnecessarily privileging certain apriori assumptions held on the extreme ends of the debate--just doesn't seem helpful. This should be obvious, no matter which side of the debate one is coming from. Edited September 28, 2022 by Ryan Dahle 1
OGHoosier Posted September 28, 2022 Posted September 28, 2022 2 hours ago, JarMan said: Comparing the relative likelihood of a supernatural explanation of x with a natural explanation. There is no such thing as an empirical likelihood or probability of a supernatural occurrence. This type of comparison is meaningless; it is a category error. For instance--it would have been very difficult for Joseph Smith to have created the Book of Mormon, so the more likely explanation is that it was revealed to him by God. I've use this one myself. It's tantalizing, but ultimately fallacious. This begs the question against "supernatural" occurrences. The term "supernatural" is an artifact of an outdated materialist paradigm (especially in the context of Latter-day Saint theology) and I don't believe that applying it to events has any meaningful non-prejudicial impact on the assessment of likelihood. 2
mfbukowski Posted September 28, 2022 Posted September 28, 2022 4 hours ago, JarMan said: For instance--it would have been very difficult for Joseph Smith to have created the Book of Mormon, so the more likely explanation is that it was revealed to him by God. I've use this one myself. It's tantalizing, but ultimately fallacious Then I guess it is a lie that Joseph "translated" it by the power of God. I thought the church taught that. Thanks for letting us know it is a logical fallacy. By the way, what fallacy would that be?
Kenngo1969 Posted September 28, 2022 Posted September 28, 2022 @Benjamin McGuire Quote This isn't to say that people can't read some of our scriptural texts as Wisdom literature (just as anyone could read Cinderella as biography). So yes, this is part of that reason. Right on, Dude! I don't know about anyone else, but, after reading such snide barbs as this, I'm convinced, thoroughly, that you're interested in good-faith dialogue with your interlocutors! (Sneer much?)
Benjamin McGuire Posted September 28, 2022 Author Posted September 28, 2022 2 hours ago, Kenngo1969 said: Right on, Dude! I don't know about anyone else, but, after reading such snide barbs as this, I'm convinced, thoroughly, that you're interested in good-faith dialogue with your interlocutors! The idea of reading Cinderella as biography is an argument raised by Peter Rabinowitz in his narrative theory. It isn't mine. I am not sure why you think this is snide. In his article, Truth in Fiction, he wrote this: Quote If we fail to pretend to be members of the narrative audience, or if we misapprehend the beliefs of that audience, we are apt to make invalid, even perverse, interpretations. For instance, the narrative audience of Cinderella accepts the existence of fairy godmothers (although the authorial audience does not share this belief). A reader who refuses to pretend to so believe will see Cinderella as a neurotic, perhaps psychotic, young woman subject to hallucinations. And if you go back earlier in this thread, you will see that I had been discussing that particular subject earlier, so this isn't coming out of nowhere. It's the continuation of a topic, and it is a relatively serious engagement with other participants here in this forum. The issue is of some importance to discussions about the Book of Mormon. Why? Because our perception of genre matters. This is a relatively extreme example (but it is useful for that reason - the principle is very clear). If we read the fairy tale as biography it immediately changes what we get from it even though the content of the text doesn't change at all. The same principle is true when we discuss the Book of Mormon. We have to recognize that for those who read the text as fiction, as history, or as some sort of non-historical spiritual text, each approach naturally comes to different meanings about the text because of the assumptions they bring when reading the text. 3
Benjamin McGuire Posted September 28, 2022 Author Posted September 28, 2022 7 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said: Final point: When I assess any argument for or against the Book of Mormon's authenticity, ... I am curious to know what sort of argument you think is an argument for or against the Book of Mormon's authenticity - not just what the argument is, but also how it functions to attack or defend the question of authenticity. And, I think it's important to know what you mean when you use the term "authenticity".
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