Update on Huntsman Lawsuit: Ninth Circuit Reverses Trial Court

[PacMan]

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

If I donate $1,000 in tithing to the Church, and if the Church thereafter invests that $1,000 and realizes a profit of $200, would "a disinterested CPA" say that my tithe was $1,000 or $1,200?

This is the beginning and end of it. The $200 is not, in any part, a donation. It is proceeds from a donation and, therefore, is definitionally distinct. 

Furthermore, tithing, as the church had widely publicized the term, is defined as 10% of a member’s interest or income. There is no way that the $200 can be considered as income to anyone other than the church. Accordingly, it is definitionally precluded from being called tithing. 

Ensign Peak’s oversight is irrelevant. I personally have multiple accounts holding different personal investments. The church can invest its money through Ensign Peak just like it can Fidelity or Vanguard. Prove me wrong.

Lastly, the notion that a church has a fiduciary duty to members to manage the [i]church’s[i] money is nonsensical, if not frivolous. The term has no legal meaning. Despite the ridiculous attempt to conflate meanings, membership means nothing in a corporation—such as the Corporation of the President of the Church. 

Edited July 24, 2024 by PacMan

[Analytics]

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

Here: "It is disingenuous for the church to claim that no tithing funds were used to fund the City Creek Mall."

He then presents the foregoing list, apparently to demonstrate that tithing funds were used to fund the City Creek Mall.

He, like you, re-defines "tithing" to include monies which are not voluntary donations from members of the Church, and are instead generated by the investment of reserve funds.

For reference, here is the list:

1- Members pay tithing
2- Tithing in excess of current needs is invested
3- Investments earn a return
4- Money from these investment returns were reinvested into the mall.

I’ll just make three points.

First, it sounds like you basically agree that this list accurately depicts what happened.

Second, nowhere on this list is tithing redefined. In fact, the list explicitly defines tithing as what the members pay.

Third, the list is explaining what he meant by saying tithing funds were used. The key word is used. The funds were donated. The funds were invested. The investment income generated income. That income was used for another investment. Nowhere in that chain of events is tithing redefined. But if there wouldn’t have been tithing, there wouldn’t have been savings and investment income, and therefore there wouldn’t have been money for the mall project. That is what he meant.

But just so I can understand your thinking better, let me make the following assertion.

Opening the refrigerator door causes the light in the refrigerator to go on. This is because opening the door activates a light switch which closes an electrical circuit that turns on the light.

If I said that, would you accuse me of redefining refrigerator door to mean lightbulb? 

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

The Church's definition of tithing is X.

Your (re)definition of tithing is X plus some other stuff. 

No it isn’t. My definition is X; exactly the same as the Church’s.

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

It is this emandation / alteration / addition that does not work.

I wouldn’t know anything about it because I’m not altering or adding anything to the definition of tithing. I simply believe that using tithing revenue to generate investment income is using tithing. Nothing about that claim redefines tithing. It’s like saying using insurance premiums to generate investment income to pay claims is using premiums to pay claims. It isn’t that hard of a concept, and it is in the dead-center of my wheelhouse.

What a bizarre hill to die on.

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

If I donate $1,000 in tithing to the Church, and if the Church thereafter invests that $1,000 and realizes a profit of $200, would "a disinterested CPA" say that my tithe was $1,000 or $1,200?

I’d be more interested in what he thinks about my actual claim: if you donated $1,000 in tithing to the Church and the Church invested that money to realize a profit of $200, is it a reasonable point of view to say that the Church used your tithing to generate that investment income?

[Analytics]

1 hour ago, webbles said:

How would we find out if the fiduciary duty include the "best practices of financial transparency"?  Would that be in a law somewhere?  And what if that law had an exemption for religious organizations, because I've noticed that a lot of reporting laws have such exemptions (for instance the 990T form has such exemption).

For what it’s worth, I just asked Chat GPT4 the following question: In the state of Utah, do church leaders have a legal fiduciary duty regarding funds it receives in donations? What is that fiduciary duty? To whom is it owed? What does it entail?

Here is the answer, with some relevant assertions underlined. The answer was:

In Utah, as in other states, church leaders typically have a fiduciary duty regarding the management of funds received in donations. This duty arises from the broader principles of trust law and nonprofit corporation law, which are generally applicable to religious organizations.

Legal Fiduciary Duty of Church Leaders in Utah

1. Fiduciary Duty Definition:

• Fiduciary Duty: A fiduciary duty is a legal obligation of one party to act in the best interest of another. In the context of church leaders, this duty involves managing church assets, including donations, in a manner that is faithful to the church's mission and purposes.

2. To Whom is the Fiduciary Duty Owed?

• Congregation and Donors: The fiduciary duty is primarily owed to the church as an organization, which includes the congregation and, in a broader sense, the donors. Church leaders must ensure that the funds are used in accordance with the church’s mission and the intentions of the donors.
• Beneficiaries: If donations are earmarked for specific purposes or projects, the fiduciary duty extends to ensuring that the funds are used as specified.

3. What Does the Fiduciary Duty Entail?

• Duty of Care: Church leaders must manage the church’s finances and assets with the same care that an ordinarily prudent person in a similar position would exercise. This includes making informed decisions, conducting due diligence, and overseeing financial transactions appropriately.
• Duty of Loyalty: Church leaders must act in the best interest of the church, avoiding conflicts of interest and refraining from using their position for personal gain. Any potential conflicts of interest must be disclosed and managed appropriately.
• Duty of Obedience: Church leaders must ensure that the church’s activities and use of funds comply with applicable laws and the church’s governing documents, such as its bylaws or articles of incorporation.

Practical Implications

• Transparent Accounting: Church leaders must maintain accurate and transparent financial records, ensuring that donations are properly recorded and used for their intended purposes.
• Regular Audits: Conducting regular financial audits can help ensure compliance with fiduciary duties and identify any mismanagement or discrepancies in the handling of church funds.
• Policies and Procedures: Implementing and adhering to robust financial policies and procedures can help church leaders fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities and protect the church’s assets.
• Communication with Donors: Maintaining open communication with donors about how their contributions are being used can help build trust and demonstrate accountability.

In summary, church leaders in Utah have a fiduciary duty to manage donated funds responsibly and in alignment with the church’s mission and donor intentions. This duty encompasses the obligations of care, loyalty, and obedience, ensuring that the funds are used appropriately and in the best interest of the church and its beneficiaries.

FWIW

Edited July 24, 2024 by Analytics

[Analytics]

4 hours ago, smac97 said:

I am more interested in the substance of the Complaint, which I find to be fairly poor.  And surprisingly so.

Given your lack of expertise on the fiduciary duties of church leaders, I’m not sure your opinion on this should carry much weight.

4 hours ago, smac97 said:

I suspect their interest is driven by the prospect of generating notoriety for their firm, and dipping into the Church's deep pockets (including via settlement).

I don’t see any value or notoriety in signing on to a losing case.

4 hours ago, smac97 said:

The Fiduciary Duty claim in the current iteration of the Complaint is based on the same Utah statute as is cited above (Utah Code Ann. § 13-22-23).  As noted above, the statute is silent as to whom a charitable organization owes this duty.  My sense is that the duty is owed by its principals (the flesh and blood people who run it) to the organization, not to the donors.  If that were the case, every donor to every charity would have legal standing to sue it, allege a violation of the duty, conduct ruinously expensive discovery, etc. so as to extract a hefty settlement (or judgment), etc.  I just don't see donors - such as the plaintiffs in the MDL lawsuit - having standing to assert such a claim.

A couple of years ago, I was nominated to be on the ballot for a board of directors seat of a large, prestigious, and very well financed professional organization. Part of the processes of running for the board seat was training on my fiduciary duties. From memory,  I was instructed that I, as a board member, had a very serious responsibility to be diligent in my duties to the organization, and to put the organization’s interests ahead of my own when I was acting as a board member. I was expected to vigorously debate issues that the board discussed, but once the board reached a decision, I needed to keep the details of the discussion private and publicly advocate for what the board had decided. If I wasn’t willing to do that, I needed to resign my seat and would then be free to speak freely.

Based on that experience and what Chat GPT said, I believe it is the leaders of the Church who have a fiduciary duty to the Church itself, which includes a fiduciary duty to the membership.

4 hours ago, smac97 said:

Fiduciary duty claims also suffer from the same fundamental weakness as the fraud-based claims: they are pretty much guaranteed to be barred by the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine.

I don’t see how. I asked Chat GPT4 what the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine is, and if it implies that churches are exempt from fiduciary duty. It said:

The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine is a legal principle rooted in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which ensures the separation of church and state. This doctrine generally prevents civil courts from adjudicating disputes that involve religious doctrine, internal church governance, or ecclesiastical matters. The rationale is that secular courts should not entangle themselves in religious matters, as this could infringe upon religious freedom and the autonomy of religious institutions.

Key Points of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

1. Religious Doctrine and Practice: Courts refrain from deciding cases that require interpretation or application of religious doctrine, theology, or practice.
2. Internal Church Governance: Matters related to church governance, such as the appointment of clergy, internal church disputes, and disciplinary actions, are typically outside the jurisdiction of civil courts.
3. First Amendment Protection: The doctrine is based on the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, which protect religious institutions from governmental interference.

Fiduciary Duty and Churches

The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine does not imply that churches are exempt from fiduciary duties, particularly when it comes to financial management and other secular activities. Here’s how fiduciary duty interacts with the doctrine:

1. Financial Management: While courts avoid adjudicating matters of religious doctrine, they can and do address cases involving the secular activities of religious organizations, such as financial management, fraud, and embezzlement. Church leaders have fiduciary duties to manage the church’s assets responsibly and transparently.

2. Accountability: Church leaders are still accountable for their actions, particularly if they involve mismanagement or misuse of funds. Courts can intervene in cases where there are allegations of financial misconduct or breach of fiduciary duty, provided these cases do not require interpreting religious doctrine.

3. Legal Precedents: Various legal precedents show that courts can and do address fiduciary duty issues in religious organizations. For example, courts have ruled on cases involving the misuse of charitable donations, employment disputes involving non-religious staff, and other secular matters.

Summary

• The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine prevents courts from adjudicating religious or ecclesiastical matters to protect religious freedom and autonomy.
• This doctrine does not exempt church leaders from their fiduciary duties, especially regarding financial management and secular activities.
• Courts can and do address issues of financial misconduct, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty within religious organizations, as long as these issues do not require interpreting religious doctrine.

In essence, while the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine protects religious matters from judicial interference, it does not shield church leaders from accountability for their fiduciary responsibilities in managing the church’s financial and secular affairs.

That rings true to me.

Edited July 24, 2024 by Analytics

[The Nehor]

ChatGPT4 is wrong on at least a few points.

It still knows how to be confidently wrong.

[Analytics]

10 hours ago, The Nehor said:

ChatGPT4 is wrong on at least a few points.

It still knows how to be confidently wrong.

Is it wrong about fiduciary duties?

[PacMan]

13 hours ago, Analytics said:

I’d be more interested in what he thinks about my actual claim: if you donated $1,000 in tithing to the Church and the Church invested that money to realize a profit of $200, is it a reasonable point of view to say that the Church used your tithing to generate that investment income?

No. Because at the moment of donation it is not “yours.”  But even if it was, the investment income is not yours, and cannot be considered tithing or a donation.  Because it was never given.  

[ZealouslyStriving]

18 minutes ago, PacMan said:

No. Because at the moment of donation it is not “yours.”  But even if it was, the investment income is not yours, and cannot be considered tithing or a donation.  Because it was never given.  

As evidenced by orthodox RLDS trying to retain the buildings they paid for with their tithing, and built with their own hands after the institutional church went rogue. They lost in court- once your donation is submitted it's not yours any more.

[Analytics]

25 minutes ago, PacMan said:

No. Because at the moment of donation it is not “yours.”  But even if it was, the investment income is not yours, and cannot be considered tithing or a donation.  Because it was never given.  

What if I tweaked it like this?

If you donated $1,000 in tithing to the Church and the Church invested that money to realize a profit of $200, is it a reasonable point of view to say that the Church used your tithing the tithing you had donated to generate that investment income?

[Amulek]

13 hours ago, Analytics said:

For reference, here is the list:

1- Members pay tithing
2- Tithing in excess of current needs is invested
3- Investments earn a return
4- Money from these investment returns were reinvested into the mall.

I’ll just make three points.

First, it sounds like you basically agree that this list accurately depicts what happened.

Second, nowhere on this list is tithing redefined. In fact, the list explicitly defines tithing as what the members pay.

Third, the list is explaining what he meant by saying tithing funds were used. The key word is used. The funds were donated. The funds were invested. The investment income generated income. That income was used for another investment. Nowhere in that chain of events is tithing redefined. But if there wouldn’t have been tithing, there wouldn’t have been savings and investment income, and therefore there wouldn’t have been money for the mall project. That is what he meant.

I understand this position, but I think it relies on a bit of equivocation. When somebody says no tithing funds were used, I think most people understand that to mean no tithing funds were used directly.

If a critic wants to say that tithing funds were used only indirectly (i.e., by taking excess tithing income and investing it, which in turn generated investment income (which is not tithing income) that was (again, if not needed) subsequently re-invested into other projects - including but not limited to the mall), then why not just come out and say that? Why not simply state that you believe tithing funds only played an indirect role in financing the mall?

My guess is that those critics are intentionally relying on the ambiguity of the word "used" in this case in order to criticize President Hinckly's remark and suggest that he was lying.

 

[smac97]

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Given your lack of expertise on the fiduciary duties of church leaders, I’m not sure your opinion on this should carry much weight.

Says the guy quoting the legal "expertise" of . . . ChatGPT and googling.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

I don’t see any value or notoriety in signing on to a losing case.

Given your lack of expertise on the litigation, I’m not sure your opinion on this should carry much weight.  

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Based on that experience

LOL.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

and what Chat GPT said,

LOL X 2.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

I believe it is the leaders of the Church who have a fiduciary duty to the Church itself, which includes a fiduciary duty to the membership.

Yes.  So do I.  As I previously noted:

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Do the leaders of the Church really have a fiduciary duty to the tithe-paying members?

I believe so...

But I think you and I differ in the scope and breadth of that duty.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Quote

Fiduciary duty claims also suffer from the same fundamental weakness as the fraud-based claims: they are pretty much guaranteed to be barred by the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine.

I don’t see how.

Perhaps because you are leaning on ChatGPT and "googling," and because you are not reading actual case law.

Again, I previously touched on this here:

Quote

• "Discipline of church members, particularly based on a scriptural concept such as tithing, are uniquely ecclesiastical."
• "'The issue of tithing is at its core a purely ecclesiastical matter.'"
• "{T}ithing is at the root of ecclesiastical doctrine. If these complaints are in any way related to discipline on such, they would fall outside of the Court's jurisdiction."
• "At best, this raises an internal governance issue for which the courts should abstain."

Quote

The other claims--fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, equally implicate facts that are inextricably intertwined with internal church governance, the role of the pastor in church affairs, membership in the congregation, and statements of the pastor from the pulpit. The breach of fiduciary allegations itself claims Hector Ferrero "has misused the pulpit to gain the control of the purse and the power over the congregation for his sole benefit." The fraud allegation also refers to representations made to the congregation and misleading the congregation about internal church governance. We likewise conclude the trial court also lacked the jurisdiction to hear those claims under ecclesiastical abstention.

"{Fraud claims} equally implicate facts that are inextricably intertwined with internal church governance, the role of the pastor in church affairs, membership in the congregation, and statements of the pastor from the pulpit."

"The fraud allegation also refers to representations made to the congregation and misleading the congregation about internal church governance. We likewise conclude the trial court also lacked the jurisdiction to hear those claims under ecclesiastical abstention."

Again: "The other claims--fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, equally implicate facts that are inextricably intertwined with internal church governance ... We likewise conclude the trial court also lacked the jurisdiction to hear those claims under ecclesiastical abstention."

The above case was in Texas.

From Kentucky: Thang Ngo v. Ngo, 2022-CA-0573-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec 01, 2023) :

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Appellant claims that Father Anthony owed a fiduciary duty to the parishioners to properly use and account for the parish donations given to him and this does not involve church government or religious doctrine.

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It is well settled in this jurisdiction when considering a motion to dismiss under [CR 12.02], that the pleadings should be liberally construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations taken in the complaint to be true. Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court's determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo.

Littleton v. Plybon, 395 S.W.3d 505, 507 (Ky. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citations omitted). We believe that the trial court did not err in this case.

An accounting of church funds is directly related to church governance. How parish funds were being spent was under the purview of Father Anthony with oversight performed by the Archdiocese of Louisville. This is supported by the fact that Appellant informed the Archdiocese of the alleged misuse of funds and the Archdiocese initiated an investigation. In addition, the Archdiocese intended to create a new Finance Council for the parish that will have some input on how funds are used. If the trial court had allowed this case to move forward to completion, any ruling it made would be an imposition on the will of the Archdiocese and the church itself. The court would have been in a position to second guess the decisions of the Archdiocese as to the proper running of the parish and administration of the parish funds. This type of situation is precisely why the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine exists.

A few notes:

1. The foregoing case was decided by the court in a "Motion to Dismiss" context, meaning the lawsuit had just barely started, and the court deployed every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff (the guy asserting the "breach of fiduciary duty" claim against the church), and the plaintiff still lost.  Even with the deck stacked so heavily in favor of the plaintiff, his theory could not get off the ground.

2. The parishioner in the above case made the same sorts of arguments we see in the Complaint - which arguments you are now championing: "Appellant claims that Father Anthony owed a fiduciary duty to the parishioners to properly use and account for the parish donations given to him and this does not involve church government or religious doctrine."

3. The Kentucky Court of Appeals threw out the case: 

• "We believe that the trial court did not err in this case."
• "An accounting of church funds is directly related to church governance."
• "How parish funds were being spent was under the purview of Father Anthony with oversight performed by the Archdiocese of Louisville."
• "If the trial court had allowed this case to move forward to completion, any ruling it made would be an imposition on the will of the Archdiocese and the church itself."
• "The court would have been in a position to second guess the decisions of the Archdiocese as to the proper running of the parish and administration of the parish funds. This type of situation is precisely why the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine exists."

I have spent the last year using (or, to be more precise, trying to use) ChatGPT to supplement my legal research.  Apart from the very occasional low-hanging fruit, the effort has not proven useful.  ChatGPT is very much a GIGO ("Garbage In, Garbage Out") kind of resource.  You really ought not repose much trust in its capacity to provide competent legal analysis, at least not right now.

For example, here is a 2019 case from Ohio: Adkison v. Williams, 2019 Ohio 4289, Case No. 18 CA 119 (Ohio App. Oct 17, 2019) :

Quote

Claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty

In their amended complaint, appellants alleged that their dismissal from church membership "constituted a violation of the Constitution and Bylaws of the Church, and a breach of the Defendant's [sic] obligation and fiduciary duty, to the Plaintiffs." Amended Complaint at paragraph 58. We find this claim, as pled, is also an attempted extension of appellants' basic legal challenge to membership removal, and thus presents an ecclesiastical question of internal congregational governance, outside of a civil court's jurisdiction. Cf. State ex rel. First New Shiloh Baptist Church v. Meagher, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-960371, 1997 WL 180266 (holding, in the context of a writ of prohibition, "*** the lower court has no jurisdiction over the claims brought by the individual members of the congregation seeking to oust the pastor or hold the Board liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the congregation").

• "We find this {breach of fiduciary duty} claim ... {is} an attempted extension of appellants' basic legal challenge to membership removal, and thus presents an ecclesiastical question of internal congregational governance, outside of a civil court's jurisdiction."
• "'{T}he lower court has no jurisdiction over the claims brought by the individual members of the congregation ... for breach of fiduciary duty to the congregation."

Your buddies, ChatGPT and Google, apparently didn't bother to tell you about this case.

A 2012 case from Tennessee offers a glimmer of hope for Huntsman and those that think/act like him, but not much: Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012) :

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We have concluded that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not impose an absolute bar on claims for breach of fiduciary duty10 against religious institutions.
...
10 Recently, we held that a fiduciary relationship “arises when one person reposes special trust and confidence in another person and that other person—the fiduciary—undertakes to assume responsibility for the affairs of the other party.”  Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 641–42 (Tenn.2008). From this relationship arises a fiduciary duty “to act for and to give advice for the benefit of the other person on matters within the scope of the relationship.” Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d at 642.

So the "bar" is not "absolute."  That's a glimmer.

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Among the majority of courts that have permitted clerical sexual abuse claims against religious institutions to proceed, several courts have allowed breach of fiduciary claims to proceed, but only when the proof of the fiduciary relationship is not predicated solely on religious duties or religious authority.

Hmm.  The glimmer is fading.  A fiduciary breach claim as to sexual abuse doesn't implicate the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine, whereas a fiduciary breach claim is far more likely to do so:

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This limitation on claims based on breach of fiduciary duty arises from the constitutional concerns that

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the religious status of persons and the religious character of institutions should not give rise to fiduciary duties as a matter of law. In applying the law of fiduciary duty, courts should take great care to avoid the imposition, by juries and others, of liability for breaches of duties that are distinctly religious.

{Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 1789, 1797 n. 266 (2004).}

"'In applying the law of fiduciary duty, courts should take great care to avoid the imposition, by juries and others, of liability for breaches of duties that are distinctly religious.'"

Publications in BYU Law School journals are often a good resource for cases which touch on religious matters.  Here, the authors (Lupu and Tuttle) were law professors at George Washington University.  Some further excepts from the article:

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In cases of sexual abuse, the threat to First Amendment values arises from the role of juries, in applying general and sweeping standards of care to an employer’s duties to third parties.  Here, as elsewhere, one must reconcile tort law and First Amendment considerations, and the respective roles of judge and juries.

I think this is correct, and this is why your reliance on ChatGPT and Google is misplaced.  These resources, at least at present, often fail to help neophytes in getting to the substantive law.

More from the article:

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The substantive freedom of religious communities to chart their own vision of divine order has supported a pair of corollary freedoms that continue to find religion-distinctive protection in decisions linked to both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.58 The first is the right to settle, free from state interference, internal disputes whose resolution depends upon judgments about theological principles or issues of religious polity. If ownership and possession of church property, for example, turns on fidelity to religious texts or principles, and competing factions within the church each assert that it is the only group faithful to church teachings, courts cannot possibly adjudicate between the parties without judicial resolution of the true meaning of the faith. It is this dilemma that has led American courts, first as a matter of common law59 and now as a firm principle of constitutional law,60 to defer to the resolution reached by the religious polity as organized by the faith community.61 

This excerpt highlights, I think, some substantial flaws in the approach to evaluating legal issues affecting the Church taken by Hunstman and those who think and act like him:

First, religious groups and organizations enjoy substantial constitutional protections (from things such as governmental interference and intrusion) under the United States Constitution.  As the above excerpt puts it: "{Religious groups have} the right to settle, free from state interference, internal disputes whose resolution depends upon judgments about theological principles or issues of religious polity."  Consequently, in a contest between generalized principles of tort law and constitutional law, the latter will generally predominate over the former, typically by a country mile.  This is, of course, not an absolute principle.  As the above article notes: "Courts, as noted above, may apply religion-neutral principles to similarly neutral aspects of a religious entity’s activities, but courts remain forbidden from resolving questions of religious structure or theological principle."

Second, disputes about how The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (or any other religious group) spends tithes is pretty much entirely within the parameters of the Church Autonomy / Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine.

Third, Huntsman and his acolytes consistently refuse to recognize or attempt to dispassionately apply the foregoing principles to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  This is how we end up with lawsuits built on strained and weak-tea notions of "fraud" and "breach of fiduciary duty" claims, with the plaintiffs in the MDL lawsuit irrationally conflating donations to LDS Philanthropies with tithing donations, with Huntsman and others re-defining "tithing" to include monies that are not voluntary donations from members of the Church, and so on.

Back to the article:

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No comparable doctrine of absolute deference exists with respect to disputes within business organizations or secular, nonprofit organizations, all of whom courts may hold in compliance with the substance of the organizations’ founding legal documents.62 For example, courts may resolve disputes among business partners according to the terms of a partnership agreement;63 settle disagreements between majority and minority shareholders of a corporation according to the terms of a corporate charter;64 and compel, in an appropriate action, a secular nonprofit organization to conform to trust instruments under which it operates.65 Religious entities thus possess a degree of autonomy over the resolution of internal disputes unlike any other known to the law, and this autonomy may not be surrendered by contract or other act of consent to state power. Courts may not rely on theological principles to resolve disputes, even if the parties so desire, and even if some immediate social good will be served thereby.66 

"No comparable doctrine of absolute deference exists with respect to disputes within business organizations or secular, nonprofit organizations."

"Religious entities thus possess a degree of autonomy over the resolution of internal disputes unlike any other known to the law."

Again, Huntsman and his acolytes persistently refuse to evaluate the constitutional dimensions of the Huntsman lawsuit and its progeny.

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The second corollary freedom is the right to designate leaders and spokespersons for the faith. Those in such positions are the authors of each faith community’s continuing vision. They regulate its worship life, preside over changes in its liturgy and sense of values, and communicate its stories, beliefs, ethics, and sense of continuity from one generation to the next. State interference with the selection of leaders thus implicates the religious community’s method of transmitting its vision and cannot help but alter the content of the vision itself. 

Here, too, the constitutional law of religious association protects the organizational interest in leadership selection and does so more thoroughly and completely than it protects the comparable interests of secular associations. Although the matter has never come up directly, no one would doubt that the First Amendment precludes the state from instituting a system of licensure for the clergy. To do so would, in effect, impose a prior restraint on those who preach and give the state control, through criteria of education, character, or otherwise, over those who would speak in the name of a religious community. The clergy may be a learned profession, like medicine, law, architecture, or others, but the state may not create barriers to its entry. If a faith community chooses to ordain an illiterate ex-felon as its pastor, the state may not intervene or object.67

Acting consistently with the norm against state licensure of clergy, the Supreme Court has on a number of occasions ruled against efforts to overturn the judgment of a religious institution with respect to a selection for church office.68 These decisions require the lower courts to categorically reject claims of breach of contract, or implied contract, to place or maintain a particular person in a religious office against the will of a religious organization. 

"Against the will of a religious organization."

This is what Huntsman and his acolytes are trying to do.  They want to use the coercive power of the courts to tell the Church what it can, and cannot, do with its money.  The MDL Complaint is particularly brazen on this point: "In addition to tithing refunds, the class-action suit calls for declaring the church’s financial practices illegal and ordering a halt to tithing altogether while accountants sort through the faith’s finances or the court appoints a special monitor."

I am curious as to your position on this.  Do you support this part of the Huntsman lawsuit?

Back to the article:

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As an outgrowth of these decisions, lower courts for many years have applied the doctrine of “ministerial exception” to a broad variety of norms that otherwise govern the employment relation. With respect to employees in a position of spokesperson for the faith—member of the clergy,69 professor of theology70 or canon law,71 director of religious music,72 and other positions, defined by function rather than title—religious organizations are immune from claims that would entail judicial evaluation of an employee’s performance or a prospective employee’s qualifications. 

The ministerial exemption is strikingly broad in its immunizing scope. For example, in its application to the law prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, the exemption is not limited to religious institutions that explicitly assert a preference for either sex for clergy positions. The exemption extends to all claims of sex discrimination in the hiring or conditions of employment of clergy, including assertions that a religious organization that purports to comply with norms of sex equality has covertly engaged in sex discrimination under the pretext of some sex-neutral policy.73 Courts have consistently ruled that to permit adjudication of such pretext claims would be to invite judicial second-guessing of institutional judgments about the performance of agents in leadership roles. 74 

"{C}ourts for many years have applied the doctrine of 'ministerial exception' to a broad variety of norms that otherwise govern the employment relation."

"The ministerial exemption is strikingly broad in its immunizing scope."

Quote

Here, too, as in the case of broad immunity from judicial determination of theological principle to resolve intrafaith disputes, no comparable doctrine of immunity exists with respect to leadership positions in other organizations, nonprofit or otherwise. Perhaps, as a matter of freedom of association, the NAACP may reserve its presidency to African-Americans. Can we imagine, however, that courts would be barred from adjudicating a claim of race discrimination against such an organization if it held itself out as hiring on a nondiscriminatory basis? Nothing in American law would support such a claim.75 

"{A}s in the case of broad immunity from judicial determination of theological principle to resolve intrafaith disputes, no comparable doctrine of immunity exists with respect to leadership positions in other organizations, nonprofit or otherwise."

Quote

For reasons that we develop below, the regime of legal immunity for intrafaith disputes and for personnel matters involving spokespersons for the faith has quite properly survived the demise, decreed by Employment Division v. Smith,76 of a more general doctrine of religious exemptions. Smith held that religiously motivated claimants did not have a right under the Free Exercise Clause to remain exempt from religion-neutral, generally applicable laws.77 The laws of property, contract, and economic association that permit state resolution of intraorganizational disputes are indeed religion-neutral and generally applicable. The Smith opinion, however, explicitly recognizes the legal immunity of religious organizations from any civil adjudication that determines religious principle or structure.78 

"The laws of property, contract, and economic association that permit state resolution of intraorganizational disputes are indeed religion-neutral and generally applicable. The Smith opinion, however, explicitly recognizes the legal immunity of religious organizations from any civil adjudication that determines religious principle or structure."

And yet the MDL lawsuit is explicitly asking the court to "{order} a halt to tithing altogether while accountants sort through the faith’s finances or the court appoints a special monitor."

Huntsman, and those that think and act like him, are indifferent to the constitutional protections afforded to the Church.

Quote

Ecclesiastical immunities, including the ministerial exception, are not the offspring of rights in the conventional sense. They are not the legal entitlements of religious entities in the way that, for example, authors and political advocates possess rights to communicate. Instead, ecclesiastical immunities are the entailments of the jurisdictional limitations that the Establishment Clause imposes upon the state’s role.95 Because the state is forbidden from being the author or coauthor of religious faith, it may not adjudicate or regulate the ways in which communities of faith are organized. Nor may the state select the voices which lead these communities, nor the lessons they communicate. Religious entities cannot waive this jurisdictional limitation, which we believe resides most comfortably in the Establishment Clause (even as it furthers Free Exercise values). 

"{E}ecclesiastical immunities are the entailments of the jurisdictional limitations that the Establishment Clause imposes upon the state’s role

What we're seeing, I think, is how breach of fiduciary duty claims play out when "neutral principles of law" are utilized.  Some folks would prefer to weaponize the law, to contort it to suit their antipathy toward The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  This preference ends up tainting their ability to objectively and impartially evaluate the application of those principles of law.  

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

I asked Chat GPT4 what the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine is, and if it implies that churches are exempt from fiduciary duty. It said:

The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine is a legal principle rooted in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which ensures the separation of church and state. This doctrine generally prevents civil courts from adjudicating disputes that involve religious doctrine, internal church governance, or ecclesiastical matters. The rationale is that secular courts should not entangle themselves in religious matters, as this could infringe upon religious freedom and the autonomy of religious institutions.

Key Points of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

1. Religious Doctrine and Practice: Courts refrain from deciding cases that require interpretation or application of religious doctrine, theology, or practice.
2. Internal Church Governance: Matters related to church governance, such as the appointment of clergy, internal church disputes, and disciplinary actions, are typically outside the jurisdiction of civil courts.
3. First Amendment Protection: The doctrine is based on the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, which protect religious institutions from governmental interference.

Fiduciary Duty and Churches

The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine does not imply that churches are exempt from fiduciary duties, particularly when it comes to financial management and other secular activities. Here’s how fiduciary duty interacts with the doctrine:

1. Financial Management: While courts avoid adjudicating matters of religious doctrine, they can and do address cases involving the secular activities of religious organizations, such as financial management, fraud, and embezzlement. Church leaders have fiduciary duties to manage the church’s assets responsibly and transparently.

2. Accountability: Church leaders are still accountable for their actions, particularly if they involve mismanagement or misuse of funds. Courts can intervene in cases where there are allegations of financial misconduct or breach of fiduciary duty, provided these cases do not require interpreting religious doctrine.

3. Legal Precedents: Various legal precedents show that courts can and do address fiduciary duty issues in religious organizations. For example, courts have ruled on cases involving the misuse of charitable donations, employment disputes involving non-religious staff, and other secular matters.

Summary

• The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine prevents courts from adjudicating religious or ecclesiastical matters to protect religious freedom and autonomy.
• This doctrine does not exempt church leaders from their fiduciary duties, especially regarding financial management and secular activities.
• Courts can and do address issues of financial misconduct, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty within religious organizations, as long as these issues do not require interpreting religious doctrine.

In essence, while the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine protects religious matters from judicial interference, it does not shield church leaders from accountability for their fiduciary responsibilities in managing the church’s financial and secular affairs.

That rings true to me.

I think that is because you are only seeing what you want to see.  You underlined one part, but ignored this one: "Matters related to church governance, such as the appointment of clergy, internal church disputes, and disciplinary actions, are typically outside the jurisdiction of civil courts."

Also, I think you do not understand the concept of fiduciary duties very well (such as to whom the duty is owed, the scope of the duty, etc.).  You also do seem to grasp the legal concept of "standing."  You also never seem to get around to addressing the Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine, even when case law is quoted to you chapter and verse.

Back to the Redwing case:

Quote

A religious institution's fiduciary obligations cannot be predicated on a religious duty and cannot arise solely from the relationship between the institution and its members. Thus, breach of fiduciary obligation claims against religious institutions remain quite rare. However, the status of a defendant as a religious institution does not, by itself, preclude the existence of a fiduciary relationship and the possibility of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Accordingly, we find that Tennessee's civil courts may exercise jurisdiction over a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a religious institution, as long as the fiduciary relationship is not based on a religious duty or is not inextricably tied to a religious duty.

So far, this is the best case I have seen for your approach.  And it isn't very good.

In a 2012 Florida case, Bendross v. Readon, 89 So.3d 258 (Fla. App. 2012), some interesting things happened:

Quote

Bible Missionary Baptist Church of Miami, Inc. (the “Corporation”) was founded and incorporated as a not for profit organization under Florida Statutes chapter 617 (1973) by Reverend Cleo Albury, Jr., who served as pastor of the church and president of the Corporation from 1973 until 1999. He was replaced as pastor by Reverend Phillip F. Readon, though Rev. Albury retained his position as president until his death in 2009. In early February, 2010, Eugene Rice, a member of the board of directors of the Corporation, filed the Corporation's 2010 annual report without notice to the remaining directors. The report removed four members of the board: W.C. Dillard, Edwin Henderson, Lorenzo McDowell, and Sidney White (collectively, the “Appellants”). The report additionally introduced three new directors, and appointed Rev. Readon, who had not previously been on the board, president and registered agent of the Corporation.

Once Appellants discovered what Rev. Readon and Mr. Rice (collectively, the “Appellees”) had done, protracted negotiations ensued with the hopes of resolving the dispute without resorting to litigation. When that failed, Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. In May of 2011, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss the action with prejudice filed by Appellees on the grounds that “[t]he Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine bars this Court from deciding the instant dispute because doing so would necessarily and excessively entangle this Court in doctrinal and/or theological issues.” We reverse.

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine emerges from the First Amendment protections afforded to religious institutions. The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that “the First Amendment prevents courts from resolving internal church disputes that would require adjudication of questions of religious doctrine.” Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 355 (Fla.2002) (internal citations omitted). In applying the doctrine, the trial court noted that “[u]nder the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, civil courts are prohibited from interfering with internal church disputes in order to avoid excessive government entanglement with religion, in accordance with the First Amendment.” (quoting State v. Young, 974 So.2d 601, 612–13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). Appellees point in their brief to a recent First District decision which found that “how the Church should govern itself” is “an essentially religious matter.” Rosenberger v. Jamison, 72 So.3d 199, 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). This Court has previously considered the doctrine and found that “[c]ourts may not consider employment disputes between a religious organization and its clergy because such matters necessarily involve questions of internal church discipline, faith, and organization that are governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law.” Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v. Miñagorri, 954 So.2d 640, 640–42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal citations omitted).

We find that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not bar this suit. Plaintiffs are not categorically prohibited from ever seeking redress from the courts solely because a religious organization is somehow involved in the dispute. “[W]hen a church-related dispute can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law without inquiry into religious doctrine and without resolving religious controversy, the civil courts may adjudicate the dispute.” Se. Conf. ***'n of Seventh– Day Adventists, Inc. v. Dennis, 862 So.2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–604, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979)). Appellants do not allege, in their complaint, that the Bible Baptist Church committed any wrongdoing, and do not challenge the institution's employment practices or policies. Nothing in the record indicates that Appellants have sought judicial intervention concerning any aspect of church governance. Instead, Appellants allege that Appellees, acting without authority, attempted to remove specific board members from the organization in derogation of the requirements of section 617.0808 (Fla.Stat.2010).

"Appellants do not allege, in their complaint, that the Bible Baptist Church committed any wrongdoing, and do not challenge the institution's employment practices or policies. Nothing in the record indicates that Appellants have sought judicial intervention concerning any aspect of church governance."

I don't think I could formulate a better example of "judicial intervention concerning any aspect of church governance" than, as in the MDL lawsuit, asking a federal judge to "{order} a halt to tithing altogether while accountants sort through the faith’s finances or the court appoints a special monitor."  

From North Carolina: Nation Ford Baptist Church Inc. v. Davis, 279 N.C.App. 599, 866 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. App. 2021) :

Quote

Davis claims that "[a] fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence existed between [him], as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church, and the Third-Party Defendants as the Elders of the Church[,]" and that "the Third-Party Defendants[ ] ... breached their fiduciary duties owed to [Davis] and the Church" by "arrogat[ing] to themselves the sole management and control of the Church[.]" Davis's breach of fiduciary duty claim is similar to the plaintiffs’ allegations in Harris {v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 270, 643 S.E.2d 566, 569 (2007)}. Our Supreme Court has already determined that the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine prohibits judicial review of whether a church's internal governing body "breached [its] fiduciary duties by improperly using church funds." Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571.

And so it goes.

Thanks,

-Smac

Edited July 24, 2024 by smac97

[ZealouslyStriving]

7 minutes ago, Amulek said:

why not just come out and say that?

Too much bureaucracy at COB. 

[smac97]

3 hours ago, Analytics said:

Quote

ChatGPT4 is wrong on at least a few points.

It still knows how to be confidently wrong.

Is it wrong about fiduciary duties?

Ultimately, yes.  It is too vague and imprecise in its pronouncements.

Thanks,

-Smac

[webbles]

59 minutes ago, ZealouslyStriving said:

As evidenced by orthodox RLDS trying to retain the buildings they paid for with their tithing, and built with their own hands after the institutional church went rogue. They lost in court- once your donation is submitted it's not yours any more.

Do you happen to know the name of the case or the state this was in?  I'm interested to read the court's opinion if it is available online.

[ZealouslyStriving]

8 minutes ago, webbles said:

Do you happen to know the name of the case or the state this was in?  I'm interested to read the court's opinion if it is available online.

Should be a case out of Washington State in 1979 or so. I'm sure there are others from the 80's but the Washington one is the one I'm most familiar with. I'll do some digging.

[smac97]

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

For reference, here is the list:

1- Members pay tithing

Yes.  And once they do, the money belongs to the Church.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

2- Tithing in excess of current needs is invested

Yes.  And contrary to the MDL lawsuit, the Church has long been clear about this point.

This also comports with the Parable of the Talents and other religious principles.  The Church is obligated to be a good steward of its finances.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

3- Investments earn a return

"Investments" of the Church's money, yes.  At this point it is no longer the property of the individual members.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

4- Money from these investment returns were reinvested into the mall.

Essentially, yes.

"{T}hese investment returns" are not "tithing."  That Huntsman and others persist in attempting to cast them as such is flawed reasoning.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

I’ll just make three points.

First, it sounds like you basically agree that this list accurately depicts what happened.

Second, nowhere on this list is tithing redefined.

Sure it is:

Quote

In answering that question, Craig Paxton said, "It is disingenuous for the church to claim that no tithing funds were used to fund the City Creek Mall. Member Pays Tithing --> Tithing in Excess of Current Needs is Invested --> Investments Earn Return --> $$$ From This Return on Investments is Reinvested in the City Creek Mall."

Craig Paxton was exactly right. 

Again, Craig Paxton could only have been "exactly right" if he - like you so regularly have done - re-defined "tithing" to include funds which are not voluntary donations by members of the Church.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

In fact, the list explicitly defines tithing as what the members pay.

And then proceeds to also argue that "returns on investments" were used for City Creek, that this means that "tithing funds were used to fund the City Creek Mall," and that the Church was therefore "disingenuous" in stating that no tithing funds were used to fund the City Creek Mall.

And you said that Craig's pronouncements were "exactly right."

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Third, the list is explaining what he meant by saying tithing funds were used. The key word is used. The funds were donated. The funds were invested. The investment income generated income. That income was used for another investment.

Yes.  And "{t}hat income" was not "tithing," ergo the Church was not "disingenuous" when it said "that no tithing funds were used to fund the City Creek Mall."

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Nowhere in that chain of events is tithing redefined.

Again: Craig Paxton could only have been "exactly right" if he - like you so regularly have done - re-defined "tithing" to include funds which are not voluntary donations by members of the Church.

Funds earned from invested reserves are not "tithing," ergo no tithing was "used to fund the City Creek Mall."

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

But if there wouldn’t have been tithing, there wouldn’t have been savings and investment income, and therefore there wouldn’t have been money for the mall project. That is what he meant.

I don't think you are situated to tell us "what he meant."

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

No it isn’t. My definition is X; exactly the same as the Church’s.

You and yours persist in adding to X, thus making it Y.

Y = "tithing is a voluntary donation by members of the Church, and also includes any and all revenue generated by the Church when it invests tithed funds."

Your reasoning here is tortured and ad hoc.  It doesn't work.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Quote

It is this emandation / alteration / addition that does not work.

I wouldn’t know anything about it because I’m not altering or adding anything to the definition of tithing.

You are.  Craig Paxton, whom you say was "exactly right," is doing this as well.  

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

I simply believe that using tithing revenue to generate investment income is using tithing.

The money "used" on City Creek was not-X.

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Nothing about that claim redefines tithing.

When you persist in characterizing investment income as "tithing," you are re-defining the term.

Your reasoning here is endlessly regressive.

1. Roger spends $200 of his own income to buy a vintage record at a garage sale.

2. The guy who sold Roger the record uses that $200.00 to buy a cell phone from his neighbor.

3. The neighbor uses the $200. to buy a trashed motorbike.

4. The neighbor repairs the motorcycle and sells it for $500.

5. The neighbor puts $200 from this sale in his savings account, and uses the remaining $300 profit to make a campaign contribution to Donald Trump.

6. The Trump Campaign used the $300 in a successful bid for the presidency of the United States.

Could anyone say, with a straight face, that the neighbor "used" Roger's money put Donald Trump in the White House?  I don't think so.

The money Roger spent was his own income.  When the garage sale guy spent $200, the money belonged to that guy, not to Roger.  And when the neighbor spent $200, it was the neighbor's money, not Roger's.  And when the neighbor received the $300 from the buyer of the motorcycle, that $300 was also the neighbor's, not Roger's.  And when the money landed in the Trump campaign's coffers, it became the campaign's $300, not the neighbor's or Roger's.  And so on.

Now, let's say that Roger and his friends really dislike Donald Trump.  Let's also say that one of Roger's friends walks up to Roger and punches him in the face, screaming "Roger!  How can you sleep at night knowing that your money was 'used' to put Donald Trump in the White House!"  Would this be a reasonable position to take?  Would Roger be reasonable in expressing remorse?  In acknowledging that his money was "used" to put Trump in the White House?

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

Quote

If I donate $1,000 in tithing to the Church, and if the Church thereafter invests that $1,000 and realizes a profit of $200, would "a disinterested CPA" say that my tithe was $1,000 or $1,200?

I’d be more interested

Dodge.

What do you think the CPA would say?  Was the tithe $1,000 or $1,200?

Would the CPA say that the Church should report the $200 as a voluntary contribution from a member of the Church?

15 hours ago, Analytics said:

in what he thinks about my actual claim: if you donated $1,000 in tithing to the Church and the Church invested that money to realize a profit of $200, is it a reasonable point of view to say that the Church used your tithing to generate that investment income?

Yes.

But it would not be reasonable to claim that your tithing was "used" to build City Creek.  It was "that investment income" that was used.

Most of this comes down to semantics, tortured reasoning and equivocation.  What a bizarre hill to die on.

Thanks,

-Smac

Edited July 24, 2024 by smac97

[Analytics]

3 hours ago, Amulek said:

I understand this position, but I think it relies on a bit of equivocation. When somebody says no tithing funds were used, I think most people understand that to mean no tithing funds were used directly.

If a critic wants to say that tithing funds were used only indirectly (i.e., by taking excess tithing income and investing it, which in turn generated investment income (which is not tithing income) that was (again, if not needed) subsequently re-invested into other projects - including but not limited to the mall), then why not just come out and say that? Why not simply state that you believe tithing funds only played an indirect role in financing the mall?

My guess is that those critics are intentionally relying on the ambiguity of the word "used" in this case in order to criticize President Hinckly's remark and suggest that he was lying.

 

What critics think on this issue is irrelevant. What matters is how tithe-paying members interpreted the Church’s responses over the years. For example, in 2015 one believer asked this question:

One frequently hears the statement that tithing funds were not used for such and such an investment. And while I like to think that is true, I have to pause and think...if not tithing then what funds were used? Surely not Fast Offerings, too many those are even more sacred as to their dedicated use, and surely not missionary funds. So, what are these mysterious "not tithing" funds?

That question presupposes the statement “tithing funds were not used” is meant to be interpreted broadly--tithing funds weren’t used, neither directly nor indirectly.

As we go through the following answers that were offered to that question by believers, keep in mind that unlike Deseret News, Bonneville International, Property Reserve, etc.,  Ensign Peak Advisors is a non-profit organization and is essentially the Church’s treasury of unspent tithing that has grown with interest.

So, in 2015, where did Latter-day Saints think the money for the mall came from?

@The Nehor said it wasn’t from investment earnings on unspent tithing, but rather:

Income from church owned businesses and sometimes from direct donations from members for a specific purpose. 

@Robert F. Smith said it wasn't from interest on unspent tithing but rather:

There a great many original non-tithing sources of funds, beginning with Martin Harris mortgaging his farm to get the Book of Mormon printed.  The revolving Perpetual Emigration Fund used to get people into the Valley, and now the Perpetual Education Fund.  Huge donations and loans of that kind have always been available. 

@JLHPROF was on the right track when he said the following, but he assumed that tithing must have only been touched in the distant past:

I think tithing funds may have been dipped into at one time, possibly decades ago, for investment. The returns (interest, dividends, stock return, business profits, rent on properties owned etc) are probably now used for projects where they claim no tithing money was used. They may not have needed to use new tithe money for decades.

@JAHS said critics asked a totally fair question that he didn’t know the answer to:

But then of course critics ask the next question; "Where do you think the church got the money to buy the businesses in the first place?" 

Pahoran answered the question by saying,

 I am confident that the City Creek Mall's pedigree would trace back, not to the tithing paid in St George after President Snow's famous "Windows of Heaven" talk, but to the original Zion's Co-operative Mercantile Institution.

He was wrong about that, of course. While some of the money from City Creek was from the for-profit side of the house, some of it was from Ensign Peak Advisors, which reserve constitute unspent tithing and unspent interest on tithing.

Then Kim Pearson put the issue to rest in one of the most up-voted posts in the history of the board when he said:

I am a CPA who has actually worked with the Church on money issues.  I haven't seen this discussed so I will try to add something to the conversation.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saint has two basic legal entities that it controls.

One is the non for profit entity we all identify as the Church.  All donations made to the Church through the donation process of each ward and branch go to this non profit entity.  This includes tithing, fast offering, missionary, perpetual education fund and humanitarian fund.  Members can and do make specific donations to the Church through gifts, wills and estates.  All of these funds by law must be kept in the non for profit legal entity.  Donations from these funds can be made to other non for profit entities such as the American Red Cross.  This non for profit entity does keep some reserve funds that are invested in very conservative investments but would only sustain the operations of the non for profit entity for a very short period of time.  The non for profit entity of the Church really does operate on the donations of members.  Primary uses are buildings, missionary, education including Church schools and seminaries and fast offerings.

The second entity controlled by the Church is a for profit entity that pays taxes like any other for profit business entity.  This entity I believe includes mainly land (ranches, farms and urban real estate), investments such as stock and bonds and now days a very limited number of businesses such as Deseret News and KSL radio.  The original source of funds for these businesses came primarily from the businesses that the Church established in the late 1800's and early 1900's including ZCMI, U&I Sugar, an Insurance company and a bank.  This entity also owned significant real estate that was sold.  Over the years the Church has actively managed these businesses.  Towards the end of the twentieth century, the Church sold its ownership in many of these businesses and kept only a few that aligned with the purpose of the Church.  As you can imagine, these sales generated significant cash.  These are the source of funds used to finance City Creek.  No donations from Church members were used to finance City Creek.  That would break laws and cause the Church to lose its tax exempt status.  The Church did not use funds from donations to start the original business either. 

When I said the Church must have had massive savings from unspent tithing that had grown with interest and that this could have been a source, one Saint patiently explained to me, 

I'm not sure if you read the post in this thread by the person who actually worked as an accountant for the Church.  They explain how the church really doesn't have the chance to put much tithing away in a rainy day fund. 

Where we are now:

Back then, many members of the Church interpreted the Church’s statements as saying the funds for the mall came from the for-profit side of the Church, not from the non-profit side. Faithful, presumably tithe-paying members who thought that included The Nehor, Robert F. Smith, Pahoran, Kim Pearson, bluebell, and James Huntsman.

For my part, I always thought the Church’s statements were too vague to be relied on. But I’ve always been confident that the “rainy day fund” was huge, and I've always confident that these funds were invested in for-profit ventures. If it is okay to invest unspent tithing in Nvidia, why wouldn’t it be okay to invest unspent tithing in City Creek? 

Edited July 24, 2024 by Analytics

[smac97]

1 hour ago, Amulek said:

I understand this position, but I think it relies on a bit of equivocation. When somebody says no tithing funds were used, I think most people understand that to mean no tithing funds were used directly.

I agree.  And that is how the Church was using the term.

1 hour ago, Amulek said:

If a critic wants to say that tithing funds were used only indirectly (i.e., by taking excess tithing income and investing it, which in turn generated investment income (which is not tithing income) that was (again, if not needed) subsequently re-invested into other projects - including but not limited to the mall), then why not just come out and say that?

Because the lawsuits filed by Huntsman and his acolytes have been, until fairly recently, heavily reliant on this exercise in equivocation.  

Because some critics of the Church view legal issues through a "How can this be leveraged to make the Church look bad"-type lens, but admitting as much would be saying the quiet part out loud.

Because the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine is a seemingly insuperable bar to these lawsuits, so Huntsman, and his acolytes and devotees (such as critics who share with him a common cause of disliking the Church and wanting to see it harmed or embarrassed), need to dance around and re-define "tithing" so as to pound the proverbial square peg into a round hole.

1 hour ago, Amulek said:

Why not simply state that you believe tithing funds only played an indirect role in financing the mall?

Because equivocation is key. 

1 hour ago, Amulek said:

My guess is that those critics are intentionally relying on the ambiguity of the word "used" in this case in order to criticize President Hinckly's remark and suggest that he was lying.

Yes.  Particularly those critics who have spent years on this hill.

Thanks,

-Smac

[smac97]

16 hours ago, PacMan said:

This is the beginning and end of it. The $200 is not, in any part, a donation. It is proceeds from a donation and, therefore, is definitionally distinct. 

Furthermore, tithing, as the church had widely publicized the term, is defined as 10% of a member’s interest or income. There is no way that the $200 can be considered as income to anyone other than the church. Accordingly, it is definitionally precluded from being called tithing. 

Ensign Peak’s oversight is irrelevant. I personally have multiple accounts holding different personal investments. The church can invest its money through Ensign Peak just like it can Fidelity or Vanguard. Prove me wrong.

Lastly, the notion that a church has a fiduciary duty to members to manage the [i]church’s[i] money is nonsensical, if not frivolous. The term has no legal meaning. Despite the ridiculous attempt to conflate meanings, membership means nothing in a corporation—such as the Corporation of the President of the Church. 

Since Roger is playing around with ChatGPT, I thought I'd give it a go:

Quote

If a person ("Jack") were to donate $1,000 as a charitable contribution to a church, and if the Church were to invest that $1,000 in the stock market, and if that investment were to yield a profit of $200, could Jack then tell the IRS that his donation was $1,200 (the original $1,000 plus the $200 investment return)?

The response:

Quote

No, Jack cannot tell the IRS that his donation was $1,200. For tax purposes, the deduction is based on the amount donated at the time of the donation, which is $1,000 in this case. The profit made by the church from investing that donation is not part of Jack's charitable contribution and cannot be claimed as an additional donation by Jack. The $200 profit is the church's investment income and does not affect Jack's charitable contribution deduction.

I followed:

Quote

Could Jack tell the IRS that he is entitled to claim the $200 as a charitable contribution because the Church "used" his $1,000 donation to generate that investment income?

The response:

Quote

No, Jack cannot claim the $200 as a charitable contribution simply because the church used his $1,000 donation to generate investment income. The IRS allows deductions for the amount directly donated by the taxpayer, which in this case is $1,000. The $200 investment income is considered the church's earnings and not an additional contribution from Jack. Therefore, Jack can only claim the initial $1,000 donation as a charitable contribution on his tax return.

I followed:

Quote

Is the Church allowed to not pay taxes on the $1,000 donation?

The response:

Quote

Yes, the church is allowed to not pay taxes on the $1,000 donation. Generally, churches and other qualifying nonprofit organizations are exempt from federal income tax under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c)(3). Donations made to these organizations are typically considered tax-exempt, meaning the organization does not have to pay taxes on the donations it receives.

Additionally, as long as the church uses the funds for its tax-exempt purposes and activities, the investment income generated from those donations (such as the $200 profit in your example) is also usually tax-exempt. However, if the church were to engage in activities that generate unrelated business income, it might be subject to unrelated business income tax (UBIT).

I followed:

Quote

Let's say that the church uses that $200 to invest in the construction of a shopping mall. Would that $200 be taxed or untaxed?

The response:

Quote

If the church uses the $200 investment income to invest in the construction of a shopping mall, the income generated from this activity could be subject to taxation as unrelated business income.

Here's why:

1. Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT): Income from activities that are not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purposes is subject to unrelated business income tax (UBIT). Constructing and operating a shopping mall would likely be considered an unrelated business activity unless the mall's operations somehow further the church's exempt purposes.

2. Exempt Purpose: For the income to remain tax-exempt, the activity must be substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose. Building a shopping mall typically does not relate to the religious or charitable mission of a church.

Therefore, the $200 (and any subsequent income generated from the shopping mall) would likely be subject to UBIT, meaning the church would need to pay taxes on this income. The specific details and tax implications can vary, so it would be advisable for the church to consult with a tax professional or legal advisor to ensure compliance with IRS regulations.

I followed:

Quote

Let's assume that the church used the $200 to invest in the construction of the shopping mall strictly as a means of generating investment income. How would the IRS treat that?

The response:

Quote

If the church invests the $200 in the construction of a shopping mall strictly as a means of generating investment income, the IRS would likely treat the income generated from this investment as unrelated business income, which is subject to unrelated business income tax (UBIT). Here's how the IRS would typically handle this situation:

1. Unrelated Business Income (UBI): The IRS defines unrelated business income as income from a trade or business that is regularly carried on and is not substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose, apart from the need for income or funds.

2. Investment Income from Unrelated Business: If the church's primary purpose for constructing and operating the shopping mall is to generate investment income, this activity would likely be considered unrelated to its exempt purpose. As a result, the income generated from the shopping mall (such as rental income from tenants) would be classified as unrelated business income.

3. Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT): The church would be required to report this income on IRS Form 990-T and pay taxes on it. The UBIT is intended to level the playing field between tax-exempt organizations and for-profit businesses that engage in similar activities.

4. Exceptions and Exclusions: Certain types of passive income, such as dividends, interest, and capital gains, may be excluded from UBIT. However, income derived from operating a business, like a shopping mall, does not typically fall under these exclusions.

In summary, if the church uses the $200 to invest in the construction of a shopping mall purely for generating investment income, the IRS would likely treat the resulting income as unrelated business income, subject to UBIT. The church would need to comply with IRS reporting requirements and pay taxes on this income accordingly.

I followed:

Quote

Let's say that Jack (the guy who donated the $1,000 to the church originally) discovers that the church used that money to invest in a shopping mall. Could he file a lawsuit to get his money back? And would he win?

The response:

Quote

Whether Jack could successfully sue to get his $1,000 donation back from the church, and whether he would win, depends on several factors, including the terms of the donation, the church's policies, and applicable laws.

Key Considerations

1. Terms of the Donation:

   • Restricted vs. Unrestricted Donations: If Jack's donation was unrestricted, meaning he did not specify how the church should use the money, the church generally has broad discretion to use the funds as it sees fit, as long as it aligns with its exempt purposes.
   • Restricted Donations: If Jack's donation was restricted to a specific purpose (e.g., for charitable activities or a specific project), and the church used the funds for a different purpose (such as investing in a shopping mall), Jack may have grounds for a lawsuit.

2. Church Policies and Agreements:

   • Donation Agreement: If there was an agreement or understanding between Jack and the church regarding how the donation should be used, and the church violated that agreement, Jack might have a case for reclaiming his donation.

3. Legal Grounds:

   • Breach of Contract: If there was a specific agreement on the use of the funds, Jack could argue that the church breached this agreement.
   • Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Nonprofits have a fiduciary duty to use donations in a manner consistent with their stated purposes and donor restrictions. If the church's use of the funds violates this duty, Jack might have a legal claim.

4. Jurisdiction and Nonprofit Laws:

   • State Laws: Nonprofit and charitable trust laws vary by state. Some states have specific provisions regarding donor intent and the use of charitable funds.
   • Attorney General's Role: In some jurisdictions, the state attorney general has the authority to oversee charitable organizations and ensure they adhere to their fiduciary duties. Jack could potentially involve the attorney general in his claim.

Likelihood of Success

• Strong Case: If Jack has clear evidence that his donation was restricted and the church misused the funds, he might have a strong case.
• Weak Case: If the donation was unrestricted or if Jack cannot provide evidence of a specific agreement or restriction, his chances of winning the lawsuit may be lower.

Conclusion

Jack might be able to file a lawsuit to get his donation back if he can prove that the church used the funds in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the donation. However, the success of such a lawsuit would depend on the specifics of the donation agreement, the church's policies, and the applicable laws in the jurisdiction. It would be advisable for Jack to consult with a legal professional to assess the strength of his case and the appropriate legal actions to take.

I responded:

Quote

Let's say that Jack's donation was an "unrestricted donation" (which, as you put it, means that "he did not specify how the church should use the money, the church generally has broad discretion to use the funds as it sees fit, as long as it aligns with its exempt purposes"). Would that weaken or strengthen his lawsuit?

The response:

Quote

If Jack's donation was an "unrestricted donation," this would generally weaken his lawsuit. Here's why:

Unrestricted Donation

• Broad Discretion: An unrestricted donation means that the donor does not place specific conditions or restrictions on how the funds are to be used. The church, therefore, has broad discretion to use the funds in any manner that aligns with its exempt purposes.
• Church's Authority: As long as the church uses the funds in a way that is consistent with its overall mission and tax-exempt purposes, it is generally within its rights to decide how to allocate and invest those funds, even if that includes investing in a shopping mall.

Legal Considerations

1. Lack of Specific Agreement:

   • Without a specific agreement or restriction on the use of the funds, Jack would have a harder time proving that the church misused his donation.

2. Fiduciary Duty:

   • While the church has a fiduciary duty to use its funds for its exempt purposes, unrestricted donations give the church considerable latitude in determining what constitutes appropriate use.

3. Judicial Reluctance:

   • Courts are generally reluctant to second-guess the decisions of nonprofit organizations regarding the use of unrestricted donations, as long as those decisions are lawful and in line with the organization's mission.

Conclusion

Given that Jack's donation was unrestricted, his legal standing to demand the return of the funds would be significantly weakened. He would likely have to prove that the church's investment in a shopping mall somehow violated its fiduciary duty or did not align with its exempt purposes. This is typically a difficult argument to make, especially if the church can demonstrate that the investment was intended to support its mission through the generation of additional income.

Thus, the unrestricted nature of Jack's donation would indeed weaken his lawsuit, making it less likely for him to succeed in reclaiming his donation.

I followed:

Quote

Let's say that the church, prior to investing in the shopping mall, made a public statement that “tithing funds have not and will not be used to acquire this property," and "nor will they [tithes] be used in developing it for commercial purposes," and that, instead, "funds for this [investment in the shopping mall] have come and will come from those commercial entities owned by the Church." Could Jack claim in his lawsuit that because he donated money to the Church, and because the church invested that money and realized a profit, and because that profit came from the church's investment of Jack's donation, that his donation was "used" to "fund" the development of the shopping mall?

The response:

Quote

Jack could potentially make this claim in his lawsuit, but the success of such a claim would depend on several factors, including how the court interprets the use of funds and the church's financial practices. Here's an analysis of the potential arguments and challenges:

Potential Arguments

1. Indirect Use of Funds:

   • Jack could argue that, although his original donation was not directly used for the shopping mall investment, the profits generated from investing his donation were ultimately used for that purpose. This indirect use could be seen as a violation of the church's public statement.

2. Commingling of Funds:

   • If the church did not clearly separate the investment returns from tithing funds and used the profits from those investments for the shopping mall, Jack could claim that his donation indirectly funded the project.

3. Reliance on Public Statements:

   • Jack might argue that he relied on the church's public statements about the use of funds and that any profits derived from his donation should not be used for commercial investments like the shopping mall.

Challenges to the Claim

1. Tracing the Funds:

   • Proving that the specific $200 profit generated from Jack's $1,000 donation was used for the shopping mall investment might be difficult. The church could argue that the funds used for the investment came from a different source.

2. Financial Practices:

   • The church could defend itself by showing that it maintained proper financial practices and that the funds used for the shopping mall were strictly from commercial entities, as stated. If the church can demonstrate a clear separation of funds, Jack's claim might be weakened.

3. Legal Precedents:

   • Courts generally give nonprofit organizations discretion in how they use unrestricted donations, as long as they adhere to their exempt purposes and public statements. The court would consider whether the church's actions constituted a breach of fiduciary duty or misrepresentation.

Conclusion

While Jack could claim that his donation was indirectly used to fund the development of the shopping mall, the success of his lawsuit would depend on his ability to prove that the church's actions violated its public statements and that the funds were not properly segregated. The claim hinges on demonstrating a clear link between his donation and the investment in the shopping mall, which could be challenging. Consulting with a legal professional would be crucial for assessing the strength of his case and developing a strategy based on the specifics of the church's financial practices and statements.

I followed:

Quote

What impact would the "ecclesiastical abstention" or "church autonomy" doctrine have on Jack's lawsuit?

The response:

Quote

The "ecclesiastical abstention" or "church autonomy" doctrine could have a significant impact on Jack's lawsuit. This doctrine generally prevents civil courts from interfering in internal church disputes that involve doctrinal matters, church governance, or ecclesiastical decisions. Here’s how this doctrine might influence Jack's case:

Key Considerations

1. Doctrine Overview:

   • The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is based on the First Amendment, which ensures the free exercise of religion and prohibits government establishment of religion. This doctrine typically prevents courts from adjudicating issues that are purely ecclesiastical in nature, such as religious doctrine, church governance, and internal church decisions.

2. Application to Financial Decisions:

   • While the doctrine is primarily concerned with ecclesiastical matters, it can also extend to financial decisions if those decisions are intertwined with religious doctrine or church governance.

Potential Impacts on Jack’s Lawsuit

1. Non-Interference in Ecclesiastical Matters:

   • If the court views the church’s decision on how to use and invest its funds as an ecclesiastical matter, it might refuse to intervene. The court could determine that evaluating the appropriateness of the church’s financial decisions would require delving into internal church governance, which is protected by the doctrine.

2. Jurisdictional Limits:

   • The court may limit its jurisdiction to avoid entangling itself in religious matters. This means Jack’s lawsuit could be dismissed if the court finds that resolving the dispute would involve making judgments about the church’s internal policies and decisions that are ecclesiastical in nature.

3. Distinguishing Secular from Ecclesiastical:

   • The court would need to distinguish whether Jack’s claim involves purely secular issues, such as breach of contract or misrepresentation, versus ecclesiastical issues. If the court determines that the church's financial decisions are secular and can be separated from religious doctrine, it might still hear the case.

Likelihood of Success

• Weakened Position: The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine would generally weaken Jack’s lawsuit, as it limits the court's ability to intervene in matters that the church considers part of its religious or internal governance.
• Secular Claims: Jack’s best chance for success would be to frame his lawsuit in purely secular terms, such as arguing that the church’s public statements constituted a binding promise or a form of misrepresentation, without requiring the court to evaluate religious or doctrinal issues.

Conclusion

The ecclesiastical abstention or church autonomy doctrine could significantly impact Jack’s lawsuit by potentially limiting the court’s jurisdiction over the matter. The success of Jack’s claim would depend on whether he can frame his case in purely secular terms and avoid implicating religious doctrine or internal church governance. Consulting with a legal professional who specializes in church-state issues would be crucial for navigating the complexities of this doctrine and assessing the viability of his lawsuit.

This is broad stuff, but overall it's pretty good as far as it goes.  The devil, though, is often in the legal details.

I don't see the courts getting involved in adjudicating the Church's expenditure of its funds.

Thanks,

-Smac

[smac97]

39 minutes ago, Analytics said:

What critics think on this issue is irrelevant. What matters is how tithe-paying members interpreted the Church’s responses over the years.

Actually, what matters is how a reasonably prudent person would construe the Church's various statements about tithing.

39 minutes ago, Analytics said:

For example, in 2015 one believer asked this question:

One frequently hears the statement that tithing funds were not used for such and such an investment. And while I like to think that is true, I have to pause and think...if not tithing then what funds were used? Surely not Fast Offerings, too many those are even more sacred as to their dedicated use, and surely not missionary funds. So, what are these mysterious "not tithing" funds?

That question presupposes the statement “tithing funds were not used” is meant to be interpreted broadly--tithing funds weren’t used, neither directly nor indirectly.

As we go through the following answers that were offered to that question by believers, keep in mind that unlike Deseret News, Bonneville International, Property Reserve, etc.,  Ensign Peak Advisors is a non-profit organization and is essentially the Church’s treasury of unspent tithing that has grown with interest.

So, in 2015, where did Latter-day Saints think the money for the mall came from?

I quoted, verbatim and in context, the Latter-day Saints on this board who made comments in 2012 and 2015, and then summed up:

Quote

Funny how you aren't actually quoting any of these "apologists."

Whenever you make a claim about what Latter-day Saints have said, but don't actually quote them, I tend to get a bit, shall we say, cautious about accepting your unexamined say-so on the matter.

So let's examine your say-so.  You have cited to two threads.  This one from 2012 (17 pages, oi) and this one from 2012 (5 pages).  I skimmed through these threads looking for how (apparent) Latter-day Saints (all of whom, it seems, you deem to be "apologists") were using the word "tithing."  Here is what I found:
...
 

Oi.  That was a slog.  But perhaps it was useful.  To sum up what the Latter-day Saints were saying back in 2012 and 2015:

• "Tithing and other consecrated funds"
• "the funds for the mall did not come from tithing"
• "if they say tithing money is not used for the building of things like the mall I can believe them"
• "{tithing} slips have provided ways to distinguish between various types of offerings"
• "Our leaders have stated plainly that no tithing funds were used"
• "I will continue to give whatever excess funds I can, apart from tithing, for the fast offering, for the Church Humanitarian fund, for the Perpetual Education Fund..."
• "The Church has a statement saying the money did not come from tithing funds, and specifying where it did originate."
• "{'not tithing' funds are} income from church owned businesses and sometimes from direct donations from members for a specific purpose."
• "There a great many original non-tithing sources of funds..."
• "The Church has more than one bucket of investment funds.  It has a diversified portfolio of almost all investment opportunities - stocks, bonds, real estate, etc.  Church funds, tithing funds, are not commingled with investment funds."
• "When someone at Church HQ says that no tithing funds were used, it is very likely true."
• "If the Church leaders say that no tithing funds were used, I think we ought to give them the benefit of the doubt.  There are plenty of for-profit funds available..."
• "Thus the source of funds can be completely controlled, and the money for City Creek can be certified NOT to have come out of Tithing funds."
• "I do believe that no tithing money was used for CityCreek."
• "When they say 'non tithing funds' they mean that money that people paid as tithing was not used."
• "All donations made to the Church through the donation process of each ward and branch go to this non profit entity.  This includes tithing, fast offering, missionary, perpetual education fund and humanitarian fund."
• "If the statement was made that no tithing funds were used, I am confident that is the case."

That sure sounds like what Latter-day Saints are saying now, in 2023, in this thread.  If the Latter-day Saints believe that A) the Church stated that the funds for City Creek did not come from tithing, and also B) the Church actually used from for City Creek, then those funds, ipso facto, are not "tithing funds," and the Latter-day Saints are not treating "tithing" as being synonymous with all other sources of Church income.  So it won't do for you to cram into our mouths and minds the notion that "tithing" includes monies that are not tithes.  You are just making that up.

Observant and conversant Latter-day Saints understand what "tithing" is, and what it means, and what it is not and what it does not mean.  (For that matter, I think the overwhelming majority of all people familiar with a dictionary would not subscribe to your tortured re-definition of "tithing.")

Latter-day Saints understand that the Church receives "tithes" from members (a tenth of their income), but also has other sources of income.  Fast offerings.  Charitable donations (such as to LDS Philanthropies), earnings on investments, for-profit ventures, and so on.

Latter-day Saints do not, per your suggestion, conflate these various sources of income as all falling under the rubric of "tithing."  Tithing has an actual and fairly specific definition and meaning.

A tithe is a donation by a member of the Church amounting to a tenth of his income.

A fast offering is a numerically distinct and separate and additional donation by a member of the Church, generally equivalent to the money that would have been spent on two meals (some members give more, some give less).  A fast offering is money that belongs to the Church, but it is not a "tithe," and tithing is not a fast offering.  The two are not synonymous.

A profit generated by EPA investing money in stocks, bonds, etc. is money that belongs to the Church, but such earnings on EPA's investments is not a "tithe" and tithing is not money generated by the EPA's investment efforts.  The two are not synonymous.

And so on.

Though derived from different sources, all of the monies held by the Church are held in trust.  All of these monies belong to the Lord.  All of these monies are, therefore, "sacred funds."  But not all "sacred funds" are "tithing."  Latter-day Saints, as shown above, do not believe that.  Nor does the Church teach that.

FWIW.

39 minutes ago, Analytics said:

For my part, I always thought the Church’s statements were too vague to be relied on.

Then the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims aren't really worth much.

Thanks,

-Smac

[Calm]

1 hour ago, ZealouslyStriving said:

Too much bureaucracy at COB. 

It is not the COB that is not including “indirectly” in its claims, so I don’t understand your comment here. 

[Calm]

59 minutes ago, Analytics said:

For example, in 2015 one believer asked this question:

I am not sure “believer” is an accurate description of Stoneholm, though I may be mixing him up with other posters.  I don’t remember and can’t find looking at his profile anything positive he said about the church. 

Edited July 24, 2024 by Calm

[SeekingUnderstanding]

13 minutes ago, Calm said:

I am not sure “believer” is an accurate description of Stoneholm, though I may be mixing him up with other posters.  I don’t remember and can’t find looking at his profile anything positive he said about the church. 

Nuanced but believing I'd say

[Analytics]

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

Given your lack of expertise on the litigation, I’m not sure your opinion on this should carry much weight.  

I agree. 100%.

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

Again, I previously touched on this here:

Again: "The other claims--fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, equally implicate facts that are inextricably intertwined with internal church governance ... We likewise conclude the trial court also lacked the jurisdiction to hear those claims under ecclesiastical abstention."

The above case was in Texas.

From Kentucky: Thang Ngo v. Ngo, 2022-CA-0573-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec 01, 2023) :

A few notes:

1. The foregoing case was decided by the court in a "Motion to Dismiss" context, meaning the lawsuit had just barely started, and the court deployed every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff (the guy asserting the "breach of fiduciary duty" claim against the church), and the plaintiff still lost.  Even with the deck stacked so heavily in favor of the plaintiff, his theory could not get off the ground.

2. The parishioner in the above case made the same sorts of arguments we see in the Complaint - which arguments you are now championing: "Appellant claims that Father Anthony owed a fiduciary duty to the parishioners to properly use and account for the parish donations given to him and this does not involve church government or religious doctrine."

3. The Kentucky Court of Appeals threw out the case: 

• "We believe that the trial court did not err in this case."
• "An accounting of church funds is directly related to church governance."
• "How parish funds were being spent was under the purview of Father Anthony with oversight performed by the Archdiocese of Louisville."
• "If the trial court had allowed this case to move forward to completion, any ruling it made would be an imposition on the will of the Archdiocese and the church itself."
• "The court would have been in a position to second guess the decisions of the Archdiocese as to the proper running of the parish and administration of the parish funds. This type of situation is precisely why the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine exists."

Those cases do seem to be different than the consolidated class action complaint. Those cases are people complaining about how the churches were run. In contrast, this one is about the church allegedly lying to donors about what it does with the money they donate. I would think ecclesiastical abstention doctrine gives churches the right to teach whatever they want and to spend their money on anything they want, but it doesn’t give them the right to lie to the donors. 

Am I wrong about that?

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

I have spent the last year using (or, to be more precise, trying to use) ChatGPT to supplement my legal research.  Apart from the very occasional low-hanging fruit, the effort has not proven useful.  ChatGPT is very much a GIGO ("Garbage In, Garbage Out") kind of resource.  You really ought not repose much trust in its capacity to provide competent legal analysis, at least not right now.

You'll note that I began and ended each quote with “FWIW.” 

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

For example, here is a 2019 case from Ohio: Adkison v. Williams, 2019 Ohio 4289, Case No. 18 CA 119 (Ohio App. Oct 17, 2019) :

• "We find this {breach of fiduciary duty} claim ... {is} an attempted extension of appellants' basic legal challenge to membership removal, and thus presents an ecclesiastical question of internal congregational governance, outside of a civil court's jurisdiction."
• "'{T}he lower court has no jurisdiction over the claims brought by the individual members of the congregation ... for breach of fiduciary duty to the congregation."

Your buddies, ChatGPT and Google, apparently didn't bother to tell you about this case.

How is that case relevant? That is about a guy suing because he was excommunicated. He wasn’t suing because the Church lied to him about what it did with the money he donated.

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

A 2012 case from Tennessee offers a glimmer of hope for Huntsman and those that think/act like him, but not much: Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012) :

So the "bar" is not "absolute."  That's a glimmer.

Hmm.  The glimmer is fading.  A fiduciary breach claim as to sexual abuse doesn't implicate the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine, whereas a fiduciary breach claim is far more likely to do so:

"'In applying the law of fiduciary duty, courts should take great care to avoid the imposition, by juries and others, of liability for breaches of duties that are distinctly religious.'"

I didn’t see anything in the consolidated class action suit that was distinctly religious. The suit isn’t about any religious doctrine or practice. The suit is about whether the brethren’s fiduciary duty extends to being honest with the membership about the Church’s finances. That isn’t a distinctly religious question.

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

Publications in BYU Law School journals are often a good resource for cases which touch on religious matters.  Here, the authors (Lupu and Tuttle) were law professors at George Washington University.  Some further excepts from the article:

I think this is correct, and this is why your reliance on ChatGPT and Google is misplaced.  These resources, at least at present, often fail to help neophytes in getting to the substantive law.

More from the article:

This excerpt highlights, I think, some substantial flaws in the approach to evaluating legal issues affecting the Church taken by Hunstman and those who think and act like him:

First, religious groups and organizations enjoy substantial constitutional protections (from things such as governmental interference and intrusion) under the United States Constitution.  As the above excerpt puts it: "{Religious groups have} the right to settle, free from state interference, internal disputes whose resolution depends upon judgments about theological principles or issues of religious polity."  Consequently, in a contest between generalized principles of tort law and constitutional law, the latter will generally predominate over the former, typically by a country mile.  This is, of course, not an absolute principle.  As the above article notes: "Courts, as noted above, may apply religion-neutral principles to similarly neutral aspects of a religious entity’s activities, but courts remain forbidden from resolving questions of religious structure or theological principle."

Second, disputes about how The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (or any other religious group) spends tithes is pretty much entirely within the parameters of the Church Autonomy / Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine.

Third, Huntsman and his acolytes consistently refuse to recognize or attempt to dispassionately apply the foregoing principles to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  This is how we end up with lawsuits built on strained and weak-tea notions of "fraud" and "breach of fiduciary duty" claims, with the plaintiffs in the MDL lawsuit irrationally conflating donations to LDS Philanthropies with tithing donations, with Huntsman and others re-defining "tithing" to include monies that are not voluntary donations from members of the Church, and so on.

Nowhere in there does it address the actual issue: does the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine give churches the right to lie to tithe-paying members about how donations will be deployed?

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

This is what Huntsman and his acolytes are trying to do.  They want to use the coercive power of the courts to tell the Church what it can, and cannot, do with its money. 

That is false. The plaintiffs in the consolidated class action case want the Church to be honest and transparent with the membership so that they can make well-informed decisions about whether or not they want to donate in the first place. 

The issue is about honestly and transparency.

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

The MDL Complaint is particularly brazen on this point: "In addition to tithing refunds, the class-action suit calls for declaring the church’s financial practices illegal and ordering a halt to tithing altogether while accountants sort through the faith’s finances or the court appoints a special monitor."

I am curious as to your position on this.  Do you support this part of the Huntsman lawsuit?

I don’t even know what that means, much less have an opinion on it.

And for the record, I don’t support any part of these lawsuits.

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

I think that is because you are only seeing what you want to see.  You underlined one part, but ignored this one: "Matters related to church governance, such as the appointment of clergy, internal church disputes, and disciplinary actions, are typically outside the jurisdiction of civil courts."

I said “that rings true to me.” Are you using your priesthood power of discernment to claim that it really doesn’t ring true to me, despite the fact that I claimed it does?

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

Also, I think you do not understand the concept of fiduciary duties very well (such as to whom the duty is owed, the scope of the duty, etc.).  You also do seem to grasp the legal concept of "standing."

I'll give your opinion on this all the weight it deserves.

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

You also never seem to get around to addressing the Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine, even when case law is quoted to you chapter and verse.

I'm not an attorney, but I don’t think very much of the cases you’ve cited are relevant, because they are about different situations. I don’t see how the case law that’s been quoted indicate that churches have the legal right to lie to donors about what it does with money.

1 hour ago, smac97 said:

Back to the Redwing case:

So far, this is the best case I have seen for your approach.

My approach? Do you think IRL I’m one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs on the consolidated class action case or something?

[ZealouslyStriving]

50 minutes ago, Calm said:

It is not the COB that is not including “indirectly” in its claims, so I don’t understand your comment here. 

I think getting statement like that past the lawyers, PR people, etc... isn't quite as easy as we might think