Jump to content
Seriously No Politics ×

Gaddy Lawsuit Judgement


Recommended Posts

Posted (edited)
On 3/29/2023 at 8:41 AM, JustAnAustralian said:

Since I seem to have a streak of masochism, I read through the entire memorandum and decision. I have to say that I admire Gaddy and Co.'s determination. Too bad it wasn't in aid of something worthwhile. And I do hope that their attorneys are well-compensated. Wouldn't want those lawyers to not be able to afford their Mercedes-Benzs or have the wherewithal to pay for their earthly mansions.

Edited to add: Apparently there's just one attorney involved here, who seems not to remember how to attorney, if the court's decision on her rule 60 filing is any indication.

 

Edited by Stargazer
Posted

I was interested to read one of the Amici Curiae briefs, by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, in which, among other things, they write:

As the district court observed, this lawsuit “seek[s] to have the [judiciary] adjudicate the truth or falsity” of various beliefs held by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “Church”). App. Vol. 4 at 263. That has not changed on appeal. Plaintiffs continue to contend, for example, that the Church “misrepresented the process by which the Book of Mormon was created” as well as the character of its “founding prophet, Joseph Smith.” Opening Br. 21. But resolving those questions lies no more within the judicial ken than adjudicating the origin of the Qur’an or the virtue of the Buddha. Nothing could be further from the kinds of “purely secular disputes” that fall within this Court’s competence. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Further, the First Amendment not only forecloses judicial inquiry into “the Church’s teachings and representations” as to its scripture and history, App. Vol. 4 at 262, but also its representations regarding the purpose and use of Church members’ tithes. Tithing is a profoundly spiritual issue for many faith traditions—including the Church—with deep scriptural roots. It is a devotional practice, not a business transaction, and spiritual principles such as inspiration and revelation frequently guide the discussion and disbursement of tithing funds. Yet notwithstanding the “right of the church” to “discuss church doctrine and policy freely,” Bryce, 289 F.3d at 658, Plaintiffs would have this Court parse communications made during a worship service for consistency with their preferred understanding of what constitutes a tithe and how tithing funds should be used. Any such inquiry is barred by the First Amendment.

See the full brief HERE.

Posted (edited)
On 4/24/2024 at 2:20 PM, Stargazer said:

Since I seem to have a streak of masochism, I read through the entire memorandum and decision. I have to say that I admire Gaddy and Co.'s determination.  Too bad it wasn't in aid of something worthwhile.

I feel sorry for them.  I think their attorney is taking them for a ride.

On 4/24/2024 at 2:20 PM, Stargazer said:

And I do hope that their attorneys are well-compensated. Wouldn't want those lawyers to not be able to afford their Mercedes-Benzs or have the wherewithal to pay for their earthly mansions.

Edited to add: Apparently there's just one attorney involved here, who seems not to remember how to attorney, if the court's decision on her rule 60 filing is any indication.

Yes, Kay Burningham has not exactly distinguished herself on this one.  Oh, well.

Judge Shelby's March 2023 decision in Gaddy may be a good sneak peak into how he may address and apply the Church Autonomy / Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine in the context of "tithing" claims.  From that decision (summarizing its previous decision) :

Quote

The court, noting again that the church autonomy doctrine only applies as a defense to alleged misconduct “rooted in religious belief” not “purely secular decisions, even when made by churches,” found that the tithing theory was based on a secular dispute.110  The court explained that the Amended Complaint did not challenge the Church’s tithing doctrine, teachings or beliefs related to it.  Rather, the Amended Complaint identified “specific factual statements allegedly made by the Church through its representatives concerning the Church’s use of tithing funds and allege[d] those statements are false.”111  Therefore, to adjudicate the claim, the court would not be required to examine the truth or falsity of the Church’s teachings concerning tithing, but instead whether the statements about the use of funds were true or false.112

Because the Church had not raised any challenge to the civil RICO claim other than its Religion Clauses argument, the court found the civil RICO claim survived, to the extent it was based on the tithing theory.113  

This may sound like Judge Shelby is open to letting the consolidated tithing cases proceed on their fraud claims which are based on allegedly false statements about the use of tithing for City Creek.  However, this overlooks the procedural posture of the Gaddy lawsuit, which IIRC has always been stuck at the "pleading" stage.  This is the earliest stage of a lawsuit, and the applicable rule (Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) requires the judge, in a "Motion to Dismiss" context (which is where Gaddy has been all along), to accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint, and also to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  In other words, in a Rule 12 context, the Church has a much tougher row to hoe in terms of arguing the law because the Court is bound to accept Gaddy's version/recitation of the "facts" and all reasonable inferences associated with that version.  This would include allegations that the Church did, in fact, use tithing funds for City Creek.  Judge Shelby is saying here that Gaddy's tithing-based RICO claim can proceed past the "Motion to Dismiss" stage because the Church Autonomy doctrine does not preclude analysis of fraud claims.

However, all of the foregoing presupposes Gaddy's version of the facts.  If and when the consolidated cases proceed before Judge Shelby, there is a very good chance that the litigation will lead to facts and evidence demonstrating what the trial court in the Huntsman case found, namely, that tithing was not used to fund City Creek.  As we know, Huntsman is scheduled for an en banc hearing before the Ninth Circuit in June.  I suspect that at this hearing some things will come to a head, including the effort by Huntsman to argue that secular courts are situated to define "tithing," to define it in ways that the Church does not (namely, that its meaning includes both voluntary donations from church members and also earnings derived from the Church's investment of such donations), and to superimpose this after-the-fact, court-crafted definition onto the statements from Pres. Hinckley etc. from 20+ years ago. 

I don't think even the Ninth Circuit is willing to do this, as I think the Church Autonomy doctrine prohibits it.  If this happens, then the Ninth Circuit will end up affirming the trial court's dismissal of Huntsman's case.  If that happens, then I think Judge Shelby will likely give the Ninth Circuit's reasoning a lot of attention (actually, he'll likely give it attention regardless of the nature of the decision). 

Put another way, if the Ninth Circuit holds that the Church Autonomy / Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine prohibits secular courts from adjudicating claims that require it (the court) to craft novel definitions of religious terms, and to impute those definitions to a religious group, then I think Judge Shelby will follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit and reach the same conclusion.

Fraud claims have a lot of moving parts.  Here are the primary components of a fraud claim in California:

Quote

“ ‘The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’ ”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) 

Gaddy is based on fraud as defined under Utah law:

Quote

The elements of fraud in Utah are: "(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he [or she] had insufficient knowledge on which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his [or her] injury and damage."

The consolidated cases to be heard by Judge Shelby were filed in Utah, Illinois, Tennessee, and Washington

Elements of fraud in Illinois:

Quote

In order to establish a claim for common law fraud in Illinois, a plaintiff must allege and prove each of the following:

  • a false statement of material fact;
  • the party making the statement knew or believed it to be untrue;
  • the party making the statement's intent that the statement induce the other party to act;
  • the party to whom the statement was made did rely on the statement; and
  • the reliance by the person to whom the statement was made led to that person's injury. Miller v. Chevrolet/GEO, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 642, 648 (2001).

Elements of fraud in Tenneessee:

Quote

Under Tennessee law, the elements of fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation are:  (1) an intentional misrepresentation with regard to a material fact; (2) made knowingly and with a fraudulent intent; (3) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied and suffered damage; and (4) which relates to an existing or past fact or, if the claim is based on promissory fraud, the misrepresentation embodied a promise of future action without the present intention to carry out the promise.  First Nat’l Bank v. Brooks Farms , 821 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tenn. 1991).

Elements of fraud in Washington:

Quote

Under Washington law, the nine elements of fraud are (1) representation of an existing fact; (2) materiality; (3) falsity; (4) the speaker's knowledge of it falsity; (5) intent of the speaker that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (6) plaintiff's ignorance of its falsity; (7) plaintiff's reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) plaintiff's right to rely upon the representation; and (9) damages suffered by the plaintiff. Stiley v. Block, 130 Wn.2d 486, 505, 925 P.2d 194 (1996). 

All of these have, as a core component, an element of "intent."  Fraud is, after all, an intentional tort.  Consequently, courts are obligated to examine the intent of the speaker of a purportedly fraudulent statement.  That is, the court must examine what President Hinckley meant and understood by using the word "tithing" in reference to City Creek.  I don't think federal judges will be keen to impute a court-crafted definition onto statements made more than two decades ago, but that is what Huntsman is asking them to do.

Thanks,

-Smac

 

Edited by smac97
  • 2 months later...
Posted (edited)
Quote

Oral argument notice filed. This matter is set for IN PERSON oral argument on 9/23/2024 at 9:00 A.M. Mountain Time in Courtroom IV of the Byron White United States Courthouse, Denver, CO.  ... Counsel for amici parties may not participate in argument without written permission from the court.  ...  [Entered: 06/25/2024 11:56 AM]


It will be interesting to see what angle they try and take with the oral arguments. Regurgitating hundreds of pages of fluff probably won't be the smartest idea if that's what they think they'll try and do.

Edited by JustAnAustralian
  • 3 months later...

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...