Poll- On Certainty

[Eldwynn]

Just wondering what people mean when they tell others that they "know" or "This is truth" etc.

Examples:

I know the church is true.

I know the Book of Mormon is <blank>.

I know the prophet speaks with god.

etc. etc.

Do you mean "cartesian truth", "Highly likely" or "slightly probable".

In conversations with members, I find that after a good amount of prodding, they will admit that they could be wrong (we could all be wrong). Do you think the brethren feel the same way? Growing up in the church, I found this to be a rather confusing topic! As I child, I always thought the brethren were choice number one. After reading their writings, and how often prophets have been wrong in their opinions, I am much more inclined to believe the second or third option, if you sat down and really prodded in private.

Edited February 5, 2012 by Eldwynn

[stemelbow]

I would love to contribute to the poll but I don't have a clue about the second one so I can't. I tried to just vote on the first part, but leave the second blank. It would not work.

What makes this poll curious to me is do people pick out statements by the Presidency in which the phrase "I know" is used and then make value judgments in each case to decide whether he really does know if he there is some other explanation? I guess I could take the easy way and just say, "I suppose when/if any of them use the phrase, "I know" they at least mean the second option listed".

[Eldwynn]

Added an option for you. I'm worried now that people won't give their opinion on the second part though. Was curious to see the difference between what people mean when they say it, but whether they think general authority members are more certain than they are.

Obviously the prophet is a man. They aren't perfect, they make mistakes, etc. Realizing that as a young adult was... really challenging for me. Don't know about others, but I guess in my mind I had built them up to be some sort of super heroes. One day, I think I just realized that they are human too. They make a plethora of mistakes, write things that are factually incorrect, probably leave the toilet seat up sometimes, etc.

This realization that people didn't actually KNOW was kind of painful when I was a teenager. I recall confiding in my father on the matter, who told me something like "Well of course people don't really mean they KNOW. I don't know for sure, but <insert appeal to morals/population/family values/ culture etc.>. Well fine, that's great, but for the sake of the young minds... could you not stand up in testimony and talk about how darn certain you are? You aren't. The only honest answer is "I don't know, but I am pretty sure X for such and such reasons".

It was rather heart breaking for a young boy to hear.

Edited February 5, 2012 by Eldwynn

[thesometimesaint]

We all see through that glass darkly. There is at least two types of knowledge. IE; Ask anyone if they know their mother loves them. The vast majority of people will say yes. The rare few that say no doesn't invalidate the fact that they have a mother. .

Further if the Atheists are correct no one is going to know any differently any way.

[CV75]

It was rather heart breaking for a young boy to hear.

I don’t think your reaction has much to do with the age of the mind or the age of the boy, so I recommend you check into “all that” a little deeper.

One can know that God exists but not have faith to follow Him. One can have faith in God and know the fruits of following Him, which is (ultimately) to know Him. And then there can be every permutation and degree of faith and knowledge on every principle of discovered truth. Of course these are LDS definitions of knowledge, faith and truth, which are initially seemingly very subjective experiences but eventually lead people to be of one heart and one mind, and one with God.

Observing another’s knowledge and faith without being grounded in one’s own will naturally result in a subjective dissonance in the observer, because fundamentally everyone experiences a degree of knowledge and faith.

If you are bringing this up in the context of Descartes, you may want to expand on what you mean by “Cartesian truth” if it goes beyond the simple definition that someone reports he is 100% certain that he knows that something is true, methodology aside.

[Xander]

Do I know Joseph Smith wasn't a prophet?

No.

I do know he couldn't do some of the things he claimed, like translating ancient documents. That has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

I suppose it is technically possible that he could still be a real prophet, but at this point there is simply no good reason to believe so.

I do know the Church isn't the "one true Church," because I do not believe anything coming from God, assuming he exists, would need to rely on lies and falsehoods as Joseph Smith did. For example, it is an indisputable fact that he lied about polygamy. On that same subject, John Taylor engaged in lies of omission.

So once coming to grips with this, the question for me was simple. How does this reconcile with Jesus's claim that the truth will set you free?

He, and then later Brigham Young, were married to a very beautiful woman who already had a husband, but was conveniently sent away on missions. The entire doctrine of spiritual wifery, or whatever you want to call it, is incoherent and without clear purpose. It would never be accepted by prospective converts if they were to know about this before baptism. Therefore by definition, it is also a lie of omission. I mean if you think about it, polygamy signaled the impending death of Joseph Smith. But for what purpose? Was it really that important for him to practice it? Apparently not, because "God" suddenly discontinued it shortly afterwards, when the US government started applying pressure on the polygamous LDS Church.

[Kenngo1969]

... Obviously the prophet is a man. They aren't perfect, they make mistakes, etc. Realizing that as a young adult was... really challenging for me. Don't know about others, but I guess in my mind I had built them up to be some sort of super heroes. One day, I think I just realized that they are human too. They make a plethora of mistakes, write things that are factually incorrect, probably leave the toilet seat up sometimes, etc. ...

Wait, wait, wait ...

Whattaya mean, "they leave the seat up"?

You mean, prophets pee too???

For some reason, I always thought that such a method of elimination was too base ... too vulgar ... to be used by the Prophets, Seers, and Revelators. I mean, I knew it was a necessary evil for the rank-and-file (I thought the teaching was ... if you absolutely have to ... you know ... do what you gotta do ...) Somehow, though, I thought the process was more ... refined ... purer, somehow ... for those whom God has trusted to be His Mouthpieces here upon the earth.

I shall seriously have to reevaluate my testimony in the face of this startling new information.

[blackstrap]

I wonder if Joseph had only married ugly spinsters,that he would have been given a pass on this polygamy stuff. If I say that I know that Xander has lied,could I be saying that with the certainty the House does when he say " everybody lies" ? According to some NDE experiences,this life is the dream and the afterlife is reality. If that is true,then what one thinks one knows is an illusion.

[Zeta-Flux]

I couldn't answer the poll as I don't think any of the options truly reflects my feelings.

Do I know that 1+1=2 with 100% certainty? Well, I suppose that I could be wrong, and I'm really just a robot in a video game who is deceived by his own programming, but I don't think this is the case. There are many, many other things that could, theoretically, prove me wrong. On the other hand, there are reasons that I believe 1+1=2, and I can express them. I believe these reasons are convincing to others.

Similarly, when I bear testimony, I say why I believe or know something. If it is revelation, I may (if prompted) share experiences where I have received such revelations. If it's my testimony of the scriptures, I will share experiences which have shown me that they come from God.

[ERayR]

Added an option for you. I'm worried now that people won't give their opinion on the second part though. Was curious to see the difference between what people mean when they say it, but whether they think general authority members are more certain than they are.

Obviously the prophet is a man. They aren't perfect, they make mistakes, etc. Realizing that as a young adult was... really challenging for me. Don't know about others, but I guess in my mind I had built them up to be some sort of super heroes. One day, I think I just realized that they are human too. They make a plethora of mistakes, write things that are factually incorrect, probably leave the toilet seat up sometimes, etc.

This realization that people didn't actually KNOW was kind of painful when I was a teenager. I recall confiding in my father on the matter, who told me something like "Well of course people don't really mean they KNOW. I don't know for sure, but <insert appeal to morals/population/family values/ culture etc.>. Well fine, that's great, but for the sake of the young minds... could you not stand up in testimony and talk about how darn certain you are? You aren't. The only honest answer is "I don't know, but I am pretty sure X for such and such reasons".

It was rather heart breaking for a young boy to hear.

It is always heartbreaking for someone who sees the world in absolutes when they finally see the world soesn't work that way.

[Kenngo1969]

Do I know Joseph Smith wasn't a prophet?

No.

I do know he couldn't do some of the things he claimed, like translating ancient documents. That has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. ...

I see. So "evidence" is simply this monolithic, self-existent "thing" which presents itself in exactly the same way to absolutely everyone and demands that everyone give it exactly the same weight, such that only the delusional or the idiotic could fail to see the truth. Steven R. Covey was actually wrong, then. He said that we don't see things (especially past events, history) as they are; we see them as we are. The truth, however, only the delusional or the idiotic see things as they (the delusional or the idiotic) are. Those who are not delusional or idiotic, being free of those constraints, see things as they actually are.

Thanks for clearing that up for me, Kevin. You might as well provide me with some IRL contact information so I can worship You as my New God.

[The Nehor]

I see. So "evidence" is simply this monolithic, self-existent "thing" which presents itself in exactly the same way to absolutely everyone and demands that everyone give it exactly the same weight, such that only the delusional or the idiotic could fail to see the truth. Steven R. Covey was actually wrong, then. He said that we don't see things (especially past events, history) as they are; we see them as we are. The truth, however, only the delusional or the idiotic see things as they (the delusional or the idiotic) are. Those who are not delusional or idiotic, being free of those constraints, see things as they actually are.

Thanks for clearing that up for me, Kevin. You might as well provide me with some IRL contact information so I can worship You as my New God.

Now I'm conflicted. I disagree with Kevin's conclusions but I also really enjoy Steven R. Covey being wrong.

[mfbukowski]

http://www.marxists....ks/us/dewey.htm

What he said.

In other words, Alma 32

Edited February 6, 2012 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

http://www.marxists....ks/us/dewey.htm

What he said.

In other words, Alma 32

Here, I'll make it easy. I've even edited it. It's still long, yes, but it's a complicated question. There IS no shorter answer possible imo, so sweat it out and actually read it. I know you can do it.

It is more or less of a commonplace to speak of the crisis which has been caused by the progress of the natural sciences in the last few centuries. The crisis is due, it is asserted, to the incompatibility between the conclusions of natural science about the world in which we live and the realm of higher values, of ideal and spiritual qualities, which get no support from natural science. The new science, it is said, has stripped the world of the qualities which made it beautiful and congenial to men; has deprived nature of all aspiration towards ends, all preference for accomplishing the good, and presented nature to us as a scene of indifferent physical particles acting according to mathematical and mechanical laws.

This effect of modern science has, it is notorious, set the main problems for modern philosophy. How is science to be accepted and yet the realm of values to be conserved? This question forms the philosophic version of the popular conflict of science and religion. Instead of being troubled about the inconsistency of astronomy with the older religious beliefs about heaven and the ascension of Christ, or the differences between the geological record and the account of creation in Genesis, philosophers have been troubled by the gap in kind which exists between the fundamental principles of the natural world and the reality of the values according to which mankind is to regulate its life.....I am willing to run the risk of charge of naïveté for the sake of making manifest the difference upon which we have been dwelling. If men had associated their ideas about values with practical activity instead of with cognition of antecedent Being, they would not have been troubled by the findings of science. They would have welcomed the latter. For anything ascertained about the structure of actually existing conditions would be a definite aid in making judgments about things to be prized and striven for more adequate, and would instruct us as to the means to be employed in realising them. But according to the religious and philosophic tradition of Europe, the valid status of all the highest values, the good, true and beautiful, was bound up with their being properties of ultimate and supreme Being, namely, God. All went well as long as what passed for natural science gave no offence to this conception. Trouble began when science ceased to disclose in the objects of knowledge the possession of any such properties. Then some roundabout method had to be devised for substantiating them.

The point of the seemingly crass question which was asked is thus to elicit the radical difference made when the problem of values is seen to be connected with the problem of intelligent action. If the validity of beliefs and judgments about values is dependent upon the consequences of action undertaken in their behalf, if the assumed association of values with knowledge capable of being demonstrated apart from activity, is abandoned, then the problem of the intrinsic relation of science to value is wholly artificial. It is replaced by a group of practical problems: How shall we employ what we know to direct the formation of our beliefs about value and how shall we direct our practical behaviour so as to test these beliefs and make possible better ones? The question is seen to be just what it has always been empirically: What shall we do to make objects having value more secure in existence? And we approach the answer to the problem with all the advantages given us by increase of knowledge of the conditions and relations under which this doing must proceed....

But for over two thousand years the weight of the most influential and authoritatively orthodox tradition of thought has been thrown into the opposite scale. It has been devoted to the problem of a purely cognitive certification (perhaps by revelation, perhaps by intuition, perhaps by reason) of the antecedent immutable reality of truth, beauty and goodness. As against such a doctrine, the conclusions of natural science constitute the materials of a serious problem. The appeal has been made to the Court of Knowledge and the verdict has been adverse. There are two rival systems that must have their respective claims adjusted. The crisis in contemporary culture, the confusions and conflicts in it, arise from a division of authority. Scientific inquiry seems to tell one thing, and traditional beliefs about ends and ideals that have authority over conduct tell us something quite different. The problem of reconciliation arises and persists for one reason only. As long as the notions persist that knowledge is a disclosure of reality, of reality prior to and independent of knowing, and that knowing is independent of a purpose to control the quality of experienced objects, the failure of natural science to disclose significant values in its objects will come as a shock. Those seriously concerned with the validity and authority of value will have a problem on their hands. As long as the notion persists that values are authentic and valid only on condition that they are properties of Being independent of human action, as long as it is supposed that their right to regulate action is dependent upon their being independent of action, so long there will be needed schemes to prove that values are, in spite of the findings of science, genuine and known qualifications of reality in itself. For men will not easily surrender all regulative guidance in action. If they are forbidden to find standards in the course of experience they will seek them somewhere else, if not in revelation, then in the deliverance of a reason that is above experience.

This then is the fundamental issue for present philosophy. Is the doctrine justified that knowledge is valid in the degree in which it is a revelation of antecedent existences or Being? Is the doctrine justified that regulative ends and purposes have validity only when they can be shown to be properties belonging to things, whether as existences or as essences, apart from human action? It is proposed to make another start. Desires, affections, preferences, needs and interests at least exist in human experience; they are characteristics of it. Knowledge about nature also exists. What does this knowledge imply and entail with respect to the guidance of our emotional and volitional life? How shall the latter lay hold of what is known in order to make it of service?

Edit: There. I made it even easier. I underlined the best part.

Edited February 6, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Nofear]

W.V. Quine, a philosopher of science tossed in some radical complaints to the program of empiricism and really casts doubt on the validity of statements like, "That has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt."

Basically, Quine asserted that all empirical data is judged within a framework of background assumptions -- and by tweaking those assumptions we can pretty much always fit the data to our existing theory. That is say, data is really, really bad at falsifying theories. Unfortunately, some hold dearly to the illusion of confidence.

[mfbukowski]

More Dewey, from the above link

The suppositions are speculative- But they serve to indicate the significance of the one point to which this chapter is devoted. The method and conclusions of science have without doubt invaded many cherished beliefs about the things held most dear. The resulting clash constitutes a genuine cultural crisis. But it is a crisis in culture, a social crisis, historical and temporal in character. It is not a problem in the adjustment of properties of reality to one another. And yet modern philosophy has chosen for the most part to treat it as a question of how the realities assumed to be the object of science can have the mathematical and mechanistic properties assigned to them in natural science, while nevertheless the realm of ultimate reality can be characterised by qualities termed ideal and spiritual. The cultural problem is one of definite criticisms to be made and of readjustments to be accomplished. Philosophy which is willing to abandon its supposed task of knowing ultimate reality and to devote itself to a proximate human office might be of great help in such a task. It may be doubted whether it can indefinitely pursue the task of trying to show that the results of science, when they are properly interpreted, do not mean what they seem to say, or of proving, by means of an examination of possibilities and limits of knowledge, that after all they rest upon a foundation congruous with traditional beliefs about values.

Since the root of the traditional conception of philosophy is the separation that has been made between knowledge and action, between theory and practice, it is to the problem of this separation that we are to give attention. Our main attempt will be to show how the actual procedures of knowledge interpreted after the pattern formed by experimental inquiry, cancel the isolation of knowledge from overt action.

Can you say "orthopraxis"? Can you see why Mormons "have no doctrine"?