Significant Supreme Court Ruling Issued Today (Re: Lgbtq)

[Ahab]

1 minute ago, pogi said:

The answer is A, it depends on their sex.

If changing the persons sex, in this example “would have yielded a different choice by the employer-a statutory violation has occurred.”

So you're saying that a person is sexually oriented towards women and only has sex with women based on what that person's sex is?

Or are you saying that their sexual orientation is based on what their sex is, given an example of a person who is sexually oriented towards women and only has sex {sexual relations) with women?

Changing that person's sex from female to male would still not change that person's sexual orientation.  If that person prefers females and only has sexual relations with females, that would still be true whether that person was male or female.

[Bob Crockett]

22 minutes ago, smac97 said:

I agree.  My point is to object to judicial overreach.  It is the province of the legislature, not the courts, to re-write statutes.

Thanks,

-Smac

And my point is to say to you, not the Supreme Court, what does it matter?  

Right wingers object to judicial overreach all the time.  Not a convincing argument.  I don't believe for a whit that we should slavishly follow the intentions of the Founding Fathers.  Sigh to them.

Celebrate the decision as a victory for personal freedom.

Edited June 16, 2020 by Bob Crockett

[smac97]

Just now, Bob Crockett said:

And my point is to say to you, not the Supreme Court, what does it matter?  

Because I object to abuse of governmental authority.  

Just now, Bob Crockett said:

Right wingers object to judicial overreach all the time.  Not a convincing argument. 

I think it is.

Just now, Bob Crockett said:

I don't believe for a whit that we should slavishly follow the intentions of the Founding Fathers.  Sigh to them.

I think originalism, in terms of constitutional theory, is very important.  Here, though, we're not talking about the Founding Fathers.

Thanks,

-Smac

[pogi]

5 minutes ago, Ahab said:

So you're saying that a person is sexually oriented towards women and only has sex with women based on what that person's sex is?

Or are you saying that their sexual orientation is based on what their sex is, given an example of a person who is sexually oriented towards women and only has sex {sexual relations) with women?

Changing that person's sex from female to male would still not change that person's sexual orientation.  If that person prefers females and only has sexual relations with females, that would still be true whether that person was male or female.

No, I am saying that I used the phrase “sexual orientation” to mean “gay or straight.”  I made that very clear.  I won’t say it again.  Read it and re-read it.  Let it sink in. 
In that sense, a person’s sex does play a role in whether anyone identifies them as gay or straight.

 

Edited June 16, 2020 by pogi

[Ahab]

7 minutes ago, pogi said:

That’s not what I said.  I was using the term to mean gay or straight (there is a difference).  I made that clear.  

 

Okay, I agree that is one way to view it. Sexual orientation refers to whether someone is gay or straight. But knowing a person's sexual orientation still wouldn't tell you if that person is male or female. Could be either.

Each is a separate attribute, and each should be treated separately.

[Bob Crockett]

1 minute ago, smac97 said:

 

I think originalism, in terms of constitutional theory, is very important.  Here, though, we're not talking about the Founding Fathers.

 

-Smac

Says you.  But I read Marbury v. Madison to the contrary.  

There are plenty of judges who say that legislative history is a joke and shouldn't be relied upon.  I have attended a lecture to the LA County Bar by Scalia and heard him say that exact thing, while defending originalism.

I don't see a difference between the two arguments.  

Having said that as a constitutional lawyer I depend upon legislative history and originalism all the time, but as a libertarian I think those concepts, especially originalism, are an affront to personal freedom.  In particular, the constitution and legislation set up to found this country were basically an effort to throw a big sloppy piece in favor of slave holders.  The Electoral College is an affront to personal freedom, but it was established to benefit slave states.  This country was built on the backs of slaves. Time to liberate ourselves from outdated legislation.

[pogi]

2 minutes ago, Ahab said:

Okay, I agree that is one way to view it. Sexual orientation refers to whether someone is gay or straight. But knowing a person's sexual orientation still wouldn't tell you if that person is male or female. Could be either.

Each is a separate attribute, and each should be treated separately.

Thank you for conceding.  And I agree each should be treated separately, just like motherhood and womanhood should be treated separately, yet they are inextricably linked.

[Ahab]

9 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

And my point is to say to you, not the Supreme Court, what does it matter?  

Right wingers object to judicial overreach all the time.  Not a convincing argument.  I don't believe for a whit that we should slavishly follow the intentions of the Founding Fathers.  Sigh to them.

Celebrate the decision as a victory for personal freedom.

I think what we're doing here is sharing our thoughts about what the Supreme Court has done, and who knows, maybe if we protest enough we might be able to reform what they do and have done.

We're not all just going to agree with them because they did what they thought they should do.

They are free to make whatever decision or ruling they want to make, and we are free to either agree or disagree with their rules.

[Damien the Leper]

18 hours ago, Daniel2 said:

Nah... Justice Alito was entirely wrong, in his dissent. (I can assert the superiority of my opinion, too).

The legal reality is whether or not one agrees,  the law is now established by a 6-3 ruling.

Too bad you poisoned the well by reading opinion pieces like these before allowing yourself the benefit of reading the ruling for yourself.  But I guess confirmation bias is a real thing for all of us, anyway. 

Oh damn! Ouch!

[Bob Crockett]

16 minutes ago, smac97 said:

Because I object to abuse of governmental authority.  

 

Right wing politics, and the entrenchment of power, is one big long abuse of government authority.  Put down gays and disfavored religions.  Put down people with different views while licking the boots of the president of the United States.  

Our freedom is found in the teachings of Jesus Christ, not in the politics of man.  True freedom.  Enduring freedom.  We should eschew politics and preach repentance.   I believe that in the end, Joseph Smith was a libertarian who saw fundamental flaws with the U.S. Constitution. 

See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (the Nobel prize winner in 1988).

Edited June 16, 2020 by Bob Crockett

[smac97]

2 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

Quote

I think originalism, in terms of constitutional theory, is very important.  Here, though, we're not talking about the Founding Fathers.

Says you.  But I read Marbury v. Madison to the contrary.  

The merits of originalism are a discussion for another day.

2 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

There are plenty of judges who say that legislative history is a joke and shouldn't be relied upon. 

Well, here we're not talking about that.  

2 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

I have attended a lecture to the LA County Bar by Scalia and heard him say that exact thing, while defending originalism.

I largely agree with Scalia's stringent textualism, summarized here:

Quote

Textualism is a formalist theory in which the interpretation of the law is primarily based on the ordinary meaning of the legal text, where no consideration is given to non-textual sources, such as: intention of the law when passed, the problem it was intended to remedy, or significant questions regarding the justice or rectitude of the law.

 

The textualist will "look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words." The textualist thus does not give weight to legislative history materials when attempting to ascertain the meaning of a text. Textualism is often erroneously conflated with originalism, and was advocated by United States Supreme Court Justices such as Hugo Black and Antonin Scalia; the latter staked out his claim in his 1997 Tanner Lecture: "[it] is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., although not a textualist himself, well-captured this philosophy, and its rejection of intentionalism: "We ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used ... We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statutes mean."

Textualist judges have contended, with much practical impact, that courts should not treat committee reports or sponsors' statements as authoritative evidence of legislative intent. These judges base their resistance to that interpretive practice on two major premises: first, that a 535-member legislature has no "genuine" collective intent concerning the proper resolution of statutory ambiguity (and that, even if it did, there would be no reliable basis for equating the views of a committee or sponsor with the "intent" of Congress as a whole); second, that giving weight to legislative history offends the constitutionally mandated process of bicameralism and presentment.

— John F. Manning, "Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine", 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 1997, JSTOR 1123360

 

2 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

I don't see a difference between the two arguments.  

Okay.

2 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

Having said that as a constitutional lawyer I depend upon legislative history and originalism all the time, but as a libertarian I think those concepts, especially originalism, are an affront to personal freedom. 

Alas, no approach is pristinely perfect.

2 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

In particular, the constitution and legislation set up to found this country were basically an effort to throw a big sloppy piece in favor of slave holders.  The Electoral College is an affront to personal freedom, but it was established to benefit slave states.  This country was built on the backs of slaves. Time to liberate ourselves from outdated legislation.

Not sure what this has to do with the Civil Rights Act.  

Thanks,

-Smac

[Ahab]

4 minutes ago, pogi said:

Thank you for conceding.  

If that's what you want to call what I did, I will allow it.

4 minutes ago, pogi said:

And I agree each should be treated separately, just like motherhood and womanhood should be treated separately, yet they are inextricably linked.

We could make rules about a person's sexual orientation without regard to what sex they are, or vice versa, though.  We don't have to link the 2 things together, as the Supreme Court did. That was just one of their options.

[Bob Crockett]

2 minutes ago, smac97 said:

 

Not sure what this has to do with the Civil Rights Act.  

Thanks,

-Smac

Read it expansively to protect personal freedoms, as the intent of the Act was to do so.

[pogi]

16 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

Celebrate the decision as a victory for personal freedom.

I have to say, I am surprised by your reaction as a libertarian.  I thought that you would complain about government regulations on the private sector.  Traditionally, libertarians are skeptical and opposed to anti discrimination laws.

[Anijen]

1 hour ago, pogi said:

I didn't see any attempt to redefine sex. 

I guess to be more exact I should say attempt to redefine Title VII. Read the three dissenting opinions they will spell it out how they did it. 

 

Quote

I think it is wrong to accuse a 6-3 politically bipartisan ruling of "judicial activism (framed as textualism)" and overstepping their roles as judges. 

Really? It is wrong to accuse judges of judicial activism? 

If cases are decided on personal preference and not on the text of the Constitution or on established precedence what would you call it? And why would it be appropriate?

I call it judicial activism and judges overstepping their roles making law when that is the duty of the legislature. 

 

Quote

Is it truly without precedence for the Supreme Court to interpret a law in a way that Congress has never heretofore done?   

I am really surprised that you said that.

Judicial Activism can take place in many ways, here are a few of them;

• Importing foreign law to interpret the U.S. Constitution
• Elevating policy considerations above the requirements of the law
• Discovering new "rights" not found in the text of the Constitution or a law to comport with the judges own sensibilities

Pogi, judicial activism has occurred for a long time. Please do a simple Google search on examples of judicial activism. See here my search results, more than I can begin to list.

 

 

 

[smac97]

18 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

Right wing politics, and the entrenchment of power, is one big long abuse of government authority.  Put down gays and disfavored religions.  Put down people with different views while licking the boots of the president of the United States.  

You seem to be spoiling for a fight.  A politically partisan one.  Let's not.

18 minutes ago, Bob Crockett said:

Our freedom is found in the teachings of Jesus Christ, not in the politics of man.  True freedom.  Enduring freedom.  We should eschew politics and preach repentance.   I believe that in the end, Joseph Smith was a libertarian who saw fundamental flaws with the U.S. Constitution. 

And yet Joseph Smith still ran for president.  

And yet the Church teaches its members to participate in the political process.

I don't think we can "eschew politics."  It's a part of this mortal sphere.

Thanks,

-Smac

[smac97]

17 minutes ago, Ahab said:

We could make rules about a person's sexual orientation without regard to what sex they are, or vice versa, though.  We don't have to link the 2 things together, as the Supreme Court did. That was just one of their options.

The better option would have been to adopt the approach from Justice Kavanaugh:

"We are judges, not Members of Congress," Kavanaugh wrote, adding "our role is not to make or amend the law."

Yep.

Thanks,

-Smac

[pogi]

1 minute ago, Anijen said:

Really? It is wrong to accuse judges of judicial activism? 

If cases are decided on personal preference and not on the text of the Constitution or on established precedence what would you call it? And why would it be appropriate?

I call it judicial activism and judges overstepping their roles making law when that is the duty of the legislature. 

Pogi, judicial activism has occurred for a long time. Please do a simple Google search on examples of judicial activism. See here my search results, more than I can begin to list.

I didn't say it is wrong to accuse judges of judicial activism.  Nor am I suggesting that it has never happened.  I am suggesting that it is less likely a case of judicial activism in a bipartisan 6-3 ruling by the Supreme Court.  If it was a split, partisan ruling, then it might be more convincing.  I have read their opinions and I don't see it as judicial activism. 

[Ahab]

4 minutes ago, smac97 said:

The better option would have been to adopt the approach from Justice Kavanaugh:

"We are judges, not Members of Congress," Kavanaugh wrote, adding "our role is not to make or amend the law."

Yep.

Thanks,

-Smac

Maybe you could answer this for me:  Does what the Supreme Court decides automatically become the law?  Is that a power they have?  Are we stuck with this now because they said so? Couldn't we all just ignore what they said?

[pogi]

28 minutes ago, Ahab said:

We could make rules about a person's sexual orientation without regard to what sex they are

No we can't.  As you already so eloquently stated:

Quote

We call a person different things [gay or straight] depending on their sexual orientation [attracted to male or females] AND what sex they are.

You even made "AND" all caps to make the point that sex is inextricably linked in the equation. 

You can't make rules about gay or straight people without taking into account their "sexual orientation AND what sex they are".  One can't determine if they are gay or straight or if anyone else is for that matter, without taking into account sex. 

Impossible. 

Edited June 16, 2020 by pogi

[Ahab]

2 minutes ago, pogi said:

No we can't.  As you already so eloquently stated:

You even made "AND" all caps to make a point. 

You can't make rules about gay or straight people without taking into account their "sexual orientation AND what sex they are".  One can't determine if they are gay or straight or if anyone else is for that matter, without taking into account sex. 

Impossible. 

Regardless of what we call them, we could make separate rules distinguishing sexual orientation from sex.  We could make rules about not hiring any gay people without regard to what sex they are, for example.

Easy.  It might not be a good idea or a good thing to do, but it would be very easy to do.

[Anijen]

Just now, pogi said:

I didn't say it is wrong to accuse judges of judicial activism.  Nor am I suggesting that it has never happened.  I am suggesting that it is less likely a case of judicial activism in a bipartisan 6-3 ruling by the Supreme Court.  If it was a split, partisan ruling, then it might be more convincing.  

Judicial activism can take place no matter if it is a split decision or unanimous decision.

 

Quote

I have read their opinions and I don't see it as judicial activism. 

I get that. You would be in the majority of those who have read the decision.

However, I have noticed the legally trained here on this board, even while disagreeing with each other, has appeared to stipulate that judicial activism has occurred. One saying overreach has happened the other saying what does it matter, and me just pointing out it has happened and will continue to happen and suits will be forthcoming using these same tactics in the future.

[pogi]

4 minutes ago, Ahab said:

Regardless of what we call them, we could make separate rules distinguishing sexual orientation from sex.  We could make rules about not hiring any gay people without regard to what sex they are, for example.

Easy.  It might not be a good idea or a good thing to do, but it would be very easy to do.

The ruling addresses this.  Go read it. 

[Amulek]

47 minutes ago, Anijen said:

I will have to disagree. It is being branded about as a textualist approach (i.e.,  Justice Kagan saying; "we are all textualist now"), but it is still changing the meaning of the text (Title VII) to include dictum not in Title VII, thus it is judicial activism. Legislating from the bench.

Well, then I'll have to disagree with your disagreement.  

This isn't just a branding issue. Justice Gorsuch is a conservative, known for his adherence to both originalism and textualism. And the argument he advances in the opinion follows textualism; see, e.g., here:

Quote

From the ordinary public meaning of the statute's language at the time of the law's adoption, a straightforward rule emerges: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. It doesn't matter if other factors besides the plaintiff 's sex contributed to the decision. And it doesn't matter if the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group. If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee's sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the employee's sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred.

The statute's message for our cases is equally simple and momentous: An individual's homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions. That's because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex. Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the employer's mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague….

 

So, that's him explaining why discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation qualifies as discrimination "based on sex" under the plain text of the law.  That's classic textualism. Much of his reasoning throughout is similarly textualist in nature. 

Now, to be fair, there is certainly room for debate among textualists about the correct methodological considerations relating to the case and where those considerations should lead, but I don't think you can just shrug it off and say it isn't textualism just because you disagree with the outcome. 

 

[smac97]

1 minute ago, Ahab said:

Maybe you could answer this for me:  Does what the Supreme Court decides automatically become the law? 

That's a complext question.  As to questions of whether a law or a governmental act is constitutional, yes, SCOTUS is the ultimate arbiter of that.

Here, we have a question of statutory construction (interpretation).  Wikipedia has a decent summary here:

Quote

The judiciary interprets how legislation should apply in a particular case as no legislation unambiguously and specifically addresses all matters. Legislation may contain uncertainties for a variety of reasons:

• Words are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. They are ambiguous and change in meaning over time. The word 'let' used to mean 'prevent' or 'hinder'^[12] and now means 'allow'. The word 'peculiar' is used to mean both specific and unusual, e.g. "kangaroos are peculiar to Australia," and "it's very peculiar to see a kangaroo outside Australia."^{[citation needed][13]}
• Unforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures make application of existing laws difficult. (e.g. does the use of a new cloning technique create an embryo within the meaning of statute enacted when embryos could only be created by fertilisation?)^[14]
• Uncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the need for compromise or catering to special interest groups.

Therefore, the court must try to determine how a statute should be enforced. This requires statutory construction. It is a tenet of statutory construction that the legislature is supreme (assuming constitutionality) when creating law and that the court is merely an interpreter of the law. Nevertheless, in practice, by performing the construction the court can make sweeping changes in the operation of the law.

Statutory interpretation refers to the process by which a court looks at a statute and determines what it means. A statute, which is a bill or law passed by the legislature, imposes obligations and rules on the people. Although legislature makes the Statute, it may be open to interpretation and have ambiguities. Statutory interpretation is the process of resolving those ambiguities and deciding how a particular bill or law will apply in a particular case.
...
There are numerous rules of statutory interpretation. The first and most important rule is the rule dealing with the statute's plain language. This rule essentially states that the statute means what it says. If, for example, the statute says "motor vehicles", then the court is most likely to construe that the legislation is referring to the broad range of motorised vehicles normally required to travel along roadways and not "aeroplanes" or "bicycles" even though aeroplanes are vehicles propelled by a motor and bicycles may be used on a roadway.

In Australia and in the United States, the courts have consistently stated that the text of the statute is used first, and it is read as it is written, using the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute.

The "text" of the Civil Rights Act makes no mention of categorizing "sexual orientation" as a protected class.  Hence the controversy about the decision in this case.

Quote

Below are various quotes on this topic from US courts:

• U.S. Supreme Court: "We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.:" Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et al.,447 U.S. 102 (1980). "n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Indeed, "when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'" 503 U.S. 249, 254.

9th Circuit Court of Appeals: In the dissent from en banc rehearing of Silveira v. Lockyer 312 F.3rd 1052 (2002), dissent at 328 F.3d 567 (2003) at 575, Judge Kleinfeld stated "it is 'a cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.' Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)." Supreme Court of Virginia: "Every part of an act is presumed to be of some effect and is not to be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary." Red Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542 (1929). Supreme Court of Alaska: "In assessing statutory language, unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common usage." Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1996); Arkansas Supreme Court: "When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we keep in mind that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. This court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent." Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619. (2006) New Mexico Supreme Court: "The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature using the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent." State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994) "The words of a statute . . . should be given their ordinary meaning, absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary," as long as the ordinary meaning does "not render the statute's application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust." State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995) When the meaning of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, we have recognized that it is "the high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of government to facilitate and promote the legislature's accomplishment of its purpose." State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). - New Mexico v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, August 9, 2010 California Court of Appeals, 4th District: "Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441].) Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228].) We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation, but rather examine the entire substance of the statute in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision, construing its words in context and harmonizing its various parts. (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 112 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, 52 P.3d 624].)" Alford v. Superior Court (People) (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute. The first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) "nless otherwise defined, statutory words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1994). Maryland Court of Appeals: "[W]e begin our analysis by reviewing the pertinent rules of [statutory construction]. Of course, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. To this end, we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also." Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 683 A.2d 512 (1996) Indiana Court of Appeals: "The first and often last step in interpreting a statute is to examine the language of the statute. We will not, however, interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous on its face." Ashley v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1037, 1039, 1040 (2001).

As you can see, "the language of the statute" is very important.  This is why, I think, the majority went to such lengths to dissemble and mislead.  They know they are bound by the "language of the statute," but they really, really wanted the Civil Rights Act to apply to sexual orientation.  So they shoehorned it into the word "sex" in Title VII.

1 minute ago, Ahab said:

Is that a power they have?  Are we stuck with this now because they said so?

In this instance, yes, we're stuck with SCOTUS reading "sexual orientation" into the Civil Rights Act.

1 minute ago, Ahab said:

Couldn't we all just ignore what they said?

Nope.  All courts in the United States are bound and obligated to follow this decision.

To be sure, I appreciate and respect the ends (protections for the employment of gay people).  My concern, though, is that SCOTUS has used specious, unlawful "means" to reach those admirable ends.

Thanks,

-Smac