Calm Posted January 9 Posted January 9 (edited) 4 hours ago, JVW said: understand your point about the fallout from some operations being more extreme than others and it seems to me like you are basing it on a "burden to society" metric. More of the amount of increased time and effort is required if one needs others to contribute to one’s care, whether it’s on the patient or the caregiver as well as disruption of one’s normal routines (if one becomes unable to physically do things or has frequent interruptions due to illness or just many doctor’s appointments). As soon as others are a necessity for day to day care, life gets so much more complicated…just in having to have an additional awareness of the other’s schedule and availability and what can impact that. I don’t drive very much due to issues of dizziness, which means I am very dependent on others to get to doctor’s appointments. I have to be sure before I schedule that someone is available, I have to remember to remind them, have to schedule extra time set aside to ensure if they are delayed getting to my place we will still be on time, etc. And that is one adjustment. If you have to pay for a service, then there is the worry of financial costs and trying to ensure it’s covered by insurance. Insurance is getting insane for the amount of time and effort it takes for something unusual. If you have to involved physical or emotional aids, another layer of complication and cost. Self care is no longer a couple of hours a day if one has hygiene and exercise routines plus the time involved in feeding and cleaning one’s residence, but could become the equivalent of a full time job. Edited January 9 by Calm 1
longview Posted January 9 Posted January 9 5 hours ago, SeekingUnderstanding said: Dude, when you cut the question in half and claim it didn't have a question mark - like most people put their question marks at the end, not in the middle. And she even followed up with "serious question". And the reason for the "so" is because based on her understanding of your reasoning, one follows the other. She is asking for you to clarify your reasoning as to why you believe one is ok but not the other. She is inviting further discussion not putting words in your mouth. So it was a compounded convoluted question? The first phrase snidely implying that I believe nose jobs and face lifts to be EVIL. This is a red herring. The second phrase cynically asserting that I would go overboard arguing against these elective routine procedures. Calm's word salads are loaded with false premises and pointless tangents. She is working hard to avoid conceding Smac's sincere points in comparing the awful severity of BIID and GD mutilations. There was NO need to say one is worse than the other. BOTH are frightful and unwise and deeply concerning. As I stated in an earlier post: 'Calm frequently uses circular reasoning as a way to soft pedal the controversy or to show "broadmindedness" as a way to <bring> comfort <to> certain "victim classes".'
ttribe Posted January 9 Posted January 9 1 minute ago, longview said: So it was a compounded convoluted question? The first phrase snidely implying that I believe nose jobs and face lifts to be EVIL. This is a red herring. The second phrase cynically asserting that I would go overboard arguing against these elective routine procedures. Calm's word salads are loaded with false premises and pointless tangents. She is working hard to avoid conceding Smac's sincere points in comparing the awful severity of BIID and GD mutilations. There was NO need to say one is worse than the other. BOTH are frightful and unwise and deeply concerning. As I stated in an earlier post: 'Calm frequently uses circular reasoning as a way to soft pedal the controversy or to show "broadmindedness" as a way to <bring> comfort <to> certain "victim classes".' You are aggressively rude and off putting. Your message doesn't get past your bile. Ever. 1
longview Posted January 9 Posted January 9 5 minutes ago, ttribe said: You are aggressively rude and off putting. Your message doesn't get past your bile. Ever. Interesting that you do not address the structuring and wording of the compounded convoluted question?
Calm Posted January 9 Posted January 9 (edited) 28 minutes ago, longview said: The first phrase snidely implying that I believe nose jobs and face lifts to be EVIL. Quote Interesting that you do not address the structuring and wording of the compounded convoluted question? Do you think it is possible that I was asking for clarification to see if I was interpreting your comments correctly out of simple curiosity at that point and there was no other emotion involved since I was refraining from judgment until I knew for sure what you meant? I don’t think it will help explain my reasoning behind the way I phrased it unless you can see it in that way. Edited January 9 by Calm
longview Posted January 9 Posted January 9 3 minutes ago, Calm said: Do you think it is possible that I was asking for clarification to see if I was interpreting your comments correctly out of simple curiosity at that point and there was no other emotion involved since I was refraining from judgment until I knew for sure what you meant? I don’t think it will help explain my reasoning behind the way I phrased it unless you can see it in that way. Mindless and pointless tangents are NOT helping the discussion. Why do you work so strenuously against Smac's straightforward concerns over the tragedy of BIID and GD mutilations. Please review my post where I answered SeekingUnderstanding then I will be able to determine your sincerity and respond to your question.
Calm Posted January 9 Posted January 9 Just now, longview said: Why do you work so strenuously against Smac's straightforward concerns over the tragedy of BIID and GD mutilations. I am not working against his concerns even if it seems to be that way. Disagreeing with part of an argument is not dismissing or arguing against the whole of it. I share some of his concerns myself, others I do not but I am trying to understand why he and you are concerned in these ways. I can try to explain the one part of his current argument I have expressed having difficulty with if it makes sense to you I am approaching that part of his arguments not to confront, but to clarify.
Calm Posted January 9 Posted January 9 (edited) 1 hour ago, longview said: Please review my post where I answered SeekingUnderstanding then I will be able to determine your sincerity and respond to your question. I have read it. I don’t see much value in trying to prove my sincerity if you start from a position of me lacking it or with the same assumptions about my reasoning as before since trying to demonstrate your misunderstandings before hasn’t worked at all on the thread so far even though I have invested a lot of effort and time into it already. Edited January 10 by Calm
ttribe Posted January 9 Posted January 9 57 minutes ago, longview said: Interesting that you do not address the structuring and wording of the compounded convoluted question? Interesting that you seem to think acting like you do is in any way appropriate.
smac97 Posted January 13 Posted January 13 Oral argument on the two cases in the OP occurred today before SCOTUS. A review from SCOTUSBlog: Supreme Court appears likely to uphold transgender athlete bans Quote The Supreme Court on Tuesday during oral arguments seemed likely to uphold laws that prohibit transgender women and girls from competing on women’s and girls’ school sports teams. After nearly three-and-a-half hours of arguments in a pair of cases from Idaho and West Virginia, a majority of the justices appeared to agree with the states that the laws can remain in place, even if it was not clear how broadly their ruling might sweep. 3.5 hours. Wow. I hope SCOTUS comes out with a "sweeping" ruling, one that fully disposes of the varied legal disputes centering on Title IX and "gender identity," on the Equal Protection Clause, and even more fundamentally the importation into the law of the more radical elements of trans ideology (“Trans women are women," “A woman is anyone who identifies as a woman," etc.). Quote The court’s three Democratic appointees appeared to recognize that the challengers faced an uphill battle. They seemed to devote much of their efforts to mitigating their losses – either by getting one case thrown out or by limiting the court’s decision to a narrow one. I think those advocating for the more radical policy preferences re: trans issues would much prefer to have these issues endlessly churning in the lower courts. A SCOTUS decision will be definitive, and not in the day these advocates what. Quote Idaho adopted its law in 2020; West Virginia followed one year later. Lindsay Hecox, now 24 years old, went to federal court in Idaho to challenge that state’s law. Hecox is a transgender woman who wanted to be able to try out for the women’s track and cross-country teams at Boise State University; she did not make those teams but later played club sports. The West Virginia case was filed by Heather Jackson, the mother of B.P.J., a now-15-year-old transgender high school student who has publicly identified as a girl since the third grade. B.P.J. has taken puberty blockers to prevent the onset of male puberty, as well as hormone therapy with estrogen. B.P.J. has competed on the track and cross-country teams at school. A federal appeals court in San Francisco barred Idaho from enforcing its law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit agreed with Hecox that the law violates the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause because it was intended “to categorically ban transgender women and girls from public school sports teams that correspond with their gender identity.” The law also discriminates on the basis of sex, the panel concluded, because athletes on girls’ and women’s teams – but not on boys’ and men’s teams – are subject “to invasive sex verification procedures to implement the law.” I think the 9th Circuit's analysis was fundamentally flawed. Title IX addresses sex, not "gender identity." Quote The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in Richmond issued an order that prohibited West Virginia from enforcing its law, but for a different reason. That court ruled that West Virginia’s law violates Title IX, a federal civil rights law that bars sex discrimination in educational programs and activities that receive federal funding, because it discriminates against B.P.J. on the basis of sex. Idaho Solicitor General Alan Hurst told the justices that Idaho’s ban classifies athletes based on sex, not gender identity, because sex correlates with characteristics (such as strength) that provide athletes with an advantage and therefore is the key distinction in sports. The purpose of the state’s law, he said, is to preserve equal opportunities for women and girls in sports. I think this is a good argument. Quote Representing West Virginia, Michael Williams – that state’s solicitor general – echoed Hurst’s statements. The West Virginia law, Williams insisted, was intended to ensure that women and girls can safely compete in school sports. But Kathleen Hartnett and Joshua Block, who argued on behalf of Hecox and B.P.J., respectively, countered that Title IX and the 14th Amendment are intended to protect everyone. Protect everyone as pertaining to biological sex, yes. Not as pertaining to "gender identity." Quote And if transgender athletes like B.P.J. and Hecox do not have the biological advantages that the laws target in the name of fairness, they said, there is no reason why their clients cannot play on sports teams that match their gender identity. I think there are other reasons in addition to unfairness. Quote The court’s Democratic appointees appeared to agree. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, for example, asked Hurst about “someone who is transgender but who does not have, because of the medical interventions and the things that have been done, who does not have the same threat to physical competition and safety and all of the reasons that the state puts forward.” Why shouldn’t that person, Jackson suggested, be able to bring a challenge to the law as it applies to her? Justice Neil Gorsuch, who in 2020 wrote for the majority in Bostock v. Clayton County, holding that federal employment discrimination laws protect LGBTQ employees, initially appeared to voice some support for the challengers. He pushed back against the states’ argument that transgender people are not a “suspect” class – that is, people who have historically been subject to discrimination (which would require any discrimination against them to be subject to heightened scrutiny). But Gorsuch later suggested that Title IX would not pass muster under the Constitution’s spending clause – which requires Congress to clearly indicate when it intends states to be bound by accepting funds – because when the law was enacted in 1972 states would have understood the term “sex” to refer to “biological sex.” Two of the court’s conservative justices also appeared to side with the states. Justice Brett Kavanaugh suggested (among other things) that the Supreme Court should stay out of the debate right now given the “scientific uncertainty” and the “strong assertions of equality interest on both sides.” “[G]iven that half the states are allowing it, allowing transgender girls and women to participate,” Kavanaugh posited, “why would we at this point … jump in and try to constitutionalize a rule for the whole country?” And Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked Hartnett “how would we say this discriminates on the basis of transgender status when” “trans boys can play on boys’ teams,” so that the effect of the law “really only runs towards trans girls?” Hashim Mooppan, representing the Trump administration, offered what he characterized as a straightforward way to resolve B.P.J.’s case. Regulations issued under Title IX, he said, indicate that schools can draw distinctions based on sex, which the litigants agree means biological sex. Therefore, he contended, whether the challengers are correct that puberty blockers and hormone therapy eliminates any advantages that transgender athletes might otherwise have is irrelevant. Yep as to the bold part. Quote The court spent relatively little time on Hecox’s request to dismiss the case as moot – that is, no longer a live controversy. Hecox had sought to end the case in the lower court, arguing that she hoped to graduate soon, that she did not intend to try to play sports in Idaho again, and that she disliked the negative public attention that she had received as a result of the case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, perhaps as part of an effort to minimize the effect of the court’s ruling, showed interest in Hecox’s request, but overall, the question did not receive much attention. The decision will likely come out in the summer. Thanks, -Smac 1
Calm Posted January 13 Posted January 13 (edited) 1 hour ago, smac97 said: 3.5 hours. Wow. Meaning short or long? Quote I hope SCOTUS comes out with a "sweeping" ruling Do you think it’s likely? Just curious. Also curious….even if sweeping, this can be overturned in the future is there’s a pertinent case and the judges lean differently, just as Roe vs Wade was overturned. Uphill battle of course once a decision has been made and set a precedent, but it’s not guaranteed to not be revisited, correct? I like the idea of not having to worry about laws changing, to be able to know where we stand in terms of what’s legal and what’s not (I remember the confusion of law students when we lived in Moscow in 95 where they were complaining they had to dump old textbooks and buy new ones each semester law was being changed around so much plus what good was memorizing anything). But I also highly approve of laws being revisited from time to time to ensure they are the best for the people they govern. Humans being involved, even the best we can currently do should be improved upon when we can and there are plenty of laws that are not the best we can do. Edited January 14 by Calm 1
smac97 Posted January 14 Posted January 14 2 hours ago, Calm said: Meaning short or long? Long. My understanding is that 60 minutes is the typical duration. For both sides. I had oral argument last month before the Utah Court of Appeals, with each side limited to 15 minutes. 2 hours ago, Calm said: Quote I hope SCOTUS comes out with a "sweeping" ruling Do you think it’s likely? Just curious. I don't know enough. It's possible that SCOTUS will review the cases on narrow/limited grounds, and so not "reach" the more substantive issues, such as whether or not "trans" people qualify as a quasi-suspect class. 2 hours ago, Calm said: Also curious….even if sweeping, this can be overturned in the future is there’s a pertinent case and the judges lean differently, just as Roe vs Wade was overturned. Uphill battle of course once a decision has been made and set a precedent, but it’s not guaranteed to not be revisited, correct? No SCOTUS precedent is totally immune from being overturned, so the more appropriate inquiry is not whether it's "possible" but whether it's probable. I can't speak to that, either. 2 hours ago, Calm said: I like the idea of not having to worry about laws changing, to be able to know where we stand in terms of what’s legal and what’s not (I remember the confusion of law students when we lived in Moscow in 95 where they were complaining they had to dump old textbooks and buy new ones each semester law was being changed around so much plus what good was memorizing anything). But I also highly approve of laws being revisited from time to time to ensure they are the best for the people they govern. Humans being involved, even the best we can currently do should be improved upon when we can and there are plenty of laws that are not the best we can do. There are some areas of the law that change at a glacial pace. Contract law, for example, is very well settled, and changes to it are mostly incremental tweaks. Constitutional law can be a bit more turbulent. Here, the central issue is whether our society's laws can accommodate a re-definition of "sex" to include within it "gender identity." I find that quite unlikely. I also think there is notably waning in the public's enthusiasm for "trans" advocacy. Letting people of the same sex get married plucks at heartstrings, and does not contravene reality. Men in women's bathrooms, sports, and prisons, and the sexualization of children, and permanent and sterilizing medical procedures on children, and coercive "person pronouns," and large scale equivocation and obfuscation, and denial of the sexual binary, on the other hand... Thanks, -Smac 3
Calm Posted January 14 Posted January 14 (edited) 28 minutes ago, smac97 said: sterilizing medical procedures on children I really wish stats didn’t use 12-18, but 12-17. It makes no sense to include 18 when 18 is considered a legal adult and not a child, imo. There are 3 states that have older legal age, but still seems to make more sense to go with the majority. I say this because looking up one set of stats for genital surgery gives me 15-18, which means we can’t know how many, if any were actually performed on children. Did find another for 15-17 which gave a total of 56 over three years (2019-2021), so they were happening, if rare (this was insurance claims, so those willing to pay out of pocket might not be included, but seems like given the expense, that would add very few). Would really like to know why they were allowed to go ahead and not wait a couple of years, if only because the doctors were concerned about liability (much more likely to get sued for malpractice with children…or were last time I looked it up, it’s one reason why there are fewer pediatric specialists). The only thing I can think of is puberty blockers couldn’t be used. I wonder given the additional attention the last few years if this stat has stayed the same, increased or decreased. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-transyouth-data/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Edited January 14 by Calm
smac97 Posted January 14 Posted January 14 12 hours ago, Calm said: I really wish stats didn’t use 12-18, but 12-17. It makes no sense to include 18 when 18 is considered a legal adult and not a child, imo. Minority is not the only concern. Comorbidities. Informed consent lacking. Irreversibility. Sterilization. Insufficient longitudinal studies. Compromised medical decision-making processes (and perverse financial incentives). Lifelong medical regimens. Social contagion risks. Ideological/sociopolitical influences/pressures on medical care. Huge financial expenditures. Thanks, -Smac 1
smac97 Posted January 14 Posted January 14 (edited) I have looked for editorial/commentary articles published subsequent to yesterday's oral argument. I found virtually nothing published by outlets sympathetic to trans ideology and its efforts to justify incursions of biological men into women's sports, etc., but plenty of commentary from those opposed to those efforts. The Federalist: SCOTUS Signals Willingness To Uphold State Laws Protecting Women’s Sports Quote A majority of Supreme Court justices appear poised to uphold state laws protecting women’s sports from trans-identifying men. The high court held oral arguments on Tuesday in Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J., which center around statutes passed by Idaho and West Virginia stipulating that girls’ sports are reserved for females. The justices will address the question of whether the laws violate the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause, or, in West Virginia’s case, Title IX. ... During his questioning in Little, Chief Justice John Roberts questioned Hecox’s attorney Kathleen Hartlett about whether or not the court should view her position as “a challenge to the distinction between boys and girls on the basis of sex or whether or not [she is] perfectly comfortable with the distinction between boys and girls, [but she] just want[s] an exception to the biological definition of girls.” He also appeared to espouse concern about the can of worms it would open up should the court adopt such a position. “If we adopted that, that would have to apply across the board and not simply to the area of athletics,” Roberts said. ... Another justice seemingly unconvinced by Hartlett’s claims was Samuel Alito. The George W. Bush appointee’s most notable exchange came when he stumped Hecox’s lawyer with the “toughest” question of her career. That is, he asked her to define “man” and “woman.” What follows is an audio recording of the following exchange between Justice Alito and Ms. Hartlett that reflects the definitional incoherence that I have seen, in dozens and dozens of discussions, from advocates of trans ideology about one of the most fundamental questions that needs to be answered in a legal setting, and which instead is endlessly evaded and danced around. From this transcript: Quote SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SAMUEL ALITO: Well, to pick up on the issue of discrimination on the basis of transgender status, let me just go back to—let me go to some basics. Do you agree that a school may have separate teams for a category of students classified as boys and a category of students classified as girls? KATHLEEN HARTNETT, ATTORNEY FOR TRANSGENDER WOMAN LINDSAY HECOX: Yes, Your Honor. ALITO: If it does that, then is it not necessary for there to be, for equal protection purposes, if that is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, an understanding of what it means to be a boy or a girl or a man or a woman? HARTNETT: Yes, Your Honor. ALITO: And what is that definition? For equal protection purposes, what does it mean to be a boy or a girl or a man or a woman? HARTNETT: Sorry, I misunderstood your question. I think that the underlying enactment, whatever it was, the policy, the law, the—we'd have to have an understanding of how the state or the government was understanding that term to figure out whether or not someone was excluded. We do not have a definition for the Court. And we don't take issue with the—we're not disputing the definition here. What we're saying is that the way it applies in practice is to exclude birth sex males categorically from women's teams and that there's a subset of those birth sex males where it doesn't make sense to do so according to the state's own interest. ALITO: Well, how can you—how can a court determine whether there's discrimination on the basis of sex without knowing what sex means for equal protection purposes? HARTNETT: I think here we just know—we basically know that the—that they've identified pursuant to their own statute, Lindsay qualifies as a birth sex male, and she's being excluded categorically from the women's teams as the statute. So we're taking the statute's definitions as we find them and we don't dispute them. We're just trying to figure out do they create an equal protection problem. Ms. Hartnett's refusal to define sex abdicates the core dispute, as classifying teams requires a fixed meaning to evaluate discrimination claims. And I think she knows she is doing that. Her core stance—"We do not have a definition for the Court"—while strategically evasive, is logically weak for several interconnected reasons: 1. Concession Undermines the Premise of Sex-Segregated Categories: Hartnett explicitly agrees that schools may have sex-segregated teams and that equal protection analysis requires understanding what "boy," "girl," "man," or "woman" means. This implicitly acknowledges that a workable, objective definition of sex is necessary to justify and administer such separations (e.g., for fairness, safety, or privacy). Yet she immediately refuses to provide or endorse any definition. This creates an internal contradiction: if no coherent definition exists (or if the court should not require one), then the justification for maintaining separate teams at all collapses. The argument concedes the need for a definition but abdicates responsibility for supplying one, leaving the foundational classification system undefended. 2. Evasion of the Core Discriminatory Classification Question: Alito's questioning targets the heart of sex-discrimination claims: to determine if a policy discriminates "on the basis of sex" (or violates equal protection via sex-based classification), courts must know what "sex" denotes. Hartnett sidesteps this by claiming acceptance of the states' biological-sex definitions while attacking only the application (categorical exclusion is overbroad). This is intractably inconsistent. If biological sex is the accepted definition, then transgender women (born male) are properly classified as male, and exclusion from women's teams follows logically without needing exceptions. To demand case-by-case exceptions without altering the definition effectively argues for rewriting the category boundaries sub silentio (Latin for "under silence," referring to something decided, implied, or accepted without explicit mention or discussion) but without articulating what the new boundaries are. It begs the question rather than answering it. 3. Strategic Avoidance Highlights Definitional Circularity or Indefinability: Challengers in these cases often seek to include transgender women in female categories, which typically requires arguing that "sex" encompasses gender identity (or that discrimination against transgender status is per se sex discrimination, per Bostock v. Clayton County). Hartnett avoids this route, likely because defining "woman" as "anyone who identifies as a woman" risks circularity (critics call it tautological or unfalsifiable) or opens the door to unbounded inclusion (e.g., self-ID without medical transition). The trans-inclusive definition is at once the sine qua non of the ideology, and also the part that is the most logically problematic, and the one that is so assiduously papered over elided around and protected (often with shrill "You're a Bigot!"-style reactions). Hartnett actually stood in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, in a hearing about laws that differentiate based on "sex," and she refused to explain what her argument posits to be the definition of "sex." By pleading "no definition," she dodges pitfalls but at the cost of intellectual coherence—essentially admitting that no robust, non-biological alternative definition can withstand scrutiny in this context. This turns the argument into a negative one (categorical rules bad) without a positive alternative (what rule should apply?). 4. Practical and Judicial Impossibility: Courts cannot adjudicate classification-based claims in a vacuum. Without a definition, administering policies becomes impossible (e.g., how to verify team eligibility?). Hartnett's position implies deference to undefined or fluid understandings, which Justice Alito exposed as inadequate for constitutional review. It shifts the burden improperly: challengers bear the onus to show why the state's definition and application fail, yet here they disclaim the need to engage the definition at all. In sum, the argument is poor because it is evasive and self-undermining—it relies on the necessity of sex-based distinctions (to preserve separate teams) while refusing to define the central term, rendering the equal protection challenge incomplete and circular. This highlights a broader difficulty in transgender sports cases: redefining protected categories to include gender identity often conflicts with the rationales for sex segregation itself. Back to the Federalist article: Quote Meanwhile, Associate Justice Brett Kavanaugh, a father of two daughters, raised the unfairness issue of permitting trans-identifying men in women’s sports. In arguments for Little, the Trump appointee highlighted the progress of women’s sports throughout the past several decades. He also underscored the unfairness issue at the heart of the matter, telling Hartlett, “[F]or the individual girl who does not make the team or doesn’t get on the stand for the medal or doesn’t make all league … there’s a harm there, and I think we can’t sweep that aside.” Kavanaugh raised similar concerns when later addressing B.P.J.’s attorney Joshua Block during arguments for the West Virginia case. [JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: "I hate, hate that a kid who wants to play sports might not be able to play sports, hate that, but it's kind of a zero sum game for a lot of teams. Someone who tries out and makes it, who is a transgender girl will bump someone else."] There is a 5-minute video clip of the above exchange here. Worth a listen. Quote Associate Justice Clarence Thomas also sounded skeptical of the arguments put forward by the laws’ opponents. During her questioning in Little, Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett probed how Hartlett’s claim that Idaho’s law, as Barrett summarized, “discriminates on the basis of transgender status” can hold up when the statute only prevents trans-identifying males from competing in women’s sports and not the other way around. She further pressed Hecox’s attorney on whether “transgender status is a suspect class” — an issue she raised in her concurring opinion in U.S. v. Skrmetti, in which the court upheld state laws prohibiting trans-related procedures from being administered to minors. It looks like Justice Coney-Barrett wants to address the constitutional component ("suspect class") we have discussed earlier in this thread. I hope SCOTUS does this. Quote Perhaps the most notable line of questioning, however, came from Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch. While offering several tough queries for Hartlett, the Trump appointee had his own share of challenging questions for the laws’ advocates. Similar to Barrett, Gorsuch probed Idaho Solicitor General Alan Hurst about whether “transgender” should be considered a suspect class, as argued by Hecox. He also got into tense exchanges with West Virginia Solicitor General Michael Williams and Deputy Principal Solicitor General Hashim Mooppan, who argued in support of the laws on behalf of the Trump administration, during the West Virginia case. I have obviously never encountered Justice Gorsuch personally, but I have encountered his published opinions for the Tenth Circuit. The man's legal prowess is, in my view, very good. Some of the best legal reasoning I have encountered in 20+ years of law practice. Quote It’s worth mentioning that Gorsuch authored the court’s 2020 Bostock v. Clayton County decision, in which the majority (that also included Roberts) unliterally declared that so-called “gender identity” is covered under the Civil Rights Acts’ Title VII protections. Justice Gorsuch is an interesting fellow. I wonder where he will land on this. Politico: 5 takeaways from the Supreme Court’s showdown over transgender athletes It's a long article. A Grok summary: Quote Here are the five key takeaways from the Politico article on the Supreme Court's oral arguments in cases challenging transgender athlete bans in Idaho and West Virginia: 1. The court mulls the downside for blue states Several justices (including Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Kagan) sought assurances that upholding the bans in red states would not force blue states to abandon their transgender-inclusive sports policies, probing ways to avoid imposing a nationwide Title IX definition of sex. I'm not sure what to make of this. My understanding is that Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded programs but does not dictate exactly how schools must structure sports teams. It has historically allowed significant state and local variation. Several justices seemed interested in narrower paths that would let states continue to disagree. Several justices signaled discomfort with the Court becoming the arbiter of a single national sports policy on a culturally divisive issue. Allowing state variation—however messy in practice—aligns with the principle that states can serve as “laboratories of democracy” on contested social questions. I asked Grok: Quote "Allowing state variation—however messy in practice—aligns with the principle that states can serve as “laboratories of democracy”..." Okay. But I wonder if we really are at a zero-sum game sort of situation. Let's say that a girl's volleyball team from California travels to Idaho to compete against another girl's team. Let's also say that Idaho has, or passes, a law that prohibits biological males in women's changing rooms. What will happen? The response: Quote In your hypothetical—a California girls' volleyball team (including a transgender girl who is biologically male but eligible under California rules) traveling to Idaho for a competition against an Idaho team—the situation would likely create significant practical and legal friction due to conflicting state laws. Here's a breakdown of what would probably happen, based on Idaho's relevant statutes and how similar conflicts have played out: Eligibility to Compete Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act (2020) explicitly restricts school sports teams "designated for females, women, or girls" to those whose biological sex (as listed on their original birth certificate) is female. Transgender girls are generally ineligible for girls' teams. High school sports in Idaho are governed by the Idaho High School Activities Association (IHSAA), which must comply with state law. For an event hosted in Idaho (e.g., a tournament, invitational, or dual meet), the IHSAA and host school would almost certainly apply Idaho rules to all participants, including out-of-state visitors. This means the transgender athlete would likely be barred from competing on the girls' team. Possible workarounds or outcomes: The athlete could be reclassified to a boys' or mixed/open category (if one exists for the event), though this might not align with their identity or the visiting team's preferences. The California team might choose to leave the athlete home to avoid issues. The entire match or team's participation could be affected—e.g., the visiting team forfeits, withdraws, or the event is adjusted/canceled. There aren't widely documented exact precedents of this cross-state matchup in Idaho high school sports, but similar tensions have arisen elsewhere (e.g., teams from inclusive states facing restrictions or protests in ban states, or vice versa with forfeits over inclusion). Access to Changing Rooms/Locker Rooms Idaho has a separate law (Senate Bill 1100, enacted 2023) requiring public school students (and implicitly anyone using school facilities) to use multi-occupancy restrooms, locker rooms, changing facilities, and overnight accommodations based on biological sex. Federal appeals courts (9th Circuit) have upheld or declined to block enforcement of this law as of 2025. In an Idaho school hosting the event, the transgender athlete (biologically male) would be prohibited from using the women's/girls' changing room. Schools are often required to provide "reasonable accommodations" under these laws, such as: A private/single-occupancy changing area (e.g., a staff restroom, nurse's office, or curtained space). Access to the boys'/men's facility (which could raise safety or comfort concerns). Non-compliance could expose the school to legal risks, so hosts would likely enforce it strictly. Broader Outcomes and Zero-Sum Reality Yes, this is largely a zero-sum situation in practice: The host state (Idaho) has strong incentives to enforce its laws on its own turf to avoid lawsuits from in-state parties (e.g., parents challenging lax enforcement). The visiting team from California faces tough choices: comply (potentially sidelining the athlete or using suboptimal facilities), challenge the application legally (e.g., via emergency injunction, though unlikely to succeed quickly), boycott the event, or avoid traveling to ban states altogether. Real-world ripple effects seen in similar cases include protests, forfeits, heated parent/spectator conflicts, or schools/teams self-segregating schedules to avoid cross-state matchups with policy mismatches. Athletic associations sometimes negotiate ad-hoc solutions, but without a national override (e.g., from SCOTUS or Congress), these interstate events remain messy and deterrent—some California entities have even restricted state-funded travel to Idaho over such laws (a policy dating back to 2020). This kind of conflict underscores the practical downsides of state variation that justices flagged in the recent arguments: it works as "laboratories of democracy" in theory but creates real inequities and barriers in cross-state activities like sports. Until there's a uniform federal rule (or governing bodies like the NFHS impose one), teams and athletes navigate it case-by-case, often at the expense of participation or harmony. Interesting, but also troubling, stuff. Back to the Grok summary of the Politico article: Quote 2. Public discourse about trans athletes was mostly on the sidelines The arguments stayed focused on legal precedents and discrimination law, with limited dive into heated cultural debates. Justice Alito pressed on defining "boy" or "girl" and fairness concerns, but responses emphasized evidence over fear-based claims. 3. Justices weigh options that could dodge a definitive ruling The Court explored narrower paths, such as dismissing one case as moot (due to the plaintiff's personal circumstances) or remanding the other for more factual development on physiological advantages, potentially avoiding a broad constitutional or Title IX decision. 4. Male-dominated chess clubs and sex differences in teen brains Debate arose over whether physical sex differences are unique to sports. Justices like Kagan and Gorsuch used analogies (e.g., male dominance in chess, teenage brain development favoring girls academically) to question claims that athletics alone justify strict sex-based separations. 5. Coach K rides a different bench Justice Kavanaugh, drawing from his experience coaching girls' basketball, highlighted the "zero-sum" reality of sports—where including a transgender girl could displace a cisgender girl from roster spots, playing time, or awards—and stressed that such harms cannot be dismissed. National Review: There’s No Sex Discrimination Without Sex An excerpt: Quote The very existence of female-only sports that exclude males is sex discrimination. That’s the entire point. Yet, the Court’s precedents have long allowed sex discrimination that is based upon real, biological sex differences. In competitive sports, those are glaringly obvious and have real consequences not only for who wins but also for the safety of female athletes. That’s why most of these cases involve males trying to play with the females, rather than the other way around. Males who identify as female can still play sports — just not as females. The stubborn reality of biology is why the Court applies a more lenient test (“intermediate” scrutiny) than it does when assessing race discrimination, which is presumed to be irrational and thus can be justified only by the most compelling interests and applied only in the most narrowly tailored settings. We think Justice Samuel Alito cut to the heart of these cases when he asked Kathleen Hartnett, the ACLU’s lawyer, “For equal protection purposes, what does — what does it mean to be a boy or a girl or a man or a woman? . . . How can a court determine whether there’s discrimination on the basis of sex without knowing what sex means for equal protection purposes?” That question goes double for Title IX, which bans discrimination “on the basis of sex.” Congress must have meant something when it used that word. Yet, Hartnett responded as if this was an unsolvable stumper: “We do not have a definition for the Court.” That ought to be the end of the case. If the Constitution and federal law define sex, we assume those definitions to be what the public understood when the 14th Amendment was ratified in 1868, when the Civil Rights Act passed in 1964, and when Title IX was passed in 1972 — none of which would have expected the term to mean that men who identify as women are women. If the Constitution and federal law are agnostic on the question, however, states and schools are entitled to their own definitions, in which case a traditional biological definition cannot violate federal law. Hartnett’s only proffered alternative is to argue that a subset of a subset — males who can show that they have purged the effects of testosterone from their bodies — should have their own constitutional and statutory exemption from being treated as males. It makes no sense to think that either the 14th Amendment or Title IX was drafted to require such a thing, and it would be far more cumbersome and invasive to ask schools to administer such a regime rather than recognize reality: boys are not girls, and men are not women. It really is that simple. A few more resources: Prescott News: States Poised to Win Supreme Court Battle Over Men in Women’s Sports, Legal Experts Predict Alabama Attorney General: States Made Strong Case for States’ Authority to Enforce Laws Protecting Girls’ Sports from Biological Males Idaho Capital Sun: US Supreme Court appears poised to affirm trans athlete bans in Idaho, West Virginia The New Republic: Supreme Court Seems Ready to Ban Trans Kids From Playing Sports News items from sources sympathetic to efforts to include biological males in women's sports were, I think, fewer and farther between, and they did not seem to address much of yesterday's proceedings. Washington Blade: Supreme Court hears arguments in two critical cases on trans sports bans This article does a good job of being candid with what happened yesterday. Human Rights Campaign: HRC President Reacts to Supreme Court Oral Arguments in West Virginia v. BPJ and Little v. Hecox, Cases that Challenge Discriminatory Sports Bans for Transgender Youth The above article is notable for what it does not address, which is what actually happened during yesterday's oral argument. Instead, the article commentates about what should be happening. I sense that even HRC sees the writing on the wall. Financial Content: LGBTQI+ Leaders Gather in Los Angeles to Support the Rights of All Americans to Live Their Lives Freely and Fairly This article is, like the HRC article, fairly sparse in addressing yesterday's oral argument, and instead opting for public statements about what should be happening. There is this bit tho: Quote “This Court has surprised us at times, and no one can predict with confidence how the Court will rule in these cases,” Pizer continued. “But the questions we heard today showed that the Justices know that changing long-settled sex discrimination doctrine could undermine arguments some of them seem to favor on behalf of cisgender girls and women, and probably for cisgender men and boys, too. That was a positive sign. Still, the stakes are high. Every one of us has a direct stake in being protected against discrimination based on other people’s notions about sex and gender. When the government acts to exclude a group of people from a public program or activity, it is supposed to have valid reasons – not generalized, unsubstantiated assumptions. West Virginia did not, and does not, have valid reasons for excluding BPJ from her team. If the Supreme Court allows her exclusion, even assuming the decision will be limited to school sports bans, it will be yet another worrisome signal for all of us about the state of our legal system.” Not really optimistic, this. I am firmly opposed to biological males competing in women's sports. It is unfair and erodes the integrity of female athletics. Yesterday's SCOTUS arguments were encouraging: conservative justices pushed back hard on redefining "sex" under Title IX to include gender identity, and even some others explored narrow rulings that could uphold state bans without forcing inclusion nationwide. Fairness for women and girls first. Biological reality matters. This could be a turning point against the more extreme aspects of trans ideology—equivocating basic terms, mandatory pronouns, males in women's prisons/lockers, etc.—while still preserving core protections like nondiscrimination in housing and employment. The decision from SCOTUS will likely come out in June, but yesterday's oral argument was very important. I wonder if January 13, 2026 will go down in history as, to paraphrase Don McLean, "The Day the Extremist Trans Movement Died." I find much of the more recent and extreme aspects of trans ideology to be unworkable when put into practice. I appreciate the Church's guidance on these matters: Handbook, Section 38.6.23: Quote Individuals Who Identify as Transgender Gender is an essential characteristic in Heavenly Father’s plan of happiness (see Genesis 1:27). The intended meaning of gender in “The Family: A Proclamation to the World” is biological sex at birth. (For those whose biological sex is not clear at birth, see 38.7.7.) Some people feel their inner sense of gender does not align with their biological sex at birth. The Church does not take a position on the causes of these feelings. Some who experience these feelings identify as transgender. These individuals often face complex challenges. They—and their family and friends—should be treated with sensitivity, kindness, compassion, and Christlike love. All are children of God and have divine worth. The ordinances of salvation and exaltation are received according to a person’s biological sex at birth. For guidance about administering these ordinances, refer to the following: Baptism and confirmation (see 38.2.8.9) Priesthood ordination (see 38.2.9.9) Temple ordinances (see 26.5.6) Worthy individuals who do not pursue surgical, medical, or social transition away from their biological sex at birth may enjoy all the privileges of Church membership. Church leaders counsel against pursuing surgical, medical, or social transition away from one’s biological sex at birth. (Social transitioning means intentionally identifying and presenting oneself as other than one’s biological sex at birth, and may include changing dress, grooming, names, or pronouns.) Leaders advise that taking these actions will result in some Church membership restrictions. These restrictions include receiving or exercising the priesthood, receiving or using a temple recommend, and serving in some Church callings. Individuals who transition away from their biological sex at birth are welcome to attend sacrament meetings and participate in the Church in many other ways. These individuals and their families are encouraged to counsel with their local leaders regarding Church participation. Church leaders teach gospel truth and minister in a Christlike way. They consider the needs of all involved. Sections of this handbook—such as attendance at Church meetings and activities (see 38.1.1), participation in family history work (see 25.1 and 25.4), service to others (see 22.2.3), and so on—should guide leaders as they counsel with individuals and their families. For further guidance on Church participation of individuals who identify as transgender, refer to these guiding principles. Members who have taken steps to transition and then transition back to their biological sex at birth and are worthy and committed to keeping God’s commandments may enjoy all the privileges of Church membership. Circumstances vary greatly from person to person and can change over time. Members who feel their inner sense of gender does not align with their biological sex at birth or who identify as transgender, as well as the parents or guardians of minors facing such circumstances, are encouraged to seek counsel from their bishop. Bishops counsel with the stake president to address individual circumstances with sensitivity and Christlike love. Stake and mission presidents seek counsel from the Area Presidency. Church Website: Transgender - Love, Inclusion, and Respect for All of God’s Children Church Website: Transgender - Love, Inclusion, and Respect for All of God’s Children: Understanding Yourself Church Website: Transgender - Love, Inclusion, and Respect for All of God’s Children: Supporting Others I have a very close friend whose son has been caught up in trans ideology. A few years back he kinda sorta "transitioned." He grew his hair out, started using "she/her" pronouns, took a feminine/androgynous name, etc. My friend, who some years prior to that had left the Church with some acrimony against it and some of its members, initially supported her son's decisions with some real enthusiasm. But then he started talking about medical interventions, such as hormone treatment and perhaps surgical procedures. At this point my friend found herself in something of a quandary. My understanding is that her son wanted to know why she she was enthusiastic about some of his "transitioning" decisions (pronouns, new name, etc.), but not others (hormone treatments). The more extreme forms of trans ideology espouse the notion that "gender identity" is simply who that person is, that children are situated to adopt an "identity" incongruent with their biological sex, that children should be able to decide for themselves regarding medical interventions, and - perhaps most potently - that resistance or opposition to any of these matters is per se bigotry. My friend is a beautiful soul. She does hate trans people at all. And she dutifully supported her son's initial and incremental movements toward "transitioning." But now she has had to come up with a rationale justifying her "Yes on this stuff, but no on that stuff" position. I think she is really struggling to do that without running afoul of the "You're a Bigot!"-style histrionics that are so baked into the extreme trans stuff. At present, there is apparently some measure of detente between her and her son. He is not insisting on the female pronouns and new name stuff, letting family and friends call him by his given (male) name. And he does not seem to be pushing as much for medical intervention. My surmise is that my friend is hoping that he does not advance his transitioning, and that he instead "grows out of it." Sadly, I think she must harbor these sentiments in secret, as otherwise she opens herself up to the "You're a Bigot!", both from her son (if he buys into that ideological presupposition) and from outside her family as well. And having left the Church, she does not really have much of a philosophical or ideological counterweight to the radical "trans" ideas that have affected her son and her relationship with him. In contrast, I think Latter-day Saints do have a philosophical counterweight in the doctrines of the Restored Gospel, and in counsel from living prophets and apostles. The above resources illustrate this. The Proclamation illustrates this. I think we as a society are mostly moving away from the more extreme aspects of trans ideology, and I am grateful for that. I hope we can do so in ways that minimize conflict and maximize comity and mutual respect. Thanks, -Smac Edited January 14 by smac97 2
JVW Posted January 14 Author Posted January 14 2 hours ago, smac97 said: I have looked for editorial/commentary articles published subsequent to yesterday's oral argument. I found virtually nothing published by outlets sympathetic to trans ideology and its efforts to justify incursions of biological men into women's sports, etc., but plenty of commentary from those opposed to those efforts. The Federalist: SCOTUS Signals Willingness To Uphold State Laws Protecting Women’s Sports What follows is an audio recording of the following exchange between Justice Alito and Ms. Hartlett that reflects the definitional incoherence that I have seen, in dozens and dozens of discussions, from advocates of trans ideology about one of the most fundamental questions that needs to be answered in a legal setting, and which instead is endlessly evaded and danced around. From this transcript: Ms. Hartnett's refusal to define sex abdicates the core dispute, as classifying teams requires a fixed meaning to evaluate discrimination claims. And I think she knows she is doing that. Her core stance—"We do not have a definition for the Court"—while strategically evasive, is logically weak for several interconnected reasons: 1. Concession Undermines the Premise of Sex-Segregated Categories: Hartnett explicitly agrees that schools may have sex-segregated teams and that equal protection analysis requires understanding what "boy," "girl," "man," or "woman" means. This implicitly acknowledges that a workable, objective definition of sex is necessary to justify and administer such separations (e.g., for fairness, safety, or privacy). Yet she immediately refuses to provide or endorse any definition. This creates an internal contradiction: if no coherent definition exists (or if the court should not require one), then the justification for maintaining separate teams at all collapses. The argument concedes the need for a definition but abdicates responsibility for supplying one, leaving the foundational classification system undefended. 2. Evasion of the Core Discriminatory Classification Question: Alito's questioning targets the heart of sex-discrimination claims: to determine if a policy discriminates "on the basis of sex" (or violates equal protection via sex-based classification), courts must know what "sex" denotes. Hartnett sidesteps this by claiming acceptance of the states' biological-sex definitions while attacking only the application (categorical exclusion is overbroad). This is intractably inconsistent. If biological sex is the accepted definition, then transgender women (born male) are properly classified as male, and exclusion from women's teams follows logically without needing exceptions. To demand case-by-case exceptions without altering the definition effectively argues for rewriting the category boundaries sub silentio (Latin for "under silence," referring to something decided, implied, or accepted without explicit mention or discussion) but without articulating what the new boundaries are. It begs the question rather than answering it. 3. Strategic Avoidance Highlights Definitional Circularity or Indefinability: Challengers in these cases often seek to include transgender women in female categories, which typically requires arguing that "sex" encompasses gender identity (or that discrimination against transgender status is per se sex discrimination, per Bostock v. Clayton County). Hartnett avoids this route, likely because defining "woman" as "anyone who identifies as a woman" risks circularity (critics call it tautological or unfalsifiable) or opens the door to unbounded inclusion (e.g., self-ID without medical transition). The trans-inclusive definition is at once the sine qua non of the ideology, and also the part that is the most logically problematic, and the one that is so assiduously papered over elided around and protected (often with shrill "You're a Bigot!"-style reactions). Hartnett actually stood in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, in a hearing about laws that differentiate based on "sex," and she refused to explain what her argument posits to be the definition of "sex." By pleading "no definition," she dodges pitfalls but at the cost of intellectual coherence—essentially admitting that no robust, non-biological alternative definition can withstand scrutiny in this context. This turns the argument into a negative one (categorical rules bad) without a positive alternative (what rule should apply?). 4. Practical and Judicial Impossibility: Courts cannot adjudicate classification-based claims in a vacuum. Without a definition, administering policies becomes impossible (e.g., how to verify team eligibility?). Hartnett's position implies deference to undefined or fluid understandings, which Justice Alito exposed as inadequate for constitutional review. It shifts the burden improperly: challengers bear the onus to show why the state's definition and application fail, yet here they disclaim the need to engage the definition at all. In sum, the argument is poor because it is evasive and self-undermining—it relies on the necessity of sex-based distinctions (to preserve separate teams) while refusing to define the central term, rendering the equal protection challenge incomplete and circular. This highlights a broader difficulty in transgender sports cases: redefining protected categories to include gender identity often conflicts with the rationales for sex segregation itself. Back to the Federalist article: There is a 5-minute video clip of the above exchange here. Worth a listen. It looks like Justice Coney-Barrett wants to address the constitutional component ("suspect class") we have discussed earlier in this thread. I hope SCOTUS does this. I have obviously never encountered Justice Gorsuch personally, but I have encountered his published opinions for the Tenth Circuit. The man's legal prowess is, in my view, very good. Some of the best legal reasoning I have encountered in 20+ years of law practice. Justice Gorsuch is an interesting fellow. I wonder where he will land on this. Politico: 5 takeaways from the Supreme Court’s showdown over transgender athletes It's a long article. A Grok summary: I'm not sure what to make of this. My understanding is that Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded programs but does not dictate exactly how schools must structure sports teams. It has historically allowed significant state and local variation. Several justices seemed interested in narrower paths that would let states continue to disagree. Several justices signaled discomfort with the Court becoming the arbiter of a single national sports policy on a culturally divisive issue. Allowing state variation—however messy in practice—aligns with the principle that states can serve as “laboratories of democracy” on contested social questions. I asked Grok: The response: Interesting, but also troubling, stuff. Back to the Grok summary of the Politico article: National Review: There’s No Sex Discrimination Without Sex An excerpt: A few more resources: Prescott News: States Poised to Win Supreme Court Battle Over Men in Women’s Sports, Legal Experts Predict Alabama Attorney General: States Made Strong Case for States’ Authority to Enforce Laws Protecting Girls’ Sports from Biological Males Idaho Capital Sun: US Supreme Court appears poised to affirm trans athlete bans in Idaho, West Virginia The New Republic: Supreme Court Seems Ready to Ban Trans Kids From Playing Sports News items from sources sympathetic to efforts to include biological males in women's sports were, I think, fewer and farther between, and they did not seem to address much of yesterday's proceedings. Washington Blade: Supreme Court hears arguments in two critical cases on trans sports bans This article does a good job of being candid with what happened yesterday. Human Rights Campaign: HRC President Reacts to Supreme Court Oral Arguments in West Virginia v. BPJ and Little v. Hecox, Cases that Challenge Discriminatory Sports Bans for Transgender Youth The above article is notable for what it does not address, which is what actually happened during yesterday's oral argument. Instead, the article commentates about what should be happening. I sense that even HRC sees the writing on the wall. Financial Content: LGBTQI+ Leaders Gather in Los Angeles to Support the Rights of All Americans to Live Their Lives Freely and Fairly This article is, like the HRC article, fairly sparse in addressing yesterday's oral argument, and instead opting for public statements about what should be happening. There is this bit tho: Not really optimistic, this. I am firmly opposed to biological males competing in women's sports. It is unfair and erodes the integrity of female athletics. Yesterday's SCOTUS arguments were encouraging: conservative justices pushed back hard on redefining "sex" under Title IX to include gender identity, and even some others explored narrow rulings that could uphold state bans without forcing inclusion nationwide. Fairness for women and girls first. Biological reality matters. This could be a turning point against the more extreme aspects of trans ideology—equivocating basic terms, mandatory pronouns, males in women's prisons/lockers, etc.—while still preserving core protections like nondiscrimination in housing and employment. The decision from SCOTUS will likely come out in June, but yesterday's oral argument was very important. I wonder if January 13, 2026 will go down in history as, to paraphrase Don McLean, "The Day the Extremist Trans Movement Died." I find much of the more recent and extreme aspects of trans ideology to be unworkable when put into practice. I appreciate the Church's guidance on these matters: Handbook, Section 38.6.23: Church Website: Transgender - Love, Inclusion, and Respect for All of God’s Children Church Website: Transgender - Love, Inclusion, and Respect for All of God’s Children: Understanding Yourself Church Website: Transgender - Love, Inclusion, and Respect for All of God’s Children: Supporting Others I have a very close friend whose son has been caught up in trans ideology. A few years back he kinda sorta "transitioned." He grew his hair out, started using "she/her" pronouns, took a feminine/androgynous name, etc. My friend, who some years prior to that had left the Church with some acrimony against it and some of its members, initially supported her son's decisions with some real enthusiasm. But then he started talking about medical interventions, such as hormone treatment and perhaps surgical procedures. At this point my friend found herself in something of a quandary. My understanding is that her son wanted to know why she she was enthusiastic about some of his "transitioning" decisions (pronouns, new name, etc.), but not others (hormone treatments). The more extreme forms of trans ideology espouse the notion that "gender identity" is simply who that person is, that children are situated to adopt an "identity" incongruent with their biological sex, that children should be able to decide for themselves regarding medical interventions, and - perhaps most potently - that resistance or opposition to any of these matters is per se bigotry. My friend is a beautiful soul. She does hate trans people at all. And she dutifully supported her son's initial and incremental movements toward "transitioning." But now she has had to come up with a rationale justifying her "Yes on this stuff, but no on that stuff" position. I think she is really struggling to do that without running afoul of the "You're a Bigot!"-style histrionics that are so baked into the extreme trans stuff. At present, there is apparently some measure of detente between her and her son. He is not insisting on the female pronouns and new name stuff, letting family and friends call him by his given (male) name. And he does not seem to be pushing as much for medical intervention. My surmise is that my friend is hoping that he does not advance his transitioning, and that he instead "grows out of it." Sadly, I think she must harbor these sentiments in secret, as otherwise she opens herself up to the "You're a Bigot!", both from her son (if he buys into that ideological presupposition) and from outside her family as well. And having left the Church, she does not really have much of a philosophical or ideological counterweight to the radical "trans" ideas that have affected her son and her relationship with him. In contrast, I think Latter-day Saints do have a philosophical counterweight in the doctrines of the Restored Gospel, and in counsel from living prophets and apostles. The above resources illustrate this. The Proclamation illustrates this. I think we as a society are mostly moving away from the more extreme aspects of trans ideology, and I am grateful for that. I hope we can do so in ways that minimize conflict and maximize comity and mutual respect. Thanks, -Smac Thanks for the legal update, brother. I know it's a lot of time and work to summarize and communicate all of this for people who don't speak 'law'. 1
smac97 Posted January 14 Posted January 14 (edited) 4 hours ago, JVW said: Thanks for the legal update, brother. I know it's a lot of time and work to summarize and communicate all of this for people who don't speak 'law'. Writing this stuff up also helps me synthesize and collate data for myself as well. We live in turbulent times. Lots of insistent voices out there. I like to listen to the Brethren, and read and apply the scriptures ("liken all scriptures unto us" and all that), and then also do my own research and analysis, and reach my own conclusions. This board used to be a venue for seeking out voices and perspectives to critique and "steel man" alternative positions on this or that issue. Not so much any more. Thanks, -Smac Edited January 15 by smac97 3
Kenngo1969 Posted January 15 Posted January 15 @smac97, It appears that Ms. Hartnett defines "biological s*x" in the same way that former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart defined obscenity: "I can't define it, but I know it when I see it." One might wonder what would be the equivalent of attempting to define "biological s*x" for the Court to the Court's former practice of holding screenings of allegedly-obscene films for the Justices so that they could attempt to determine whether such films were "obscene" or not. We live in ... interesting times ... and have, for quite awhile now. 1
Doctor Steuss Posted January 15 Posted January 15 (edited) On 1/3/2026 at 5:32 PM, Calm said: Lots of boys get their breasts removed because they don’t want to look feminine and lots of women get some (lots for me, actually requested more be chopped off, but doctor decided otherwise for some reason…could have been for the very good reason of making reconstruction safer and not just easier, if so I don’t fault him) of their healthy breasts removed because they want smaller breasts. [...] Somewhat related to the topic of surgeries to alter one's body. The American Journal of Surgery published a systematic review about a year ago. For breast augmentation, the regret ranged from 5-9%. For body contouring, the regret rate was as high as 33%. Prostatectomy regret rate was about 30%, and bariatric surgery was almost 20%. They even noted the regret rates for non-surgical life decisions, like having children (7%), and getting a tattoo (16%). One that I looked up recently (due to some funk I am dealing with) was the regret rate for surgery for degenerative conditions of the spine. About 6% of people regret surgery. Note that with a lot of these surgeries there's no going back from. Once the surgery is done, you are stuck for life with it. Yet, there aren't scores of internet warriors poo-pooing people's personal decisions to get bariatric surgery, or prostatectomies, or spinal fusions, demanding government intervention. The regret rate for gender-affirmation surgery (from the systematic review in AJS)? A whopping 1% Edited January 15 by Doctor Steuss 2
Calm Posted January 15 Posted January 15 (edited) 1 hour ago, Doctor Steuss said: The regret rate for gender-affirmation surgery (from the systematic review in AJS)? A whopping 1% I did the research on this as well and had noted the significantly less regret with gender affirming surgery over other permanent similar (in terms of medical procedures). I do find it rather hypocritical if lawmakers push for limits on gender affirming treatments for minors claiming they are doing so because of the medically invasive, permanent changes that the minors may regret later in their life while ignoring cosmetic surgeries for minors that result in pretty much the same medical outcomes especially given there is a greater dissatisfaction/regret rate for the latter. If it’s about stopping minors from making life altering decisions they will regret later, then cosmetic surgeries done to affirm the gender that matches their biological sex should also be included in any bans. I actually tend to lean towards surgical bans except in extreme cases given my own personal experience with aftercare of several different surgeries as well as seeing how teens with medical issues, acute and chronic, are often into heavy denial or ignore their own needs…I have my doubts most teens will comprehend sufficiently beforehand what the immediate results will be like including looks, which aren’t always that great (and that initial impression may lower overall satisfaction because that could forever color their view of the results). And then there is the basic additional self care required after surgery when teens aren’t known for healthy behaviours even when life is uncomplicated, so delaying it a few years until they will have better followthrough as well as bodies that are more fully developed so any shaping won’t get outdated or off balanced due significant changes in body fat, height, etc. I also think anyone, adult or minor, who wants to get a breast augmentation should be required to wear a bra that has the equivalent added weight and shape of their planned choice for at least a month so they know how it will affect their posture, how clothes fit, etc. Almost every one of my roommates in college and then some would express to me how jealous they were of me and I would tell them they didn’t know how good they had it as I was having back pain and headaches even then when I was pretty fit from the additional top weight. They obviously didn’t believe me. I get that a couple of lbs extra weight doesn’t seem like it would make much difference, but placement matters. Augmentations in general are apparently dropping down in size as women are going for a more holistic, balanced look. Given the significant physical inconveniences of larger breasts, that’s a very smart trend imo. Edited January 15 by Calm 1
longview Posted January 16 Posted January 16 6 hours ago, Calm said: Augmentations in general are apparently dropping down in size as women are going for a more holistic, balanced look. Given the significant physical inconveniences of larger breasts, that’s a very smart trend imo. There is NO "augmentation" that will prepare for the loss of procreative functions of either sex. Wokism is horribly evil.
ZealouslyStriving Posted January 16 Posted January 16 22 minutes ago, longview said: There is NO "augmentation" that will prepare for the loss of procreative functions of either sex. Wokism is horribly evil. 👍🏻👍🏻👍🏻
Calm Posted January 16 Posted January 16 (edited) 2 hours ago, longview said: There is NO "augmentation" that will prepare for the loss of procreative functions of either sex. Wokism is horribly evil. Breast augmentations don’t affect reproduction, so not sure what your comment has to do with my point. Women can even breast feed with them. Edited January 16 by Calm
smac97 Posted January 16 Posted January 16 19 hours ago, Doctor Steuss said: The regret rate for gender-affirmation surgery (from the systematic review in AJS)? A whopping 1% I question that statistic. See, e.g., here: Accurate transition regret and detransition rates are unknown This is by SEGM (Society for Evidence-based Gender Medicine). Quote Like all medical interventions, “gender-affirming” interventions are associated with a range of physical and mental health outcomes—both positive and negative. Regret and detransition are examples of negative outcomes. Proponents of youth gender transition assert that rates of regret and detransition are extremely low. These assertions are frequently cited in legal proceedings, medical journals, and even treatment recommendations. A new paper by Cohn, “The Rate of Detransition is Unknown,” reviews common limitations of “regret” studies and demonstrates that hormone discontinuation, detransition, and regret rates are largely unknown. It is important that clinicians, law makers, and those contemplating medical interventions understand that frequently cited low rates of regret are based on flawed evidence. "Hormone discontinuation, detransition, and regret rates are largely unknown." Quote Detransition and regret have varied presentations. Sometimes individuals embrace their ultimately regretted transition as part of the “gender journey” they felt was inevitable for them. Other times, individuals openly express devastating regret. As one detransitioner stated, “Some of us will now never be able to have children and many of us live with great distress and regret every day.” Nearly two thirds of detransitioners in a recent convenience sample survey said they would not have had medical intervention had they known what they know now. For such individuals, medical and surgical “gender-affirming” interventions constituted iatrogenic harm. "Nearly two thirds of detransitioners in a recent convenience sample survey said they would not have had medical intervention had they known what they know now." Very small sample, so more data is needed. Quote Studies that claim low regret commonly suffer from the following methodological limitations, which render the conclusions of “very low regret” at a critical risk of bias: Inadequate follow-up. While some individuals report regret shortly after starting treatment (such as postsurgical regret), more typically, regret takes significant time to set in. The median time for surgical regret has been reported to be as much as 8 years. Somewhat shorter average times (3-6 years) to detransition have been reported for groups who had a mix of interventions (including puberty blockers, hormones, and/or surgeries). This is important considering that transition is intended to be a lifelong process. The flipside of underestimating the adverse psychosocial findings of regret and detransition due to short follow-up is the corresponding overestimation of positive psychological findings, such as of reduced depression, anxiety, and suicidality. Transition may be associated with a “honeymoon period”, with quality of life and satisfaction rising at 1 year post-transition compared to baseline, but then starting to fall at 3 years and falling even more precipitously at 5 years post-transition. It is therefore alarming that studies extolling the benefits of youth transition often focus on outcomes as short as 3 months and rarely extend beyond 5 years. In the instances when follow-up is longer, studies suffer from other significant methodological limitations outlined below. High rates of loss to follow-up. A common limitation of regret studies is reporting only on the individuals who willingly engage in follow-up research. While dropouts can occur randomly due to attrition (people move away, move on with their lives, or simply overlook an invitation to participate in follow-up), at other times dropouts are not random and result in a highly biased sample. For example, one of the most frequently-cited studies asserting a low rate of regret omitted all those who stopped coming to the gender clinic - a remarkably high 36%. It is not known how many of these individuals went on to obtain hormones elsewhere or how many decided to stop using “gender-affirming” hormones altogether. Another way in which non-random dropouts may lead to an underestimation of detransition and regret is that those who feel harmed by the treatment may not wish to participate in follow-up research. At least one study showed that fewer than one quarter of detransitioners returned to their clinicians to tell them about their decision to detransition. While there is no cut-off for the dropout rate that critically biases a study, methodologists assess the risk by estimating whether the study results would substantively change had the dropouts stayed in the study but reported different outcomes than the subjects or participants who remained. Less than 5% loss to follow-up is often thought to not to critically bias results especially when treatment effect among participants is large. On the other hand, 15%-20% dropout rates lead to “degraded” quality and can pose “serious threats” to the validity of findings, especially when treatment effect is modest. While there are several studies that claim low regret rates, such studies routinely lose 20%-60% of the original group to follow-up, rendering the results at a critical risk of bias. This is because patients who still attend the gender clinic and those satisfied with their transitions are likely more willing to participate in follow-up research. Imprecision of the measurement of detransition and regret. Conscientious researchers who understand the importance of following up with all of the original cases but are unable to contact many individuals in the original cohort resort to other ways to estimate detransition and regret. Unfortunately, the proxy measures they use, such as analyzing medical or legal records for signs of detransition, likely systematically bias the results toward underreporting detransition and regret. Consider, for example, a well-known study that asserted extremely low regret rates by searching records for mention of regret and reversal of hormones, or studies that used similarly weak methodologies to assert low regret of surgery. When medical records do not state that the patient regretted treatment, researchers assume that the patient was happy. The presumption of “no news is good news” is inappropriate for research on detransition and regret since, as previously observed, detransitioners are unlikely to return to the physicians who treated them to share their concerns, so “no news” is as likely to signal “bad news.” Another common but problematic methodology of identifying instances of detransition and regret is checking for a legal name change. The problems with reducing the complex phenomenon of regret to a binary action such as requesting a legal name / sex marker change were discussed in another recent study. There must be a hierarchy of intensity of regret related to the situations patients ultimately find themselves in. The most extreme form of regret is post-transition suicide and suicide attempts. Individuals who undergo medical detransition to restore the body to its pre-transitioned state are also high on this hierarchy. Lower on this hierarchy are those who regret their transitions but due to the irreversible changes to their bodies’ anatomy and function, adaptively choose to make the best of their lives without detransitioning. Regret and acceptance can co-exist. Reliance on biased samples or samples with poor generalizability. The “low regret” narrative stems from older studies that sought legal record changes to identify individuals who detransitioned. However, these more carefully vetted older samples are not generalizable to the population of young gender dysphoric people who have multiple mental health comorbidities, and are transitioning currently under the “informed consent” model of care which requires no psychological evaluations. Inadequate follow-up. High rates of loss to follow-up. Imprecision of the measurement of detransition and regret. Reliance on biased samples or samples with poor generalizability. I am concerned that some medical research and analysis on trans issues has been ideologically tainted/compromised. Quote The fact that detransitioners who realigned with their biological sex were excluded from the study is only apparent once one reads the several-hundred-page report describing the survey methodology of which the study was based. The attitudes of individuals who identify as transgender but who detransitioned (due to medical complications or external pressures) are likely markedly different from the attitudes of detransitioners who no longer identify as transgender. "Detransitioners who realigned with their biological sex were excluded from the study." Quote Cohn illustrates how several frequently quoted detransition and regret studies suffer from one or more of the limitations outlined above. Cohn also details how every study measuring surgical regret rates in a recent systematic review and meta-analysis of surgical regret rates suffers from insufficient follow-up time and/or high dropout rates. There are other previously voiced criticisms and concerns about this study as well, yet it continues to be frequently cited as demonstrating low regret rates for transition surgery. Cohn concludes that it is important for those considering medical intervention to know that the likelihood of regret, detransition, and discontinuation is unknown and that regret and detransition can be traumatic. Cohn conveys the urgency of this concern by highlighting the rapidly growing numbers of youth pursing gender transition: in the US alone, more than 17,000 children aged 6–17 started puberty blockers or hormones from 2017 to 2021, and there were at least 56 genital surgeries and 776 double mastectomies in the 13–17 age range from 2019 to 2021. "The likelihood of regret, detransition, and discontinuation is unknown." "More than 17,000 children aged 6–17 started puberty blockers or hormones from 2017 to 2021, and there were at least 56 genital surgeries and 776 double mastectomies in the 13–17 age range from 2019 to 2021." Troubling stuff, this. Quote Cohn calls for improved methodologies in studying detransition and regret rates, and advocates for disseminating accurate information about the gap in knowledge of detransition and regret so that young patients and their families can make informed decisions about treatments, rather than being lulled into a false sense of security by the erroneous “low regret” narrative. SEGM Take-away While the negative physical health outcomes have increasingly come under scrutiny (including adverse effects on bone and cardiovascular health, sexual dysfunction, and infertility/sterility), less attention has been paid to adverse psychological outcomes. Although the proponents of youth transition assert that detransition should not be thought of as a manifestation of a failed transition, this argument is hard to justify. Hormones and surgery irreversibly change the body and some of its key functions. And since gender transition is a lifelong process required to maintain a masculinized or feminized appearance, instances of medical detransition—reported by one study as reaching 30% within just 4 years of initiating treatment—is an alarming warning signal of high numbers of inappropriate transitions. The current narrative by gender-affirming clinicians that regret is extremely rare is based on studies that suffer from significant methodological limitations, which critically bias those studies toward underreporting of detransition and regret. A recent study, which claims significantly reduced depression and suicidality following testosterone administration for gender dysphoric females is a case in point: the subjects were followed for a mere 3 months (long before any physiological effects of testosterone—positive or negative—could set in). A potential “honeymoon period” associated with starting treatment has been observed. Short-term improvements in mood do not provide credible evidence that the highly invasive medical and surgical interventions involved in gender transition will assure a regret-free, high-quality life. Studies that do not extend sufficiently long after transition should explicitly state that they are unable to ascertain true regret rates. Until reliable measures of regret are available (which will take years to collect, given the recent rise in gender transitions of youth), patients, families, clinicians, policy makers, and the public-at-large need to know that the regret and detransition rates are unknown, and that the evidence in hand does not demonstrate that these rates are very low. Note: A larger list of study regret rates, without their follow-up times or percentages, can be found here. From the last link above: Quote Gender detransition is the act of stopping or reversing the social, medical, and/or administrative changes achieved during a gender transition process. It is an emerging phenomenon of significant clinical and social interest. Methods. We systematically searched seven databases between 2010 and 2022, manually traced article references, and consulted specialized books. Quantitative and content analyses were carried out. Results. We included 138 registers, 37% of which were empirical studies and 38.4% of which were published in 2021. At least eight terms related to detransition were identified, with differences in their definitions. Prevalence estimates differ according to the criteria used, being lower for detransition/regret (0-13.1%) than for discontinuation of care/medical treatment (1.9%-29.8%), and for detransition/ regret after surgery (0-2.4%) than for detransition/ regret after hormonal treatment (0-9.8%). More than 50 psychological, medical, and sociocultural factors influencing the decision to detransition and 16 predictors/associated factors are described. No health or legal guidelines are found. Current debates focus on the nature of gender dysphoria and identity development, the role of professionals in accessing medical treatments, and the impact of detransition on future access to these treatments. Conclusions. Gender detransition is a complex, heterogeneous, under-researched, and poorly understood reality. A systematic study and approach to the topic is needed to understand its prevalence, implications, and management from a healthcare perspective. "Gender detransition is a complex, heterogeneous, under-researched, and poorly understood reality. A systematic study and approach to the topic is needed to understand its prevalence, implications, and management from a healthcare perspective." Quote The more recent detransition samples that should be applicable to the current clinical presentations frequently suffer from methodological problems, rendering the results at a high risk of bias. For example, a sample in a well-publicized study, which concluded that most detransitioners did not regret their transition, paradoxically only allowed in the detransitioners who still identified as transgender. This was not disclosed in the published study. "A sample in a well-publicized study, which concluded that most detransitioners did not regret their transition, paradoxically only allowed in the detransitioners who still identified as transgender. This was not disclosed in the published study." Another: Regretting Transition for Gender Dysphoria Quote Supporters of gender-affirming therapy (GAT)—transition affirmation—are doubling down on claims that regret and detransition are rare. From state-level bills in my home state of California to national policy initiatives from the federal administration, the assertion that transitioning for gender dysphoria is all but regret free is used as a promotional tool for the proposed mandating of GAT essentially on request. However, the sales pitch does not hold up to inspection. Studies and surveys commonly cited to prove that regret after transition (GAT) for gender dysphoria is exceedingly rare remarkably often demonstrate the same fatal flaws: Impressively high rates of loss to follow up, from over 20 percent to over 60 percent, which invalidate the findings.[1] Were those lost patients helped, hurt or even still alive?[2] Exceedingly strict definitions for regret, e.g. requiring formal application to change their legal documents back to the original sex.[3] Insufficient periods of follow up, usually only six months to two years post-transition, despite the existing evidence that post-surgical regret is known to manifest eight years or so post-transition.[4],[5] Sampling usually taken from gender clinics, to which those with regret repeatedly report they do not return. Dr. Littman’s 2021 survey of 100 detransitioners found that only 24 percent had informed their clinician of their detransition, thus 76 percent did not.[6] Data is gleaned from in-house satisfaction surveys lacking clear and uniform definitions, metrics and follow up. This low-quality data then gets pooled to create low quality, unreliable results. A 2022 review by Boyd et al., of a modest but at least population-based UK sample (n=68) noted that 20 percent of the sampled patients quit hormone treatment, with half reporting “regret” or “detransition” as why.[7] That would mean a 10 percent rate of regret or detransition, except that regretters often don’t return to gender clinics or even inform their healthcare professionals of their progress. A 2021 single-clinic review by Hall et al found a 6.9 percent detransition rate, but the same caveat applies, namely that those with regret avoid the gender clinics.[8] The obvious implication is that the rate of regret is higher than reported. An oft-cited study from 2021 by Bustos et al., of regret after gender-affirming surgery pooled 27 studies comprising a reported 7,928 “transgender patients,” resulting in a “pooled prevalence” rate of regret of 1 percent.[9] Though the authors did offer a caution that “there is high subjectivity in the assessment of regret and lack of standardized questionnaires…,” rebuttal letters were more revealing. One such letter by Exposito-Campos et al., reported three levels of error in the Bustos study.[10] First, flawed methods were seen in the excluding of several highly relevant studies, along with the fact that the sample from the largest included study (Wiepjes 2018 Amsterdam Cohort study) was exaggerated to 4,863 from 2,627, an 85 percent bump up. Next listed was flawed data: (1) inadequate follow up period, only one or two years post-surgery for many of the included studies; (2) 36 percent loss to follow up in the Amsterdam Cohort study alone, which supplied nearly half of the Bustos study’s participants; (3) 23 of 27 studies with “moderate-to-high risk of bias”; (4) “The majority of included studies ranged between ‘poor’ and ‘fair’ quality…”; and (5) even in the five included studies with higher quality ratings, the loss to follow up was 28 to over 40 percent and included “loss through death from complications or suicide, negative outcomes potentially associated with regret.” Third and finally, Exposito-Campos et al., noted flawed sample selection in that the cohorts represented in the pooled studies met a different standard than those with gender dysphoria today due to the current loose criteria in determining clearance for gender-affirming surgery. The authors diplomatically specified that Bustos’ conclusions were “unsupported and potentially inaccurate.” Dr. Lisa Littman’s previously mentioned 2021 paper titled “Individuals Treated for Gender Dysphoria with Medical and/or Surgical Transition Who Subsequently Detransitioned: A Survey of 100 Detransitioners” found, unsurprisingly, there was no solitary reason or experience leading to detransition.[11] Among the most common motivations given were 60 percent who developed more comfort identifying with their natal sex, 55 percent saying they had received inadequate evaluation from medical or mental health professionals prior to transitioning, 49 percent concerned about potential medical complications of the transition and 30 percent who began to see their gender dysphoria as caused by trauma, abuse or mental health issues. And to reiterate, 76 percent failed to inform their clinician of their detransition. Further evidence regarding regret is not hard to find. A 2021 paper by Entwistle examined testimonies of detransitioners.[12] A 2019 story in the British News.sky.com discussed the establishment of The Detransition Advocacy Network necessitated, as the title of the article stipulated, by “‘Hundreds’ of young trans people seeking help to return to original sex.”[13] The Reddit.com group r/detrans has more than 34,000 members. Walt Heyer’s sexchangeregret.com site contains numerous accounts and more information on the topic. Walt informed me that of the many thousands of people with post-transition regret he has counselled, not one of them had ever been approached to participate in a regret study, including Walt. A series of five-minute mini-documentaries with regretters of transition is on Facebook under the “His Name is Money” project. Post-transition regret in patients with gender dysphoria is not rare. The studies claiming regret to be extremely uncommon are usually fatally flawed by high rates of loss to follow up, excessively rigid definitions of regret, insufficient length of follow up, sampling bias and low-quality data, which can then get pooled into larger amounts of low-quality data. We will be hearing more from those with transition regret, and so shall the courts. "Impressively high rates of loss to follow up [in studies and surveys commonly cited to prove that regret after transition." "Exceedingly strict definitions for regret [in studies and surveys commonly cited to prove that regret after transition], e.g. requiring formal application to change their legal documents back to the original sex." "Insufficient periods of follow up, usually only six months to two years post-transition, despite the existing evidence that post-surgical regret is known to manifest eight years or so post-transition." "Sampling usually taken from gender clinics, to which those with regret repeatedly report they do not return." How Many People Regret Transitioning and Why? Quote Many physicians quote a 1% regret rate. This statistic is based on The Amsterdam Cohort of Gender Dysphoria Study (1972-2015): Trends in Prevalence, Treatment, and Regrets. This study had significant limitations and cannot be used as a baseline for the current cohort: • All study participants were adults and those who had significant pre-pubescent gender dysphoria. • Definition of “regret” excludes most detransitioners. The study included: – ONLY those who had their testes or ovaries removed – ONLY those who resumed natal sex hormones – ONLY those who returned to original medical provider — most don’t inform their original provider that they detransitioned • The study DID NOT INCLUDE: – those who committed suicide or those who died as a result of gender treatment complications – those who regret puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, mastectomy or breast augmentation • 20% were lost to follow-up Troubling. The Dutch Leaks: Trans Regret is Possibly 33% The Detransition Rate Is Unknown Thanks, -Smac 1
longview Posted January 16 Posted January 16 10 hours ago, Calm said: 13 hours ago, longview said: There is NO "augmentation" that will prepare for the loss of procreative functions of either sex. Wokism is horribly evil. Breast augmentations don’t affect reproduction, so not sure what your comment has to do with my point. Women can even breast feed with them. I made my point specific and clear. I was NOT referring to plastic surgery. However, you did make a "connection" between the two in your paragraph below: 19 hours ago, Calm said: I do find it rather hypocritical if lawmakers push for limits on gender affirming treatments for minors claiming they are doing so because of the medically invasive, permanent changes that the minors may regret later in their life while ignoring cosmetic surgeries for minors that result in pretty much the same medical outcomes especially given there is a greater dissatisfaction/regret rate for the latter. If it’s about stopping minors from making life altering decisions they will regret later, then cosmetic surgeries done to affirm the gender that matches their biological sex should also be included in any bans. Same medical outcomes? Agonizing regret for loss of procreative functions is FAR more serious than the vain regret of an unsatisfactory change in the "new body image".
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