JVW Posted December 11, 2025 Posted December 11, 2025 https://www.abc4.com/news/religion/lds-church-scotus-brief-transgender-rights/ Quote This brief was filed in two cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. The Supreme Court agreed to hear these cases in July, and they are focused on bans against transgender women participating in women’s sports. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the National Association of Evangelicals, the Ethics & Religious Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, the Coalition for Jewish Values, and the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty filed the brief. ... It argues that transgender people should not be afforded protected class status because it would conflict with religious beliefs that gender and sex are inseparable, and because it would threaten religious freedom. This is really an @smac97 kind of thing. I don't know lawyer language so you'll get no analysis of the brief from me here. Honestly, I'm just happy to see that leaders of Evangelical organizations are getting along with LDS, maybe I can hope for a future with less anti-Mormon bias. What I'm most curious to hear about from everyone is not whether this is right or wrong, but what would your personal solution be to balance religious freedom and the rights of trans people to do whatever they want to do? (However, comments about anything are welcome.) Should churches be forced in any way to compromise their doctrine or beliefs to accommodate people who aren't living in accordance with it? What about religious schools or charitable organizations? How would you draw the line and balance this?
ZealouslyStriving Posted December 11, 2025 Posted December 11, 2025 1 hour ago, JVW said: Honestly, I'm just happy to see that leaders of Evangelical organizations are getting along with LDS, maybe I can hope for a future with less anti-Mormon bias. I admire your optimism. 2
webbles Posted December 11, 2025 Posted December 11, 2025 If anyone is curious to read the actual brief - https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-43/375227/20250919133740714_24-38-24-43acTheChurchOfJesusChristOfLatter-DaySaints.pdf They are talking about whether or not transgenderism should be considered a "quasi-suspect class". Sex is a quasi-suspect class, religion and race are suspect classes. That controls what type of scrutiny should be applied. For suspect classes, strict scrutiny. For quasi-suspect classes, intermediate scrutiny. 2
Popular Post The Nehor Posted December 11, 2025 Popular Post Posted December 11, 2025 (edited) 5 hours ago, JVW said: Honestly, I'm just happy to see that leaders of Evangelical organizations are getting along with LDS, maybe I can hope for a future with less anti-Mormon bias. If the Christian Nationalists that are influential in the Evangelical movement win out and manage to hold onto their political power and seize more of it as they make the United States into a “Christian nation” they will start to target religious groups who were former allies. It is mostly a question of whether they go after the Mormons or the Catholics first. I don’t think they will succeed in the first place but if they do they will narrow down what it means to be Christian. This is an alliance of convenience and I am disappointed in how many church members think it is genuine friendship and tolerance on the macro level. There is a reason the founders didn’t want religious tests for government office and didn’t make it a “Christian nation”. They wanted to avoid having the Wars of Religion that had caused a lot of death and persecution and hatred in Europe. Those can happen here too. 5 hours ago, JVW said: What I'm most curious to hear about from everyone is not whether this is right or wrong, but what would your personal solution be to balance religious freedom and the rights of trans people to do whatever they want to do? Whatever they want to do? You want to let the Woke mindvirus destroy western civilization? That is their goal you know! /s The religious and those who feign religion are wielding the power of government to further marginalize an already marginalized group. There is a good faith argument to be had about transgender people in professional sports but that is for professional sports leagues to figure out. At schools just let the kids play. Also one side is stirring up hatred. I have transgender friends who have been attacked by horrible people who these high-minded church leaders are providing rhetorical cover to. If you are a Christian siding with the powerful against the marginalized doesn’t that seem off somehow? 5 hours ago, JVW said: Should churches be forced in any way to compromise their doctrine or beliefs to accommodate people who aren't living in accordance with it? No, they shouldn’t and no one is asking them to or compelling them to. They can kick transgender people out of their churches. I think what churches want is protection from social scorn for doing this. That is not something the government can or should legislate though many are trying to. They are hard at work butchering part of the First Amendment while claiming to save another part that was never in any real danger. 5 hours ago, JVW said: What about religious schools or charitable organizations? If they want to function without federal funding they can. This may end up being like desegregating schools again. 5 hours ago, JVW said: How would you draw the line and balance this? On one side you have people afraid for their lives and safety. On the other hand you have people worried about not getting federal funding and wanting to avoid social scorn. I am going to favor the former until they no longer have to be afraid for their lives and safety. Edited December 11, 2025 by The Nehor 8
Calm Posted December 11, 2025 Posted December 11, 2025 (edited) 5 hours ago, JVW said: I'm just happy to see that leaders of Evangelical organizations are getting along with LDS It’s happened before, we even had a candidate that supported their values better than the other if we are talking conservative Evangelicals/Fundamentalist and got more votes than the previous Rep candidate. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/11/07/how-the-faithful-voted-2012-preliminary-exit-poll-analysis/ Would be interesting to take the Pew data on likes and dislikes and see what it says about trends in opinions towards LDS over the decades as we become in general more politically similar. I have things to do, so resorted to Chat to analyze Pew for me, so no guarantee of accuracy. According to them working with the conservative Christians more in the past 30 years has not helped. Quote In the mid/late-2000s white evangelicals were roughly split but leaned less warm than other Christians: e.g., a 2007 Pew report found about 46% of white evangelical Protestants had a positive impression of Mormons while 39% had an unfavorable impression. Pew’s 2011/2012 work showed the same pattern on a different question: roughly half of white evangelicals (≈47%) said Mormonism is not a Christian religion, and large majorities said Mormonism is “very/somewhat different” from their own religion. That signals persistent doctrinal distance. At the same time, Pew’s feeling-thermometer series shows the general public warmed toward Mormons between the 2010s and mid-2010s (average thermometer scores for Mormons rose between 2014 and 2017). That warming was broad in the public but did not erase the gap with evangelicals. By Pew’s 2023 favorability report the gap is stark: only 15% of born-again/evangelical Protestants expressed a favorable view of Mormons while 27% expressed an unfavorable view (Pew’s 2023 report shows Mormons as one of the groups toward which evangelicals are relatively cold). In short — white evangelical warmth toward LDS is substantially lower in the 2020s than earlier decades. I would love to see Pew divided out conservative Evangelicals from Christian Nationalists and see if that makes a difference, but I doubt they have that data. added: currently 2/3 identify with or are favorable to Christian Nationalism according to this, need older measures. https://prri.org/press-release/survey-two-thirds-of-white-evangelicals-most-republicans-sympathetic-to-christian-nationalism/ Edited December 11, 2025 by Calm 1
Popular Post smac97 Posted December 11, 2025 Popular Post Posted December 11, 2025 (edited) On 12/11/2025 at 8:38 AM, JVW said: https://www.abc4.com/news/religion/lds-church-scotus-brief-transgender-rights/ This is really an @smac97 kind of thing. A few thoughts: 1. Here is a link to the Church's brief. 2. The legal question is whether "trans" people can qualify as a "quasi-suspect class." This requires a bit of unpacking: A. When examining the constitutionality of a statute or an act taken by any government actor, SCOTUS looks at whether the persons affected are a "suspect class," that is, "a class or group of persons meeting a series of criteria suggesting they are likely the subject of discrimination." If a person/group is found to be part of a "suspect class," then the statute/act affecting them can argue that they have been discriminated against under the "Equal Protection" clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. Put another way, this classifications opens all sorts of doors to lawsuits and money damages, but only if the courts recognize the classification. (All of this, BTW, has been made up by SCOTUS, so it's not a statute or anything, and is therefore somewhat of a vague concept.) B. There are, so far, three recognized "suspect classes": race, national origin, and religion. Consequently, any government act that treats people differently based on one of these classifications is going to be very heavily scrutinized by SCOTUS under the highest level of analysis, fairly heavily scrutinized under the intermediate level, and nominally scrutinized under the lowest level. These three levels of scrutiny are further described as follows: Strict Scrutiny: The toughest form of legal scrutiny. The challenged law "presumptively invalid unless the government can demonstrate that the law or regulation is necessary to achieve a 'compelling state interest,'" and that the statute is "narrowly tailored" to meet that compelling interest, and that the law is the "least restrictive means" of achieving that interest. Per Wikipedia, only about 30% of laws found to be subject to "Strict Scrutiny" survive that scrutiny. An example of a law surviving Strict Scrutiny is Grutter v. Bollinger (Upheld the University of Michigan Law School's race-based affirmative action program, deeming "student body diversity" (that is, the consideration of race as a factor in admissions) to be a compelling interest and the race-conscious admissions process to be narrowly tailored). Examples of laws not surviving Strict Scrutiny include well-known cases like Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia. Intermediate Scrutiny: As you can guess by it's name, this is a lesser, though still potent, form of legal scrutiny. From Wikipedia: "In order to overcome the intermediate scrutiny test, it must be shown that the law or policy being challenged furthers an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest." A recent example of a law surviving Intermediate Scrutiny is Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton (allowing states to require Internet pornography websites to verify the age of viewers in order to prevent access by minors). Rational Basis: This is the lowest, the "normal," standard of review. From Wikipedia: "Courts applying rational basis review seek to determine whether a law is 'rationally related' to a 'legitimate' government interest, whether real or hypothetical." This one is very difficult to overcome for a person challenging the constitutionality of a statute or government act (and, obviously, pretty easy for the state actor to satisfy). "Strict Scrutiny," then, is a fairly closed set of classifications (race, national origin, and religion), and "Rational Basis" is the default approach to assessing constitutionality. Consequently, a person or group looking to challenge a law will do everything they can to escape the clutches of "Rational Basis" and get themselves designated as a group for which "Intermediate Scrutiny" applies. C. "Intermediate Scrutiny" has a fairly narrow application. It is clear that sex and legitimacy of birth are both classifications that trigger "Intermediate Scrutiny" (that is, laws that discriminate based on these classifications must show the "important government interest" and such as noted in the above summary). These are called "quasi-suspect classes." D. Sexual orientation might be a quasi-suspect class (see here). Two circuit courts (2nd and 9th) have said it is, but that's it. E. With this backdrop in mind, we come back to the issue addressed in the Church's brief, that is, whether "trans" people qualify, in a legal setting, as a "quasi-suspect class." If they do, then laws which differentiate/discriminate based on "transgender status" will face a considerably more difficult constitutional burden (Intermediate Scrutiny) than otherwise (Rational Basis). An excellent, and related, example of this sort of question arose in United States v. Skrmetti: Quote United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. ____ (2025), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that a Tennessee state law banning puberty blockers and hormone therapy for the treatment of gender dysphoria in minors did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[2] Under Tennessee’s law, a child could receive puberty blockers and hormone therapy if the medications were provided to help them conform to their sex assigned at birth, but not to treat gender dysphoria.[3] The plaintiffs argued this constituted sex-based discrimination and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause.[4] Tennessee argued the law did not treat people differently based on their sex, but rather based on their age and medical condition.[3] The district court applied heightened scrutiny and blocked the law from taking effect. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned, ruling the ban did not discriminate based on sex and thus only required rational basis review.[3] The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision on a 6–3 split, with the six conservative justices agreeing the ban was based on age and medical reason for treatment rather than on sex. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts emphasized that the ruling was not based on an ideological opposition to transgender rights; writing for the minority, Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor criticized the Court's decision as a failure to uphold the civil rights of transgender youth.[4][5][6] Skrmetti is likely relevant to the question in the two consolidated cases in which the Church's brief was filed (though the brief does not address Skrmetti). Here is Grok's assessment: Quote Application to Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. Little v. Hecox (No. 24-38) and West Virginia v. B.P.J. (No. 24-43) are consolidated cases challenging state laws—Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act and West Virginia's SAVE Women's Sports Act—that restrict participation in female-designated school and college sports to individuals assigned female at birth (effectively barring transgender girls and women). The Ninth and Fourth Circuits, respectively, enjoined the laws, applying intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and finding they impermissibly classified based on sex and transgender status without sufficiently important justifications. Skrmetti directly undercuts the lower courts' approach here. Both sports laws, like SB1, draw distinctions tied to biological sex to advance policy goals (fairness, safety, and opportunities in women's athletics) amid debates over biology, inclusion, and competitive equity—areas of "medical and scientific uncertainty" where legislatures deserve deference. The sports bans reference sex but regulate based on participation category and biological criteria, not disparate treatment of sexes. Following Skrmetti, transgender status will not elevate these to quasi-suspect classifications requiring heightened scrutiny; rational basis will suffice. Under that standard, the laws easily survive: protecting female athletes' opportunities is a conceivable legitimate interest, supported by evidence of physiological advantages from male puberty (e.g., strength, speed), and the classifications are rationally tailored to that end without broader animus. Post-Skrmetti filings reinforce this. Petitioners in both cases cited the ruling to argue for reversal, emphasizing its rejection of Bostock's extension to Equal Protection challenges and its deference to state policy in sex-related transgender regulations. Even the DOJ's merits brief analogized the cases to Skrmetti, urging the Court to avoid heightened review. Amicus briefs from religious and conservative groups (echoing the one you referenced earlier) highlight how elevated scrutiny would conflict with free exercise rights, a tension Skrmetti implicitly avoids by keeping review minimal. Predicted Outcome Given Skrmetti's clear signal—transgender-related sex classifications get rational basis deference, not heightened scrutiny—I predict the Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in a 6-3 or 7-2 decision (likely along similar lines, with Justice Gorsuch or Alito authoring). The laws will be upheld as constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Oral arguments are set for January 13, 2026, so a ruling could come by June 2026, but the conservative majority's trajectory favors states' authority here. This would greenlight similar bans in over 20 states, shifting focus to Title IX claims or legislative workarounds, while cabining transgender rights to rational basis in analogous policy domains like prisons, bathrooms, or education. Dissenters (likely Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson) will decry it as eroding protections for a vulnerable group, but the majority will frame it as democratic restraint. I think this is likely a correct prediction. F. Here is Grok's summary of the Church's brief (which brief, IMO, was not adequately addressed or described in the news article) : Quote Main Arguments: Conflict with Religious Employment Protections: Heightened scrutiny for transgender status would undermine safeguards under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Title VII, and precedents like Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), making it harder for religious organizations to hire based on faith-aligned views of gender without facing discrimination claims. Chilling Free Exercise of Religion: Without a clear framework to resolve clashes between Equal Protection balancing tests and Free Exercise Clause protections (e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993)), religious practices could be suppressed to avoid litigation. Broader Impacts on Public Accommodations, Funding, and Parental Rights: It could force religious entities to affirm transgender identities in exchange for public benefits (Carson v. Makin (2022)) or in adoption/foster care, and impose nondiscrimination mandates conflicting with beliefs about sex and gender. Risk of Stigma and Isolation: Elevating transgender status might equate traditional religious views on gender with invidious discrimination (analogous to racism), leading to social and legal marginalization of faith communities, as seen in post-Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) dynamics. Relief Sought: The amici request that the Supreme Court reverse the courts of appeals' rulings, rejecting quasi-suspect status for transgender classifications to safeguard religious freedoms without diminishing equality protections. Key Constitutional Issues and Precedents: The brief highlights tensions between the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, invoking RFRA (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb) and cases like Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC (2012) for ministerial exceptions, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) for equality's moral force, and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) for protecting dissenting beliefs. It warns of a "zero-sum" framework lacking a "meta-principle" for reconciliation. G. Here are some verbatim excerpts from the Church's brief: Quote Elevating transgender status under the Fourteenth Amendment will shatter the framework of rights and protections reflecting this Nation’s fundamental commitment to religious freedom. Constitutional guarantees of the free exercise of religion and equal protection are both subject to judicial balancing tests. A novel equality right would compel courts to steer between liberty and equality, without compass or star, at the expense of rights embodied in the written Constitution. And because constitutional rights prevail over statutes, elevating transgender status would weaken the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and create uncertainty for religious organizations in employment, public accommodations, public funding, and parental rights. Uncertainty breeds risk, and risk chills the exercise of religion. Making transgender status a quasi-suspect class will expose religious people and institutions to fines, damages suits, and the loss of public benefits—all for exercising their religion. This is pretty good stuff, but conclusory (to be expected in the introduction, I guess). The brief gets into some particulars later on. Quote The Court’s warnings about the costs of adopting constitutional solutions to bitter national controversies apply here. Constitutional law shapes national morality. Granting transgender status heightened judicial protection would recast millenniaold religious teachings about the inseparability of sex and gender as akin to racism and their adherents as bigots. A very solid point, this. Quote Religious organizations depend on the settled framework of federal rights. First Amendment guarantees and statutory protections secure the freedom of a religious organization to exercise its religion. Uncertainty about whether a court will vindicate these rights and protections would chill that right. A religious organization’s pursuit of a unique religious mission would be molded to avoid government penalties and private litigation rather than to express the organization’s authentic self-definition. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343–44 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). "A religious organization’s pursuit of a unique religious mission would be molded to avoid government penalties and private litigation rather than to express the organization’s authentic self-definition." Yep. Quote Recognizing transgender status as a quasi-suspect class would make established legal protections for religious organizations profoundly uncertain. Equality claims would generate conflicts affecting religious freedom in employment. Novel questions would cast doubt on whether religious organizations can exercise their faith without facing penalties and lawsuits. Consider the distinctive requirements of religious employment. “Unlike secular employers, a religious organization depends on its employees not only to carry out workaday tasks, but to pursue the organization’s religious mission. * * * Without the freedom to make judgments about the religious suitability of its employees, a religious organization’s capacity to pursue its religious mission will deteriorate or disappear.” R. Shawn Gunnarson, James Cleith Phillips & Christopher A. Bates, Religious Employment and the Tensions between Liberty and Equality, 2025 BYU Law Rev. (forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5183766. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from firing someone “merely for being gay or transgender.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 683 (2020). But the Court reserved questions about “how Title VII may intersect with religious liberties.” Id. at 681. And while reaffirming its commitment to “preserving the promise of the free exercise of religion enshrined in our Constitution,” the Court acknowledged that “RFRA operates as a kind of super statute” that “might supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases.” Id. at 681–82. Thee RFRA as "super statute." That's new to me. Anyhoo, the brief is pretty good, and I think "trans" or "gender identity" as a quasi-suspect class will not be recognized. Thanks, -Smac Edited March 24 by smac97 8
JVW Posted December 11, 2025 Author Posted December 11, 2025 1 hour ago, smac97 said: A few thoughts: 1. Here is a link to the Church's brief. 2. The legal question is whether "trans" people can qualify, in a legal setting, as a "quasi-suspect class." This requires a bit of unpacking: A. When examining the constitutionality of a statute or an act taken by any government actor, SCOTUS looks at whether the persons affected are a "suspect class," that is, "a class or group of persons meeting a series of criteria suggesting they are likely the subject of discrimination." If a person/group is found to be part of a "suspect class," then the statute/act affecting them can argue that they have been discriminated against under the "Equal Protection" clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. Put another way, this classifications opens all sorts of doors to lawsuits and money damages, but only if the courts recognize the classification. (All of this, BTW, has been made up by SCOTUS, so it's not a statute or anything, and is therefore somewhat of a vague concept.) B. There are, so far, three recognized "suspect classes": race, national origin, and religion. Consequently, any government act that treats people differently based on one of these classifications is going to be very heavily scrutinized. There are essentially three "levels" of scrutiny that SCOTUS uses: Strict Scrutiny: The toughest form of legal scrutiny. The challenged law "presumptively invalid unless the government can demonstrate that the law or regulation is necessary to achieve a 'compelling state interest,'" and that the statute is "narrowly tailored" to meet that compelling interest, and that the law is the "least restrictive means" of achieving that interest. Per Wikipedia, only about 30% of laws found to be subject to "Strict Scrutiny" survive that scrutiny. An example of a law surviving Strict Scrutiny is Grutter v. Bollinger (Upheld the University of Michigan Law School's race-based affirmative action program, deeming "student body diversity" (that is, the consideration of race as a factor in admissions) to be a compelling interest and the race-conscious admissions process to be narrowly tailored). Examples of laws not surviving Strict Scrutiny include well-known cases like Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia. Intermediate Scrutiny: As you can guess by it's name, this is a lesser, though still potent, form of legal scrutiny. From Wikipedia: "In order to overcome the intermediate scrutiny test, it must be shown that the law or policy being challenged furthers an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest." A recent example of a law surviving Intermediate Scrutiny is Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton (allowing states to require Internet pornography websites to verify the age of viewers in order to prevent access by minors). Rational Basis: This is the lowest, the "normal," standard of review. From Wikipedia: "Courts applying rational basis review seek to determine whether a law is 'rationally related' to a 'legitimate' government interest, whether real or hypothetical." This one is very difficult to overcome for a person challenging the constitutionality of a statute or government act (and, obviously, pretty easy for the state actor to satisfy). "Strict Scrutiny," then, is a fairly closed set of classifications (race, national origin, and religion), and "Rational Basis" is the default approach to assessing constitutionality. Consequently, a person or group looking to challenge a law will do everything they can to escape the clutches of "Rational Basis" and get themselves designated as a group for which "Intermediate Scrutiny" is applies. C. "Intermediate Scrutiny" has a fairly narrow application. It is clear that sex and legitimacy of birth are both classifications that trigger "Intermediate Scrutiny" (that is, laws that discriminate based on these classifications must show the "important government interest" and such as noted in the above summary). These are called "quasi-suspect classes." D. Sexual orientation might be a quasi-suspect class (see here). Two circuit courts (2nd and 9th) have said it is, but that's it. E. With this backdrop in mind, we come back to the issue addressed in the Church's brief, that is, whether "trans" people qualify, in a legal setting, as a "quasi-suspect class." If they do, then laws which differentiate/discriminate based on "transgender status" will face a considerably more difficult constitutional burden (Intermediate Scrutiny) than otherwise (Rational Basis). An excellent, and related, example of this sort of question arose in United States v. Skrmetti: Skrmetti is likely relevant to the question in the two consolidated cases in which the Church's brief was filed (though the brief does not address Skrmetti). Here is Grok's assessment: I think this is likely a correct prediction. F. Here is Grok's summary of the Church's brief (which brief, IMO, was not adequately addressed or described in the news article) : G. Here are some verbatim excerpts from the Church's brief: This is pretty good stuff, but conclusory (to be expected in the introduction, I guess). The brief gets into some particulars later on. A very solid point, this. "A religious organization’s pursuit of a unique religious mission would be molded to avoid government penalties and private litigation rather than to express the organization’s authentic self-definition." Yep. Thee RFRA as "super statute." That's new to me. Anyhoo, the brief is pretty good, and I think "trans" or "gender identity" as a quasi-suspect class will not be recognized. Thanks, -Smac Thanks for taking the time to lay this out. I appreciate you, brother. 2
Popular Post The Nehor Posted December 11, 2025 Popular Post Posted December 11, 2025 (edited) Okay, who performed the summoning ritual to bring smac back? I’m not mad, I just want to know. Also, does it work like the bat-signal? Because that would be pretty neat. 1 hour ago, smac97 said: Here is Grok's assessment: I think this is likely a correct prediction. F. Here is Grok's summary of the Church's brief (which brief, IMO, was not adequately addressed or described in the news article) : Grok doesn’t assess or summarize from a complete whole. It parrots based on probability. 1 hour ago, smac97 said: G. Here are some verbatim excerpts from the Church's brief: This is pretty good stuff, but conclusory (to be expected in the introduction, I guess). The brief gets into some particulars later on. You could cut out a few words and replace them and it would also work to argue for keeping in place school segregation or to defend the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws or to argue against giving women the right to vote or to allow black people to serve in the military. This is all fear-mongering of potential ramifications and is a well-worn trope where the horrible fantasies of the doomsayer never happen. 1 hour ago, smac97 said: A very solid point, this. Based on rubbish though. The idea that sex and gender being inseparable are somehow millennia old religious teachings is silly. First off sex and gender are words that were repurposed. This isn’t a linguistics issue. If we made up a new word and assigned it the meaning we now give to “gender” it wouldn’t satisfy people that they weren’t defying some ancient church teachings. There are lots of linguistic issues the openness of transgender people create (amab and afab are clunky and misleading terms but we don’t have anything better yet) but they can be figured out. I am reminded of someone who was ostensibly serious arguing that a child being adopted by two fathers or two mothers would lead to confusion because there would be two people with the same title. I can personally attest that there are solutions to these pressing problems. As to the idea in the abstract the whole idea was rarely challenged in the environment in which Abrahamic monotheistic religions grew up in and when Christianity encountered groups that had more nuanced ideas of what we would now call gender colonialism dealt with them swiftly and decisively. And Christianity in particular has a strange history with gender and sex. The gnostics had some fun ideas in this realm. I giggle at the bit at stuff like this from the gospel of Thomas: Simon Peter said to him, "Let Mary leave us, for women are not worthy of life." Jesus said, "I myself shall lead her in order to make her male, so that she too may become a living spirit resembling you males. For every woman who will make herself male will enter the kingdom of heaven." You heard it here first folks. Transmasc guys enter the kingdom of heaven! Also the idea that something is old makes it worth keeping around is one of the reasons it took us so long to get rid of slavery. The Christian slaveholders had a better biblical argument than the Christian abolitionists. Also did we just abandon the teaching about the Great Apostasy at some point. We are seriously pointing to how old the teachings of apostate Christendom are as a kind of proof of their validity? Really? This kind of tension is the price of living in a pluralistic society. I think the Church is unwise to back Christians in power who want to give their religion unique privileges as a kind of national religion. That isn’t likely to end well for religious minorities like the Church. 1 hour ago, smac97 said: "A religious organization’s pursuit of a unique religious mission would be molded to avoid government penalties and private litigation rather than to express the organization’s authentic self-definition." Yep. So churches want to be authentic to themselves and share what they really believe to be true and to represent themselves as they see themselves despite outward governmentally-sanctioned pressures to conform to a more socially acceptable presentation? Huh….that sounds vaguely familiar. 1 hour ago, smac97 said: Thee RFRA as "super statute." That's new to me. So it isn’t about transgender people? It is just about queer people in general? This doesn’t actually prevent a conflict from existing. It just means a few more people will be involved in these questions when they come up? Hardly a compelling argument that this will help in any way. 1 hour ago, smac97 said: Anyhoo, the brief is pretty good, I disagree. 1 hour ago, smac97 said: and I think "trans" or "gender identity" as a quasi-suspect class will not be recognized. I agree. This is the likely result. Sadly. Edited December 11, 2025 by The Nehor 5
JVW Posted December 11, 2025 Author Posted December 11, 2025 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: If the Christian Nationalists that are influential in the Evangelical movement win out and manage to hold onto their political power and seize more of it as they make the United States into a “Christian nation” they will start to target religious groups who were former allies. It is mostly a question of whether they go after the Mormons or the Catholics first. I don’t think they will succeed in the first place but if they do they will narrow down what it means to be Christian. This is an alliance of convenience and I am disappointed in how many church members think it is genuine friendship and tolerance on the macro level. I agree with you, but I try to have hope because living in despair kind of sucks. 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: There is a reason the founders didn’t want religious tests for government office and didn’t make it a “Christian nation”. They wanted to avoid having the Wars of Religion that had caused a lot of death and persecution and hatred in Europe. Those can happen here too. Agreed. 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: Whatever they want to do? You want to let the Woke mindvirus destroy western civilization? That is their goal you know! /s The religious and those who feign religion are wielding the power of government to further marginalize an already marginalized group. Also one side is stirring up hatred. I have transgender friends who have been attacked by horrible people who these high-minded church leaders are providing rhetorical cover to. I'm not sure I entirely understand what your saying here. But according to how I'm interpreting you, you are claiming that religions are taking the U.S. law and beating up the little guy with it. I'm not sure that I agree with that assessment because the law in the U.S. is "freedom of religion" since the founding. That, to me, strikes me more as a defensive previously established position as opposed to an offensive tool used to beat others into submission; but I could be missing something. I do not agree that one side is stirring up hatred. I see plenty of hatred coming from all directions from all types of people: religious, trans, political, you name it. Are you honestly only seeing one side stirring up hatred or were you just being rhetorical because of your close proximity to the trans issue? 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: If you are a Christian siding with the powerful against the marginalized doesn’t that seem off somehow? Yes, when that happens I am against it. In this specific case in the courts I am not seeing that though. This case seems to have been instigated by the trans side with the religious side defending to protect their right to express their values. I acknowledge that that isn't always the case though. 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: No, they shouldn’t and no one is asking them to or compelling them to. They can kick transgender people out of their churches. I think what churches want is protection from social scorn for doing this. That is not something the government can or should legislate though many are trying to. They are hard at work butchering part of the First Amendment while claiming to save another part that was never in any real danger. I can see where you are coming from but I don't think the law cares much about "social scorn" and I don't think the stakes in the law realm are "someone might think I'm a bad person". As far as I'm aware the stakes are financially and criminally related. For example with the dumb gay wedding cake thing that's happened a bunch of times. Both parties had a bunch of legal fees, businesses and livelihoods were impacted, I don't know if jail was ever a threat in any of those cases, but it has been in other cases in the past. The law is much more than about "social scorn". If something can be open for lawsuits you can bet there will be people suing. Lawsuits are what make the world go 'round. 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: If they want to function without federal funding they can. This may end up being like desegregating schools again. If the OP court case was won by the trans side I wonder if BYU separated itself from all Federal funding if it would be immune from lawsuits from trans if the school did something that a trans didn't like. What do you think? 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: On one side you have people afraid for their lives and safety. On the other hand you have people worried about not getting federal funding and wanting to avoid social scorn. I am going to favor the former until they no longer have to be afraid for their lives and safety. If I understand you correctly where you draw the line on religions being able to preserve their values and enforce their internal rules on their congregants vs being accommodating to trans you are on the side of fully accommodating trans, regardless of what the religions want. Even if that means the church goes out of business or has to fundamentally change their doctrine in order to make those accommodations. Even if the clergyman has to act against their conscience in order to acquiesce. Is that correct? So on a scale of 1-10 with 1 being full religious protection and 10 being full trans protection you are a 10? Thanks for sharing your thoughts! 2
Popular Post The Nehor Posted December 11, 2025 Popular Post Posted December 11, 2025 36 minutes ago, JVW said: If I understand you correctly where you draw the line on religions being able to preserve their values and enforce their internal rules on their congregants vs being accommodating to trans you are on the side of fully accommodating trans, regardless of what the religions want. Even if that means the church goes out of business or has to fundamentally change their doctrine in order to make those accommodations. Even if the clergyman has to act against their conscience in order to acquiesce. Is that correct? So on a scale of 1-10 with 1 being full religious protection and 10 being full trans protection you are a 10? Thanks for sharing your thoughts! Trans people existing and having equal protection doesn’t put a church out of business. Westboro Baptist has been pumping out antisemitic hate speech for decades and Jewish people have more protections than transgender people would if they win this case. They are still there and haven’t changed their doctrine or violated their (theoretical) conscience. 5
Calm Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 (edited) 2 hours ago, JVW said: I'm not sure that I agree with that assessment because the law in the U.S. is "freedom of religion" since the founding. That, to me, strikes me more as a defensive previously established position as opposed to an offensive tool used to beat others into submission; but I could be missing something. Simplistic summary… The law is or supposed to be the government doesn’t support one faith more than others (show favoritism) and the government doesn’t interfere with the practice of religion (limitations placed on the last depending on whether it breaks laws or not). But tell me what was the defensive legally pre established position in the Reynolds vs the US (1878)? Serious question, want to see how you think about it. While bigamy was illegal at least in some states earlier (maybe all, going from memory) but not US territories, non-civil religious marriages done with knowledge of all parties were not illegal until LDS were targeted and a law was made because of them (as cohabitation was not enforced in other territories iirc). Seems to me there is a difference between popular customs and the law. If a new law needs to be made to protect a practice wouldn’t that make the practice a custom rather than a law being defended? (Haven’t thought this all the way through, so may be quickly dissuaded from this idea) Not saying there aren’t customs that should get legal protection, but there are a lot that shouldn’t. Edited December 12, 2025 by Calm 3
JVW Posted December 12, 2025 Author Posted December 12, 2025 14 hours ago, Calm said: Simplistic summary… The law is or supposed to be the government doesn’t support one faith more than others (show favoritism) and the government doesn’t interfere with the practice of religion (limitations placed on the last depending on whether it breaks laws or not). But tell me what was the defensive legally pre established position in the Reynolds vs the US (1878)? Serious question, want to see how you think about it. While bigamy was illegal at least in some states earlier (maybe all, going from memory) but not US territories, non-civil religious marriages done with knowledge of all parties were not illegal until LDS were targeted and a law was made because of them (as cohabitation was not enforced in other territories iirc). Seems to me there is a difference between popular customs and the law. If a new law needs to be made to protect a practice wouldn’t that make the practice a custom rather than a law being defended? (Haven’t thought this all the way through, so may be quickly dissuaded from this idea) Not saying there aren’t customs that should get legal protection, but there are a lot that shouldn’t. I read a very simple overview of the case and I agree with this blurb from the article https://www.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/98us145 Quote The Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and Congress’s power to prohibit polygamy. The Court held that while Congress could not outlaw a belief in the correctness of polygamy, it could outlaw the practice thereof. The majority reasoned that while marriage is a “sacred obligation,” it is nevertheless “usually regulated by law” in “most civilized nations.” Finally, the Court held that people cannot avoid a law due to their religion. The fundamental difference between this case and the trans case, in my mind, is that this case is about doing something as a result of religious belief and the trans case is about not doing something as a result of religious belief. It reminds me of how mask wearing during covid was enforced less by fines for non-compliance (action) and more by businesses not being willing to serve customers who weren't wearing one (refusal to act). If someone was actively targeting non-mask wearers during covid due to their religious beliefs that would be different than that same person refusing entry to their home or church. I am not a lawyer and I'm tired and I feel like my opinion here is really dumb, but there you have it. I do think that this problem is a really fascinating one and, in general, I don't know what the solution is. Specifically to this case I do not believe that trans should become a protected class because it's not scientifically provable. In theory (not saying that this is actually happening!), anyone could temporarily identify as trans in order to accomplish something and then change their mind after they accomplish their goal as a protected class unless a system for "trans passports" or something is effected. It would be akin to giving protected class to "depression" or "ADHD". Regardless of the reality of the situation the only evidence of its existence is the individuals beliefs and insistence on their condition, and there are many cases of ex-trans people indicating that one could be trans for an extended period of time (years, decades) and then not be anymore which reinforces my argument. Race, sex, and nationality are not like that, they are (generally, don't be dumb) immutable and easily certifiable.
The Nehor Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 2 hours ago, JVW said: Specifically to this case I do not believe that trans should become a protected class because it's not scientifically provable. In theory (not saying that this is actually happening!), anyone could temporarily identify as trans in order to accomplish something and then change their mind after they accomplish their goal as a protected class unless a system for "trans passports" or something is effected. It would be akin to giving protected class to "depression" or "ADHD". Regardless of the reality of the situation the only evidence of its existence is the individuals beliefs and insistence on their condition, and there are many cases of ex-trans people indicating that one could be trans for an extended period of time (years, decades) and then not be anymore which reinforces my argument. Race, sex, and nationality are not like that, they are (generally, don't be dumb) immutable and easily certifiable. I think you’re approaching it wrong. In this theoretical case what is the advantage this person is claiming out of the temporary claiming to be trans? There aren’t super secret awesome privileges you suddenly gain. How are you hacking the system by doing this? You gain a protection from discrimination and possibly laws that impact you as a class specifically have to pass a higher standard of judicial review. What is the advantage? There is this hidden belief among some that declaring you are transgender opens all kinds of doors in terms of education and employment. It doesn’t. It doesn’t get you social prestige. The idea that the marginalized are actually the privileged is a lie that propagandists love to spew. In 1930s Germany the Jews were not given all kinds of special advantages. In 1940s USA despite claims by racists the interned Japanese Americans were not living well off the government’s money. In the pre-Civil War American South the enslaved people were not living a life of contentment and ease compared to impoverished white people. The demonization of the marginalized by those in power to reinforce the necessity of keeping them marginalized because they get some special advantage or are somehow coddled is an old strategy and it is happening with transgender people now. Also the comparison to race is a pretty ironic one. One of the primary reasons that ‘scientific racism’ failed is there were no boundary lines that could be scientifically set. You can’t run a test and determine conclusively if someone is black or hispanic. So how do you enforce a law that treats these categories differently? You can’t. This is probably where the fight to insist that people’s gender identity should match their biological sex will fail. You can’t identify anyone with certainty. Biological sex isn’t a binary. There is a lot of ambiguity. You can say it is based on chromosomes but most people are never tested. There are men out there who have male genitalia and never doubted their gender identity who have XX chromosomes. There are women with female genitalia who never doubted their gender identity with XY chromosomes. There are intersex people. If we enforced testing we would have to shift people to another sex. There is no firm boundary line. The weirdos who think they are dumbfounding people by asking “what is a woman” think they are showcasing how ignorant and ridiculous the people being questioned are because they think there is an easy answer and the person being asked won’t just say it. Instead they are showing that they are idiots because their easy answer either doesn’t work or they don’t realize they don’t have an answer either. They insist it is obvious. It isn’t. They insist they can always tell if someone is transgender when they can’t. They are falsely calling out cis women and girls as transgender as part of their deranged crusade. It is the same with race. They think they can identify black or Hispanic people by sight. They often can in a general sense in the same way people can tell men and women apart but in many specific cases they cannot. So no, being of a specific race isn’t “immutable” or “easily certifiable”. It is what box you tick on the census or some other form. Also, no. ADHD and depression are not something that can only be identified due to a person believing and insisting they have the condition. There are tests. There are fuzzy boundaries. But no, you can’t walk into a doctor’s office or a pharmacy and say you have ADHD or depression and demand prescription medication. So your examples of identities that are (mostly) immutable just aren’t and your claims about identities that are completely arbitrary are also not arbitrary. We are left with the uncomfortable uncertainty. 1
smac97 Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 (edited) 2 hours ago, JVW said: Specifically to this case I do not believe that trans should become a protected class because it's not scientifically provable. I agree. The effort to have "trans" identity designated as a quasi-suspect class suffers from a number of, in my view, insuperable defects: First, as you say, there is no way to quantify who is and is not in this class. Empirical confirmation ("scientifically provable") is likely not legally required, but there is no "limiting principle." Anyone can "identify" as "trans" at any time for any reason or no reason at all, and migrate in and out of that "identity" at any time. This amounts to a lack of immutability. Transgender identity is not inherently fixed—individuals can transition, detransition, or identify variably, allowing movement in/out of the class. This contrasts with immutable traits like race or sex (born into, unchangeable). Second, the Supreme Court has not recognized a new quasi-suspect class in decades. Third, the majority opinion in Skrmetti did not directly address this question (whether trans persons can qualify as a "suspect" or "quasi suspect" class), but the concurring opinion by Justice Barrett did. She cites the four-part analysis that SCOTUS uses when asked to address this issue: The group has historically been discriminated against or have been subject to prejudice, hostility, or stigma. They possess an immutable or highly visible trait. They lack political power. The group's distinguishing characteristic does not inhibit it from contributing meaningfully to society. I do not think "trans"-identified persons can qualify as a quasi-suspect class under this analysis. Justice Barrett explains why: Quote The test is strict, as evidenced by the failure of even vulnerable groups to satisfy it: We have held that the mentally disabled, the elderly, and the poor are not suspect classes. ... In fact, as far as I can tell, we have never embraced a new suspect class under this test. Our restraint reflects the principle that “[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” She is quite right. This issue is, or should be, addressed and decided by the Legislative Branch, not by the Nine Enrobed Ones (I think this same principle should have precluded the decision in Obergefell). Justice Barrett goes on: Quote The Sixth Circuit held that transgender individuals do not constitute a suspect class, and it was right to do so. To begin, transgender status is not marked by the same sort of “‘obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics’” as race or sex. ... In particular, it is not defined by a trait that is “‘definitively ascertainable at the moment of birth.’” The plaintiffs here, for instance, began to experience gender dysphoria at varying ages—some from a young age, others not until the onset of puberty. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs acknowledge that some transgender individuals “detransition” later in life—in other words, they begin to identify again with the gender that corresponds to their biological sex. Accordingly, transgender status does not turn on an “immutable . . . characteristi[c].” I don't see a viable counter-argument to this: Justice Barrett goes on to counter the "quasi suspect class" argument by quoting, ironically, WPATH and the APA (both of which are likely very much in favor of the classification) : Quote Nor is the transgender population a “discrete group,” as our cases require. Instead, like classes we have declined to recognize as suspect, the category of transgender individuals is “large, diverse, and amorphous.” The World Professional Association for Transgender Health states that the term “‘transgender’ can describe ‘a huge variety of gender identities and expressions.’” The American Psychological Association similarly uses the phrase “‘transgender youth’” as an “umbrella term” “to describe . . . varied groups” with “many diverse gender experiences.” Underscoring the point, plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged at oral argument that “there are people who fall within a transgender identity who may not fit into a binary identity.” The boundaries of the group, in other words, are not defined by an easily ascertainable characteristic that is fixed and consistent across the group. I don't see a viable counterargument for this one, either. Quote Finally, holding that transgender people constitute a suspect class would require courts to oversee all manner of policy choices normally committed to legislative discretion. The parties agree that the States have a legitimate interest in regulating health care. They also agree that transgender status implicates physical and mental health—indeed, this case is about the medical treatment of children with gender dysphoria, which is “clinically significant distress resulting from the incongruence between . . . gender identity and . . . sex assigned at birth,” and which “can result in severe anxiety, depression, self-harm, and even suicide.” Brief for Respondents in Support of Petitioner 4–5. The question of how to regulate a medical condition such as gender dysphoria involves a host of policy judgments that legislatures, not courts, are best equipped to make. See Cleburne, 473 U. S., at 441–442 (declining to recognize a suspect class when the “distinguishing characteristics” of the proposed class are “relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement”). Consider just a few: What are the relevant risks and benefits to children of puberty blockers and hormone treatments? What is the age at which these treatments become appropriate? 15? 16? 18? What about surgeries? Expert disagreements highlight the difficulty of such choices. As the Court recounts, England, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have raised concerns about using puberty blockers or hormone treatments on juveniles with gender dysphoria and have limited such treatments, in some cases by allowing them to go forward only in a research setting. See 1 App. 332–342, 409–411; 2 id., at 726–727; ante, at 3–4. By contrast, the guidelines promulgated by the Endocrine Society, upon which the plaintiffs rely, broadly recommend treatment for adolescents with sustained gender dysphoria and the capacity to give informed consent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 256a–259a. As we have emphasized before, “state and federal legislatures [have] wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 163 (2007). The prospect of courts second-guessing legislative choices in this area should set off alarm bells. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 72 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“What the precise facts are it may be difficult to say. It is enough for . . . this court to know . . . that the question is one about which there is room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion”). I think similar legislative concerns arise when it comes to "trans" people generally. Having biological males in women's bathrooms, changing rooms, sports competitions, prisons, the long-term effects of medical interventions, etc. are "[questions] one about which there is room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion," such that legislatures should address them, and courts should refrain from "second-guessing legislative choices." I think there are some portions of society who steadfastly deny that there is "room for debate" here, such that anyone who even suggests otherwise is per se a bigot, "transphobe," and so on. These sorts of my-way-or-the-highway histrionics, bordering on hysteria, have substantially decreased in efficacy over the past several years. The collective fear has dissipated. More and more people are willing to publicly acknowledge what I think almost all of us have known all along: That the Emperor is naked. A man does not become a woman by "identifying" as one. Justice Barret observes, correctly, that there is ample constitutional leeway for differing policy perspectives on this, which leeway pushes most "trans" issues into the legislative sphere: Quote Beyond the treatment of gender dysphoria, transgender status implicates several other areas of legitimate regulatory policy—ranging from access to restrooms to eligibility for boys’ and girls’ sports teams. If laws that classify based on transgender status necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny, then the courts will inevitably be in the business of “closely scrutiniz[ing] legislative choices” in all these domains. To be sure, an individual law “‘inexplicable by anything but animus’” is unconstitutional. But legislatures have many valid reasons to make policy in these areas, and so long as a statute is a rational means of pursuing a legitimate end, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied. This is why those lobbying for "trans" rights are frequently so over-the-top and shrill and coercive. They cannot countenance that society and the legislative bodies elected to enact laws pertaining to it have "many valid reasons to make policy in these areas." Justice Barrett goes on to address the "historical discrimination" prong of the "suspect class" analysis: Quote The conclusion that transgender individuals do not share the “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” of “a discrete group” is enough to demonstrate that transgender status does not define a suspect class. Lyng, 477 U. S., at 638. But the second factor—whether the group has, “[a]s a historical matter, . . . been subjected to discrimination,” ibid.—also poses a problem for the plaintiffs’ argument. In addressing this factor, the plaintiffs assume that a history of private discrimination may satisfy this condition. For instance, the plaintiffs argue that “it is undeniable that transgender individuals, as a class, have ‘historically been subject to discrimination including in education, employment, housing, and access to healthcare.’” Brief for United States 29; Brief for Respondents in Support of Petitioner 37 (adopting the arguments made by the United States).4 The Solicitor General confirmed at oral argument that this argument did not turn on “discrimination . . . reflected in the laws.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 60. The District Court also assumed that a history of private discrimination could suffice to establish that a group comprises a suspect class. See L. W. v. Skrmetti, 679 F. Supp. 3d 668, 690 (MD Tenn. 2023). This assumption is mistaken. For purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the relevant question is whether the group has been subject to a longstanding pattern of discrimination in the law. In other words, we ask whether the group has suffered a history of de jure discrimination. This is, in my view, a very important point. The analysis requires, or should require, de jure, not simply de facto, discrimination. She continues: Quote Existing suspect classes had such a history. Most obviously, “[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.” ... In recognizing sex as a suspect class, we similarly emphasized that women faced more than a century’s worth of discrimination in the law: “[N]ot until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the franchise. And for a half century thereafter, it remained the prevailing doctrine that government, both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as any ‘basis in reason’ could be conceived for the discrimination.” ... And in protecting alienage, we underscored the many state laws that discriminated on that ground, typically by targeting individuals of a particular national origin. ... Indeed, Congress criminalized discrimination on the basis of alienage by state actors in 1870, “in response to California legislation restricting the rights of Chinese immigrants.” I think this is quite correct. Moreover, I think it is getting more difficult, not less, to argue that "trans" persons face invidious discrimination in our increasingly pluralistic society. So even as de facto invidious discrimination wanes or waxes (I think the waning was happening quite a bit until the trans ideologues started to include in their efforts the sexualization of children, which has led to some societal resistance to these excesses), the likelihood of demonstrating de jure discrimination decreases. Quote The distinction between de jure discrimination and private animus is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and purpose. Most fundamentally, the Fourteenth Amendment constrains state action, not private conduct. ... And state actors are entitled to a presumption that their actions turn on constitutionally legitimate motivations rather than impermissible animus. ... Of course, this presumption can be defeated, and a widespread history of state action that reflects animus or stereotyping gives courts good reason to be suspicious of the government’s motives. But because we presume that state actors abide by the Constitution, the fact of private discrimination—which is not itself unconstitutional, even if morally blameworthy—does not provide a basis for inferring that state actors are also likely to discriminate and thereby violate the Constitution. This focus on de jure discrimination is not only theoretically sound—it is also judicially manageable. Courts are ill suited to conduct an open-ended inquiry into whether the volume of private discrimination exceeds some indeterminate threshold. By contrast, they are well equipped to analyze whether there is a history of legislation that has discriminated against the group in question. This is very good constitutional analysis, and I commend Justice Barrett for it. "Legislating from the Bench" really needs to be reigned in. Justice Barrett goes on to address the "lack [of] political power" prong of the analysis: Quote Focusing the inquiry on de jure state action would also clarify the test for political powerlessness, which is another factor we have used to determine whether a classification is suspect. Carolene Products, the source of the “discrete and insular minority” test, equates political powerlessness with laws burdening those who lacked a vote. Aye, there's the rub. I think advocates of trans ideology do know that they have access to the "vote," but they know that they mostly can't win legislatively. One of the better evidences of this mindset is the scorched earth "either you agree with me or your a bigot!"-style acrimonies, which they must know do far more to alienate and offend rather than persuade the "hearts and minds" of large swaths of the electorate. Hence the turn to lawfare such as Skrmetti and the current case discussed here. Justice Barrett continues: Quote Because the litigants assumed that evidence of private discrimination could suffice for the suspect-class inquiry, they did not thoroughly discuss whether transgender individuals have suffered a history of de jure discrimination as a class. And because the group of transgender individuals is an insufficiently discrete and insular minority, the question is largely academic.5 In future cases, however, I would not recognize a new suspect class absent a demonstrated history of de jure discrimination. --- 5. The evidence that is before this Court is sparse but suggestive of relatively little de jure discrimination. When asked at oral argument, the Solicitor General acknowledged that “historical discrimination against transgender people may not have been reflected in the laws.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 60. Counsel for the private plaintiffs, however, suggested that bans on military service for transgender individuals and on cross-dressing might qualify as de jure discrimination. See id., at 110; see also post, at 25–26 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). Because the issue was unbriefed, I take no position on whether there is a longstanding history of de jure discrimination with respect to the relevant characteristic of transgender status. I think Justice Barrett has here put - or proposed - a substantial gloss and refinement on the first prong of quasi-suspect class analysis (historical discrimination). A comment from one justice in a concurring opinion is, of course, not binding. However, I think the point she makes here - that demonstrated "discrimination" must be de jure and not just de facto - will likely be adopted in the current case. Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Jackson and Kagan) makes an effort to argue that trans folks are a quasi suspect class. It makes some pretty solid points, but it leans to heavily on analogies in which differentiated treatment based on biological sex exists. Biological sex is essentially always empirically testable, "trans" identity is not. To her credit, Justice Sotomayor references "sex identified at birth" (not "assigned") (emphasis added). She uses that phrase about 25 times, in fact. By sticking to "identified," Justice Sotomayor emphasizes observational neutrality ("identified" evokes medical/biological documentation (e.g., birth certificates noting observable traits) without the connotation of "assignment" as a social construct or potential error). "Identified" also avoids ideological baggage. "Assigned" has roots in transgender advocacy (e.g., emphasizing fluidity/correctability), which could undermine her equal-protection argument by inviting majority counterattacks on "pretextual" framing. Critics of quasi-suspect status (e.g., Barrett's concurrence) already stress immutability and historical discrimination; "identified" sidesteps debates over whether sex is "assigned" like a gender role, keeping focus on disparate impact. Sotomayor's restraint might reflect strategic lawyering—grounding in statute over activism—or a nod to the Court's conservative tilt. Either way, it's a subtle win for clarity amid polarized discourse. In any event, I commend Justice Sotomayor on this point. In sum, I think Skrmetti is a strong bellwether for Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. Justice Barrett's dissent in that case laid out the blueprint for constitutional analysis, and I think the majority will substantively adopt her approach in the current case. 2 hours ago, JVW said: In theory (not saying that this is actually happening!), anyone could temporarily identify as trans in order to accomplish something and then change their mind after they accomplish their goal as a protected class unless a system for "trans passports" or something is effected. I'll venture to say that this is actually happening. See, e.g., here and here. 2 hours ago, JVW said: It would be akin to giving protected class to "depression" or "ADHD". Regardless of the reality of the situation the only evidence of its existence is the individuals beliefs and insistence on their condition, and there are many cases of ex-trans people indicating that one could be trans for an extended period of time (years, decades) and then not be anymore which reinforces my argument. Race, sex, and nationality are not like that, they are (generally, don't be dumb) immutable and easily certifiable. The "immutable trait" prong of quasi-suspect class analysis is, interestingly, not applicable to the "suspect" class of "religion," which classification people can migrate into or out of. I think the analysis allows for "religion" to be a mutable trait and still a "suspect" class for a few reasons that are mostly not applicable to, say, trans folks. First, protections for religious affiliation are explicitly rooted in the First Amendment, and those protections get "suspect" classification via constitutional incorporation, and not Carolene's minority rationale. Second, religion is a "suspect" because, like race, religions faced de jure oppression (e.g., anti-Catholic laws, blasphemy statutes). Third, religion is also a "suspect" class because the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses elevate it above quasi-suspect traits. Fourth, religion is also a "suspect" class because even mutable minorities (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses, Amish) are "insular" due to majority hostility (the can't "assimilate" without abandoning faith), Fifth, requiring "discrete/insular" for quasi-suspect classification prevents slippery slopes (e.g., obesity, poverty), whereas religion as a "suspect" class is both narrow and tied to the Bill of Rights. Thanks, -Smac Edited December 12, 2025 by smac97 4
JVW Posted December 12, 2025 Author Posted December 12, 2025 8 minutes ago, The Nehor said: I think you’re approaching it wrong. In this theoretical case what is the advantage this person is claiming out of the temporary claiming to be trans? I don't know. 8 minutes ago, The Nehor said: Also the comparison to race is a pretty ironic one. One of the primary reasons that ‘scientific racism’ failed is there were no boundary lines that could be scientifically set. You can’t run a test and determine conclusively if someone is black or hispanic. So how do you enforce a law that treats these categories differently? You can’t. This is probably where the fight to insist that people’s gender identity should match their biological sex will fail. You can’t identify anyone with certainty. I brought in race because it is one of the protected classes. 8 minutes ago, The Nehor said: Biological sex isn’t a binary. There is a lot of ambiguity. You can say it is based on chromosomes but most people are never tested. There are men out there who have male genitalia and never doubted their gender identity who have XX chromosomes. There are women with female genitalia who never doubted their gender identity with XY chromosomes. There are intersex people. If we enforced testing we would have to shift people to another sex. Ok 8 minutes ago, The Nehor said: There is no firm boundary line. The weirdos who think they are dumbfounding people by asking “what is a woman” think they are showcasing how ignorant and ridiculous the people being questioned are because they think there is an easy answer and the person being asked won’t just say it. Instead they are showing that they are idiots because their easy answer either doesn’t work or they don’t realize they don’t have an answer either. They insist it is obvious. It isn’t. They insist they can always tell if someone is transgender when they can’t. They are falsely calling out cis women and girls as transgender as part of their deranged crusade. It is the same with race. They think they can identify black or Hispanic people by sight. They often can in a general sense in the same way people can tell men and women apart but in many specific cases they cannot. Ok 8 minutes ago, The Nehor said: So no, being of a specific race isn’t “immutable” or “easily certifiable”. It is what box you tick on the census or some other form. People have family histories and their race and national origin can be verified. A black guy could tick the white box on forms but it wouldn't hold up under scrutiny. Though, to your point, I've been made aware that there are a lot of people who lie about having Native American ancestry in order to get a bunch of perks from the State. However, under scrutiny, the lie would be revealed. 8 minutes ago, The Nehor said: Also, no. ADHD and depression are not something that can only be identified due to a person believing and insisting they have the condition. There are tests. There are fuzzy boundaries. But no, you can’t walk into a doctor’s office or a pharmacy and say you have ADHD or depression and demand prescription medication. The tests are professionally administered self-assessments and speaking with therapists. People can lie. And yes, people can walk into their GP office and say they feel depressed or have ADHD and get medication for it after taking a self-assessment and chatting for 5 minutes. I've done it and I know many others who have as well. 8 minutes ago, The Nehor said: So your examples of identities that are (mostly) immutable just aren’t and your claims about identities that are completely arbitrary are also not arbitrary. We are left with the uncomfortable uncertainty. My quote Quote Race, sex, and nationality are not like that, they are (generally, don't be dumb) immutable and easily certifiable. You're being a little dumb right now. If someone is born in Japan they are nationality Japanese. If someone is born with the equipment to pop out a baby they are sex (the protected class, not gender!): Female. If someone has black skin they are Black. It's not complicated. The law didn't make "uncomfortably uncertain" traits protected. These traits are, by and large, are easily verifiable and able to be defended in the court of law. In order for trans to exist a person needs to claim a belief about themselves that they cannot prove to anyone else. It's very similar to bearing a testimony about God or whatever. The person can live their life a certain way to reinforce their beliefs and strengthen their ability to convince others that their belief is real and true, but it cannot be proven. Anyone I know who is trans (my sister, for example) I am taking it on good faith that they are being sincere, and honest, and know what being the opposite sex feels like. I am believing their personal testimony about their lived experience. I am allowed not to believe it, just like most people I talk to don't believe me when I tell them that I've met God and know there is a God. No skin off my nose, I don't have to have other people believe me in order to know what I know. I promise I am not trying to be antagonistic or disrespectful. I like reading your opinions and value your contribution to this forum. Thank you for participating in this thread with me, Nehor.
InCognitus Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 20 hours ago, The Nehor said: Okay, who performed the summoning ritual to bring smac back? I’m not mad, I just want to know. Also, does it work like the bat-signal? Because that would be pretty neat. I have to agree, that was very impressive. 3
JVW Posted December 12, 2025 Author Posted December 12, 2025 12 minutes ago, smac97 said: I agree. The effort to have "trans" identity designated as a quasi-suspect class suffers from a number of, in my view, insuperable defects: First, as you say, there is no way to quantify who is and is not in this class. Empirical confirmation ("scientifically provable") is likely not legally required, but there is no "limiting principle." Anyone can "identify" as "trans" at any time for any reason or no reason at all, and migrate in and out of that "identity" at any time. This amounts to a lack of immutability. Transgender identity is not inherently fixed—individuals can transition, detransition, or identify variably, allowing movement in/out of the class. This contrasts with immutable traits like race or sex (born into, unchangeable). Second, the Supreme Court has not recognized a new quasi-suspect class in decades. Third, the majority opinion in Skrmetti did not directly address this question (whether trans persons can qualify as a "suspect" or "quasi suspect" class), but the concurring opinion by Justice Barrett did. She cites the four-part analysis that SCOTUS uses when asked to address this issue: The group has historically been discriminated against or have been subject to prejudice, hostility, or stigma. They possess an immutable or highly visible trait. They lack political power. The group's distinguishing characteristic does not inhibit it from contributing meaningfully to society. Justice Barrett states: She is quite right. This issue is, or should be, addressed and decided by the Legislative Branch, not by the Nine Enrobed Ones (I think this same principle should have precluded the decision in Obergefell). Justice Barrett goes on: I don't see a viable counter-argument to this: Justice Barrett goes on to counter the "quasi suspect class" argument by quoting, ironically, WPATH and the APA (both of which are likely very much in favor of the classification) : I don't see a viable counterargument for this one, either. I think similar legislative concerns arise when it comes to "trans" people generally. Having biological males in women's bathrooms, changing rooms, sports competitions, prisons, the long-term effects of medical interventions, etc. are "[questions] one about which there is room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion," such that legislatures should address them, and courts should refrain from "second-guessing legislative choices." I think there are some portions of society who steadfastly deny that there is "room for debate" here, such that anyone who even suggests otherwise is per se a bigot, "transphobe," and so on. These sorts of my-way-or-the-highway histrionics, bordering on hysteria, have substantially decreased in efficacy over the past several years. The collective fear has dissipated. More and more people are willing to publicly acknowledge what I think almost all of us have known all along: That the Emperor is naked. A man does not become a woman by "identifying" as one. Justice Barret addresses this: This is why those lobbying for "trans" rights are frequently so over-the-top and shrill and coercive. They cannot countenance that society - and the legislatures elected to enact laws pertaining to it - has "many valid reasons to make policy in these areas." Justice Barrett goes on to address the "historical discrimination" prong of the "suspect class" analysis: This is, in my view, a very important point. The analysis requires de jure, not simply de facto, discrimination. She continues: I think this is quite correct. Moreover, I think it is getting more difficult, not less, to argue that "trans" persons face invidious discrimination in our increasingly pluralistic society. So as de facto invidious discrimination wanes, the likelihood of demonstrating de jure discrimination decreases. This is very good constitutional analysis, and I commend Justice Barrett for it. "Legislating from the Bench" really needs to be reigned in. Justice Barrett goes on to address the "lack [of] political power" prong of the analysis: Aye, there's the rub. I think advocates of trans ideology know that they mostly can't win legislatively, as otherwise they would not resort to scorched earth "either you agree with me or your a bigot!"-style acrimonies which they must know do far more to alienate and offend rather than persuade the "hearts and minds" of large swaths of the electorate. Hence the turn to lawfare such as Skrmetti and the current case discussed here. Justice Barrett continues: I think Justice Barrett has here put - or proposed - a substantial gloss and refinement on the first prong of quasi-suspect class analysis (historical discrimination). A comment from one justice in a concurring opinion is, of course, not binding. However, I think the point she makes here - that demonstrated "discrimination" must be de jure and not just de facto - will likely be adopted in the current case. Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Jackson and Kagan) makes an effort to argue that trans folks are a quasi suspect class. It makes some pretty solid points, but it leans to heavily on analogies in which differentiated treatment based on biological sex exists. Biological sex is essentially always empirically testable, "trans" identity is not. To her credit, Justice Sotomayor references "sex identified at birth" (not "assigned") (emphasis added). She uses that phrase about 25 times, in fact. By sticking to "identified," Justice Sotomayor emphasizes observational neutrality ("identified" evokes medical/biological documentation (e.g., birth certificates noting observable traits) without the connotation of "assignment" as a social construct or potential error). "Identified" also avoids ideological baggage. "Assigned" has roots in transgender advocacy (e.g., emphasizing fluidity/correctability), which could undermine her equal-protection argument by inviting majority counterattacks on "pretextual" framing. Critics of quasi-suspect status (e.g., Barrett's concurrence) already stress immutability and historical discrimination; "identified" sidesteps debates over whether sex is "assigned" like a gender role, keeping focus on disparate impact. Sotomayor's restraint might reflect strategic lawyering—grounding in statute over activism—or a nod to the Court's conservative tilt. Either way, it's a subtle win for clarity amid polarized discourse. In any event, I commend Justice Sotomayor on this point. In sum, I think Skrmetti is a strong bellwether for Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. Justice Barrett's dissent in that case laid out the blueprint for constitutional analysis, and I think the majority will substantively adopt her approach in the current case. I'll venture to say that this is actually happening. See, e.g., here and here. The "immutable trait" prong of quasi-suspect class analysis is, interestingly, not applicable to the "suspect" class of "religion," which classification people can migrate into or out of. I think the analysis allows for "religion" to be a mutable trait and still a "suspect" class for a few reasons that are mostly not applicable to, say, trans folks. First, protections for religious affiliation are explicitly rooted in the First Amendment, and those protections get "suspect" classification via constitutional incorporation, and not Carolene's minority rationale. Second, religion is a "suspect" because, like race, religions faced de jure oppression (e.g., anti-Catholic laws, blasphemy statutes). Third, religion is also a "suspect" class because the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses elevate it above quasi-suspect traits. Fourth, religion is also a "suspect" class because even mutable minorities (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses, Amish) are "insular" due to majority hostility (the can't "assimilate" without abandoning faith), Fifth, requiring "discrete/insular" for quasi-suspect classification prevents slippery slopes (e.g., obesity, poverty), whereas religion as a "suspect" class is both narrow and tied to the Bill of Rights. Thanks, -Smac Thank you for this post, I appreciate you taking the time to write it. There were a few things I wanted to pick your brain on here. You mentioned there not being a "limiting principle". If society wanted to help trans along to get a protected status and create a "limiting principle" what do you think that would look like? At the end of your remarks you talk about religion having "suspect" classification even though it's mutable. I think this is actually really fascinating. So basically if religion wasn't enshrined in the U.S. Constitution then it probably wouldn't be a protected class? There is at least, in some cases, a "limiting principle" for those churches who keep membership records (i.e. bapism, marriage, etc.) so I suppose if religion wasn't in the Constitution then all churches would be required to keep documentation on their members, and possibly institute requirements in order to join the religion, so that a person's religion could be easily proved in a court of law. Is that correct?
JVW Posted December 12, 2025 Author Posted December 12, 2025 (edited) 21 minutes ago, InCognitus said: I have to agree, that was very impressive. If I told you how I did it I'd have to blank you. There was some occult-level ceremonies going on behind the screen to get Smac to pop up. Edited December 12, 2025 by JVW probably shouldn't use that word on the internet even when making jokes
smac97 Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 13 minutes ago, JVW said: Thank you for this post, I appreciate you taking the time to write it. There were a few things I wanted to pick your brain on here. You mentioned there not being a "limiting principle". If society wanted to help trans along to get a protected status and create a "limiting principle" what do you think that would look like? I don't know. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020) did not provide an explicit, standalone definition of "transgender" as a term. Instead, the opinion integrates it into the analysis of "sex" discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. SCOTUS held that firing someone "for being homosexual or transgender" necessarily involves sex-based discrimination, as the adverse action turns on incongruence between the employee's sex assigned at birth and their gender identity or presentation. The opinion assumes a common understanding (e.g., identity/presentation differing from birth sex) but avoids granular details like medical transition or non-binary inclusion, focusing on statutory text over policy. 13 minutes ago, JVW said: At the end of your remarks you talk about religion having "suspect" classification even though it's mutable. I think this is actually really fascinating. So basically if religion wasn't enshrined in the U.S. Constitution then it probably wouldn't be a protected class? Dunno. It probably would be a quasi-suspect class, and perhaps a suspect class. As it is, though, the First Amendment requires that it be a suspect class. 13 minutes ago, JVW said: There is at least, in some cases, a "limiting principle" for those churches who keep membership records (i.e. bapism, marriage, etc.) so I suppose if religion wasn't in the Constitution then all churches would be required to keep documentation on their members, and possibly institute requirements in order to join the religion, so that a person's religion could be easily proved in a court of law. Is that correct? It's hard to address a hypothetical like this. Thanks, -Smac 3
Calm Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 (edited) 4 hours ago, JVW said: Specifically to this case I do not believe that trans should become a protected class because it's not scientifically provable. If it becomes possible to differentiate between cis and transgender brains as some studies are indicating it might be, would you be supportive then of changing the law to give transgender people protected or quasi protected status? (If that is the correct language)? https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9374880/ https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8955456/ https://www.nature.com/articles/s41386-020-0666-3 ***need to add here I am simplifying and the question of how to differentiate is likely going to be more complicated than just brain structure or activity just as it is with those who identify as cis. Edited December 12, 2025 by Calm 1
JVW Posted December 12, 2025 Author Posted December 12, 2025 (edited) 24 minutes ago, Calm said: If it becomes possible to differentiate between cis and transgender brains as some studies are indicating it might be, would you be supportive then of changing the law to give transgender people protected or quasi protected status? (If that is the correct language)? https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9374880/ https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8955456/ https://www.nature.com/articles/s41386-020-0666-3 ***need to add here I am simplifying and the question of how to differentiate is likely going to be more complicated than just brain structure or activity just as it is with those who identify as cis. If there was an "immutable" characteristic that didn't change regardless of how someone dressed, what pronouns they used, what drugs they were taking, and what surgeries they had then I think there could be a case made for some kind of protected status. (I say this because trans can be any pronoun, no hormones, no diagnosis, no cross-dressing, and no surgeries or any combination of them. Trans advocates highlight the "fluidity" of the trans/queer experience.) But on that note I think that the gays would get protected status first because at least they can define themselves by who they sleep with and have a long history of showing consistency and lack of malleability in sexual preferences. What do you think, Calm? Edited December 12, 2025 by JVW
Calm Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 (edited) 3 hours ago, JVW said: People have family histories and their race and national origin can be verified. A black guy could tick the white box on forms but it wouldn't hold up under scrutiny. This is a derail, but feel the need to add the info…. Family histories can be lost. I have known people who don’t know where their great grandparents are from. I have even known people whose grandparents refuse to share their background for some reason, so genealogy goes only back two generations. There are people who have been adopted who know nothing of their parents even. I have heard of people lying about their ancestry. Family history is not reliable enough, imo. Theoretically it’s 50% DNA from each parent, 25% grandparents etc, but that is on average (due to recombination). I think it’s 5 generations when it becomes a decent probability that one ancestor’s DNA is no longer present, it could be much sooner, though unlikely. It is not uncommon (10% iirc) for 3rd cousins to share noDNA. Example…one great grandparent moves from Korea to Britain and marries someone with Scottish heritage and none of their children marry someone with Korean ancestry and so forth until you get to the greatgrandchild. It is possible no greatgrandchildren show Korean DNA. For some reason the knowledge the great grandparent was from Korea was lost (say prejudice made the British family embarrassed to talk about it and everyone who didn’t know assumed he was Chinese). No way for a great grandchild to know ancestry goes back to Korea. I can find an article that goes into disappearing DNA if you want. As far as scrutiny, what level of scrutiny would you suggest? These two young women are twins. The picture is from FB, so found this link instead: https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/03/living/feat-black-white-twins Edited December 12, 2025 by Calm
Calm Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 8 minutes ago, JVW said: What do you think, Calm? I think I don’t know enough yet to have an opinion. Biology isn’t as clear cut as it is often presented as demonstrated by the brain studies and intersex variations for one thing. And I certainly know little about the legal history of protected classes and the reasoning behind them. 1
JVW Posted December 12, 2025 Author Posted December 12, 2025 9 minutes ago, Calm said: Family histories can be lost. I have known people who don’t know where their great grandparents are from. I have even known people whose grandparents refuse to share their background for some reason, so genealogy goes only back two generations. There are people who have been adopted who know nothing of their parents even. At what point, how many generations forward do you believe a person must have DNA from a particular ancestor? Example…one of their great grandparents moves from Korea to Britain and marries someone with Scottish heritage and none of their children marry someone with Korean ancestry and so forth until you get to the greatgrandchild. Do you believe in all cases you can show through DNA this person had a Korean great grandparent? I don't know. I'd have to defer to someone who knows the law around race as a protected status. I imagine they have set the burden of proof in order to litigate any lawsuits. 1
The Nehor Posted December 12, 2025 Posted December 12, 2025 (edited) 5 hours ago, JVW said: People have family histories and their race and national origin can be verified. A black guy could tick the white box on forms but it wouldn't hold up under scrutiny. Though, to your point, I've been made aware that there are a lot of people who lie about having Native American ancestry in order to get a bunch of perks from the State. However, under scrutiny, the lie would be revealed. The place they were born can often be verified but how do you verify race. If both parents are white then you are white? But how do you know both parents are white? What determines this? You can often get away with broad generalizations but race is a human construct. There isn’t some level of scrutiny that determines it. Many segregationist groups tried long and hard to find a way to quantify ‘blackness’ so they could maintain segregation. It didn’t work. There was no test that worked. If two black parents have a child that can ‘pass’ as white what does that mean? How do you test that? Mixed race children fit where? I would be laughed at if I tried to claim I was Asian or Hispanic but if your division can’t handle edge cases then there is no level of scrutiny that can make a positive determination. Racists desperately want there to be one but they can’t find it or demonstrate it. There are still eugenicist organizations (some going back to the Nazis) out there using pseudoscience to try to cook up some standards. You mentioned Native Americans and tribal politics are often downright brutal over who they exclude and include (especially when money is involved). Some try to have standards. Some determinations are much more arbitrary. 5 hours ago, JVW said: The tests are professionally administered self-assessments and speaking with therapists. People can lie. And yes, people can walk into their GP office and say they feel depressed or have ADHD and get medication for it after taking a self-assessment and chatting for 5 minutes. I've done it and I know many others who have as well. That just means you can cheat the system. You can do that with stuff that could be empirically falsified if you know the right people. 5 hours ago, JVW said: You're being a little dumb right now. If someone is born in Japan they are nationality Japanese. If someone is born with the equipment to pop out a baby they are sex (the protected class, not gender!): Female. If someone has black skin they are Black. It's not complicated. The law didn't make "uncomfortably uncertain" traits protected. These traits are, by and large, are easily verifiable and able to be defended in the court of law. What if they appear female but they don’t have the equipment to make a baby or it doesn’t function. What if they are intersex with ambiguous genitalia? You have edge cases. Yes, in a lot of cases you can look at someone and determine their race. You can often determine biological sex by looking at someone especially if they aren’t wearing clothing but even there there are cases that don’t follow a binary. Race is much more complicated since mixed race people are fairly common. 5 hours ago, JVW said: In order for trans to exist a person needs to claim a belief about themselves that they cannot prove to anyone else. It's very similar to bearing a testimony about God or whatever. The person can live their life a certain way to reinforce their beliefs and strengthen their ability to convince others that their belief is real and true, but it cannot be proven. Anyone I know who is trans (my sister, for example) I am taking it on good faith that they are being sincere, and honest, and know what being the opposite sex feels like. I am believing their personal testimony about their lived experience. I am allowed not to believe it, just like most people I talk to don't believe me when I tell them that I've met God and know there is a God. No skin off my nose, I don't have to have other people believe me in order to know what I know. You are comparing it to religion which you state is about their beliefs without demonstrable proof. Yet religion IS an even more protected class. If these are all potentially delusions why do religious delusions get even more protection? 5 hours ago, JVW said: I promise I am not trying to be antagonistic or disrespectful. I like reading your opinions and value your contribution to this forum. Thank you for participating in this thread with me, Nehor. Nope, didn’t read you that way. You’re good. Edited December 13, 2025 by The Nehor 2
Recommended Posts