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Posted

Another article on real-world ramifications of "trans" issues: Incarcerated transgender woman Demi Minor impregnates two inmates at NJ prison

And this one: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/seven-sex-attacks-in-womens-jails-by-transgender-convicts-cx9m8zqpg

Quote

Transgender prisoners are five times more likely to carry out sex attacks on inmates at women’s jails than other prisoners are, official figures show.

Male prisoners who were transferred to women’s jails during gender reassignment and women inmates who are transitioning committed seven of the 124 sex attacks recorded between 2010 and 2018. They occurred at HMP Low Newton in Co Durham, Foston Hall in Derbyshire, Peterborough, Bronzefield in Middlesex and New Hall, West Yorkshire.

Another: https://news.wttw.com/2020/02/19/lawsuit-female-prisoner-says-she-was-raped-transgender-inmate

Quote

An inmate at Illinois’ largest women’s prison says she was raped by a transgender inmate who was transferred into her housing unit last year, and claims Illinois Department of Corrections officials conducted a “sham investigation” to help cover up the incident.

In a federal lawsuit filed last week, a Jane Doe inmate at the Logan Correctional Center in central Illinois said that after being sexually assaulted in June 2019, she was coerced by a supervisory officer into denying the attack took place and then punished for filing a “false” complaint under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA).

The suit names Logan’s acting warden Beatrice Calhoun as a defendant, along with officers Brent Keeler and Todd Sexton.

“The transfer of transgender inmates from male to female prisons has been a contentious policy within IDOC,” the plaintiff’s Peoria-based attorneys wrote in a five-page complaint. “In an attempt to justify the transfers, Defendants Sexton, Calhoun, Keeler and currently other unknown IDOC employees covered up the sexual assault of Plaintiff and tried to falsely classify it as consensual, to keep it from being considered a PREA violation.”

Regarding whether such "trans"-related policies are susceptible to being gamed by opportunistic sexual predators: https://torontosun.com/2014/02/26/predator-who-claimed-to-be-transgender-declared-dangerous-offender

Quote

A sexual predator who falsely claimed to be transgender and preyed on women at two Toronto shelters was jailed indefinitely on Wednesday.

Justice John McMahon declared Christopher Hambrook — who claimed to be a transgender woman named Jessica — was a dangerous offender.

"A sexual predator who falsely claimed to be transgender..."

"Falsely claimed."

Another (from Cal) :

Quote

Sherri (formerly Richard) Masbruch has been accused of raping inmates (torturing two women put him in prison).  Claim is they just keep moving him. 

Original case, quite horrific 

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1761574.html

https://prisonreformmovement.wordpress.com/2012/08/08/update-on-richardsherri-masbruch/

Appeal by one woman to be moved as Masbruch’s presence trigger anxiety attacks due to her history of trauma (women in prison have a much higher rate of abuse than the general population):

http://media.fresnobee.com/smedia/2008/12/05/16/ccwf_complaint.source.prod_affiliate.8.pdf

Assaulted women knowing she was HIV positive:

http://murderpedia.org/male.H/h/hall-maddison.htm

And here (same link) :

Quote

Stats….

longterm studies finds criminality rate stays the same for male to female (iow, transgender women are just as dangerous as nontrans male prisoners) while female to male increase criminality (transgender men are more dangerous than nontrans female prisoners).

https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0016885

This article was posted last year: 

Quote

Why it's wrong – and profoundly damaging – to make us all agree that someone is whatever gender they say they are: HELEN JOYCE argues the gender self-identification lobby is harming children, women – and trans people themselves

By HELEN JOYCE FOR THE MAIL ON SUNDAY
PUBLISHED: 17:00 EDT, 3 July 2021

Gender self-identification is often described as this generation's civil rights battle. 

But for a man to declare 'I am a woman', and for everyone to be compelled to agree, is not, as with genuine civil rights movements, about extending privileges unjustly hoarded by a favoured group to a marginalised one.

What we are facing is a fundamental redefinition of what it means for anyone to be a man or woman – the supplanting of biology and a total rewrite of society's rules, with far-reaching consequences.

Most people are supportive of 'trans rights' – assuming something similar to same-sex marriage and women's franchise is being demanded. 

That trans people be allowed to live full lives, free from discrimination, harassment and violence and to express themselves as they wish.

Such goals are worthy but they are not what mainstream transactivism is about.

What 'trans rights' actually refers to is gender self-identification. This means that others are forced to agree someone is the gender they say they are. 

It requires that everyone else accept trans people's subjective beliefs as objective reality.

This is not a human right at all. It is akin to a new state religion, complete with blasphemy laws.

This is, IMO, a very astute and accurate observation.

Quote

Underlying my objections is a scientific fact: that biological sex has an objective basis. 

Sexual dimorphism – the two sexes, male and female – first appeared on Earth 1.2 billion years ago. 
...
The distinction between the sexes is not likely to be amenable to social engineering, no matter how much some people want it to be.

As well as serving the interests of trans people very poorly, the ideological focus of this powerful lobby means it seeks to silence anyone who does not support gender self-identification. 

What's more, I fear, its overreach is likely to provoke a backlash that will harm ordinary trans people who simply want safety and social acceptance.

When the public finally realises what is being demanded, the blame may not land with the activists, where it belongs.

This article was published in July 2021.  I think her prediction may be starting to come true.

She goes on to touch on A) biological males competing in women's sports, B) substantive changes in paediatric gender medicine, C) the dramatic increase in gender-dysphoric teenage girls, D) women being punished for saying that male and female are objective, socially significant categories, and E) detransitioners:

Quote

I know that I will be called unkind, and worse, for writing my book. Some of what I say is bound to be perceived as deeply hurtful by some.

But I believe that it is rare to be able to pass as a member of the opposite sex, especially if you are male; that the feeling of being a member of the opposite sex, no matter how deep and sincere, cannot change other people's instinctive perceptions; that such a feeling does not constitute licence to use facilities or services intended for the sex that you are not; that children who suffer distress at their sex are ill-served by being told that they can change it.
...
What finally pushed me to write my book was meeting some of gender-identity ideology's most poignant victims. 

They are detransitioners: people who took hormonal and sometimes surgical steps towards transition, only to realise that they had made a catastrophic mistake.

They speak of trauma from experimental drugs and surgeries and having been manipulated and deceived by adults.

I have seen them abused and defamed on social media. 

Their most obvious wounds are physical: mastectomies; castration; bodies shaped by cross-sex hormones.

But the mental wounds go deeper. They bought into an ideology that is incoherent and constantly shifting and where the slightest deviation is ferociously punished.

They were led to believe that parents who expressed concern about the impact of powerful drugs on developing minds and bodies were hateful bigots and that the only conceivable alternative to transition was suicide.

People "express{ing} about the impact of powerful drugs on developing minds and bodies" being smeared as "hateful bigots."  

Trans ideology being "incoherent and constantly shifting," from which "the slightest deviation is ferociously punished."

Been seeing this a lot.

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted
9 minutes ago, Scott Lloyd said:

I think Smac makes a valid point that a charge of “doxxing” rings hollow when it refers to the highlighting of information that has been readily available from public sources for years. 
 

An analogy: If someone here were to mention the fact that I used to work for the Deseret News, I would have no reasonable grounds to complain about a violation of board rules or to make an accusation of “doxxing” when I myself have made no secret of it and in fact have unabashedly revealed it. 

You’re saying  an obscure post from 10 years ago on an obscure message board is a“readily available public source”?

Posted
On 7/15/2022 at 10:31 AM, Analytics said:
Quote

98% of people wanting separate bathrooms doesn't mean 98% of people want the government to force people to use a restroom that conflicts with their gender identity or gender expression.

More information about what Brits are thinking on this issue:

Quote

At the end of the UK Gender Recognition consultation, an online survey was commissioned by ‘Women Ask Questions’ and paid for by publicly crowd-funded money raised for this purpose. Populus conducted the survey between 19th and 21st October 2018, using 2074 UK respondents (49% male, 51% female, weighted) across a range of age groups.
...

8 main areas were covered in the survey (you can click to go straight to each question)

Should doctors be part of a legal transition process?
Is a self-identifying transwoman with a penis a woman?
Is it hate speech to think women don’t have a penis?
Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis compete against women in sporting competitions?
Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis be free to use female changing rooms?
Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis be allowed to live in a female prison?
Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis perform intimate procedures like smear tests, when the woman has specifically requested a female?

MAIN CONCLUSIONS

A breakdown of some of the responses to above questions:

Is a self-identifying transwoman with a penis a woman?

2.png

Is it hate speech to think women don’t have a penis?

Quote

0 – This is a legitimate viewpoint and should be allowed to be expressed

10 – This is hate speech and is unacceptable

5.png

6.png

Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis compete against women in sporting competitions?

7.png

8.png

Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis be free to use female changing rooms?

9.png

10.png

Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis be allowed to live in a female prison?

Quote

Still thinking about a person who was born male and has male genitalia but who identifies as woman. If someone who identifies as a woman but was born male and still has male genitalia commits a crime and receives a prison sentence, do you think they should serve their sentence in a male prison, a female prison or neither?

6.png

Quote

Only 12% of UK respondents thought that a male-born prisoner with a penis who self-identifies as a woman should live in a female-only prison. The majority (58%) thought this person should live in either a male prison or a third space option. A similar pattern of views was given by male and female respondents.

6a.png

Quote

All age groups were more likely to say someone born male and retaining a penis should serve a prison sentence in a place other than a female-prison. However, the likelihood of opposing a female-prison clearly increased with age of respondent. About a quarter of 18-24 year olds thought that a female prison is the appropriate location compared to only 6% of age 65 plus.

 

Should a self-identifying transwoman with a penis perform intimate procedures like smear tests, when the woman has specifically requested a female?

Quote
Quote

Only 9% of UK respondents thought that if a woman requests a female practitioner for a smear test, then a male who self-identifies as a woman must always be allowed to perform the procedure.

11.png

 

12.png

Quote

Two thirds of UK respondents thought it should not always be allowed, answering that it should be either ‘never allowed’ or ‘only allowed with informed consent’. There was no significant difference between male or female respondents in this case.

A clear majority of respondents thought it should not always be allowed, regardless of the respondent’s age. Although young people (aged 18-24) were more likely than older respondents to think it should always be allowed.

 

"Main Conclusion":

Quote

8b-2.png

Quote

In all cases the majority of UK respondents consider a self-identifying transwoman who retains their penis to still be a man, and for it to be inappropriate for them to be considered female when it comes to changing rooms, sports, prisons and performing intimate procedures on a woman.

Although almost a fifth (19%) of UK respondents said that a self-identifying transwoman who retains their penis is a woman, a significant number of them did NOT then go on to agree that they should be treated as women in all circumstances (ranging from only 9-14%).

Young people (aged 18-25) are significantly more likely to consider a self-identifying transwoman who retains their penis to be a woman and that they should be treated as such, compared to older respondents.

 

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted

An article worth reading: Puberty Blockers, Cross-Sex Hormones, and Youth Suicide

The summary:

Quote

Lowering legal barriers to make it easier for minors to undergo cross-sex medical interventions without parental consent does not reduce suicide rates—in fact, it likely leads to higher rates of suicide among young people in states that adopt these changes. States should instead adopt parental bills of rights that affirm the fact that parents have primary responsibility for their children’s education and health, and that require school officials and health professionals to receive permission from parents before administering health services, including medication and “gender-affirming” counseling, to children under 18. States should also tighten the criteria for receiving cross-sex treatments, including raising the minimum eligibility age.

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted
53 minutes ago, SeekingUnderstanding said:

You’re saying  an obscure post from 10 years ago on an obscure message board is a“readily available public source”?

The terms internet and worldwide web  scarcely give credence to the “obscure” descriptor. 

Posted (edited)
4 minutes ago, SeekingUnderstanding said:

Then how can anything be doxing by that definition? 

By revealing personal information intended to be kept hidden and thereby making an individual a potential target for harassment or other harm. If you put something on the internet, you’ve not hidden it; on the contrary, you’ve in effect revealed it to the world and cannot credibly claim you’ve been “doxxed” if someone references it. 

Edited by Scott Lloyd
Posted

Another noteworthy article

Quote

The Dangerous Denial of Sex

Gender ideology harms women, gays—and especially feminine boys and masculine girls.

 

Gender ideology can take on a comical character, as in a recent American Civil Liberties Union commentary objecting to sales tax on tampons and similar products while pondering: “How can we recognize that barriers to menstrual access are a form of sex discrimination without erasing the lived experiences of trans men and non-binary people who menstruate, as well as women who don’t?”

Yet it’s one thing to claim that a man can “identify” as a woman or vice versa. Increasingly we see a dangerous and antiscientific trend toward the outright denial of biological sex.

“The idea of two sexes is simplistic,” an article in the scientific journal Nature declared in 2015. “Biologists now think there is a wider spectrum than that.” A 2018 Scientific American piece asserted that “biologists now think there is a larger spectrum than just binary female and male.” And an October 2018 New York Times headline promised to explain “Why Sex Is Not Binary.”

The argument is that because some people are intersex—they have developmental conditions resulting in ambiguous sex characteristics—the categories male and female exist on a “spectrum,” and are therefore no more than “social constructs.” If male and female are merely arbitrary groupings, it follows that everyone, regardless of genetics or anatomy should be free to choose to identify as male or female, or to reject sex entirely in favor of a new bespoke “gender identity.”

To characterize this line of reasoning as having no basis in reality would be an egregious understatement. It is false at every conceivable scale of resolution.

In humans, as in most animals or plants, an organism’s biological sex corresponds to one of two distinct types of reproductive anatomy that develop for the production of small or large sex cells—sperm and eggs, respectively—and associated biological functions in sexual reproduction. In humans, reproductive anatomy is unambiguously male or female at birth more than 99.98% of the time. The evolutionary function of these two anatomies is to aid in reproduction via the fusion of sperm and ova. No third type of sex cell exists in humans, and therefore there is no sex “spectrum” or additional sexes beyond male and female. Sex is binary.

There is a difference, however, between the statements that there are only two sexes (true) and that everyone can be neatly categorized as either male or female (false). The existence of only two sexes does not mean sex is never ambiguous. But intersex individuals are extremely rare, and they are neither a third sex nor proof that sex is a “spectrum” or a “social construct.” Not everyone needs to be discretely assignable to one or the other sex in order for biological sex to be functionally binary. To assume otherwise—to confuse secondary sexual traits with biological sex itself—is a category error.

Denying the reality of biological sex and supplanting it with subjective “gender identity” is not merely an eccentric academic theory. It raises serious human-rights concerns for vulnerable groups including women, homosexuals and children.

The entire article is worth a read.

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted
On 7/16/2022 at 7:23 PM, smac97 said:

Here's another story about the state of Free Speech in Norway (hint: It just happens to be taking a beating due to the imposition of trans ideology - what are the odds?) :

As noted below, the law in Norway actually criminalizes both public and private speech...

In all countries, free speech has limits. In the United States for example, freedom of speech doesn't include the right to shout "fire!" in a crowded theater. It doesn't even include the right to incite lawbreaking (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). I recall there being "time and manner" restrictions on protests in Utah. Presumably, free speech doesn't give anti-Mormons the right to continuously yell obscenities into the faces of conference goers on every inch of their journey on public walkways between their cars and the conference center. A grownup analysis of these issues needs to look at free speech rights as a balancing act.

Before being updated to also protect people based on gender identification, Norway's law said:

Quote

[a] person who willfully or through gross negligence publicly utters a discriminatory or hateful expression is punishable by fines or imprisonment of up to three years. The use of symbols also counts as an expression. Aiding and abetting is punishable in the same way.

[“]Discriminatory or hateful expression[”] means to threaten or insult anybody, or to promote hate, persecution, or contempt for anyone because of their

  1. skin color, or national or ethnic origin,
  2. religion or faith,
  3. homosexuality, lifestyle, or sexual orientation, or
  4. disability

(§ 135a Straffeloven)

It's curious that on a discussion board about religion, you don't regularly post about how oppressive it is that in Norway, it illegal to threaten and insult people, promote hate, promote persecution, and promote contempt for people because of their religion. But now that transgender Norwegians have the same protections that religious Norwegians have enjoyed for decades, you are up in arms.

On 7/16/2022 at 7:23 PM, smac97 said:

Analytics, you seem to be insistent that there is no movement anywhere to criminalize or suppress viewpoints about "gender identity."  Am I correct in that assessment?  If that is so, why do you think WDI has adopted the foregoin provision in their official "Declaration on Women’s Sex Based Rights"?  Is it possible that there are efforts going to persuade governments to punish selected viewpoints about "gender identity," such that WDI feels obligated to assert a right of women to "'hold opinions without interference' ... {including} the right to hold and express opinions about 'gender identity' without being subject to ... prosecution or punishment"?  Or do you think they are just tilting at windmills?

What I'm trying to do is keep these issues in perspective and to have an appropriately nuanced view. I think it is misleading to claim that Norway giving transgender people the same protections from hate speech that religious Norwegians have enjoyed for decades is an attempt to "criminalize or suppress viewpoints about "gender identity."

Regarding "Women's Declaration International" (WDI), it isn't an established women's organization that decided it needed to adopt a provision to defend women against an imminent threat of transgender people. Rather, it is a fledging anti-transgender group that has only existed for a couple of years. It changed its name to WDI from Women's Human Rights Campaign (WHRC) 6 months ago. One of the reasons it did so was because the name WHRC was trashed because of their own actions (for example, see the article in Vice magazine, "The Anti-Trans 'Gender-Critical' Movement Is Overflowing with Bullshit: Wild conspiracy theories, distortions and misinformation about trans issues are spreading like wildfire online", that was published a month before the name change).

According to Wikipedia:

Quote

The Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID) has described WHRC (i.e. WDI) as a trojan horse in human rights spaces and argued that WHRC "engages in sensationalism and fear-mongering" to "undermine and water down the progressions of human rights standards that protect the rights of trans and gender non-conforming persons".[4] Scottish Women's Aid described WHRC as a group "seeking to stigmatise and discriminate against trans women".[16] The Trans Safety Network described WHRC as "an extreme anti-trans group".[14] Equity Forward discussed WHRC in the context of the Trump administration's "anti-human rights multilateralism" and described it as anti-trans.[3] The Canadian Anti-Hate Network described WHRC as a "TERF project".[7]

For International Women's Day in 2021, WHRC Norway (now WDI Norway) proposed the slogans "No to heresy in primary schools, girls and women do not have a penis" and "Only women are women," that were accused of being hateful and transphobic by the established feminist organizations.[17] Christine Marie Jentoft, an advisor on gender diversity at the Norwegian Organisation for Sexual and Gender Diversity, described WHRC as a hate group that works to deprive transgender people of autonomy and rights.[18] Gender studies professor Elisabeth L. Engebretsen [no] described the group's Norwegian branch as anti-gender and part of a "complex threat to democracy" that "represent[s] a reactionary populist backlash to basic human rights principles," and that seeks to "demonize the very basics of trans existence."[19] In 2022 Norwegian police opened a criminal investigation of the leader of WDI Norway, Christina Eline Ellingsen, who is accused of violating section 185 on hate speech in the Norwegian Penal Code.[20]

So really, there are two issues here that ought to be disentangled.

First, how reasonable are Norway's laws that make it illegal to promote hate, persecution, or contempt on others because of their skin color, religious faith, sexual orientation, disability, or gender identity?

Second, is Christina Eline Ellingsen guilty of those laws?

The first question deserves a nuanced analysis of the competing issues involved. The second question deserves a detailed examination of the facts of the case--I'd like to see the results of the criminal investigation and hear arguments from both sides before making a decision on that.

Posted
1 hour ago, Analytics said:

In all countries, free speech has limits.

Well, well.

A few pages back you were insisting, in response to my comments about the law in Norway, that "{t}here isn't a law that makes the non-use of preferred pronouns a crime," that this is instead "a lie that is being spread by right-wing media," and that I "somehow fell for it, and {am} now spreading it."

I was, at the time, itemizing instances of laws which criminalize or otherwise punish speech, or else which compel speech, pertaining to trans persons ("a few examples of what seems to be a burgeoning tolerance for (and even advocacy of and demand for) compelled speech").  Required use of of "preferred pronouns" was but one manifestation of this phenomenon:

  • Zoey Tur physically assaulting Ben Shapiro and threatening to send him "home in an ambulance" because of his (Shapiro's) comments.  He (Tur) did this right in front of a bunch of witnesses.  He did this knowing the discussion was ben recorded.  And he subsequently got away with it.
  • A video compilation of various trans persons screaming and threatening people who had failed to use "preferred pronouns" or gendered titles (like "Ma'am").
  • A doctor in the UK who was fired for not using transgender pronouns.
  • A law in Scotland that may make non-use of preferred pronouns a hate crime.
  • A similar law in Canada (along with a story about a father held in contempt of court for refusing to use court-ordered preferred pronouns when referencing his daughter).
  • A similar law in Norway (a man criminally punished for saying on Facebook "Do you really believe that a single human being thinks that you are a woman and not an old (geezer) man" and Christina Ellingsen facing three years in prison for tweeting "Why (does) FRI teach young people that males can be lesbians? Isn't that conversion therapy?" and "Jentoft, who is male and an advisor in FRI, presents himself as a lesbian – that's how bonkers the organization which supposedly works to protect young lesbians' interests is. How does it help young lesbians when males claim to be lesbian, too?").
  • A similar law in New York (assessing massive fines for failing to use preferred pronouns).
  • A similar law in Virginia (a county school district policy compelling teachers to use counterfactual pronouns).
  • And, of course, the law in California (requiring use of preferred pronouns).

Now you seem to be conceding the point with "free speech has limits."

Obviously.  The question, though, is whether those limits are appropriate and healthy.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

In all countries, free speech has limits. In the United States for example, freedom of speech doesn't include the right to shout "fire!" in a crowded theater. It doesn't even include the right to incite lawbreaking (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). I recall there being "time and manner" restrictions on protests in Utah. Presumably, free speech doesn't give anti-Mormons the right to continuously yell obscenities into the faces of conference goers on every inch of their journey on public walkways between their cars and the conference center. A grownup analysis of these issues needs to look at free speech rights as a balancing act.

I agree.  And that "grownup analysis" would not, I think, yield results like a woman in Norway facing years in prison for tweets that have no corollary to speech like shouting 'fire,' or inciting to riot, or "time, place and manner" restrictions.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

Before being updated to also protect people based on gender identification, Norway's law said:

Quote

[a] person who willfully or through gross negligence publicly utters a discriminatory or hateful expression is punishable by fines or imprisonment of up to three years. The use of symbols also counts as an expression. Aiding and abetting is punishable in the same way.

[“]Discriminatory or hateful expression[”] means to threaten or insult anybody, or to promote hate, persecution, or contempt for anyone because of their

  1. skin color, or national or ethnic origin,
  2. religion or faith,
  3. homosexuality, lifestyle, or sexual orientation, or
  4. disability

(§ 135a Straffeloven)

(Bolded emphasis added.)

If we used the foregoing statutory framework to examine your years of rhetoric against the beliefs and doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, I think many of your statements would be fairly characterized as "insult{ing}," and perhaps even "promot{ing} ... persecution, or contempt."

I would such a thing, as I think you ought to be free to disparage and malign my religious beliefs without fear of punishment by the State.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

It's curious that on a discussion board about religion, you don't regularly post about how oppressive it is that in Norway, it illegal to threaten and insult people, promote hate, promote persecution, and promote contempt for people because of their religion. 

Again, it's never come up.  

And again, I oppose such restrictive laws.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

But now that transgender Norwegians have the same protections that religious Norwegians have enjoyed for decades, you are up in arms.

Because this topic has come up, yes, I have responded to it.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

What I'm trying to do is keep these issues in perspective and to have an appropriately nuanced view.

So am I.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

I think it is misleading to claim that Norway giving transgender people the same protections from hate speech that religious Norwegians have enjoyed for decades is an attempt to "criminalize or suppress viewpoints about "gender identity."

That is precisely what it is doing, though.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

Regarding "Women's Declaration International" (WDI), it isn't an established women's organization that decided it needed to adopt a provision to defend women against an imminent threat of transgender people. Rather, it is a fledging anti-transgender group that has only existed for a couple of years. It changed its name to WDI from Women's Human Rights Campaign (WHRC) 6 months ago. One of the reasons it did so was because the name WHRC was trashed because of their own actions (for example, see the article in Vice magazine, "The Anti-Trans 'Gender-Critical' Movement Is Overflowing with Bullshit: Wild conspiracy theories, distortions and misinformation about trans issues are spreading like wildfire online", that was published a month before the name change).

This from the same guy who elsewhere says he "really dislike editorials and don't trust what they say."

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

According to Wikipedia:

Quote

The Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID) has described WHRC (i.e. WDI) as a trojan horse in human rights spaces and argued that WHRC "engages in sensationalism and fear-mongering" to "undermine and water down the progressions of human rights standards that protect the rights of trans and gender non-conforming persons".[4] Scottish Women's Aid described WHRC as a group "seeking to stigmatise and discriminate against trans women".[16] The Trans Safety Network described WHRC as "an extreme anti-trans group".[14] Equity Forward discussed WHRC in the context of the Trump administration's "anti-human rights multilateralism" and described it as anti-trans.[3] The Canadian Anti-Hate Network described WHRC as a "TERF project".[7]

For International Women's Day in 2021, WHRC Norway (now WDI Norway) proposed the slogans "No to heresy in primary schools, girls and women do not have a penis" and "Only women are women," that were accused of being hateful and transphobic by the established feminist organizations.[17] Christine Marie Jentoft, an advisor on gender diversity at the Norwegian Organisation for Sexual and Gender Diversity, described WHRC as a hate group that works to deprive transgender people of autonomy and rights.[18] Gender studies professor Elisabeth L. Engebretsen [no] described the group's Norwegian branch as anti-gender and part of a "complex threat to democracy" that "represent[s] a reactionary populist backlash to basic human rights principles," and that seeks to "demonize the very basics of trans existence."[19] In 2022 Norwegian police opened a criminal investigation of the leader of WDI Norway, Christina Eline Ellingsen, who is accused of violating section 185 on hate speech in the Norwegian Penal Code.[20]

So really, there are two issues here that ought to be disentangled.

First, how reasonable are Norway's laws that make it illegal to promote hate, persecution, or contempt on others because of their skin color, religious faith, sexual orientation, disability, or gender identity?

Fair question.  Good luck answering it, though.  The law is vague to the point of absurdity, such that it can be applied arbitrarily at the whim of particular State actors.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

Second, is Christina Eline Ellingsen guilty of those laws?

Again, good luck in answering this.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

The first question deserves a nuanced analysis of the competing issues involved.

So . . . let's have it.  Do you support or oppose the law?

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted
On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

Point #1: Didn't you just two seconds ago say that you "really dislike editorials and don't trust what they say?"  Why then, are you quoting "sensibilities" from this law journal article?

The journal article was dealing with the subtleties of the law in a scholarly way. That is qualitatively different than a 900-word editorial in a partisan rag.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

Point #2: The author of the piece, Tyler Sherman, wrote it while he was still in law school.  Why are you giving credence to his comments/observations while ignoring/disparaging Volokh's?

Sherman's piece was in a peer reviewed scholarly journal. It is 32 pages long and has 278 footnotes. It reads like a serious attempt to illuminate the law in its context. It's the kind of thing that would be referred to in serious scholarship or serious legal decisions.

In contrast, Volokh's piece says stuff like "So people can basically force us — on pain of massive legal liability — to say what they want us to say, whether or not we want to endorse the political message associated with that term, and whether or not we think it’s a lie." That statement is not only unserious, it is grossly misleading. It is gross hyperbole written for the political purpose of riling up a partisan audience.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

Point #3: The point at issue, the practical application of the statute in New York, is something that anyone can have an opinion about, but the more worthwhile assessments are going to be from people with substantial expertise in the area.  Volokh fits the bill, Sherman does not.  

There is a term for what you are doing here: Ad hominem.

Double-blind peer review is the gold standard because it forces reviewers to make their evaluations on the actual arguments rather than whether the author has "substantial expertise in the area."

Remember. I didn't cherry-pick the Tyler Sherman paper because I liked its conclusions. I read it because you referred me to it. You referred me to it because I informed you that I would seriously read papers that were meant to be taken seriously. I take legal journals seriously. I don't take National Review seriously.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

Point #4: Regarding your statement that the statute ("NYCHRL") applies only to "employers," um, no.  It apparently applied to "employers and covered entities."  It prohibits discrimination by "most employers, housing providers, and public accommodations," and also from "law enforcement."  That covers a lot more people than people in employer-employee relationships.  

But it also covers a lot fewer people than what you had originally implied.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

The official guidance also references discrimination "in employment, housing, public accommodations, discriminatory harassment, and bias-based profiling by law enforcement."  Does this reference to "discriminatory harassment" apply to John Q. Public and/or any business (as to the latter, I think yes)?  Well, the statute is apparently intended to be construed broadly:

The references here to "public accommodations" and "harassment" are, I think, very broad.  It's not just about employers.  Essentially all businesses fall under "public accommodations" laws.  For example, a biological male who wants to use a business's "Women's" bathroom cannot be excluded from it under this law.  

Not necessarily. If a customer wants to quietly use the restroom, finish their business, and leave, then you might be right--the business would be out of line to have an inquisition and do a genital check before allowing her to use the restroom. But if the person was harassing other patrons, then yes, I'm sure the business could legally exclude the patron from the restrooms.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

Point #5: This 2019 article, points to an interesting part of the text of the official "guidance" article:

That sure comes across as "compelled speech."

Of course it is compelled speech. The very title of the Tyler Sherman paper is "All Employers Must Wash Their Speech Before Returning t e Returning to Work: The First Amendment & Compelled Use of Employees’ Preferred Gender Pronouns". It goes into quite a bit of detail about two different branches of "compelled speech jurisprudence," and after pages and pages of dense legal argument, concludes:

Quote

Nonetheless, because pronoun laws do not unreasonably infringe upon a speaker’s—employer’s—ability to denounce the laws, because the government itself has not mandated a specific ideology, and because the laws affect a space outside of private life, the social justice they work is not unconstitutional. To be sure, balancing the rights of speakers and listeners in cases of compelled speech is a complex, careful task. The test and the result alike are far from perfect. And laws which compel speech should not escape close constitutional scrutiny. But, as the analysis above shows, pronoun laws themselves also serve a traditionally constitutional anti-discrimination purpose, and ought be found constitutional if ever they are challenged.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

Point #6: This article also makes some salient observations about this statute:

I'll take your word for it.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

Point #7: I can't help but think that the statute has been quietly repealed.  It is really weird that I cannot find it.  

I have a feeling you are mistaken about it being repealed.

On 7/16/2022 at 10:25 PM, smac97 said:

A federal appellate court in the Fifth Circuit addressed "preferred pronouns" in a 2020 decision (the claimant was an incarcerated prisoner, a biological male, who wanted the courts to use female pronouns when referring to him) :

Personally, I think James L. Dennis's dissenting opinion is the most discerning. He said:

Quote

Ultimately, the majority creates a controversy where there is none by misinterpreting Varner’s motion as requesting “at a minimum, to require the district court and the government to refer to Varner with female instead of male pronouns,” when she in fact simply requests that this court address her using female pronouns while deciding her appeal. The majority then issues an advisory opinion on the way it would answer the hypothetical questions that only it has raised. Such an advisory opinion is inappropriate, unnecessary, and beyond the purview of federal courts.

Posted (edited)
2 hours ago, smac97 said:

Well, well.

A few pages back you were insisting, in response to my comments about the law in Norway, that "{t}here isn't a law that makes the non-use of preferred pronouns a crime," that this is instead "a lie that is being spread by right-wing media," and that I "somehow fell for it, and {am} now spreading it."

I stand by what I said. Norway has a law that says you can't willfully or through gross negligence threaten somebody or promote hate, persecution, or contempt because of their skin color, national or ethnic origin, religion or faith, sexual orientation, disability, or gender identity. 

Norway does not have a law that "makes the non-use of preferred pronouns a crime."

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

I agree.  And that "grownup analysis" would not, I think, yield results like a woman in Norway facing years in prison for tweets that have no corollary to speech like shouting 'fire,' or inciting to riot, or "time, place and manner" restrictions.

The grownup analysis would be based on all of the facts of the case and not merely the ones that have been curated by propogandists.

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

(Bolded emphasis added.)

If we used the foregoing statutory framework to examine your years of rhetoric against the beliefs and doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, I think many of your statements would be fairly characterized as "insult{ing}," and perhaps even "promot{ing} ... persecution, or contempt."

I disagree, but let's say for the sake of argument that the Norwegian courts share your interpretation of the law and the nature of what I've said over the years, and would throw me in jail for three years for what I've said here.

Now let's conjure up a hypothetical Norwegian who is an ideal member of Norwegian society, but in a tone of voice that is otherwise nice and respectful, refers to the missionaries in Oslo as "Mr. Smith" and "Mr. Jones" rather than "Elder Smith" and "Elder Jones."

Would that Norwegian be guilty of a hate crime for merely refusing to use the title "Elder"?

I don't think he would be guilty of a hate crime, and I think that is the type of behavior that is analogous to not using requested pronouns.

The law is about being hateful. It isn't about failing to use titles or pronouns.

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

I would such a thing, as I think you ought to be free to disparage and malign my religious beliefs without fear of punishment by the State.

Again, it's never come up.  

And again, I oppose such restrictive laws.

Because this topic has come up, yes, I have responded to it.

I appreciate your consistency on the point.

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

That is precisely what it is doing, though.

I disagree.

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

This from the same guy who elsewhere says he "really dislike editorials and don't trust what they say."

I was just providing some context on how WDI is perceived in the broader women's rights movement.

2 hours ago, smac97 said:

Fair question.  Good luck answering it, though.  The law is vague to the point of absurdity, such that it can be applied arbitrarily at the whim of particular State actors.

Again, good luck in answering this.

So . . . let's have it.  Do you support or oppose the law?

As I've said several times now, I'm in favor of broad freedom of speech protections. But there are tradeoffs. Given that Norway outranks America in every ranking I can think of (e.g. Quality of Life IndexLegatum Prosperity Index, World Happiness Report, Human Development Index the Heritage Foundation's Freedom Index, the Cato Institute's Human Freedom Index), they might have something to teach us. 

Edited by Analytics
Posted
16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

The journal article was dealing with the subtleties of the law in a scholarly way. That is qualitatively different than a 900-word editorial in a partisan rag.

Sherman's piece was in a peer reviewed scholarly journal.

First, Sherman was a first- or second-year law student when he wrote it.  At the time he had exactly zero practical or substantive experience in the law.  

Second, the other students who "peer reviewed" his piece also had precious little training, and likely little to zero, practica/substantive experience in the law.

Third, the meaning of "peer reviewed" is . . . undefined.  It means anything the school and journal wants it to mean.  That is, "{t}he field of law has retained its distinctiveness regarding peer review to this day, and reviews are often conducted without following standardized rules and principles. ...  There is no question that student-edited law journals contribute to legal science, but usually they do not have the same weight as peer-reviewed journals."

Fourth, law reviews/journals have proliferated over the years, so there are more of them.  In other words, "the number of journals has consistently increased, and more and more papers are published in journals with low level of critical assessment. ... {S}ome authors argue that even if student editors are to some extent competent to evaluate traditional legal or 'doctrinal' scholarship, they are by no means competent to evaluate increasingly interdisciplinary papers."

Fifth, no attorney or judge worth his salt would given any persuasive weight to a student-authored Note/Comment.  None.  Zero.  Zip.  This is because, well, law students are writing as neophytes, such that their viewpoint carries essentially no particular influence in terms of interpreting or applying the law in the real world.  At best, a student-authored piece might be cited insofar as it has compiled data or lists of statutes.  But in terms of citing a law student for his or her substantive analysis of the law?  Nope.  No way.

Sixth, I had a "Comment" published while in law school.  The "peer review" amounted to A) tightening up grammar, spelling, formatting, etc. and B) double-checking to make sure I had accurately quoted my sources.  There was zero "editing" done on it in terms of substance.

Seventh, I have had five published in the Utah Bar Journal:

  • 1. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Assessing the Statute of Limitations in a Nonjudicial Foreclosure Context, 35 Utah B.J. 2 (2022).
  • 2. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Sorting Out Statute of Limitations for Utah Foreclosures, 32 Utah B.J. 5 (2019).
  • 3. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, A Primer on Pleading Fraud Claims in Utah, 30 Utah B.J. 4 (2017).
  • 4. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Analyzing Mechanics’ Liens Claim: A Few Suggestions, 22 Utah B.J. 5 (2009).
  • 5. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Does the Wrongful Lien Statute Apply to Mechanics' and Other Types of Liens?, 21 Utah B.J. 6 (2008).

I have received a fair bit more feedback from the Utah State Bar on these submissions than I did for the Note/Comment I had published while I was in law school.

Eighth, peer review is, I think, vastly overrated.  This is plainly so for law reviews/journals (where the "peers" doing the "reviewing" are inexperienced law students), and even in academia generally.  I'm not particularly inclined to judge an idea based primarily on it having been peer reviewed or not.  Here are a few reasons why:

  1. Peer review: a flawed process at the heart of science and journals
  2. Let's stop pretending peer review works
  3. When reviewing goes wrong: the ugly side of peer review (Illustrating some of the most common ways that things can go wrong during peer review – and what to do if this happens)
  4. Peer Review is Not Scientific (How a process designed to ensure scientific rigor is tainted by randomness, bias, and arbitrary delays.)
  5. Is Peer Review A Big Bad Joke? (You, too, could have a paper in a science journal! An investigation reveals that dozens of sketchy titles were happy to publish a study so egregiously flawed it almost had to be fake.)
  6. Science Is Suffering Because of Peer Review’s Big Problems (How to reform the journal publication process.)
  7. Phony peer review: The more we look, the more we find
  8. This Study Just Revealed Why The Peer-Review Process Is in So Much Trouble (In recent years, scientists have been warning us about a reproducibility crisis in science, which has seen many seminal papers - particularly in psychology - failing to hold up when an independent team tries to reproduce the results.)

There are significant problems with bias, politics, funding concerns, etc. being implicated in scholarly research and publications.

Again, as between Sherman's nephyte interpretation of the New York statute and Volokh's, there is no comparison.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

It is 32 pages long and has 278 footnotes.

Big whoop.  Mine was 28 pages and 154 footnotes.

Length and number of footnotes are not a reasonable measure of competency in the law.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

In contrast, Volokh's piece says stuff like "So people can basically force us — on pain of massive legal liability — to say what they want us to say, whether or not we want to endorse the political message associated with that term, and whether or not we think it’s a lie." That statement is not only unserious, it is grossly misleading. It is gross hyperbole written for the political purpose of riling up a partisan audience.

Volokh's point was both serious and on-the-money accurate.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:
Quote

Point #3: The point at issue, the practical application of the statute in New York, is something that anyone can have an opinion about, but the more worthwhile assessments are going to be from people with substantial expertise in the area.  Volokh fits the bill, Sherman does not.  

There is a term for what you are doing here: Ad hominem.

Not even close.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Double-blind peer review

By other law students.

I've been to lawyer school.  I am familiar with the process and its substantial shortcomings.  See above.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

is the gold standard

I literally chuckled when I read this.

Again, law reviews/journals have proliferated, so there are a ton of them.  And they all need content to publish on a regular basis.  And their target audience, attorneys, work for a living, and so have less time and inclination to expend on writing academic articles for free.  So they are generally starving for content.  

Imagine, then, how rigorous the "gold standard" of peer review - by unpaid law students - is going to be.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

because it forces reviewers to make their evaluations on the actual arguments rather than whether the author has "substantial expertise in the area."

Candidly, you are up in the night.

Don't get me wrong.  I think Sherman's article was good (I am the one that provided the link to it, after all).  But in terms of it meaningfully interpreting the real-world application of the New York statute (particularly as compared to Volokh's assessment), there is no question here.  Not in the same ballpark.  Not even the same sport.

For pete's sake, take a look at his CV (emphases added) :

Quote

Eugene Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, an intensive editing workshop, and a First Amendment amicus brief clinic at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, tort law, and a seminar on firearms regulation policy. Before coming to UCLA, he clerked for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the U.S. Supreme Court and for Judge Alex Kozinski on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Volokh is the author of the textbooks The First Amendment and Related Statutes (7th ed. 2020) and Academic Legal Writing (5th ed. 2016), as well as over 80 law review articles; his work makes him one of the most cited law review article authors. He is a member of The American Law Institute, a member of the American Heritage Dictionary Usage Panel, and the founder and coauthor of The Volokh Conspiracy, a Weblog (independent 2002-2014, hosted at the Washington Post 2014-2017, hosted at Reason from 2017).

Volokh has argued over 30 appellate cases since 2013 in state and federal courts throughout the country, and has filed over 100 appellate briefs; his articles have also been cited over 240 times in judicial opinions.
...

Did you catch that last bit?  "{H}is articles have also been cited over 240 times in judicial opinions."  How many times has Tyler Sherman been quoted in judicial opinions, do you imagine?

Are you sure you want to pit Tyler Sherman against Eugene Volokh in terms of competency in the law?

Look at how many times he has published (often in your vaunted "peer-reviewed" journals/reviews) articles about Free Speech (emphases added) :

Quote

Cyberspace and the Law

First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J. L. Econ. & Pol. 883 (2012) (with Donald M. Falk) (white paper commissioned by Google).

The Future of Books Related to the Law?, 108 Michigan L. Rev. 823 (2010).

Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 Stanford Law Review 1095 (2005) (shorter version, recommended).

Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop Others from Speaking About You, 52 Stanford Law Review 1049 (2000).

Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton Administration, 63 Law and Contemporary Problems 299 (2000).

Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 Supreme Court Review 141.

Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective, 1996 University of Chicago Legal Forum 377.

Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale Law Journal 1805 (1995), reprinted in First Amendment Law Handbook, 1996-97, p. 53 (Swanson ed.).

Scholarship, Blogging, and Trade-Offs: On Discovering, Disseminating, and Doing, 84 Wash. U. Law Review 1089 (2007).

Law Reviews, the Internet, and Preventing and Correcting Errors, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 4, Sept. 6, 2006.

Written Testimony Regarding Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Mar. 1, 2000.

How May Cyberspace Change American Politics?, 34 Loyola (Los Angeles) Law Review 1213 (2001)~.

Cheap Speech and What It Will Do (revised version of Yale Law Journal article), 1 The Communications Review 261 (1996).

A Reply to Brian Winston, Rob Kling, C. Edwin Baker, and Carolyn Marvin, 1 The Communications Review 337 (1996).

Computer Media for the Legal Profession, 94 Michigan Law Review 2058 (1996)~.

Technology and the Future of Law, 47 Stanford Law Review 1375 (1995) (book review of Ethan Katsh's Law in a Digital World)~.

Personalization and Privacy, Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery), August 2000, vol. 43, issue 8, at 84, reprinted in Competitive Enterprise Institute, The Future of Financial Privacy ch. 10 (2000).

Review coordinator, National Academy of Sciences Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Report, Youth, Pornography, and the Internet: Can We Provide Sound Choices in a Safe Environment (2002).

Cyberspace Law for Non-Lawyers, an electronic e-mail seminar with over 17,000 subscribers (with Larry Lessig and David Post).

Fresh Produce in the Marketplace of Ideas, New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 3, 2005.

Underfire: Dismissing Controversial Professor Would Set a Frightening Precedent, Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 5, 2005.

You Can Blog But You Can't Hide, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2004, reprinted in L.A. Daily News, Dec. 3, 2004, p. N17, and Lanahan Readings in Media and Politics 159 (Lewis S. Ringel ed., 2009).

Porn Free, Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2004.

Obscenity Crackdown�What Will the Next Step Be?, Cato TechKnowledge, April 12, 2004.

The Future of Internet Speech, techcentralstation.com, Dec. 5, 2002.

Where Obscenity Meets Speech, techcentralstation.com, June 6, 2002.

Squeamish Librarians, reason.com, June 4, 2001.

Paper Books? They're So 20th Century, Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2000, p. A26.

Facts Debunk Internet Myth, Lima (Ohio) News, Aug. 27, 1997.

Speech and Spill-Over, Slate Magazine, July 18, 1996.

Chilled Prodigy, Reason Magazine, Aug. 1995, p. 49.

Free Speech

Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? -- From the Framing to Today, 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459 (2012).

Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 Texas Review of Law & Politics 295 (2012).

The Trouble with the "Public Discourse" Test as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 Virginia Law Review 567 (2011).

In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas / Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 Virginia Law Review 595 (2011).

Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 Iowa Law Review 249 (2010).

Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 Georgetown Law Journal 1057 (2009).

Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stanford Law Review 1919 (2006).

Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 NYU Law Review 631 (2006).

Deterring Speech: When Is It "McCarthyism"? When Is It Proper?, 93 California Law Review 1413 (2005).

Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 Stanford Law Review 1095 (2005) (shorter PDF version, recommended).

Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell Law Review 1277 (2005), reprinted in First Amendment Law Handbook 314 (Rodney A. Smolla ed. 2005-06).

Pragmatism vs. Ideology in Free Speech Cases, 99 Northwestern U. Law Review 33 (2004).

The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harvard Law Review 1026 (2003) (HTML version) (shorter PDF version, recommended) (10-page version cowritten with Ward Farnsworth as chapter in Farnsworth's The Legal Analyst).

The First Amendment and Related Statutes: Law, Cases, Problems, and Policy Arguments (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2007).

That last one is used in law schools.  Volokh literally wrote the book on Free Speech. 

Quote

Testimony Regarding Freedom of Speech and Ratings Agencies, U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, May 15, 2009.

Written Testimony Regarding Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Mar. 1, 2000.

Seven law review articles, several op-eds, one practitioner article, and one Web site on Free Speech and Workplace Harassment Law, listed below.

Five law review articles, several op-eds, and an online seminar on Free Speech and Cyberspace, listed above.

Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of the First Amendment� "False Statements of Fact" Exception, 6 Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 343 (2010).

Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 300.

Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston Law Review 697 (2003), reprinted in 3 The ICFAI Journal of International Business Law 47 (2004) (Hyderabad, India).

Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Houston Law Review 903 (2003).

Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right, 34 Arizona State Law Journal 1095 (2003) (PDF version).

How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000, 48 UCLA Law Review 1191 (2001).

Freedom of Speech and Speech About Political Candidates: The Unintended Consequences of Three Proposals, 24 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 47 (2000).

Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke Law Journal 147 (1998) (with Mark Lemley).

Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale Law Journal 2431 (1998) (with Brett McDonell).

Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2417 (1996).

Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 University of Chicago Roundtable 223 (1996).

A Penumbra Too Far, 106 Harvard Law Review 1639 (1993) (with Judge Alex Kozinski).

Freedom of Speech and of the Press, in The Heritage Guide to the Constitution 311 (2005).

Intellectual Property Law and the First Amendment, Encyclopedia of the U.S. Constitution 1377 (Leonard Levy & Kenneth Karst eds. 2000).

Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment, I, Encyclopedia of the U.S. Constitution 2925 (Leonard Levy & Kenneth Karst eds. 2000) (debating Catharine A. MacKinnon).

No 'Heckler's Veto', N.Y. Times Room for Debate blog, Sept. 20, 2010.

On Free Association, the Court Makes the Right Call, N.Y. Daily News online, June 29, 2010.

How Corporate Money Will Reshape Politics, N.Y. Times Room for Debate blog , Jan. 21, 2010.

Flag Burning and Free Speech, Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2009.

A Gag Order on Parents?, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 6, 2007, at A17, reprinted in Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Feb. 9, 2007; St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 10, 2007; Newsday, Feb. 12, 2007, at A37; Newark Star-Ledger, Feb. 12, 2007, at 17; Korea Herald, Feb. 2007; The Peninsula (Qatar), Feb. 2007.

Burying Funeral Protests, National Review Online, March 23, 2006.

Forget Free Speech? (debate with Geoffrey Stone), Legal Affairs, March 21-25, 2005.

Porn Free, Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2004.

Sometimes, the Politically Correct Really Are Correct, GlennReynolds.com, Sept. 22, 2004.

Obscenity Crackdown�What Will the Next Step Be?, Cato TechKnowledge, April 12, 2004.

First Myths, National Review Online, Jan. 5, 2003.

Nike and the Free-Speech Knot, Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2003, p. A16.

Club Codes: The Slippery Slope Hits the Local Elks, National Review Online, June 25, 2003.

Does Pfc. Jessica Lynch Own the Movie Rights to Her Life?, Slate Magazine, Apr. 14, 2003.

Burning to Say Something, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 9, 2003, p. A12.

The Right to Oppose, National Review Online, Feb. 7, 2003.

The Future of Internet Speech, techcentralstation.com, Dec. 5, 2002.

Coding Campus, National Review Online, Nov. 21, 2002.

Shift Shows: Conservatives and Liberals Show Their New True Colors in Republican Party v. White, National Review Online, June 28, 2002.

The U.S. Constitution Says We All Have to Live With Being Offended (criticism of the proposed flag burning amendment), Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2001, reprinted in Milwaukee Journal & Sentinel, July 23, 2001, at 7A, Virginian Pilot, July 23, 2001, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, July 25, 2001, at 25A, and Moscow Times, July 25, 2001, at 7.

Regulating Reporters' Revelations, Los Angeles Daily Journal, June 11, 2001, at 6.

Free Speech Is Nothing to Fear, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 3, 2001, p. A24.

When the Justices are Unpredictable, New York Times, Oct. 30, 2000, p. A27.

Taxation Isn't Censorship, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 23, 2000, p. A22.

How Free Is Speech When the Government Pays?, Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1998, p. A18.

Expressive Association

Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stanford Law Review 1919 (2006).

Sexual/Religious/Racial Harassment

Freedom of Speech vs. Workplace Harassment Law, a comprehensive Web site for lawyers, academics, students, writers, and laypeople, containing updated and edited excerpts of various law review articles on free speech and workplace harassment law.

Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell Law Review 1277 (2005).

Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accommodation Law, 33 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 57 (2001).

Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton Administration, 63 Law and Contemporary Problems 299 (2000) (PDF version).

What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 Georgetown Law Journal 627 (1997), excerpted in Women's Freedom Network, Rethinking Sexual Harassment pp. 18-23 (Cathy Young ed. 1988) and Ethical Theory and Business (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds. 2003).

Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment, 17 Berkeley Journal Employment & Labor Law 305 (1996).

Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Northwestern University of Law Review 1009 (1996).

How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 Rutgers Law Journal 561 (1995) (replying to Suzanne Sangree's response to my Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment).

Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA Law Review 1791 (1992), excerpted in Judi Greenberg, Dorothy Roberts & Martha Minow, Women and the Law Casebook pp. 287-95 (2nd ed. 1998), Women and Work pp. 33-45 (Greenberg, Roberts & Frug eds. Supp. 1997), Marcia Canavan, Woman�s Law pp. 397-405 (2000), and Paul E. Weizer, Sexual Harassment: Cases, Case Studies & Commentary 189-211 (2002).

Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment, I, Encyclopedia of the U.S. Constitution 2925 (Leonard Levy & Kenneth Karst eds. 2000) (debating Catherine A. McKinnon).

A Practitioner's Guide to the First Amendment Defense in Hostile Environment Harassment Cases, 12 California Labor & Employment Law Quarterly no. 3, p. 20 (1998) (with Ann Swarzburg Wexler).

A Hostile Environment for Free Speech, printed under various titles in Atlanta Journal-Constitution and Albany Times Union, Apr. 12, 2000, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Apr. 13, 2000, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 15, 2000, Charleston Gazette & Daily Mail, Apr. 16, 2000, Washington Times, May 11, 2000, and eight other newspapers.

Eenie, Meenie, Minie . . . Lawsuit, UCLA Today, Feb. 25, 2003.

Squeamish Librarians, reason.com, June 4, 2001.

Is Criticizing Affirmative Action Illegal in Chicago?, Jewish World Review, Aug. 30, 1999.

Was Wright Wrong? Who Knows?, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 3, 1998, p. A18.

Dialogue � Free Speech vs. Workplace Harassment, Slate Magazine, Sept. 17, 1997.

A National Speech Code from the EEOC, Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1997, p. A23; reprinted as Bureaucrats Trying to Halt Free Speech at Workplace Door, Rocky Mountain News (Denver), Aug. 31, 1997, p. 4B; and as A National Speech Code Courtesy of the EEOC, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 14, 1997, p. 21.

Rights Trampled in Workplace, Montgomery Advertiser, July 4, 1997; adapted into editorial in Daily Oklahoman, Aug. 6, 1997, p. 4.

Harassment Law Flirts With Speech Suppression, Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1995, p. A19.

If Everything Is Harassment, Then Nothing Is, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 12, 1995, p. 19A, also printed in the L.A. Daily News and the Deseret News.

The Dangerous Drift of "Harassment" in From Data to Public Policy: Affirmative Action, Sexual Harassment, Domestic Violence and Social Welfare, p. 43 (Rita Journal Simon ed. 1996).

Law and Medicine

Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 Harvard Law Review 1813 (2007), featured in The 7th Annual Year In Ideas, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2007 (under Right to Medical Self-Defense, The), and reprinted in Right of Private Defense: Expanding Horizons 96 (P. Satyanarayana Prasad ed., The Icfai University Press [Hyderabad, India] 2008).

Information Privacy

Written Testimony Regarding Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Mar. 1, 2000.

Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop Others from Speaking About You, 52 Stanford Law Review 1049 (2000).

Big Brother Is Watching -- Be Grateful!, Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2002, at A22, reprinted with some changes as The Benefits of Surveillance, The Responsive Community, Fall 2002, at 9.

Personalization and Privacy, Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery), August 2000, vol. 43, issue 8, at 84.

Affirmative Action and the California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209)

Legal Advisor, Yes on Proposition 209 campaign.

Written Testimony Regarding the Constitutionality of Federal Transportation Contract Set-Asides, Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, Oct. 1, 1997.

Oral Testimony Regarding A.B. 1700, proposed California law repealing various programs outlawed by Prop. 209, Apr. 21, 1998.

Racial and Ethnic Classifications in American Law, in Beyond the Color Line: New Perpsectives on Race and Ethnicity in America 309 (Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom eds. 2002).

Judging Clarence Thomas, msnbc.com (glennreynolds.com), June 27, 2003.

Racial Politics at the Supreme Court, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 12, 1998, p. A19, reprinted in Los Angeles Daily Journal, Oct. 28, 1998, and Harvard Law Record, Oct. 23, 1998.

Making Hay With Shifty Labels, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 9, 1998, p. B9, excerpted in Washington Times, Apr. 10, 1998, p. A6.

The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA Law Review 1335 (1997).

Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA Law Review 2059 (1996).

Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right, Jewish Journal (Los Angeles), Oct. 25-31, 1996, p. 12; also reprinted in the Jewish Voice (Sacramento), Nov. 1996, p. 9; and the Jewish Bulletin (San Francisco), Oct. 25, 1996, p. 23.

Women Need Not Fear the Civil Rights Initiative, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 1996, p. B9 (with Sally Pipes).

Religious Freedom and Separation of Church and State

The First Amendment and Related Statutes: Law, Cases, Problems, and Policy Arguments (published by Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2007).

The Religion Clauses and Related Statutes: Law, Cases, Problems, and Policy Arguments (published by Foundation Press 2007).

Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 431 (2014).

Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accommodation Law, 33 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 57 (2001) (PDF version).

Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions � A Research Agenda With Test Suites, 21 Cardozo Law Review 595 (1999) (PDF version).

Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 341 (1999).

A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA Law Review 1465 (1999), excerpted in The First Amendment: The Free Exercise of Religion Clause 232 (Thomas C. Berg ed. 2009).

Written Testimony Regarding Proposed Religious Land Use Statute (AB 600), California Assembly Committee on Local Government, Jan. 13, 2004.

Under the Veil: Religious Exemption and Muslims, National Review Online, June 22, 2007.

Oh Say, Can You Swear on a Koran?, National Review Online, Nov. 29, 2006.

This Old Church, Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2003.

Vouched For, The New Republic, July 6, 1998, p. 12; reprinted in the Sacramento Bee, July 5, 1998, p. F03 and in Marshall Journal Breger & David M. Gordis (eds.), Vouchers for School Choice: Challenge or Opportunity?-An American Jewish Reappraisal 121-25 (1998).

Vouchers Mean Equality, not Preference or Discrimination, N.J. Jewish News, Nov. 19, 1998.

Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA Law Review 2059 (1996).

Equal Treatment: How Best to Separate Church and State, printed in the L.A. Daily News and the Fresno Bee, July 20, 1998; the Orange County Register, the Las Vegas Review Journal, the St. Petersburg Times, the Vancouver (Wash.) Columbian, and the Champaign (Ill.) News-Gazette, July 19, 1998; and Intellectual Capital, April/May 1998, p. 8.

Finally, Equality for Religious Schools, Cleveland Plain-Dealer, June 30, 1997, p. 9B.

Founder and list operator of the religionlaw@listserv.ucla.edu discussion list, an Internet electronic conference involving many of the top scholars on the law of government and religion.

Constitutional and Legal History

Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 Georgetown Law Journal 1057 (2009).

Thomas Cooper, Early American Public Intellectual, 4 NYU Journal of Law & Liberty 372 (2009).

Elizabeth Ryland Priestley, Early American Author on Free Speech, 4 NYU Journal of Law & Liberty 382 (2009).

"Necessary to the Security of a Free State," 83 Notre Dame Law Review 1 (2007).

The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 NYU Law Review 793 (1998).

The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 NYU Law Review 831 (1998).

Copyright and Intellectual Property Law

Amicus Brief of Michael Crichton[, Larry David, Jeremiah Healy, Elmore Leonard, Harry Shearer, Ron Shelton, Scott Turow, Paul Weitz, and the Authors Guild, Inc.] in McFarlane v. Twist, 11 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 1 (2004).

Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston Law Review 697 (2003).

Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Houston Law Review 903 (2003).

Written Testimony Regarding the Constitutionality of the GATT Copyright Act of 1994, H.R. 4894 and S. 2368, House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration and Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Aug. 12, 1994. [Available on LEXIS.]

Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke Law Journal 147 (1998) (with Mark Lemley).

Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale Law Journal 2431 (1998) (with Brett McDonell).

Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 So. Cal. Law Review 1161 (2000).

Intellectual Property Law and the First Amendment, Encyclopedia of the U.S. Constitution 1377 (Leonard Levy & Kenneth Karst eds. 2000).

Does Pfc. Jessica Lynch Own the Movie Rights to Her Life?, Slate Magazine, Apr. 14, 2003.

Same-Sex Marriage

Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 Hofstra Law Review 1155 (2006).

Ted Olson's Supreme Court Adventure, N.Y. Times Room for Debate blog, Aug. 18, 2009.

Family Law

Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 NYU Law Review 631 (2006).

Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 Hofstra Law Review 1155 (2006).

A Gag Order on Parents?, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 6, 2007, at A17, reprinted in Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Feb. 9, 2007; St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 10, 2007; Newsday, Feb. 12, 2007, at A37; Newark Star-Ledger, Feb. 12, 2007, at 17; Korea Herald, Feb. 2007; The Peninsula (Qatar), Feb. 2007.

Restrictions on Sexual Behavior

The Lonely Optician, OpinionJournal.com (Federation), Jan. 24, 2007.

Constitutional Law Generally

Many law review articles and op-eds on the freedom of speech, mentioned above.

Two law review articles, some op-eds, and other work on equal protection, mentioned above.

Several law review articles and other work on religious freedom and church-state questions, mentioned above.

Three law review articles and other work on constitutional questions related to gun control, mentioned below.

Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 Hofstra Law Review 1155 (2006).

Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 Virginia Law Review 1957 (2004).

Congress Has Every Right to Judge the Judges, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 2004.

The Fourth Amendment Meets the War on Terror, Slate Magazine, June 17, 2002.

Dialogue�Civil Liberties in Wartime, Slate Magazine, Sept. 17, 2001.

Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 So. Cal. Law Review 1161 (2000).

Can John Walker Be Stripped of His U.S. Citizenship?, Slate Magazine, Dec. 17, 2001.

A More Conservative Supreme Court May Overturn the 1982 Decision That Guarantees Education to Illegal Alien Children, L.A. Daily News, Nov. 20, 1994, viewpoint sec., p. 5 (reprinted in L.A. Daily J.).

Founder and list operator of the conlawprof@listserv.ucla.edu discussion list, an Internet electronic conference for constitutional law scholars.

The Supreme Court

Written Testimony on Judicial Nominations, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, June 26, 2001, reprinted in 50 Drake Law Review 475 (2002).

How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2000, 48 UCLA Law Review 1191 (2001).

What Kagan Will Bring to the Court, N.Y. Times Room for Debate blog, May 10, 2010.

Doubting Thomas, OpinionJournal.com (Federation), Sept. 27, 2007.

Free Speech Libertarian: Judge Alito Has an Expansive View of the First Amendment, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 13, 2005.

Picking the Contenders, msnbc.com, June 1, 2001.

Racial Politics at the Supreme Court, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 12, 1998, p. A19, reprinted in Los Angeles Daily Journal, Oct. 28, 1998, and Harvard Law Record, Oct. 23, 1998.

When the Justices are Unpredictable, New York Times, Oct. 30, 2000, p. A27.

...

Awards / Honors

Honorary Award in the Field of Constitutional Law, Century City Bar Association, 2008.

Selected as one of the Top 100 Lawyers in California, L.A./S.F. Daily Journal, 2005.

Selected as one of the Top 20 Legal Thinkers in America in a highly unscientific poll conducted by Legal Affairs magazine, 2005.

Freedom of Information Award, Society of Professional Journalists, Los Angeles Chapter, 2003.

Paul Bator Award for Excellence in Teaching, Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy, 1999.

Look, I get that you want to bolster Sherman's student note.  But as a practical matter, Sherman is to Volokh what two pair are to a full house in poker.

Training in the law matters.  

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Remember. I didn't cherry-pick the Tyler Sherman paper because I liked its conclusions.

Sure you did.  

That you didn't know enough to pick any of the other cherries, or that you are denigrating the "cherry" that is Volokh's assessment by saying it is inferior to Sherman's, is a reflection of your lack of experience in the law.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

I read it because you referred me to it.  You referred me to it because I informed you that I would seriously read papers that were meant to be taken seriously. I take legal journals seriously. I don't take National Review seriously.

You take seriously people who agree with your worldview.  Hence on the one hand we have your praise of a student-authored-and-peer-reviewed note, and on the other we have you disparaging and ignoring the substance of one of most respected experts in the world on Free Speech law.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:
Quote

Point #4: Regarding your statement that the statute ("NYCHRL") applies only to "employers," um, no.  It apparently applied to "employers and covered entities."  It prohibits discrimination by "most employers, housing providers, and public accommodations," and also from "law enforcement."  That covers a lot more people than people in employer-employee relationships.  

But it also covers a lot fewer people than what you had originally implied.

Hard to say, actually, since the statute appears to have been repealed or memory-holed.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:
Quote

 

Point #5: This 2019 article, points to an interesting part of the text of the official "guidance" article:

That sure comes across as "compelled speech."

 

Of course it is compelled speech.

Thank you for finally conceding the point.

I mean, even Sherman calls these "pronoun laws," contrary to your various assertions that no such laws exist.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

The very title of the Tyler Sherman paper is "All Employers Must Wash Their Speech Before Returning t e Returning to Work: The First Amendment & Compelled Use of Employees’ Preferred Gender Pronouns". It goes into quite a bit of detail about two different branches of "compelled speech jurisprudence," and after pages and pages of dense legal argument, concludes:

Quote

Nonetheless, because pronoun laws do not unreasonably infringe upon a speaker’s—employer’s—ability to denounce the laws, because the government itself has not mandated a specific ideology, and because the laws affect a space outside of private life, the social justice they work is not unconstitutional. To be sure, balancing the rights of speakers and listeners in cases of compelled speech is a complex, careful task. The test and the result alike are far from perfect. And laws which compel speech should not escape close constitutional scrutiny. But, as the analysis above shows, pronoun laws themselves also serve a traditionally constitutional anti-discrimination purpose, and ought be found constitutional if ever they are challenged.

Virtually every word in this conclusion is off-base or flat out wring.

Speech can be "compelled" regardless of whether it infringes on an "ability to denounce the laws."  That is a massive non sequitur.  It doesn't even make sense.

And yes, the State is mandating "a specific ideology."  Person A's "ideology" in terms of preferred pronounces is, under the statute, imposed on Person B.  Person B's failure or refusal to use the words that Person A wants can result in, as Volokh put it, "massive legal liability."  See here:

Quote

We have to use "ze," a made-up word that carries an obvious political connotation (endorsement of the "non-binary" view of gender).

I think Volokh is quite right here.  Mandatory pronouns amounts to state-compelled "endorsement of the 'non-binary' view of gender."

Quote

We have to call people "him" and "her" even if we believe that people's genders are determined by their biological sex and not by their self-perceptions - perceptions that, by the way, can rapidly change, for those who are "gender-fluid" - and that using terms tied to self-perception is basically a lie.

Again, being forced to speak words that you believe to be a lie is compelled speech.

I am glad you and I finally agree on that point.

Quote

(I myself am not sure whether people who are anatomically male, for example, but perceive themselves as female should be viewed as men or women; perhaps one day I'll be persuaded that they should be viewed as women; my objection is to being forced to express that view.)

Again, I think Volokh is quite right here.  The law "forces" him to use specific words.  Sherman, to his credit, notes that "whether the government itself has compelled a specific message or whether speakers have a reasonable opportunity to disassociate from the compelled message, signifying they disagree with it" is an important factor in evaluating the statute in a "compelled speech" context.  But his subsequent analysis is, well, pretty much what one would expect from a law student with no practical experience in the law.

He analogizes "preferred pronouns" to A) mandatory labeling of alcohol and tobacco products, B) mandatory workplace notifications, C) subpoenaed testimony in court, D) and filing taxes.  None of these pertain to an ideology.  None of these compel a private party to speak things he believes are false.

He also speaks about, but does not competently address, the right not to speak.  He notes that "the U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated laws compelling individuals to express a message other than the individual’s own," but he fails to apply this to the New York statute.  He asserts that "{a}t the time of this writing, no case has explicitly litigated the mandated use of preferred gender pronouns," and on that basis apparently just speculates.  But he's got ideological blinders on.  

The best evidence that Volokh is more correct than Sherman in their respective assessments is, I think, the Meriweather v. Harp decision from the Sixth Circuit in March 2021.  Both Volokh and Sherman wrote well before this decision was handed down.  So how did the Sixth Circuit decide?  Are mandated pronouns incompatible with the Constitution (Volokh's view), or was Sherman correct when he declared that "pronoun laws do not violate the First Amendment"?  The decision applied a two-part analysis: "First, was Meriwether speaking on 'a matter of public concern'?" and "{S}econd, was his interest in doing so greater than the university's interest in 'promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through' him?"

Read the text of the decision.  (Hint: Sherman's assertion  doesn't quite pan out.)  Of course, the Sixth Circuit will not have the final word.  The district court in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp. (January 2020, in Indiana) applied the same 2-part test used in Meriweather and found that mandated pronouns are not a matter of public concern.

I don't really blame Sherman for overlooking this two-part test.  He was, after all, just a law student.  But the test was nevertheless firmly in place well before he wrote his piece.  Volokh, I believe, was well aware of it.  

Also, Volokh has conveniently analyzed Meriweather in the context of the New York statute we have been discussing:

Quote

So there are several important conclusions and implications here, it seems to me:

  1. The case provides further support for the view that the First Amendment potentially protects public university professors' teaching decisions (at least in some situations).
  2. Under the court's reasoning, the First Amendment would even more clearly protect against liability imposed by the government as sovereign (e.g., through the civil liability system or through administrative fines)—for instance, in the New York City rules I discussed here—rather than just as employer.
  3. Much of the language in the opinion will also be used to support other kinds of academic freedom claims, for instance based on faculty research, faculty outside writing (from Tweets to blog posts to op-eds), and university student speech.
  4. But whether a university may forbid faculty members from referring to students using the pronoun that the student rejects remains an open question. This case only deals with faculty members declining to use the pronoun the student prefers, and using the student's name instead.

In other words, in the Sixth Circuit Sherman's approach is . . . super duper wrong.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:
Quote

Point #6: This article also makes some salient observations about this statute:

I'll take your word for it.

I would prefer that you read and respond to it.  But "cherry picking" resources that you agree with (like the Sherman piece) seems to be your preferred way to go.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:
Quote

Point #7: I can't help but think that the statute has been quietly repealed.  It is really weird that I cannot find it.  

I have a feeling you are mistaken about it being repealed.

I'm not saying it has.  It's a guess.  It's weird that the statute is not available online.

16 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Personally, I think James L. Dennis's dissenting opinion is the most discerning. He said:

An advisory opinion about another (purported) advisory opinion is "the most discerning?"

Moreover, I think Judge Dennis is simply wrong.  Let's look at what an "advisory opinion" is:

Quote

An advisory opinion is a court's nonbinding interpretation of law.  It states the opinion of a court upon a legal question submitted by a legislature, government official, or another court. Parties seeking advisory opinions tend to do so to better understand their odds of winning a potential lawsuit before risking the expensive process of litigation

Federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions because of the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement.

None of this applies to Varner.  Nobody submitted "a legal question."  Instead, Mr. Varner had filed a motion asking the Court to use female pronouns.  The Court denied that motion and explained the basis for its denial.  Judge Dennis, who I think disagreed with the decision, opted to characterize that explanation as an "advisory opinion" because he could then cite case law about such opinions.  

The majority opinion explained itself:

Quote

First, no authority supports the proposition that we may require litigants, judges, court personnel, or anyone else to refer to gender-dysphoric litigants with  pronouns matching their subjective gender identity. ...  Varner’s motion in this case is particularly unfounded. While conceding that "biological[ly]" he is male, Varner argues female pronouns are nonetheless required to prevent "discriminat[ion]" based on his female "gender identity." But Varner identifies no federal statute or rule requiring courts or other parties to judicial proceedings to use pronouns according to a litigant’s gender identity.  
...
Second, if a court were to compel the use of particular pronouns at the invitation of litigants, it could raise delicate questions about judicial impartiality.
...
Third, ordering use of a litigant’s preferred pronouns may well turn out to be more complex than at first it might appear. It oversimplifies matters to say that gender dysphoric people merely prefer pronouns opposite from their birth sex—"her" instead of "his," or "his" instead of "her." In reality, a dysphoric person’s "[e]xperienced gender may include alternative gender identities beyond binary stereotypes."

Varner filed a motion about pronouns.  The Sixth Circuit denied the motion and explained why it denied it.  This is not an advisory opinion.

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted (edited)
2 hours ago, Analytics said:
Quote

Do you support or oppose the law {in Norway}?

As I've said several times now, I'm in favor of broad freedom of speech protections. But there are tradeoffs. Given that Norway outranks America in every ranking I can think of (e.g. Quality of Life IndexLegatum Prosperity Index, World Happiness Report, Human Development Index the Heritage Foundation's Freedom Index, the Cato Institute's Human Freedom Index), they might have something to teach us. 

"I'm in favor of broad freedom of speech protections. But there are tradeoffs."  This is pretty nonresponsive.  

It's almost as if you are . . . equivocating.

Thanks,

-Smac

Edited by smac97
Posted
38 minutes ago, smac97 said:

First, Sherman was a first- or second-year law student when he wrote it.  At the time he had exactly zero practical or substantive experience in the law.  

Second, the other students who "peer reviewed" his piece also had precious little training, and likely little to zero, practica/substantive experience in the law.

Third, the meaning of "peer reviewed" is . . . undefined.  It means anything the school and journal wants it to mean.  That is, "{t}he field of law has retained its distinctiveness regarding peer review to this day, and reviews are often conducted without following standardized rules and principles. ...  There is no question that student-edited law journals contribute to legal science, but usually they do not have the same weight as peer-reviewed journals."

Fourth, law reviews/journals have proliferated over the years, so there are more of them.  In other words, "the number of journals has consistently increased, and more and more papers are published in journals with low level of critical assessment. ... {S}ome authors argue that even if student editors are to some extent competent to evaluate traditional legal or 'doctrinal' scholarship, they are by no means competent to evaluate increasingly interdisciplinary papers."

Fifth, no attorney or judge worth his salt would given any persuasive weight to a student-authored Note/Comment.  None.  Zero.  Zip.  This is because, well, law students are writing as neophytes, such that their viewpoint carries essentially no particular influence in terms of interpreting or applying the law in the real world.  At best, a student-authored piece might be cited insofar as it has compiled data or lists of statutes.  But in terms of citing a law student for his or her substantive analysis of the law?  Nope.  No way.

Sixth, I had a "Comment" published while in law school.  The "peer review" amounted to A) tightening up grammar, spelling, formatting, etc. and B) double-checking to make sure I had accurately quoted my sources.  There was zero "editing" done on it in terms of substance.

Seventh, I have had five published in the Utah Bar Journal:

  • 1. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Assessing the Statute of Limitations in a Nonjudicial Foreclosure Context, 35 Utah B.J. 2 (2022).
  • 2. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Sorting Out Statute of Limitations for Utah Foreclosures, 32 Utah B.J. 5 (2019).
  • 3. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, A Primer on Pleading Fraud Claims in Utah, 30 Utah B.J. 4 (2017).
  • 4. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Analyzing Mechanics’ Liens Claim: A Few Suggestions, 22 Utah B.J. 5 (2009).
  • 5. Bar Journal Article: R. Spencer Macdonald, Does the Wrongful Lien Statute Apply to Mechanics' and Other Types of Liens?, 21 Utah B.J. 6 (2008).

I have received a fair bit more feedback from the Utah State Bar on these submissions than I did for the Note/Comment I had published while I was in law school.

Eighth, peer review is, I think, vastly overrated.  This is plainly so for law reviews/journals (where the "peers" doing the "reviewing" are inexperienced law students), and even in academia generally.  I'm not particularly inclined to judge an idea based primarily on it having been peer reviewed or not.  Here are a few reasons why:

  1. Peer review: a flawed process at the heart of science and journals
  2. Let's stop pretending peer review works
  3. When reviewing goes wrong: the ugly side of peer review (Illustrating some of the most common ways that things can go wrong during peer review – and what to do if this happens)
  4. Peer Review is Not Scientific (How a process designed to ensure scientific rigor is tainted by randomness, bias, and arbitrary delays.)
  5. Is Peer Review A Big Bad Joke? (You, too, could have a paper in a science journal! An investigation reveals that dozens of sketchy titles were happy to publish a study so egregiously flawed it almost had to be fake.)
  6. Science Is Suffering Because of Peer Review’s Big Problems (How to reform the journal publication process.)
  7. Phony peer review: The more we look, the more we find
  8. This Study Just Revealed Why The Peer-Review Process Is in So Much Trouble (In recent years, scientists have been warning us about a reproducibility crisis in science, which has seen many seminal papers - particularly in psychology - failing to hold up when an independent team tries to reproduce the results.)

There are significant problems with bias, politics, funding concerns, etc. being implicated in scholarly research and publications.

Again, as between Sherman's nephyte interpretation of the New York statute and Volokh's, there is no comparison.

Big whoop.  Mine was 28 pages and 154 footnotes.

Length and number of footnotes are not a reasonable measure of competency in the law.

Volokh's point was both serious and on-the-money accurate.

Not even close.

By other law students.

I've been to lawyer school.  I am familiar with the process and its substantial shortcomings.  See above.

I literally chuckled when I read this.

Again, law reviews/journals have proliferated, so there are a ton of them.  And they all need content to publish on a regular basis.  And their target audience, attorneys, work for a living, and so have less time and inclination to expend on writing academic articles for free.  So they are generally starving for content.  

Imagine, then, how rigorous the "gold standard" of peer review - by unpaid law students - is going to be.

Candidly, you are up in the night.

Don't get me wrong.  I think Sherman's article was good (I am the one that provided the link to it, after all).  But in terms of it meaningfully interpreting the real-world application of the New York statute (particularly as compared to Volokh's assessment), there is no question here.  Not in the same ballpark.  Not even the same sport.

For pete's sake, take a look at his CV (emphases added) :

Did you catch that last bit?  "{H}is articles have also been cited over 240 times in judicial opinions."  How many times has Tyler Sherman been quoted in judicial opinions, do you imagine?

Are you sure you want to pit Tyler Sherman against Eugene Volokh in terms of competency in the law?

Look at how many times he has published (often in your vaunted "peer-reviewed" journals/reviews) articles about Free Speech (emphases added) :

That last one is used in law schools.  Volokh literally wrote the book on Free Speech. 

Look, I get that you want to bolster Sherman's student note.  But as a practical matter, Sherman is to Volokh what two pair are to a full house in poker.

Training  in the law matters.  

You missed the point by a mile.

images.png.95fd410c2679a1cc76a4ac232488c693.png

Here is what I said that led to this: Show me where it "imposes massive fines against people who refuse to use "preferred pronounds" and/or who "misgender" someone." Don't quote some editorial from some right-wing culture warrior. Cite me the actual law, or a paper published in a serious legal journal. 

I never said or implied that Sherman was a more qualified attorney or whatever. I asked for either a citation of the actual law that says what you claimed it says, or a paper published in a serious legal journal.

You provided me with a paper written by Sherman that was published in a serious legal journal. You didn't provide me with a paper written by Volokh that was published in a serious legal journal. That's all. I'm sure Volokh is a brilliant legal mind who understands the nuances of these issues. But that doesn't change the fact that your Volokh reference was a short editorial intended to inflame rather than illuminate. 

38 minutes ago, smac97 said:

Thank you for finally conceding the point.

Your original representation of the scope and context of the New York City Human Rights Law bears almost no resemblance to what the law actually says, as interpreted by the city's Council on Human Rights. I'm certainly not conceding that your original representation of it was accurate.

38 minutes ago, smac97 said:

The best evidence that Volokh is more correct than Sherman in their respective assessments is, I think, the Meriweather v. Harp decision from the Sixth Circuit in March 2021.  Both Volokh and Sherman wrote well before this decision was handed down.  So how did the Sixth Circuit decide?  Are mandated pronouns incompatible with the Constitution (Volokh's view), or was Sherman correct when he declared that "pronoun laws do not violate the First Amendment"?  The decision applied a two-part analysis: "First, was Meriwether speaking on 'a matter of public concern'?" and "{S}econd, was his interest in doing so greater than the university's interest in 'promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through' him?"

Read the text of the decision.  (Hint: Sherman's assertion  doesn't quite pan out.)  Of course, the Sixth Circuit will not have the final word.  The district court in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp. (January 2020, in Indiana) applied the same 2-part test used in Meriweather and found that mandated pronouns are not a matter of public concern.

Meriweather v. Harp has almost nothing to do with the New York City Human Rights Law.

38 minutes ago, smac97 said:

Moreover, I think Judge Dennis is simply wrong. 

Let's look at what an "advisory opinion" is:

None of this applies to Varner.  Nobody submitted "a legal question."  Instead, Mr. Varner had filed a motion asking the Court to use female pronouns.  The Court denied that motion and explained the basis for its denial.  Judge Dennis, who I think disagreed with the decision, opted to characterize that explanation as an "advisory opinion" because he could then cite case law about such opinions.  

The majority opinion explained itself:

Varner filed a motion about pronouns.  The Sixth Circuit denied the motion and explained why it denied it.  This is not an advisory opinion.

I don't think you understand Dennis's point. 

Posted
1 hour ago, smac97 said:

"I'm in favor of broad freedom of speech protections. But there are tradeoffs."  This is pretty nonresponsive.  

It's almost as if you are . . . equivocating.

Thanks,

-Smac

Either that or I have a nuanced view of things and don't like passing judgement on things I don't fully understand.

Posted
1 hour ago, Analytics said:

Your original representation of the scope and context of the New York City Human Rights Law bears almost no resemblance to what the law actually says, as interpreted by the city's Council on Human Rights. I'm certainly not conceding that your original representation of it was accurate.

My "point" was about how various jurisdictions are passing laws compelling "preferred pronouns"-style speech.  Some such laws limit themselves to government employees, some do not.  Some criminalize non-use of preferred pronouns, some do not.  Some impose massive fines, some do not.

Variations on a theme.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

Meriweather v. Harp has almost nothing to do with the New York City Human Rights Law.

It is a legal dispute regarding governmental compulsion of "preferred pronouns"-type speech.

It is highly relevant to the New York statute, particularly since it appears to be the first (and so far only) federal appellate decision addressing this issue.

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

I don't think you understand Dennis's point. 

Right back atcha.

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted
1 hour ago, Analytics said:
Quote

 

Quote

 

Quote

So . . . let's have it.  Do you support or oppose the law?

"I'm in favor of broad freedom of speech protections. But there are tradeoffs."  This is pretty nonresponsive.  

 

It's almost as if you are . . . equivocating.

 

Either that or I have a nuanced view of things and don't like passing judgement on things I don't fully understand.

I have a nuanced view of these things as well, and yet I can still answer the question of whether I support laws which criminalize or otherwise punish people who do not want to speak the words the State wants them to speak.

From the Meriweather decision:

Quote

Traditionally, American universities have been beacons of intellectual diversity and academic freedom. They have prided themselves on being forums where controversial ideas are discussed and debated. And they have tried not to stifle debate by picking sides. But Shawnee State chose a different route: It punished a professor for his speech on a hotly contested issue. And it did so despite the constitutional protections afforded by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the professor's free-speech and free-exercise claims. We see things differently and reverse.

Wow.  Wow.  This is the jurisprudential equivalent of whipping the university like a rented mule.

Meriweather pertains to actions by the State.  Similar (though not identical) principles of First Amendment law would apply to the New York statute.  If anything, the New York statute is a greater violation of Free Speech, as it seeks to do far more than compel government actors to speak.

Quote

Under controlling Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, the First Amendment protects the academic speech of university professors. Since Meriwether has plausibly alleged that Shawnee State violated his First Amendment rights by compelling his speech or silence and casting a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom, his free-speech claim may proceed.

The "speech" here is preferred pronouns.

The "compelled speech" here pertains to employed-by-state-sponsored-institutions teachers, who have less "Free Speech" rights in class than John Q. Public, and yet the Sixth Circuit still found that Meriweather had a case.

Quote

Start with the basics. The First Amendment protects "the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Thus, the government "may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees." Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. , 515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). When the government tries to do so anyway, it violates this "cardinal constitutional command." Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018).

"And the right to refrain from speaking at all."  You are not addressing this.

"Thus, the government 'may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees.'"  You are not addressing this.

"When the government tries to do so anyway, it violates this 'cardinal constitutional command.'"  You are not addressing this.

Your "nuanced view of things" is predicated on cherry-picking.  You simply ignore decisional authorities that deviate from your presuppositions.

So feel free to advance the theories of a law student with no experience in the law.  I'll stick with Volokh's assessment, Meriweather, and I think such additional cases that will be coming down the pipeline.

Meanwhile, I will again state that I am opposed to the State punishing people for resisting compelled speech, including mandated "pronouns."

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted (edited)
22 hours ago, Analytics said:

... Presumably, free speech doesn't give anti-Mormons the right to continuously yell obscenities into the faces of conference goers on every inch of their journey on public walkways between their cars and the conference center. ...

I'm not sure how many obscenities, if any, were involved*, but perhaps the Conference "Street Screechers" who were lined up on one side of nearly the entirety of the route I traversed between the parking garage and the Conference Center when I sang in a regional choir during a Conference session in 2014 could have used a reminder that, yes, indeed, Free Speech does have its limits, even in the Good Old U S of A.

*In any case, I was struck by the stark contrast between a sizeable crowd of people on one side of me yelling that I was Hellbound :diablo: , while, on the other side of me, there was a group of Sister Missionaries, Youth, and Other Fellow Saints singing Hymns and other Songs of the Restoration.  (Actually, it makes me tear up, now, thinking about it: God Bless those Sister Missionaries, Youth, and Fellow Saints!) 

Edited by Kenngo1969
Posted (edited)
15 hours ago, smac97 said:

My "point" was about how various jurisdictions are passing laws compelling "preferred pronouns"-style speech.  Some such laws limit themselves to government employees, some do not.  Some criminalize non-use of preferred pronouns, some do not.  Some impose massive fines, some do not.

My point is that such laws, as you just described them, do not exist. Norway has a law that says you can't promote hate and persecution against people because of their race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity. New York City and Canada have laws that say in employment and public accommodations you can't discriminate against people based on their race, religion, etc. The laws themselves say nothing about compelling "preferred-pronouns-style speech." 

I reject your assertion that these laws that protect people from hate, discrimination, and harassment because of their race, religion, etc. somehow compel speech in an unconstitutional way.

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

[Meriwether] is a legal dispute regarding governmental compulsion of "preferred pronouns"-type speech.

It is highly relevant to the New York statute, particularly since it appears to be the first (and so far only) federal appellate decision addressing this issue.

Meriwether is about the specific actions taken by the administration of Shawnee State University, in the context of a university where "the Constitution protects 'academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.'" It says precisely nothing about whether the Constitution guarantees the right to discriminate in employment and public accommodations on the basis of race, religion, etc.

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

Right back atcha.

Let's summarize what James L. Dennis's point actually was. 

Varner, the appellant, respectfully submitted a motion requesting that that court in that proceeding use female pronouns when referring to the appellant. All the court was asked to do was use its own discretion and decide whether to humor the appellant in this way. Nobody argued they and the entire government were somehow legally obligated to use whatever pronouns somebody requests.

Dennis concludes this is the scope of the request because it is both the narrowest interpretation of the motion and is the most faithful interpretation of the actual words that were used. 

Rather than simply deciding one way or another how it would refer this particular appellant in this particular case, the court asked itself a broad question that wasn't before it: is the entire government, including the courts, required to use any and all pronouns that anybody requests? Even pronouns such as xyrs, perself, and xem? The problem is nobody argued the government should be required to use any neologism anybody dreams up. Nobody even argued that the government should be required to use preferred pronouns ever. Because they were addressing a question that was not before it, their ruling was, in effect, an advisory opinion. 

Note that Dennis didn't merely dissent. He "emphatically" dissented.

Your claim is that Dennis simply disagreed with the majority and started throwing around arbitrary legal terms so he could fill up space with citations to irrelevant case law. This interpretation ignores what he actually said.

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

I have a nuanced view of these things as well, and yet I can still answer the question of whether I support laws which criminalize or otherwise punish people who do not want to speak the words the State wants them to speak.

The laws in question are nuanced and are about protecting people from discrimination based on race, religion, etc. Yet you insist on looking at the issue in sharp black-and-white terms and insist the laws are really about criminalizing people who "do not want to speak the words the State wants them to speak." 

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

The "compelled speech" here pertains to employed-by-state-sponsored-institutions teachers, who have less "Free Speech" rights in class than John Q. Public, and yet the Sixth Circuit still found that Meriweather had a case.

Again, Meriwether says precisely nothing about whether the Constitution guarantees the right to discriminate in employment and public accommodations on the basis of race, religion, etc.

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

"And the right to refrain from speaking at all."  You are not addressing this.

Correct. That is off topic.

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

"Thus, the government 'may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees.'"  You are not addressing this.

Correct. That is off topic.

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

"When the government tries to do so anyway, it violates this 'cardinal constitutional command.'"  You are not addressing this.

And I'm not addressing your right to keep and bear arms as part of a well-regulated militia, either.

15 hours ago, smac97 said:

Your "nuanced view of things" is predicated on cherry-picking.  You simply ignore decisional authorities that deviate from your presuppositions.

You are a terrible mind reader.

Here is the big difference between you and me. I presume that when, for example, New York extends the exact same legal protection against discrimination to people based on gender identity that it already grants to others based on race, religion, etc., it is doing so in order to actually protect people from discrimination, and that it will interpret and administer the law in a competent, good-faith way that is reasonable and well within the bounds of the Constitution. In contrast, you perceive such things as a coordinated attack at the top of a steep, slippery slope that has been maliciously crafted to take away all of your rights of free speech. 

In the Meriwether case, Professor Meriwether made multiple good-faith efforts to find a way to grant his students the right to an education free from discrimination while also accommodating his own freedom of speech, freedom of academic inquiry, and freedom of religion. The University's administration was unwilling to compromise at any point, and that's what got them into trouble. The Sixth Circuit made the right call in this case. But so what? The University refusing to make any accommodations whatsoever for this professor doesn't imply that New York City's endeavor to make it illegal to discriminate in employment and public accommodations on the basis of race, religion, etc., is somehow unconstitutional.

The Sixth Circuit didn't say that the antidiscrimination provisions of Title IX are unconstitutional. It said the behavior of the Shawnee State administrators was. That's a huge difference that you don't seem willing to acknowledge.

 

Edited by Analytics
Posted
3 hours ago, Analytics said:

I presume that when, for example, New York extends the exact same legal protection against discrimination to people based on gender identity that it already grants to others based on race, religion, etc., it is doing so in order to actually protect people from discrimination, and that it will interpret and administer the law in a competent, good-faith way that is reasonable and well within the bounds of the Constitution. In contrast, you perceive such things as a coordinated attack at the top of a steep, slippery slope that has been maliciously crafted to take away all of your rights of free speech. 

Of course, this hands the power of governing speech to whoever gets to decide the limits of "discrimination," which are not particularly clear and appear to be based on the current temperature of public outrage. 

You have the luxury of assuming "good-faith interpretation" because there is no way it could be weaponized against you. That sort of confidence is a privilege, not an obligation. 

Posted
On 6/28/2022 at 9:27 PM, smac97 said:

Oh, boy. 

If a word doesn't mean what you want it to mean, just have some functionary arbitrarily add a radical new definition to it.  Convenient, that.  Also creepily Orwellian.

This is you disputing my comments about your side of the debate resorting to Orwellian tactics, is it?

First off, we've been principally discussing the word "woman."  And yet slipped on past citing the Merriam-Webster definition of "woman" in favor of "female" because, I suspect, it has not (yet) been re-defined to kowtow to the radical idealogues with Orwellian tendencies.

Merriam-Webster defines "woman" as:

No reference to "gender identity" there.  Not yet, anyway.  I guess it takes time for you Orwellian types to persuade dictionaries to insert inanities into basic definitions.

"Woman" can trace its origins back to the 8th century or so.  But here you are, relying on one dictionary that arbitrarily and radically re-defined its inherent meaning in . . . 2020.

Boy, nothing bespeaks authenticity like a radical re-definition of a basic word that is, comparatively speaking, about five minutes old.  See here (from September 2020) :

Another article about Merriam-Webster's re-definition of the word "female":

Quote

Here's the entry:

article-62d6bedd5e8dc.jpg

Fortunately, the definition of "woman" remains unchanged (for the moment):

article-62d6bf23a3edf.jpg

But if a woman is "an adult human female" and female can be defined as "having a gender identity that is the opposite of male," then technically the linguistic foundation has been purposely shifted to fit a religious stance.

Not sure what they mean by "religious stance," but the incoherence of Merriam-Webster's re-definition is nevertheless manifest.

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted

Another example of Orwellianism creeping into the public discourse:

Quote

A growing number of abortion rights advocates have shifted from calling the procedure a “women’s rights” issue to favor more gender-neutral terminology...

The abortion rights movement’s lexicon has changed to incorporate terms such as “pregnant people” and “people with a capacity for pregnancy.”

The high-profile exchange between Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) and University of California, Berkeley law professor Khiara Bridges in a Tuesday hearing about abortion access underscored the move away from using the term "women" among abortion rights supporters.

Hawley asked Bridges about her use of the term “people with a capacity for pregnancy," asking to clarify, “Would that be women?” Bridges called his question transphobic, saying that it excluded transgender men and nonbinary people.

She said the Supreme Court’s decision last month to overturn Roe v. Wade affects cisgender women, as well as other groups.

...

“Now they dehumanize women by denying the existence of females (and ‘women’ as a term that applies only to females), referring instead to women by bodily functions or capacity — ‘pregnant-capable’ or ‘birthing’ — or as possessors of anatomical parts— ’vagina-havers,’” said Mary Rice Hasson, a fellow at the conservative Ethics and Public Policy Center. “That kind of language is dehumanizing, but completely in character for pro-abortion/pro-choice activists.”

In a separate hearing before the Senate Health Committee last Wednesday, Dr. Jamila Taylor, the director of health care reform and a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, a progressive policy think tank, used the term “birthing people” in her opening statement before lawmakers.

In another high-profile instance, Rep. Cori Bush (D-MO) used the term “birthing people” in her personal testimony before the House Oversight Committee last year. Soon after, in the Biden administration’s 2022 budget proposal, the words “mothers” and “women” were stricken and replaced with “birthing people.”

Abortion rights groups have also elbowed out terms that include "women," choosing gender-inclusive language instead. In 2020, for instance, official NARAL guidance advised abortion activists to refer to abortion as a "woman's choice." Two years later, that guidance had changed to advise people to use more "gender-neutral language" instead.

Reproductive rights and transgender issues are two of the most hot-button political topics, and the change in language surrounding pregnancy has caused the two to intersect. 

Boy, this whole let's-placate-trans-ideology-by-radically-redefining-the-basic-meaning-of-words-like-"woman"-and-"female" thing doesn't seem to be going very well.

I'm glad of that.  It's a profoundly deceptive effort that needs to be strongly resisted and rejected.

Thanks,

-Smac

Posted (edited)
1 hour ago, OGHoosier said:

Of course, this hands the power of governing speech to whoever gets to decide the limits of "discrimination," which are not particularly clear and appear to be based on the current temperature of public outrage. 

There is a name for people who get to decide the limits of discrimination: Justices of the Supreme Court.

Which raises the question: even if the lawmakers in New York City wanted to infest the city with jack-booted thugs to monitor everyone's use of pronouns and slap a $25,000 fine on anybody with the audacity to say anything other than the Government's Approved Message, why would they bother, knowing how they would inevitably be humiliated in a conservative federal court?

 

Edited by Analytics
Posted
1 hour ago, smac97 said:

Another example of Orwellianism creeping into the public discourse:

Boy, this whole let's-placate-trans-ideology-by-radically-redefining-the-basic-meaning-of-words-like-"woman"-and-"female" thing doesn't seem to be going very well.

I'm glad of that.  It's a profoundly deceptive effort that needs to be strongly resisted and rejected.

Thanks,

-Smac

My goodness. According to "the conservative Ethics and Public Policy Center", it is "dehumanizing" to to refer to them as "pregnant people" and as "people who can become pregnant."

According to Conservatives new radical ideology, "people" aren't "human" and it is dehumanizing to accuse a woman of being a person.

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