8 Year Olds, Free Will, and Baptism

[mfbukowski]

5 hours ago, OGHoosier said:

I'll get that book and get back to you.

Actually, I did mean to ask you for more recommendations. I've finished reading and digesting "What It's Like To Be A Bat", what's the next great text?

Well you have some digesting to do.

Look at the Frank Jackson stuff I mentioned in posts above, and then this:

https://www.philosophersmag.com/interviews/22-frank-jackson-latter-day-physicalist

This shows how Jackson supposedly returned to dualism- maybe.  But I think it is because he doesn't have a good grasp of the philosophy of language which is absolutely necessary for this pov to work- it's great to be an anti-realist and think all this is "in your head" but you are always teetering on the edge of dualism that way- it's like Corona virus coming back after you have been "cured"!

But the key to the problem Jackson has I think is that he does not seem familiar with Wittgenstein, nor has he a good grasp of the philosophy of language.  In that link above the whole discussion comes down to the word "know" and whether or not Mary "KNEW" something more about the world OR her mode of perception.

To me that is semantic confusion!  It doesn't matter to a good pragmatist if you call it "knowledge" or not - it's semantics.  The bottom line is that for me, it's mental states all the way down- I cannot see a way out of it.

All we can see or know is ALL we CAN see or know. It is what it is.      .  If it ain't perceivable to a human- and I would include- in LDS parlance- "the spirit" as perceivable-  if it cannot be experienced, then we cannot say "IT EXISTS" much less it is something we can use to build worlds and help those worlds grow in predictability.

It's literally NO-THING if we cannot perceive it in some manner, we cannot "know" it 

Of course that is true for humans but not bats- perhaps  or maybe God- or maybe not.  But that is pragmatically irrelevant.   It can't make a difference in my life any more than the death battle now happening on the edge of the galaxy on the planet Wiswon .

Oh- you didn't hear about that?   Hmmm- maybe it doesn't "exist". 

So I think some more exploration in the philosophy of language would help.  Late Wittgenstein- Philosophical Investigations.  THAT is a weird book because it does not lay down a "thesis" nor is it organized to present a model or paradigm. 

It is a "workbook" in language and about language and is a series of thought experiments, but the farther you go, the more convinced - at least i was- that he is right.

Arguments have to stick within language games to make sense,

If you mix the science language game with the scripture language game, you get Bellarmine vs Galileo and somebody loses their head over semantics!   😵

Conclusion from the above link:

Quote

 

I take the point that a physicalist can be humble, but I’m still left with doubts about Mary. In the end, somehow, I don’t entirely buy Jackson’s new reply to that old question: does she learn anything or not? I’m still back where he was some years ago – I’ve got the feeling something’s wrong with the argument, but I don’t know what it is.

Maybe the long representationalist story is right, but somehow it just doesn’t quite fit the simple, elegant question raised by Mary seeing red for the first time. The part of me in favour of parsimony would very much like a simple answer to a simple question. It’s ingenious, all that talk about representing complex similarity and difference relationships between the light accessible properties of objects. I wouldn’t go so far to say it seems ad hoc, but it does feel a little contorted, an unnatural stance taken up to squeeze out of the tangle of the knowledge argument. And maybe that long story works with seeing red – I think Jackson is right to say that perceptual states are essentially representational – but I’m left wondering about other states with qualitative feels that don’t obviously represent anything. What is this pang of regret supposed to represent? My stupid decision to study philosophy when I could have been a well-heeled lawyer instead?

Jackson might have talked himself out of the knowledge argument’s conclusion, but I still don’t know. I’m no dualist, but there’s something about Mary.

 

Does she "learn" anything?

You know something is happening but you don't know what it is, do you- Mr.Jones!

Do we "learn" anything from a religious experience?   Who cares what we call it -SOMETHING happened and we are different for it.

Edited August 28, 2020 by mfbukowski

[stemelbow]

On 8/28/2020 at 1:36 PM, pogi said:

I have seen several videos of Harris Debating Carrol.  I think Harris takes Carrol on the matter of free-will (in my opinion), but Harris is dead wrong here.  One thing I would like to point out that whenever I ask for proof of science, you show me more philosophy.  Carrol is a philosopher, not a scientist.  This is largely a philosophical debate between the two.  Where is the science? 

Carroll is a scientist, a physicist.  Harris is a scientist, a neuroscientist.  Yes the debate is largely philosophical at this point, as I already pointed out.  The science is largely undeveloped as yet.  If in the coming decades its all borne out, then I suppose your argument becomes moot.  If not, then perhaps Harris' does.  

On 8/28/2020 at 1:36 PM, pogi said:

My point was related to Carrol's, but different.  My point was more about the philosophical vs objective foundation of any particular field of science and how that affects the limits of what can be said about anything built upon it.  The results can only be as strong as the foundation.  Even if Harris made up a definition, it would be philosophically based and not objective (until it can be measured).  To suggest that it theoretically could be measured is one thing, and I agree with Harris here.  It theoretically could be measured.  But we need a definition to know what to measure.  Until it is actually measured, it remains in the realm of philosophy. 

Harris brings up a point about the "limits of scientific truth"?  If not being able to measure whatever it is you are studying is not a limit to objective scientific truth...I don't know what is.  

Well-being: It is not defined. It can't be measured objectively.  It manifests as quale experience. People experience and describe it differently.  Its effect can be observed in brain scans though.  

God: It is not defined. Can't be measured objectively.  It manifests as quale experience.  People experience and describe it differently.  Its effects can be observed in brain scans though. 

If well-being poses no limits to scientific truth, then neither does God.

Harris has a theory that has potential to be scientific if he could develop a methodology to objectively measure it.  Until it is objectively measured, tested, and falsified, it only has potential to be scientific.  It is not yet scientific truth.   It is as simple as that. 

Carrol does have a "methodological" point, as Harris points out.  Harris should understand that methodology is kind of important to science.  Without a scientific methodological way to study an undefined phenomenon, then there is a limit to what we can say about it scientifically.  That is a HUGE FREAKING LIMIT to objective scientific truth.   That is the limit that Harris has failed to address.  That is why you can't show me any science.  Because there is none!  There is no method to study it.  Science requires methodology, not just philosophy.  He has absolutely no methodology.

We wont even know if they were "relevant" facts until we know which books were actually in the library!  The "Relevant facts" don't tell us which books were in the Library of Alexandria.  In Harris' case, those books represent well-being and morality.  In religion, those books represent God.  We can be absolutely right or absolutely wrong about the relevant facts about God too, that doesn't mean God is a legitimate study of science.  We have no methodology to study Him (or well-being/morality) objectively.   How is this not crystal clear?

Because there is no methodology, we cannot scientifically say what those books are, just like we can't say what well-being and morality is, just like we can't objectively say what God is.  Without methodology, there is no science.  There is only philosophy. 

There are plenty of things we do know about the books in the library at Alexandria.  As Harris points out, we do know there was no Catcher in the Rye, for instance.  As Carroll and Harris agree, there is nothing but an assumption for every field of science to get it off the ground.  For some reason the ought-is dilemma only seems a problem for morality. Not any other field of science.  Carroll disagrees not because there is no objective measures, there certainly potentially are, but because the goal the stated assumption isn't science, in his view.  But it seems to me the only reason why he maintains that is because he doesn't want it to be science.  It feels like a backward maneuver.  I brought him in because I thought he was saying what you wanted to point out...but I guess not.

Thanks again.  

[pogi]

1 hour ago, stemelbow said:

The science is largely undeveloped as yet.  If in the coming decades its all borne out, then I suppose your argument becomes moot.  If not, then perhaps Harris' does.  

The science is entirely non-existent.  Any claim that morality is a science is moot.

1 hour ago, stemelbow said:

As Carroll and Harris agree, there is nothing but an assumption for every field of science to get it off the ground.  For some reason the ought-is dilemma only seems a problem for morality. Not any other field of science.  Carroll disagrees not because there is no objective measures, there certainly potentially are, but because the goal the stated assumption isn't science, in his view.  But it seems to me the only reason why he maintains that is because he doesn't want it to be science.  It feels like a backward maneuver.  I brought him in because I thought he was saying what you wanted to point out...but I guess not.

Thanks again.  

Science is built on the assumed values of empiricism and logic.  But as Carroll points out, science has to do with those who accept those presuppositions.  That doesn't mean anyone can come in and build on any made up assumption they want and call it science.  No, it has to be built on the presuppositions accepted by science, otherwise it is built on a different foundation and can't rightly be called hard science.  As Carrol points out, the disagreements are not analogous. 

Quote

And finally: Pointing out that people disagree about morality is not analogous to the fact that some people are radical epistemic skeptics who don't agree with ordinary science.  That's mixing levels of description.  It is true that the tools of science cannot be used to change the mind of a committed solipsist who believes they are a brain in a vat, manipulated by an evil demon; yet, those of us who accept the presuppositions of empirical science are able to make progress.  But here we are concerned only with people who have agreed to buy into all the epistemic assumptions of reality-based science -- they still disagree about morality.  That's the problem.  If the project of deriving ought from is were realistic, disagreements about morality would be precisely analogous to disagreements about the state of the universe fourteen billion years ago. There would be things we could imagine observing about the universe that would enable us to decide which position was right.  But as far as morality is concerned, there aren't.  

Here is Harris' response:

Quote

It seems to me that these two quotations converge on the core issue. Of course, it is easy enough for Carroll to assert that moral skepticism isn’t analogous to scientific skepticism, but I think he is simply wrong about this. To use Myer’s formulation, we must smuggle in an “unscientific prior” to justify any branch of science.

If we follow Harris's reasoning, we can take any "unscientific prior" (aka assumption) and build a new field of hard science upon it.  Harris is taking advantage of the fact that science makes epistemic assumptions of reality-based science, and uses that as justification to assume whatever we wants.  His reasoning would lead to the utter destruction of science as we know it.    Harris:

Quote

I can appeal to data from chemistry, describing the outcome of simple experiments. But in so doing, I implicitly appeal to the values of empiricism and logic. What if my interlocutor doesn’t share these values? What can I say then? What evidence could prove that we should value evidence? What logic could demonstrate the importance of logic? As it turns out, these are the wrong questions. The right question is, why should we care what such a person thinks in the first place?

And if anyone disagrees with whatever whackadoo "unscientific prior" we make up - the right attitude is to simply say "why should we care what such a person thinks in the first place?"  That seems reasonable!

Here is the logic of Harris:

Premise 1:  Science is built upon an unscientific prior

Premise 2:  Morality is built upon an unscientific prior

Conclusion: Therefor morality is science.

That is nonsense.

I could just as easily make the following argument:

Premise 1: Science is built upon an unscientific prior

Premise 2: Religion is built upon an unscientific prior

Conclusion: Therefore religion is science.  

I am telling you, Harris is trying to open a door that would be the downfall of science as we know it. 

Yes, Science is built upon an unscientific prior.  That doesn't mean that any unscientific prior is scientific!  It would be an entirely different foundation. 

Edited August 31, 2020 by pogi

[stemelbow]

22 minutes ago, pogi said:

The science is entirely non-existent.  Any claim that morality is a science is moot.

Science is built on the assumed values of empiricism and logic.  But as Carroll points out, science has to do with those who accept those presuppositions.  That doesn't mean anyone can come in and build on any made up assumption they want and call it science.  No, it has to be built on the presuppositions accepted by science, otherwise it is built on a different foundation and can't rightly be called hard science.  As Carrol points out, the disagreements are not analogous. 

Here is Harris' response:

If we follow Harris's reasoning, we can take any "unscientific prior" (aka assumption) and build a new field of hard science upon it.  Harris is taking advantage of the fact that science makes epistemic assumptions of reality-based science, and uses that as justification to assume whatever we wants.  His reasoning would lead to the utter destruction of science as we know it.    Harris:

And if anyone disagrees with whatever whackadoo "unscientific prior" we make up - the right attitude is to simply say "why should we care what such a person thinks in the first place?"  That seems reasonable!

Here is the logic of Harris:

Premise 1:  Science is built upon an unscientific prior

Premise 2:  Morality is built upon an unscientific prior

Conclusion: Therefor morality is science.

That is nonsense.

I could just as easily make the following argument:

Premise 1: Science is built upon an unscientific prior

Premise 2: Religion is built upon an unscientific prior

Conclusion: Therefore religion is science.  

I am telling you, Harris is trying to open a door that would be the downfall of science as we know it. 

Yes, Science is built upon an unscientific prior.  That doesn't mean that any unscientific prior is scientific!  It would be an entirely different foundation. 

I pointed out Harris' argument, at least one branch of it.  The premises are set and the conclusion in place.  He most certainly is not advocating any old unscientific prior is a good enough.  He's pointing out there is legitimate reason for the science of morality.  I still think medical science is a good comparison here.  Well being and physically healthy seem very much comparable on this front.  

[pogi]

18 minutes ago, stemelbow said:

He most certainly is not advocating any old unscientific prior is a good enough.

He may not be advocating for it per se, but what would keep anyone from using his same justification to advance any assumption they want as scientific?

Quote

 I still think medical science is a good comparison here.

I've already addressed this.

Edited August 31, 2020 by pogi

[stemelbow]

3 minutes ago, pogi said:

He may not be advocating for it per se, but what would keep anyone from using his same justification to advance any assumption they want as scientific?

I've already addressed this.

I've already addressed your question.  Sounds like we're stuck repeating and/or talking past each other.  I'm happy leaving the argument put forth by Sam as is.  To me it remains untouched.  I think you feel you've already addressed it.  I don't think so.  Not sure where to go from here. 

[pogi]

9 minutes ago, stemelbow said:

I've already addressed your question.  

Where?

[stemelbow]

54 minutes ago, pogi said:

Where?

There has to be legitimate reason.  If it's true Sam does not have legitimate reason, then so be it.  But he's arguing specifically for there being legitimate reason.  Just as there is legitimate reason to assume a goal of physical health.  Just as there is for physics and chemistry.  

[pogi]

1 hour ago, stemelbow said:

There has to be legitimate reason. 

What is his legitimate reason exactly?  Help me understand why he is not legitimizing any arbitrary assumption by using the reasoning he does?  What am I missing?

Quote

Just as there is legitimate reason to assume a goal of physical health

Do you see how 1) assuming a goal of human well-being (making any such scientific goal a soft science, I might add), and 2) assuming such a goal is the definition of morality are 2 different things (they are not analogous)?  Why is human well-being the only legitimate goal of morality?  Seriously.  Why isn't a more ecocentric goal legitimate?  What legitimate reason is there to limit the goal of morality to anthropocentrism?  You have failed to address this.

1 hour ago, stemelbow said:

Just as there is for physics and chemistry.  

Empiricism and logic are the assumption and presupposed foundation for the hard-sciences (such as physics and chemistry).  If something claims to be a hard science, it must be based on those presuppositions. There is no empirical evidence or logic to making anthropocentrism the goal or morality.  None.  It is entirely arbitrary. 

Edited August 31, 2020 by pogi

[stemelbow]

3 hours ago, pogi said:

What is his legitimate reason exactly?  Help me understand why he is not legitimizing any arbitrary assumption by using the reasoning he does?  What am I missing?

Do you see how 1) assuming a goal of human well-being (making any such scientific goal a soft science, I might add), and 2) assuming such a goal is the definition of morality are 2 different things (they are not analogous)?  Why is human well-being the only legitimate goal of morality?  Seriously.  Why isn't a more ecocentric goal legitimate?  What legitimate reason is there to limit the goal of morality to anthropocentrism?  You have failed to address this.

I"m feeling confident we can go the rounds from a different angle, but i"m not feeling confident i'd be too interested.  The arguments propose the reasons.  I provided a syllogism for ease of discussion.  I get you feel it's a bad one, or problematic, but in my mind it doesn't appear you really addressed it.  

3 hours ago, pogi said:

Empiricism and logic are the assumption and presupposed foundation for the hard-sciences (such as physics and chemistry).  If something claims to be a hard science, it must be based on those presuppositions. There is no empirical evidence or logic to making anthropocentrism the goal or morality.  None.  It is entirely arbitrary. 

I don't think it's arbitrary nor entirely arbitrary.  It may be there is some major disagreement about the definition of science or what falls in the realm of science.  Brain science is science.  There are plenty of data to measure.  And it may not stop there.  

[pogi]

43 minutes ago, stemelbow said:

I"m feeling confident we can go the rounds from a different angle, but i"m not feeling confident i'd be too interested.  The arguments propose the reasons.  I provided a syllogism for ease of discussion.  I get you feel it's a bad one, or problematic, but in my mind it doesn't appear you really addressed it.  

I don't think it's arbitrary nor entirely arbitrary.  It may be there is some major disagreement about the definition of science or what falls in the realm of science.  Brain science is science.  There are plenty of data to measure.  And it may not stop there.  

I get the sense you just want to be done with this discussion.  If that is the case, let me know, but I am happy to readdress the syllogism if you think I didn't address it to your satisfaction.

Quote

 

Premise 1:

Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds, and specifically, on that fact that various minds can experience various forms of well being and suffering in the universe.

Premise 2:

Conscious minds and their states are a natural phenomena, of course, fully constrained by the laws of nature whatever these end up being in the end.  

Conclusion:

Therefore there must be right and wrong answers to the questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science.  

 

This presupposes that we have already accepted his arbitrary definition of morality.   We haven't.

If I accept premise 1 and 2, why do I have to accept the arbitrary anthropocentric definition of morality that he proposes?  What makes his anthropocentric version of morality any less arbitrary than an ecocentric version?

Lets start with that.

This syllogism doesn't prove what morality is, it simply suggests that if we accept his arbitrary definition, then that version of morality could "potentially fall within the purview of science" given advancements in technology that we don't currently have to measure well-being objectively. 

Nothing really grounds this syllogism in objectivity.  It is based on my accepting his arbitrary proposal of what morality is and relies on undiscovered and "potentially" impossible technology. 

 

Edited August 31, 2020 by pogi

[Ahab]

10 minutes ago, pogi said:

I get the sense you just want to be done with this discussion.  If that is the case, let me know, but I am happy to readdress the syllogism if you think I didn't address it to your satisfaction.

If I accept premise 1 and 2, why do I have to accept the arbitrary anthropocentric definition of morality that he proposes?  What makes his anthropocentric version of morality any less arbitrary than an ecocentric version?

Lets start with that.

His syllogism is based on the presumption that his arbitrary definition of morality is already accepted as factual.  It isn't. 

 

I'm interested and am following this discussion and would appreciate some examples to refine the point, if there is only one point, or your point and his point if the 2 of you have different points.

For example, of an example, you might try using the concepts of good or bad or both.  I'm thinking I'd like to see an example used right about here:

Premise 1:

Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds, and specifically, on that fact that various minds can experience various forms of well being and suffering in the universe.

Premise 2:

Conscious minds and their states are a natural phenomena, of course, fully constrained by the laws of nature whatever these end up being in the end.  

Conclusion:

Therefore there must be right and wrong answers to the questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science.  

[stemelbow]

15 hours ago, pogi said:

I get the sense you just want to be done with this discussion.  If that is the case, let me know, but I am happy to readdress the syllogism if you think I didn't address it to your satisfaction.

Only in that, we're not getting anywhere.  I'm happy to discuss as long as we make progress in terms of engagement.  

15 hours ago, pogi said:

This presupposes that we have already accepted his arbitrary definition of morality.   We haven't.

If I accept premise 1 and 2, why do I have to accept the arbitrary anthropocentric definition of morality that he proposes?  What makes his anthropocentric version of morality any less arbitrary than an ecocentric version?

Lets start with that.

This is where I think I'm going to propose a different angle to address this.  I read your response and see it as too divergent from what the argument is.  There is no "presupposes that we have already accepted his arbitrary definition of morality".  I mean to say, it may be, but I don't see that.  The result of the argument is perhaps a redefinition of morality, but I don't think it presupposes anything.  Also, I don't see the purpose of the repeated use of the term "arbitrary".  Nothing, as I can see, can be said to be arbitrary here.  We are talking about a topic.  There is nothing arbitrary.  We are human, there is nothing arbitrary in that.  We do not know the conscious lives of other species. 

15 hours ago, pogi said:

This syllogism doesn't prove what morality is, it simply suggests that if we accept his arbitrary definition, then that version of morality could "potentially fall within the purview of science" given advancements in technology that we don't currently have to measure well-being objectively. 

Nothing really grounds this syllogism in objectivity.  It is based on my accepting his arbitrary proposal of what morality is and relies on undiscovered and "potentially" impossible technology. 

 

Well, I suppose this is precisely where I agree to disagree.  I don't know what you mean by "Nothing really grounds this syllogism in objectivity".  I think we have different ideas of objectivity.  There are at least two ways to view objectivity--scientifically and philosophically.  I'm not saying morality can be objective in the philosophical sense--because on such grounds nothing really is.  I would suggest morality can be objective in a scientific sense.  And that is precisely why I've shied away from getting caught up in objective vs subjective.  It doesn't matter in that it feels more of a semantics (in how we are using the term) game then an attempt to dialogue our way through the issues.  

I think this video helps explain that.  I think you're thinking more along the lines of Cosmic Skeptic (Alex), while I am more along the lines of Rationality Rules (Stephen).  

 

 

[pogi]

6 hours ago, stemelbow said:

This is where I think I'm going to propose a different angle to address this.  I read your response and see it as too divergent from what the argument is.  There is no "presupposes that we have already accepted his arbitrary definition of morality".  I mean to say, it may be, but I don't see that.  The result of the argument is perhaps a redefinition of morality, but I don't think it presupposes anything.  

Harris defines morality more or less like this: "Morality is the promotion of human well-being" (anthropocentric).  That is the presupposition.  As a result of that presupposition we get "Premise 1"  (not the other way around).

Premise 1) "Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds [so far so good, no presupposition here], and specifically, on that fact that various minds can experience various forms of well being and suffering in the universe [here, he automatically presupposes that morality is dependent upon human well-being and suffering]."  What is that idea in the premise (that morality depends on well-being and suffering) based on?  Well, it is based on his presupposed definition that ties morality to human well-being, obviously.  What else could it be based on?  Science?  I don't think so.  Premise 1 is founded entirely upon that presupposed definition of morality.

For example, if the presupposed definition of morality was this: "morality is the promotion of homeostasis in ecosystems" (ecocentric), then premise 1 would obviously read entirely different.

Premise 1 only makes sense if we accept his presupposed anthropocentric definition, otherwise it makes no sense at all in the context of an ecocentric morality.

Why couldn't I just as easily use my definition of morality - "morality is the promotion of homeostasis in ecosystems".  That definition is not about "maximizing human pleasures" (which could be seen as immoral under my definition)! 

How can science tell me one definition is more accurate and factual than the other?  If it can't, then it is fairly arbitrary which definition we choose. Do we get to vote?  Is that how this works?  Personal whim?  

P.S. I have been using the term objective in the same way that your guy, Stephen, is using it (definition is explained at around 4:10 in the video) - in the scientific sense. 

Edited September 1, 2020 by pogi

[stemelbow]

On 9/1/2020 at 9:44 AM, pogi said:

Harris defines morality more or less like this: "Morality is the promotion of human well-being" (anthropocentric).  That is the presupposition.  As a result of that presupposition we get "Premise 1"  (not the other way around).

Premise 1) "Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds [so far so good, no presupposition here], and specifically, on that fact that various minds can experience various forms of well being and suffering in the universe [here, he automatically presupposes that morality is dependent upon human well-being and suffering]." 

This is where I disagree with you.  I don't see how you are getting the idea that he is defining morality.  He's simply pointing out that minds experience a range from well being to suffering.  I don't think your claim here makes sense.  Earlier you suggested you had no issue with his premises.  Now it appears you do.  As you commented earlier,  it seemed to me you did have an issue with premise one.  In my mind, your issue is simply you're misunderstanding it.  

Quote

What is that idea in the premise (that morality depends on well-being and suffering) based on?  Well, it is based on his presupposed definition that ties morality to human well-being, obviously.  What else could it be based on?  Science?  I don't think so.  Premise 1 is founded entirely upon that presupposed definition of morality.

He's linking the notion that morality is only in existence due to a conscious mind.  He's also pointing out that minds experience a range of forms--from well being to suffering.  

Quote

For example, if the presupposed definition of morality was this: "morality is the promotion of homeostasis in ecosystems" (ecocentric), then premise 1 would obviously read entirely different.

Premise 1 only makes sense if we accept his presupposed anthropocentric definition, otherwise it makes no sense at all in the context of an ecocentric morality.

Without humans there'd be no discussion or concept of morality.  Of course it depends on conscious minds--specifically minds that experience a range of forms from well-being to suffering.  

Quote

Why couldn't I just as easily use my definition of morality - "morality is the promotion of homeostasis in ecosystems".  That definition is not about "maximizing human pleasures" (which could be seen as immoral under my definition)! 

How can science tell me one definition is more accurate and factual than the other?  If it can't, then it is fairly arbitrary which definition we choose. Do we get to vote?  Is that how this works?  Personal whim?  

P.S. I have been using the term objective in the same way that your guy, Stephen, is using it (definition is explained at around 4:10 in the video) - in the scientific sense. 

There is plenty of room to disagree with the notion that morality can have an objective, in the scientific sense, basis.  I disagree with those disagreements.  I don't think you've exactly laid out why you disagree.  Although I've given you at least a couple of links to demonstrate reasonable ways to disagree--both from Alex and Dr. Carroll (a physicist, to be clear...and a hobby philosopher, obviously).  Be that as it may, every branch of science suffers from the very thing you are trying to pin on morality--the assumption of a goal.  I don't think the definition of terms is at issue, per se.  But I think you've misunderstood.  He's not saying morality is well-being.  He's suggesting that the things we do, the things we think, that which is in the realm of morality, definitely affects our well being.  Our goal should be well being.  Thus, we should use our scientific methods, our scientific disciplines, to help us determine which things we do and think to best promote well being.  He's certainly not saying it's an easy science or well defined.  In infancy it may seemingly get us very little.  But as it matures it might be a very helpful approach.  

Edited September 4, 2020 by stemelbow

[pogi]

Never mind.

Edited September 4, 2020 by pogi

[pogi]

I posted a long reply, but I think I am going to try and kip this simple.

4 hours ago, stemelbow said:

Earlier you suggested you had no issue with his premises.  Now it appears you do. 

I don't have an issue with his premise given his definition of morality.  My prior argument was that even if I accept his definition of morality (which would cause me to accept the two premises), his conclusion is still problematic (and it is).  

My angle now is that his presupposed definition of morality is not an objective fact, and yet he presumes it to be so as evidenced by premise 1.

Quote

 In my mind, your issue is simply you're misunderstanding it

By all means, please reasonable and rationally explain how he came to the factual conclusion that "Morality and values depend...specifically, on that fact that various minds can experience various forms of well being and suffering in the universe."

How is that an objective fact?  

How does he come to that conclusion without relying on a presupposed definition of morality?

I understand the consciousness bit, I am more concerned about the morality "specifically" depends on "well-being and suffering" part. 

 

 

 

Edited September 4, 2020 by pogi

[stemelbow]

On 9/4/2020 at 10:54 AM, pogi said:

I posted a long reply, but I think I am going to try and kip this simple.

I don't have an issue with his premise given his definition of morality.  My prior argument was that even if I accept his definition of morality (which would cause me to accept the two premises), his conclusion is still problematic (and it is).  

My angle now is that his presupposed definition of morality is not an objective fact, and yet he presumes it to be so as evidenced by premise 1.

By all means, please reasonable and rationally explain how he came to the factual conclusion that "Morality and values depend...specifically, on that fact that various minds can experience various forms of well being and suffering in the universe."

How is that an objective fact?  

How does he come to that conclusion without relying on a presupposed definition of morality?

I understand the consciousness bit, I am more concerned about the morality "specifically" depends on "well-being and suffering" part. 

 

 

 

 

What specifically are you accusing him of defining morality as?  All words have "presupposed" definitions. It doesn't say morality depends on "well-being and suffering".  It says Morality and values depend on a conscious mind...and on that fact (That morality and values depend on a conscious mind, he adds) various minds can experience various forms of well being and suffering.  I think both notions are true, axiomatically.  Morality simply is not a concept without a conscious mind.  And it's simply true we all, with our various minds, experience well being and suffering.  

Edited September 8, 2020 by stemelbow

[pogi]

23 hours ago, stemelbow said:

 It doesn't say morality depends on "well-being and suffering".  

He says that morality and values depends “specifically” on the fact that conscious minds experience different forms of wellbeing and suffering...

If you wont acknowledge that, then we are done here.

[stemelbow]

4 minutes ago, pogi said:

He says that morality and values depends “specifically” on the fact that conscious minds experience different forms of wellbeing and suffering...

If you wont acknowledge that, then we are done here.

Ok.  Thanks Pogi.  As I read it, he says morality and values depend on conscious minds.  That is to him the fact.  On that fact, various minds experience well being and suffering--I don'tsee how anyone can read that to suggest he's saying morality and values depend specifically on the fact that conscious minds experience different forms of wellbeing and suffering.  Again, I think you are misreading.  But we can be done here.  I don't think we moved very far along in the discussion--getting hung up on mis-readings.  

[pogi]

40 minutes ago, stemelbow said:

Ok.  Thanks Pogi.  As I read it, he says morality and values depend on conscious minds.  

...then he continues, ...“and specifically on the fact that...”.

That sentence doesn’t makes sense independent of the verb “depends”.  
 

What “specifically on the fact..”?

Depends “Specifically on the fact...”

What depends specifically on the fact...?

Morality and values!

You are misreading it.

It is out of place and nonsensical in that sentence if it is not tied to morality.  His whole book then continues to make that point.  Why would he just throw in a random fact that conscious minds suffer, if it morality doesn’t depend on it.  It would be unrelated to the the purpose he is making.

Edited September 9, 2020 by pogi

[stemelbow]

20 minutes ago, pogi said:

...then he continues, ...“and specifically on the fact that...”.

That sentence doesn’t makes sense independent of the verb “depends”.  
 

What “specifically on the fact..”?

Depends “Specifically on the fact...”

It doesn't really matter.  Whether morality and values depend on conscious minds and depend on minds experiencing well being and suffering.  It hardly means he's defining morality and values.  

20 minutes ago, pogi said:

What depends specifically on the fact...?

Morality and values!

You are misreading it.

Seems like an inconsequential quibble to me. I think he means now that fact is stated and established, I need to add that conscious minds experience well being and suffering, for further explanation.  

20 minutes ago, pogi said:

It is out of place and nonsensical in that sentence if it is not tied to morality.  His whole book then continues to make that point.  Why would he just throw in a random fact that conscious minds suffer, if it morality doesn’t depend on it.  It would be unrelated to the the purpose he is making.

It's completely related and relevant.  But again...I'm not sure why this is hanging you up.  It doesn't really matter.  Even if morality and values depended on minds experiencing wellbeing and suffering, it does not mean he's changing the meaning of the words morality and values.  

[pogi]

21 minutes ago, stemelbow said:

, it does not mean he's changing the meaning of the words morality and values.  

Why does morality depend on minds that experience well-being?

It is not axiomatic to me.  He is just making stuff up. Why must morality be associated with the goal of well-being? 

The only reason is because that’s what fits into his anthropocentric  world view.  It is arbitrary to his personal whim.

An ecocentric world view and morality doesn’t set goals of maximizing human “pleasures“.  That could be seen as immoral.

But I have already made this point.  You have yet to address it.

Edited September 9, 2020 by pogi

[stemelbow]

5 minutes ago, pogi said:

Why does morality depend on minds that experience well-being?

It is not axiomatic to me.  He is just making stuff up. Why must morality be associated with the goal of well-being? 

You can simply drop the second half of premise 1 and it works the same, it that's hanging you up.  Take premise 1 simply has Morality and values depend on conscious minds.  

[pogi]

Just now, stemelbow said:

You can simply drop the second half of premise 1 and it works the same, it that's hanging you up.  Take premise 1 simply has Morality and values depend on conscious minds.  

Except that misses the point of his morality, which is well-being.

Are you denying that the goal of his morality is human well-being?