smac97

From a previous post: I don't think you responded to the above. I think the better comparison would be to live adult performances such as strip clubs. I am willing to examine whether this particular statute is vague, overbroad, or redundant with prior law. I am less persuaded by the claim that any effort to set age-based limits on sexualized live performances must be dismissed as pure identity politics. I admit I struggle with the notion that supporting laws which prohibit exposing children to highly sexualized adult performances - regardless of the sexual orientation/identity of the performers - is an example of "religious hatred of LGBTQ people." My understanding is that there are good numbers of "LGBTQ people" who support laws protecting children along these lines. Do you agree or disagree with that assessment? In any event, in response to your comment: The distinction is not that the same content is fine in a theater and criminal in a live venue. It is that the law already treats commercial live adult performances differently from filmed entertainment, and has done so for a long time. Movie theaters operate under a ratings system, age restrictions for certain ratings, and parental controls that parents can exercise before the child ever enters the building. The content is fixed, pre-screened, and mediated. In contrast, live commercial performances that meet the obscenity-as-to-minors standard present a different setting: the child is physically present in a space where the adult material is being performed in real time, and the venue is knowingly admitting the child. Florida’s statute does not ban every sexualized image or performance. It targets the act of knowingly admitting a minor to a commercial live performance that predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive as to what is suitable for the child’s age, and lacks serious value for that age. This is the same constitutional standard long applied to material harmful to minors in other contexts. Do you agree or disagree with that? If so, is it your position that "LGBTQ people" are, or ought to be, exempted from such laws? The rule is content-based in the sense that it turns on the nature of the performance, not the identity or orientation of the performers. Traditional adult venues such as strip clubs have long been subject to age restrictions; the statute applies the same principle across the board. Disagreement with that line does not require attributing religious hatred or anti-LGBTQ motive. The question remains whether the state may set age limits on admitting children to qualifying live commercial adult performances. On that narrower question, the answer - for me (and I think most people) - is yes. Thanks, -Smac

So we've had a lot of discussion, in this thread and elsewhere, about "limiting principles" in relation to trans ideology. Essentially, it appears that there are no "limiting principles" to trans advocates as to who is, and who is not, a "woman." It looks like this issue - are there any "limiting principles" as to "what is a woman" - is quickly coming to a head in the context of women's sports: Ex-NBA Players Say They’re ‘Declaring’ For WNBA As League Considers Transgender Player Policy And here: I am very curious about how the WNBA will formulate eligibility requirements for players. In many quarters the preferred - and perhaps sole - criterion for "woman" in essentially every context is "someone who identifies as a woman." Fundamentally, this is incoherent - it does not define "woman" - and also lacks any "limiting principle." There also appears to be no limitation on what motives an individual may have for identifying as a woman. Here are some of the discussions we have had about "limiting principles" in this context: Here: It is important to note that previous to transgender issues streaming to the forefront that there weren’t any laws about being in the wrong gendered bathroom. There were even reasons to ignore those rules like the men’s bathroom not having a changing table. There wasn’t a rash of perverts rushing into women’s bathrooms. Weirdos spinning tales of how they would have claimed they “felt like a woman” in High School in order to change in the girl’s locker room are just weirdos outing themselves. Transgender people rarely switch which restrooms they use until they are passable or androgynous at least and many actually plan around not having to use public restrooms out of fear. They just want to pee. They aren’t excited to use them or anything. Although the above discussion pertains to trans women - that is, biological men - entering into women's bathrooms, the same broader questions and concerns are now landing in the WNBA. If a male's "self-identity" as a woman is sufficient to justify him going into a woman's bathroom, is it also sufficient to justify him joining the WNBA? The above discussion is between myself (the initial quote) and @The Nehor. His approach has been, essentially, that no "limiting principles" are required at all: Here: Self-identification and also for law enforcement not to be involved at all. They weren’t before. It is a self-policing situation. Here: I keep saying there doesn’t need to be a “limiting” principle because we don’t need a law about this. There wasn’t one before. No limiting principle needed. Not everything needs to be legislated. If trans women (biological men) can "self-police" for purposes of entering into women's bathrooms, can they also "self-police" for purposes of entering into the WNBA? "No limiting principle needed"? Others seem to think that physical appearance should be the limiting principle: Here: Can looking like a woman be a "limiting principle" in the WNBA? If so, what counts? Nail polish? Wearing a dress? Wearing pink? This does not seem to work. Here: I don't want anyone to be harassed. And any "limiting principle" would be one implemented by a legislature or civil body, not by me. In the past, the "limiting principle" was, it seems, based on biological sex. Is subjective self-identity a better limiting principle? Physical appearance? Or do we just abolish sex-segregated bathrooms altogether? I'm interested in hearing what you have to say and your reasoning for it. Here I floated the idea of getting rid of sex segregation altogether. Can that work in the WNBA? Is the WNBA really prepared to not define "woman" at all, even though the "W" in the acronym is the sine qua non of the league's existence? Here: In general the advice to transwomen and transmen is not to switch public bathroom usage until you are androgynous or passable. So the "limiting principle" is being "androgynous or passable"? A "trans woman" who does not look sufficiently like a "woman" would, under color of law, be prohibited from entering a woman's bathroom? Is "passing" the limiting principle, then? Here: This part. This is the correct limiting principle. You want “ obvious” males to use women’s bathroom. I do not. I’m not sure what’s wrong with this standard. In my system people use the restroom that matches their gender presentation. In your system obvious men are forced into women’s spaces and vice versa. Can "obvious biological males" be a "limiting principle" in the WNBA? If so, can that same reasoning be applied in other contexts (bathrooms, etc.)? What about "passing" ("androgynous or passable")? Can that be a "limiting principle" in the WNBA? Here: These are my comments. I think the "limiting principle" should be biological sex. But that does not work in some quarters. So what should work? Here: I quite agree with you here. But this goes back to the "limiting principle" inquiry. Assuming that the vast majority of trans women (biological males) in women's bathrooms "are not threats," is there a risk of biological males who are "threats" going into women's bathrooms? If so, how would we propose to differentiate between the two groups? What limiting principle would allow non-threatening biological males into women's spaces but disallow potentially threatening biological males into women's space? In the context of the WNBA, male players are both a physical threat to female players (because they are, on average, so much stronger than women), but also a "threat" in terms of dominance in play. Former NBA players entering the WNBA will destroy the league. There is also the question/concern about whether the female players will consent to having biological males in the locker rooms. Here: Thank you for explaining your position clearly. I appreciate you wanting to keep things practical and minimize conflict for everyone. ... Also, I think that the “leave it the way it is — let people use the bathroom of their choice” is actually a new policy, not the status quo of the last several decades. For generations, the limiting principle for women’s bathrooms, locker rooms, and showers has been biological sex, not self-identified gender. That bright-line rule was simple, enforceable, and grounded in the real differences between males and females that make sex-segregated spaces necessary for safety and privacy. Allowing biological males into women’s facilities (even if they identify as women) changes the fundamental nature of those spaces. Many women and girls experience that change as a loss of privacy and safety — not because they assume every trans woman is a threat, but because biological sex is the reason those spaces were segregated in the first place. ... The bathroom policy debate isn’t about pretending signs are foolproof barriers. It’s about whether we should keep the long-standing, objective limiting principle of biological sex for women’s facilities. That clear, enforceable standard has protected women’s privacy and safety in vulnerable spaces for generations. Changing it to self-identified gender identity removes that objective boundary, such that it seems to make things easier for bad actors to gain access without raising any red flags. I’m not asking anyone to harass trans people. I’m just trying to explore the perspective your are presenting here, which perspective, if enacted, would seemingly solve one person’s discomfort at the expense of others' discomfort (i.e., requiring women and girls to surrender the privacy and safety protections they’ve always had). Single-use bathrooms or third spaces are a much better way to accommodate trans individuals without compromising those protections. But even that does not seem to be a comprehensive solution. Nevertheless, if we keep the traditional biological-sex rule for women’s facilities, do you see single-use or family bathrooms as a reasonable way to give trans people privacy and dignity? "So far as that 'limiting principle,' then, my position echo's that same 2016 position as our current president: leave it the way it is now--let people use their bathroom of choice." Should this same reasoning apply when it comes to who is eligible to play in the WNBA? Here: These are my comments. If Richard Cox can, via "self-identity" as a woman, enter into women's locker rooms and showers, then is that a workable "limiting principle"? Is there any impediment to Enes Kanter Freedom using "self identity" to declare for eligibility to play in the WNBA? Here: Here: I don't think that's where the problem lies. "If a biological male thinks he is a woman, let him compete in women's sports, use women's bathrooms, be housed in women's prisons, and so on." I think such accommodations become difficult pretty quickly. Further, there is no limiting principle. If a biological male can "identify" as a woman, then can Rachel Dolezal and Jessica Krug "identify" as "Black?" Can "Stefoknee Wolscht," a biological male in his 50s, call himself a perpetual six-year-old girl? Can a 5'9" white guy "identify" as a six-foot-tall Chinese woman? Can Eva Tiamat Medusa "identify" as a dragon? Can Naia Ōkami "identify" as a wolf? If not, why not? Can I "identify" myself as someone or something I am not? Can I use the force of law to coerce other people into capitulating to that identity? These are my comments, and they seem to be relevant to the current WNBA controversy. Regarding "limiting principles," @Analytics weighed in: Here: Regarding laws dealing with sex and gender, we should recognize that not everybody neatly and accurately fits into the broad-brush categories of being biologically male or biologically female. Furthermore, laws should recognize that depending on the situation, somebody's gender identity might be more pertinent than their biological sex. Laws are in fact evolving to deal with these realities. Some people are objectively intersex--they aren't 100% male or 100% female. That complexity is biological fact. However, that type of complexity doesn't exist with whether you are a human, how old you are, etc. Putting aside his rejection of the sexual binary, is the "complexity" he describes - associated with persons with DSDs - a valid "limiting principle" for the WNBA? It seems not, as it goes against the seemingly prevailing "self-identity" sentiment. Lia Thomas, for example, does not have a DSD. Nor, I think, does Enes Kanter. Here: This is my statement, and I think it is reasonable. Others disagree. For those people, what "limiting principle{s}" do you have in mind in relation to WNBA eligibility? Here: This is my comment. Is Enes Kanter Freedom playing in the WNBA an "absurdity"? If so, why? Why can't he "self identify" as a woman? Who polices this? What does and does not count as "self identifying" as a woman? This is a difficult topic. In everyday discourse, it's easy to make broad declarations about "trans women are women" and "a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman" and so on. However, sooner or later, these declarations encounter reality, such as we have seen with biological males entering into women's sports, bathrooms, prisons, and so on. And when those declarations are applied, they lead to untenable results, such as Enes Kanter Freedom being eligible to play in the WNBA. We all deserve presumptive measures of respect and kindness. The vagaries arising from applying the central tenets of trans ideology, though, seem very difficult. Thanks, -Smac

Personally, no. I view the deliberate exposure of children to highly sexualized live adult performances as a form of sexualizing and grooming minors. I regard that as wrong. This assessment does not depend on the sexual orientation or identity of the performers. Parental approval does not change the above judgment. There are circumstances in which society is justified in using the law to protect children, even when their own parents consent to the exposure. Age-based restrictions on commercial adult live performances fall into that category. I am not aware of any significant contemporary movement openly advocating that children be admitted to traditional heterosexual adult venues such as strip clubs (I am open to correction on this point). Existing norms and laws have largely kept that from becoming a live controversy. What has generated recent dispute is resistance, in some quarters, to efforts to keep children out of highly sexualized live performances of particularized type (i.e. drag shows that meet the statutory criteria). In a pluralistic society people will disagree about many cultural questions. On this particular point, however, the sexualization of children should remain a bright line. Advocating for it, or even treating it as controversial or negotiable is, I think, a rapid way for the LGBT community to forfeit broader public support. Many people across communities, including many within the LGBT community, share a straightforward revulsion at the idea of sexualizing children. Those voices are worth hearing more clearly. Thanks, -Smac

LDS Leader Detained For "Financing Terrorism" FYI, "Vyborg" is a city in Russia. Navalny He died in prison in 2024. The Anti-Corruption Foundation ("NBK") : More context on the designation of FBK as a terrorist organization seems Back to the article: I tried to watch the video. Could not get it to work. Looks like Br. Gavrilov is a Branch President. The poor man is 74 years old. I wonder if this will have a larger impact on the Church in Russia. Thanks, -Smac

Ouch!?! Eww!?! -Smac

The presence of sexual content on television, streaming, and in movies is a real issue, and parental control over it is often imperfect. That does not resolve the narrower question raised by the Florida statute. The law does not attempt to regulate every form of sexual imagery minors might encounter. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets a specific three-part test: it predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive to prevailing standards regarding what is suitable for the child’s age, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for that age. That is the longstanding obscenity-as-to-minors standard. I keep saying this because it seems to not be getting much attention: Live, in-person commercial performances differ from mediated content in important ways. Parents can more readily limit or supervise what comes into the home through ratings, parental controls, and device settings. A commercial venue that knowingly admits children to a qualifying adult live performance is a different setting—one the law has long treated as subject to age-based restrictions. It may be that, historically, existing rules were largely effective at keeping children out of traditional adult venues such as strip clubs. In recent years, however, some venues have sought to present sexually explicit live performances in settings that are specifically intended to include children. The newer statute responds to that development by applying a clear, neutral standard to all qualifying adult live performances, regardless of the identity or orientation of the performers. It is not limited to any one type of event. Pointing to the broader problem of media exposure does not make a targeted limit on certain live performances incoherent. We already accept many age-based rules without first requiring that every other avenue of similar content be eliminated. The question is whether this particular restriction is justified on its own terms. The distinction is not simply “live versus filmed.” The statute targets a specific conduct: knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets the obscenity-as-to-minors test. That is different from the separate (and imperfect) systems that already exist for broadcast, streaming, and theatrical films—ratings, parental controls, time-slot restrictions, and the practical ability of parents to limit what enters the home. Whether a particular drag show or Pride-related performance is more or less explicit than a given movie or television scene is a factual question that varies case by case, and in the end is immaterial. The statute does not depend on a blanket ranking of entire categories. It asks whether the specific live performance, taken as a whole, meets the three-part standard for material that is unsuitable for the child’s age. Some will; many will not. Broadcasting raises different issues under different legal frameworks. The statute at issue does not regulate broadcasting, and hypothetical questions about what would be permitted if the same content were only televised do not determine whether a state may set age limits on admitting children to qualifying live commercial performances. Those are separate regulatory domains, just as age limits on entering an adult club are separate from rules governing what may air on television. In short, the law draws a line around a particular commercial setting and a particular act (knowingly admitting a child). It does not require proving that every other form of sexual content is more restrained, nor does it turn on whether the same material would be treated identically if it appeared only on a screen. Thanks, -Smac

I'd be happy to evaluate whatever analysis it was that led you to this conclusion. If so, doesn't that cut against the "Hey, this new statute is unnecessary because we already had one that covers this stuff" argument? I think there are plenty of heterosexual people who are prosecuted under obscenity laws, child-endangerment laws, and so on. Plenty of white people too. Plenty of Christians as well. Criminal statutes with differentiated application based on sexual orientation or race or religion would be unconstitutional. The Florida statute does not do any of that. The relevant decision is from the en banc Eleventh Circuit (not the Eighth), which vacated the preliminary injunction against Florida’s statute. The majority held that the law tracks the longstanding “obscenity-as-to-minors” standard recognized by the Supreme Court: material that, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of minors, is patently offensive under contemporary community standards regarding what is suitable for minors, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. The court rejected the claims that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad or vague and concluded the challenger was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Obscenity—including material that is obscene as to minors—is not protected speech under the First Amendment. That is settled doctrine, not an “imagined” exception invented for this case. The statute does not ban every drag performance or every Pride-related event, nor are "straight" performances/events exempted from it. Instead, the statute restricts knowingly admitting a child to any live performance that meets the statutory criteria above. On parental rights, again, they are fundamental, but they have never been treated as an absolute trump card that disables every age-based restriction on commercial exposure of minors to sexual content. Neither Supreme Court nor circuit precedent in Florida requires a parental-consent exception for regulations of material that is obscene as to minors. States already limit minors’ access to certain live entertainment, alcohol, tobacco, and other categories without first proving that every parent would make the same choice. The “persecution of groups who aren’t straight-white Christians” framing converts a content-based restriction (tied to sexual explicitness relative to the child’s age) into a claim of viewpoint or identity-based targeting. The statutory text applies to any qualifying adult live performance regardless of the performers’ identities. Whether particular shows meet the criteria is a factual question; the constitutional validity of the underlying standard is what the en banc court addressed. In sum, the appellate ruling does not treat the speech as categorically protected, does not treat parental preference as automatically controlling, and does not rest on the identity-based persecution narrative. It rests on the obscenity-as-to-minors doctrine. Thanks, -Smac

What "other reasons" do you have in mind? Again, parental rights are important and broad, but they are not unlimited. The rights and interests of the child, and of society, may also play a role in justifying state intervention. I don't think "take over parental control" is accurate. Parental rights exist, but they have always had some constraints. I have previously provided extensive examples of sexually explicit behavior at drag shows, Pride parades, etc. which I find to be problematic, particularly in relation to children. Florida and other states have long allowed non-sexual social nudity in designated private settings such as AANR-affiliated resorts and certain clothing-optional venues. Those places operate under an explicit legal exception for nudity “in any place provided or set apart for that purpose,” and AANR clubs emphasize a family-friendly, non-sexual code of conduct. Simple nudity in that context is not treated as indecent exposure. The Florida statute at issue is narrower. It does not ban all nudity around minors, nor does it ban every Pride parade or every drag performance. It prohibits knowingly admitting a child to an “adult live performance” that depicts or simulates nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, specific sexual activities, lewd conduct, or lewd exposure of prosthetic/imitation genitals or breasts when the performance, taken as a whole: Predominantly appeals to a prurient, shameful, or morbid interest; Is patently offensive to prevailing adult community standards regarding what is suitable for the age of the child present; and Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for the age of the child present. That is the longstanding “obscenity-as-to-minors” standard. It targets sexualized performances aimed at adult audiences, not ordinary social nudity or non-sexual public events. A family nudist resort where people of all ages are, it is argued, simply unclothed in a non-sexual recreational setting is not the same thing as a commercial show that includes simulated sexual acts, exaggerated sexualized dancing, or other content designed to appeal to adult sexual interests. I have some personal reservations about these things, but we live in a pluralistic society. In any event, the law already draws that kind of distinction in many areas (public indecency, age-restricted entertainment, material harmful to minors). Treating every instance of nudity as equivalent to every sexually explicit live performance collapses a distinction the law has maintained for a long time. I’m not “railing against” all LGBT events. The question is whether the state may set age limits on commercial live performances that meet the statutory criteria for being unsuitable for children. Florida’s statute attempts to do exactly that. Whether particular shows cross the line is a fact-specific question; the principle that some adult-oriented sexual performances can be restricted for minors is not novel. You are pointing to a legitimate issue: a great deal of sexual content is available to minors through television, streaming, movies, and advertising, and parental oversight of that material is often inconsistent. That is a fair observation. I'm less persuaded that it is a moral one. That we have allowed children to be exposed to sexually explicit context is not, in my view, a justification to throw off any and all constraints intended to protect children. It also does not answer the narrower question raised by the Florida statute. The law does not claim that live adult performances are the only source of sexualized material minors encounter, nor does it require that every other form of exposure be eliminated before any limit can be placed on commercial live shows. Most regulations work that way: We restrict minors from buying alcohol even though they may see adults drinking on television. We restrict minors from certain rated films in theaters even though similar content exists online. We set age limits on casinos, tobacco, and adult businesses even though the underlying themes appear elsewhere in media. And on and on. The existence of other, sometimes more pervasive problems does not make a targeted restriction incoherent or hypocritical. There are also differences in kind that matter. A live performance in front of an audience is an immediate, in-person experience, often commercial and specifically marketed. Streaming or cinematic content is mediated, usually subject to ratings systems, parental controls, and the practical reality that parents can (and frequently do) limit access in the home. Those distinctions are imperfect, but they are not imaginary. The statute targets knowingly admitting a child to a live show that meets the statutory criteria for being unsuitable for minors; it does not attempt to solve the entire landscape of media exposure. If the broader concern is that sexual content reaches children too easily across many platforms, that is a legitimate subject for separate discussion about things like ratings enforcement, parental tools, platform responsibility, and so on. It does not follow, though, that therefore no age-based limits should exist on commercial live adult performances. Pointing to worse or more widespread examples elsewhere is a classic “not as bad as” move; it shifts the focus rather than addressing whether the specific restriction is justified on its own terms. Again, parental authority over children is fundamental, but it has never been absolute. The state already draws lines around what adults may expose minors to commercially: material harmful to minors statutes, age-restricted theaters and clubs, restrictions on selling certain sexual content to children, and limits on public indecency. Those rules exist alongside parental rights; they do not wait for every other form of exposure (TV, streaming, billboards) to be eliminated first. The Florida statute does not outlaw all sexual content or strip parents of guidance over their own living rooms. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets the statutory test for being unsuitable for minors—appealing to prurient interest, patently offensive for the child’s age, and lacking serious value for that age. That is a narrower rule than the “state controls every sex act a child might see” claim suggests. Whether a particular depiction is pornographic does not depend on the medium alone. The law has long treated live, commercial, in-person performances differently from mediated content that parents can more readily control at home. Demanding that every other source of sexual imagery be banned before any limit can be placed on adult live shows is an all-or-nothing standard the law has never required. The statute we’ve been discussing does not single out LGBT events. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial adult live performance that meets a specific three-part test: it predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive for the child’s age, and lacks serious value for that age. That standard applies regardless of the sexual orientation or identity of the performers. A heterosexual burlesque show meeting the same criteria would fall under it just as readily. Do you agree or disagree with the foregoing paragraph? If not, I would like to hear about your disagreement. I’m not arguing that parents should have no role, or that every form of sexual content in media should be treated identically. I’m arguing that the state may set age limits on certain commercial live performances without first solving every other avenue through which sexual imagery reaches children. Pointing to television, streaming, or advertising does not make a targeted restriction on live adult shows incoherent. As for you speculating about motives: I have no animus toward LGBT people. Disagreement about where to draw age and content lines for minors applies to both the "gay" and "straight" segments of society (to the extent we want to divvy ourselves up that way), and is not the same as hostility toward a community. It seems an ongoing challenge for some folks to cope with disagreement about their worldview. I think some Latter-day Saints construe any and all critiques of their faith as "attacks," as "anti-Mormonism" (candidly, I have done this in some instances). Similarly, some in the LGBT community seem to construe too many things to be hatred or "hostility" (your word) rather than what they really are: instances of disagreement in a pluralistic society. Reasoned and principled and civilly-expressed disagreement is not hate or hostility. It's just disagreement. So when, as here, the response shifts from the content of the rule to speculation about my personal reasons for discussing it, the underlying policy question tends to get lost. I’m willing to keep discussing the merits of the restriction itself—what the statute actually covers, whether the line is drawn in the right place, and how it compares to other age-based limits we already accept. Thank you for sharing your thoughts and perspective. We seldom agree, but sometimes we do. And in any event, I find value in listing to perspectives which vary from my own. Thanks, -Smac

Plenty of ways to test whether their interpretation of the law is an anomaly or congruent with general principles of constitutional jurisprudence. Broadly, I think the majority opinion is more in line with those general principles. No, it means that legal analysis reliant or or derived mostly/entire from AI is fairly suspect. Thanks, but I'm not interested in exploring this in this thread. Thanks, -Smac

An update: House Judiciary Approves Bill Establishing Right to Sue for Damages on Trans Surgery Another lawsuit: ‘I thought gender surgery would make me feel better. I was misled’ A Grok summary: Informed consent. Irreversibility. Sterilization. Cutting off healthy body parts. Lifelong medical regimens. Comorbidities. Compromised assessments of the best interests of the child. Informed consent. Massive ideological/sociopolitical influences/pressures on medical care. Article about Soren Aldaco: Woman claims gender-affirming doctors ‘gaslit’ her into transitioning: ‘Disguising harm as compassion’ Back to the first article: I am curious how many "detransitioner" lawsuits we will see. Thanks, -Smac

The Plaza Live case is an ideal case study about whether the new law was necessary: 1. The state's own investigators said the show was raunchy and suggestive, but that there was no genital exposure, no physical sexual interaction with audience members, and no lewd acts. In other words, this was a marginal case. 2. It wasn't marketed as being family friendly, and only three minors were there. 3. They successfully prosecuted this under the old laws--the venue had to pay a $5,000 administrative penalty, and promise that it would forbid people under the age of 18 from attending in the future, even with parental approval. From your source: "Although the complaint asserted that the Plaza Live broke decency laws, prosecutors have not filed criminal charges. The state is handling the case as a license-compliance matter." It appears that whether the charges in Plaza Live would have stood up in a criminal context (rather than an administrative one) was never determined. Would you agree with that? I could not immediately find any published cases where the older statute - Fla. Stat. § 847.013 - was applied to adult live performances. I previously noted that there are some substantial differences between the two statutes. As for whether their overlap or non-overlap defines whether the new statute is "necessary," I think that's really hard to assess. Whether a statute that is more narrowly crafted towards adult live performances (and which has different parameters and applications) is "necessary" seems to have a good amount of "value judgment" aromas coming off it. In any event, both are misdemeanors. Thanks, -Smac

The LDS Church continues to teach in its seminary manuals that a dark skin color was the sign of the curse. 1) "Some people have mistakenly thought that the dark skin placed upon the Lamanites was the curse. President Joseph Fielding Smith (1876–1972) explained that the dark skin was not the curse: "The dark skin was placed upon the Lamanites so that they could be distinguished from the Nephites and to keep the two peoples from mixing. The dark skin was the sign of the curse [not the curse itself]. The curse was the withdrawal of the Spirit of the Lord" (Religion 121–122 - Book of Mormon Student Manual, 2018, chapter 8). This is interesting. Your quote here is from Chapter 8 of the Church's 2018 Student Manual, which quotes an excerpt from Pres. Joseph Fielding Smith's "Answers to Gospel Questions." This same passage was quoted two years later in the Come Follow Me manual: Significantly, the Church publicly apologized for this, calling it an error (Deseret News) : See also LDS Living and KSL News. And also here (Millennial Star Blog). Ben Spackman quite helpfully weighed in as well: Inerrancy among Church Employees about Church Materials I even called them out on avoiding the central issues, which received no response. One of them said (quoting from a screenshot), Let’s set aside the traditional misunderstanding of the “steadying the ark” story. Let’s set aside the fact that Elder Stevenson demonstrates below that in this case, the ark did need steadying, as Curriculum, Correlation, and review failed to do its job— or more likely, simply saw nothing wrong with what had been written. Let’s set aside that manuals themselves invite feedback and constructive criticism via an email address. (Seriously, open any printed manual and look. I myself was one of those back in fall who was made aware of the problems with the printed manual, and privately raised my voice.) No, the problem is that while S&I may venerate these manuals because of their mythic view of the review process, it does not appear that such intensive Apostolic review actually corresponds to reality. (Even if it were, it would not guarantee the correctness of the material.) From the Deseret News on January 20, here is an Apostle speaking about this issue, my italics. A search of the Church's website indicates that the quote still appears in two places (neither which is the Come Follow Me manual) : The URLs for these two: https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/manual/book-of-mormon-student-manual-2018/chapter-8-2-nephi-4-8?lang=eng https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/manual/book-of-mormon-seminary-teacher-manual-2013/2-nephi/lesson-27?lang=eng Note that these manuals were published in 2018 and 2013, respectively, so both came out prior to the 2020 retraction/apology by Elder Stevenson as noted above. So, in Elder Stevenson’s words, this was a mistake in the manual, which escaped the attention of Church leaders. His words do not lend support to the view of these two S&I employees that the printed published manuals must be treated as the infallible word of God because they have been closely reviewed by Apostles. Nor does the printed history support it. Example 1, manuals change, sometimes 180 degrees. Ben's comments about expectations of infallible church manuals are, in my view, very worthwhile. I encourage you to read his entire post. I surmise - but cannot confirm - that the Church's historical retention of manuals (such as those published prior to 2020) may well include quotes which have since been set aside. Either that or the Church has only been made aware of the quote existing in the 2020 manual, and so has simply overlooked these other sources (from 2013 and 2018). In any event, let's go back to your critique that the Church "continues to teach in its seminary manuals" the very quote for which an apostle in the Church very publicly apologized, and which he explicitly said had been "mistakenly included in the printed version of the manual," and which quote he said - again, publicly - the Church had asked members to "disregard." Given what I have now presented to you, do you think your statement is accurate? Or would you consider re-visiting it? Okay. Could you then explain why you are claiming that the Church "continues to teach in its seminary manuals" items which were addressed in 2020 by Elder Stevenson in 2020 and removed from the current (2024) version? There's more to it than that. See the FAIR article titled, "What Does the Book of Mormon Mean by "Skin of Blackness"? "2 Skousen, Analysis of Textual Variants, 4–2:897, appears to follow the suggestion that there was a physical change in skin color. Discussing the change of white to pure in 2 Nephi 6:30 for the 1840 edition, he notes: "Of course, the 1840 change of white to pure avoids . . . the need to interpret the remnant of the Nephites as being dark skinned. In other words, the editing change to pure may represent a conscious attempt at avoiding what was perceived as a difficult reading (the Nephites as being dark skinned), which therefore explains why the change from white to pure was made here—and only here—in 2 Nephi 30:6. There has never been any attempt to emend any of the passages that directly comment on the dark skin of the Lamanites." Skousen's argument for the reason for the editorial change is persuasive. It persuades, however, that the reader's understanding of the text related to a change in pigmentation. It does not discuss the point made in this commentary of the text's use of skin as a metaphor rather than as a literal description". Despite the esthetic reword in later Book of Mormon versions, Alma 3:6-8 remains to lend support to the real intent of 2 Nephi 30:6. What do you feel is "the real intent of 2 Nephi 30:6"? The FAIR article you cite was written by Brant Gardner. An eminently erudite and sharp scholar, one of our best. But they were not taught as theories in the past. Perhaps not. But the issue has been corrected for some years now. Not sure about that. See above. Could you elaborate? Is the Church allowed, in your view, to correct past errors? Are all past errors instances of the Church "leading people astray"? What are your thoughts about Ben Spackman's comments about "infallible" manuals (or, errors leading some to consider manuals to be infallible)? For obvious reasons. Fortunately his and teachings by others are still available. Yes. That availability is a fulfillment of Mormon 9:32: The leaders of the Church are not perfect, nor are those responsible for overseeing the contents of its manuals. Mistakes happen. Those comments constitute false teaching. Well, perhaps, and perhaps not. Could you elaborate on the significance of this issue for you? Thanks, -Smac

Analytics just ran into the same issue when responding to a post of mine in this thread. Looks like the board is glitchy today. Take your time. Thanks, -Smac

I don’t understand. Analytics’ example showed a drag show being investigated under the earlier statue, Yes. That other statute was a less-than-ideal fit, but it's what was on the books at the time. Because an investigation is at the front end of a legal process, and may or may not culminate in a conviction, and I think the new statute was not in place at the time (I'm open to correction on that point). Thanks, -Smac

Okay. "The evidence that a minor suffers serious, lasting harm from a single or occasional vodka tonic is weak." And yet we still have a categorical prohibition against minors imbibing. Ah. How would this play out in the real world? Would you agree with the following statement? In the absence of legal constraints, children and/or their parents are at liberty to attend sexually explicit adult live performances, and so run the risk of "chronic exposure, exposure combined with abuse, or exposure to pornographic material." Claude apparently did not tell you that the "judges" referenced here are those who dissented. The actual decision held: "The Supreme Court of Florida’s definition of 'lewd' eliminates any overbreadth, and the use of the phrase 'age of the child present' does not render the Act unconstitutionally vague." That's the bummer thing about AI. It's not ready for primetime when it comes to substantive legal analysis. Two thoughts: First, the new statute seems to have harder definitional edges in many respects. Second, yes, the legislature can chill or prohibit a "disfavored expressive category" as long as it does so within the confines of the Constitution. And the 8th Circuit held that this is what Florida has done. I'm not persuaded that the statute was preemptive. I've previously provided ample citations to situations in which children have been exposed to explicitly sexual adult live performances. I'm reasonably confident there were instances of this in Florida. The statute, then, could be seen as remedial rather than preemptive. Either way, though, it is a legitimate legislative exercise. There is no principle of law that says that a legislature must sit on its hands and wait for a substantial number of harmful events to occur before it can take steps to mitigate or prohibit those events from happening. I agree with this. Sure. But the constitutional question was asked and answered by the 8th Circuit. Yes, parental rights are not absolute. Florida, like every state, has long imposed significant limits on parental authority. A few ordinary examples: Parents cannot consent to their child having sex with an adult. Age-of-consent and child-sex-offense laws categorically disable both the minor’s agreement and any parental attempt to authorize it. Parents cannot authorize female genital mutilation or most non-therapeutic sterilizations of minors. Parents can lose custody or have their rights terminated for abuse, neglect, or abandonment under Chapter 39; the state may intervene even over parental objection when a child’s safety is at stake. Compulsory education laws and certain vaccination/school-entry requirements constrain parental choice. Child labor laws limit the hours and types of work parents may permit. Parents cannot refuse life-saving medical treatment in many circumstances without the state being able to intervene. The Florida Parents’ Bill of Rights itself (Chapter 1014) explicitly states that it does not authorize a parent to engage in unlawful conduct or to abuse or neglect a child, and it does not apply to parental decisions that would end life. In short, parental rights in Florida have never been "near-absolute." They are fundamental but bounded by the child’s welfare and by specific statutory prohibitions. Pointing to limits on taking children to sexually explicit adult performances, or to restrictions on certain medical pathways for minors, does not uniquely contradict a previously “near-absolute” regime—because no such regime existed. The real debate is which limits are justified and whether they are applied consistently, not whether the state suddenly invented constraints on parental authority. I agree with this. I think it's a given. The "not as bad as" fallacy again. And I would like to see that literature. "That asymmetry is defensible only if one thinks religion is constitutionally special." Is there any question about religion being "constitutionally special"? Also, just because an action is taken under the rubric of "religion" does not protect it from state intervention. I am not aware that "Hooters, beauty pageants, and cheerleading routines" involve Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts I think this presupposes, rather than demonstrates, ulterior motives. Thanks, -Smac

The Economist (June 2024) : Research into trans medicine has been manipulated A Grok summary: Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy (January 2023) : The Myth of “Reliable Research” in Pediatric Gender Medicine: A critical evaluation of the Dutch Studies—and research that has followed A Grok summary: Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (June 2025) : The Façade of Medical Consensus: How Medical Associations Prioritize Politics Over Science A Grok summary: Thanks, -Smac

Your acting as if public screening R rated movies doesn't exist. Not quite. I am saying the comparison to R-rate movies does not really work here. Florida Statute § 847.013: Prohibits knowingly exhibiting, selling, renting, or-providing paid admission for minors to view motion pictures, shows, or representations depicting nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or abuse that is "harmful to minors". Violations are generally first-degree misdemeanors punishable by up to one year in jail. Florida Statute § 847.012: Criminalizes selling, renting, loaning, or distributing materials defined as harmful to minors to a child under 18. I think this is an example of the "not as bad as" fallacy, or the "fallacy of relative privation" or "appeal to worse problems" or the "starving children in Africa" argument. It happens when someone tries to dismiss a problem or complaint just because a worse problem exists somewhere else. You seem to be suggesting that until and unless I first express concern about this or that other social ill, it is not legitimate for me to speak about the one under discussion here. I respectfully do not agree with that proposition. Thanks, -Smac

My original post was based on a news item, for which I provided a link. That news item quoted Gov. DeSantis, but it also stated: "Critics have argued the measure could be used to crack down on certain drag performances and chill free expression." Overall, I thought the article did a good job of clinically describing the news item at hand. This misconstrues both the legal background of this case and what this particular law actually changes in Florida. Could you elaborate? What am I misconstruing? I was not parroting Gov. DeSantis. I was expressing my own viewpoint, which happens to be similar to his. Existing laws in Florida include: Fla. Stat. § 847.013 — Exposing minors to harmful shows and exhibitions Fla. Stat. § 800.04(7) — Lewd or lascivious exhibition before a person under sixteen Fla. Stat. § 847.011(4) — Obscene live performances Fla. Stat. § 847.0133 — Showing obscene material to a minor Fla. Stat. § 800.03 — Exposure of sexual organs Fla. Stat. § 847.012 — Harmful material distributed to minors Fla. Stat. § 827.071 — Sexual performances by children and child pornography Fla. Stat. § 796.07 — Places operated for “lewdness” Fla. Stat. § 823.05 — Public nuisances involving lewdness or illegal conduct Fla. Stat. § 877.03 — Disorderly conduct and breach of the peace ... I would say the closest real-world parallel to Fla. Stat. § 827.11 — Exposing children to an adult live performance is Fla. Stat. § 847.013 — Exposing minors to harmful shows and exhibitions. Okay. Thank you for this list, and for the comparison between 827.11 and 847.013. I asked Grok to compare the two: What are your thoughts about this? Do you think the earlier statute was sufficient to cover drag shows? Way back in the day I clerked for a judge in Tacoma who heard an interesting criminal case about a guy manufacturing meth. He had been pulled over in his truck, the bed of which was full of boxes containing jars filled with alcohol and a white sludge at the bottom, which turned out to be powdered Sudafed tablets. My recollection is that everyone, including the criminal defense attorney, agreed that the only possible purpose for having jars full of alcohol with powdered Sudafed was to make meth, which is a controlled substance. However, the criminal statute in place at the time only criminalized the production of a controlled substance, which had not yet happened (since there was no meth or other controlled substances in the truck, just a bunch of pseudoephedrine, which is not a controlled substance). The criminal defense attorney argued that the statute - as worded - only criminalized the completion of "production," not interim steps are are incrementally headed that way. He also contrasted Washington's statute with Idaho's, which did criminalize both "production" and "taking a substantial step towards the production" of controlled substances. The judge agreed with the criminal defense attorney and dismissed the case. The prosecutor was not happy, but the judge noted that criminal statutes are often refined by these sorts of developments, which eventually filter up to the legislature so that they can fill in the gaps. Another example: Years ago I worked with a criminal defense attorney in Utah. He came back from a hearing and said that he had succeeded in getting serious criminal charges against my client dismissed. The criminal statute in question was sort of complex, but basically criminalized physical contact between an adult's mouth, genitals or hands with any part of a minor's genitals or anus. However, there was one combination that the legislature had left out, namely, an adults mouth to a minor's anus. This was precisely what the police had charged the defendant, and the statute did not criminalize it, so the defendant effectively got away with it. It is my understanding that in both instances the state legislatures have either amended existing statutes or enacted new ones to address the foregoing "gaps" in what the criminal statutes cover. I think something similar happened in Florida. I think what is illegitimate and imaginary is Ron DeSantis's claim, which you parrotted, that this particular law shouldn't even be controversial, and the implication that his political oponents are against "limiting minors access to sxualized events." I'm not sure I understand your position. Do you think the statute is controversial or not? I don’t have an absolute rule. I can imagine sufficiently extreme sexual conduct where the state would be justified in overriding parental consent. Fair enough. Can you allow for principled departure from your position on this? Is it possible and reasonable that citizens and their legislative representatives might prefer to not limited constraints to only "sufficiently extreme sexual conduct"? I would be interested in hearing what you feel these "real questions" are. But isn't this what the legislative process is for? To make judgment calls about "whether Florida's existing laws" were sufficient to address whether children should be allowed to view highly sexualized live adult performances? As for "whether § 827.11 makes Florida a better place to live and raise a family," I think it does. You (apparently?) do not. Again, isn't that what the legislative process does all the time? Just as I don't think Florida needs redundant laws, I don't think other states need them, either. Okay. I think we just disagree about redundancy, as I think the statutes overlap but still have some material differences. Criminal statutes are regularly created or refined to address more particularized behaviors. I don't think anyone has made "the suggestion that, before § 827.11, Florida was helpless to protect children from sexually inappropriate live entertainment." Again, criminal statutes are amended or created all the time to more specifically address particularized behaviors. As noted above, § 827.11 seems to cover ground that other statutes did not, or did not cover with clarity and concision. I believe the importance of a topic like this should depend, at least in part, on how much actual harm it causes individuals and society. Okay. Is it possible that exposing children to highly sexualized live adult performances causes "actual harm" to individuals and/or society? Do you think legislatures and societies are obligated to wait until "actual harm" accrues and becomes a very serious problem before taking steps to legislative mitigate it? Can it be reasonable and appropriate for legislatures to take reasonable preemptive steps to avoid the "actual harm" before it actually harms society and individuals? I have previously posted a number of news items about children being exposed to highly sexualized behaviors at drag shows, "Pride" parades, and so on. A sampling: SF Cop Says Nudity Around Kids is OK at Pride Parade Graphic “Pride” Parades Attacking the Innocence of Children San Francisco Pride Parade features public nudity around kids, 'Fetish Zone' with urine Why drag queen performances are not appropriate for children Yes, kink belongs at Pride. And I want my kids to see it. Don't Look Away: These Are the 'Family-Friendly' Pride Events the Left Is Pushing On Kids Prepping Kids for a Pride Parade Journalist Witnesses Naked Men Playing with Kids at Pride Children as Sex Objects: Why NYC Gay Pride Parade Is Being Called a 'Celebration of Pedophilia' DC Pride parade marked by depravity, grooming of children despite ‘family friendly’ billing Pride Parade Clips Show Shocking and Bizarre Moments — with Children in Attendance Pride Month Jumps the Shark Yale Professor Wants Your Kids To See Sex At Pride Parades So They’re Not ‘Homophobes’ Dallas Club Investigated After Drag Show for Kids Why Drag Events for Kids Are Inappropriate—And Actually Work Against the LGBT Community Children to experience sexual content at "Drag the kids to pride" (video included) Not for children! A lot of the events in the foregoing links involve quite a bit more than “a hip thrust or two” or “bare-chested men who wouldn’t have been out of place at a Madonna concert.” What "made-up" incidents are you referring to here? We have had all sorts of discussions about bishops who have abused children while acting in that capacity. Given the size of the Church, the number of actual incidents is statistically tiny, but does that mean that the Church can therefore safely disregard the issue, take not remedial efforts to mitigate risks, etc.? Also, is it ever appropriate for a legislature to anticipate, and preemptively take steps to curb or avoid, "widespread threats to children" before they actually materialize? Also, is it possible that the legislature in Florida decided that the exposure of children to highly sexualized adult live performances was sufficiently "widespread" as to warrant a statutory response? I think this is an example of the "not as bad as" fallacy, or the "fallacy of relative privation" or "appeal to worse problems" or the "starving children in Africa" argument. It happens when someone tries to dismiss a problem or complaint just because a worse problem exists somewhere else. Well, yes. Legislators may well be incentivized to pass laws that they think will please their constituencies. We live in a pluralistic society, so there are differences of opinions. Some people may indeed have "beliefs and cultures" in which it is acceptable to expose children to highly sexualized live adult performances (if you would like to identify these, feel free). Other people, meanwhile, have "beliefs and cultures" which find that unacceptable. We generally let the democratic process govern such differences. That said, the result is that legislatures pass laws to be enforced by the State and by law enforcement. Previously you said that the new statute was unnecessary/redundant because preexisting statutes were already sufficient to address the issue. Do you characterize those statutes as "tak{ing} away parents rights"? Here you seem to be saying that the statute amounts to "new exercises of state power," which would seem to suggest that the new statute is not "redundant" after all (since its effect is "new"). Could you clarify? What is it that you think is "really going on here"? I appreciate your input. Thanks, -Smac

I understand the skepticism about legislative motives. Politicians of every stripe mix principle, politics, and constituency pressure, and it is fair to question whether a particular bill is primarily about child protection or about "signaling." That said, the comparison to R-rated movies watched with parents does not seem to work. An R-rated film is a recorded work that parents can preview, control, and contextualize in private. A live performance in a commercial or public venue is different in setting, immediacy, and the degree of parental control once the child is present. Existing law already treats live adult entertainment, obscenity, and age-restricted venues differently from private viewing of movies for related reasons. A person can criticize the Florida statute as poorly drafted, politically timed, or broader than necessary, but I think he could do that without treating every age-based limit on sexualized live performances as illegitimate religious lawfare. However, the reverse is also true: existing gaps or inconsistencies in how other forms of content are regulated do not automatically prove that any restriction in this area is pretextual. I would be interested in your responses to the questions I posed above: Do you believe there should be any age-based legal limits on the sexual content of live performances that minors can attend, or is your position that parental consent should be the sole and final authority in every case? If Florida’s prior obscenity and harmful-to-minors statutes already fully solved the problem, why do similar age restrictions exist in many other states and localities for adult entertainment venues, strip clubs, and certain performances? Are those also unnecessary? CB compared this law to forcing children to read the Bible. What is the closest real-world parallel you see: is restricting minors from a sexualized stage performance more like compelled religious exercise, or more like existing limits on minors’ access to pornography, alcohol, or adult businesses? Thank you for your participation. -Smac

I can't tell whether you want to have a serious conversation about this. I do want to have a serious conversation. Could you explain what part(s) of my comments are causing confusion on this point? Existing laws against obscenity and harmful material to minors are relevant, and it’s fair to ask whether a new statute is necessary or carefully drawn. Legislatures sometimes pass overlapping or politically timed measures; that criticism is not unique to this issue. That said, equating a law that restricts minors’ access to performances meeting a statutory definition of sexual or lewd content with a proposal about litter boxes in schools is a category error. One involves regulating adult-oriented sexualized performances in the presence of children. The other addresses a largely anecdotal or satirical claim that never reflected widespread policy. Treating them as the same kind of “made-up problem” collapses distinct questions into a single partisan narrative. I am willing to examine whether this particular statute is vague, overbroad, or redundant with prior law. I am less persuaded by the claim that any effort to set age-based limits on sexualized live performances must be dismissed as pure identity politics. Consequently, please identify which preexisting Florida statutes which you think already cover the same ground as the above-referenced statute covers. The underlying interest—limiting children’s exposure to certain sexual content in public or commercial settings—is not new, and it is a legitimate governmental objective. Children really are being exposed to highly sexualized content. While reasonable disagreement exists about the means and the drafting of the statute, that is different from saying the entire subject is imaginary. That’s a fair description of the procedural history. The district court and a majority of the original panel found a substantial likelihood of success on the vagueness and overbreadth claims and issued a broad injunction. Five judges on the en banc court agreed with that view in dissent. The en banc majority of eight, however, disagreed. It held that the statute’s use of “lewd,” as construed under existing Florida law, and its age-variable standard did not render the Act facially unconstitutional, and it vacated the injunction. Close divisions among judges are common on difficult First Amendment questions; they do not themselves establish that the losing side’s position is the correct one. The controlling decision at this stage is the en banc majority’s. That is a legitimate policy question, and it is distinct from the constitutional one the en banc court decided. I don't think I have claimed that the statute was the only possible way to address the issue, or that Florida’s prior obscenity and harmful-to-minors laws were a complete nullity. Legislatures often add overlapping or more specific tools when they conclude existing provisions are hard to apply to live performances, slow to enforce, or uncertain in scope when the event is marketed as entertainment rather than explicit adult material. Whether this particular law was necessary is a judgment call about legislative priorities and drafting. Reasonable people can conclude it was redundant, poorly tailored, or politically motivated. My point has been narrower: the underlying interest in setting some age-based limits on sexualized live performances is not inherently illegitimate, and the en banc court found the statute survived the facial constitutional challenge that was brought. Necessity and constitutionality are related but not identical questions. I am open to arguments that better-drafted or more targeted tools would have been preferable. Those are reasonable criteria for evaluating any statute. I'm not sure the statute in question scores perfectly on all of them. Clearer definitions and tighter tailoring are almost always preferable. Age-variable standards can create practical uncertainty for venues. Parental autonomy deserves due weight and deference (due, but not unlimited). Any law that touches expressive conduct needs safeguards against selective or viewpoint-driven enforcement. The dissent emphasized these concerns, and they are worth taking seriously in application. My position is not that the statute is a model of legislative craftsmanship. Rather, I think the state has a legitimate interest in placing some outer limits on sexualized live performances involving minors. I also think that existing - and constitutionally valid - categories of regulation (obscenity, harmful-to-minors material, age restrictions on adult entertainment) already reflect that interest, and that the en banc court found the facial constitutional challenge unlikely to succeed. One can accept those points while still preferring narrower drafting, stronger definitional clarity, or greater deference to parental decision-making in close cases. So while criticizing the law's language or design is fair, but I think that treating the entire subject as illegitimate or imaginary is a different claim. A few questions for you: Do you believe there should be any age-based legal limits on the sexual content of live performances that minors can attend, or is your position that parental consent should be the sole and final authority in every case? If Florida’s prior obscenity and harmful-to-minors statutes already fully solved the problem, why do similar age restrictions exist in many other states and localities for adult entertainment venues, strip clubs, and certain performances? Are those also unnecessary? CB compared this law to forcing children to read the Bible. What is the closest real-world parallel you see: is restricting minors from a sexualized stage performance more like compelled religious exercise, or more like existing limits on minors’ access to pornography, alcohol, or adult businesses? This is an important and difficult topic. I appreciate your efforts to treat it seriously. Thanks, -Smac

Do you find it troubling at all when the state starts to take over and decide what is appropriate or not appropriate rather than let the parents of their own children decide how they raise their children? I do think parental authority should be the default, and state intervention in family decisions deserves close scrutiny. Neither of these considerations is absolute. We as a society already accept a number of limits that apply even when parents might consent: Minimum age for alcohol Restrictions on tattoos and certain body modifications Child labor laws Prohibitions on exposing minors to obscenity or pornography Do you agree or disagree with these other instances of the state "tak{ing} over and decid{ing} what is appropriate or not appropriate" for children "rather than let the parents ... decide"? I would assume you agree with them, but I am open to correction. In any event, the debate seems to really be about where the line belongs, not whether any line can exist. I am open to arguments that this particular statute is drawn too broadly or too vaguely. I just do not accept the premise that the state must stay entirely out of the question of what sexualized content is appropriate for children in public or commercial settings. I would be interested in hearing more from you about this topic. That’s a useful test of the principle, so let’s take it seriously. Forcing children to read the Bible (or any religious text), or "anti-Mormon literature," either of which being against their parents’ beliefs, would be a clear establishment of religion and a direct violation of both parental rights and the Free Exercise Clause. The state would be affirmatively compelling a particular religious practice or viewpoint. Restricting minors’ access to sexualized live performances is a different category. It does not compel anyone to adopt a belief, practice a religion, or consume any particular content. It sets a boundary on what commercial or public adult-oriented sexual material may be presented to children. That kind of age-based restriction already exists in many areas (obscenity laws, pornography, alcohol, tobacco, certain performances) without being treated as equivalent to compelled religious instruction. One can consistently support parental primacy on matters of religious upbringing while also supporting some outer limits on the sexual content to which children can be exposed in public or commercial settings. The two are not the same exercise of state power. Respectfully, no, I am not advocating for that. I am not advocating a “takeover” of parenting. I am defending the idea that the state may set some outer limits on the sexual content to which children can be exposed in public or commercial settings—just as it already does with obscenity, pornography, alcohol, and certain performances. Parental judgment remains primary in most areas, but that does not mean it is the only consideration when the question is what adults may present to other people’s children in shared spaces. The law in question is not limited to “drag shows.” It targets all live performances (not just drag shows) that meet a statutory definition involving nudity, sexual conduct, lewdness, etc., when those performances are deemed unsuitable for the age of the child present. Some events marketed as family-friendly have included highly sexualized elements; others have not. Treating every drag performance as identical is no more accurate than treating every restriction as a ban on two moms in a picture book. Could you clarify your perspective? If a drag show does not violate the statute, then the statute would not apply. Do you therefore endorse drag shows which do violate the statute? Drag shows depicting or simulating: Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts? Or putting aside specific endorsement, do you think children should be exposed to these behaviors? Or is your perspective more about leaving such matters to parents? If so, what are the parameters you envision? Are parental rights inviolate in your view? If not, what limitations do you think can or should exist? As for quantified “proven harm” from every possible exposure: that is a high bar that we do not require in most other areas of child-protection law. We do not demand a precise body count of damaged children before restricting minors’ access to pornography, strip clubs, or other adult sexual material. The question is whether the state may draw any age-based line around sexualized live performances at all. I think it may. Reasonable minds can disagree about where exactly that line should sit and how clearly a statute must define it. Thank you for sharing your perspective. Thanks, -Smac

That’s a fair question about definitions. Vague or elastic terms in any criminal or regulatory statute are worth scrutinizing, because the people enforcing them will not always share our priorities or judgment. Nevertheless, the existence of hard cases or bad-faith actors does not mean we abandon the underlying category. That a concept cannot be defined with exacting precision does not mean it cannot be defined at all. We already have legal concepts like “obscenity,” “harmful to minors,” “indecent exposure,” and age-based restrictions on alcohol, tobacco, and certain performances. Those terms are also contested at the margins, yet most people still accept that some line exists between material appropriate for adults and material that should not be presented to children in public or commercial settings. The examples you raise (books depicting same-sex parents, or a same-sex kiss in Lightyear) are not the same as sexually explicit or lewd live adult performances. Conflating ordinary representation of gay people with adult sexual content is, I think, a category error that makes productive disagreement harder. One can support age restrictions on sexualized entertainment without supporting the removal of books that simply show two moms or two dads. Here is a copy of the en banc decision from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Here is a Grok summary of its treatment of the two phrases you referenced: I am happy discuss where the line should be drawn and how clearly the statute defines it. I am less persuaded that the risk of overreach by “the wrong people” means there should be no enforceable line at all when it comes to minors and sexual content. Thank you for sharing your perspective. -Smac

I find it more troubling that you trust the government to make these decisions for families rather than trusting parents to decide what is appropriate for their own children. Thank you for sharing your perspective. I think most of us have a healthy dose of skepticism in terms of relying on the State to intervene in family matters. We should be cautious about state intervention in areas that traditionally fall under parental judgment. Parents generally know their own children best, and government overreach in family life is something worth watching carefully. That said, the principle of parental authority has never been absolute when it comes to protecting minors from certain harms. We already accept a number of limits even when parents might consent: Minors generally cannot get tattoos or certain body modifications without restrictions, regardless of parental approval. Parents cannot lawfully provide alcohol to their underage children in most settings. Child labor laws restrict the hours and types of work minors can perform, even with parental permission. Mandatory schooling and certain medical reporting requirements exist precisely because society has decided some baseline protections apply to children as a class. In each of these cases, the law draws a line based on the view that children lack full capacity to consent to certain risks, and that parental judgment, while primary, is not the only consideration. The debate over whether sexually explicit performances fall into that same category is a legitimate policy disagreement. But the existence of some outer limits on what adults (including parents) can expose children to is not a novel or radical idea. This is already already embedded in many areas of law. I am open to arguments about where exactly that line should be drawn in this specific context. I just don’t think the principle itself, that the State may set some protective boundaries for minors irrespective of parental oversight, is inherently illegitimate. So what are your thoughts. Per the article, children cannot attend adult live performances depicting or simulating: Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts Do you think parents should be allowed to have their children attend adult live performances which feature these sorts of things? Or is your position more of a "I just think parental rights should supersede governmental oversight" sort of thing? Thanks, -Smac

A news item about a federal appellate court decision: Florida’s old ‘drag show’ law can be enforced once again. Here’s what that means I find it troubling that limiting minors' access to sexualized events is controversial, and that a federal judge stopped it, and that the decision by the federal appellate court to reverse it was sort of close (8-5). I think encouraging minors to attend events such as this amounts to sexualization and grooming. It seems, though, that only venues with drag shows are trying to attract children to their "adult live performance{s}." The statute does not single out any sexual/gender orientation or identity of the performers, and yet the only lawsuit challenging it is about drag shows. It will be interesting to see how the case turns out. Frankly, I would not be surprised if it dies on the vine. Sexualization and grooming. The statute "crack{s} down" on venues which invite children to attend sexually explicit live performances. The only "certain drag performances" which will be affected are those which violate the statute. Performances which violate the statute live performances depicting or simulating: Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts This is a reasonable statute, IMO. A good result here. Thanks, -Smac

I wonder if she was "willing to alter stuff on plural marriage" because she was personally so troubled by it. She wanted to create a narrative that conformed to her preferences on that subject. Perhaps notably, her sons stated that they "apologized to our mother for putting the questions respecting polygamy and plural wives, as we felt we ought to do." Even decades later, the topic was very painful to her. I don't know that she had a motive to substantively depart from the truth as to other matters in her life. See here: See here: Thanks, -Smac