smac97

From the DesNews article: I am not sure what sort of nomenclature need be deployed here. I'm not sure what you are asking here. In this chapter Abinadi is quoted as speaking of "the wicked." There is no racial or skin color component to verse 3 (moreover, Abinadi was speaking to a Nephite king). Or it may reflect the possibility that not everyone who encountered this error was pained by it. You would first need to demonstrate that any "waiting" was involved. I think the disavowal is what we have. Reasonable minds can disagree about collective guilt, the utility of public "apologies," and the like. I think the Church, and more particularly its leaders, has gone through long an arduous processes intended to differentiate doctrine from conjecture and personal opinion, as such differentiations were not always made. I made these comments in 2016: And in 2022: I think this has some application to the teaching of our doctrine as well. Perhaps you could clarify what you mean by "led its members astray." I think there was a lot more to it than that. See, e.g., these comments of mine from 2018 (regarding the Priesthood Ban) : Prince also provides this fascinating account (p. 104): This uncharacteristic outburst in the presence of an astonished church architect highlights the contrast between two strands in McKay's thought that are, by today's standard, inseparably joined: civil rights for blacks and priesthood ordination for black men. The blurring, combined with McKay's own reticence, means that this difference has not been understood until now. By Prince's accounting, Pres. McKay wanted to rescind the ban, but was told by the Lord to "not bring the subject up with the Lord again; that the time will come, but it will not be my time, and to leave the subject alone." You seem to be suggesting that the Civil Rights Movement was a major precipitating cause of the 1978 revelation, and you cite Prince as your source. But Prince's citations about McKay's efforts to rescind the ban have it starting around 1954 (if not earlier), when the Civil Rights Movement was in its infancy. Meanwhile, the revelation came in 1978, fourteen years after the Civil Rights Movement was at its apex (1964). And more to the point, Prince characterizes Pres. McKay as having "built the foundation upon which the revelation to Spencer W. Kimball rests," and this foundation was built by repeatedly seeking revelatory guidance. Prince seems to have very little to say about Pres. McKay (the president of the Church during the entirety of the Civil Rights Era) being influenced by the "pretty big spectacle" of "activism for blacks receiving the priesthood." Furthermore, Edward Kimball traces efforts to address the ban back to 1948 (pp. 18-19). Thoughts? Noted. I will reword that claim when the LDS Church removes the error, which leads people astray. Why was it found in manuals and books prior to 2020? Because the LDS Church continued to teach what previous LDS Presidents and apostles taught as "truth". If you can show me where Joseph Fielding Smith and others taught it as opinion, speculation, or theory, then let me know with specific words of his or theirs to that effect. See above. I am happy to listen to what you have to say on this point. It appears that you are inferring notions of prophetic/apostolic infallibility, and that any demonstrated flaw or error in their actions and words amounts to "lead{ing} the Church astray." For this conversation to be effective, I think you will need to define and explain, rather than presuppose, these things. I would say that one error does not make an entire manual fallible. Okay. What does make "an entire manual fallible"? What manuals do you believe to be "entire{ly} ... fallible"? Okay. I guess this goes back to the presuppositions about leading the Church astray. I'd like to better understand your perspective on that. What do you think defines a "false teacher"? Do you differentiate between a "false teacher" and a person who harbors some errors in their understanding of doctrine? If so, how? I appreciate your input. Thanks, -Smac

No. Don’t misrepresent the article. From the article, self-identity plus surgical transition = "welcome to use the facility." Fair enough. "Welcome to use the facility" = post-operative "trans women." Other trans women are not allowed to use the facility. The difficulty with the “social contract” approach is that it only functions while the underlying categories remain relatively stable and widely shared. Once law and institutional policy treat self-identification as the sole and decisive criterion, the informal expectations you describe lose their force. The person who declines to “not make waves” is no longer merely being inconsiderate; he is asserting a right that others are expected to honor. At that point, grace and common sense are no longer the governing standards—legal entitlement is. Olympus Spa illustrates the problem. The spa is not asking the state to criminalize anyone. It is asking to maintain a facility whose core service involves communal female nudity. When the state declares that self-identification overrides that boundary, the “make common-sense accommodations” model has already been displaced by a rule. The remaining question is whether that rule has any coherent limit. So far, none has been supplied. The same pattern appears in sex-separated sports. An informal expectation that males will not compete in female categories works only so long as the categories themselves are understood to be based on sex. When eligibility is redefined solely by subjective self-identity, the expectation becomes optional, and the competitive and safety interests of female athletes are subordinated to the identity claim. This is no longer a "live and let live" scenario, but rather a "whose interests are subordinated to others'" scenario. Grace and case-by-case judgment are valuable, but they are not a substitute for clear categories in domains such as we are seeing here: intimate spaces (Olympus Spa), competitive sport (Lia Thomas, WNBA), prisons, shelters. These are environments where physical sex remains material. A limiting principle is simply the recognition that those categories cannot remain coherent if they are endlessly revised or overridden by subjective assertion. I think this does not accurately characterize, or else understates, the sequence of events. The issue did not originate with politicians inventing a controversy. It arose when institutions and advocacy groups began treating self-identification as sufficient to redefine sex-based categories in sports, prisons, shelters, and intimate facilities, and when those changes produced concrete conflicts over fairness, privacy, and safety. Some politicians may have later amplified the issue, as they do with most culturally charged questions. That does not mean the underlying tensions were manufactured. Female athletes who lost opportunities, women in shelters who raised safety concerns, and businesses like Olympus Spa that faced legal pressure over nude facilities were responding to real policy shifts, not to campaign messaging. I'm reminded of this, which I have seen on social media several times: See, e.g., here: Replace CRT with "biological men in women's sports," and it looks like you are at "Step 2." I think we can criticize political opportunism on all sides without concluding that the only reason the subject exists is electoral calculation. The practical collisions between sex-based boundaries and identity-based claims would still require resolution even if every politician remained silent. Are you okay with that policy? Yes, I am okay with that policy. I would be in favor of some provision for people with clearly-diagnosed DSDs, but I'm not sure if that is present in the current NCAA guidelines or not. I think the policy already has a limiting principle, namely, biological sex. The policy "does not permit competition by an individual assigned male at birth to compete on a women’s team," with "no waivers available." Ipso facto, {S}tudents assigned male at birth may not compete on a women’s team with amended birth certificates or other forms of ID. Student-athletes assigned male at birth may not receive athletic scholarships that are otherwise designated for women. If competition occurs, the team will be considered a mixed team and not eligible to compete against women’s teams. This also applies to a student-athlete assigned male at birth competing as an individual against women. Such individual competition is not permitted under the policy. Putting aside the question for potential exemptions for persons with DSDs, I think this policy works, and is reasonable. It looks like we substantively agree. TL;DR. Skimmed it. Yes, I agree with the Kansas law, for the same reason as is noted above, namely, that it is based on biological sex. I am, however, open to listening to alternatives. If we are to set aside biological sex as a limiting principle, what will replace it? Subjective "self-identity"? Nothing? I would submit that calling a requirement that government-issued identification reflect biological sex “arbitrary” and “dehumanizing” misuses both words. Biological sex is not an arbitrary classification. It is an observable, binary, and medically significant fact in every human being, and which is only in question in a statistically tiny number of situations (people with DSDs). Governments routinely record it for the same reason they record date of birth, height, or citizenship: those facts are relevant to identity verification, public safety, medical treatment, and the administration of sex-based rules (prisons, sports, shelters, etc.). Treating sex as if it were a subjective preference, while treating height or age as fixed, is - in my view - the more "arbitrary" approach. Nor is accurate recording of sex "dehumanizing." Recognizing physical reality does not deny anyone’s humanity, dignity, or moral worth. It simply declines to rewrite material facts in official documents. We do not allow people to declare a different age, height, or blood type on a license because they strongly identify with another number. Sex is not, or should not be, uniquely exempt from that principle. One can debate the wisdom or scope of any particular ID policy. But describing the recognition of biological sex as fascistic or dehumanizing collapses serious disagreement into moral denunciation. It also inverts the ordinary meaning of “arbitrary”: a rule grounded in a stable, empirically verifiable characteristic is the opposite of arbitrary. I guess that takes us to "Step 4" ("People freaking out about it are the real problem"). That does not follow at all. Recognizing that human beings are a sexually binary species does not imply that every individual must be a perfect, unambiguous exemplar of one sex or the other in order to count as human. Developmental variations and disorders of sex development exist. They are medical conditions that occur within the binary framework of male and female; they do not create additional sexes or dissolve the binary. We do not say that someone born with an extra chromosome, a limb difference, or a congenital heart defect is “not human” because they deviate from the statistical norm. The same logic applies here. Atypical development does not erase the underlying categories; it is defined by reference to them. The claim that affirming the sex binary somehow expels people with DSDs from the human family is a non sequitur. It confuses the existence of edge cases with the non-existence of the categories those edge cases depart from. I think it matters that we try, as best we can, to seek and defend what is true. When a person's request is not merely for compassion or accommodation, but for the affirmation (increasingly demanded more than merely "requested") that sex is determined by identity rather than biology, we are being asked to treat a proposition at odds with physical reality as if it were fact. That is a different kind of demand, and it is reasonable to decline it where, as here, there are ample reasoned grounds to disagree with the request/demand. Thanks, -Smac

Thank you for your input. Could you clarify? What distinction do you see between "a woman" and "a trans woman"? If you'd prefer to not clarify, that's fine. Thanks, -Smac

From the article: So "self-identity" plus surgical transition = "woman." Is this a valid "limiting principle"? If not, why not? If yes, then what do we make of, for example, Lia Thomas? I'd be interested in hearing others' thoughts on this. @Analytics, this is one of any number of examples as to why "limiting principles" can be important and necessary. Thanks, -Smac

I agree with you. Context matters. And once it does, we have already conceded that self-identification is not an absolute that must be accepted without further inquiry. In ordinary social settings we often extend courtesy and decline to interrogate someone’s stated identity. That is a social practice, not a metaphysical rule. When the claim is used to demand entry into a sex-separated space, a competitive category, or a legal protection that was created on the basis of sex, context does matter—and the relevant context includes biological sex, physical reality, and the interests of the other people in that space or category. The analogy to “I love you” is quite useful. We do not treat every utterance of those words as binding or sincere regardless of circumstances. We evaluate them in light of behavior, setting, and consequence. The same is true here. If self-identification is decisive in every context, then the Kanter/White-style claims cannot be dismissed as illegitimate; they meet the stated criterion. If those claims can be dismissed because of context, motive, or physical reality, then self-identification was never the actual rule, sex and material distinction still are. You cannot have it both ways: either self-identification is the controlling standard, or context (including sex) is allowed to limit it. The moment context is admitted as relevant, the claim that self-identification must be accepted without question no longer holds. I would like to hear more of what you have to say about this. if "context matters," which contexts allow us to question/dispute a person's subjective "self-identity" and which do not? And who is it that decides which contexts matter? Thanks, -Smac ETA: Just saw this: A few responses: Seems like there are no "limiting principles" and context doesn't matter, until there are and it does. Thanks, -Smac

Why does there need to be a limiting principle? That's a fair question, but perhaps it is answered by Enes Kanter Freedom's declaration for joining the WNBA. In the absence of a limiting principle, what would prevent him or any other male from joining? I think the question is not whether every individual must be policed at the door. It is whether the category itself retains any stable meaning. But to answer your question anyway: Sex-separated spaces exist because of average physical differences and because many people—particularly women—have legitimate interests in privacy and safety that are tied to sex, not to appearance or self-description. A rule that reduces the matter entirely to individual comfort and self-identification removes the basis for having the separation in the first place. If the only criterion is how someone feels or how they present, then the boundary becomes whatever any person says it is. That is the practical meaning of having no limiting principle. Most people already navigate these spaces with a degree of common sense and restraint. The difficulty arises when policy formally elevates self-identification over sex. At that point the rule is no longer an informal social accommodation; it becomes an entitlement that others are expected to accept regardless of their own privacy or safety concerns. Trusting individuals to decide “what’s most appropriate” works only so long as everyone shares roughly the same understanding of the underlying categories. I don't think we can really say that anymore, or else we are saying it now to re-assert what has been diminished in recent years. Once that shared understanding is replaced by an unbounded identity claim, the trust model no longer resolves the conflict. Rather, it simply declares one side the winner. We as a society can support reasonable, case-by-case accommodations for people with gender dysphoria without accepting the premise that sex-based boundaries are illegitimate or that any limiting principle is unnecessary. The two positions are not the same. Some domains are low-stakes and can reasonably be left to personal preference—clothing, hairstyles, and forms of address among willing participants. Other domains are not. Bathrooms, locker rooms, shelters, and sex-separated sports involve shared physical spaces or competitive fairness where sex remains material. In those settings, treating self-identification as decisive does not merely expand individual choice; it revises the terms on which everyone else must participate. So I think a "limiting principle" (or principles) is/are needed precisely because resources and spaces are finite and because the original rationale for separating them by sex does not vanish just because someone asserts a different identity. Without such a principle, the category becomes unbounded: any male who claims a female identity is entitled to the same access or eligibility. That is not a neutral “case-by-case” approach; it is a rule that privileges one set of claims over the privacy, safety, and fairness interests of others. We can be personally indifferent to the WNBA’s internal decisions and yet still recognize that the league’s choice of criterion has consequences for the integrity of women’s sport. The same is true of other sex-separated spaces. And these decisions are not limited to the WNBA. I submit that the existence of rare developmental conditions (DSDs) does not require us to treat sex as irrelevant, nor does it obligate us to accept self-identification as the sole or overriding standard. Though some "complexity" exists, it does not erase the underlying distinction or the reasons the distinction was drawn in the first place. I appreciate you sharing your thoughts. Thanks, -Smac

Except they are saying they do identify as women. And in virtually every other circumstance the questioning of a person's self-identity is verboten. I think you are entitled to dispute their self-identification by suggesting they are doing this "to make a political point." Are others entitled to dispute the "self-identification" of other trans women by suggesting they are doing this to garner attention and/or because they have a mental illness? If not, why not? Also, what is the limiting principle here? When are we at liberty to dispute someone's wholly subjective "self-identity" (as you have done here) and when are we not at liberty to do so? I don't see how you can make such a distinction without running afoul of the "Special Pleading" fallacy. Thank you for sharing your thoughts on this. You are right that there is no constitutional right to play in the WNBA, and that sports organizations are generally free to set their own eligibility rules. No dispute there, really. The difficulty is that the rule the league (and many similar bodies) has effectively adopted — eligibility based on self-identification as a woman — does not contain a coherent limiting principle. Once the category is defined by identity rather than sex, it becomes difficult to explain, on principled grounds, why a male who identifies as a woman is admitted while another male who makes the same claim (even if the claim is perceived as insincere or political) is excluded. The distinction ends up resting on judgments about motive or authenticity rather than on a clear, pre-announced standard. Weight classes in wrestling are, I think, different in kind. They rest on a measurable criterion (body weight) that is applied uniformly. Self-identification is not a comparable criterion; it is subjective and, by design, not externally verifiable. That is why the “complexity” associated with DSDs does not function as a stable limiting principle for a self-ID rule. DSDs are medical conditions, whereas the prevailing eligibility claim is not medical at all. One can prefer that the WNBA simply decide the matter for itself. But if the decision is going to be defended as fair or principled, it still needs a workable definition of the category it is protecting. Self-identification alone has not supplied one. The world is certainly more complicated than slogans and declarations, and rare developmental conditions (DSDs) certainly exist. That does not mean the underlying binary is arbitrary, or that every boundary drawn on the basis of sex is therefore illegitimate, or that biological males who subjectively "identify" as women have no material distinction from those few people with DSDs. Sex-based spaces such as bathrooms, locker rooms, and shelters were created for reasons of privacy, safety, and dignity that track average physical differences and the reality of sexual offense patterns. Those reasons do not disappear because a small number of people experience gender dysphoria or because some individuals feel more comfortable in the opposite facility. Comfort is not the only interest at stake; the interests of the other people using the space also count. A rule that simply says “use the facility that matches your self-identified gender” has no internal limiting principle. It provides no coherent basis for excluding anyone who makes the same claim. Once the criterion becomes subjective and unverifiable, the original purpose of the sex-separated space is difficult, even impossible, to maintain. That is why many jurisdictions have retained sex-based rules, sometimes with limited, case-by-case accommodations, rather than adopting an open-ended and infinitely malleable "self-identity" standard. I think we as a society can acknowledge some (very few) edge cases exist, but also differentiate those edge cases (people with DSDs) from people who are wholly male but who claim to be women based on purely subjective self-identity. I think we also can conclude that the default organizing principle should remain biological sex. The existence of complexity does not require abandoning the categories that complexity is defined against. Thanks, -Smac

The Russian word for "Elder" is Старейшина (Stareyshina). I've never heard of it having any connotation along the lines of "magician." I think Russians view us as an "American" church, and therefore bad or suspect. Given the sociocultural influence of the Russian Orthodox Church... Thanks, -Smac

The Florida statute is not about that. It absolutely is about that. I appreciate that you have strong feelings about this, but the statute has no religious component. It's not in the language of the statute. The folks who filed a lawsuit challenging it appeared to not even attempt to make such an argument about the statute. I think we have addressed this a few times now. We have both laid out what we think of the Florida statute. The statute is about protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit live adult performances. I don't see that this has much to do with abstractions about parents' efforts to have their children "find their own path back to God." I generally do not find it difficult to understand that parents hold different views about how to raise their children, including matters of belief, culture, and exposure to the wider world. Reasonable people disagree about those questions, and a pluralistic society has to make room for that disagreement. The Florida statute, however, is not an attempt to impose a single religious or cultural upbringing. It does not dictate what books parents may read to their children, what movies they may watch at home, what conversations they may have, or what path a child may ultimately take in matters of faith or identity. It addresses a narrower issue: whether commercial venues may admit minors to live performances that meet a specific legal definition of sexual conduct. Parental rights are important, but they have never been treated as absolute in every context. Long-standing limits already exist on what parents may authorize for minors: entry into adult entertainment venues, provision of alcohol, certain medical procedures, and so on. The statute operates in that same tradition in that it draws a boundary around a particular category of commercial activity rather than placing broad parental judgment under state control. One can debate whether the line is drawn in the right place. That is a fair policy discussion. That said, I think framing the law as an effort to force a “narrow upbringing” or to prevent children from finding their own path mischaracterizes what the statute actually does. I appreciate your input and observations. Thanks, -Smac

Thank you for your input. I wonder if your suggestion actually illustrates the difficulty. If the eligibility rule is pure self-identification, then the speaker’s willingness (or unwillingness) to identify as a woman in every other context is irrelevant. The claim itself is supposed to be sufficient. Introducing a consistency-across-contexts requirement converts the rule into something else: a judgment about how thoroughly, how publicly, or how sincerely the person lives out the identity. That is no longer self-ID; it is an external assessment of presentation, lifestyle, or commitment. Once that door is opened, the league (or any decision-maker) must decide which forms of self-identification count and which do not. Does the person need to change their legal documents? Use certain pronouns everywhere? Undergo medical steps? Present in a particular way full-time? Each of those conditions reintroduces objective criteria and discretionary judgment—the very things a pure self-ID rule claims to avoid. In short, requiring consistency “in all contexts” would seem to be an admission that unadorned self-identification is not a workable or stable standard. It quietly replaces the stated rule with a different, more demanding one. That is precisely the incoherence the declarations of Kanter and Smith seem to be testing. Thanks, -Smac

You're conflating lack of understanding with disagreement. Thank you for your comment here. Another common response I see is the conflation of disagreement with bigotry. Both conflations are unfortunate and impede meaningful discussion. Thanks, -Smac

I think this is a noteworthy point. If no other venues are allowed to expose children to highly sexualized live adult performances, it seems like venues hosting sexually explicit drag shows, etc. should be held to the same standard. Thanks, -Smac

The Florida statute is not about that. My apologies. I must have missed it. Thank you, -Smac

I'm not sure I understand your question. A “reasonable person” standard is useful in many legal contexts, but it does not solve the eligibility problem. I'd like to lay out my thinking on that, and hope that you can respond: If the governing criterion is self-identification (or an undefined term like “woman” that some interpret as identity-based), then the league has to decide how to apply that criterion consistently. Once the rule turns on an internal, subjective claim rather than biological sex, distinguishing “sincere” identification from strategic or satirical identification becomes difficult and inherently discretionary. A "reasonable" observer may conclude that a particular declaration is trolling. However, another observer—or a court reviewing a discrimination claim—may treat the same declaration as protected self-identification that the league is obligated to honor under its own stated principles. If the WNBA allows subjective self-identification for this person, then they will have a hard time formulating a non-arbitrary and legally viable way to differentiate supposedly "trolling" trans women from supposedly "real" trans women. That is the core issue. Rules that rest on self-ID create an opening that invites both genuine claims and opportunistic ones. The league then faces an unattractive choice: accept the claim and compromise the category, or reject it and explain why this particular self-identification does not count while others do. The second path quickly looks like viewpoint- or motive-based enforcement. That becomes legally problematic very quickly. The second path may also becomes problematic the other way, namely, the WNBA will join the UK Supreme Court in establishing parameters for what "woman" means, and those parameters may end up excluding all "trans women" (because excluding some "trans women" is almost certainly going to end up being discretionary/arbitrary). Whether any given former NBA player is trolling is secondary. The policy question is whether eligibility for a women’s professional league should turn on sex or on a subjective identity claim that is hard, perhaps impossible, to police consistently. A reasonable-person intuition that “this one is obviously not serious” does not supply a stable, non-arbitrary rule for the next case. I've been saying this for a long time now: the ideological claims based entirely on subjective self-identity ("trans women are women," "a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman") are, in a legal setting, not coherent and lack limiting principles. I think Enes Kanter Freedom and his attorneys have seen this, and so they are going to hoist the WNBA by its own petard. The WNBA cannot maintain its allegiance to the foregoing ideological principles and also exclude Enes Kanter Freedom. It either has to abandon the former or let Enes (and anyone else who subjectively "self identifies" as a "woman") play. Scylla and Charybdis, indeed. What are your thoughts? What do you think the WNBA should do? Assuming you want to differentiate between "legitimate" claims of being a woman from illegitimate/trolling ones, how do you think the WNBA could do that? What "limiting principles" do you think the WNBA should use to allow some self-identified "trans women" into the WNBA while keeping others out? I'm not really looking for an argument or to score points. I really do want to understand your perspective. Thanks, -Smac

I object to this, because the motivation for the legislature was clear. This is lawfare intended to chill a particular kind of speech practiced by a particular group of people using vague language. The law applies to any adult live performance that meets that statutory criteria. The State has long maintained laws that prohibit admitting children to sexually explicit adult live performances. It seems like most strip clubs understand this, and there has not been any effort to justify exposing children to the events in those venues. In contrast, in recent years we have seen many news items in which children have been particularly and specifically targeted for exposure to sexually explicit live adult performances by some folks in the LGBTQ community. If the statute was responsive to those events, I do not think that amounts to prejudice or ill motive. Frankly, I have a hard time with the notion in some quarters that protecting children from sexually explicit live adult performances is a bad or controversial thing. I think that there are many LGBTQ folks who strongly support the State's efforts to protect children from exposure to such things. Do you agree or disagree with that? Actually, it matters a lot. Children are not categorically prohibited from all drag shows, just those those that meet the statutory criteria. I think your assessment does not work in a legal context. The 8th Circuit did not find any issue along those lines. The statute does not criminalize “hip thrusts” or drag in general. It uses the long-standing three-part obscenity-as-to-minors standard: the performance, taken as a whole, must predominantly appeal to a prurient interest, be patently offensive to prevailing standards regarding what is suitable for the child’s age, and lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for that age. That is the same constitutional test courts have applied for decades to material harmful to minors. It is not a newly invented vague standard aimed at one group. Many live drag performances will not meet that test. Those that do—highly sexualized adult performances—are treated the same way the law has long treated other commercial adult live entertainment. The rule turns on the nature of the performance, not the identity or orientation of the performers. The distinction with movies remains the same one previously stated: commercial live performances that knowingly admit children are a different setting from pre-screened, rated, mediated content in a theater. Existing age restrictions on adult venues already reflect that difference. Applying a parallel limit here is not “lawfare” against a particular group; it is an age-based restriction on a specific category of live adult entertainment. Disagreement with the policy does not require attributing religious bigotry or a desire to chill protected speech. The narrower question is whether the state may set age limits on admitting children to commercial live performances that meet the established harmful-to-minors standard. On that question, the answer - for me - remains yes. You feel differently, and I respect that. Thanks, -Smac

I am seeing both as "adult live performances." They may exist at somewhat different spaces along the same continuum, but neither is an appropriate thing for children. The statute does not ban drag, Pride events, or story hours. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets a specific three-part standard: it predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive to prevailing standards of what is suitable for the child’s age, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for that age. Many drag events and virtually all ordinary story hours and parades do not meet that test. Those that do—highly sexualized adult performances—are the ones the law reaches. The law also reaches "heterosexual" adult live performances. That is the same kind of line the law has long drawn around traditional adult live entertainment. The comparison is not “strip club = every drag event.” The comparison is “adult live performance that meets the harmful-to-minors standard should be age-restricted, regardless of the performers’ identity.” I'm not sure that you do. I find the Church's "guidelines" to be overwhelmingly reasonable and valid and effective. Moreover, the "should" is about as far as the Church can or does go. It has no real enforcement mechanism, as the only thing the Church can do is add or remove constraints to my membership and activity in the Church. As it is, I am far along enough in life to see the value in constraining influences such as the Law of Chastity (including attendant counsel on topics such as modesty), the Word of Wisdom, fidelity within marriage, the Golden Rule, and so on. All of these are about what what I "should" do. I'm okay with that. At the other end of the spectrum we have, essentially, hedonism. No constraints. "If it feels good, do it." I have never met you, but you do not strike me as a hedonist. You have adopted for yourself certain constraints on your behavior, and good on ya for that. We differ, then, not in the presence or absence of constraints, but rather in the degree and source of those constraints. I think substantial constraints/parameters on behavior, such as those listed above, are good and healthy. I believe this not because of some reflexive kowtow to the Church's say-so and orthodoxy, but because of a lifetime of seeing the observance and non-observance of those parameters play out in my life and in the lives of others. The Florida statute is not about imposing a religious upbringing or telling other parents how to raise their children in general. It is about a narrow category of commercial live adult performances. Society already limits parental authority in other areas that involve serious risk or exploitation of children (age-of-consent laws, child labor, certain medical procedures, access to alcohol and tobacco, etc.). Age limits on admitting children to qualifying adult live performances fit within that existing framework. Disagreement with the line does not require attributing religious control or a desire to dictate every aspect of someone else’s parenting. I think the State has authority, not me. I've never lived in Florida. I had nothing to do with the law's enactment or enforcement. Also, could you elaborate on what parameters you believe exist, or should exist, about the State "dictating how {parents} should raise their children"? From a prior post: Thanks, -Smac

From a previous post: I don't think you responded to the above. I think the better comparison would be to live adult performances such as strip clubs. I am willing to examine whether this particular statute is vague, overbroad, or redundant with prior law. I am less persuaded by the claim that any effort to set age-based limits on sexualized live performances must be dismissed as pure identity politics. I admit I struggle with the notion that supporting laws which prohibit exposing children to highly sexualized adult performances - regardless of the sexual orientation/identity of the performers - is an example of "religious hatred of LGBTQ people." My understanding is that there are good numbers of "LGBTQ people" who support laws protecting children along these lines. Do you agree or disagree with that assessment? In any event, in response to your comment: The distinction is not that the same content is fine in a theater and criminal in a live venue. It is that the law already treats commercial live adult performances differently from filmed entertainment, and has done so for a long time. Movie theaters operate under a ratings system, age restrictions for certain ratings, and parental controls that parents can exercise before the child ever enters the building. The content is fixed, pre-screened, and mediated. In contrast, live commercial performances that meet the obscenity-as-to-minors standard present a different setting: the child is physically present in a space where the adult material is being performed in real time, and the venue is knowingly admitting the child. Florida’s statute does not ban every sexualized image or performance. It targets the act of knowingly admitting a minor to a commercial live performance that predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive as to what is suitable for the child’s age, and lacks serious value for that age. This is the same constitutional standard long applied to material harmful to minors in other contexts. Do you agree or disagree with that? If so, is it your position that "LGBTQ people" are, or ought to be, exempted from such laws? The rule is content-based in the sense that it turns on the nature of the performance, not the identity or orientation of the performers. Traditional adult venues such as strip clubs have long been subject to age restrictions; the statute applies the same principle across the board. Disagreement with that line does not require attributing religious hatred or anti-LGBTQ motive. The question remains whether the state may set age limits on admitting children to qualifying live commercial adult performances. On that narrower question, the answer - for me (and I think most people) - is yes. Thanks, -Smac

So we've had a lot of discussion, in this thread and elsewhere, about "limiting principles" in relation to trans ideology. Essentially, it appears that there are no "limiting principles" to trans advocates as to who is, and who is not, a "woman." It looks like this issue - are there any "limiting principles" as to "what is a woman" - is quickly coming to a head in the context of women's sports: Ex-NBA Players Say They’re ‘Declaring’ For WNBA As League Considers Transgender Player Policy And here: I am very curious about how the WNBA will formulate eligibility requirements for players. In many quarters the preferred - and perhaps sole - criterion for "woman" in essentially every context is "someone who identifies as a woman." Fundamentally, this is incoherent - it does not define "woman" - and also lacks any "limiting principle." There also appears to be no limitation on what motives an individual may have for identifying as a woman. Here are some of the discussions we have had about "limiting principles" in this context: Here: It is important to note that previous to transgender issues streaming to the forefront that there weren’t any laws about being in the wrong gendered bathroom. There were even reasons to ignore those rules like the men’s bathroom not having a changing table. There wasn’t a rash of perverts rushing into women’s bathrooms. Weirdos spinning tales of how they would have claimed they “felt like a woman” in High School in order to change in the girl’s locker room are just weirdos outing themselves. Transgender people rarely switch which restrooms they use until they are passable or androgynous at least and many actually plan around not having to use public restrooms out of fear. They just want to pee. They aren’t excited to use them or anything. Although the above discussion pertains to trans women - that is, biological men - entering into women's bathrooms, the same broader questions and concerns are now landing in the WNBA. If a male's "self-identity" as a woman is sufficient to justify him going into a woman's bathroom, is it also sufficient to justify him joining the WNBA? The above discussion is between myself (the initial quote) and @The Nehor. His approach has been, essentially, that no "limiting principles" are required at all: Here: Self-identification and also for law enforcement not to be involved at all. They weren’t before. It is a self-policing situation. Here: I keep saying there doesn’t need to be a “limiting” principle because we don’t need a law about this. There wasn’t one before. No limiting principle needed. Not everything needs to be legislated. If trans women (biological men) can "self-police" for purposes of entering into women's bathrooms, can they also "self-police" for purposes of entering into the WNBA? "No limiting principle needed"? Others seem to think that physical appearance should be the limiting principle: Here: Can looking like a woman be a "limiting principle" in the WNBA? If so, what counts? Nail polish? Wearing a dress? Wearing pink? This does not seem to work. Here: I don't want anyone to be harassed. And any "limiting principle" would be one implemented by a legislature or civil body, not by me. In the past, the "limiting principle" was, it seems, based on biological sex. Is subjective self-identity a better limiting principle? Physical appearance? Or do we just abolish sex-segregated bathrooms altogether? I'm interested in hearing what you have to say and your reasoning for it. Here I floated the idea of getting rid of sex segregation altogether. Can that work in the WNBA? Is the WNBA really prepared to not define "woman" at all, even though the "W" in the acronym is the sine qua non of the league's existence? Here: In general the advice to transwomen and transmen is not to switch public bathroom usage until you are androgynous or passable. So the "limiting principle" is being "androgynous or passable"? A "trans woman" who does not look sufficiently like a "woman" would, under color of law, be prohibited from entering a woman's bathroom? Is "passing" the limiting principle, then? Here: This part. This is the correct limiting principle. You want “ obvious” males to use women’s bathroom. I do not. I’m not sure what’s wrong with this standard. In my system people use the restroom that matches their gender presentation. In your system obvious men are forced into women’s spaces and vice versa. Can "obvious biological males" be a "limiting principle" in the WNBA? If so, can that same reasoning be applied in other contexts (bathrooms, etc.)? What about "passing" ("androgynous or passable")? Can that be a "limiting principle" in the WNBA? Here: These are my comments. I think the "limiting principle" should be biological sex. But that does not work in some quarters. So what should work? Here: I quite agree with you here. But this goes back to the "limiting principle" inquiry. Assuming that the vast majority of trans women (biological males) in women's bathrooms "are not threats," is there a risk of biological males who are "threats" going into women's bathrooms? If so, how would we propose to differentiate between the two groups? What limiting principle would allow non-threatening biological males into women's spaces but disallow potentially threatening biological males into women's space? In the context of the WNBA, male players are both a physical threat to female players (because they are, on average, so much stronger than women), but also a "threat" in terms of dominance in play. Former NBA players entering the WNBA will destroy the league. There is also the question/concern about whether the female players will consent to having biological males in the locker rooms. Here: Thank you for explaining your position clearly. I appreciate you wanting to keep things practical and minimize conflict for everyone. ... Also, I think that the “leave it the way it is — let people use the bathroom of their choice” is actually a new policy, not the status quo of the last several decades. For generations, the limiting principle for women’s bathrooms, locker rooms, and showers has been biological sex, not self-identified gender. That bright-line rule was simple, enforceable, and grounded in the real differences between males and females that make sex-segregated spaces necessary for safety and privacy. Allowing biological males into women’s facilities (even if they identify as women) changes the fundamental nature of those spaces. Many women and girls experience that change as a loss of privacy and safety — not because they assume every trans woman is a threat, but because biological sex is the reason those spaces were segregated in the first place. ... The bathroom policy debate isn’t about pretending signs are foolproof barriers. It’s about whether we should keep the long-standing, objective limiting principle of biological sex for women’s facilities. That clear, enforceable standard has protected women’s privacy and safety in vulnerable spaces for generations. Changing it to self-identified gender identity removes that objective boundary, such that it seems to make things easier for bad actors to gain access without raising any red flags. I’m not asking anyone to harass trans people. I’m just trying to explore the perspective your are presenting here, which perspective, if enacted, would seemingly solve one person’s discomfort at the expense of others' discomfort (i.e., requiring women and girls to surrender the privacy and safety protections they’ve always had). Single-use bathrooms or third spaces are a much better way to accommodate trans individuals without compromising those protections. But even that does not seem to be a comprehensive solution. Nevertheless, if we keep the traditional biological-sex rule for women’s facilities, do you see single-use or family bathrooms as a reasonable way to give trans people privacy and dignity? "So far as that 'limiting principle,' then, my position echo's that same 2016 position as our current president: leave it the way it is now--let people use their bathroom of choice." Should this same reasoning apply when it comes to who is eligible to play in the WNBA? Here: These are my comments. If Richard Cox can, via "self-identity" as a woman, enter into women's locker rooms and showers, then is that a workable "limiting principle"? Is there any impediment to Enes Kanter Freedom using "self identity" to declare for eligibility to play in the WNBA? Here: Here: I don't think that's where the problem lies. "If a biological male thinks he is a woman, let him compete in women's sports, use women's bathrooms, be housed in women's prisons, and so on." I think such accommodations become difficult pretty quickly. Further, there is no limiting principle. If a biological male can "identify" as a woman, then can Rachel Dolezal and Jessica Krug "identify" as "Black?" Can "Stefoknee Wolscht," a biological male in his 50s, call himself a perpetual six-year-old girl? Can a 5'9" white guy "identify" as a six-foot-tall Chinese woman? Can Eva Tiamat Medusa "identify" as a dragon? Can Naia Ōkami "identify" as a wolf? If not, why not? Can I "identify" myself as someone or something I am not? Can I use the force of law to coerce other people into capitulating to that identity? These are my comments, and they seem to be relevant to the current WNBA controversy. Regarding "limiting principles," @Analytics weighed in: Here: Regarding laws dealing with sex and gender, we should recognize that not everybody neatly and accurately fits into the broad-brush categories of being biologically male or biologically female. Furthermore, laws should recognize that depending on the situation, somebody's gender identity might be more pertinent than their biological sex. Laws are in fact evolving to deal with these realities. Some people are objectively intersex--they aren't 100% male or 100% female. That complexity is biological fact. However, that type of complexity doesn't exist with whether you are a human, how old you are, etc. Putting aside his rejection of the sexual binary, is the "complexity" he describes - associated with persons with DSDs - a valid "limiting principle" for the WNBA? It seems not, as it goes against the seemingly prevailing "self-identity" sentiment. Lia Thomas, for example, does not have a DSD. Nor, I think, does Enes Kanter. Here: This is my statement, and I think it is reasonable. Others disagree. For those people, what "limiting principle{s}" do you have in mind in relation to WNBA eligibility? Here: This is my comment. Is Enes Kanter Freedom playing in the WNBA an "absurdity"? If so, why? Why can't he "self identify" as a woman? Who polices this? What does and does not count as "self identifying" as a woman? This is a difficult topic. In everyday discourse, it's easy to make broad declarations about "trans women are women" and "a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman" and so on. However, sooner or later, these declarations encounter reality, such as we have seen with biological males entering into women's sports, bathrooms, prisons, and so on. And when those declarations are applied, they lead to untenable results, such as Enes Kanter Freedom being eligible to play in the WNBA. We all deserve presumptive measures of respect and kindness. The vagaries arising from applying the central tenets of trans ideology, though, seem very difficult. Thanks, -Smac

Personally, no. I view the deliberate exposure of children to highly sexualized live adult performances as a form of sexualizing and grooming minors. I regard that as wrong. This assessment does not depend on the sexual orientation or identity of the performers. Parental approval does not change the above judgment. There are circumstances in which society is justified in using the law to protect children, even when their own parents consent to the exposure. Age-based restrictions on commercial adult live performances fall into that category. I am not aware of any significant contemporary movement openly advocating that children be admitted to traditional heterosexual adult venues such as strip clubs (I am open to correction on this point). Existing norms and laws have largely kept that from becoming a live controversy. What has generated recent dispute is resistance, in some quarters, to efforts to keep children out of highly sexualized live performances of particularized type (i.e. drag shows that meet the statutory criteria). In a pluralistic society people will disagree about many cultural questions. On this particular point, however, the sexualization of children should remain a bright line. Advocating for it, or even treating it as controversial or negotiable is, I think, a rapid way for the LGBT community to forfeit broader public support. Many people across communities, including many within the LGBT community, share a straightforward revulsion at the idea of sexualizing children. Those voices are worth hearing more clearly. Thanks, -Smac

LDS Leader Detained For "Financing Terrorism" FYI, "Vyborg" is a city in Russia. Navalny He died in prison in 2024. The Anti-Corruption Foundation ("NBK") : More context on the designation of FBK as a terrorist organization seems Back to the article: I tried to watch the video. Could not get it to work. Looks like Br. Gavrilov is a Branch President. The poor man is 74 years old. I wonder if this will have a larger impact on the Church in Russia. Thanks, -Smac

Ouch!?! Eww!?! -Smac

The presence of sexual content on television, streaming, and in movies is a real issue, and parental control over it is often imperfect. That does not resolve the narrower question raised by the Florida statute. The law does not attempt to regulate every form of sexual imagery minors might encounter. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets a specific three-part test: it predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive to prevailing standards regarding what is suitable for the child’s age, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for that age. That is the longstanding obscenity-as-to-minors standard. I keep saying this because it seems to not be getting much attention: Live, in-person commercial performances differ from mediated content in important ways. Parents can more readily limit or supervise what comes into the home through ratings, parental controls, and device settings. A commercial venue that knowingly admits children to a qualifying adult live performance is a different setting—one the law has long treated as subject to age-based restrictions. It may be that, historically, existing rules were largely effective at keeping children out of traditional adult venues such as strip clubs. In recent years, however, some venues have sought to present sexually explicit live performances in settings that are specifically intended to include children. The newer statute responds to that development by applying a clear, neutral standard to all qualifying adult live performances, regardless of the identity or orientation of the performers. It is not limited to any one type of event. Pointing to the broader problem of media exposure does not make a targeted limit on certain live performances incoherent. We already accept many age-based rules without first requiring that every other avenue of similar content be eliminated. The question is whether this particular restriction is justified on its own terms. The distinction is not simply “live versus filmed.” The statute targets a specific conduct: knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets the obscenity-as-to-minors test. That is different from the separate (and imperfect) systems that already exist for broadcast, streaming, and theatrical films—ratings, parental controls, time-slot restrictions, and the practical ability of parents to limit what enters the home. Whether a particular drag show or Pride-related performance is more or less explicit than a given movie or television scene is a factual question that varies case by case, and in the end is immaterial. The statute does not depend on a blanket ranking of entire categories. It asks whether the specific live performance, taken as a whole, meets the three-part standard for material that is unsuitable for the child’s age. Some will; many will not. Broadcasting raises different issues under different legal frameworks. The statute at issue does not regulate broadcasting, and hypothetical questions about what would be permitted if the same content were only televised do not determine whether a state may set age limits on admitting children to qualifying live commercial performances. Those are separate regulatory domains, just as age limits on entering an adult club are separate from rules governing what may air on television. In short, the law draws a line around a particular commercial setting and a particular act (knowingly admitting a child). It does not require proving that every other form of sexual content is more restrained, nor does it turn on whether the same material would be treated identically if it appeared only on a screen. Thanks, -Smac

I'd be happy to evaluate whatever analysis it was that led you to this conclusion. If so, doesn't that cut against the "Hey, this new statute is unnecessary because we already had one that covers this stuff" argument? I think there are plenty of heterosexual people who are prosecuted under obscenity laws, child-endangerment laws, and so on. Plenty of white people too. Plenty of Christians as well. Criminal statutes with differentiated application based on sexual orientation or race or religion would be unconstitutional. The Florida statute does not do any of that. The relevant decision is from the en banc Eleventh Circuit (not the Eighth), which vacated the preliminary injunction against Florida’s statute. The majority held that the law tracks the longstanding “obscenity-as-to-minors” standard recognized by the Supreme Court: material that, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of minors, is patently offensive under contemporary community standards regarding what is suitable for minors, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. The court rejected the claims that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad or vague and concluded the challenger was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Obscenity—including material that is obscene as to minors—is not protected speech under the First Amendment. That is settled doctrine, not an “imagined” exception invented for this case. The statute does not ban every drag performance or every Pride-related event, nor are "straight" performances/events exempted from it. Instead, the statute restricts knowingly admitting a child to any live performance that meets the statutory criteria above. On parental rights, again, they are fundamental, but they have never been treated as an absolute trump card that disables every age-based restriction on commercial exposure of minors to sexual content. Neither Supreme Court nor circuit precedent in Florida requires a parental-consent exception for regulations of material that is obscene as to minors. States already limit minors’ access to certain live entertainment, alcohol, tobacco, and other categories without first proving that every parent would make the same choice. The “persecution of groups who aren’t straight-white Christians” framing converts a content-based restriction (tied to sexual explicitness relative to the child’s age) into a claim of viewpoint or identity-based targeting. The statutory text applies to any qualifying adult live performance regardless of the performers’ identities. Whether particular shows meet the criteria is a factual question; the constitutional validity of the underlying standard is what the en banc court addressed. In sum, the appellate ruling does not treat the speech as categorically protected, does not treat parental preference as automatically controlling, and does not rest on the identity-based persecution narrative. It rests on the obscenity-as-to-minors doctrine. Thanks, -Smac

What "other reasons" do you have in mind? Again, parental rights are important and broad, but they are not unlimited. The rights and interests of the child, and of society, may also play a role in justifying state intervention. I don't think "take over parental control" is accurate. Parental rights exist, but they have always had some constraints. I have previously provided extensive examples of sexually explicit behavior at drag shows, Pride parades, etc. which I find to be problematic, particularly in relation to children. Florida and other states have long allowed non-sexual social nudity in designated private settings such as AANR-affiliated resorts and certain clothing-optional venues. Those places operate under an explicit legal exception for nudity “in any place provided or set apart for that purpose,” and AANR clubs emphasize a family-friendly, non-sexual code of conduct. Simple nudity in that context is not treated as indecent exposure. The Florida statute at issue is narrower. It does not ban all nudity around minors, nor does it ban every Pride parade or every drag performance. It prohibits knowingly admitting a child to an “adult live performance” that depicts or simulates nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, specific sexual activities, lewd conduct, or lewd exposure of prosthetic/imitation genitals or breasts when the performance, taken as a whole: Predominantly appeals to a prurient, shameful, or morbid interest; Is patently offensive to prevailing adult community standards regarding what is suitable for the age of the child present; and Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for the age of the child present. That is the longstanding “obscenity-as-to-minors” standard. It targets sexualized performances aimed at adult audiences, not ordinary social nudity or non-sexual public events. A family nudist resort where people of all ages are, it is argued, simply unclothed in a non-sexual recreational setting is not the same thing as a commercial show that includes simulated sexual acts, exaggerated sexualized dancing, or other content designed to appeal to adult sexual interests. I have some personal reservations about these things, but we live in a pluralistic society. In any event, the law already draws that kind of distinction in many areas (public indecency, age-restricted entertainment, material harmful to minors). Treating every instance of nudity as equivalent to every sexually explicit live performance collapses a distinction the law has maintained for a long time. I’m not “railing against” all LGBT events. The question is whether the state may set age limits on commercial live performances that meet the statutory criteria for being unsuitable for children. Florida’s statute attempts to do exactly that. Whether particular shows cross the line is a fact-specific question; the principle that some adult-oriented sexual performances can be restricted for minors is not novel. You are pointing to a legitimate issue: a great deal of sexual content is available to minors through television, streaming, movies, and advertising, and parental oversight of that material is often inconsistent. That is a fair observation. I'm less persuaded that it is a moral one. That we have allowed children to be exposed to sexually explicit context is not, in my view, a justification to throw off any and all constraints intended to protect children. It also does not answer the narrower question raised by the Florida statute. The law does not claim that live adult performances are the only source of sexualized material minors encounter, nor does it require that every other form of exposure be eliminated before any limit can be placed on commercial live shows. Most regulations work that way: We restrict minors from buying alcohol even though they may see adults drinking on television. We restrict minors from certain rated films in theaters even though similar content exists online. We set age limits on casinos, tobacco, and adult businesses even though the underlying themes appear elsewhere in media. And on and on. The existence of other, sometimes more pervasive problems does not make a targeted restriction incoherent or hypocritical. There are also differences in kind that matter. A live performance in front of an audience is an immediate, in-person experience, often commercial and specifically marketed. Streaming or cinematic content is mediated, usually subject to ratings systems, parental controls, and the practical reality that parents can (and frequently do) limit access in the home. Those distinctions are imperfect, but they are not imaginary. The statute targets knowingly admitting a child to a live show that meets the statutory criteria for being unsuitable for minors; it does not attempt to solve the entire landscape of media exposure. If the broader concern is that sexual content reaches children too easily across many platforms, that is a legitimate subject for separate discussion about things like ratings enforcement, parental tools, platform responsibility, and so on. It does not follow, though, that therefore no age-based limits should exist on commercial live adult performances. Pointing to worse or more widespread examples elsewhere is a classic “not as bad as” move; it shifts the focus rather than addressing whether the specific restriction is justified on its own terms. Again, parental authority over children is fundamental, but it has never been absolute. The state already draws lines around what adults may expose minors to commercially: material harmful to minors statutes, age-restricted theaters and clubs, restrictions on selling certain sexual content to children, and limits on public indecency. Those rules exist alongside parental rights; they do not wait for every other form of exposure (TV, streaming, billboards) to be eliminated first. The Florida statute does not outlaw all sexual content or strip parents of guidance over their own living rooms. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets the statutory test for being unsuitable for minors—appealing to prurient interest, patently offensive for the child’s age, and lacking serious value for that age. That is a narrower rule than the “state controls every sex act a child might see” claim suggests. Whether a particular depiction is pornographic does not depend on the medium alone. The law has long treated live, commercial, in-person performances differently from mediated content that parents can more readily control at home. Demanding that every other source of sexual imagery be banned before any limit can be placed on adult live shows is an all-or-nothing standard the law has never required. The statute we’ve been discussing does not single out LGBT events. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial adult live performance that meets a specific three-part test: it predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive for the child’s age, and lacks serious value for that age. That standard applies regardless of the sexual orientation or identity of the performers. A heterosexual burlesque show meeting the same criteria would fall under it just as readily. Do you agree or disagree with the foregoing paragraph? If not, I would like to hear about your disagreement. I’m not arguing that parents should have no role, or that every form of sexual content in media should be treated identically. I’m arguing that the state may set age limits on certain commercial live performances without first solving every other avenue through which sexual imagery reaches children. Pointing to television, streaming, or advertising does not make a targeted restriction on live adult shows incoherent. As for you speculating about motives: I have no animus toward LGBT people. Disagreement about where to draw age and content lines for minors applies to both the "gay" and "straight" segments of society (to the extent we want to divvy ourselves up that way), and is not the same as hostility toward a community. It seems an ongoing challenge for some folks to cope with disagreement about their worldview. I think some Latter-day Saints construe any and all critiques of their faith as "attacks," as "anti-Mormonism" (candidly, I have done this in some instances). Similarly, some in the LGBT community seem to construe too many things to be hatred or "hostility" (your word) rather than what they really are: instances of disagreement in a pluralistic society. Reasoned and principled and civilly-expressed disagreement is not hate or hostility. It's just disagreement. So when, as here, the response shifts from the content of the rule to speculation about my personal reasons for discussing it, the underlying policy question tends to get lost. I’m willing to keep discussing the merits of the restriction itself—what the statute actually covers, whether the line is drawn in the right place, and how it compares to other age-based limits we already accept. Thank you for sharing your thoughts and perspective. We seldom agree, but sometimes we do. And in any event, I find value in listing to perspectives which vary from my own. Thanks, -Smac

Plenty of ways to test whether their interpretation of the law is an anomaly or congruent with general principles of constitutional jurisprudence. Broadly, I think the majority opinion is more in line with those general principles. No, it means that legal analysis reliant or or derived mostly/entire from AI is fairly suspect. Thanks, but I'm not interested in exploring this in this thread. Thanks, -Smac