smac97

I'm not sure I understand your point. What do "transgenders actually look like"? We've been told that "transgender" status is purely a matter of identity, not looks: Now you are tying being an "actual" transgender to outward looks/presentation. Could you explain/clarify your position here? If a man who "identifies" as transgender, but who has not taken any steps toward either medical or social transitioning, is he - in your view - a "trans woman"? Or does that not happen until and unless he "look{s} like" one? Appearance is how people form quick, practical judgments in public. That has always been true. It does not make sex itself a matter of appearance, and it does not make the underlying rule “use the facility that matches your sex” collapse. People rely on appearance precisely because, for the overwhelming majority of human beings, appearance correlates strongly with sex. That correlation is what allows the informal system to function most of the time. When someone deliberately alters their appearance to resemble the opposite sex, the correlation is disrupted. The resulting confusion or discomfort is not evidence that sex is irrelevant; it is evidence that the visual cue people normally rely on has been made unreliable. A rule based on sex does not require every person to produce a birth certificate at the bathroom door. It sets the standard. Enforcement in ordinary cases will continue to rest on the same appearance-based judgments people already make. The difference is that the standard remains sex, not self-identification or the success of someone’s presentation. When a conflict arises, the question is still “what sex is this person?” rather than “how convincingly do they present?” or “what do they claim to be?” Treating “people go by appearance” as a reason to abandon sex as the organizing principle confuses a practical heuristic with the category itself. The heuristic works because of the underlying reality of sex. It does not replace that reality. Thanks, -Smac

I don’t see an issue with making exceptions for exceptional cases. The law doesn’t have to be all or nothing. There could be a process to be declared an exception by a committee if it turns out that self appraisal of how much one passes is not enough. This would not make it so anyone who wants to can use any facilities. I agree that exceptional cases can be handled as exceptions. The question, I think, is what counts as an "exceptional" case. As soon as we make an exception to allow women and anyone who in any way subjectively identifies as a woman into women's spaces, the exception swallows the rule, women's spaces are obliterated, and A diagnosed disorder of sex development is a medical fact. It is rare, documented, and does not require inventing a new category or a standing committee that evaluates identity claims. That is a narrow, evidence-based exception within a sex-based rule. What you are describing is different. A process that lets people apply to be treated as the opposite sex—whether by self-appraisal of “passing” or by committee review of identity—turns the exception into a pathway for reclassification. Once that pathway exists, the rule is no longer “these spaces are organized by sex, with rare medical anomalies handled as medical anomalies.” It becomes “these spaces are organized by sex, except for those who successfully petition to be treated otherwise.” That is not a minor administrative refinement. It is a substantive change in, even an upending of, the organizing principle. The problem is not the existence of any exception whatsoever. The problem is converting sex-based spaces into spaces that can be entered by the opposite sex through a bureaucratic or identity-based process. Diagnosed DSDs do not require that. Self-identification, even if filtered by a committee, does. A formal “committee” process for granting exceptions based on gender identity (or related criteria such as “passing,” diagnosis of gender dysphoria, or self-identification) could carry a real Equal Protection risk. A clean sex-based rule—everyone uses the facility matching biological sex—is a straightforward sex classification. Courts have upheld such rules under intermediate scrutiny when justified by privacy and safety interests tied to physical sex differences. The classification is applied uniformly: males use male facilities, females use female facilities. Once the government creates a discretionary pathway that lets some people use the opposite-sex facility based on gender identity, the policy is no longer purely sex-based. It now classifies people according to whether their gender identity has been approved by the committee. That introduces an identity-based distinction on top of the sex classification. Plaintiffs can then argue: The state is treating similarly situated people differently on the basis of gender identity (those whose identity is recognized versus those whose is not). The existence of an identity-based exception undermines the claim that the underlying sex classification is necessary or evenhandedly applied. Depending on the circuit and the evolving case law, the policy may trigger intermediate scrutiny (as a sex classification) or, in some views, heightened scrutiny if transgender status is treated as quasi-suspect. In short, the committee approach converts a relatively clean sex-based rule into a hybrid system that explicitly turns on gender identity for a subset of people. That makes the policy more vulnerable to Equal Protection challenges than a uniform sex-based rule with no identity-based exceptions. Rare, medically diagnosed disorders of sex development can still be handled as medical facts without creating a standing identity-review process that invites these claims. Thanks, -Smac

I’m curious why this is different than other difficult to prove cases like stalking, harassment, and many cases of rape including marital rape. Cases where there exists a great deal of plausible deniability? Those cases are difficult for a reason, and the difficulty is not treated as a reason to abolish the underlying category. Stalking, harassment, and rape (including marital rape) remain crimes even though proof is often hard, evidence is contested, and plausible deniability is common. We do not, however, respond to that difficulty by declaring that the prohibited conduct is no longer prohibited, or by redefining the relevant categories so that the conduct becomes harder to identify in the first place. We keep the substantive rule and accept that some cases will be difficult to prove. The bathroom issue is different in a key respect. When the rule is “no males in the female facility,” the threshold question is relatively concrete: is this person male? That is a factual question about sex. When the rule is replaced by self-identification, the threshold question becomes “does this person identify as a woman?”—a claim that is, by design, difficult or impossible for an outsider to falsify. That is not the same as the ordinary problem of proving intent or non-consent in stalking or rape cases. It is a deliberate shift that makes the boundary itself unverifiable. Difficult proof is a feature of many criminal laws. It is not a justification for eliminating the sex-based boundary or for making the boundary turn on an unfalsifiable internal state. The two problems should not be conflated. Thanks, -Smac

Which makes you kind of wonder whether things have changed in recent years, such that a laissez fair policy that was previously sufficient has ceased being so. Perhaps in the past Kansans axiomatically valued considerations that protect women's interests, and so prioritized those interests, and that prioritization was sufficient to allow a laissez faire policy to work. Nothing more was needed because there was no effort in years past to do what you are trying to do now, namely, obliterate sex-segregated spaces and let anyone and everyone enter into women's bathrooms. Sex-segregated bathrooms survived for over a century without detailed statutory rules because almost everyone shared the same basic understanding: sex is binary, real, and the relevant category for those spaces. The norm was enforced by social expectation, facility design, and ordinary common sense, not by a thicket of statutes. When virtually no one was claiming a right to enter the opposite-sex facility on the basis of identity, formal legal lines were unnecessary. But things have changed. That background consensus has been deliberately contested. Once institutions, activists, and some governments began treating sex as secondary and subordinate to self-identification, and once people began entering opposite-sex spaces on that basis, the informal equilibrium no longer held. The new statutes are a response to that change, not the cause of it. Pointing to the long period without explicit statutory language does not prove that sex-based boundaries are optional. It proves that shared recognition of sex made detailed legal enforcement largely unnecessary. When that recognition is rejected, the prior arrangement stops working on its own, and clearer rules become necessary to preserve the same spaces. The difficulties arising from the persistent lack of candor about the purpose of these spaces are substantial. Sex-segregated facilities for women were created to protect the privacy, safety, and dignity of women as a sex class. They were never designed to accommodate males who subjectively identify as women. That original purpose is routinely and vigorously obscured and ignored. The lack of candor appears in several recurring patterns, several of which are manifest in this thread: Conflating rare medical DSDs with identity claims. Treating disorders of sex development as if they justify self-identification policies, while refusing to distinguish the two. Selective concern for “safety.” Emphasizing the vulnerability of males who identify as women while downplaying or dismissing or ignoring the safety and privacy concerns of women and girls in the same spaces. Moving the goalposts on evidence. Demanding exhaustive proof that problems occur under self-ID regimes, while treating anecdotal or institutional accommodations as sufficient evidence that no problems exist. Euphemism and linguistic capture. Preferring terms like “gender-affirming,” “assigned sex,” or “sex assigned at birth” in ways that obscure the underlying biological distinction rather than clarify it. Asymmetry in application. Insisting that sex is irrelevant when males seek access to female spaces, but treating sex as highly relevant when discussing medicalization, sports performance, or criminal pattern data. Refusal to define terms operationally. Avoiding clear, falsifiable definitions of “woman,” “man,” or “gender identity” that could be applied consistently in law, policy, or data collection. Treating dissent as "harm." Framing disagreement about sex-based rules as inherently bigoted or dangerous, which short-circuits substantive debate about trade-offs and consequences. No limiting principles. The refusal to state any coherent limiting principle that would prevent the category from expanding without end; and the corresponding unwillingness to acknowledge the predictable result—that women’s single-sex spaces are steadily eroded or eliminated once sex ceases to be the operative criterion. These are not minor rhetorical disagreements. They are systematic efforts to avoid stating, in plain terms, what the policy actually requires and whom it disadvantages. Thanks, -Smac

The Kris Ripper case does not show that recording biological sex on a government ID is “outing.” Again, “outing” means disclosing private information that a person has deliberately chosen to keep hidden—typically something like sexual orientation or gender identity that is not otherwise apparent or documented. Biological sex is, under the law, not that kind of information, even if this or that individual feels otherwise. It is a material, observable, and already-documented fact recorded on birth certificates, medical records, and (in Kansas under the new law) driver’s licenses. Requiring an ID to state that fact is not the same as forcing someone to reveal a concealed personal secret. In the actual incident: Ripper’s license correctly stated Male, which matched the birth certificate and complied with Kansas law requiring the marker to reflect biological sex. The officer’s initial confusion arose from the mismatch between appearance and the marker on the license. That is a predictable consequence of presenting in a way that diverges from the recorded sex; it is not evidence that the recorded sex itself is “private.” Some months ago I was working on an a protective order (against a tenant who had threatened the property manager, my client). The police called me and said they were having difficulty identifying the guy (in the housing complex). They had his DL photo, but it turns out the guy had, since taking the photo on this DL, gained weight, shaved his head, and grew a beard. The police's initial difficulty was immediately resolved. They found the guy a few minutes later in the common area. This is not an uncommon thing. According to Ripper’s own account, the officer ultimately returned the license and issued only a verbal warning at the scene. The later charge appears to have been an administrative error or processing failure that the prosecutor dismissed once the facts were clarified. A bureaucratic mistake does not redefine the nature of the information on the ID. The claim that the birth-certificate sex is “private information [Ripper] would rather keep hidden” inverts the categories. The state is not requiring disclosure of internal identity, medical history, or preferred presentation. It is requiring the license to state a factual attribute that the government already maintains for identification purposes—exactly as it requires name, date of birth, and photograph. Those attributes are also “disclosed” every time the ID is presented; we do not treat them as outing. If the objection is that the law creates friction when appearance and documented sex diverge, that is a different (and debatable) policy argument. It does not convert the recording of biological sex into “outing” in the ordinary sense of the word. Thank you! That is exactly my point. That is why the description on your driver license is supposed to describe what you look like. Hmm. You seem to overlook the point I was making. The comparison doesn’t hold. A driver’s license contains two different kinds of information. Appearance fields (photo, height, weight, eye/hair color) exist to help an officer confirm that the person standing in front of them is the same person the license was issued to. Those fields are updated because appearance changes. That is their sole purpose. Sex is not an appearance field. It has never functioned primarily as a current visual description. It records a stable biological classification—rooted in reproductive anatomy and development—that serves identification and medical and legal and statistical and security purposes across many systems. It is not analogous to “has this person’s weight changed since the last renewal?” Updating a photo every few years does not convert the sex marker into a field whose job is to match current presentation. If that were the rule, the license would also need to track breast development, facial hair, voice pitch, or any other secondary sex characteristic that can be altered. No jurisdiction treats the sex marker that way, and for good reason: it would cease to function as a reliable classifier. On the examples you cite: In the ordinary transgender case (Kris Ripper), the “M” marker is not an “inaccurate description of appearance.” It accurately records biological sex. The visual mismatch is the result of presentation or medical intervention, not an error in the vital record. Emily Quinn has Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (XY chromosomes, internal testes, female external phenotype). That is a genuine disorder of sex development. Such cases are rare, medically complex, and do not turn the binary classification system into something “objectively wrong” for the 99.98%+ of people whose sex development is unambiguous. Treating a rare developmental anomaly as proof that the sex marker on everyone’s license should track self-perception or current appearance confuses the exception with the rule. The Kansas law requires the license to state biological sex. That is consistent with the marker’s historical and practical function. It is not a rejection of the idea that a photo should look like the holder. Those are different data fields doing different jobs. And your policy preference is to abolish women's spaces, full stop. I think that is a bad idea. Also, if the Kansas Legislature were to amend the statute to provide some limited exceptions pertaining to persons with DSDs, you would still find it a bad law, right? So the presence or absence of exceptions does not seem to be determinative. The law is bad because you want men to have the legal right to enter women's bathrooms, changing rooms, and so on. Anything other than that is, in your view, "a bad law." Am I correct on this surmise? No. Recognizing that a tiny number of people have disorders of sex development is not the same as abandoning the binary or adopting the liberal position. Sex in humans is binary: male or female, defined by the type of gamete the body is organized to produce (sperm or ova). Disorders of sex development (DSDs) such as Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome are medical conditions in which development is disrupted. They are not a third sex, a spectrum that dissolves the categories, or proof that the categories are optional. They are exceptions within the binary, not exceptions to it. As I understand it, Emily Quinn has CAIS: XY chromosomes and testes, but the body cannot respond to androgens, so external development followed the female pathway. Per this article, this condition has a prevalence of of 2:100,000 to 5:100,000. In other words, it is an exceedingly rare condition, one which which makes the person biologically male with a specific developmental disorder, not “objectively female” and not a third category. The existence of such conditions does not mean sex is a spectrum any more than the existence of people born without legs means humans are not bipedal. On the driver’s license point: the sex marker records biological sex, not current appearance or self-identification. In the overwhelming majority of cases this is straightforward. Rare DSDs create edge cases that medical systems and governments have historically handled by looking at the full developmental picture (chromosomes, gonads, phenotype). That is not “putting objectively false information” on the license; it is dealing with a medical anomaly. It does not require, and does not justify, letting ordinary males who identify as female - and I think you must concede that this is the group for which you are really advocating in terms of putting them in women's bathrooms - change the marker. On restrooms: sex-segregated spaces exist because of the average physical differences and privacy/safety interests between the two sexes. A person with CAIS who has a fully female external phenotype and has been raised and lived as female is not the same situation as a typical male who identifies as a woman. Policy can (and long has) treated genuine DSDs as the rare medical exceptions they are without opening the category to anyone who claims an identity. Conflating the two is the actual radical move. The position is not “no exceptions ever” or “exceptions for anyone who wants one.” It is that sex is binary, DSDs are rare developmental disorders that do not erase the binary, and policy should be grounded in that reality rather than in the claim that sex itself is a spectrum or a feeling. You’re treating this as if the question is “who gets to hand out special exemptions so males can be treated as female.” I think that is the wrong framing. Genuine DSDs are medical facts, not privileges granted by some authority. A person is not male becA person with Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome has a documented developmental condition: XY chromosomes and testes, but a body that did not respond to androgens and therefore developed a female external phenotype. Doctors diagnose it; it is not a policy preference or an identity claim. We already handle rare medical anomalies through medicine and existing legal processes without needing a central “exception committee.” That is altogether different from the current demand that any male who identifies as a woman must be allowed to change the sex marker on a driver’s license or enter female spaces. One is a documented developmental disorder. The other is an ideological claim that sex is subordinate to identity. Conflating the two is the error. So the answer is not “we need a First Presidency equivalent to approve males into female categories.” The answer is that sex remains the classification, rare medical DSDs are handled as the (exceedingly) rare medical exceptions they are, and ordinary males do not get reclassified as female by declaration, feeling, or bureaucratic permission. No new authority is required to invent that reclassification, and none should be created. A male who has a diagnosed DSD. You keep asking questions to which you already know the answer. Marquise Vilsón is a biological woman who has taken cosmetic, medical and sartorial measures to deliberately appear and "identify" as a man. Absent some viable limiting principle that avoid the obliteration of sex-segregated spaces, yes, she would need to use the women's bathroom. I am not conceding that sex-based rules have open-ended exceptions for subjective "self identity." The teenage boy I met at Encircle House "identifies" as a dog, but he's not really a dog, and our society is not (yet) ready to actually treat him like one. When he gets sick, his parents don't take him to the vet. He doesn't eat dog foot or sleep outside or relief himself on the lawn. And just as a teenage boy does not "become" a species he is not by "identifying" as one, a man does not "become" a woman by identifying as one. Emily Quinn has a documented disorder of sex development (CAIS): XY chromosomes and testes, but a body that could not respond to androgens and therefore developed a female external phenotype. That is a medical condition that produced a female appearance and secondary sex characteristics. It is not a claim that sex is a feeling or that males become female by declaration. Marquise Vilsón is a biological female who identifies as male and presents as such. That is an identity claim layered on top of an intact female developmental pathway. The two situations are not symmetrical, and treating them as equivalent is a category error. That is, "a semantic or ontological error in which things belonging to a particular category are presented as if they belong to a different category, or, alternatively, a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property." A man is not a woman, even if he chooses to dress and act like one. Ipso facto, men are in the "male" category, including those who dress and act like women. Sex-segregated spaces exist because of the average physical differences and privacy/safety interests between the two sexes. A person whose body developed along the female pathway due to a rare developmental disorder is not the same case as a person of the opposite sex who adopts the appearance or identity of the other sex. One is a medical anomaly in development; the other is not. I am not inventing a system of discretionary exceptions that lets males into female spaces (or vice versa) based on identity. I am saying that rare disorders of sex development are medical facts that do not erase the binary, and that ordinary policy based on sex remains the correct default. Conflating those rare developmental cases with transgender identity claims is how the binary gets dissolved in practice. Again, you keep asking questions to which you already know the answer. From my prior posts: I am not sure how much more clear I can be. I am not conceding a system of discretionary exceptions that lets people opt out of sex-based rules by identity or appearance. The line is drawn by biological sex and by the medical reality of disorders of sex development. Sex is binary: male or female, defined by the type of gamete the reproductive system is organized around. That classification holds for the overwhelming majority of people and is the proper basis for sex markers on identification and for sex-segregated spaces. A tiny number of people have disorders of sex development—medically diagnosable conditions in which the usual developmental pathway is disrupted (for example, Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome). These are not a third sex, a spectrum that dissolves the binary, or a license for self-identification. They are rare developmental anomalies. When they produce a clear mismatch between chromosomal/gonadal sex and external phenotype, medical systems have long treated them as the medical exceptions they are. That is not the same as rewriting the categories so that anyone who identifies as the opposite sex, or who has altered their appearance, is reclassified. The distinction is straightforward: A documented disorder of sex development is a medical fact. A transgender identity claim is not. I do not support a process in which ordinary males (or females) are allowed to change the sex marker on a driver’s license or enter opposite-sex spaces because they identify as the other sex. That is not an “exception” within the binary; it is a rejection of the binary. Rare medical DSDs do not require, and do not justify, that rejection. The line is therefore not drawn by feelings, self-declaration, or visual presentation alone. It is drawn by sex, with genuine, diagnosed disorders of sex development recognized as the narrow medical anomalies they are. The name “Compliance Crew” is doing the rhetorical work for them. These are biological females who identify as male. Under the Kansas law, that means they are required to use the women’s facility. So they put on masculine presentation, walk into the women’s room in groups, and call it “compliance.” The point of the stunt is to create exactly the visual and social mismatch the law is designed to - and generally will prevent (people who look and present as male occupying a female space) and then treat the resulting discomfort as proof that the law is absurd. It is not a demonstration that sex-based rules are incoherent. It is a demonstration that when people adopt the appearance of the opposite sex, friction occurs. That friction is the reason sex-segregated facilities exist in the first place. Calling it “compliance” does not change the underlying reality: the law is sorting by sex, not by identity or presentation. Their protest confirms why that sorting is necessary. Thanks, -Smac

That or keep one's covenants. Yes, lying is bad.

How is this prosecutable? With purely reactive and after-the-fact measures. No preventive mechanism at all. There is no limiting principle here. Per @Analytics' preference, anyone can go into any women's bathroom, and do so entirely legally. This includes not just the men who "pass" as women, but also the bad actors. Both law enforcement and any persons in the bathroom have no recourse to prevent misconduct, but can instead only react after it has happened. In contrast, a sex-segregated bathroom policy does have preventive measures, and effective ones (not totally effective, but no measure is). If there is a limiting principle whereby some men can legally enter into women's bathrooms and others cannot, I would like to see it. We've had a lot of pages of discussion, with nothing so far. Reactively. Wait until after women and girls are victimized by an opportunistic bad actor who but for Analytics' policy would have broken the law the minute he entered into the bathroom, and could therefore have been summarily and immediately excluded from it on that basis. We can trust a law that has prophylactic effect, such as categorically excluding men from women's bathrooms. Again, if there is a limiting principle whereby some men can legally enter into women's bathrooms and others cannot, I would like to see it. Thanks, -Smac

In effect, you are obliterating sex-segregated facilities. Anyone can go into women's bathrooms for any reason or no reason at all. That is the opposite of what I said. I said people should only go into the bathroom that is most appropriate. I do not understand your point. Your position is that anyone can go into any bathroom ("people have the right to choose which restroom to use"). Ipso facto, no segregation by sex. "{P}eople have the right to choose which restroom to use" = "{N}o segregation by sex." Several months ago I attended a hearing at which the attorneys were arguing about the enforceability of a settlement agreement. In Utah, an unsigned settlement agreement can be enforceable where there is clear evidence the parties assented to it. In this case, the settlement agreement called for a large initial payment of $20K starting in a given month, followed by monthly payments of $1,000. The defendant (the niece of the plaintiff) did not dispute that she had seen the agreement and that she had made the $20K payment followed by 8 monthly payments of $1,000, and then she stopped. With this in mind, I watched the following exchange between the judge and the defendant's attorney (more or less) : Judge: So counsel, we have a settlement agreement that calls for an initial payment of $20,000, followed by monthly payments of $1,000. And your client does not dispute that she made a payment of $20,000, followed by eight monthly payments of $1,000. Is that correct? Attorney: Yes. Judge: But your client is saying that she did not sign the settlement agreement, so it's not enforceable, even though case law in Utah is very clear that unsigned settlement agreements are enforceable where there is a course of conduct indicating acceptance of the agreement? Attorney: That's correct. The agreement is unenforceable because although she gave that money to the plaintiff, she did not do so based on the settlement agreement. Judge: Then why did she make those payments? Attorney: They weren't "payments." She gave her aunt the money out of the goodness of her heart because they are family. Judge: Counsel, she gave money to hear aunt "out of the goodness of her heart," and those payments, or whatever you are calling them, just happened to be in amounts and timing which perfectly match the terms of the settlement agreement? That is your argument? Attorney: Yes. Judge: Counsel, are you sure you want to advance that argument? Attorney: Yes. Judge: How do you account for the match between the agreement's payment requirements and your client's conduct? Attorney: It's just a coincidence, your honor. The settlement agreement is unenforceable. Judge: Okay. Anything else? Attorney: No. Judge: I'm ready to rule... As you can imagine, I won the case. I spoke with the attorney at some length after the hearing. He was pretty sheepish, and acknowledged that he fully anticipated losing, but that he had to make that argument because it was the only one available to him. Except that's not the only thing he could have done. What he could and should have done was comply with Rule 3-3.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct ("Candor toward the tribunal"). From a "Comment" on that rule: Of course, this rule has no real application to an informal discussion on a message board. But "candor" was that that lawyer was really missing. He was focused on presenting hic client's case "with persuasive force," to the effective exclusion of his corollary obligation to be candid with the judge. Here, you are advocating a particular policy regarding sex-segregated bathrooms, and that policy, in your own words, is that "people have the right to choose which restroom to use." The practical effect and consequence of this policy will be the obliteration of sex-segregated bathrooms (and, apparently, all other sex-segregated spaces as well). You are denying this practical reality, but until and unless you elaborate on how it does not result in obliteration, I am reminded of the above attorney. He did his client no favors by doggedly sticking to an argument that was facially absurd and other-than-candid. What the attorney could and should have done is been candid with the judge. Yes, it would have injured his client's case, but I think he injured it worse by advancing a specious argument and refusing to be candid about it. This sort of thing aggravates judges a lot. A lot. The courts are, after all, supposed to be a venue in which the parties, using rules of procedure and evidence, survey and determine the facts of the case and then ascertain how the law applies to those facts. Demonstrating "candor toward the tribunal" means that his client would lose, but at least the loss would have been honest. By advancing a specious argument, the loss came not only to the detriment of the attorney (whose reputation, at least with that judge, took a beating that day), and also the client (the judge did not do any sort of "split the baby" thing in his ruling, as is often the case, and rather gave my client everything she had asked for, including substantial interest amounts that were a maybe-yes-maybe-no sort of thing). I am open to hearing what you have to say about your perspective. I hope you will lay out your reasoning, with candor, as to why your policy preference would not result in the obliteration of sex-segregated bathrooms (as opposed to a "biological sex"-based policy, which preserves them). Thanks, -Smac

That’s a fair question, and it helps separate two different issues. Bathroom and changing-room policies are about access to sex-separated spaces. In those settings, the practical problem is overwhelmingly created by males who retain male physical advantages or male patterns of behavior, not by the tiny number of people who “pass” so completely that no one can tell. Edge cases do not justify rewriting the rule that the spaces are organized by sex. The rule exists to protect the privacy, safety, and dignity of the female sex class as a whole; it is not contingent on every single male being visually obvious. An identity document serves a different purpose. It is a durable record of stable identifying characteristics for use by government agencies, law enforcement, medical providers, and others who need reliable information when appearance is ambiguous, when the person is unconscious, when records must be matched across time, or when visual inspection is impossible or insufficient. The fact that most people are visually congruent with their sex does not make the recorded fact useless. Height, date of birth, and eye color are also listed even though they are usually obvious; we still record them because documents are meant to be consistent and independent of momentary appearance. In short: Sex-separated spaces are organized by sex because sex itself is the relevant category for privacy and safety. The existence of people who pass does not erase that category. Sex is recorded on IDs because identity documents need stable, non-appearance-based data. The fact that the marker is most useful in ambiguous cases does not mean it is only justified by those cases. The two contexts answer different questions. One is about who may enter a space reserved for one sex. The other is about what facts an identity document should reliably contain. Treating them as the same argument confuses the purpose of the rule with the purpose of the record. Thanks, -Smac

"This type of information" = biological sex? No, whether or not the person has transitioned I'm not quite following you. The driver's license says nothing about "whether or not the person has transitioned." It just lists the person's biological sex. As would putting biological sex on the ID of a person who clearly looks like the opposite of that sex. At the very least hormonal treatment. The comparison still doesn’t hold. A person on long-term hormones may look more like the opposite sex, but the license is not a fashion statement or a real-time appearance certificate. It is an identity document that records stable, material facts. We already accept that a license photo may not perfectly match a person’s current hairstyle, weight, facial hair, or clothing. The photo is a snapshot; the data fields (name, date of birth, sex, height, etc.) are meant to be consistent identifiers that do not shift with presentation or medical treatment. Hormonal treatment does not change the underlying sex recorded at birth, any more than a beard, mastectomy, or heavy makeup does. If the argument is that the marker should be updated whenever appearance changes, then the document stops functioning as a reliable record and becomes a reflection of current self-presentation. That is a different kind of document. The opioid analogy remains useful here: we do not put “currently appears sedated” or “looks like someone who might be on opioids” on a license. We record facts that are useful for identification and that do not require constant subjective updating. Biological sex is one of those facts. Appearance is not. Thanks, -Smac

This is a new argument from you, which appears to be made up out of whole cloth, apparently so that you can fit it under a rubric of heightened constitutional scrutiny. I am pretty sure it’s not in terms of at least links either he or others have posted. Well, I am certainly open to correction on that point. I would be surprised if an attorney tried, with a straight face, and on a legal filing submitted to a court with his name on it, to argue that a driver's license inclusion of the individual's sex is a constitutional violation, even under the rubric of the somewhat unique and heightened "personal autonomy" jurisprudential thought arising from the Kansas State Constitution. Consider, for example, the Corbit decision. The attorneys in that case probably threw in every argument they could file in good faith. Some excerpts: This case originated out of Alabama, but I think the same principles and outcome will apply. I surmise that @Analytics agrees with the foregoing claims. They did not work in the 11th Circuit. I don't think they would work in the 10th Circuit (Kansas is in that one). Will it work when presented to the Kansas Supreme Court? I guess we'll see. Kobach might give some a glimmer of hope, but I wouldn't hang my hat on it (how's that for a mixed metaphor!). This sure sounds like what @Analytics wants to say. How does it hold up in federal appellate court? Not very well: This is not binding precedent on constitutional questions based on the Kansas State Constitution. But I think the Kansas Supreme Court would be hard-pressed to utterly deviate it and come to a contradictory conclusion. Perhaps there is other case law touching on this topic. My search was not exhaustive. Overall, I think this legal argument is not well-developed in the U.S. Why it is undeveloped is open for speculation. My guess is that "the State is constitutionally prohibited from requiring a person's biological sex to appear on his/her driver's license." Honestly, I have a hard time taking this argument seriously in a legal sense. But who knows? Maybe Kansas and the 11th Circuit will end up at different places. Two Kansas state statutes to keep in mind: K.S.A. 77-207 ("Biological sex; application thereof to any state law or rule or regulation; application of intermediate constitutional scrutiny standard of review; important governmental objectives; collection of vital statistics.") Subsection (b) is very likely to be unconstitutional. But can the Kansas Supreme Court override the legislature's statutory definition in subsection (a) of "sex" and "gender" (that is, biological sex at birth)? Not so sure about that. See also K.S.A. 8-243 (Issuance of licenses; contents; signature; photograph, exception; fee; anatomical gift; distinguishable license for deaf and hard of hearing; distinguishable number for registered offenders; veterans; persons needing assistance with cognition.) There it is. The Kansas Legislature has enacted a statute that requires "gender" to be listed on a driver's license, and has elsewhere defined "gender" as coterminous with "biological sex and birth." Will the Kansas Supreme Court override this legislative decision? I am skeptical. The legislature exceeded its authority when purported to tell the Supreme Court how to analyze constitutional questions. That was improper. I think it would likewise be improper for the Supreme Court to tell the legislature that including an individual's biological sex in a driver's license is a constitutional violation. That seems a few bridges too far, even for a leftist court like this one. The number of transgenders who has access to medical treatment wasn’t that high in the past and just because society didn’t care at the time to protect this type of information doesn’t mean we shouldn’t. "This type of information" = biological sex? Why should this be "protect{ed}" (by which you mean "not disclosed in the government's official documents, such as driver's licenses")? I understand the concern about sensitive information and the desire to avoid unnecessary stigma or scrutiny. But I think the opioid example actually helps clarify the distinction rather than erase it. Opioid use is a variable medical treatment. It can change, it can be temporary or long-term, it can affect alertness and reaction time, and it is highly individual. Putting it on a driver’s license would create real practical and privacy problems: it would expose a medical regimen to every officer, employer, or clerk who sees the license, and it would not reliably tell anyone whether the person is currently impaired. That is why we don’t put medication lists on licenses. Biological sex is not a treatment, a diagnosis, or a variable condition in the same way. It is a basic, binary, and stable physical characteristic that is already used for identification, medical triage, forensic evidence, and the design of sex-separated spaces. Unlike a medication list, it does not change with dosage, tolerance, or new prescriptions. Recording it does not disclose a person’s health history, diagnoses, or treatment decisions; it records a material fact about the body that has identification and safety relevance independent of any medical condition. In my view, the two are not parallel. One is a private medical regimen that can affect driving performance in complex ways and carries social stigma. The other is a permanent physical characteristic that societies have long used for identification and for maintaining privacy and safety boundaries. Declining to treat them as equivalent is not a refusal to protect privacy, but rather is a recognition that not every fact about a person belongs in the same category. I appreciate you sharing your perspective. Thanks, -Smac

He did not speak in a representative capacity for the Church when addressing the NAACP? It sure seems like he was doing just that. Could you elaborate on that? This presupposes A) that only the Presiding High Priest can speak on behalf of the Church, B) that the Church should issue "apologies," and C) the Church's "apologies" will only be valid if they use "the particular word 'error.'" I'm not sure any of those presuppositions is warranted. Well, that's an arguable point. Brant Gardner addresses it here: What Does the Book of Mormon Mean by “Skin of Blackness”? Some relevant excerpts: I would be happy to listen to what you have to say regarding Gardner's analysis here. Could you elaborate? I'm not sure I understand the "doubt" and who is casting it. Latter-day Saints have received a number of exhortations to A) refrain from expecting perfection/infallibility, and B) avoid condemning others (including, I think, prophets and apostles, both past and present). Some examples. The Title Page to the Book of Mormon: "And now, if there are faults they are the mistakes of men; wherefore, condemn not the things of God, that ye may be found spotless at the judgment-seat of Christ." Mormon 9:31 states: "Condemn me not because of mine imperfection, neither my father, because of his imperfection, neither them who have written before him; but rather give thanks unto God that he hath made manifest unto you our imperfections, that ye may learn to be more wise than we have been." Joseph Smith said, “I never said I was perfect, but there is no error in the revelations.” Joseph Smith said: "I will give you one of the Keys of the mysteries of the Kingdom. It is an eternal principle, that has existed with God from all eternity: That man who rises up to condemn others, finding fault with the Church, saying that they are out of the way, while he himself is righteous, then know assuredly, that that man is in the high road to apostasy; and if he does not repent, will apostatize, as God lives." From then-Pres. Uchtdorf: "And, to be perfectly frank, there have been times when members or leaders in the Church have simply made mistakes. There may have been things said or done that were not in harmony with our values, principles, or doctrine. I suppose the Church would be perfect only if it were run by perfect beings. God is perfect, and His doctrine is pure. But He works through us—His imperfect children—and imperfect people make mistakes. In the title page of the Book of Mormon we read, 'And now, if there are faults they are the mistakes of men; wherefore, condemn not the things of God, that ye may be found spotless at the judgment-seat of Christ.' This is the way it has always been and will be until the perfect day when Christ Himself reigns personally upon the earth." From Elder Andersen: "The leaders of the Church are honest but imperfect men. Remember the words of Moroni: 'Condemn me not because of mine imperfection, neither my father … ; but rather give thanks unto God that he hath made manifest unto you our imperfections, that ye may learn to be more wise than we have been.' Joseph Smith said, 'I never told you I was perfect; but there is no error in the revelations.' The miracle of God’s hand in the history and destiny of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is understood only through the lens of spiritual inquiry." Latter-day Saints who follow this counsel and abstain from notions/expectations of infallibility/perfection from the leaders of the Church will, I think, do just fine in weathering controversies and difficulties. Well, not really. First, you seem to be equating "lead us astray" with infallibility. With the Brethren never making any mistake to any degree, ever. Second, the governance of the Church has multiple safeguards in place. The First Presidency and the Quorum of the Twelve. The general requirement for unanimity. The Standard Works. The oversight of the Presiding Bishopric. Third, we should attune ourselves to the checks and balances that are built in to the Restored Gospel: See also here: Fourth, the notion that leaders of the Church should pretty much be followed without question with unquestioning loyalty is, in my view, misguided. As I have previously noted here: The generalized statement of "When you are in the Army you are obligated to follow the orders of your superiors" is not incompatible with the foregoing "duty to disobey." Virtually every law or moral principle allows for exceptions in extraordinary or very unusual circumstances. Similarly, the generalized statement of "the prophet will never lead us astray, meaning that we can always trust them" is not incompatible with the foregoing statements from Joseph Fielding Smith, Harold B. Lee and others. Fifth, we have been given prophets and apostles for the express purpose of following them: The problem is when we rely on them too much, and/or when our reliance on them is predicated on tacit expectations of infallibility. Brigham Young really nailed it here: These sentiments have come to mind in the past when I have raised my hand to sustain new leadership in the Church. When Pres. Nelson passed away, I was saddened for a time. He was a good man, even a great one. He will be missed. However, a bit later I raised my arm and sustained Pres. Oaks. Prophets and apostles are good and decent men. But in the end, they are servants. In a way, I am happy to see them pass on to the next phase of their journey, as I fully expect for the Atonement to apply to them, to wash away their sins and weaknesses, leaving them for what they really tried to be. "Well done, thou good and faithful servant..." My job is not to sustain them unless they have weaknesses. My job is to sustain them despite their weaknesses. And meanwhile, I should look to see that my own house is in order. I think I'm in the Church, come what may. I believe any member of the Church can be led astray, including leaders (witness the many who apostasized in the early days of the Church). I also reject the notion of inerrancy (though I note that it is quite possible for a church leader to make a mistake, or even many mistakes, and yet not be "astray"). However, I subscribe to the position that the Church and its leaders, collectively, will not be led astray. I believe in the prophecy found in Daniel 2 and in how it has been interpreted. I agree with Wilford Woodruff that "The Lord will never permit me or any other man who stands as President of this Church to lead you astray. It is not in the programme. It is not in the mind of God." I think that's right. I believe in The Book of Mormon, in its testimony of Jesus Christ, and of the implications that are associated with the prophetic mantle involved in its production, preservation, and transmission to us. I believe the sentiment expressed here (attributed to Joseph Smith): "‘I will give you a key that will never rust, —if you will stay with the majority of the Twelve Apostles, and the records of the Church, you will never be led astray." The Church is not perfect. But it is, in my view, overwhelmingly good. I love it a lot. Again, "that verse" was not speaking about humanity in toto, but rather about "the wicked" (v. 2). And not just any old bunch of sinners, but those who, facing the "{just} judgments" of God, will "shall have cause to howl, and weep, and wail, and gnash their teeth; and this because they would not hearken unto the voice of the Lord; therefore the Lord redeemeth them not." The category of unredeemed "wicked" persons referenced here seems to be . . . sons of perdition (see, e.g., here). So could you elaborate What is it that you think merits an apology? Are you suggesting that "the wicked" being referenced - that is, sons of perdition - are not "carnal and devilish"? I understand the distinction people sometimes draw between “regret” and “apology,” and why the word choice matters to them. A few thoughts on why an institution might deliberately use the language of regret rather than a formal institutional apology (such as, for example, when the Illinois House of Representatives drafted a written statement to the Church about the privations and abuses the Saints endured in the 1840s, and in which statement they changed the word "apology" to "regret") : First, a formal apology from an organization often carries an implication of ongoing collective guilt that attaches to every current member. Most people reject that logic in other contexts. We do not expect every living Japanese person to apologize for Pearl Harbor, every German for the Holocaust, every Chinese citizen for the Great Leap Forward, or every American for slavery or the internment of Japanese Americans. Moral responsibility is personal. Expressing deep regret for past wrongs while declining to place perpetual guilt on people who had nothing to do with those decisions is consistent with that principle. Second, institutional apologies can become performative or endless. Once an organization starts issuing formal apologies for historical actions, the demand rarely stops at one statement. Such faultfinding demands, at in some quarters, are less about encouraging amends for misdeeds and more about hectoring and moving the goalposts, over and over. That may be the closest we get to a Perpetual Motion Machine). Critics often treat any subsequent disagreement on other issues as evidence that the apology was insufficient or insincere. Choosing precise language of regret can be a way of acknowledging real pain and error without turning the institution into a permanent defendant in a historical grievance process. Third, the Church has in fact used strong language. Leaders have spoken of past theories and practices as incorrect, disavowed them, and expressed profound regret for the suffering they caused. The 2013 Gospel Topics essay on race and the priesthood, for example, is explicit that the explanations once offered were wrong and that the restriction was not of God. See also the Church's 2007 public statement of regret about the Mountain Meadows Massacre: These statements are stronger than many institutions manage when confronting their own histories. Whether one prefers the word “apology” or “regret,” the substance—repudiation of the old justifications and sorrow for the harm—is present. Fourth, an exclusive focus on the precise verb can obscure the larger record. The same institution has spent decades teaching against racism, expanding missionary and leadership opportunities across every nation and people, and emphasizing the equal worth of every soul. Evaluating that longer trajectory matters at least as much as the choice between two English words. None of this denies that real harm occurred or that people who experienced it are entitled to have that harm recognized. It simply suggests that “regret” is not necessarily an evasion; it can be a deliberate choice about how responsibility, continuity, and language interact. People of good faith can still prefer different wording, but the distinction is not automatically evidence of bad faith. False teaching leads people in the wrong path, to worship a false God. For example, Joseph Smith teaching that God is not God from all eternity. This is not the God faithful Jews or the majority of Christians worship. Thank you for clarifying. You are pointing to Joseph Smith’s teaching (in the King Follett discourse) that God became God, and that humans can follow a similar path. You’re right that this differs from the classical theism held by most Jews and the majority of Christians, who affirm that God is eternal, uncreated, and without beginning. A few observations: Disagreement is not automatically “leading people astray” in the sense of deception. If every departure from post-biblical creedal formulations counts as leading people to a false God, then the early Christian debates over the nature of the Godhead, the later split between East and West, the Reformation, and countless other theological developments would all fall under the same charge. Latter-day Saints understand themselves to be restoring truths that were lost or obscured, not inventing a different object of worship. We worship the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—the Father of Jesus Christ. The disagreement is about the nature and history of that God, not about substituting a different being. “God from all eternity” is itself a philosophical development. The absolute timelessness and pure actuality of God (actus purus) as later articulated in classical theism is heavily shaped by Greek philosophical categories. Biblical language is often more dynamic—God “becomes,” “relents,” “remembers,” and enters into time with His people. Latter-day Saint theology leans into that biblical dynamism and rejects some of the later philosophical overlays. One can view that as a recovery rather than a corruption. The practical fruit matters. The charge that this teaching leads people to “worship a false God” needs to be tested against what Latter-day Saints actually do and teach: faith in Jesus Christ as the Son of God, repentance, baptism in His name, receiving the Holy Ghost, and enduring in covenant relationship with the Father and the Son. If the accusation is that we are directed toward a different being, the lived religion doesn’t match that claim. You’re free to believe the classical view is correct and the Latter-day Saint view is wrong. That is a fair and reasonable theological disagreement. But equating a different understanding of God’s nature with “leading people astray to worship a false God” assumes that only one post-biblical philosophical formulation can possibly refer to the true God. That seems to me too narrow a standard. I’m happy to keep discussing the doctrine itself if you’d like to go further into the King Follett material or the relevant biblical texts. I think it would help if you explained and demonstrated, rather than merely asserted that a revelation was not needed. Could you elaborate? It seems we have different meanings for the same term. What does leading people in the Church astray mean to you? When I speak of someone “leading people in the Church astray,” I do not mean: Making an honest mistake in doctrine or history Holding or teaching an incomplete or imperfect understanding of a gospel topic Getting a policy, a timeline, or a historical detail wrong Expressing a personal opinion that later turns out to be incorrect Struggling with questions or publicly acknowledging difficult issues Human beings, including prophets and apostles, are fallible. Error, incompleteness, and the need for correction are part of the mortal experience. Those things, by themselves, do not constitute leading people astray. What it does mean is something more deliberate and more serious. Leading people astray means using influence, teaching, or example to turn people away from Jesus Christ, away from the covenants of His gospel, and away from the Church He established—persuading them to abandon faith in Christ, reject prophetic authority, break covenants, or leave the path of discipleship. It is the active effort to draw people off the covenant path and toward disbelief, bitterness, or competing systems of belief that separate them from the Savior and His restored Church. In short, it is not the same as being wrong. It is the work of pulling people away from Christ. Well, that's a point that has been debated for a long time. A manual is entirely fallible if it contains no truth. Okay. But you have not claimed that the manual "contains no truth," but rather that it contains an error (which error the Church has caught, corrected, and about which expressed regret). If you are truly saying the Church's manuals contain "no truth" at all, then please elaborate. I would like to hear what you have to say. No LDS teaching manuals are "entirely" fallible. Okay. I'm glad we cleared that up. Thanks. But surely not in equal measure. There are vastly more items in the former category than the latter. Do we agree on that point? We really need to pin down what you mean by "astray." I'm not sure this statement is part of the canonized text of OD1, but I nevertheless accept it as substantively prophetic, revelatory and correct. The "idea" being "The Lord will never permit me or any other man who stands as President of this Church to lead you astray." I think we need to have some clarity as to what Pres. Woodruff and his predecessors and successors have had in mind on this issue. We still need to clear up what you think "astray" means in the context in which the leaders of the Church have spoken. Consider, for example, this quote from Joseph Smith: I sense that you carry implicit expectations/requirements of infallibility/perfection in prophets and apostles. And when - as they inevitably do - make a mistake, you use this implicit notion to nullify their claims of prophetic/apostolic authority. I just don't think that works. Thanks, -Smac

Two different questions are being collapsed (that seems to be happening a lot in this discussion). First, existing criminal laws against voyeurism and exhibitionism address conduct. They do not address the prior question of who is entitled to be present, unclothed, in a space that exists precisely because of sex-based differences in privacy and vulnerability. A rule that keeps intact males out of the women’s locker room is not redundant of a statute that punishes someone only after they have already exposed themselves or surreptitiously watched others. The entry rule is preventive; the criminal statutes are reactive and require proof of specific intent or conduct that is often difficult to establish in the moment. Second, the ongoing demands for documented, prosecuted “examples” in Kansas before the law took effect sets an unrealistic bar. Sex-separated spaces exist because the material differences between male and female bodies create predictable privacy and safety interests. Those interests do not suddenly become illegitimate the moment someone asks for a pre-law incident report. We do not require a body count before recognizing that prisons, shelters, and locker rooms have long been separated by sex for reasons that predate any particular statute. The claim that “no law will prevent every bad act” is both true and irrelevant. The same could be said of every entry restriction, age limit, or sex-based classification. Rather, the policy question is whether the classification is rationally related to the privacy and safety interests that justify sex-separated spaces in the first place. Recording and applying biological sex is directly related to those interests. Treating self-identification as the operative criterion is not. Existing criminal laws remain available either way; they do not make the classification itself unnecessary. Thanks, -Smac

In effect, you are obliterating sex-segregated facilities. Anyone can go into women's bathrooms for any reason or no reason at all. And if challenged, they can just say "I have the right to choose which restroom to use, and I have taken other people's sensibilities into consideration, and I am a 'reasonable person.'" And since there is no functional limiting principle in your regime, they'll get away with it. Thanks, -Smac

The 1926 provision you’re citing is from the Uniform Vehicle Code, a model act recommended to the states — not a binding federal statute that standardized driver’s licenses nationwide. Licensing has always been primarily a state function. Two important points from that era: The application for a license under the 1926 Uniform Vehicle Code explicitly required the applicant’s sex (along with name, date of birth, and address). The license itself was required to contain a “brief description of the licensee for the purpose of identification.” In practice, that description routinely included sex, height, weight, eye color, and similar identifying characteristics. Sex was treated as basic identifying information from the beginning. More relevant today is current federal law. Under the REAL ID Act regulations (6 CFR § 37.17), a driver’s license or ID card that is to be accepted by federal agencies must include the holder’s "sex" on the face of the card (as determined by the State). You already have to radically re-define "woman" to make the ideology work. Your proposal would now require that Kansas also re-define "sex" to include "gender identity." So the historical record does not support the idea that sex was ever regarded as irrelevant to identification on a driver’s license. It has been part of the identifying description for a century, and modern federal standards continue to require it. States remain free to decide how they determine and record sex, but the category itself has never been treated as optional for identification purposes. That is certainly one purpose of the identifying information on a license: confirming that the person presenting it is the same individual who was issued the license. Height, weight, eye color, photo, and signature all serve that function. But it is not the only purpose, and it does not explain why sex has been included from the beginning. A “brief description for the purpose of identification” has always treated sex as a basic, observable characteristic of the person, just as height or eye color is. It is not merely a temporary password that can be changed at will. When an officer (or anyone else relying on the license) looks at the document, the sex marker is part of the overall description that helps establish who the person is. If the only goal were photo matching, we would not need height, weight, eye color, or sex on the face of the card. Those fields exist because identification has historically included a set of stable physical descriptors. Sex has been one of them for a century, and current federal REAL ID standards continue to require it. The question is not whether the license helps an officer confirm identity — of course it does. Rather, the question is whether sex is a legitimate part of that identifying description. History, practice, and current federal rules all treat it as one. I think those comparisons miss the point. No one is claiming that a driver’s license = medical alert bracelet or birth certificate. The question is simpler: Is sex a legitimate piece of identifying information on a government-issued ID? For a century it has been treated as one. The 1926 Uniform Vehicle Code required sex on the application and a “brief description” on the license itself. Modern REAL ID regulations still require sex to appear on the face of the card. Height, eye color, and date of birth are also on the license even though no committee of ophthalmologists or vital-records officials demanded it. They are there because they help describe who the person is. You are correct that a driver’s license is not required to use a public restroom. That is beside the point. The license is an official identity document used for countless purposes — police encounters, age verification, air travel, financial transactions, and more. When the state issues an ID, it has historically included sex as part of the basic description of the holder. The debate is whether that long-standing practice should be abandoned so the marker can reflect self-identification instead of biological sex. Saying “doctors never required it on a medical bracelet” or “you don’t need a license to use the restroom” does not answer that question. It simply changes the subject. Yes, it does. I respectfully disagree. Simply saying “Yes, it does” doesn’t engage the distinction. A government ID that records biological sex is not “outing” someone in the ordinary sense of the word. "Outing" implies revealing private information that the person has chosen to keep hidden. Biological sex is not private information of that kind — it is an observable, documented fact that has long been recorded on official documents for public purposes (identification, law enforcement, medical response, vital statistics, and access rules for sex-separated spaces). What would be novel is what you are proposing, namely, that the state rewrite its own records to reflect a subjective identity claim instead of the underlying biological fact. Declining to do that is not the same as forcing a private disclosure. It is the state declining to falsify its own records. If the argument is that any official record of biological sex constitutes “outing,” then every birth certificate, every passport, and every driver’s license that has ever listed sex has been “outing” people. That is not how the term has traditionally been understood, and it collapses the difference between recording a verifiable fact and compelling the disclosure of something genuinely private. The original purpose was identification, that is, confirming that the person presenting the license is the same individual who was issued it. That purpose has always included a set of relatively stable physical descriptors, not a real-time description of current appearance or presentation. Sex has been one of those descriptors from the beginning, alongside height, eye color, and (historically) weight. It was never intended to be a field that changes with clothing, hairstyle, or self-identification. The fact that a mismatch can occur when someone presents differently from their recorded sex does not mean the category itself was a mistake. It means the person’s presentation has changed relative to a longstanding identifying marker. A driver’s license is not a vital record, but it is still an official identity document. It has never been designed to function as a continuously updated physical description. If it were, we would update height, weight, eye color, and photographs far more frequently than we do. We don’t, because the document records relatively fixed identifying characteristics rather than momentary appearance. Requiring the sex marker to reflect biological sex is therefore not a radical departure from the original purpose. Treating sex as mutable self-identification is the departure. The older approach treated sex as a basic, observable fact about the person; the newer approach treats it as a statement of identity that the state is expected to affirm. Those are different theories of what the document is for. This is the rare developmental condition argument, and it does not do the work being asked of it. Also, I have repeatedly acknowledged that there may be some need for exemptions to account for DSDs: Androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS) is a disorder of sex development. In complete AIS, the person has XY chromosomes and testes, but the body does not respond to androgens, so the external phenotype develops along female lines. These are medical exceptions — extremely uncommon — that have always existed and have always been handled as such. They do not redefine the ordinary categories of male and female, nor do they turn sex into a matter of self-identification. A law that records sex on the basis of biological sex is not “defeated” by the existence of rare DSDs any more than the category “height” is defeated by people with rare skeletal disorders. Hard cases and developmental anomalies are real; they are not a warrant for discarding the underlying binary or for treating ordinary males who identify as female as equivalent to people with AIS. In the specific example you raise, someone with complete AIS is typically raised as female, has a female phenotype, and has been treated as female for practical purposes. That is a medical and social accommodation to a developmental condition. It is not the same thing as a male with typical male development who later claims a female identity. Conflating the two is the error, and apparently a deliberate one. This isn't the first time where advocates have conflated people with DSDs with men whose sex is unambiguous but who nevertheless "identifies" as a "woman," and vice versa. Sex-segregated spaces exist because of the material reality of the two sexes in the overwhelming majority of cases. Rare disorders of sex development require careful, individualized handling. They do not supply a general rule that sex is whatever is written on a birth certificate by mistake, nor do they require the law to treat self-identified sex as the operative category. Two separate claims are being mixed together. First, the privacy claim: This is a new argument from you, which appears to be made up out of whole cloth, apparently so that you can fit it under a rubric of heightened constitutional scrutiny. As it is, though, I think this argument is of the "pounding a round peg into a square hole" variety. Sex has appeared on driver’s licenses and similar identity documents for a century. It has never been treated as sensitive medical information on the order of a diagnosis, treatment history, or private health condition. It is a basic identifying descriptor, like height or eye color. Calling it a “privacy violation” that triggers strict scrutiny simply because the document is shown in ordinary transactions rewrites the longstanding understanding of what these documents contain. Height and date of birth are also revealed every time a license is shown; no one seriously argues those disclosures require strict scrutiny. AFAICS, courts have not treated the sex marker on a driver’s license as a disclosure of intimate medical information subject to strict scrutiny. I think one of the many reasons I think you just made it up, but I am certainly open to correction, so feel free to point to case law where courts have "treated the sex marker on a driver’s license as a disclosure of intimate medical information subject to strict scrutiny." I found a case that sort of touches on this: Corbitt v. Sec'y of the Ala. L. Enf't Agency, 115 F.4th 1335 (11th Cir. 2024). A Grok summary: I think Corbitt v. Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency is fairly on point (though in a different circuit, and analyzing federal - not Kansas State - constitutional arguments). It upholds a state policy that ties the sex marker on a driver’s license to biological/surgical criteria (amended birth certificate or proof of sex-reassignment surgery) rather than self-identification. The court held that the policy is not a sex-based classification triggering heightened scrutiny, applies the same objective rules to everyone, and survives rational-basis review because the state has legitimate interests in consistency of identity documents and reliable information for law enforcement. It also rejected due-process and First Amendment challenges, treating the license as government speech. This supports the position I am advancing fairly well: the sex marker is an official identifying descriptor grounded in biological sex (or a closely related medical standard), not a vehicle for affirming subjective gender identity, and requiring it does not violate equal protection, privacy, or free-speech rights in the way opponents claim. The more ordinary framework is rational-basis or intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications, not strict scrutiny for the mere presence of the marker. Second, the line-drawing claim: Rare disorders of sex development create difficult edge cases. I acknowledge this now, and have done so many times in the past. But the old legal idiom has some relevance: "Hard cases make bad law." Edge cases do not erase the underlying binary or make the ordinary category unworkable. Almost every legal classification has hard cases at the margin. The existence of those cases does not require the state to abandon biological sex as the operative category in favor of self-identification, nor does it convert a longstanding identity field into a constitutional privacy violation. The state’s interest in recording sex on an identity document is the same interest it has always had: basic identification and the administration of sex-based rules where they exist. That interest does not disappear because a small number of developmental conditions require careful handling, and it does not elevate ordinary disclosure of the sex marker to a strict-scrutiny event. I think your argument here overstates both points. Yes, a driver’s license is not a full vital-records extract. It does not carry birth weight, birth length, or a baby photo. No one is claiming it should. But that does not mean every field on the license must be limited to whatever helps an officer match a face to a photo in the moment of a traffic stop. The license has always contained a short set of relatively stable physical descriptors — height, eye color, and sex among them — precisely because identification is not limited to a single snapshot comparison. Officers use the listed information when querying databases, checking warrants, making arrests, booking people, and determining housing or search procedures. Sex has been part of that identifying description for a century, and current federal REAL ID standards still require it. The claim that the only purpose is “ascertain that the person presenting the license is the person who is licensed to drive” is too narrow. If that were truly the sole purpose, height, eye color, and even the address could be omitted once a current photo is on the card. They are not omitted, because the document serves broader identification and administrative functions. Sex has historically been treated as one of those basic descriptors. Insisting that the marker must instead reflect current self-identification (or appearance) is the newer claim. The traditional approach treated sex as a stable identifying characteristic, not a field to be updated whenever presentation or identity claims change. That is the distinction at issue — not whether the license should also display birth weight. You are treating “description of the licensee for the purpose of identification” as if it means “whatever the person currently looks like or claims to be.” That is not how the field has ever functioned. The 1926 Uniform Vehicle Code and the long practice that followed treated sex as one of a short list of relatively stable physical descriptors (alongside height and eye color) not as a real-time appearance field. Those descriptors were chosen because they are objective and do not change with clothing, hairstyle, or self-description. An officer (or a database query) can rely on them as fixed reference points. If the standard is simply “what does this person look like right now,” then height, weight, and even the photograph itself would need constant updating. We do not do that. We accept that the license records durable identifying characteristics rather than a continuously revised physical description. Calling the biological-sex entry “objective data” and a self-identified marker “because-I-say-so” is therefore accurate in this context. One is a recorded biological fact that has long served identification purposes; the other is a subjective claim that the state is being asked to treat as controlling. Nothing in the original “description for identification” language requires the state to substitute the latter for the former. Although we continue to disagree, I appreciate both the vigor and the generalized civility with which you have participated in this thread. Thanks, -Smac ETA: I just found a Kansas Court of Appeals case that may have some relevance: State ex rel. Kobach v. Harper, 65 Kan. App. 2d 680 (Kan. App. 2025). A Grok summary: This decision does not hold that biological sex may not be required on driver’s licenses, nor does it endorse self-identification as the controlling standard. It is a narrow ruling on the standards for a temporary injunction: the Attorney General failed to make the required preliminary showings of irreparable harm and substantial likelihood of success. The underlying statutory question (whether K.S.A. 77-207 forces the sex marker on the face of the license to be biological sex at birth) remains open for a full merits determination. In this conversation, this case may be seen as a procedural setback for the biological-sex position at the preliminary-injunction stage of a lawsuit. I'm not sure that's much. And it leaves the substantive policy and statutory arguments (consistency of identity documents, law-enforcement utility, privacy/safety interests in sex-separated spaces, etc.) still live. It does not resolve the deeper dispute we have been addressing about whether the marker should track biological sex or self-identified gender. Thanks, -Smac

I think the former (legally defining "sex") is within the province of the legislature. So is the latter, subject to constitutional scrutiny. And yet the statute addresses biological sex, not "chosen gender." Aye, there's the rub. I agree that personal autonomy is a serious constitutional principle, and Hodes gives it real weight in Kansas. The question is not whether autonomy exists, but where its limits are when it collides with other interests the state may legitimately protect. A driver’s license or birth certificate is not intended as an expression of private identity. It is a government document that records biological sex for a range of public purposes—law enforcement, medical emergencies, vital statistics, and access to sex-separated spaces. Requiring those documents to reflect biological sex does not “out” someone in the sense of forcing private disclosure; it declines to make the state itself rewrite an official record to match an individual's subjective "gender identity." I think the same limiting principle applies to sex-segregated bathrooms and similar facilities. These spaces exist because biological sex creates material differences in privacy, safety, and vulnerability. The segregation is based on biological sex, not "gender identity." The state’s decision to maintain them on the basis of sex is not an attempt to control anyone’s internal sense of self or private gender expression. It is a regulation of shared, intimate public spaces where the autonomy and bodily privacy interests of other people are also at stake. If personal autonomy means the state must alter official sex designations on request and must grant access to opposite-sex facilities on the basis of self-identification, it becomes difficult to identify a coherent stopping point or limiting principles. After all, the same logic could be advanced for other recorded facts (date of birth, height, weight, eye color, age) or for access to any sex-separated space whenever someone experiences distress at the mismatch. Courts have generally not treated those other categories as subject to unilateral redefinition. And the more emphatic the "special pleading" becomes (to treat sex as malleable, but not the other objective markers noted here), the more problematic the constitutional challenge becomes. After all, if "personal autonomy" can mean a state-recognized "right" for a man to "identify" as a woman, what is the legal distinction between that and him wanting to "identify" as 6'2 tall (when he is not that height), or 185 pounds (when he is not that weight) or 28 years old (when he is not that age), etc.? The stronger reading of the autonomy right recognized in Hodes—even giving it full weight—is that it protects individuals from compelled medical procedures, forced pregnancy, or direct control over their own bodies and private decisions. It does not require the state to abandon biological sex as a classifying principle in official records or in the design of intimate public facilities. That distinction seems to me a necessary constraint if the principle is to remain workable. Otherwise, "personal autonomy" becomes a blank check for the Kansas Supreme Court to fabricate and dole out newly-minted constitutional "rights" like some sort of black-robed Pez dispenser. I acknowledge that the Kansas Supreme Court may ultimately draw the line differently. What you call "the sensibilities of our State Supreme Court" may make it appear to be one of the more progressive / left-leaning state supreme courts in the country. 6 of the 7 justices were appointed by Democratic governors. So your preferences may well play out. Whether that would amount to judicial activism/overreach is yet to be seen. But again, even "progressive / left-leaning" may eventually realize that "personal autonomy" as to have some constraints and parameters. In any event, the existence of a genuine autonomy interest does not automatically convert every identity claim into a right to rewrite government documents or to redefine the boundaries of sex-separated spaces. I think this needs to be demonstrated rather than asserted. I also think you will have a pretty hard time demonstrating it. The State does not have authority to regulate the contents of its official documents, such as driver's licenses, etc.? Could you elaborate on how that works? Same goes for passing sex-based laws. Constitutional scrutiny will always apply, but that likely cuts against your preferred outcome, since I think the State can present all sorts of important state interests for regulating sex-segregated spaces, as it has in the past many times. A private citizen can compel the State of Kansas to change objective data on driver's license in favor of subjective, because-I-say-so preferences? Could you elaborate on how you get there? Also, could you elaborate on why the State can require designation of objective data points like a person's DOB, but not biological sex? But you do have a problem if "women" = adult human female. Am I correct on that point? I am reminded of this little thing about Abe Lincoln: There are different versions of this puzzler, and each is based on a different type of animal, e.g., a sheep, a calf, a horse, or a pig. But the template for the question and answer remains the same. Abraham Lincoln has usually been given credit for this instructive brainteaser. Similarly: Q. What is a man who is unequivocally biologically male, but subjectively "identifies" as a woman? A. He's a man. A claim by a man to "identify" as a women does not make him one. You’re drawing a distinction I think is worth taking seriously: you accept that the state may maintain sex-separated bathrooms limited to "women," but you object to the state deciding that men who "identify" as women remain men for that purpose. That distinction actually points in the opposite direction from the ID argument. If the state is allowed to maintain women’s bathrooms as women’s bathrooms, then it necessarily needs a workable, non-circular definition of who qualifies. This is where the foundational premise of your position - that "a woman is anyone who 'identifies' as a woman" - bumps into cold, hard reality. The longstanding, administrable definition has been biological sex. Once the state is required to treat self-identified gender as controlling for official purposes, the sex-separated bathroom rule becomes difficult to enforce in any coherent way. The same person the state must record as female on a driver’s license is then the person the state must treat as female for bathroom access. The two issues are linked. On the “outing” concern: a sex designation on a government ID is not primarily a speech or privacy act directed at the public. It is an official record used for identification, law enforcement, medical emergencies, and access rules that still turn on sex. Declining to change that record is not the state “outing” someone; it is the state declining to alter a material fact it has traditionally recorded. People remain free to present themselves however they wish in daily life. The state is simply not obligated to make its own documents the vehicle for that presentation. You say you have no problem with “only women can use the women’s restroom.” The live question is, and has been for years, what the word “women” means when the state draws that line. If it means adult human females, the bathroom policy is coherent and the ID policy follows. If it means anyone who identifies as a woman, then the bathroom policy you say you accept becomes largely unenforceable. That is the tension I don’t think the autonomy argument resolves. I appreciate your input. Thanks, -Smac

Hmm. You went from "intermediate" to "strict" scrutiny in less than a day. I asked Grok: "How do you think the Hodes decision in Kansas may apply to a challenge to the Kansas law regarding sex-segregated bathrooms?" The response: I will be interested to see how far the Kansas Supreme Court is willing to go regarding the constitutional right to "personal autonomy." There must be some constraints on this principle. Thanks, -Smac

Okay. Okay. Seems like the negation of sex-segregated spaces, since what counts as "passing" and what does not is almost certainly unworkable. What about just a regular guy, not a man dressed and "passing" as a woman, but a straight-up man? Don't see how to exclude them. Thanks, -Smac

We're at a pretty pass when I have to ask you to clarify what you mean by "men" and "women." I think many women and girls do not want men in women's bathrooms. I think plenty of men feel the same about women in men's bathrooms, but less due to safety concerns and more due to privacy/dignity concerns. Okay. Glad we cleared that up. Thanks, -Smac

"Background" about abortion? How does that relate to sex-segregated bathrooms? Yes. We should expect to see varying constitutional analyses in the state appellate courts. I'm not sure why you are bringing up abortion or the "religious right's" efforts pertaining to it. Could you clarify how this is relevant to sex-segregated bathrooms? "This" being sex-segregated bathrooms? Oddly, the Kansas legislature has apparently attempt to enact a statute setting the level of constitutional analysis is set by statute: I haven't looked into this, and I have no experience with Kansas jurisprudence, but it seems almost axiomatic that under basic separation-of-powers principles, the judiciary, not the legislature, determines what standard of review the state constitution requires and whether a particular law satisfies it. A statute can supply definitions, substantive rules, and legislative findings, but it cannot dictate to the courts the applicable constitutional test or compel a finding that the test is met. That said, I think you "it's all political" approach to jurisprudential thought is not a reliable thing. Moreover, because the statute on its face differentiates based on sex, it necessarily requires strict scrutiny. There are three standards: (1) the rational basis standard, which requires only that the enactment bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest; (2) the heightened or intermediate scrutiny standard, which requires the enactment to substantially further an important state interest; and (3) the strict scrutiny standard, which requires the enactment serve some compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest. The determination of which of the three standards applies depends on the nature of the right at stake. The second on applies. Generally, under intermediate scrutiny, a law or government action must serve an important (or significant) government interest, and the means used to achieve that goal must be substantially related to the interest. The government holds the burden of proof to justify its action. I asked Grok to take a stab at guessing how things will turn out: We'll see. Interesting that you keep attempting to frame litigation in provocative, slanted terminology. Anyway, in March the court in Doe "denied a requested temporary restraining order to block enforcement of the law": More here: While certainly not definitive, that the plaintiffs' failure to establish a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claims (the article above references "successful likelihood," but that may be a typo) would not normally be encouraging to the plaintiffs. In cases such as this there really isn't a factual dispute, but rather the dispute pertains to constitutionality. If they could not demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing at the outset of the case, I'm not sure much will change in the future. Yes, we'll see. Sex-based separations in bathrooms, locker rooms, and similar facilities have long been treated as constitutionally permissible. Federal courts in recent years have generally upheld biological-sex rules in analogous settings (schools, prisons, etc.), and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2025 Skrmetti decision applied only rational-basis review to a related transgender regulation. Thanks, -Smac

What transgender men/biological women? You don’t think they have difficulties using women’s restrooms, they won’t be harassed, recorded, threatened as well? (Maybe not physically threatened on that moment, but put at risk by being recorded, doxxed, etc)? I think I have addressed this at substantial length. "The discomfort that can arise in edge cases under a sex-based rule is real. I acknowledge that." "The awkwardness that can create for the individual woman who has chosen to present herself as being male (or vice versa) is real. So is the alternative of letting identity or presentation override sex, which creates a different and broader set of costs for the people the female (or male) category was created to protect, and it eliminates any stable limiting principle." "Highly masculinized females remain female under a sex-based criterion; they use the women’s facility. The awkwardness that can arise in those edge cases is real. It is still a different—and smaller—problem than admitting anyone into women's space on the basis of subjective identity or appearance (or not even based on that)." "The discomfort this creates for some individuals who present or identify differently is real, but it does not require us to redefine the category or surrender the boundary" "I acknowledge that rule will sometimes produce awkward situations for people whose appearance does not match their sex. That is a real cost. But then, the alternative rule (access according to self-identification) also produces costs: loss of privacy, safety concerns, and competitive unfairness for the group the spaces were created to protect." "In short, the policy requires people to use the facility that matches their sex. Residual social friction for a small number persons is a genuine downside worth managing with good complaint procedures and common sense. But I think it is not a reason to abandon the sex-based boundary that protects the group for whom the spaces were created: women and girls." "Sex-segregated spaces are created and maintained for the benefit of women and girls, or half the population. I think the Kansas legislature passed the law to benefit woman and girls. Sex-segregated spaces impose some difficulties on a statistically small - even tiny - number of men." "The awkwardness that can create for the individual woman who has chosen to present herself as being male (or vice versa) is real. So is the alternative of letting identity or presentation override sex, which creates a different and broader set of costs for the people the female (or male) category was created to protect, and it eliminates any stable limiting principle." "A consistent sex-based rule will sometimes create awkward or painful situations for people whose appearance or identity diverges from their sex. That is a genuine cost, and practical accommodations (single-occupancy options, etc.) can reduce it without erasing the boundary. But the alternative rule, access by self-identification, imposes a different set of costs on the far larger group for whom the spaces were created, and it removes any stable limiting principle. Once sex is no longer the criterion, there is no coherent basis for excluding any male." "On the specific example: a sex-based rule does mean that a female person who has taken steps to appear male still uses the women’s facility (or a single-occupancy option where available). That can be awkward for the individual. The alternative rule of letting identity or appearance control means male people who identify or present as female, and anyone else as well, gain access to women’s facilities. That creates a different set of costs, borne by the women the space was created to serve, and it removes any stable way to exclude males who might exploit the rule." "So as between the seemingly competing and incompatible interests and preferences of (A) biological women and girls and (B) biological males who, having taken cosmetic, medical and sartorial measures to deliberately appear and "identify" as women, which set of interests and preferences should prevail? In my view, I think the prevailing group should be the one for whom sex-segregated spaces were created: biological women and girls." It appears that we differ in a few things, but we both acknowledge that the Kansas law can have some adverse effects on men who "identify" as women and so want to enter women's bathrooms. Where we differ is whether the alternative approach has some adverse effects on women and girls (for whom sex-segregated facilities were intended to protect). Thanks, -Smac

These are value judgments about which reasonable minds can and do disagree. I don't recall saying you "{don't} care about the integrity of data." You cannot or will not define what a "woman" is. You conflate actual women with men who, having taken cosmetic, medical and sartorial measures to deliberately appear as a woman, "identify" as, and become, a woman. Your position requires society to radically re-define "woman." Again: I do not share that premise. I take “woman” to mean adult human female. On that understanding, a male who identifies as a woman remains male. Admitting him to women’s facilities is not an act of recognition, but instead is the abandonment of the sex-based boundary that justifies the facilities in the first place. The discomfort this creates for some individuals who present or identify differently is real, but it does not require us to redefine the category or surrender the boundary. And the alternative is to create problems and impositions on women and girls, for whom bathrooms and other sex-segregated spaces are intended. It was done by the Kansas State Legislature. I think we're mixing issues again. First, clinical care. Good doctors do rely on the full medical history, current anatomy, hormones, and relevant labs—not on the letter printed on a driver’s license. No serious argument says otherwise. The license marker is not a substitute for a chart. It is a basic administrative and identification field that is also used outside the exam room: for screening in sex-separated spaces, for records that feed population data, for matching to prior medical and legal history, and for ordinary verification. Saying “doctors should look at the whole history” does not answer whether the underlying sex marker itself should be accurate. Second, data. If the claim is that recording the person as “Female” does not enhance the data, that cuts against self-ID, not in favor of it. Actuarial, epidemiological, and clinical datasets are useful only to the extent the categories track the biological and physiological differences that actually drive risk, drug response, disease prevalence, and outcomes. Sex is one of those variables. Replacing it with an identity label that can diverge from sex introduces noise precisely where sex is the relevant covariate. An actuary who needs reliable sex-stratified data is not helped by a system that treats the marker as a self-reported preference. "Trust doctors to read the chart: is not a reason to make the official sex marker inaccurate, nor is it a reason to claim that calling a male “Female” improves the data. If anything, the actuarial point runs the other way—categories that no longer track sex make the data worse for the purposes for which sex is recorded. You being an actuary, I am curious. Here is my understanding: Actuaries price and reserve on the basis of factors that demonstrably correlate with claim costs. Sex is one of the strongest and most persistent of those factors in mortality, certain morbidity, and some casualty lines (especially young-driver auto). Male and female populations show different average life expectancy, different patterns of cardiovascular disease, cancer, disability, and (at younger ages) accident frequency/severity. Those differences are biological and behavioral in origin; and are therefore not created by the gender marker on a license. Are these substantively accurate statements? Continued: If a risk truly varies by biological sex, recording or pricing a biological male as “female” (or vice versa) does not improve the data—it introduces misclassification error. For example, hormone therapy and surgery change some risk factors (e.g., certain hormone-dependent conditions, thromboembolic risk) but do not rewrite the entire sex-based risk profile. Where the carrier has credible experience or medical evidence that a transitioned person’s residual risk now more closely resembles the identified sex, some will adjust. Where it does not, birth sex (or a substandard rating that reflects the actual medical history) remains the more accurate approach. Broadly speaking, actuaries do not treat “identifies as a woman” as automatically equivalent to “is female for risk purposes.” Practices differ by product, carrier, and jurisdiction. When sex is a material rating factor, the safer and more common actuarial default is still biological sex / sex at birth, supplemented by individual medical underwriting. Self-identified gender is used more often when required by law, by document-matching convenience, or when the carrier has decided the residual risk difference is small enough to absorb. I am really out of my field here, hence my request for your input. From the outside looking in, I would think that from a pure data-quality standpoint, if the risk varies by sex, labeling a person according to subjective "self-identity" rather than sex reduces, rather than enhances, the usefulness of the classification. How do you, in your professional capacity as an actuary, define "woman"? As you like. It is interesting to me that the two women I have spoken with about this topic in recent days - my wife and my sister - agree with me. Or is that perhaps a "faulty generalization"? I'm not sure we have good data. It seems like surveys/polls are carefully drafted to not address the presence or absence of limiting principles. For example, if the question were "Would you support a law that essentially eliminates sex-segregated bathrooms, changing rooms, etc.?", I think quite a few, perhaps the majority, would say no. Or "Would you support a law that allows anyone who looks or acts or subjective 'self-identifies' as a woman to enter into women's bathrooms, changing rooms, etc.?", I think there would be a lot of people opposing this. I would be interested in any data you have on this. For example, I found this report by YouGov, but it is about "gender neutral toilets," not "men in women's bathrooms." Moreover, the split seems to vacillate over time. Moreover, the methodology is questionable. YouGov uses an online opt-in panel rather than random telephone sampling. My understanding is that opt-in panels can skew results or attract insincere respondents on rapid-turnaround cultural topics. I agree. You may be wrong. A space in which any male for any reason can enter into women's spaces, with no limiting principles at all, is not "segregated" in any meaningful sense. Yes, I acknowledge we disagree. I am not in the Kansas State Legislature, nor did I have anything to do with its approach to sex-segregated bathrooms. I do agree with it, though, and find it reasonable. You do not. Such are the vicissitudes of living in a pluralistic society. I would prefer if you were refrain from personalizing this thread, as you have done many times now. But so far I think we've managed to stay on topic despite those efforts. I'm glad of that. I agree. Where we disagree is what sort of preemptive/prophylactic measures a jurisdiction can/should deploy to mitigate the risk of these things happening. We also disagree in that you appear to focus overwhelmingly on what one of several grounds I have cited. You haven't "established" anything either. This is just an informal discussion about public policy. And yet you oppose any "limiting principles" designed to keep such facilities "sex-distinct." I disagree with you on this point, as i think limiting principles are important. I also think biological sex is a very good, and perhaps the best (in terms of public policy and enforcement), limiting principle. I don't think they do. That a man may go to great lengths to pass as a woman does not make him one. And vice versa. So the general rule of biological sex is reasonable. I also think that some particularized exemptions/exceptions for people with DSDs would be reasonable. Where we disagree is whether the entirety of the male population should be able, for any reason or no reason at all (there being no coherent limiting principles under your preferred regime), be allowed by law to enter into women's bathrooms. Thanks, -Smac

At this point, this is probably the closest to my actual position if you are interested in that, smac. It is not what I am currently exploring though. I also recognize that for many “appearance” counts as what someone “does”, so not sure how to achieve this. How do you imagine a state law would be drafted so as to allow everyone into women's bathrooms except those who enter the bathroom, do something "that is making people uncomfortable," and then have a legal process whereby a judge enters an order stating "they should not be allowed to use the {women's} facilities" in the future. From a public policy position, I don't think CB"s proposal works. Thanks, -Smac

Some points need separating: First, prevalence. You say the people you know who have transitioned “fall very close in line” with the highly masculinized photos and that this is “the vast majority.” That may reflect the circles you move in. It is not the general picture. Many people who identify as transgender have not undergone extensive testosterone use, surgery, and permanent masculinization of the kind shown in those images. Presentation varies widely. Even if a large share of the subset who medically transition do end up looking highly masculine, that still does not convert the policy question into an appearance test. The rule under discussion tracks sex, not how successfully someone has approximated the opposite sex’s appearance. Second, the purpose of the rule. A sex-based boundary is not a law “against a class of people simply because how they look is uncomfortable for some.” It is a rule about which sex uses which multi-occupancy facility in settings that involve undress and vulnerability. The interest it serves is the long-standing one that justified sex separation in the first place: privacy and safety patterns that track sex. Conduct rules against harassment, voyeurism, and assault remain necessary and should be enforced against anyone. They have never been treated as a complete substitute for the boundary itself. We do not eliminate sex-separated changing rooms, shelters, or restrooms on the theory that “only bad behavior matters.” You argue that a sex-based rule has “the opposite effect” of making women feel safe if highly masculinized females are directed to the women’s room. I am not persuaded that you are speaking on behalf of women and girls who want sex-segregated bathrooms. Moreover, I think your comment misstates the rule. Highly masculinized females remain female under a sex-based criterion; they use the women’s facility. The awkwardness that can arise in those edge cases is real. It is still a different—and smaller—problem than admitting anyone into women's space on the basis of subjective identity or appearance (or not even based on that). Replacing sex with either self-identification or a pure looks-based test does not eliminate discomfort or risk; it relocates and, for many women and girls, increases it. “There are way too many variables to simply judge by a birth certificate” is a reason some people prefer self-ID or case-by-case appearance judgments. It is not a demonstration that sex is an irrational or purely aesthetic criterion for these spaces. Sex is the characteristic the facilities were separated on. Edge cases (including people with DSDs and people whose appearance is ambiguous) can be handled with ordinary judgment and fair process. They do not require abandoning the category that organizes the rule for everyone else. Third, your comment here: "If in fact there is ANY person, male or female transitioned or cis is doing things in any restroom that is making people uncomfortable then they should not be allowed to use the facilities." That standard sounds reasonable until you try to operate a restroom under it. “Making people uncomfortable” is not a workable access rule. Discomfort is subjective, varies by person, and can be triggered by ordinary presence, appearance, disability, age, or nothing more than nervousness. A rule that turns on whether someone is “making people uncomfortable” gives no clear notice of what is prohibited, invites selective or viewpoint-based enforcement, and collapses into complaints about who “belongs” rather than about discrete misconduct. Sex-separated facilities already exist because the setting involves undress and vulnerability. The boundary is categorical: it reduces the occasions on which those privacy and safety interests are implicated. Conduct rules against harassment, voyeurism, loitering, recording, or assault remain necessary and should be enforced against anyone. They are not a substitute for the boundary itself. We do not eliminate sex separation in changing rooms, shelters, or multi-stall restrooms on the theory that we can simply eject whoever makes someone uncomfortable after the fact. If the proposal is that facilities should be open to all and that only proven bad acts justify exclusion, that is a policy choice—one that abandons sex as a criterion. It is not the same as saying the current design is irrational or that discomfort is the only legitimate concern. The disagreement is whether the category still matters. Treating every access dispute as a pure conduct case does not resolve that disagreement; it assumes one side of it. In short: the photos show that some females can look very male. That fact is not ignored. It simply does not establish that the proper response is to drop sex as the criterion and rely only on after-the-fact policing of “bad behavior.” The disagreement remains whether the category still matters. That is a substantive dispute, not a failure to notice that transition can change appearance. Thanks, -Smac

Neither of us is "trying to legislate anything." Both of us are commentating about the the Kansas legislature and other lawmaking bodies should do in relation to men in women's bathrooms. I appreciate your perspective. For my part, you have failed to make the case for why laws like the one in Kansas are unnecessary, or why they should not be enacted, etc. I am taking the position, which I also think is "extremely practical," which endorses biological sex as a limiting principle as pertaining to men going into women's bathrooms. Reasonable minds can disagree about such things. But it is arguing from the margins, so it amounts to the same thing. Sex-segregated spaces are created and maintained for the benefit of women and girls, or half the population. I think the Kansas legislature passed the law to benefit woman and girls. Sex-segregated spaces impose some difficulties on a statistically small - even tiny - number of men. I think it is reasonable for the Kansas legislature to do what it did. I'm okay with that. You haven't convinced me of the merits of your position either. Respectfully, I think this needs to be demonstrated, rather than assumed/demonstrated. From one of my posts on Friday: IIRC, you did not address these, and are now simply declaring that they don't exist at all ("doesn't hurt anyone"). I don't think you are situated to speak on behalf of women and girls. I think many, likely most, women and girls have reasonable expectations of privacy and dignity, and to not to share bathrooms, locker rooms, changing areas with the opposite sex. You decline to recognize violations of privacy and dignity as "harm." I think many, likely most, women and girls view males, as a group, as committing the large majority of sexual assaults, voyeurism, and exhibitionism, such that prophylactic measures - such as sex-segregated facilities - reduce opportunities for male-pattern offenses in spaces where women and girls are vulnerable. You decline to recognize the elimination of sex-segregated spaces as "harm." Women’s shelters, prisons, sports teams, and certain schools or organizations were created to serve females as a class. Allowing males to enter on the basis of identity undermines the purpose of those institutions and the ability of women to associate on the basis of sex. You are declining to recognize this as "harm." Loss of sex-separated spaces can increase anxiety, reduce participation (especially in sport and school activities), and signal that female boundaries are secondary to male identity claims. You are declining to recognize this as "harm." I think that description is incomplete. The primary practical function of a restroom is, of course, to allow people to relieve themselves. But the reason public restrooms in this country (and most of the world) have long been separated by sex is not that society was indifferent to who else was present. Sex separation exists precisely because these are spaces that involve partial undress, vulnerability, and physical proximity. The design choice reflects a judgment that privacy, safety, and comfort interests differ systematically by sex, especially for women and girls. If the only purpose were “a place to use the bathroom,” unisex multi-stall facilities would have been the historical default. They were not, and still are not. Single-sex multi-occupancy restrooms became the norm because people, particularly women, valued not having to share that intimate setting with the opposite sex. The “guarantee” of sex separation is not an accidental side effect; it is the point of the architectural and legal convention. You can argue that the privacy and safety interests are overstated, or that self-identification should now override them. Those are substantive claims worth debating. But it is not accurate to treat sex separation as irrelevant to the purpose of the facility. The purpose has always included both the functional need to relieve oneself and the conditions under which that occurs. The argument treats the only legally relevant question as discrete misconduct (harassment, voyeurism, assault). I think that is too narrow. Sex-separated restrooms exist because the setting itself involves undress, vulnerability, and enforced proximity. The boundary is not solely a back-end enforcement tool against bad actors. Instead, it is a front-end design choice that reduces the occasions on which those risks and privacy costs arise. We do not wait for a documented assault in every locker room before maintaining sex separation, any more than we wait for a documented assault before maintaining sex separation in shelters, prisons, or changing areas. The category is the point of the rule, not an irrelevant side issue. “Discomfort is not harm” understates what is at stake for many women and girls. The interest being protected includes the ability to use a multi-occupancy facility without the presence of men while in a state of partial undress. That interest has long been treated as legitimate in law and social practice. Calling it mere “discomfort” reframes a privacy and safety claim as mere subjective sensitivity so it can be dismissed. On evidence: the claim that there is “no actual problem” is contested. There are documented incidents of males accessing female facilities and committing offenses. I provided a list of reported instances, which I think you have not addressed at all: Judge Rules Loudoun County Teen Sexually Assaulted Female Student in Girls' Bathroom (2021) 6 Men Who Disguised Themselves as Women to Access Bathrooms (from 2016) Transgender woman arrested for voyeurism at Ammon Target (2016) Man Dressed as Woman Arrested for Spying Into Mall Bathroom Stall, Police Say (2015) Cross-Dressing Man Secretly Taped Women at Macy’s (2013) Sex offender posed as woman, went into women's locker room Man Undresses In Front Of Children In Walmart Restroom (2010) Purdue police investigate report of man taking photographs in women's restroom (2008) Sexual predator jailed after claiming to be ‘transgender’ to assault women in shelter (2014 in Canada) ‘Transgender’ man may continue using girls’ locker room, says college (2012) I don't know how you can reconcile these incidents with your "no harm" argument. There are also surveys and testimony from women and girls about reduced willingness to use facilities, sports changes, and shelters when men are present. One can debate the frequency and weight of those incidents. One cannot accurately say the policy concern is invented out of thin air or that the only permissible legal response is after-the-fact prosecution of discrete crimes. The framing “a transgender woman is simply going in to pee” assumes the conclusion that sex is irrelevant and only current identity and immediate intent matter. That is the policy dispute, not a foregone conclusion. A sex-based rule says biological sex remains the relevant criterion for these spaces precisely because the physical and privacy stakes track sex, not self-description. You can reject that criterion; you cannot treat its rejection as self-evident while demanding that the other side alone supply overwhelming proof. As we are concluding the discussion, I won't say anything else except to thank you for sharing your thoughts and perspective. Thanks, -Smac