Analytics Posted December 28, 2021 Author Posted December 28, 2021 6 hours ago, webbles said: My hold on "The Big Picture" finally came in and I read it. It was alright. It didn't really improve my opinion of the "Core Theory". It looks like the "Core Theory" only works if you also accept the "Many-worlds" theory or similar theories that don't use the "wave-function collapse". That's because the "Core Theory" combines the Standard Model with Gravity by "smoothly" integrating the Schrödinger equation. But a "wave-function collapse" doesn't allow smooth integration so acceptance of the "Copenhagan interpretation" or similar would mean that the "Core Theory" isn't accurate. Hi Webbles, First, thank you for reading the book. What did you think of Carroll's emphasis on domains of applicability and poetic naturalism? I'm pretty confident what you're saying here doesn't really address his point. His point is that within its domain of applicability, the core theory describes reality with exquisite precision. How you go about interpreting the formulas is irrelevant to the fact that within their domain of applicability, the formulas describe what happens. 6 hours ago, webbles said: I don't accept the "Many-Worlds" theory, mainly because I find it basically negates any discoveries we make. For example, lets say that a quark, in addition to the various properties we have discovered, also has a "spirit property" or a "conscious property". Per, "The Big Picture", we can supposedly prove that those properties don't exist because we haven't yet seen them in our millions of experiments.... Did you read chapter 42 ("Are Photons Conscious?")? He addresses panpsychism directly. If these particles had a "spirit property" or a "conscious property", it would have more degrees of freedom and the formulas of quantum mechanics wouldn't work. Is that what you're referring to here? 6 hours ago, webbles said: Except, per "Many-Worlds", each time that a quantum particle would "collapse", instead the "worlds" split. So, when two particles are smashed together in the LHC, every possible result happens and each of those possibilities are seen in a different "world". Now suppose that our "world" just happens to be the extremely unlikely world where we never see the "spirit property" appear in the LHC experiments? That probability would be extremely low because we've done millions of experiments, but maybe that is the reason why we are arguing over whether it exists or not. In all of the other "worlds", we aren't having this discussion because we've discovered the "spirit property". Unfortunately, we can't tell. What does this have to do with whether or not you interpret QM using the many-worlds interpretation? QM tells the probability of seeing different events--those probabilities are still there, regardless of how it is interpreted. 6 hours ago, webbles said: Another reason why I don't care for the "Many-Worlds" theory is because it actually allows for spoon-bending powers and similar. For example, what can cause a spoon to bend when I'm holding it? A gravitational pull on the spoon that is somehow localized just to the spoon, a magnetic force that pulls the spoon, or heat on the handle that weakens it so the spoon bends. The last two all have an unlikely possibility of actually happening. When a person is holding a spoon and "willing" it to bend, there is a remote possibility that it will bend and one world will have it bending and the other worlds wouldn't. So, if I'm in the world where the spoon bent, how do I prove that it wasn't by the person's "mind power"? Maybe I do further studies? But in each study, the one of the "worlds" will include the "mind power" working. This reminds me of something I read in The Blind Watchmaker, by Richard Dawkins. Dawkins was talking about the probability of unlikely things happening like this, and he said he asked a physicist friend to calculate the probability of a marble statue spontaneously waving simply do to the underlying particles happening to align. The physicist said he did the calculations and said it was on the order of magnitude of 1 to 10^(1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) or something like that--a number so big that even if you started writing it at the moment of the Big Bang, you would still be writing zeros now. But there's still a chance! 6 hours ago, webbles said: Another problem with the "Core Theory" (or at least the equation) is that it contains multiple parts which zero out for different types of experiments. When dealing with particles where we use the Standard Model, the gravitational part is 0. When dealing with particles where we use relativity, the standard model part is 0. We haven't yet had an experiment that uses both of those parts of the "Core Theory" so it is possible that the equation is inaccurate in how it combines relativity and the Standard Model. But within its domain of applicability, the model successfully describes reality very accurately, doesn't it? That is all Carroll claims. 6 hours ago, webbles said: I did enjoy reading about "Aumann's Agreement Theorem". I find Sean Carrol to be a little optimistic in thinking that the agreement theorem actually works with humans, though. The theorem only works for humans if we are "Bayesian rational agents" and I find that extremely unlikely. Since we don't actually have any choice, we probably don't have the ability to revise any or all of our posteriors. Maybe I'm programmed to always believe that God exists. No amount of reasoning or explaining will be able to change me. Perhaps, lol. But according to poetic naturalism, free agency really does exist, and you are free to endeavor to be a bayesian rational agent if you want to.
webbles Posted December 28, 2021 Posted December 28, 2021 4 hours ago, Analytics said: What did you think of Carroll's emphasis on domains of applicability and poetic naturalism? I'm pretty confident what you're saying here doesn't really address his point. His point is that within its domain of applicability, the core theory describes reality with exquisite precision. How you go about interpreting the formulas is irrelevant to the fact that within their domain of applicability, the formulas describe what happens. I didn't care much for poetic naturalism. It is just wordsmith and doesn't really mean much of anything. One big example where he points this out is the 4 ways to describe why giraffes have long necks. The first description (giraffes kept stretching their necks) is incorrect, but the other 3 descriptions are correct. The second two are using a form of wordsmithing that helps explain it to people in the same field (similar to poetic naturalism) but the last one describes what is really happening at the lowest level. Since no one really likes to talk about it at the lowest level, we create words/ideas to explain it in "poetic" terms. 4 hours ago, Analytics said: Did you read chapter 42 ("Are Photons Conscious?")? He addresses panpsychism directly. If these particles had a "spirit property" or a "conscious property", it would have more degrees of freedom and the formulas of quantum mechanics wouldn't work. Is that what you're referring to here? Yes, I was referencing chapter 42 in my example. 4 hours ago, Analytics said: What does this have to do with whether or not you interpret QM using the many-worlds interpretation? QM tells the probability of seeing different events--those probabilities are still there, regardless of how it is interpreted. No, theories that use "quantum-wave collapse" say that when a quantum state is measured, then the probabilities reduce into a specific state. So if you look at millions of events, you should have a fairly good chance of seeing all the possibilities because you are seeing the reduced state. Let's look at Schrodinger's cat as an example of the two views. In "quantum-wave collapse" interpretation, you don't know if the cat is dead or alive before you open the box. But once you open the box, the cat is definitely dead or alive. In "many-world collapse" interpretation, you also don't know if the cat is dead or alive before you open the box. But once you open the box, the cat is actually both dead and alive. A version of you sees a dead cat (dead-cat world) and a version of you sees a living cat (living-cat world). The worlds split once you opened the box and there are now two versions of you in your own worlds and neither know of each other. To bring this back to the "spirit properties", let's have a scientist do an quantum experiment to detect the "spirit properties". Let's say that there are 100 possible states of the quantum experiment and one of them will show "spirit properties". In the first experiment, the scientist will split into 100 new worlds. In 99 of them, she won't see the "spirit properties" but she will see them in 1 and will have her proof. In those 99 versions of her without proof, she'll do another experiment. There are now 100 worlds with proof and 99*99 without proof. In those 100 worlds, she has proven that "spirit properties" do exist. In the other 99*99 worlds, she has proven that they don't exist. Now, say she does millions of experiments. There are now lots of worlds that know about the "spirit properties" but the vast majority of the worlds would have "proven" them to not exist. In all of those worlds that have incorrect knowledge, the scientist would never know that it is incorrect. 4 hours ago, Analytics said: This reminds me of something I read in The Blind Watchmaker, by Richard Dawkins. Dawkins was talking about the probability of unlikely things happening like this, and he said he asked a physicist friend to calculate the probability of a marble statue spontaneously waving simply do to the underlying particles happening to align. The physicist said he did the calculations and said it was on the order of magnitude of 1 to 10^(1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) or something like that--a number so big that even if you started writing it at the moment of the Big Bang, you would still be writing zeros now. But there's still a chance! I totally agree. But many-worlds actually means that those extremely rare things would be the norm for that extremely rare world. And we wouldn't know if our world is the extremely rare world. To us, we would assume that it is the norm because that is what how we see the world. 4 hours ago, Analytics said: But within its domain of applicability, the model successfully describes reality very accurately, doesn't it? That is all Carroll claims. It describes quantum mechanics accurately and it describes general relativity accurately. But it doesn't describe the part of the world where those two interact with each other. And that part of the world is very much within our domain. If you assume that the wave-function doesn't collapse but instead integrates smoothly (which is what Carrol assumes), then it might describe our world fairly accurately. But we don't know whether the wave-function actually collapses or integrates smoothly or does something completely different. 4 hours ago, Analytics said: Perhaps, lol. But according to poetic naturalism, free agency really does exist, and you are free to endeavor to be a bayesian rational agent if you want to. No, poetic naturalism doesn't say that free agency exists. It says that since we feel like we have "choice", we can say that we have "free agency". But Carrol describes multiple times in the book on how we don't actually have free agency or choice. Most likely, he is programmed to like the idea that we are bayesian ration agents and I'm programmed to not like the idea. And whether either of us can change our programs is entirely dependent on Laplace's demon
Analytics Posted December 28, 2021 Author Posted December 28, 2021 (edited) 10 hours ago, webbles said: I didn't care much for poetic naturalism. It is just wordsmith and doesn't really mean much of anything. One big example where he points this out is the 4 ways to describe why giraffes have long necks. The first description (giraffes kept stretching their necks) is incorrect, but the other 3 descriptions are correct. The second two are using a form of wordsmithing that helps explain it to people in the same field (similar to poetic naturalism) but the last one describes what is really happening at the lowest level. Since no one really likes to talk about it at the lowest level, we create words/ideas to explain it in "poetic" terms. I wouldn't say poetic naturalism is about wordsmithing. I would say it is about using models that are appropriate to the situation. A civil engineer will model water as if it is a fluid even though it isn't really a fluid, but rather is a collection of quantum fields. But on a macroscopic level, it is more useful to think of it as a fluid. Poetic naturalism is permission to use the most appropriate model for the situation at hand. It isn't about whether the engineer "likes" to talk about water at the lowest level. The question is whether it is appropriate to talk about it at the lowest level when solving macro problems. 10 hours ago, webbles said: In "quantum-wave collapse" interpretation, you don't know if the cat is dead or alive before you open the box. But once you open the box, the cat is definitely dead or alive. My understanding is that this is completely wrong. It isn't a matter of not knowing if the cat is dead or alive. It's a matter of the cat literally being both dead and alive at the same time in a wave function. The process of opening the box and observing actually causes the wave function to collapse and causes it to stop being both dead and alive. 10 hours ago, webbles said: To bring this back to the "spirit properties", let's have a scientist do an quantum experiment to detect the "spirit properties". Let's say that there are 100 possible states of the quantum experiment and one of them will show "spirit properties". In the first experiment, the scientist will split into 100 new worlds. In 99 of them, she won't see the "spirit properties" but she will see them in 1 and will have her proof. In those 99 versions of her without proof, she'll do another experiment. There are now 100 worlds with proof and 99*99 without proof. In those 100 worlds, she has proven that "spirit properties" do exist. In the other 99*99 worlds, she has proven that they don't exist. Now, say she does millions of experiments. There are now lots of worlds that know about the "spirit properties" but the vast majority of the worlds would have "proven" them to not exist. In all of those worlds that have incorrect knowledge, the scientist would never know that it is incorrect. If we want to be technical about it, the scientists in these hypothetical worlds haven't "proven" anything. They're merely 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% confident that they are right. It's important to remember that even if they had a string of incredible luck up until now, the next time they run the experiment odds are their luck will run out. A few years ago I was at a business conference in Las Vegas, and found myself doing some low-stakes gambling at a table with some gimmicky game. At one point I was up a couple hundred dollars, and somebody mentioned how lucky I was. They dealer accurately said, "the house always wins in the end." Reality is like that. 10 hours ago, webbles said: I totally agree. But many-worlds actually means that those extremely rare things would be the norm for that extremely rare world. And we wouldn't know if our world is the extremely rare world. Right. All we can do is be 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% confident that the laws of nature are what we observe. We can actually calculate that specific probability, regardless of how the quantum mechanical formulas are interpreted. It's important to remember that just because we've had an uncanny string of luck up until now doesn't mean the next time we run the experiment the luck will continue. This has nothing to do with multiple universes--it has to do with the stochastic nature of the quantum fields. 10 hours ago, webbles said: No, poetic naturalism doesn't say that free agency exists. It says that since we feel like we have "choice", we can say that we have "free agency". But Carrol describes multiple times in the book on how we don't actually have free agency or choice. He talked about this directly. He says in some senses we do have it, and in other senses we do not. 10 hours ago, webbles said: Most likely, he is programmed to like the idea that we are bayesian ration agents and I'm programmed to not like the idea. And whether either of us can change our programs is entirely dependent on Laplace's demon People being Bayesian rational agents is aspirational, not descriptive. Edited December 28, 2021 by Analytics
mfbukowski Posted December 28, 2021 Posted December 28, 2021 (edited) 3 hours ago, Analytics said: I wouldn't say poetic naturalism is about wordsmithing. I would say it is about using models that are appropriate to the situation. A civil engineer will model water as if it is a fluid even though it isn't really a fluid, but rather is a collection of quantum fields. But on a macroscopic level, it is more useful to think of it as a fluid. Poetic naturalism is permission to use the most appropriate model for the situation at hand. It isn't about whether the engineer "likes" to talk about water at the lowest level. The question is whether it is appropriate to talk about it at the lowest level when solving macro problems. My understanding is that this is completely wrong. It isn't a matter of not knowing if the cat is dead or alive. It's a matter of the cat literally being both dead and alive at the same time in a wave function. The process of opening the box and observing actually causes the wave function to collapse and causes it to stop being both dead and alive. If we want to be technical about it, the scientists in these hypothetical worlds haven't "proven" anything. They're merely 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% confident that they are right. It's important to remember that even if they had a string of incredible luck up until now, the next time they run the experiment odds are their luck will run out. A few years ago I was at a business conference in Las Vegas, and found myself doing some low-stakes gambling at a table with some gimmicky game. At one point I was up a couple hundred dollars, and somebody mentioned how lucky I was. They dealer accurately said, "the house always wins in the end." Reality is like that. Right. All we can do is be 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% confident that the laws of nature are what we observe. We can actually calculate that specific probability, regardless of how the quantum mechanical formulas are interpreted. It's important to remember that just because we've had an uncanny string of luck up until now doesn't mean the next time we run the experiment the luck will continue. This has nothing to do with multiple universes--it has to do with the stochastic nature of the quantum fields. He talked about this directly. He says in some senses we do have it, and in other senses we do not. People being Bayesian rational agents is aspirational, not descriptive. That's why the philosophy of science forgets about "reality" and just goes with the paradigm that works, until it doesn't, then on to something new. Just like religion. I hope someday you get that. The pool of human intelligence creates "reality" AS WE KNOW IT It's all just faith in one paradigm ot another You're just a step away from the Holy Grail Edited December 28, 2021 by mfbukowski
webbles Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 14 hours ago, Analytics said: I wouldn't say poetic naturalism is about wordsmithing. I would say it is about using models that are appropriate to the situation. A civil engineer will model water as if it is a fluid even though it isn't really a fluid, but rather is a collection of quantum fields. But on a macroscopic level, it is more useful to think of it as a fluid. Poetic naturalism is permission to use the most appropriate model for the situation at hand. It isn't about whether the engineer "likes" to talk about water at the lowest level. The question is whether it is appropriate to talk about it at the lowest level when solving macro problems. To me, what you described sounds just like wordsmithing (but maybe I don't actually know what wordsmithing means ). Yes, it is easier to talk about water as a fluid vs a collection of quantum fields, but the reality is that it is a collection of quantum fields. 14 hours ago, Analytics said: My understanding is that this is completely wrong. It isn't a matter of not knowing if the cat is dead or alive. It's a matter of the cat literally being both dead and alive at the same time in a wave function. The process of opening the box and observing actually causes the wave function to collapse and causes it to stop being both dead and alive. Schrodinger's cat paradox was formulated before many of the theories on how to resolve the quantum state collapse issue. When he initially wrote it, the initial idea was that a "conscious" observer was needed to cause the collapse of the quantum state and so the cat would be entangled with the quantum particle and be both dead and alive until an observer opened the box. But we've had several theories and refinements since then and now we know (through actually experimentation) that the very presence of the detector in the cat's box would cause the wave to collapse (if wave-collapse is what is really happening) and so the cat is definitely dead or alive and not in a superposition. So I'm using the newer understanding of wave-collapse and not what Schrodinger was using. We, on the outside of the box, do not know whether the cat is dead or alive because we haven't seen the measurement and we only know the probabilities. But once we open the box, we definitely know the cat is dead or alive. But in the many-world theory, the cat is both dead and alive simultaneously. One version of us will see the dead cat and one version of us will see the living cat and both version of us will actually exist but not know about each other. 15 hours ago, Analytics said: If we want to be technical about it, the scientists in these hypothetical worlds haven't "proven" anything. They're merely 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% confident that they are right. It's important to remember that even if they had a string of incredible luck up until now, the next time they run the experiment odds are their luck will run out. A few years ago I was at a business conference in Las Vegas, and found myself doing some low-stakes gambling at a table with some gimmicky game. At one point I was up a couple hundred dollars, and somebody mentioned how lucky I was. They dealer accurately said, "the house always wins in the end." Reality is like that. 15 hours ago, Analytics said: Right. All we can do is be 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% confident that the laws of nature are what we observe. We can actually calculate that specific probability, regardless of how the quantum mechanical formulas are interpreted. It's important to remember that just because we've had an uncanny string of luck up until now doesn't mean the next time we run the experiment the luck will continue. This has nothing to do with multiple universes--it has to do with the stochastic nature of the quantum fields. Second, we CAN NOT calculate the specific probability if "many-worlds" is correct. I'll try another way to explain it. Imagine that I have a quantum coin that I can flip. It can either land heads or tails. I'm the first person to flip that coin so I have no idea what the probability is. So I flip the coin. In the many-worlds, there is now two versions of me that are completely independent. One of them sees heads, the other sees tails. Both write down their result and both flip the coin again. Now there are 4 versions of me. One version sees 2 heads, another sees one head and one tail, another sees one tail and one head, and another sees two tails. So all 4 flip the coin again. Now there are 8 versions of me: 3 heads, head/head/tail, head/tail/head, head/tail/tail, tail/head/head, tail/head/tail, tail/tail/head, and 3 tails. They flip the coin again and there are now 16 versions of me: 4 heads, head/head/head/tail, head/head/tail/head, head/head/tail/tail, head/tail/head/head, head/tail/head/tail, head/tail/tail/head, head/tail/tail/tail, tail/head/head/head, tail/head/head/tail, tail/head/tail/head, tail/head/tail/tail, tail/tail/head/head, tail/tail/head/tail, tail/tail/tail/head, 4 tails. So, of the 16 versions of me: one has 100% probability of heads one has 100% probability of tails four have 25% probability of tails and 75% probability of heads four have 25% probability of heads and 75% probability of tails six have 50% probability of heads and 50% probability of tails So, of the 16 versions of me, there are 5 different probabilities that I've discovered and now believe is true. Even if you increase the number of flips to millions, there will always be a version of me that knows that the quantum coin will always land on heads. On the millionth flip, this version of me will split and there will be a version that sees it land on tails for the first time but the other version of me will continue to see it land on heads. Your arguments of "It's important to remember that just because we've had an uncanny string of luck up until now doesn't mean the next time we run the experiment the luck will continue." doesn't work with the multiple-world theory. Because each time an experiment happens, the worlds split and a version of me keeps having his incredible luck. And that version of me will never run out of luck because each time the experiment happens, the worlds keep splitting and there is always a version of me with that luck. So, how do we know that the probabilities that we've calculated for quantum particles is correct if the "many-worlds" theory is valid? We could be in a world where quantum coin flipping has a 100% probability of heads or we could be in a world where it has 25% probability of heads. We don't know. And no matter how many quantum experiments we do, we'll never know. Some version of us will know because they are the version that sees 50% probability of heads and tails but we don't know which version we are. Only Laplace's Demon or God would be able to tell us. 14 hours ago, Analytics said: He talked about this directly. He says in some senses we do have it, and in other senses we do not. You are right he talked about it directly. And he was quite explicit that we don't have any. An example is in chapter 44 paragraph 4: Quote Of course there is no such notion as free will when we are choosing to describe human beings as collections of atoms or as quantum wave functions. He then says that the concept of free agency is useful when we are trying to describe human beings because we use the concept of choice in a lot of things. He gives an example of a student trying to choose their college. But that is only a way to describe humans with poetic naturalism. It would be ignoring the underlying reality to say that we actually do have free choice. Later in the chapter, he talks about "libertarian free-will" (which is what I mean when I say free-will and probably what most other people think as well), which he describes as Quote ...the position that humany agency introduces an element of indeterminacy into the universe; people are not governed by the impersonal laws of physics; they have a distinct ability to shape their own futures. It's a denial that there could be anything like Laplace's Demon, who could know the future before it happened. There's no reason to accept libertarian freedom as part of the real world. Also later in that chapter, he says: Quote If you accept the universal applicability of the laws of nature and therefore deny libertarian freedom, the argument between compatibilists and incompatibilists can seem a bit tiresome. We basically agree on what's happening -- particles obeying the laws of physics, and a macroscopic description of people making choices -- and where we decide to label it "free will" might not seem like the most important question. 2
mfbukowski Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 (edited) 2 hours ago, webbles said: To me, what you described sounds just like wordsmithing (but maybe I don't actually know what wordsmithing means ). Yes, it is easier to talk about water as a fluid vs a collection of quantum fields, but the reality is that it is a collection of quantum fields. Schrodinger's cat paradox was formulated before many of the theories on how to resolve the quantum state collapse issue. When he initially wrote it, the initial idea was that a "conscious" observer was needed to cause the collapse of the quantum state and so the cat would be entangled with the quantum particle and be both dead and alive until an observer opened the box. But we've had several theories and refinements since then and now we know (through actually experimentation) that the very presence of the detector in the cat's box would cause the wave to collapse (if wave-collapse is what is really happening) and so the cat is definitely dead or alive and not in a superposition. So I'm using the newer understanding of wave-collapse and not what Schrodinger was using. We, on the outside of the box, do not know whether the cat is dead or alive because we haven't seen the measurement and we only know the probabilities. But once we open the box, we definitely know the cat is dead or alive. But in the many-world theory, the cat is both dead and alive simultaneously. One version of us will see the dead cat and one version of us will see the living cat and both version of us will actually exist but not know about each other. Second, we CAN NOT calculate the specific probability if "many-worlds" is correct. I'll try another way to explain it. Imagine that I have a quantum coin that I can flip. It can either land heads or tails. I'm the first person to flip that coin so I have no idea what the probability is. So I flip the coin. In the many-worlds, there is now two versions of me that are completely independent. One of them sees heads, the other sees tails. Both write down their result and both flip the coin again. Now there are 4 versions of me. One version sees 2 heads, another sees one head and one tail, another sees one tail and one head, and another sees two tails. So all 4 flip the coin again. Now there are 8 versions of me: 3 heads, head/head/tail, head/tail/head, head/tail/tail, tail/head/head, tail/head/tail, tail/tail/head, and 3 tails. They flip the coin again and there are now 16 versions of me: 4 heads, head/head/head/tail, head/head/tail/head, head/head/tail/tail, head/tail/head/head, head/tail/head/tail, head/tail/tail/head, head/tail/tail/tail, tail/head/head/head, tail/head/head/tail, tail/head/tail/head, tail/head/tail/tail, tail/tail/head/head, tail/tail/head/tail, tail/tail/tail/head, 4 tails. So, of the 16 versions of me: one has 100% probability of heads one has 100% probability of tails four have 25% probability of tails and 75% probability of heads four have 25% probability of heads and 75% probability of tails six have 50% probability of heads and 50% probability of tails So, of the 16 versions of me, there are 5 different probabilities that I've discovered and now believe is true. Even if you increase the number of flips to millions, there will always be a version of me that knows that the quantum coin will always land on heads. On the millionth flip, this version of me will split and there will be a version that sees it land on tails for the first time but the other version of me will continue to see it land on heads. Your arguments of "It's important to remember that just because we've had an uncanny string of luck up until now doesn't mean the next time we run the experiment the luck will continue." doesn't work with the multiple-world theory. Because each time an experiment happens, the worlds split and a version of me keeps having his incredible luck. And that version of me will never run out of luck because each time the experiment happens, the worlds keep splitting and there is always a version of me with that luck. So, how do we know that the probabilities that we've calculated for quantum particles is correct if the "many-worlds" theory is valid? We could be in a world where quantum coin flipping has a 100% probability of heads or we could be in a world where it has 25% probability of heads. We don't know. And no matter how many quantum experiments we do, we'll never know. Some version of us will know because they are the version that sees 50% probability of heads and tails but we don't know which version we are. Only Laplace's Demon or God would be able to tell us. You are right he talked about it directly. And he was quite explicit that we don't have any. An example is in chapter 44 paragraph 4: He then says that the concept of free agency is useful when we are trying to describe human beings because we use the concept of choice in a lot of things. He gives an example of a student trying to choose their college. But that is only a way to describe humans with poetic naturalism. It would be ignoring the underlying reality to say that we actually do have free choice. Later in the chapter, he talks about "libertarian free-will" (which is what I mean when I say free-will and probably what most other people think as well), which he describes as Also later in that chapter, he says: Sigh. This is pure pragmatism/phenomenology bright as the sun. Observations depend on the observer. It's that simple. We see thing not "as they are" but ALWAYS depending on our perceptions as we interpret them. Without human consciousness there would be no such theories- how could there be? It's as plain as that. The human factor creates the inconsistency because of an altered context. You were right in the first sentence- it is the ambiguity of language itself here at work. The error are the words "but the reality is...." You are turning a river into a concrete slab, but you never step into the same river twice, because it is dynamic and relational. The twigs floating downstream are in a different relation every nanosecond. Everything affects everything. Edited December 29, 2021 by mfbukowski
Analytics Posted December 29, 2021 Author Posted December 29, 2021 (edited) 8 hours ago, webbles said: To me, what you described sounds just like wordsmithing (but maybe I don't actually know what wordsmithing means ). Yes, it is easier to talk about water as a fluid vs a collection of quantum fields, but the reality is that it is a collection of quantum fields. It brings to mind that famous George Box quote: all models are wrong, but some are useful. 8 hours ago, webbles said: Schrodinger's cat paradox was formulated before many of the theories on how to resolve the quantum state collapse issue..... The point is that until the wave function collapses, there are two broad possibilities--either the cat is in a superimposed state, simultaneously alive and dead in one world, or there are two worlds, one where the cat is alive and another where it is dead. 8 hours ago, webbles said: We, on the outside of the box, do not know whether the cat is dead or alive because we haven't seen the measurement and we only know the probabilities. Quantum mechanics isn't about not knowing whether the cat is alive or dead because we haven't checked. It's about the cat being in a superimposed state. 8 hours ago, webbles said: Second, we CAN NOT calculate the specific probability if "many-worlds" is correct. I'll try another way to explain it. Imagine that I have a quantum coin that I can flip. It can either land heads or tails. I'm the first person to flip that coin so I have no idea what the probability is. So I flip the coin. In the many-worlds, there is now two versions of me that are completely independent. One of them sees heads, the other sees tails. Both write down their result and both flip the coin again. Now there are 4 versions of me. One version sees 2 heads, another sees one head and one tail, another sees one tail and one head, and another sees two tails. So all 4 flip the coin again. Now there are 8 versions of me: 3 heads, head/head/tail, head/tail/head, head/tail/tail, tail/head/head, tail/head/tail, tail/tail/head, and 3 tails. They flip the coin again and there are now 16 versions of me: 4 heads, head/head/head/tail, head/head/tail/head, head/head/tail/tail, head/tail/head/head, head/tail/head/tail, head/tail/tail/head, head/tail/tail/tail, tail/head/head/head, tail/head/head/tail, tail/head/tail/head, tail/head/tail/tail, tail/tail/head/head, tail/tail/head/tail, tail/tail/tail/head, 4 tails. So, of the 16 versions of me: one has 100% probability of heads one has 100% probability of tails four have 25% probability of tails and 75% probability of heads four have 25% probability of heads and 75% probability of tails six have 50% probability of heads and 50% probability of tails So, of the 16 versions of me, there are 5 different probabilities that I've discovered and now believe is true. Even if you increase the number of flips to millions, there will always be a version of me that knows that the quantum coin will always land on heads. Here's the thing. The probability of us tracing through the path of worlds where you get heads 1,000 times in a row is exactly as likely as flipping a coin in this one world and by chance getting 1,000 heads in a row. (The odds of getting 1,000 heads in a row are about 9.3326 * 10^-302, by the way, which is much, much, less than one divided by the number of fundamental particles in the entire universe). This is true regardless of how you interpret quantum mechanics. The mathematics are the same regardless. That is why the "many-worlds interpretation" is an interpretation of the formulas, and not a distinctive set of formulas in its own right. That's why Carroll says: Despite the appearance of probabilities, the predictions of quantum mechanics can be extraordinarily precise. For example, we can measure the strength of the electromagnetic interaction by one kind of experiment, such as how an atom recoils when it emits a photon. Then we can use that measurement to predict the outcome of a different experiment, such as how fast electrons precess in a magnetic field. Finally, we can compare that prediction to an actual observation. The resulting agreement is breathtakingly good: Observation/Prediction = 1.000000002 The observed and predicted values aren't exactly the same, both because of experimental error and because of theoretical approximations. But the lesson is clear: quantum mechanics isn't some loosey-goosey, anything-goes kind of operation. It is relentlessly specific and unforgiving. (page 165) This is true regardless of how you interpret it. Edited December 29, 2021 by Analytics
pogi Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 (edited) On 12/28/2021 at 8:12 AM, Analytics said: Right. All we can do is be 99.9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999% confident that the laws of nature are what we observe. Actually, we can't be that certain at all - only within the vastly limited context of human perception. The laws of nature most certainly constitute more than what we observe. While the laws of nature may be what we observe, they are most certainly also what we do not observe. "Reality" is like a coin with 2 sides. One side is reality when we observe it, the other side is reality when we are not observing. Without understanding both sides of the coin of reality, we are limited to only 50% of reality. So with only 50% of reality observable, we can't say that we are 99.999...% confident about the whole coin that constitutes reality. The question is what are the laws of nature outside of what we humans observe? What is "reality" like when we are not observing it? I am not an expert on quantum mechanics by any means, but doesn't quantum mechanics agree that the act of observing actually alters "realty'? Quote REHOVOT, Israel, February 26, 1998--One of the most bizarre premises of quantum theory, which has long fascinated philosophers and physicists alike, states that by the very act of watching, the observer affects the observed reality. https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/02/980227055013.htm So if the act of observing affects reality, how can we know what an objective reality (not limited to our altered reality cause by human observation) really is? What laws are in play when we are not observing? The fact is that we can't know what an objective reality might be outside of human perspective, because whenever we try to observe it, it is altered. While our observations may be relatively true in context of our perspectives, we can't escape our perspective to understand an objective reality which exists outside of human perception. We are entirely limited to relative truth based on human perspective. There is no near certainty of anything "objective". You see, while we may have techniques to limit the effects of human bias which affects our beliefs and perceptions of reality, we don't have any techniques to limit the effects of human observation that affect our perspectives of reality. Edited December 29, 2021 by pogi 1
Analytics Posted December 29, 2021 Author Posted December 29, 2021 1 hour ago, pogi said: Actually, we can't be that certain at all - only within the vastly limited context of human perception. The laws of nature most certainly constitute more than what we observe. While the laws of nature may be what we observe, they are most certainly also what we do not observe. "Reality" is like a coin with 2 sides. One side is reality when we observe it, the other side is reality when we are not observing. Without understanding both sides of the coin of reality, we are limited to only 50% of reality. So with only 50% of reality observable, we can't say that we are 99.999...% confident about the whole coin that constitutes reality. The question is what are the laws of nature outside of what we humans observe? What is "reality" like when we are not observing it? I am not an expert on quantum mechanics by any means, but doesn't quantum mechanics agree that the act of observing actually alters "realty'? So if the act of observing affects reality, how can we know what an objective reality (not limited to our altered reality cause by human observation) really is? What laws are in play when we are not observing? The fact is that we can't know what an objective reality might be outside of human perspective, because whenever we try to observe it, it is altered. While our observations may be relatively true in context of our perspectives, we can't escape our perspective to understand an objective reality which exists outside of human perception. We are entirely limited to relative truth based on human perspective. There is no near certainty of anything "objective". You see, while we may have techniques to limit the effects of human bias which affects our beliefs and perceptions of reality, we don't have any techniques to limit the effects of human observation that affect our perspectives of reality. Those are all fair points. It seems we have two options: 1- we can take a hardline approach that we can't know anything at all (other than, perhaps that "I am," even if I'm a mere brain in a vat), and 2- we can use empiricism to infer some things about reality with different degrees of confidence. There is an unlimited about of stuff we don't know and probably never will, but there are some things that we do know. In my conversation here, I'm taking a position of empiricism--that there are some things we can know with relative certainty. In the last few posts with @webbles, we aren't talking about these issues. We are talking about the specific predictions of quantum mechanics. My position is that of Sean Carroll--that even if we don't understand on a fundamental level why things behave as they do on a quantum level, quantum mechanics does make extremely precise and reliable predictions about how specific experiments will unfold. "Observing" does change the state of things, but in well-defined and precise ways. The disagreement webbles and I have, to the extent that I understand him, is he thinks whether or not quantum mechanics is reliable hinges on how it is interpreted. I think quantum mechanics is equally reliable at describing reality, regardless of how it is interpreted.
The Nehor Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 4 hours ago, Analytics said: It brings to mind that famous George Box quote: all models are wrong, but some are useful. 1
Analytics Posted December 29, 2021 Author Posted December 29, 2021 At the end of the chapters explaining his take on statistical inference, Pinker shows the following:
The Nehor Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 27 minutes ago, Analytics said: At the end of the chapters explaining his take on statistical inference, Pinker shows the following: Titletext for comic: Correlation doesn't imply causation, but it does waggle its eyebrows suggestively and gesture furtively while mouthing 'look over there'. 1
mfbukowski Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 1 hour ago, Analytics said: Those are all fair points. It seems we have two options: 1- we can take a hardline approach that we can't know anything at all (other than, perhaps that "I am," even if I'm a mere brain in a vat), and 2- we can use empiricism to infer some things about reality with different degrees of confidence. There is an unlimited about of stuff we don't know and probably never will, but there are some things that we do know. Or we can forget Santa Claus and the myth of "things as they are " because THINGS AS THEY ARE ARE UNOBSERVABLE by a human brain evolved to find fruit on a tree, and go with what practice or paradigm works best for what we need now, until we find a better way to find fruit. And curiously, this bizarre "postmodern" theory just happens to be taught in Alma 32. 1
pogi Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 42 minutes ago, Analytics said: Those are all fair points. It seems we have two options: 1- we can take a hardline approach that we can't know anything at all (other than, perhaps that "I am," even if I'm a mere brain in a vat) Some can take it a step further and suggest that we can't even know that. Sam Harris, for example, concludes based on science that there is no "I" or "ego" that exists in "reality". Indeed, the self is an illusion. One can't know that "I am" outside of an illusory sense... 1 hour ago, Analytics said: and 2- we can use empiricism to infer some things about reality with different degrees of confidence. Only if you define reality as what humans observe... Once again, the parable of the blind men and the elephant comes in handy. Empiricists and scientists are like one blind man grasping onto the tail of the elephant insisting that an elephant (aka "reality") is like a rope... They are really no different from the theologians and philosophers who refute that and suggest that reality is like a spear or a wall, etc. We are all blind men. Period. Science/empiricism can't give us 99.99999999999% confidence in anything concrete outside of their own relative truth and limited perspective. Science, like religion, is just another blind man feeling the elephant claiming that they are right while all others are wrong... They can't say that with any degree of confidence however. They are reliant on faith, just like the rest of us. They may claim to be able to approach reality as it is by using tools to limit personal bias, but they can't escape empiricism which limits knowledge to what we can perceive - even as they claim that the very act of perceiving alters reality as it is. Just what reality (the elephant is), science can therefore never say with ANY degree of confidence. Are our scientific observations/perceptions true to reality as it is? We will never know and can never approach objective truth as it is. Truth is relative. 1 hour ago, Analytics said: There is an unlimited about of stuff we don't know and probably never will, but there are some things that we do know. As a subscriber to the holistic philosophy of truth, all truth - all variables of truth are interconnected in one great whole. We can't know one aspect of truth with confidence until we know all variables of truth as each variable is relational to all other variables. Because we are so vastly limited with what we don't know, we can't have any degree of confidence in what we think we do "know". Those things that we do "know" are relative to our limited scope of human observation. We can't have any confidence that what we observe and think we "know" actually corresponds with some reality independent of human perception/experience. We are relegated to relative truth in mortality. Period. There is no objective reality that science can speak of or have any degree of confidence in. I personally think both options are useful in different contexts. I like option one which allows me to believe beyond the limits of science and have faith in my own personal experience with God I also like empiricism and science as we are relegated to human perceptions in mortality, and it thus becomes useful as a tool to engage the world as we perceive it. I just think scientists overstate their claim of confidence in "reality" though. Science is very useful in the realm of human perception. Reality is more than human perceptions that agree with each other though. 2 hours ago, Analytics said: In my conversation here, I'm taking a position of empiricism--that there are some things we can know with relative certainty. In the last few posts with @webbles, we aren't talking about these issues. We are talking about the specific predictions of quantum mechanics. My position is that of Sean Carroll--that even if we don't understand on a fundamental level why things behave as they do on a quantum level, quantum mechanics does make extremely precise and reliable predictions about how specific experiments will unfold. "Observing" does change the state of things, but in well-defined and precise ways. The disagreement webbles and I have, to the extent that I understand him, is he thinks whether or not quantum mechanics is reliable hinges on how it is interpreted. I think quantum mechanics is equally reliable at describing reality, regardless of how it is interpreted. Sorry to interject myself in your conversation. I just wanted to give a shout out to faith. Faith is all we have as a foundation for everything we believe we know. 1
mfbukowski Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 15 minutes ago, pogi said: Some can take it a step further and suggest that we can't even know that. Sam Harris, for example, concludes based on science that there is no "I" or "ego" that exists in "reality". Indeed, the self is an illusion. One can't know that "I am" outside of an illusory sense... Only if you define reality as what humans observe... Once again, the parable of the blind men and the elephant comes in handy. Empiricists and scientists are like one blind man grasping onto the tail of the elephant insisting that an elephant (aka "reality") is like a rope... They are really no different from the theologians and philosophers who refute that and suggest that reality is like a spear or a wall, etc. We are all blind men. Period. Science/empiricism can't give us 99.99999999999% confidence in anything concrete outside of their own relative truth and limited perspective. Science, like religion, is just another blind man feeling the elephant claiming that they are right while all others are wrong... They can't say that with any degree of confidence however. They are reliant on faith, just like the rest of us. They may claim to be able to approach reality as it is by using tools to limit personal bias, but they can't escape empiricism which limits knowledge to what we can perceive - even as they claim that the very act of perceiving alters reality as it is. Just what reality (the elephant is), science can therefore never say with ANY degree of confidence. Are our scientific observations/perceptions true to reality as it is? We will never know and can never approach objective truth as it is. Truth is relative. As a subscriber to the holistic philosophy of truth, all truth - all variables of truth are interconnected in one great whole. We can't know one aspect of truth with confidence until we know all variables of truth as each variable is relational to all other variables. Because we are so vastly limited with what we don't know, we can't have any degree of confidence in what we think we do "know". Those things that we do "know" are relative to our limited scope of human observation. We can't have any confidence that what we observe and think we "know" actually corresponds with some reality independent of human perception/experience. We are relegated to relative truth in mortality. Period. There is no objective reality that science can speak of or have any degree of confidence in. I personally think both options are useful in different contexts. I like option one which allows me to believe beyond the limits of science and have faith in my own personal experience with God I also like empiricism and science as we are relegated to human perceptions in mortality, and it thus becomes useful as a tool to engage the world as we perceive it. I just think scientists overstate their claim of confidence in "reality" though. Science is very useful in the realm of human perception. Reality is more than human perceptions that agree with each other though. Sorry to interject myself in your conversation. I just wanted to give a shout out to faith. Faith is all we have as a foundation for everything we believe we know. BRAVO! Alma:32: 31 And now, behold, are ye sure that this is a good seed? I say unto you, Yea; for every seed bringeth forth unto its own likeness. 32 Therefore, if a seed groweth it is good, but if it groweth not, behold it is not good, therefore it is cast away. 33 And now, behold, because ye have tried the experiment, and planted the seed, and it swelleth and sprouteth, and beginneth to grow, ye must needs know that the seed is good.
mfbukowski Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 20 minutes ago, pogi said: I just think scientists overstate their claim of confidence in "reality" though. Science is very useful in the realm of human perception. Reality is more than human perceptions that agree with each other though. Certainty is a psychological phenomenon, and has nothing to do with "reality" independent of human perception. All it is, is being "certain" of one's perceptions and experiences
The Nehor Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 23 minutes ago, mfbukowski said: Certainty is a psychological phenomenon, and has nothing to do with "reality" independent of human perception. All it is, is being "certain" of one's perceptions and experiences Are you sure about that?
Analytics Posted December 29, 2021 Author Posted December 29, 2021 40 minutes ago, pogi said: Science, like religion, is just another blind man feeling the elephant claiming that they are right while all others are wrong... They can't say that with any degree of confidence however. They are reliant on faith, just like the rest of us. They may claim to be able to approach reality as it is by using tools to limit personal bias, but they can't escape empiricism which limits knowledge to what we can perceive - even as they claim that the very act of perceiving alters reality as it is... Relying on empiricism isn't something science needs to escape from. By design, it is an essential feature of the system. The universe is filled with truth we can't observe. Of course. But since we can't observe it, we have no way of knowing anything about it. The honest thing to say about stuff that is unknowable is "I don't know." Of course we could make stuff up and have faith that what we make up is true. Doing that would expand the scope of things we can make truth claims about. But even if we happened to be right it wouldn't vindicate the methodology of having faith in stuff you make up. It would continue to be just a lucky guess.
mfbukowski Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 (edited) 1 hour ago, The Nehor said: Are you sure about that? Lol. Yes, based on keeping the paradigm consistent. That's not me making it up, it's a long established paradigm itself, see Dewey and Wittgenstein If all we have are perceptions, all we can be certain about is what we, and others, experimentally perceived. We cannot be certain of "things as they are" but obviously there are CAUSES of perception, but we can only "know with certainty" what our human brain/mind/spirit shows us, and we judge to be a certainty It's just logic. If you are wearing sunglasses you see the colors they allow you to see. We wear permanent built in sun glasses! And selective ear plugs, etc etc. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/certainty/ Edited December 29, 2021 by mfbukowski
pogi Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 22 minutes ago, Analytics said: Relying on empiricism isn't something science needs to escape from. By design, it is an essential feature of the system. The universe is filled with truth we can't observe. Of course. But since we can't observe it, we have no way of knowing anything about it. The honest thing to say about stuff that is unknowable is "I don't know." Truth, to me, works like pixels on a screen where each pixel alters our perspective and understanding of the pixel next to it in the grand vision of "reality". All truth is interconnected that way, in one great whole (most will recognize this as temple language). What we "don't know" inescapably affects our perception and interpretation of what we claim to "know" - just as a blue pixel next to a yellow pixel affects our perception of the blue pixel in the grand scheme of things. All truth is relative in that way, and we can't claim to know anything in an objective way without knowing everything, in the grand scheme of things. The limited context of our understanding will inevitably skew our interpretation of reality, and humans are seemingly infinitely limited in perspective and understanding. There are insurmountable variables that we don't, and can't, know. Human perception only allows us to see a handful of pixels on the grand scheme or screen of seemingly infinite pixels. What if we are only capable of seeing red pixels? How is that going to affect our perception and interpretation of "reality"? The lack of blue and yellow pictures will cause us to be incapable of observing the vast array of different hues and colors that make up reality. It will lack meaningful context in the big picture. Science, in this scenario, will claim that the elephant is red and disconnected. They will claim that it is positively demonstrably and verifiably so. It is an "objective" truth as all observers will agree after experimentation and observation. Do you see the limits of science and observation in interpreting what an elephant is? While they may technically be correct that the limited pixels of the elephant that they can observe are red - they don't know what they don't know, and do not understand that what they are observing is actually just a pixel - not the elephant. It is like being limited to vision that can only see electrons and claiming that humans are electrons. Well...yes...but mostly no. The limited context really skews the proper interpretation of what really constitutes a human. We are only observing pixels in isolation, and we can't interpret objective truth/reality with isolated variables. As the parable goes - "while all are partly in the right, they are all in the wrong." This gives them a false understanding of the elephant. Their interpretations of the elephant will never approach what the elephant really is, because of what they don't know. 50 minutes ago, Analytics said: The honest thing to say about stuff that is unknowable is "I don't know." The honest thing to say about the stuff we think we know is that "until I can see how this variable relates with the rest of what I don't know, there is not much I can say about it." While yes it is red, maybe in the grand scheme of things it is supposed to appear yellow. 1 hour ago, Analytics said: Of course we could make stuff up and have faith that what we make up is true. Doing that would expand the scope of things we can make truth claims about. But even if we happened to be right it wouldn't vindicate the methodology of having faith in stuff you make up. It would continue to be just a lucky guess. I agree. That would be useless. But, what about the ineffable and subjective stuff that we don't make up, but experience individually that can't be observed by science?
webbles Posted December 29, 2021 Posted December 29, 2021 8 hours ago, Analytics said: The point is that until the wave function collapses, there are two broad possibilities--either the cat is in a superimposed state, simultaneously alive and dead in one world, or there are two worlds, one where the cat is alive and another where it is dead. 8 hours ago, Analytics said: Quantum mechanics isn't about not knowing whether the cat is alive or dead because we haven't checked. It's about the cat being in a superimposed state. I'm trying to explain the difference between theories that use the wave function collapsing and the multi-world theory. For wave collapse theories, the cat is not in a superimposed state. We've known that for years now. The wave state collapses by the geiger counter. There isn't a situation that puts the cat in a superimposed state anymore unless you are talking about the multi-world theory. 8 hours ago, Analytics said: Here's the thing. The probability of us tracing through the path of worlds where you get heads 1,000 times in a row is exactly as likely as flipping a coin in this one world and by chance getting 1,000 heads in a row. (The odds of getting 1,000 heads in a row are about 9.3326 * 10^-302, by the way, which is much, much, less than one divided by the number of fundamental particles in the entire universe). This is true regardless of how you interpret quantum mechanics. The mathematics are the same regardless. That is why the "many-worlds interpretation" is an interpretation of the formulas, and not a distinctive set of formulas in its own right. That's why Carroll says: Despite the appearance of probabilities, the predictions of quantum mechanics can be extraordinarily precise. For example, we can measure the strength of the electromagnetic interaction by one kind of experiment, such as how an atom recoils when it emits a photon. Then we can use that measurement to predict the outcome of a different experiment, such as how fast electrons precess in a magnetic field. Finally, we can compare that prediction to an actual observation. The resulting agreement is breathtakingly good: Observation/Prediction = 1.000000002 The observed and predicted values aren't exactly the same, both because of experimental error and because of theoretical approximations. But the lesson is clear: quantum mechanics isn't some loosey-goosey, anything-goes kind of operation. It is relentlessly specific and unforgiving. (page 165) This is true regardless of how you interpret it. You are looking at this as if you are Laplace's Demon. You have "extra knowledge" about the situation and so can calculate what are the odds for a quantum coin flip to always turn up heads. If multi-world theory is actually true, then we don't have that "extra knowledge". We could be living in the world where the quantum coin was flipped 1,000 times and landed up heads and that would be the probability. We would have no knowledge of anything else. For Carroll's expirement, we have one set of results in our world. But there are other worlds that have different results. Why is our results more correct than theirs? How can we prove that our numbers are correct when we are not seeing the big picture? We aren't Laplace's Demon or God, we can't see all the worlds and all the results they got. We can only see the results that we got and assume that they are accurate but we actually don't have any way to prove it. That's why I don't accept the "multi-world" theory. It makes it impossible for us to even trust science. We aren't actually discovering things but instead are just seeing the different results that our world received when it split off from the other worlds. But our world could be the rarest of all of the worlds where a quantum coin is constantly landing on heads after a million attempts. I get why Carroll and others like the "multi-world" theory, though. The "wave-collapse" doesn't make any sense either. But at least with the "wave-collapse" we can actually calculate probabilities and assume that we are seeing the entire picture. 1
mfbukowski Posted December 30, 2021 Posted December 30, 2021 (edited) 7 hours ago, pogi said: Truth, to me, works like pixels on a screen where each pixel alters our perspective and understanding of the pixel next to it in the grand vision of "reality". All truth is interconnected that way, in one great whole (most will recognize this as temple language). What we "don't know" inescapably affects our perception and interpretation of what we claim to "know" - just as a blue pixel next to a yellow pixel affects our perception of the blue pixel in the grand scheme of things. All truth is relative in that way, and we can't claim to know anything in an objective way without knowing everything, in the grand scheme of things. The limited context of our understanding will inevitably skew our interpretation of reality, and humans are seemingly infinitely limited in perspective and understanding. There are insurmountable variables that we don't, and can't, know. Human perception only allows us to see a handful of pixels on the grand scheme or screen of seemingly infinite pixels. What if we are only capable of seeing red pixels? How is that going to affect our perception and interpretation of "reality"? The lack of blue and yellow pictures will cause us to be incapable of observing the vast array of different hues and colors that make up reality. It will lack meaningful context in the big picture. Science, in this scenario, will claim that the elephant is red and disconnected. They will claim that it is positively demonstrably and verifiably so. It is an "objective" truth as all observers will agree after experimentation and observation. Do you see the limits of science and observation in interpreting what an elephant is? While they may technically be correct that the limited pixels of the elephant that they can observe are red - they don't know what they don't know, and do not understand that what they are observing is actually just a pixel - not the elephant. It is like being limited to vision that can only see electrons and claiming that humans are electrons. Well...yes...but mostly no. The limited context really skews the proper interpretation of what really constitutes a human. We are only observing pixels in isolation, and we can't interpret objective truth/reality with isolated variables. As the parable goes - "while all are partly in the right, they are all in the wrong." This gives them a false understanding of the elephant. Their interpretations of the elephant will never approach what the elephant really is, because of what they don't know. The honest thing to say about the stuff we think we know is that "until I can see how this variable relates with the rest of what I don't know, there is not much I can say about it." While yes it is red, maybe in the grand scheme of things it is supposed to appear yellow. I agree. That would be useless. But, what about the ineffable and subjective stuff that we don't make up, but experience individually that can't be observed by science? Totally agree. All our observations are relational, and the pixel analogy is a great one. One cannot discover "the thing" without seeing the thing AND all its relations. Paris is not only found in a map, it is a vibrant culture AND a city AND the sum of its occupants, its strong points, its problems and on and on. We cannot know "Paris" unless we know all of that and more This is the central point of Radical Empiricism. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_empiricism Science tends to dissect the frog while what should happen is its study including all its relations as well. A photo of someone's steak on a plate cannot include the smell, the sizzle, the restaurant's babble, the EXPERIENCE of eating that steak. True Radical Empiricism would study ALL human experience, including religious experience, not simply dismissing it with a wave of the hand. Edited December 30, 2021 by mfbukowski 1
Analytics Posted December 30, 2021 Author Posted December 30, 2021 18 hours ago, pogi said: I agree. That would be useless. But, what about the ineffable and subjective stuff that we don't make up, but experience individually that can't be observed by science? I don't think it is helpful to focus on what we don't know, especially to the extreme position you seem to be taking of almost completely disregarding everything we do know because of stuff that we presume is out there but don't know anything about. Regarding your question here, it's interesting that you want to discount what we objectively are pretty sure about in order to accommodate subjective, ineffable impressions. In the context of this thread, Steven Pinker wrote a book that describes the normative tools of rationality. Why are these tools important? Because science has figured out that human beings are irrational in systematic and predictable ways; the strength of the normative tools of rationality is they help cut through those biases and approach the truth. As Ruskin said: "The work of science is to substitute facts for appearances and demonstrations for impressions." If somebody is really committed to appearances and impressions, he might actually attempt to rely on cognitive biases to maintain belief in what he wants to believe, rather than use the tools of rationality to figure out what's really true.
Analytics Posted December 30, 2021 Author Posted December 30, 2021 (edited) 18 hours ago, webbles said: I'm trying to explain the difference between theories that use the wave function collapsing and the multi-world theory. For wave collapse theories, the cat is not in a superimposed state. We've known that for years now. The wave state collapses by the geiger counter. There isn't a situation that puts the cat in a superimposed state anymore unless you are talking about the multi-world theory. I think you fundamentally misunderstand quantum mechanics. There isn't one theory of the wave function collapsing and another theory of the multi-world. There is only one theory: quantum field theory. These different ideas aren't different theories--they are different interpretations of the one theory. 18 hours ago, webbles said: You are looking at this as if you are Laplace's Demon. You have "extra knowledge" about the situation and so can calculate what are the odds for a quantum coin flip to always turn up heads. No. I'm looking at it from the state of actual scientific knowledge. I'm not talking about different universes that might have different laws of nature. I'm talking about this universe with our laws of nature. 18 hours ago, webbles said: If multi-world theory is actually true, then we don't have that "extra knowledge". We could be living in the world where the quantum coin was flipped 1,000 times and landed up heads and that would be the probability. We would have no knowledge of anything else. The law of large numbers doesn't work that way, regardless of how one interprets quantum mechanics. 18 hours ago, webbles said: For Carroll's expirement, we have one set of results in our world. But there are other worlds that have different results. Why is our results more correct than theirs? How can we prove that our numbers are correct when we are not seeing the big picture? It would be more accurate to say that the body of evidence we are looking at here isn't the quantum results from one universe--they are the results of billions of universes that have unfolded and continue to unfold in the way that quantum mechanics predicts. 18 hours ago, webbles said: We aren't Laplace's Demon or God, we can't see all the worlds and all the results they got. We can only see the results that we got and assume that they are accurate but we actually don't have any way to prove it. If you flip a coin 10,000 times and get 10,000 heads and zero tails, does that constitute any evidence that the coin is not a fair coin? The law of large numbers proves quantum mechanics is true with a confidence level on the order of something like 99.999999999999999999999999999999999%. This is true regardless of how it is interpreted. 18 hours ago, webbles said: That's why I don't accept the "multi-world" theory. It makes it impossible for us to even trust science. I'll just note that Carroll gives a lot of credence to the multi-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, and he finds it to be an extremely robust theory. Do you think you understand the implications of this interpretation better than he does? Edited December 30, 2021 by Analytics
Analytics Posted December 30, 2021 Author Posted December 30, 2021 11 hours ago, mfbukowski said: Totally agree. All our observations are relational, and the pixel analogy is a great one. One cannot discover "the thing" without seeing the thing AND all its relations. Paris is not only found in a map, it is a vibrant culture AND a city AND the sum of its occupants, its strong points, its problems and on and on. We cannot know "Paris" unless we know all of that and more This is the central point of Radical Empiricism. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_empiricism Science tends to dissect the frog while what should happen is its study including all its relations as well. A photo of someone's steak on a plate cannot include the smell, the sizzle, the restaurant's babble, the EXPERIENCE of eating that steak. True Radical Empiricism would study ALL human experience, including religious experience, not simply dismissing it with a wave of the hand. In principle, everything that interacts with objective reality is within the purview of science. This includes the smell, sizzle, babble, and experience of eating a steak. Science clashes with religion only when religion makes truth-claims about objective reality that are demonstrably false.
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