How Many Of You Agree With Augustine Here?

[inquiringmind]

I was just wondering how many of you actually agree with Augustine here?

ALMOST all authors, Catholic and Protestant, admit, that when a just cause is present, there is some kind or other of verbal misleading, which is not sin. Even silence is in certain cases virtually such a misleading, according to the Proverb, “Silence gives consent.” Again, silence is absolutely forbidden to a Catholic, as a mortal sin, under certain circumstances, e.g. to keep silence, when it is a duty to make a profession of faith.

Another mode of verbal misleading, and the most direct, is actually saying the thing that is not; and it is defended on the principle that such words are not a lie, when there is a “justa causa,” as killing is not murder in the case of an executioner.

Another ground of certain authors for saying that an untruth is not a lie where there is a just cause, is, that veracity is a kind of justice, and therefore, when we have no duty of justice to tell truth to another, it is no sin not to do so. Hence we may say the thing that is not, to children, to madmen, to men who ask impertinent questions, to those whom we hope to benefit by misleading...

Another mode of verbal misleading is equivocation or a play upon words; and it is defended on the theory that to lie is to use words in a sense which they will not bear. But an equivocator uses them in a received sense, though there is another received sense, and therefore, according to this definition, he does not lie.

Others say that all equivocations are, after all, a kind of lying,—faint lies or awkward lies, but still lies; and some of these disputants infer, that therefore we must not equivocate, and others that equivocation is but a half-measure, and that it is better to say at once that in certain cases untruths are not lies...

To these must be added the unscientific way of dealing with lies,—viz. that on a great or cruel occasion a man cannot help telling a lie, and he would not be a man, did he not tell it, but still it is very wrong, and he ought not to do it, and he must trust that the sin will be forgiven him, though he goes about to commit it ever so deliberately, and is sure to commit it again under similar circumstances. It is a necessary frailty, and had better not be thought about before it is incurred, and not thought of again, after it is well over. This view cannot for a moment be defended, but, I suppose, it is very common.

I think the historical course of thought upon the matter has been this: the Greek Fathers thought that, when there was a justa causa, an untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with great misgiving; and, whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that there can be no just cause of untruth. In these later times, this doctrine has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely taught that, though all untruths are lies, yet that certain equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.

Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says that equivocations, &c. after all are lies, and another which says that there are untruths which are not lies.

And now as to the “just cause,” which is the condition, sine quâ non. The Greek Fathers make it such as these, self-defence, charity, zeal for God’s honour, and the like.

St. Augustine seems to deal with the same “just causes” as the Greek Fathers, even though he does not allow of their availableness as depriving untruths, spoken on such occasions, of their sinfulness. He mentions defence of life and of honour, and the safe custody of a secret. Also the great Anglican writers, who have followed the Greek Fathers, in defending untruths when there is the “just cause,” consider that “just cause” to be such as the preservation of life and property, defence of law, the good of others. Moreover, their moral rights, e.g. defence against the inquisitive, &c.

http://the-american-...ion/#more-28580

And if you do, isn't this whole article pointless?

In any discussion of polygamy during the Nauvoo period–particularly as it relates to the secrecy and purported lies that surround its introduction–questions inevitably turn toward the biblical record. Critics often indicate that biblical prophets were never called upon to engage in lying or to make public statements at odds with private behavior.

LDS authors often cite the examples of Abraham and Isaac, both of whom deceived others about their marital status for their own protection, as biblical precedent for polygamy and its deceptions. There are, however, examples recorded in Exodus that are more on-point to the situation in Nauvoo.

The first is an example of civil disobedience sanctioned by God. It involves Pharaoh’s murderous instructions to the Egyptian midwives...The midwives are confronted with a command from the head of state which offends their personal/professional morality. They decline to participate, and actively deceive the Pharaoh–they even lie to him or his officers so that the deception may continue, as well as to (one assumes) spare themselves his punishment. The subsequent verses indicate God’s approval of their action–honesty is not the primary moral value: obedience to the will of God is...The second example comes from the prophetic call of Moses. The Lord speaks to Moses and says: And I have said, I will bring you up out of the affliction of Egypt unto the land of the Canaanites, and the Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, unto a land flowing with milk and honey.

The Lord announces His intention to liberate the Israelites from slavery. But, in the very next breath, He tells Moses what to tell Pharaoh–what the “public story” should be, if you will: And they shall hearken to thy voice: and thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and ye shall say unto him, The LORD God of the Hebrews hath met with us: and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days’ journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice to the LORD our God.

The “public stance” of Moses and the Israelite leaders is to be that they only want to go three days’ journey to sacrifice. So, here the Lord is advocating some degree of deception.

http://www.fairlds.o...rication#head08

If all untruths are lies, doesn't this article (from the Mormon apologists at FAIR) blaspheme God by accusing Him of lying (when it says He advocated "some degree of deception")???

Edited February 27, 2013 by inquiringmind

[BlueDreams]

Could you make it any other color that bright red...that much font in read hurts my eyes and I can read beyond a sentence or two.

With luv,

BD

[inquiringmind]

Could you make it any other color that bright red...that much font in read hurts my eyes and I can read beyond a sentence or two.

With luv,

BD

I didn't make it that color (but I'll change it for you if you like.)

Is that better?

Edited February 27, 2013 by inquiringmind

[rodheadlee]

Why the need to pin it down with words? We have the Holy Spirit to tell us when we are being deceived (if we listen) and the Light of Christ to tell us when we are the deceivers or lying. We are to live the Spirit of the law not the letter of the law. No I don't agree with St Augustine.

[inquiringmind]

Why the need to pin it down with words? We have the Holy Spirit...We are to live the Spirit of the law not the letter of the law. No I don't agree with St Augustine.

Thank you.

I don't see how Augustine could be right here.

The Greek Fathers didn't agree with him, Cardinal Newman didn't agree with him. and I don't think the author of that article at FAIR agrees with him.

It's nice to know I'm not the only one here who tends to disagree with him.

Edited February 27, 2013 by inquiringmind

[TAO]

Yeah, I'd disagree too. He seems to agree with Kant to some degree though.

[inquiringmind]

Yeah, I'd disagree too.

Thank you.

He seems to agree with Kant to some degree though.

Yes, Kant was in agreement with Augustine..

Edited February 27, 2013 by inquiringmind

[thesometimesaint]

Honey; does this dress make me look fat?

[mfbukowski]

Thank you.

I don't see how Augustine could be right here.

The Greek Fathers didn't agree with him, Cardinal Newman didn't agree with him. and I don't think the author of that article at FAIR agrees with him.

It's nice to know I'm not the only one here who tends to disagree with him.

Good for you

Language is ambiguous- there is no getting around that. Some use that to say something and mean something else, but all of it is ambiguous anyway.

Rather than to accuse people of lying, I think it is better to question them about why they say what they say or help them say it more clearly. If you do that, it becomes easy to separate the liars from the just confused.

99.99% are just confused.

[Questing Beast]

Of course a lie is a lie, anything which is not the known truth is a lie. However, there are much greater evils that can come to pass as a consequence of telling the absolute truth. My favorite example is the fictional anecdote from A Tale of Two Cities, where the housekeeper, famed in the neighborhood for her impeccable honesty, lies to the gendarmes by saying there was no one but herself in the house, and thus saves the lives of everyone hiding in the house, because the gendarmes left off searching the house on her word alone. She was mortified that she had lied for the first time in her life, but those she had saved called upon God to bless her for it....

[BlueDreams]

I didn't make it that color (but I'll change it for you if you like.)

Is that better?

Much better, thank you!

[inquiringmind]

Of course a lie is a lie, anything which is not the known truth is a lie.

Would you be as quick to say that all killing is murder?

Edited February 27, 2013 by inquiringmind

[RobertAC]

Augustine's zeal to find things black and white, good and evil, seems naive. I don't agree with his blanket statement about an untruth=a lie.

[inquiringmind]

Augustine's zeal to find things black and white, good and evil, seems naive. I don't agree with his blanket statement about an untruth=a lie.

Thank you.

[Ahab]

Honey; does this dress make me look fat?

No... it's not the dress that does it.

And just in case this is next: Honey, am I fat?

No... you have some fat on your body but you are not fat.

Edited February 27, 2013 by Ahab

[inquiringmind]

No... it's not the dress that does it.

And just in case this is next: Honey, am I fat?

No... you have some fat on your body but you are not fat.

Another mode of verbal misleading is equivocation or a play upon words; and it is defended on the theory that to lie is to use words in a sense which they will not bear. But an equivocator uses them in a received sense, though there is another received sense, and therefore, according to this definition, he does not lie.

Others say that all equivocations are, after all, a kind of lying,—faint lies or awkward lies, but still lies; and some of these disputants infer, that therefore we must not equivocate, and others that equivocation is but a half-measure, and that it is better to say at once that in certain cases untruths are not lies...

http://the-american-...ion/#more-28580

Edited February 28, 2013 by inquiringmind

[mfbukowski]

Of course a lie is a lie, anything which is not the known truth is a lie.

Well then, that makes this a "lie" I guess.

[kenporay]

Would you be as quick to say that all killing is murder?

Killing and murder are two different words with two different meanings. Lie is a word that has a specific meaning.

You can adhere to logic and know that a lie is a lie. It may be the quickest way out of a tight spot but that doesnt make it true.

You can think that there are justifications that make lies into 'not lies' but they're still lies....because thats the definition of a lie.

[mfbukowski]

Killing and murder are two different words with two different meanings. Lie is a word that has a specific meaning.

You can adhere to logic and know that a lie is a lie. It may be the quickest way out of a tight spot but that doesnt make it true.

You can think that there are justifications that make lies into 'not lies' but they're still lies....because thats the definition of a lie.

It would perhaps be easier to define truth than what constitutes a "lie", since one needs to know what is true before one can call anything "untrue".

Definitions of truth are notoriously difficult

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/

Truth

First published Tue Jun 13, 2006; substantive revision Tue Jan 22, 2013

Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.

It would be impossible to survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way. Instead, this essay will concentrate on the main themes in the study of truth in the contemporary philosophical literature. It will attempt to survey the key problems and theories of current interest, and show how they relate to one-another. A number of other entries investigate many of these topics in greater depth. Generally, discussion of the principal arguments is left to them. The goal of this essay is only to provide an overview of the current Theories. Many of the papers mentioned in this essay can be found in the anthologies edited by Blackburn and Simmons (1999) and Lynch (2001b). There are also a number of book-length surveys of the topics discussed here, including Burgess and Burgess (2011), Kirkham (1992), and Künne (2003).

The problem of truth is in a way easy to state: what truths are, and what (if anything) makes them true. But this simple statement masks a great deal of controversy. Whether there is a metaphysical problem of truth at all, and if there is, what kind of theory might address it, are all standing issues in the theory of truth.

[Nathair/|\]

Honey; does this dress make me look fat?

No, dear, the dress does not make you look fat? (It's the five pounds of cake that are to blame.)

[Nathair/|\]

Honey; does this dress make me look fat?

No, dear, the dress does not make you look fat. (You don't have to add that It's the five pounds of cake that are to blame.)

[Nathair/|\]

Honey; does this dress make me look fat?

No, dear, the dress does not make you look fat. (You don't have to add that It's the five pounds of cake that are to blame.)

[kenporay]

It would perhaps be easier to define truth than what constitutes a "lie", since one needs to know what is true before one can call anything "untrue".

Definitions of truth are notoriously difficult

Maybe for some...but I know when I'm lying and when I'm not. It's not some mystical thing.

[mfbukowski]

Maybe for some...but I know when I'm lying and when I'm not. It's not some mystical thing.

Of course you know. That's not the problem. The problem is for others to know.

[kenporay]

Of course you know. That's not the problem. The problem is for others to know.

Oh no, you have it quite backwards. It is paramount for me to know when I am honest...it doesnt matter what others think.