Trinitarian Or Modal: Dancing On Pinheads?

[Cobalt-70]

Any philosophy of language, must be, itself, deeply embedded in and bound and conditioned by the very same contraints, limits, and dynamics of language that it seeks to understand and critique. Any philosophy of language, in other words, must itself be a manifestation and product of the very language of which its own concepts and arguments are composed. It must be itself, at its core, a phenomena of language and the nature of language and as deeply conditioned by the essential elements and structure of language as any other form of discourse (text).

All philosophies are philosophies of text (a more general term than "language"), and share the the problem that you are describing. I don't engage in positive philosophy, but I have been known to read philosophy deconstructively. I don't "rely on" any philosophy of text or language--I just read it, and omit the usual step of glossing over the aporias and blindspots.

Edited February 13, 2012 by Cobalt-70

[Loran Blood]

(Sorry for mixing you and Cobalt up. The post in question was aimed at him, however, a part of that post is relevant to both you and him. I have not attacked Wittgenstien, but your concepts and claims as you have articulated them here. Below is a re-post of the first post, and is intended to be a response to Cobalt).

What Cobalt is calling a "philosohpy of language" is really little more than a sophisticated word game who's primary purpose is to defend itself from philosphical criticism in the way all postmodern concepts exempt themselves from philosophical scrutiny, which is to claim an overarching, all-ecompassing gnostic-like grand theoretical template for the understaning of all use of language, and hence in privileging itself as a grand narrative of the nature of human discourse which stands above all critique itself and passes philosophical judgement upon all attempts to look at its own internal coherence and logical cogency as a theory.

Any philosophy of language, must be, itself, deeply embedded in and bound and conditioned by the very same contraints, limits, and dynamics of language that it seeks to understand and critique. Any philosophy of language, in other words, must itself be a manifestation and product of the very language of which its own concepts and arguments are composed. It must be itself, at its core, a phenomena of language and the nature of language and as deeply conditioned by the essential elements and structure of language as any other form of discourse (text).

Once we begin to examine postmodern linguistic philosophy (which is really, as you've made more than clear here, is functioning much more as a grand ideological narrative than a true philosophy of language) itself according to its own principles (upon traditional principles of critical philosophcal analysis), you wish to take your ball and go home, and assert that those who do not accept your claims just don't understand the sophisticaed acana of "linguistic philosophy." The gnostic secrets remain beyond the ken of the uninitiated.

I do enjoy playing this game for awhile, as its a nice challenge, at least until the postmodernist inevetabley throws up his hands and walks away, shaking his head at the unsophisitaced philistine who dares hold postmodern literary theory and philosohpy of language to account to the laws of language and to the demands of philosophcal rigor that ask any such philosohphy to acccunt for itself and its claims without claiming victory by default by proposing immunity from critique from the distance of its own lofty, gnostic heights.

Your problem is that its fairly easy to show that the core claims and arguments you are using here, are, when turned upon themselves and used as counter-examples and as tools to critique your own theory, are logically self negating. Your own theory has a very difficult time standing up to inspection under its own theoretical assumptions.

[Loran Blood]

Uh huh.

Your brilliant attack on Wittgenstein has totally revolutionized philosophy in a single post. Will someone please notify all the journals they can stop publishing since Loran Blood has solved all the problems of the philosophy of language?

1. I don't give a flip about the professional philosophy journals, which are, as a body, all but utterly irrelevant to human life and thought, broadly speaking, except to the extent that their ideas - many of which have been and continue to be malignant and destructive to human flourishing and potential - trickle down and filter into the broad culture through the medium of the mainstream news media, Hollywood, and the humanities and social science professorate, which are the primary vectors or carriers of the ideas of people like Wittgenstien, deconstruction, and postmodernism as they were generations before for Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Satre et al (see Matt Damon for a primary example of the continuation of this phenomenon).

2. As you might have noticed, I have not attempted to "solve the problem" of the philosophy of language. What I have done is fielded some initial arguments against the strongly French influened arguments of Cobalt showing that when the very principles of analysis he uses to critique language are used to critique Cobalt's own theory of language (which is, itself, embedded within and deeply conditioned by language), his theory of language wilts under his own premises, and becomes questionable as a theory of language, as it does not appear able to transcend the boundaries of the very language over which it claims to hold analytical court.

Edited February 13, 2012 by Loran Blood

[Loran Blood]

All philosophies are philosophies of text (a more general term than "language"), and share the the problem that you are describing. I don't engage in positive philosophy, but I have been known to read philosophy deconstructively. I don't "rely on" any philosophy of text or language--I just read it, and omit the usual step of glossing over the aporias and blindspots.

How, however, do you interpret at text? Upon what basis?

[Cobalt-70]

How, however, do you interpret at text? Upon what basis?

It depends on the text. Every text is different. There is no real methodology to reading text. But there are trends in Western text, and if you know what those trends are, it makes the texts easier to read. For example, Western texts privilege presence over absence, mind over body, and speech over writing.

[Cobalt-70]

Your problem is that its fairly easy to show that the core claims and arguments you are using here, are, when turned upon themselves and used as counter-examples and as tools to critique your own theory, are logically self negating. Your own theory has a very difficult time standing up to inspection under its own theoretical assumptions.

I'm not really making my own "core claims." I'm just reading the "core claims" of existing texts, such as Trinitarian theology and Joseph Smith's theology, or Western philosophy in general. If you are referring to things like différence, then please make an argument that différence does not exist within Western philosophy and theology, by their own terms. To me, it seems so obvious that it hardly even needs mentioning. In Western philosophies of any denomination, signs differ from, and are separated in time from, what they represent.

[mfbukowski]

1. I don't give a flip about the professional philosophy journals, which are, as a body, all but utterly irrelevant to human life and thought, broadly speaking, except to the extent that their ideas - many of which have been and continue to be malignant and destructive to human flourishing and potential - trickle down and filter into the broad culture through the medium of the mainstream news media, Hollywood, and the humanities and social science professorate, which are the primary vectors or carriers of the ideas of people like Wittgenstien, deconstruction, and postmodernism as they were generations before for Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Satre et al (see Matt Damon for a primary example of the continuation of this phenomenon).

I added the emphasis to what you said.

That is a very big exception. The reality is that if you understood the possibilities in actually understanding Wittgenstein and some others, you would find that they greatly enhance the understanding of the fact that speaking about spiritual experiences can be seen as a perfectly valid form of philosophical discourse, and in turn that fact becomes very important in attacking anti-Mormons who generally have no clue what they are talking about in their criticism.

I don't know if you are aware that Wittgenstein was religious in his way, for much of his life, and had very definite ideas about religion which were compatible with an LDS point of view.

William James was raised Swedenborgian and his Varieties of Relgious Experience is roundly quoted sympathetically in LDS circles.

Your suspicions about the evils of contemporar philosophy are completely unfounded. Of course there is the "other side" as there is in all issues, but it is certainly possible to be believing LDS and be totally acquainted with all the views out there and and understand the full strength of the LDS position in philosophy.

Edited February 13, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Loran Blood]

I'm not really making my own "core claims."

Then, you really have no philosophical system at all, and no arguments supporting it? No wonder you're so hard to pin down!

I'm just reading the "core claims" of existing texts, such as Trinitarian theology and Joseph Smith's theology, or Western philosophy in general.

If all one ever finds in a text, or the meaning of a text, is just more text, itself surrounded by other text which "differs in meaning from what the text supposedly signifies", then how do you know you are really "reading" the "core claims" of a text? How do you know what the sign really signifies (how can you possibly come close to the original intent of the author?)?

If you are referring to things like différence, then please make an argument that différence does not exist within Western philosophy and theology, by their own terms.

Any attempt to try to untangle Derrida's obfuscatory gibberish would take much more effort and time than I'm willing to put into it here (as just understanding him involves the bulk of the difficulty), so I'll put off the highly rarefied discussion for the present. What I will again point out is that, at all events, your own position on the nature of language crumbles as an analytical tool under the very concepts it uses in analysis of the texts of others, and that is the main problem of all such approaches.

To me, it seems so obvious that it hardly even needs mentioning. In Western philosophies of any denomination, signs differ from, and are separated in time from, what they represent.

It has long been noticed that, once an otherwise fine mind becomes corrupted and regidified by the jealous god of theory, everything in the larger world ends by being subsumed within the grand theoretical web and all analysis through that prism appears "obvious." Of course, the sign "words and terms" are separated in space and time from that which they signify (meaing, either denotative or connotative), but the relevance of that to meaning is not at all clear, and points us yet again to a primary feature of the study of critial thought (logic), which is the clarity and precision of language as used in the formulation of concepts and arguments. Meaning, as the scriptures show, can survive and transcend thousands of miles, thousands of years, and substantial cultural differentiation quite well, despite vast spans of time and space.

Edited February 15, 2012 by Loran Blood

[Cobalt-70]

Then, you really have no philosophical system at all, and no arguments supporting it? No wonder you're so hard to pin down!

I didn't say that. I'm not a nihilist. I'm as entrained with Western philosophy as you are. I just don't take it as seriously as you apparently do.

If all one ever finds in a text, or the meaning of a text, is just more text, itself surrounded by other text which "differs in meaning from what the text supposedly signifies", then how do you know you are really "reading" the "core claims" of a text? How do you know what the sign really signifies (how can you possibly come close to the original intent of the author?)?

Just because a sign differs from its signified does not mean that I can't tell whether or not a particular sign or signified is central to a text. Usually, the author makes that pretty clear, and if she doesn't, the fact that she assumes the central position and doesn't discuss the alternatives is a dead giveaway.

As to coming to the original intent of the author, I don't propose to ever do that. I believe in the "death of the author." Writing is what it is, and has a life of its own which is not subservient to the logos hidden within the mind of the author.

It has long been noticed that, once an otherwise fine mind becomes corrupted and regidified by the jealous god of theory, everything in the larger world ends by being subsumed within the grand theoretical web and all analysis through that prism appears "obvious." Of course, the sign "words and terms" are separated in space and time from that which they signify (meaing, either denotative or connotative), but the relevance of that to meaning is not at all clear, and points us yet again to a primary feature of the study of critial thought (logic), which is the clarity and precision of language as used in the formulation of concepts and arguments. Meaning, as the scriptures show, can survive and transcend thousands of miles, thousands of years, and substantial cultural differentiation quite well, despite vast spans of time and space.

But meaning is a form of text, and with any text, there is différance. So any passage of space or time results in some sort of a change. If a set of thoughts goes from the brain of Paul, he puts pen to paper, the writings pass through several translations, the typed font is projected onto your retina, and then nerve impulses are transmitted into your brain, a different set of neurons will fire than the set of neurons that existed in Paul's brain. Because we understand "meaning" to reside within the brain, the only thing remaining of Paul's ideas that you could legitimately call "meaning" is the invisible markings on your own brain.

Edited February 15, 2012 by Cobalt-70

[DonBradley]

This is an area where I've changed my thinking quite dramatically over time. I used to condemn Trinitarians to a kind of damnation of illogic, thinking that they were spouting nonsense. If the Father was God and the Son was God, how could the Father not be the Son? A=B; B=C; then doesn't A=C? In this sort of familiar propositional logic, it follows naturally from the Father and the Son each being God that the Father and the Son are identical.

However, a friend who had taken in depth courses in philosophical logic made me aware that, seen through the lens of modal logic (which should not be confused in this discussion with "modalism"/Sabellianism), the Father could be God and the Son could be God in distinct ways--a "Fatherly" way and a "Sonly" way, so to speak. Given this, so far as I presently understand it, I'm not at all sure it's illogical for Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to each be God without all being the same, identical person. In fact, I think it is a logical thought, though admittedly a strange one.

The Christians of the early centuries who came up with the formal doctrine of the Trinity were trying to solve a scriptural puzzle that I think we sometimes take too lightly. How can the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost all be divine when the scriptures affirm emphatically that there is only one God? This is surely a problem that deserves considerable wrestling.

Now, regarding the OP question, I obviously can't answer for Rob, particularly since I'm LDS rather than Protestant, but I can offer an important difference between modalism and Trinitarianism. By positing that there are multiple "persons" (consciousnesses and wills) within God, Trinitarianism makes God inherently social, a fact whose implications are particularly developed by "social Trinitarian" theologians like Cornelius Plantinga. (FWIW, Blake Ostler argues that Mormons are social Trinitarians, and some on this board, like Dr. Peterson, have commented favorably on this interpretation.)

The model of God as inherently individual but taking on different roles at different times (modalism) differs greatly from the model of God as inherently social, an internal community, and may have very different implications. It's much easier, for instance, to explain why an inherently social God would be a loving, moral being, and would want to create other beings and have relationship with them than it is to explain why a God who is inherently individual (and therefore non-social) would want to do so.

I am personally struck by the difference it makes for God to be inherently social. To me, modalism and Trinitarianism, understood to be about the relationship of three persons, are worlds apart. And Trinitarianism is, in my judgment, far superior to modalism in its implications--it makes God more sociable, approachable, and comprehensible; accounts better for God's moral nature and creation of us; and seems more compatible with a doctrine of deification, in which divinity is something that can be shared, rather than simply the attribute of a single individual entity. In fact, the reason Athanasius (of Athanasian Creed fame) insisted so strongly on a Trinity, as opposed to Arius' doctrine of Christ as the first creation of the Father (the one divine person) was precisely because Athanasius was so set on deification: Christ's divinity provided an Incarnation, and incarnation meant there was a point of contact between God and man (since Christ was both God and man). It was Athanasius who, as I understand it, coined the phrase, "God became man in order that man might become God." So, at least to some extent, the doctrine of the Trinity was an outgrowth of early Christian belief in deification--a fact that should perhaps earn it more respect in present circles.

Since I am extremely strong on deification (what other ultimate point to our existence could there be?) and see it as the heart of the Christian message, of the Gospel, with salvation just being deification, I can't help seeing a doctrine compatible with deification is far superior to one alien to it.

Don

Edited February 16, 2012 by DonBradley

[Anakin7]

In my non scholarly/scholastic simpleton mind - #1 One God - a reality, #2 Nature of God another reality, #3 within the nature of the one God ... another reality #4 there lives 3 persons - 3 more realities. So there are 6 realities and 4 levels of reality of GOD. GOD The 1st reality is actually the GOD of God Realities #s 2-6. The Father/ Son/ Holy Ghost who each is GOD. So there is a One Trinity GOD - Father/ Son /Holy Ghost who has The One God #1 above them.

Did I get that right ?.

In His Debt/Grace

Anakin7

LDS JEDI KNIGHT

Edited February 16, 2012 by Anakin7

[wenglund]

This is an area where I've changed my thinking quite dramatically over time. I used to condemn Trinitarians to a kind of damnation of illogic, thinking that they were spouting nonsense. If the Father was God and the Son was God, how could the Father not be the Son? A=B; B=C; then doesn't A=C? In this sort of familiar propositional logic, it follows naturally from the Father and the Son each being God that the Father and the Son are identical.

However, a friend who had taken in depth courses in philosophical logic made me aware that, seen through the lens of modal logic (which should not be confused in this discussion with "modalism"/Sabellianism), the Father could be God and the Son could be God in distinct ways--a "Fatherly" way and a "Sonly" way, so to speak. Given this, so far as I presently understand it, I'm not at all sure it's illogical for Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to each be God without all being the same, identical person. In fact, I think it is a logical thought, though admittedly a strange one.

The Christians of the early centuries who came up with the formal doctrine of the Trinity were trying to solve a scriptural puzzle that I think we sometimes take too lightly. How can the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost all be divine when the scriptures affirm emphatically that there is only one God? This is surely a problem that deserves considerable wrestling.

Now, regarding the OP question, I obviously can't answer for Rob, particularly since I'm LDS rather than Protestant, but I can offer an important difference between modalism and Trinitarianism. By positing that there are multiple "persons" (consciousnesses and wills) within God, Trinitarianism makes God inherently social, a fact whose implications are particularly developed by "social Trinitarian" theologians like Cornelius Plantinga. (FWIW, Blake Ostler argues that Mormons are social Trinitarians, and some on this board, like Dr. Peterson, have commented favorably on this interpretation.)

The model of God as inherently individual but taking on different roles at different times (modalism) differs greatly from the model of God as inherently social, an internal community, and may have very different implications. It's much easier, for instance, to explain why an inherently social God would be a loving, moral being, and would want to create other beings and have relationship with them than it is to explain why a God who is inherently individual (and therefore non-social) would want to do so.

I am personally struck by the difference it makes for God to be inherently social. To me, modalism and Trinitarianism, understood to be about the relationship of three persons, are worlds apart. And Trinitarianism is, in my judgment, far superior to modalism in its implications--it makes God more sociable, approachable, and comprehensible; accounts better for God's moral nature and creation of us; and seems more compatible with a doctrine of deification, in which divinity is something that can be shared, rather than simply the attribute of a single individual entity. In fact, the reason Athanasius (of Athanasian Creed fame) insisted so strongly on a Trinity, as opposed to Arius' doctrine of Christ as the first creation of the Father (the one divine person) was precisely because Athanasius was so set on deification: Christ's divinity provided an Incarnation, and incarnation meant there was a point of contact between God and man (since Christ was both God and man). It was Athanasius who, as I understand it, coined the phrase, "God became man in order that man might become God." So, at least to some extent, the doctrine of the Trinity was an outgrowth of early Christian belief in deification--a fact that should perhaps earn it more respect in present circles.

Since I am extremely strong on deification (what other ultimate point to our existence could there be?) and see it as the heart of the Christian message, of the Gospel, with salvation just being deification, I can't help seeing a doctrine compatible with deification is far superior to one alien to it.

Don

Excellent post. However, as I understand it, what is at issue here isn't so much the distinction between Modalism and Trinitarianism, but rather whether certain passages in the Book of Mormon are intrinsically Modalism. Rob argues that they are, and Loran and I argue that they aren't--but instead, suggest that Rob is interpreting Modalism into those passages, errantly in our opinion.

What do you think?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Anakin7]

Wade/DonBradley you may wish to refer Rob to The 2 seperate works #1- "Book Of Mormon Christology" by Martin Tanner and the other #2 by Ross David Baron - "Melodie Moench Charles and The Humanist World View" both located at The Neil a. Maxwell Institutte aka F.A.R.M.S on the subject of Book Of Mormon Modalism.

In His Debt/Grace

Anakin7

LDS JEDI KNIGHT

Edited February 16, 2012 by Anakin7

[Cobalt-70]

This is an area where I've changed my thinking quite dramatically over time. I used to condemn Trinitarians to a kind of damnation of illogic, thinking that they were spouting nonsense. If the Father was God and the Son was God, how could the Father not be the Son? A=B; B=C; then doesn't A=C? In this sort of familiar propositional logic, it follows naturally from the Father and the Son each being God that the Father and the Son are identical.

However, a friend who had taken in depth courses in philosophical logic made me aware that, seen through the lens of modal logic (which should not be confused in this discussion with "modalism"/Sabellianism), the Father could be God and the Son could be God in distinct ways--a "Fatherly" way and a "Sonly" way, so to speak. Given this, so far as I presently understand it, I'm not at all sure it's illogical for Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to each be God without all being the same, identical person. In fact, I think it is a logical thought, though admittedly a strange one.

I don't even think you need modal logic. Just set theory. You could say that the Trinity is a one-to-one mapping between the set representing the essence of God and, separately, the sets representing the persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Thus, all the essence of God is represented in each of the three persons of the Trinity. However, each of the three persons of the Trinity may still contain characteristics (like temporary mortality, in the case of Jesus) that differ from the other two persons.

I don't see any reason why Mormons could not agree with that view of the Trinity, although we may have different views on how to describe the "essence of God" is, and different views about the characteristics of the persons of the Trinity. For example, we believe that the glory (and perhaps essence?) of God is an eternal principle we call "intelligence" or the "light of Christ," and that both the Father and the Son have physical bodies.

Perhaps the main point of departure with traditional Christianity (but perhaps not Trinitarianism) is that Mormons believe that humans, too, are co-eternal with, and thus part of, the essence of God. So perhaps it is not a Trinity, but a Trinity+.

[DonBradley]

Hi Wade,

Loran raised the issue of whether Trinitarianism and modalism are meaningfully distinct in their claims and in their implications. I was offering my view that they are very different in their implications.

The issue of whether Book of Mormon Christology is modalistic is also one where my thinking has evolved. I was long convinced that the modalistic reading was the reading. I now think the matter is much more complex.

The main seemingly modalistic text in the book is fairly early on, in Mosiah 15. This text sounds largely like modalism, except with a snag. As Ostler and Paulsen have pointed out, the Father and the Son are described in verse 7 as having distinct wills. One could, perhaps, argue that this can still be modalistic, but that point would need to be argued--not assumed. Without a solid argument for how one divine person could have been understood to have two wills, we are left with the implication that the Father and the Son are two persons.

I would suggest (and I don't know if this is where Ostler and Paulsen go with this, but it may be the same place) that the text is better read, not as teaching modalism, but rather as teaching an "incarnational" view of Christ's divine Sonship.

In the orthodox Christian creeds, Christ is described as "eternally begotten" from the Father--i.e., his divine Sonship is understood to consist in his perpetually emanating (if that's the right word) from the Father. But there is another view in traditional Christianity of the sense in which Christ is the Son, and that is that his Sonship consists in his having incarnated and thus become the Son.

Mosiah 15 speaks of Christ "becoming the Father and the Son" (verse 3), which could easily be understood to mean that prior to his human embodiment, the second divine person in the Godhead had not taken on "Sonship," because he had not yet embodied: before this there was no incarnational distinction of roles between God the First and God the Second; so each, as Creator, could be called "the Father." But once God the Second embodied, or incarnated--which also seems a proper way to say it (verse 1--"God himself shall come down")--he became "the Son," which the passage equates with his embodiment: "because he dwelleth in the flesh he shall be called the Son" (verse 2).

Later Book of Mormon passages, particularly during Jesus' ministry to the Nephites, draw a sharper distinction between the persons of the Father and the Son (and also the Holy Ghost) than Abinadi does here (see, e.g., 3 Nephi 11). But the Book of Mormon isn't as explicit on this as it could be. I can't recall any passages where it portrays interaction between God the First and God the Second before the latter is born in the flesh, or where someone sees them simultaneously. But if anyone can think of such passages, I'm very interested. (BTW, these terms "God the First" and "God the Second" come from Joseph Smith.) However, since the Father and the Son have distinct wills even in the most "modalistic" passage in the book, and since they interact in 3 Nephi, the burden of proof probably rightly falls on the view that they are not separate persons in the Book of Mormon.

Then what is the meaning of the seemingly "modalistic" passages in the book?. It is perhaps notable that when Christ is referred to in the Book of Mormon as "the Father," it is usually (though not always) during his premortal existence. And, even more notably, he is referred to as "the Son" only once before his birth--when he appears to the brother of Jared. But even then the brother of Jared is seeing, not only the Lord's spirit body (Ether 3:16), but also that he will come in the flesh (Ether 3:7-9). His vision is thus partly "proleptic"--showing things that have not yet happened as if they had. Thus, when the Lord tells the brother of Jared that he is "the Father and the Son," he also tells him he is "Jesus Christ," using the name he would receive at his birth in Bethlehem (along with his title as Messiah) and tells him that he is seeing forward to when "I shall take upon me flesh and blood" (Ether 3:9, 14).

In these Book of Mormon passages, then, there is at least one sense in which the Lord only "becomes" the Son when he comes into mortality (cf. again Mosiah 15:2).

In sum, the Book of Mormon's equation of Christ's spirit with the Father and his flesh with the Son is better read as setting forth an "incarnational" view of Christ's divine Sonship (cf. also D&C 93:4,14) than as teaching modalism. While Christ can be understood as being the Son of God in multiple senses, the Book of Mormon focuses on this incarnational Sonship--the Lord's embodiment in human flesh. Prior to his embodiment, Christ (by definition) does not possess embodied Sonship: he has not acquired that distinction. The theology here is consistent with, and likely requires, the Father and the Son to be separate persons.

Given all this, if one had to classify the Book of Mormon as modalistic or Trinitarian, one would better identify it as Trinitarian, but not necessarily teaching the doctrine of the Trinity in the same way as the orthodox creeds.

I admit that here I am really way out of my depth. I don't fully understand how the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one. But I suspect the same is true for all of us. Yet we have the scriptures in front of us, and must make judgments about what they teach and where we will center our faith. Given a number of different sacred texts, we face the task of integrating them. Various passages indicate that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are distinct persons, while others state explicitly that there is only "one God" and still others--particularly in the Book of Mormon--specify that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost constitute "one God." The question is one of how best to understand these passages together.

Don

Edited February 17, 2012 by DonBradley

[DonBradley]

In my non scholarly/scholastic simpleton mind - #1 One God - a reality, #2 Nature of God another reality, #3 within the nature of the one God ... another reality #4 there lives 3 persons - 3 more realities. So there are 6 realities and 4 levels of reality of GOD. GOD The 1st reality is actually the GOD of God Realities #s 2-6. The Father/ Son/ Holy Ghost who each is GOD. So there is a One Trinity GOD - Father/ Son /Holy Ghost who has The One God #1 above them.

Did I get that right ?.

Anakin,

So the question is, given the existence of three divine persons--Father, Son, and Holy Ghost--how is there only "one God"? LDS theologians Blake Ostler and David Paulsen have suggested that there is one God in, ironically, three senses: 1) there is one divine nature that constitutes the essence of what it is to be divine (God is love, or mutual indwelling); 2) there is one God the Father, the fount of all divinity; and 3) the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost comprise one God in a different sense from how the Father is one God--they constitute one eternal, mutually indwelling divine community. Ostler and Paulsen locate this last idea in LDS scripture and identify it as a form of social Trinitarianism.

I find their forays in this area very interesting and think they are moving in the right direction. The subject bears some real wrestling with.

Not only do the scriptures portray the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as one God (while also multiple persons with distinct wills), it is--ironically?--LDS scripture that does so most explicitly! The Bible describes the Father and the Son as one and mutually indwelling (e.g., Christ in the Gospel of John: "I am in the Father and the Father in me"). But only once does it say the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are "one," and even this passage (1 John 5:7), known as the Johannine Comma, is widely acknowledged by scholars (orthodox as well as unorthodox) as a later interpolation. While the biblical text says several times that there is "one God" (using this phrase in that sense seven times), it nowhere explicitly states that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God. LDS scripture, by contrast, uses the phrase "one God" in that sense ten times and explicitly states three times that "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost" are "one God" (Testimony of Three Witnesses; 2 Ne. 31:21; D&C 20:28). We are thus the only Christians who have scripture which states that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost comprise one God.

The Christian orthodoxy of the creeds makes some real mistakes, I think, about the Godhead, which Latter-day Saints are well-positioned to help correct. Some of the creeds, for instance, assert that the persons of the Godhead are absolutely equal (e.g., the Son is not subordinate to the Father)--a confusion which leads many Evangelicals to direct their prayers primarily to Christ, even though he said to direct them to the Father. The creeds (or some of their original proponents) also assert that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess, collectively, only one will, which--despite all protestations to the contrary--would surely make them only one person. Etc. So, to traditional Christians who hold these misunderstandings, we should, IMO, be teaching that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have distinct (but harmonious) wills--they are not effectively one person, and that prayer, as a general rule, is to be addressed to God the Father, who is the eternal head. But, granting these mistakes in some of the Trinitarian creeds that we need to inveigh against, shouldn't it be we, who do have scriptures calling the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost "one God," preaching this divine unity to those who don't have such scriptures, rather than them preaching it to us?

As Jacob wrestled with God at Beth-El, so I think we need to wrestle with Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as one God, as the scriptures teach. What does it mean? Beyond teaching the personal distinction of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the subordination of the Son and the Holy Ghost to the Father, what is the distinctive message that we are to teach from our Restoration scriptures, which uniquely affirm their divine unity? Have we yet put in the effort to grasp that?

Don

Edited February 17, 2012 by DonBradley

[DonBradley]

Cobalt,

Very interesting. I need to look into set theory.

Your discussion ties the doctrine of the Godhead to that of deification, which I think is exactly right. Jesus prayed the Father that we could be one with him, and he dwell in us, as he was one with the Father and he and the Father dwelt in one another. I think one would be hard pressed to find scriptural support for the idea that we become divine on the same scale and in the same inherent sense as the members of the Godhead, who are represented as having been divine since before the Creation. (Christ didn't come to earth in order to be deified, as we did; rather he emptied himself of his pre-existent divinity in order to become human, to lift us Godward [Phillippians 2:5-7]). But the whole idea of the Gospel appears to be that we are invited to participate in the divine relationship they share with one another. And since Latter-day Saints posit less of a gulf between us and God (we are made of Godstuff, so to speak, rather than lower materials), our notion of what such deification entails will tend to be stronger than that of other Christians. Divinity can only be poured into a vessel as much as the vessel is able to receive. Traditional Christians tend to posit that God made us rather weak vessels for such a destiny, while Latter-day Saints believe we are such vessels into which divinity can be poured abundantly.

Don

Edited February 17, 2012 by DonBradley

[wenglund]

In sum, the Book of Mormon's equation of Christ's spirit with the Father and his flesh with the Son is better read as setting forth an "incarnational" view of Christ's divine Sonship (cf. also D&C 93:4,14) than as teaching modalism. While Christ can be understood as being the Son of God in multiple senses, the Book of Mormon focuses on this incarnational Sonship--the Lord's embodiment in human flesh. Prior to his embodiment, Christ (by definition) does not possess embodied Sonship: he has not acquired that distinction. The theology here is consistent with, and likely requires, the Father and the Son to be separate persons.

I appreciate you weighing in. And, in a way, this was how I saw it as well. However, I view Abinadi's comments as speaking less to the issue theology and more to the dual nature (spirit and flesh) of the incarnate Christ, and by extension the dual nature of all mankind. To me, it wasn't a treatise on the nature of God, but a brief and symbolic expose on the plan of salvation.

Either way, as implicit in your remarks, viewing Mosiah 15 and other passages as modalism, is a function of personal interpretation, which reasonable people can reasonably disagree. It is not, as Rob suggests, a fact.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Rob Bowman]

Don,

Those are some excellently reasoned and written posts. I have other things dragging me away at the moment, but I definitely want to discuss these things with you.

[DonBradley]

All,

I should clarify some of what I said above regarding creedal Trinitarianism, and particularly the Trinity being understood to have "one will."

I've read the "one will" idea a few places, but don't recall any except Charles Hodge's "One Will in the Trinity," which argues that the Trinity possesses only one will and one mind. I don't think it's actually in one of the traditional creeds, though I seem to recall reading it from some of those involved in drafting the creeds (Athanasius?). This idea makes absolutely no sense to me. If Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are "in" one another (they mutually indwell one another in love and experience the other's consciousness) and possess the same faculty of will, then any distinction of persons among them would be trivial, if not simply illusory. They would have no way of distinguishing from one another, if, indeed, it would be proper to speak of "another." Latter-day Saint scripture offers a straightforward corrective to this: the Son has a distinct will from the Father but their wills are in harmony (e.g., Mosiah 15:7).

I may have put across the idea above that all traditional Christians make the error of viewing the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as having one faculty of will and thus of needing such a corrective. This is not so. A number of traditional Christian theologians, and probably most traditional Christians, understand them to have distinct faculties of will but to agree in the things that they will--the same as in LDS scripture. Also, some Western (mostly Protestant) Christians theologians, and again probably most traditional Christians, understand the Son to be subordinate to the Father, and the Holy Ghost to be subordinate to the Father and the Son--as Latter-day Saint scripture (and the Bible) clearly present. And such understandings are even more prevalent among the Eastern Orthodox, who embrace subordination in the Trinity and emphasize that deification ("theosis") is salvation.

The trouble is that the creeds of traditional (particularly Western) Christianity present these three divine Persons as absolutely equal, with no subordination amongst them. The need for absolute equality among them seems to me to spring from a Platonic idea of what perfection is--that it is absolute and static. While I have nothing against Plato, I think this idea, along with some others (though certainly not all) imported from Hellenism into Christianity, have tended to lead people astray. Plato's philosophy wasn't made to describe persons and relationships, but ideas. To be persons in relationship--to interact--is not static, like the Platonic forms, but inherently dynamic.

These facts are captured beautifully in LDS scripture and, I might add, the Bible. Yet because LDS scripture tends to be more explicit, on the distinction of wills in the Godhead and the dynamic nature of God, on the one hand, and on the Godhead's unity, on the other, LDS scripture has the potential--if we will mine it for such--to offer both an affirmation and a clarifying corrective to more general Christian theology on the unity of God.

Don

Edited February 17, 2012 by DonBradley

[DonBradley]

Don,

Those are some excellently reasoned and written posts. I have other things dragging me away at the moment, but I definitely want to discuss these things with you.

Rob,

I'll look forward to that.

Don

[DonBradley]

I appreciate you weighing in. And, in a way, this was how I saw it as well. However, I view Abinadi's comments as speaking less to the issue theology and more to the dual nature (spirit and flesh) of the incarnate Christ, and by extension the dual nature of all mankind. To me, it wasn't a treatise on the nature of God, but a brief and symbolic expose on the plan of salvation.

Ah, interesting. This sounds like the "two natures" understanding of Christology in traditional Christianity, which, I think, is also a connection made by Paulsen and Ostler.

Either way, as implicit in your remarks, viewing Mosiah 15 and other passages as modalism, is a function of personal interpretation, which reasonable people can reasonably disagree. It is not, as Rob suggests, a fact.

Agreed. I think the Book of Mormon can be read as modalistic--provided one finds a way around the two wills in Mosiah 15 and the interactions between Father and Son in 3 Nephi (which may be possible--after all, Sabellians apparently felt they could reconcile similar difficulties in the Bible). But I certainly don't think it has to be. However, while we might reasonably disagree on whether to read its Godhead doctrine as modalism, the traditional Trinity, or something else, we can more confidently read it as setting forth both the two natures and "incarnational Sonship" of Christ. Christ, in the Book of Mormon, is clearly human and divine and, as "the condescension of God" to us in a human body (1 Nephi 11:16-21), is the Son of God, or God the Son.

Don

Edited February 17, 2012 by DonBradley

[Anakin7]

Anakin,

So the question is, given the existence of three divine persons--Father, Son, and Holy Ghost--how is there only "one God"? LDS theologians Blake Ostler and David Paulsen have suggested that there is one God in, ironically, three senses: 1) there is one divine nature that constitutes the essence of what it is to be divine (God is love, or mutual indwelling); 2) there is one God the Father, the fount of all divinity; and 3) the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost comprise one God in a difference sense from how the Father is one God--they constitute one eternal, mutually indwelling divine community. They locate this last idea in LDS scripture and identify it as a form of social Trinitarianism.

I find their forays in this area very interesting and think they are moving in the right direction. The subject bears some real wrestling with.

Not only do the scriptures portray the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as one God (while also multiple persons with distinct wills), it is--ironically?--LDS scripture that does so most explicitly! The Bible describes the Father and the Son as one and mutually indwelling (e.g., Christ in the Gospel of John "I am in the Father and the Father in me"). But only once does it say the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are "one," and even this passage (1 John 5:7), known as the Johannine Comma, is widely acknowledged by scholars (orthodox as well as unorthodox) as a later interpolation. While the biblical text says several times that there is "one God" (using this phrase in that sense seven times), it nowhere explicitly states that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God. LDS scripture, by contrast, uses the phrase "one God" in that sense ten times and explicitly states three times that "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost" are "one God" (Testimony of Three Witnesses; 2 Ne. 31:21; D&C 20:28). We are thus the only Christians who have scripture which states that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost comprise one God.

The Christian orthodoxy of the creeds makes some real mistakes, I think, about the Godhead, which Latter-day Saints are well-positioned to help correct. Some of the creeds, for instance, assert that the persons of the Godhead are absolutely equal (e.g., the Son is not subordinate to the Father)--a confusion which leads many Evangelicals to direct their prayers primarily to Christ, even though he said to direct them to the Father. The creeds (or some of their original proponents) also assert that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess, collectively, only one will, which--despite all protestations to the contrary--would surely make them only one person. Etc. So, to traditional Christians who hold these misunderstandings, we should, IMO, be teaching that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have distinct (but harmonious) wills--they are not effectively one person, and that prayer, as a general rule, is to be addressed to God the Father, who is the eternal head. But, granting these mistakes of creedal Trinitarianism that we need to inveigh against, shouldn't it be we, who do have scriptures calling the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost "one God," preaching this divine unity to those who don't have such scriptures, rather than them preaching it to us?

As Jacob wrestled with God at Beth-El, so I think we need to wrestle with Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as one God, as the scriptures teach. What does it mean? And, beyond teaching the personal distinction of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the subordination of the Son and the Holy Ghost to the Father, what is the message that we are to teach, and which our Restoration scriptures uniquely affirm, about their divine unity?

Don

I was in my simpleton mind trying to look at the way the non LDS Athanasious/Augustinian Trinity works in it's reality/realities.

Sorry to be so simple, I never finished High School and my only experience dealing with these issues is reading [Claremont School of Theology library and talking with students - Methodist seminary] located in Claremont Ca and talking with other non LDS Christians.- Evangelicals and others.

In His Debt/Grace

Anakin7

LDS JEDI KNIGHT

[wenglund]

If Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are "in" one another (they mutually indwell one another in love and experience the other's consciousness) and possess the same faculty of will, then any distinction of persons among them would be trivial, if not simply illusory. They would have no way of distinguishing from one another, if, indeed, it would be proper to speak of "another."

To me, a "one will" trinity obliterates even the least pretense of a distinction between modalism and traditional trinitarianism (as opposed to social trinitarianism).

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Calm]

I never finished High School

Never too late.