Trinitarian Or Modal: Dancing On Pinheads?

[Loran Blood]

And now, back to the Trinity...

Edited February 8, 2012 by Loran Blood

[Cobalt-70]

The key is understanding that you cannot get away from the paradoxes and strive for genuine communication in spite of them, and not let the "words get in the way".

That means, I think, that many times we are "saying the same things" as our Christian neighbors, but we don't know it because they are speaking Christian and we are speaking Mormon.

I totally agree. Half the time, the distinctions we make between ourselves and Trinitarians are just matters of taking the insular jargon-filled language Mormons have invented way too seriously, and refusing to use or even try to understand the language of Christian theology.

For example, are Mormons really so sure about the meaning of ousia that they can be sure that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit do not share that property? How many Mormons even know what ousia means? Well, Christian theologians tell us that it means "all that subsists by itself and which has not its being in another." That definition requires further definitions of words like "subsists," "self," "being," and "another," which take us back to Aristotle and Plato. But has anyone even done a careful study to determine whether Mormon theology has a place within this framework? If not, then why are we so sure that there is no common ground, and that maybe Mormons could legitimately be Trinitarian, consistently with the Mormon canon?

By the same token, what's to say that Joseph Smiths' understanding of "spirit matter" is any different from the Biblical "spirit" that every Christian believes in. We know that spirit is not composed of hydrogen and oxygen, etc., So what does adding the word "matter" really mean, other than emphasize the reality and being-ness of spirit? Smith's quip that there is no "immaterial matter" is, after all, a truism. It doesn't say anything about the "matterness" of matter.

[Cobalt-70]

I will take this to be a true statement, and based upon that, disregard the above text (which I have just said I will accept as "true" but which clearly cannot be the case as the text itself indicates that any "truth" I believe I have found is nothing more than a relative frame of reference, or node of meaning floating in a sea of other text which is inconsistent or irrelevent to the truth, or true meaning, I believe I have found, and continues in infinite regress (or expansion) without reference to a final core of meaning grounded in a shared universe of discourse) and all supporting argument following it as nothing more than a text embedded in a sea of other text that contains no coherent or settled meaning (which is to say, the argument you are trying to make thorugh your own text, is fundamentally, according to your own argument, meaningless).

You are wrong. The lack of absolute, coherent, or settled meaning does not mean meaninglessness, any more than the lack of a stable isotope of Technetium means that Technetium doesn't exist. You can't validate atheism by proving that God changes or is inconsistent.

Let's take the above paragraph as an example, but alter a few terms to narrow its applicability:

"You cannot take a first step to find out what the text Cobalt has written really means, and then merely deal with the underlying meanings. All Cobalt's arguments are themselves text, and must be defined by further text. The moment you think you have reached the meaning of Cobalt's arguments, you find that all you have actually reached is a bunch of Cobalt's text that differs in meaning from what the Cobal's arguments are supposedly trying to establish."

What I would have to tentatively derive from this is that your arguemnts are worthless as means of transferring information from one mind to another, establishing the truth, plausibility, or probability of any set of claims, and as a means of gaining knowedge of any kind. The only possibility you leave open is the claim that the "meaning" or the truth" of a text is purly the extension of one's own subjective mental state onto the text (in whatever form this may take) and has nothing to do with what the author intended or what the terms and logical skeleton of any arguments (conclusions claimed to follow from premises) imply.

Where your logic fails you is the leap from the second to third paragraph. The existence of différance does not imply the impossibility of worthwhile arguments or of gaining knowledge. Exactly the opposite is true. Différence is part of the mechanism of how arguments gain meaning, and how people gain knowledge.

All formulations of the concept "God" are in not irrational (and the basis upon which any claim of irrationality as to any particular concept of God would have to be looked at in detail in its own right).

I didn't say irrational. I said "(ir)rational," meaning that it is rational or irrational depending on how you look at it. It is rational in the sense that it is built upon a systematic system of ordered signs and attempted penetration of reality. However, it is irrational in the sense that it is intuitive, and there are "holes" in the analysis.

Words mean things, not just solipsistically to a private, subjective mind, but to an entire community within a shared universe of discourse. It is not all just more and more "text," it is meaning, and meaning can be clear, fuzzy, indistinct, or highly unstable (such as much of your text above, in which the meaning of much of what you are trying to actually say is in no sense lucid).

I am not a solipsist. I'm not denying that there is a reality of God "out there." I'm just saying that he is hidden behind, and different from, the text (in the broadest sense of that word) that represents him. Even if you could see him, he is different from, and separated in time from, the images dancing on your retina, and from the processing equipment in your brain that seeks to make sense of those retinal images.

[mfbukowski]

I totally agree. Half the time, the distinctions we make between ourselves and Trinitarians are just matters of taking the insular jargon-filled language Mormons have invented way too seriously, and refusing to use or even try to understand the language of Christian theology.

For example, are Mormons really so sure about the meaning of ousia that they can be sure that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit do not share that property? How many Mormons even know what ousia means? Well, Christian theologians tell us that it means "all that subsists by itself and which has not its being in another." That definition requires further definitions of words like "subsists," "self," "being," and "another," which take us back to Aristotle and Plato. But has anyone even done a careful study to determine whether Mormon theology has a place within this framework? If not, then why are we so sure that there is no common ground, and that maybe Mormons could legitimately be Trinitarian, consistently with the Mormon canon?

By the same token, what's to say that Joseph Smiths' understanding of "spirit matter" is any different from the Biblical "spirit" that every Christian believes in. We know that spirit is not composed of hydrogen and oxygen, etc., So what does adding the word "matter" really mean, other than emphasize the reality and being-ness of spirit? Smith's quip that there is no "immaterial matter" is, after all, a truism. It doesn't say anything about the "matterness" of matter.

Agreed. The whole notions of substance, essence, nature, being, etc are so totally ambiguous as to be virtually meaningless except to those who agree on the definitions.

The way I see it is that the notion of unity in "purpose" does away with that ambiguity- we understand what "purpose" is clearly. We understand what it means for a family to be unified in doing a job or working on a goal. The goal of course is "raising the kids" - us- or bringing to pass the immortality and eternal life of man.

There is of course a scripture which says that "God is love"- and I think the notion of a Social Trinity is perfectly compatible here with LDS theology- three separate persons in a family relationship, the three unified in one name - "God" (like Mudcat's analogy of the three musicians in one group called "Cream") unified in love and purpose.

Now to me that is something that makes sense and I can understand. Speaking of "being" etc- that is so vague as to be meaningless imo.

[Storm Rider]

To me the whole concept of this philosophical construct called "substance or essence" was created for nothing other than to give a sembance of monotheism. The early councils could not rationalize a divine, Son of God, without destroying their perceived command for single God. As a result, they created this construct to work around being a monotheistic, new religion and still have Jesus be divine.

It would be helpful to have the input of a Catholic theologian here to help us understand the Catholic position more fully. The orthodox view focuses on One God in there beings; the LDS view seems to focus on three beings in one God, more properly termed a Godhead. Though the difference, in words, appears subtle the reality of the difference is quite significant.

The LDS understanding of God has always just made more sense to me. The divinity of Jesus Christ is maintained and frankly, I do not get the irrational fear of having three Gods in one Godhead. We never confuse who we pray to, we never mix up their roles, and love and adore them; we follow after them and without them we would not be.

[Cobalt-70]

It would be helpful to have the input of a Catholic theologian here to help us understand the Catholic position more fully. The orthodox view focuses on One God in there beings; the LDS view seems to focus on three beings in one God, more properly termed a Godhead. Though the difference, in words, appears subtle the reality of the difference is quite significant.

I don't think there is anything in the Mormon canon that requires the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to have separate "being" or "ousia." The canon does say that The Father and Son have a body of flesh and bones, and that the Holy Spirit is a spirit. But that says nothing about whether those two distinct bodies and one spirit are homoousious. Rather than the view that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are heteroousious, I think the more consistent Mormon view would be that not only are the Trinity homoousious, but all of humanity are homoousious with them. That's not what other Trinitarians believe, but it might still technically be consistent with the Nicene Creed.

[Storm Rider]

That is the point Cobalt, there is no concept at all of ousia in LDS thought or theology. It is a foreign concept entirely.

The doctrine of having bodies of flesh and bone has little with do with the concept of homoousios, which deals with the substance or being of God the Father and Jesus, which again is not a concept within LDS teaching.

It may be possible to posit that all of God's children are thought to be of one substance with the Father and the Son, but this again would never be terminology used to describe such a situation. More importantly, I do not think you would find those outside the Church accept such a description. It may be that the true concept of substance is beyond the understanding of your position above.

[Loran Blood]

Loran Blood, on 08 February 2012 - 04:04 PM, said:

I will take this to be a true statement, and based upon that, disregard the above text (which I have just said I will accept as "true" but which clearly cannot be the case as the text itself indicates that any "truth" I believe I have found is nothing more than a relative frame of reference, or node of meaning floating in a sea of other text which is inconsistent or irrelevent to the truth, or true meaning, I believe I have found, and continues in infinite regress (or expansion) without reference to a final core of meaning grounded in a shared universe of discourse) and all supporting argument following it as nothing more than a text embedded in a sea of other text that contains no coherent or settled meaning (which is to say, the argument you are trying to make thorugh your own text, is fundamentally, according to your own argument, meaningless).

You are wrong. The lack of absolute, coherent, or settled meaning does not mean meaninglessness, any more than the lack of a stable isotope of Technetium means that Technetium doesn't exist. You can't validate atheism by proving that God changes or is inconsistent.

This was your argument:

You cannot take a first step to find out what things really mean, and then merely deal with the underlying meanings. All meanings are themselves text, and must be defined by further text. The moment you think you have reached the meaning, you find that all you have actually reached is a bunch of text that differs in meaning from what the text supposedly signifies. You can't escape text in general. So why do you think that text about the nature of God is any exception? There is always différance--meaning that there will always be a separation in meaning and time between the subject and the object, or between the sign and the signified.

The clear implication here, that settled, unambiguous meaning is impossible and that,as ever more text is encountered, meaning becomes progressivly more difficult to pin down, appears to have very little distinction from the concept of meaninglessness. If one can never settle on the meaning of language as used in a statement and/or argument, then one cannot settle on the meaning of either the terms used in the argument (or explanation) and therefore, within the argument itself. Of course, according to your own philosophical position, the term "meaningless," as I'm using it here, is a text that, the moment I think I understand how I am using it, I find that all I have actually done is employ a piece of text that differs in meaning, based upon its presense within a field of other text, from all that other text, and hence, from my own intentions in using it. From this, logic (superceding postmodern literary theory) indicates that, as I can never make my meaning clear (so long as I use text as my medium), my statements/arguments (and yours) are essentially meainingless. being essentially inchoerent as meaning. Claiming that there are actually a sea of differing textual meanings in play in any larger text won't help here. So long as it is impossible to to settle and establish meaning in any proposition, series of propositions, or an argument based upon them, meaning is effectively precluded from human discourse, and hence, any meaningful transfer and interplay of information between minds.

Let's take the above paragraph as an example, but alter a few terms to narrow its applicability:

"You cannot take a first step to find out what the text Cobalt has written really means, and then merely deal with the underlying meanings. All Cobalt's arguments are themselves text, and must be defined by further text. The moment you think you have reached the meaning of Cobalt's arguments, you find that all you have actually reached is a bunch of Cobalt's text that differs in meaning from what the Cobal's arguments are supposedly trying to establish."

What I would have to tentatively derive from this is that your arguemnts are worthless as means of transferring information from one mind to another, establishing the truth, plausibility, or probability of any set of claims, and as a means of gaining knowedge of any kind. The only possibility you leave open is the claim that the "meaning" or the truth" of a text is purly the extension of one's own subjective mental state onto the text (in whatever form this may take) and has nothing to do with what the author intended or what the terms and logical skeleton of any arguments (conclusions claimed to follow from premises) imply.

Where your logic fails you is the leap from the second to third paragraph. The existence of différance does not imply the impossibility of worthwhile arguments or of gaining knowledge. Exactly the opposite is true. Différence is part of the mechanism of how arguments gain meaning, and how people gain knowledge.

Nice dodge, but it wont plug the dike. As my counterexample above was intended to demonstrate, according to your own argument, your own argument itself, and the propositions you make within it, including critiques of my arguments, have no settled, clear, definitive, stable meaning, and hence, cannot be used as a criticism of the arguments of others. This is how postmodernism's own epistemological relativism turns upon itself and renders it moot as a philosophcal method. Its a grand, gnostic theoretical template that claims the power to critically analyze all "text" save its own. When its very methods and premises are turned upon itself, we find that postmodern literary theory itself evaporates under the scrutiny of its own philosophcal assumptions.

You cleanly avoided the clear implications of my paraphrasing and slight rewording of your paragraph. Let's look at it again:

You cannot take a first step to find out what the text Cobalt has written really means, and then merely deal with the underlying meanings. All Cobalt's arguments are themselves text, and must be defined by further text. The moment you think you have reached the meaning of Cobalt's arguments, you find that all you have actually reached is a bunch of Cobalt's text that differs in meaning from what the Cobal's arguments are supposedly trying to establish.

Let's clarify: what this can only be saying (if you are really trying to be clear in your arguments at all and are not simply deploying postmodern theoretical concepts as a mere exercise in defending theoretical orthodoxy) is that all of the arguments you have made thus far, and all of the statements you have made on any subject or point made within this thread, are not really arguments and statements at all having the property of meaning (and logical connections between meaningful statements) at all, but only "text" which makes the determination of the meaning of your own arguments impossible as contrasted with the text surrounding it and used as elements to compose it. "all you have actually reached," when seeking the meaning of your arguments against me here, according you your own view, "is a bunch of Cobalt's text that differs in meaning from what the Cobal's arguments are supposedly trying to establish."

In other words, what you are trying to establish here, that "The moment you think you have reached the meaning, you find that all you have actually reached is a bunch of text that differs in meaning from what the text supposedly signifies," when critiqued upon these these very assumptions, must mean that "The moment you think you have reached the meaning of what Cobalt has just said about reaching the meaning of any argument, you find that all you have actually reached is a bunch of text about reaching the meaning of arguments that differs in meaning from what Cobalt's arguement about reaching the meaning of any text supposedly signifies."

And the vast chomping maw of postmodern thinking continues to devour its own children (and everthing else around it, if allowed to do so).

I'm not denying that there is a reality of God "out there." I'm just saying that he is hidden behind, and different from, the text (in the broadest sense of that word) that represents him. Even if you could see him, he is different from, and separated in time from, the images dancing on your retina, and from the processing equipment in your brain that seeks to make sense of those retinal images.

Though how this is meaningful or relevent to a discussion of him, in a gospel sense, what its implications are and why they are important, is hardly obvious (espeically by your own philosohcal doctrines). That God isn't the text that describes his is hardly a stroke of philosophcal brilliance, and that language only imperfectly describes and elucidates is also hardly a lost point among many in the past.

Edited February 9, 2012 by Loran Blood

[mfbukowski]

The clear implication here, that settled, unambiguous meaning is impossible and that,as ever more text is encountered, meaning becomes progressivly more difficult to pin down, appears to have very little distinction from the concept of meaninglessness. If one can never settle on the meaning of language as used in a statement and/or argument, then one cannot settle on the meaning of either the terms used in the argument (or explanation) and therefore, within the argument itself. Of course, according to your own philosophical position, the term "meaningless," as I'm using it here, is a text that, the moment I think I understand how I am using it, I find that all I have actually done is employ a piece of text that differs in meaning, based upon its presense within a field of other text, from all that other text, and hence, from my own intentions in using it. From this, logic (superceding postmodern literary theory) indicates that, as I can never make my meaning clear (so long as I use text as my medium), my statements/arguments (and yours) are essentially meainingless. being essentially inchoerent as meaning. Claiming that there are actually a sea of differing textual meanings in play in any larger text won't help here. So long as it is impossible to to settle and establish meaning in any proposition, series of propositions, or an argument based upon them, meaning is effectively precluded from human discourse, and hence, any meaningful transfer and interplay of information between minds.

Na, just on your lack of understanding of the philosophy of language, which, allow me to point out, you are now discussing.

Golly, how did that happen?

I thought we we going to get "back to the Trinity"? Could it be that I was right all along?

Edited February 9, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Cobalt-70]

That is the point Cobalt, there is no concept at all of ousia in LDS thought or theology. It is a foreign concept entirely.

The doctrine of having bodies of flesh and bone has little with do with the concept of homoousios, which deals with the substance or being of God the Father and Jesus, which again is not a concept within LDS teaching.

It may be possible to posit that all of God's children are thought to be of one substance with the Father and the Son, but this again would never be terminology used to describe such a situation. More importantly, I do not think you would find those outside the Church accept such a description. It may be that the true concept of substance is beyond the understanding of your position above.

There is automatically a conception of ousia in all Western cultures (including Mormonism) who are influenced by Plato and Aristotle. In English-speaking cultures, the term influences the way we think, because it its metaphysics and mythology is transmitted via words like "substance" and "being." Mormons share their conception of "substance" and "being" with every one else who is under the historical influence of Plato.

In Mormonism, the idea of ousia is reflected in its most literal and original sense within descriptions of people having their "substance in common." For example, 4 Nephi 1:25, which describes the end of the era of communism after the appearance of Jesus. Thus, the post-Jesus people described in the Book of Mormon were, quite literally, homoousious because their "substance" was in common. This is the literal sense of the word, even before Plato got his hands on it.

Typically, though, the term ousia has a stronger meaning influenced by Plato, which is "being." Being is no more a foreign concept to a Mormon than is substance. Mosiah 4:19 uses both senses of ousia, asking, "Do we not all depend upon the same Being, even God, for all the substance which we have....?" This does not quite say that we are homoousious with God, but it at least says that our substance depends on God's substance, and I also think it means that our "being" is dependent upon God as a Being.

But the place where I think that Joseph Smith does actually make humanity homoousious with God is in D&C 93. Smith said, "I [Jesus] am the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world; And that I am the Father, and the Father in me, and the Father and I are one....I was in the beginning with the Father, and am the Firstborn.... Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be." So the substance or essence of humanity, and of God, appears to be intelligence (the light of truth), and we share that intelligence with Jesus and God because Jesus is the light of truth within us. Therefore, it appears Smith was saying that those who receive the light of Jesus are homoousious with the Father and the Son.

[Cobalt-70]

The clear implication here, that settled, unambiguous meaning is impossible and that,as ever more text is encountered, meaning becomes progressivly more difficult to pin down, appears to have very little distinction from the concept of meaninglessness. If one can never settle on the meaning of language as used in a statement and/or argument, then one cannot settle on the meaning of either the terms used in the argument (or explanation) and therefore, within the argument itself. Of course, according to your own philosophical position, the term "meaningless," as I'm using it here, is a text that, the moment I think I understand how I am using it, I find that all I have actually done is employ a piece of text that differs in meaning, based upon its presense within a field of other text, from all that other text, and hence, from my own intentions in using it. From this, logic (superceding postmodern literary theory) indicates that, as I can never make my meaning clear (so long as I use text as my medium), my statements/arguments (and yours) are essentially meainingless. being essentially inchoerent as meaning. Claiming that there are actually a sea of differing textual meanings in play in any larger text won't help here. So long as it is impossible to to settle and establish meaning in any proposition, series of propositions, or an argument based upon them, meaning is effectively precluded from human discourse, and hence, any meaningful transfer and interplay of information between minds.

No, your logic only confirms what I'm saying. I'm saying that signs are deferred from and differ from what they signify. You are saying that if what I said is true, then différance exists between the signs and signifiers invoked by my statement that "signs are deferred from and differ from what they signify." And indeed, I agree with you that such différance exists in my statement. You obviously understood my statement, therefore it is not meaningless. Thank you for proving my point.

Edited February 9, 2012 by Cobalt-70

[mfbukowski]

There is automatically a conception of ousia in all Western cultures (including Mormonism) who are influenced by Plato and Aristotle. In English-speaking cultures, the term influences the way we think, because it its metaphysics and mythology is transmitted via words like "substance" and "being." Mormons share their conception of "substance" and "being" with every one else who is under the historical influence of Plato.

In Mormonism, the idea of ousia is reflected in its most literal and original sense within descriptions of people having their "substance in common." For example, 4 Nephi 1:25, which describes the end of the era of communism after the appearance of Jesus. Thus, the post-Jesus people described in the Book of Mormon were, quite literally, homoousious because their "substance" was in common. This is the literal sense of the word, even before Plato got his hands on it.

Typically, though, the term ousia has a stronger meaning influenced by Plato, which is "being." Being is no more a foreign concept to a Mormon than is substance. Mosiah 4:19 uses both senses of ousia, asking, "Do we not all depend upon the same Being, even God, for all the substance which we have....?" This does not quite say that we are homoousious with God, but it at least says that our substance depends on God's substance, and I also think it means that our "being" is dependent upon God as a Being.

But the place where I think that Joseph Smith does actually make humanity homoousious with God is in D&C 93. Smith said, "I [Jesus] am the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world; And that I am the Father, and the Father in me, and the Father and I are one....I was in the beginning with the Father, and am the Firstborn.... Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be." So the substance or essence of humanity, and of God, appears to be intelligence (the light of truth), and we share that intelligence with Jesus and God because Jesus is the light of truth within us. Therefore, it appears Smith was saying that those who receive the light of Jesus are homoousious with the Father and the Son.

One must always look at meanings within contexts. I think that is precisely what you are NOT doing here. "Substance" in the middle ages was the underlying "stuff" of the universe which was distinguished from "accidents", or in other words, appearances.

So for an alchemist for example, lead and gold had the same underlying "substance" of metal, so all one had to do to change lead into gold is change it's "accidents" or appearances.

That of course is impossible. Conversely, to change water and wine into flesh and blood, one had to alter their "substance" or "trans-substan-tiate" them and their appearances into those of flesh and blood.

No problem. A little "hocus-pocus" and it's done. ( a corruption of "Hoc est enim corpus meam"- the Latin words used to consecrate the host)

The light of Christ is in no way a "substance" in this sense whatsoever.

http://en.wikipedia....nsubstantiation

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

Edited February 9, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Cobalt-70]

One must always look at meanings within contexts. I think that is precisely what you are NOT doing here. "Substance" in the middle ages was the underlying "stuff" of the universe which was distinguished from "accidents", or in other words, appearances.

So for an alchemist for example, lead and gold had the same underlying "substance" of metal, so all one had to do to change lead into gold is change it's "accidents" or appearances.

That of course is impossible. Conversely, to change water and wine into flesh and blood, one had to alter their "substance" or "trans-substan-tiate" them and their appearances into those of flesh and blood.

No problem. A little "hocus-pocus" and it's done. ( a corruption of "Hoc est enim corpus meam"- the Latin words used to consecrate the host)

The light of Christ is in no way a "substance" in this sense whatsoever.

Well, I was mainly looking at ousia from the Plato begets western metaphysics begets Joseph Smith angle--which kind of skips over the middle ages. It's been suggested (by John Brooke, I think) that Joseph Smith was influenced by alchemy, but I really doubt that the references to "substance" in the Book of Mormon, or the metaphysics of D&C 93 have a direct connection to ousia through alchemy. (Maybe Brooke thinks otherwise--I'll have to look at his book.) Thus, I would not be surprised at all if D&C 93 had no influence from alchemy.

Edited February 10, 2012 by Cobalt-70

[mfbukowski]

Well, I was mainly looking at ousia from the Plato begets western metaphysics begets Joseph Smith angle--which kind of skips over the middle ages.

Remember the Council of Constantinople in 381 "confirmed" and finished up the Nicene Creed.

Its first measure was to confirm St. Gregory Nazianzen as Bishop of Constantinople. The Acts of the council have almost entirely disappeared, and its proceedings are known chiefly through the accounts of the ecclesiastical historians Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret. There is good reason to believe that it drew up a formal treatise (tomos) on the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, also against Apollinarianism; this important document has been lost, with the exception of the first canon of the council and its famous creed (Nicæano-Constantinopolitanum). The latter is traditionally held to be an enlargement of the Nicene Creed, with emphasis on the Divinity of the Holy Spirit.

http://www.newadvent...then/04308a.htm

I am not crazy about wikipedia, but for general information I think it is a pretty easy reference.

For a basic generalization, the medieval period was from roughly 400–1400. Although, this is hotly contested by scholars.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Middle_Ages

Since the council was in 381, I would say that for our purposes that is "roughly 400"

So you can see that indeed it is important to see what is meant by "substance" in the middle ages.

Here is an excerpt from the Catholic Encyclopedia on "Substance"

The fundamentals of substance

Substance being a genus supremum, cannot strictly be defined by an analysis into genus and specific difference; yet a survey of the universe at large will enable us to form without difficulty an accurate idea of substance. Nothing is more evident than that things change. It is impossible for anything to be twice in absolutely the same state; on the other hand all the changes are not equally profound. Some appear to be purely external: a piece of wood may be hot or cold, lying flat or upright, yet it is still wood; but if it be completely burnt so as to be transformed into ashes and gases, it is no longer wood; the specific, radical characteristics by which we describe wood have totally disappeared. Thus there are two kinds of changes: one affects the radical characteristics of things, and consequently determines the existence or non-existence of these things; the other in no way destroys these characteristics, and so, while modifying the thing, does not affect it fundamentally. It is necessary, therefore, to recognize in each thing certain secondary realities (see ACCIDENT) and also a permanent fundamentum which continues to exist notwithstanding the superficial changes, which serves as a basis or support for the secondary realities — what, in a word, we term the substance. Its fundamental characteristic is to be in itself and by itself, and not in another subject as accidents are.

The Scholastics, who accepted Aristotle's definition, also distinguished primary substance (substantia prima) from secondary substance (substantia secunda): the former is the individual thing — substance properly so called; the latter designates the universal essence or nature as contained in genus and species. And, again, substance is either complete, e.g. man, or incomplete, e.g. the soul; which, though possessing existence in itself, is united with the body to form the specifically complete human being. The principal division; however, is that between material substance (all corporeal things) and spiritual substance, i.e. the soul and the angelic spirits. The latter are often called substantiœ separatœ, to signify that they are separate from matter, i.e. neither actually conjoined with a material organism nor requiring such union as the natural complement of their being (St. Thomas, "Contra Gentes", II, 91 sqq.). St. Thomas further teaches that the name substance cannot properly be applied to God, not only because He is not the subject of any accidents, but also because in Him essence and existence are identical, and consequently He is not included in any genus whatever. For the same reason, it is impossible that God should be the formal being of all things (esse formale omnium), or, in other words, that one and the same existence should be common to Him and them (op. cit., I, 25, 26).

http://www.newadvent...then/14322c.htm

This is, frankly, pretty unintelligible to modern ears, in my opinion, and perhaps hopeless to disagree with, but nevertheless it is pretty clear that it is quite different than the Mormon idea of the "Light of Christ".

Furthermore I find it interesting that this source says that "substance cannot be properly applied to God" because I thought that "substance" was an acceptable translation of "ousia", but - don't ask me because I don't know.

But let me point out that we are definitely talking about language here. Surprise surprise.

Edited February 10, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Cobalt-70]

http://www.newadvent...then/14322c.htm

This is, frankly, pretty unintelligible to modern ears, in my opinion, and perhaps hopeless to disagree with, but nevertheless it is pretty clear that it is quite different than the Mormon idea of the "Light of Christ".

Furthermore I find it interesting that this source says that "substance cannot be properly applied to God" because I thought that "substance" was an acceptable translation of "ousia", but - don't ask me because I don't know.

But let me point out that we are definitely talking about language here. Surprise surprise.

Joseph Smith never went to divinity school, and I think all of this advanced Medieval theological theory would not have made it into the Palmyra lecture circuit. But Platonic thinking did make it into general early American thought to which Smith had access, on a more intuitive and fundamental level, which is the level that I'm talking about. Whenever a Westerner talks about things like being and substance, especially in a religious context, they are worshipping at the feet of Plato. It is a metaphysics of presence, that has become ingrained in the Western subconscious and not even seen or questioned until the 20th century. That Platonic metaphysics could not help but be woven within D&C 93. There is a substance, according to that section, that was in the beginning with God, and in fact is God. Whether you call it intelligence, or light and truth, or the light of Christ, or the glory of God, it is an ousia.

[mfbukowski]

Joseph Smith never went to divinity school, and I think all of this advanced Medieval theological theory would not have made it into the Palmyra lecture circuit. But Platonic thinking did make it into general early American thought to which Smith had access, on a more intuitive and fundamental level, which is the level that I'm talking about. Whenever a Westerner talks about things like being and substance, especially in a religious context, they are worshipping at the feet of Plato. It is a metaphysics of presence, that has become ingrained in the Western subconscious and not even seen or questioned until the 20th century. That Platonic metaphysics could not help but be woven within D&C 93. There is a substance, according to that section, that was in the beginning with God, and in fact is God. Whether you call it intelligence, or light and truth, or the light of Christ, or the glory of God, it is an ousia.

Well on this point I think you are completely right. On the other hand, I think that what Mormonism is missing is precisely some kind of philosophical base for those who need such things and I think the whole idea of the "Restoration" was ultimately meant to be a whole reconstitution of western civilization, doing for Mormonism what Platonism did for the early church, for better or worse.

We who really believe in the restoration, I think, see it for the revolution it is philosophically and culturally and in every aspect of life. It is hard to see that now in the early years of the restoration with all the opposition we have received for the last 150 years, but let's remember where the early church was in the year 150 and what it became in a few hundred years thereafter. We are only just beginning to be noticed by the world much less understood.

And as far as the ideas of "the philosophies of men mingled with scripture", we have been beyond that from day 1 of the church. Joseph's "philosophy" if you want to think of it that way- even if not Joseph's entirely- was and is revolutionary. The notion that there God is a glorified human being just happens to fit perfectly with the philosophy of our day and I think the associations between Joseph's revelations and the philosophies of our times is totally unavoidable, and an my opinion, guided by God.

I think that God not only willed the restoration to happen in this country with its freedom of religion, but also picked the time when the cultural millieu would be appropriate so that the church could indeed roll forth and sweep the earth.

We have a long long long way to go, but I think we are on the right side. We just have to make our true theology communicate better- I think we need to do a better job at doing that. The train can yet be derailed, but I think we have a good chance that it will not be.

[mfbukowski]

Incidentally, I think the "force" or whatever you want to call it is consciousness. There are some field theories of consciousness now which I think fit well with the idea of "more refined matter" and the "Light of Christ" as being candidates for what may grow into a nearly scientific definition of how three persons can be in "one field" since they are operating with one conscious purpose. There's a philosopher named Teed Rockwell who is working on exactly that sort of thing- and also working with scientists who research the nature oc consciousness. He is a truly amazing guy. He sees the "self" as a field which interpenetrates and blends with other fields and objects through conscious intention. Pretty interesting stuff with pretty interesting implications for LDS I think.

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=10688&ttype=2

There is also a guy most scientists see as a wacko- but I think he might be onto something- named Rupert Sheldrake. Interesting ideas!

http://www.sheldrake.org/homepage.html

Another source for this kind of thing are the ideas of Whitehead and Process Theology

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-theism/

Edited February 10, 2012 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

I also find it interesting that most of that article on substance in the Catholic Encyclopedia is devoted to how all of modern philosophy is "wrong" about "substance" as understood by Catholicism.

Holding that view doesn't seem to be working too well for them.

Edited February 10, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Cobalt-70]

And as far as the ideas of "the philosophies of men mingled with scripture", we have been beyond that from day 1 of the church. Joseph's "philosophy" if you want to think of it that way- even if not Joseph's entirely- was and is revolutionary. The notion that there God is a glorified human being just happens to fit perfectly with the philosophy of our day and I think the associations between Joseph's revelations and the philosophies of our times is totally unavoidable, and an my opinion, guided by God.

I agree that Smith's theology was revolutionary. However, I don't think that he was a revolutionary philosopher. He was as much a Westerner as anyone else, if not more so. He was a product of the Enlightenment, and so was his philosophy. What he did, perhaps, was to infuse ideas of the Enlightenment (e.g., humanism, materialism, and liberalism) into Christian theology. That infusion is what was revolutionary.

[mfbukowski]

I agree that Smith's theology was revolutionary. However, I don't think that he was a revolutionary philosopher. He was as much a Westerner as anyone else, if not more so. He was a product of the Enlightenment, and so was his philosophy. What he did, perhaps, was to infuse ideas of the Enlightenment (e.g., humanism, materialism, and liberalism) into Christian theology. That infusion is what was revolutionary.

Get your story straight. It sounds like you are contradicting yourself.

[Cobalt-70]

Get your story straight. It sounds like you are contradicting yourself.

How so?

[Loran Blood]

Na, just on your lack of understanding of the philosophy of language, which, allow me to point out, you are now discussing.

Golly, how did that happen?

It appears more likely, Cobalt, that what you call "philosohpy of language" is really little more than a sophisticated word game who's primary purpose is to defend itself from philosphical criticism in the way all postmodern concepts exempt themselves from philosophical scrutiny, which is to claim an overarching, all-ecompassing gnostic-like grand theoretical template for the understaning of all use of language, and hence in privileging itself as a grand narrative of the nature of human discourse which stands above all critique itself and passes philosophical judgement upon all attempts to look at its own internal coherence and logical cogency as a theory.

Any philosophy of language, must be, itself, deeply embedded in and bound and conditioned by the very same contraints, limits, and dynamics of language that it seeks to understand and critique. Any philosophy of language, in other words, must itself be a manifestation and product of the very language of which its own concepts and arguments are composed. It must be itself, at its core, a phenomena of language and the nature of language and as deeply conditioned by the essential elements and structure of language as any other form of discourse (text).

Once we begin to examine postmodern linguistic philosophy (which is really, as you've made more than clear here, is functioning much more as a grand ideological narrative than a true philosophy of language) itself according to its own principles (upon traditional principles of critical philosophcal analysis), you wish to take your ball and go home, and assert that those who do not accept your claims just don't understand the sophisticaed acana of "linguistic philosophy." The gnostic secrets remain beyond the ken of the uninitiated.

I do enjoy playing this game for awhile, as its a nice challenge, at least until the postmodernist inevetabley throws up his hands and walks away, shaking his head at the unsophisitaced philistine who dares hold postmodern literary theory and philosohpy of language to account to the laws of language and to the demands of philosophcal rigor that ask any such philosohphy to acccunt for itself and its claims without claiming victory by default by proposing immunity from critique from the distance of its own lofty, gnostic heights.

Your problem is that its fairly easy to show that the core claims and arguments you are using here, are, when turned upon themselves and used as counter-examples and as tools to critique your own theory, are logically self negating. Your own theory has a very difficult time standing up to inspection under its own theoretical assumptions.

Edited February 12, 2012 by Loran Blood

[mfbukowski]

It appears more likely, Cobalt, that what you call "philosohpy of language" is really little more than a sophisticated word game who's primary purpose is to defend itself from philosphical criticism in the way all postmodern concepts exempt themselves from philosophical scrutiny, which is to claim an overarching, all-ecompassing gnostic-like grand theoretical template for the understaning of all use of language, and hence in privileging itself as a grand narrative of the nature of human discourse which stands above all critique itself and passes philosophical judgement upon all attempts to look at its own internal coherence and logical cogency as a theory.

Any philosophy of language, must be, itself, deeply embedded in and bound and conditioned by the very same contraints, limits, and dynamics of language that it seeks to understand and critique. Any philosophy of language, in other words, must itself be a manifestation and product of the very language of which its own concepts and arguments are composed. It must be itself, at its core, a phenomena of language and the nature of language and as deeply conditioned by the essential elements and structure of language as any other form of discourse (text).

Once we begin to examine postmodern linguistic philosophy (which is really, as you've made more than clear here, is functioning much more as a grand ideological narrative than a true philosophy of language) itself according to its own principles (upon traditional principles of critical philosophcal analysis), you wish to take your ball and go home, and assert that those who do not accept your claims just don't understand the sophisticaed acana of "linguistic philosophy." The gnostic secrets remain beyond the ken of the uninitiated.

I do enjoy playing this game for awhile, as its a nice challenge, at least until the postmodernist inevetabley throws up his hands and walks away, shaking his head at the unsophisitaced philistine who dares hold postmodern literary theory and philosohpy of language to account to the laws of language and to the demands of philosophcal rigor that ask any such philosohphy to acccunt for itself and its claims without claiming victory by default by proposing immunity from critique from the distance of its own lofty, gnostic heights.

Your problem is that its fairly easy to show that the core claims and arguments you are using here, are, when turned upon themselves and used as counter-examples and as tools to critique your own theory, are logically self negating. Your own theory has a very difficult time standing up to inspection under its own theoretical assumptions.

Uh huh.

Your brilliant attack on Wittgenstein has totally revolutionized philosophy in a single post. Will someone please notify all the journals they can stop publishing since Loran Blood has solved all the problems of the philosophy of language?

And incidentally, I am not "Cobalt".

Edited February 13, 2012 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

How so?

I was wondering if it was valid to make a distinction between Josephs "philosophy" and "theology".

I agree that Smith's theology was revolutionary. However, I don't think that he was a revolutionary philosopher. He was as much a Westerner as anyone else, if not more so. He was a product of the Enlightenment, and so was his philosophy. What he did, perhaps, was to infuse ideas of the Enlightenment (e.g., humanism, materialism, and liberalism) into Christian theology. That infusion is what was revolutionary.

On one hand his ideas are characterized as revolutionary, and on the other hand they are not. It just seemed a bit muddled.

Edited February 13, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Cobalt-70]

I was wondering if it was valid to make a distinction between Josephs "philosophy" and "theology".

On one hand his ideas are characterized as revolutionary, and on the other hand they are not. It just seemed a bit muddled.

Smith was not a philosopher, and as far as I know he wasn't familiar with the philosophical thinking of his day (Enlightenment philosophy). But he was strongly influence by them culturally, as were all early Americans. He didn't go to theological seminary, either, but he had a keen "street sense" about the major American theological disputes of his day, which he soon transcended with what I think was a revolutionary theology.