Trinitarian Or Modal: Dancing On Pinheads?

[Loran Blood]

I'd like to invite Mr. Bowman for a thorough discussion regarding the issue of modalism as over against Trinitarianism that was apparantly taking another thread off the beaten path, but which it would be interesting for him to respond to in a thread dedicated to the fleshing out of the problems involed in the traditional Christian/evengelical Prestestant treatment of the subject. To begin, I'll cut and past the initial discussion as an intro and let the discussion progress from there, if Rob is willing.

Wade began:

I believe the two terms, in this case, may reasonably viewed by some as synonymous.

Exactly. Since traditional Christians cannot explain what God is, specific terms such as "mode," "aspect," or "person" are not really descriptive of God's nature as much as place holders for the philosophical problems created by concepts like the "Trinity."

Rob:

I take it that you say this after seriously wrestling with the writings of orthodox Christian theologians and philosophers who have discussed this issue. Could you cite a couple of these Trinitarians whose treatments of the issue you have studied and found wanting?

Not off hand, as I've read a great deal from various Christian apologists, mostly EV, over probably a 30 year period, but do not have those references at hand (or even remember most of them in any detail, to be exact). OK? Its "in my head," as are a number of other things.

Rob:

I see an assertion here, not an explanation for why this distinction has no relevant meaning or appreciable difference.

Well, I think this will be made clear as the discussion progresses.

Rob:

A lot of questions, or perhaps the same question asked in several different ways. Are you claiming that Trinitarians have never addressed this question, or are you claiming that their answers are not satisfactory?

They've been addressing the Question since the initial Arian/Athanasium Christological controversies beginning in the Third Century, but the problem here is the question of the provinance of these metaphysical ideas and the philosophical/theological problems they create through their own premises and arguments.

Rob:

Yet the doctrine of the Trinity asserts otherwise. Are you claiming we are contradicting ourselves?

What I'm arguing here is that the metaphysical/ontological implications of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity tell us neither what God is, nor how the core attributes claimed for this being (one in substance yet comprising, in some metaphysical sense, three "persons") are either conceptually coherent or, for the purposes of a main part of my argument, how the difference between being a "mode" or projected extension of the single, unifed essense is meaningfully different from calling these projections "persons" and not "modes." or particular states of being of a single being, expressed, in some way, as differentiated from the unitery essence.

Rob:

How is this conclusion an implication of the doctrine of the Trinity if the doctrine of the Trinity asserts to the contrary that the Son is not the Father, the Father is not the Holy Spirit, and so forth?

I am, precisely, attempting a philosophical critique of precisely that claim. What the doctrine of the Trinity asserts is important, but equally important is what those assertion imply and the logical implications of those assertions to the body of the doctrine itself.

Rob:

Well, Loran, you've asserted strongly that Trinitarianism amounts to modalism and asked how it could be otherwise, but you haven't indicated any awareness of why Trinitarians (and modalists, for that matter) disagree with you. Do you really think the argument between Trinitarians and Oneness Pentecostals, for example, is merely semantics?

No, not merely semantic. However, I do think a real problem exists in the sense that neither modalists or non-modalists can say, with any degree of conceptual clarity, what either of them are really talking about with reference either to what the "persons" or the "modes" of the Trinity actually are.

Rob:

The doctrine of the Trinity differs from modalism in several significant ways.

First, modalism generally denies the preexistence of the Son distinct from the Father. They maintain that the Son came into existence in the Incarnation. Prior to the conception and birth of Jesus, on this view, God was simply God; through the conception and birth of Jesus, God became Father and Son (Father in reference to his deity, Son in reference to his humanity). The Holy Spirit is typically viewed as God in his immanence, contrasting with God in his transcendence (now known as the Father). In contrast to this typical modalist theology, Trinitarianism maintains that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have always existed simultaneously and as distinct from eternity.

I understand this aspect of it, but I don't think this gets us very far exactly for the reason that this is fundamentally metaphysical hairsplitting over attributes and chacteristics that it is not clear are much more than finely honed metaphysical trivialities. If God the Father is God in his transcendence, the Holy Spirit God in his immanence, and the Son God God in human manifestation, it is not clear how this is to be understood as meaningfully different from the idea of God the Father person, God the Son person, and God the Holy Spirit person being all a single, unitary entity while at the same time being three distinct entities presenting themselves as "God" while yet maintaining a single, fused identity (being a single "mode" in other words) of which other disctinct "modes" are extended in different forms for different purposes.

Rob:

Another significant difference is that modalism typically denies the deity of the Son. Again, as stated above, the Son is usually understood in modalism as the humanity or flesh of Jesus Christ, as opposed to the deity of Christ which is identified as the Father. Trinitarianism, on the other hand, regards the Son as God.

But this is peripheral to my main point, which is that the "modes" and the "persons," within both persons cannot be defined in any clear way, and therefore cannot be sufficiently differentiated from each other to make either modalism or non-modal Trinitarianism conceptually meaningful. And both concepts contain overwhelming logical contradictions and conceptual dead ends that themselves are not amenable to clear description of meaning.

Rob:

A third difference is that modalism must either deny relationship between the Father and the Son or it must deny that Jesus really is God after all. That is, if the Father and the Son are two different aspects of Jesus Christ, then it makes no sense for the Son to talk to the Father, to love the Father, to obey the Father, and for the Father to love the Son, talk to the Son, send the Son, and so forth.

But this just kicks the philosophical can down the road a bit. It equally makes no sense for Jesus to talk to, pray to, and obey the Father if Jesus is actually is the Trinity manifested as a specific instance of it. If Jesus is one in ontological substance or essense with the Father and the Holy Ghost; if Jesus is one in the absolute ontological sense the doctrine of the Trinity asserts, then it is the Trinity that is always manifesting itself, at one time as the Father, at another point as the Son, and here and there (or simultaineously) as the Holy Ghost. The Trinity then manifests itself in various ways for different purposes, and this is where modalism simply takes this to a logical conclusion somewhat different from the traditional Trinitarian view. Leaving the question of the Son's divinity or questions of his precise relationship to the Father as to origination aside for the moment, agian, the actual distinction between what a mode might be and what a "person" might be, with respect to ontological unitary essense itself, appears far less that sharp.

Rob:

To get around this, modalists sometimes retreat into the idea that Jesus is not himself God but is a man in whom God dwelled.

But standard Trinitarianism claims that Jesus is a man in whom one of the "persons" of the Trinity dwells. And as God is "one" in some absulute metaphysical sense, it is claiming that the Trinity dwells in its fullness in the man Jesus, which mans that the other "persons" of the unified Trinitarian being must also, in some sense, be present in the man Jesus, as the man Jesus must in some ontological sense be simultaneously present in the Father and in the Holy Ghost.

Rob:

These differences don't exhaust the issue, but they should be enough to show that the differences are not merely semantic.

No, they're not merely semantic, but the semantics of the question do appear to me to paper over a series of deep conceptual and logical problems created by the very doctrine itself, problems that are clearly and succinctly resolved by the First Vision.

Rob

In the rest of your post, you in effect argue that none of the differences between modalism and trinitarianism that I mentioned are relevant to your concern. Well, perhaps your concern is not ours.

My concern is, if I may express it yet again in another way, that the difference between being a "mode" within a single ontologically unifed entity and being a "person" within a single ontologically unified entity, is, for all intents, both meaningless and trivial. Meaningless because the terms and concepts are not defined and, given the nature of the conceptual catagories involved, cannot be defined, and trivial because neither the modal or non-modal perspective makes the slightest difference to the core Christian messege, from a traditional Christian standpoint. I do not mean the questions of whether Christ always existed or came, in some way, from the Father, whether he is subordinate to or equal with the Father, or as to the relative strength of his divinity, but only the ontological question of what a "mode" is relative to the singular entity (the "Trinity") vs. what a "person" is relative to that wholistic entity.

Rob:

You continue to make the same assertion over and over that you don't find the trinitarian distinctions coherent or meaningfully different from modalist distinctions. Yet you have not explained what is incoherent about them or why it is not meaningfully different to say that the three persons stand in eternal dynamic relationships with one another rather than that they are three different temporal modes of manifestation.

I've now spent a great deal of time and bandwidth doing exactly this. If you do not wish to engage the points and concerns I'm rasing in an intellectually coherent, point by point way, that is your priveledge, but the impression at this point is that you are not engaging them because you are at a loss as to the specific arguments you would need to deploy.

Rob:

You also continue to confuse trinitarianism with modalism, as when you complain, "It equally makes no sense for Jesus to talk to, pray to, and obey the Father if Jesus is actually is the Trinity manifested as a specific instance of it." Indeed, but this isn't what the doctrine of the Trinity says. Jesus is not the Trinity. If you haven't gotten this much clear, then you need to do more serious reading on the subject than you have up to now.

OK, here's the problem Rob: I'm not confusing Trinitarianism with modalism. Trinitarianism and modalism are confused with respect to and in contrast with each other. That's the point. In other words, plowing through this problem by restating, dogmatically, that Trinitarianism is not modalism isn't going to cut the proverbial mustard, because the conceptual and logical implications of the assertions made in both views, and in your own continually nebulous explication of their core propositions, pose the very problems I'm trying to point out.

Instead of avoding the questions raised here, by repeating over and over again, "Trinitarianism is not modalism etc., etc.," grasp the horns of the dilemmas here. How are these concepts really different and why is it important?

This is where it left off, and I'd invite Rob to attempt a serious critical engagement with the points I've articulated above, in response to his criticisms.

Edited February 7, 2012 by Loran Blood

[Cobalt-70]

Exactly. Since traditional Christians cannot explain what God is, specific terms such as "mode," "aspect," or "person" are not really descriptive of God's nature as much as place holders for the philosophical problems created by concepts like the "Trinity."

...

What I'm arguing here is that the metaphysical/ontological implications of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity tell us neither what God is, nor how the core attributes claimed for this being (one in substance yet comprising, in some metaphysical sense, three "persons") are either conceptually coherent or, for the purposes of a main part of my argument, how the difference between being a "mode" or projected extension of the single, unifed essense is meaningfully different from calling these projections "persons" and not "modes." or particular states of being of a single being, expressed, in some way, as differentiated from the unitery essence.

...

I understand this aspect of it, but I don't think this gets us very far exactly for the reason that this is fundamentally metaphysical hairsplitting over attributes and chacteristics that it is not clear are much more than finely honed metaphysical trivialities. If God the Father is God in his transcendence, the Holy Spirit God in his immanence, and the Son God God in human manifestation, it is not clear how this is to be understood as meaningfully different from the idea of God the Father person, God the Son person, and God the Holy Spirit person being all a single, unitary entity while at the same time being three distinct entities presenting themselves as "God" while yet maintaining a single, fused identity (being a single "mode" in other words) of which other disctinct "modes" are extended in different forms for different purposes.

...

But this is peripheral to my main point, which is that the "modes" and the "persons," within both persons cannot be defined in any clear way, and therefore cannot be sufficiently differentiated from each other to make either modalism or non-modal Trinitarianism conceptually meaningful. And both concepts contain overwhelming logical contradictions and conceptual dead ends that themselves are not amenable to clear description of meaning.

I don't think you can say that the Nicene Trinity, or the Modal Trinity, are defined any less distinctly than nebulous Mormon concepts like "priesthood" or "intelligence." There have been nearly two thousand years of defining, analogizing, and explaining, so that the Trinity concept is defined as well as any other. You can't expect, however, that the idea will be clearer and less opaque than the English, Greek, or Latin languages in general. Opacity and paradox is the nature of all language.

[Loran Blood]

I don't think you can say that the Nicene Trinity, or the Modal Trinity, are defined any less distinctly than nebulous Mormon concepts like "priesthood" or "intelligence." There have been nearly two thousand years of defining, analogizing, and explaining, so that the Trinity concept is defined as well as any other. You can't expect, however, that the idea will be clearer and less opaque than the English, Greek, or Latin languages in general. Opacity and paradox is the nature of all language.

I do not agree that the concept of priesthood authority is vaguly defined. "Intelligence" is vague because its ineffible and quite beyond our grasp as a phemonena, in its ultimate sense, but we have been told that it exists and is at the core of individual, personal being.

The problem with the trinitarian/modal flap is not just that the concepts are vague, but that they are unintelligible; they are undefined and therefore their actual relation to each other is unclear, and this is interesting because, at first glance, they are so similar in fundamental form.

Opacity and paradox is the nature of all language.

Been listening to mf I see. This is just throwing up your hands and walking away from the task of thinking hard about the concepts involved and what they imply for the idea of human's relation to God, and perhaps not even really caring about such things in the first place.

Be that as it may.

Edited February 7, 2012 by Loran Blood

[rameumptom]

I have spent decades discussing the concepts of the Trinity and Modalism with lots of traditional Christians, including pastors and priests. It ends up that many attempt to describe the Trinity in modalistic form (egg has three components, but one egg - complete modalism). The concept of Trinity is so "incomprehensible" (as the creed tells us) that it cannot be described in any intelligible way separate from modalism.

That one uses different terminology "personage" vs "person" does not really ontologically describe a difference. We cannot read it and say "one is red and the other is blue." Instead, we are comparing terms that in normal language mean essentially the same thing.

However, I have come to understand somewhat the difference. To see three persons in one car is Modalism. To see one person in three cars at the same time is Trinitarianism. Yet, we still see it all described by most in modalist terms, simply because it is easier to comprehend.

That the Trinitarian and Modal creeds ignore key concepts in the Bible, such as the vast collection of anthropomorphic material regarding God, is something they tend to ignore, neglect, or attempt to explain away. Using one or two verses in the Bible to describe God, while ignoring so much pro-anthropomorphic evidence, is as incomprehensible to me as is the Trinity.

BTW, while some modalists reject Christ's co-eternal nature with God, or of Christ's divinity, not all do. So to attempt to explain the differences between modalism and Trinitarian views in such a way is again to neglect key evidence that does not sufficiently answer the issues at hand. It ends up being like the Great Oz, demanding we focus on the big screen, while ignoring the "small man" behind the curtain.

[Loran Blood]

I have spent decades discussing the concepts of the Trinity and Modalism with lots of traditional Christians, including pastors and priests. It ends up that many attempt to describe the Trinity in modalistic form (egg has three components, but one egg - complete modalism). The concept of Trinity is so "incomprehensible" (as the creed tells us) that it cannot be described in any intelligible way separate from modalism.

This is exaclty right. My first year at college was at a small, and very nice private school (Point Loma College) run by the evangelical Church of the Nazarine (a close relation to the Assembly of God). Once, when askin a professor to describe the Trinity to me, she used the anology of a droplet of water. The water droplet is one, and yet the single droplet can be divided into three water droplets. Each droplet is still composed of the same "substance" as the original single droplet, and yet they are three droplets.

A moment's reflection convinced me that this was actually a very poor anology to the actualy metaphysical claims made by the doctrine of the Trinity (the three water droplets are disctinct and separate from the single droplet and, in actual point of fact, once the three droplets appear, the original single droplet is destoryed, and no longer exists. This is patently not what the doctrine of the Trinity is trying to say).

That one uses different terminology "personage" vs "person" does not really ontologically describe a difference. We cannot read it and say "one is red and the other is blue." Instead, we are comparing terms that in normal language mean essentially the same thing.

Exactly, and I'm not sure if Rob is getting this or not. If I'm Jesus, and I'm a "person" of the Trinity (whatever that actually is), or, if I'm Jesus, and I'm a "mode" (whatever that actally is) of the Trinity, in what ultimate metaphysical sense are these different in a way that makes a difference? No answer from Rob as of yet.

However, I have come to understand somewhat the difference. To see three persons in one car is Modalism. To see one person in three cars at the same time is Trinitarianism. Yet, we still see it all described by most in modalist terms, simply because it is easier to comprehend.

Yes, I see what's being attempted here, but none of it really works. In both cases, the concept of homoousia and its assoicated implications makes a hash out of any such normative four dimensional, logical catagories such as "person" and "car." These still, like the water droplet anology, takes us nowhere near what the doctrine of the Trinity actually implies about the nature of God (one assumes, that Jesus Christ, as he appeared to the apostles after his resurrection and showed them the wounds in his hands and feet, could not, in that "body of flesh and bones as ye see me have," have been both in that room displaying the nail marks and, at the same time, in a car on the San Diego freeway, let alone three of them).

BTW, while some modalists reject Christ's co-eternal nature with God, or of Christ's divinity, not all do. So to attempt to explain the differences between modalism and Trinitarian views in such a way is again to neglect key evidence that does not sufficiently answer the issues at hand. It ends up being like the Great Oz, demanding we focus on the big screen, while ignoring the "small man" behind the curtain.

I think that's true. The ancient, pre-Prosestant Christian world was quite vaired and heterodox, and the farther back one goes, the more interesting it becomes.

Edited February 7, 2012 by Loran Blood

[KevinG]

It is a mystery. Just don't let the Mormons try to explain it!

[Cobalt-70]

...."Intelligence" is vague because its ineffible and quite beyond our grasp as a phemonena, in its ultimate sense, but we have been told that it exists and is at the core of individual, personal being.

The problem with the trinitarian/modal flap is not just that the concepts are vague, but that they are unintelligible; they are undefined and therefore their actual relation to each other is unclear, and this is interesting because, at first glance, they are so similar in fundamental form.

So what then, precisely, is the relationship between "intelligence" and "glory"? What is the relationship between the "light of Christ" and the "light of the sun," and how is Jesus "in the sun" and "in the moon" (D&C 88:7-8 )?

Been listening to mf I see. This is just throwing up your hands and walking away from the task of thinking hard about the concepts involved and what they imply for the idea of human's relation to God, and perhaps not even really caring about such things in the first place.

Who is mf? I'm not advocating giving up critical analysis. Quite the contrary, I think the problem is that the analysis you are pursuing doesn't think hard enough about the inherent opacity and intractability of text, and contains a blind spot for the similar opacity and intractability of Mormon metaphysics.

Edited February 7, 2012 by Cobalt-70

[Cobalt-70]

I have spent decades discussing the concepts of the Trinity and Modalism with lots of traditional Christians, including pastors and priests. It ends up that many attempt to describe the Trinity in modalistic form (egg has three components, but one egg - complete modalism). The concept of Trinity is so "incomprehensible" (as the creed tells us) that it cannot be described in any intelligible way separate from modalism.

That's not true. The trinity is indeed described separately than modalism. Look at any Christian theological text. When they say that the Trinity is "incomprehensible" they do not mean it cannot be described in language. They just mean that the nature of God surpasses human understanding, which is not much different from what Mormons claim.

However, I have come to understand somewhat the difference. To see three persons in one car is Modalism. To see one person in three cars at the same time is Trinitarianism. Yet, we still see it all described by most in modalist terms, simply because it is easier to comprehend.

I would reverse that. Three "persons" is trinitarianism unless it is tritheism. One person in three modes of transportation is modalism.

That the Trinitarian and Modal creeds ignore key concepts in the Bible, such as the vast collection of anthropomorphic material regarding God, is something they tend to ignore, neglect, or attempt to explain away. Using one or two verses in the Bible to describe God, while ignoring so much pro-anthropomorphic evidence, is as incomprehensible to me as is the Trinity.

I agree that Christianity has set aside the original anthropomorphic view of God believed by the early polytheistic Hebrews, of which there are traces in the Bible. And likewise, Mormons typically ignore the modalistic parts of the Book of Mormon, and we've long forgotten about the binitarian parts of the original Doctrine and Covenants.

[mfbukowski]

Been listening to mf I see. This is just throwing up your hands and walking away from the task of thinking hard about the concepts involved and what they imply for the idea of human's relation to God, and perhaps not even really caring about such things in the first place.

Don't drag me into your semantic slugfest, misrepresenting my position, when you obviously have absolutely no clue what I am talking about.

The best thing about Point Loma is the Cabrillo light house and watching whales.

I have been over this with Rob before and he's got nothing but "substance" to offer, - with quotes- which means NO substance without quotes. Oh maybe he will call it "being" or "essence" or "nature" but it really doesn't matter.

Look up "virtus dormitiva", read some Wittgenstein, and call me in the morning.

[mfbukowski]

There is literally nothing to talk about when you talk about the Trinity. Even Catholics will tell you that. They say it's a "mystery" which can't be expressed in language, and we say that such "mystery" is just literally NON-sense, ie it cannot be made sensible, or in other words, it can't be expressed in language.

So in a sense we agree. There is nothing to talk about.

So let them keep their mystery and we will keep what makes sense linguistically.

If you want to argue about what can't be said, be my guests.

Edited February 7, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Loran Blood]

Don't drag me into your semantic slugfest, misrepresenting my position, when you obviously have absolutely no clue what I am talking about.

I prefer to fling you into it, and its not about semantics, but about truth and philosophical seriousness.

Now, no derails...

[wenglund]

One of my favorite trinity/modalistic analogies is: ice, water, steam.

The best thing about Point Loma is the Cabrillo light house and watching whales.

..that and the tidal pools and watching America Cup racing boats sailing out of the harbor. Oh, and there is a nice Suchi restraunt on the way to Shelter Island.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Cobalt-70]

There is literally nothing to talk about when you talk about the Trinity. Even Catholics will tell you that. They say it's a "mystery" which can't be expressed in language, and we say that such "mystery" is just literally NON-sense, ie it cannot be made sensible, or in other words, it can't be expressed in language.

So in a sense we agree. There is nothing to talk about.

So let them keep their mystery and we will keep what makes sense linguistically.

If you want to argue about what can't be said, be my guests.

It can be expressed in language, and is. That's what the creeds do. What they are complaining about is that there is that the Trinity is supposed to transcend all human understanding or expression. Yet how is that different from anything else. All text is a mystery. What makes the Trinity more mysterious than the atom, the number 12, or the human female? Just because the human female is a mystery does not mean that you can't say lots of things about her.

[Cobalt-70]

I prefer to fling you into it, and its not about semantics, but about truth and philosophical seriousness.

See, that's the issue. The Trinity and the Modality are clearly distinct as a matter of semantics. The only thing that is indistinct is the difference between semantics and "philosophical seriousness."

Edited February 8, 2012 by Cobalt-70

[mfbukowski]

I prefer to fling you into it, and its not about semantics, but about truth and philosophical seriousness.

Now, no derails...

Whatever that means. Tell me what truth is then. You don't understand what you term "realitivism"- its not that at all - it's Pragmatism which is a different theory of truth than you understand

[mfbukowski]

One of my favorite trinity/modalistic analogies is: ice, water, steam.

..that and the tidal pools and watching America Cup racing boats sailing out of the harbor. Oh, and there is a nice Suchi restraunt on the way to Shelter Island.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

I am an old SD boy from way back!

I mean we are talking "love-ins" in Presidio Park here, with visitors from the Family Dog.

Good old Chet. He actually had hair longer than mine. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chet_Helms

Edited February 8, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Loran Blood]

See, that's the issue. The Trinity and the Modality are clearly distinct as a matter of semantics. The only thing that is indistinct is the difference between semantics and "philosophical seriousness."

Semantics is the branch of philosophy that studies the meaning of language. Very important and useful in philosophcal analysis, but only to a point. An important aspect (to me at least) of philosophical thought (and debate) is care and precision in language use, and defining terms (this cannot become a fetish, however). Once, or as this is done, the real work begins, and that is what is usually called "critical thinking" (NOT the "critical thinking" one encounters in "critical theory" or in may "multidisciplinary" humanities and social science areas) in which informal and forma logic are used to analyze the arguments of others for their logical consistency/coherence.

Reducing everything to language and semantics tends to remove one of the most salient insigns that one must bring into any serious discssion, and that is that "words mean things." Once meaning is ascertained, we can discuss things like the Trinity, in which meaning is unclear or absent, but then this becomes itself a philosophical problem to be resolved, not a chance to throw up our hands and walk away saying "its all just semantics."

Philosophy (critical reasoning) is only partly concerned with language use. It is just, if not more concerned, with the laws governing language, which are the principles governing the way statements and conclusions from those statements are evidentially (logically) linked. The reason mf (and postmodernists generally) and I don't get along very well is because postmodernism's (whatever that is, as every time you draw a bead on it it changes into someting else - a strategy of intellectual werewolfery that, along with its deep epistemological nihilism, relativism, and fundamental internal incoherence, can make it exremely annoying and trying to critique) fundammental purpose has been to delegitimize, disorient, and deprivilege all the traditional intellectual disciplines of thought that make philosophy, ethics, and religious thought meaningful (as well as science).

Edited February 8, 2012 by Loran Blood

[mfbukowski]

It can be expressed in language, and is. That's what the creeds do. What they are complaining about is that there is that the Trinity is supposed to transcend all human understanding or expression. Yet how is that different from anything else. All text is a mystery. What makes the Trinity more mysterious than the atom, the number 12, or the human female? Just because the human female is a mystery does not mean that you can't say lots of things about her.

OK fair enough. I meant you cannot speak logically about the Trinity. You can write all the poetry you like. And that is a good thing- I have no problem with poetry- except when it masquerades as something that is supposed to make sense and not contradict itself.

[mfbukowski]

One of my favorite trinity/modalistic analogies is: ice, water, steam.

That's a great analogy for modes. Unfortunately you cannot make "persons" into steam and then get them back into human form again. But I must admit there are a few I would like to experiment on to see if it can be done.

[mfbukowski]

Semantics is the branch of philosophy that studies the meaning of language. Very important and useful in philosophcal analysis, but only to a point. An important aspect (to me at least) of philosophical thought (and debate) is care and precision in language use, and defining terms (this cannot become a fetish, however). Once, or as this is done, the real work begins, and that is what is usually called "critical thinking" (NOT the "critical thinking" one encounters in "critical theory" or in may "multidisciplinary" humanities and social science areas) in which informal and forma logic are used to analyze the arguments of others for their logical consistency/coherence.

Reducing everything to language and semantics tends to remove one of the most salient insigns that one must bring into any serious discssion, and that is that "words mean things." Once meaning is ascertained, we can discuss things like the Trinity, in which meaning is unclear or absent, but then this becomes itself a philosophical problem to be resolved, not a chance to throw up our hands and walk away saying "its all just semantics."

Philosophy (critical reasoning) is only partly concerned with language use. It is just, if not more concerned, with the laws governing language, which are the principles governing the way statements and conclusions from those statements are evidentially (logically) linked. The reason mf (and postmodernists generally) and I don't get along very well is because postmodernism's (whatever that is, as every time you draw a bead on it it changes into someting else - a strategy of intellectual werewolfery that, along with its deep epistemological nihilism, relativism, and fundamental internal incoherence, can make it exremely annoying and trying to critique) fundammental purpose has been to delegitimize, disorient, and deprivilege all the traditional intellectual disciplines of thought that make philosophy, ethics, and religious thought meaningful (as well as science).

I am not a postmodernist. I don't even know what that word means. Go over to the trailer park and do a search on my name and the word postmodernism and you will see what I am talking about

I am a Pragmatist and a Wittgensteinin. If you are going to make this a personal thread about me, I appreciate the flattery but trust me, it won't last long especially if you are distorting my positions - which is exactly what you are doing.

If I want THAT, I can get it at the trailer park all day long.

[Mudcat]

Not Rob and can't speak to his particular view, but as a Trinitarian I thought I would play ball. I have always thought the distinction between modalism and the Trinity was fairly simple and I don't understand the confusion on the topic.

The Trinity would assert that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are not each other but are God. i.e. Jack Bruce, Ginger Baker and Eric Clapton are Cream.

Modalism would assert that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are differing states of God. i.e. Steam, water and ice are H₂0.

edit add - In the current acceptance of modal belief, "Oneness" Pentecostals seem to think that Jesus is the Holy Ghost doing something in a different state/manifestation, where Trinitarians would not agree with that.

Edited February 8, 2012 by Mudcat

[mfbukowski]

Contested definitions

The term "Postmodernism" is often used to refer to different, sometimes contradictory concepts. Conventional definitions include:

• Compact Oxford English Dictionary: "a style and concept in the arts characterized by distrust of theories and ideologies and by the drawing of attention to conventions."^[12]
  
• Merriam-Webster: Either "of, relating to, or being an era after a modern one", or "of, relating to, or being any of various movements in reaction to modernism that are typically characterized by a return to traditional materials and forms (as in architecture) or by ironic self-reference and absurdity (as in literature)", or, finally "of, relating to, or being a theory that involves a radical reappraisal of modern assumptions about culture, identity, history, or language".^[13]
  
• American Heritage Dictionary: "Of or relating to art, architecture, or literature that reacts against earlier modernist principles, as by reintroducing traditional or classical elements of style or by carrying modernist styles or practices to extremes: 'It [a roadhouse] is so architecturally interesting ... with its postmodern wooden booths and sculptural clock.'"^[14]
  

While the term "Postmodern" and its derivatives are freely used, with some uses apparently contradicting others, those outside the academic milieu have described it as merely a buzzword that means nothing. **** Hebdige, in his text ‘Hiding in the Light’, writes:

When it becomes possible for a people to describe as ‘postmodern’ the décor of a room, the design of a building, the diegesis of a film, the construction of a record, or a ‘scratch’ video, a television commercial, or an arts documentary, or the ‘intertextual’ relations between them, the layout of a page in a fashion magazine or critical journal, an anti-teleological tendency within epistemology, the attack on the ‘metaphysics of presence’, a general attenuation of feeling, the collective chagrin and morbid projections of a post-War generation of baby boomers confronting disillusioned middle-age, the ‘predicament’ of reflexivity, a group of rhetorical tropes, a proliferation of surfaces, a new phase in

commodity fetishism

, a fascination for images, codes and styles, a process of cultural, political or existential fragmentation and/or crisis, the ‘de-centring’ of the subject, an ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, the replacement of unitary power axes by a plurality of power/discourse formations, the ‘implosion of meaning’, the collapse of cultural hierarchies, the dread engendered by the threat of nuclear self-destruction, the decline of the university, the functioning and effects of the new miniaturised technologies, broad societal and economic shifts into a ‘media’, ‘consumer’ or ‘multinational’ phase, a sense (depending on who you read) of ‘placelessness’ or the abandonment of placelessness (‘critical regionalism’) or (even) a generalised substitution of spatial for temporal coordinates - when it becomes possible to describe all these things as ‘Postmodern’ (or more simply using a current abbreviation as ‘post’ or ‘very post’) then it’s clear we are in the presence of a buzzword.

[15]

British historian Perry Anderson's history of the term and its understanding, 'The Origins of Postmodernity', explains these apparent contradictions, and demonstrates the importance of "Postmodernism" as a category and a phenomenon in the analysis of contemporary culture.^[16]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernism#Contested_definitions

[mfbukowski]

Reducing everything to language and semantics tends to remove one of the most salient insigns that one must bring into any serious discssion, and that is that "words mean things."

Your understanding of the philosophy of language is seriously lacking.

[Loran Blood]

Your understanding of the philosophy of language is seriously lacking.

Postmodernists tend also to be quite intolerant of other philosophers who see through the game and don't genuflect before the totem of "text" and "discourse."

All I can say is, "I dood it."

[mfbukowski]

Not Rob and can't speak to his particular view, but as a Trinitarian I thought I would play ball. I have always thought the distinction between modalism and the Trinity was fairly simple and I don't understand the confusion on the topic.

The Trinity would assert that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are not each other but are God. i.e. Jack Bruce, Ginger Baker and Eric Clapton are Cream.

Now THAT makes sense, but is awfully close to the LDS view.

Great band but I guess we are dating ourselves, aren't we? I actually saw those guys at the Avalon Ballroom- or was it the Fillmore? Can't remember