Not so easy?

[Brant Gardner]

Dan:

Thank you for an example of your methodology. I found it fascinating that you would pick this particular example.

Now, as I said at the end of my 1993 essay:

[alienward]

I will pass on commenting on your characterization of Ostler. I am much more interested in the very interesting assertion that the Book of Mormon's anachronisms are qualitatively different than those in the KJV. Since one of the KJV's anachronisms/mistranslations is "steel," I am hard pressed to see why steel in the KJV is qualitatively different than "steel" in the Book of Mormon. Since the KJV anachronously says "candles" and candles were not in use, I have a hard time seeing the difference between that and the Book of Mormon "sword," which one might argue wasn't in use. However, the KJV accurately indicated an man-made portable light source andd the Book of Mormon accurately indicates a hand-held slashing weapon I am again hard pressed to see why the issue of the relationship of the English word to the object should be that different.

Are you as hard pressed to see why wooden club with embedded rock chips is qualitatively different than steel sword made from melted rock in the BoM?

The word

[Bill Hamblin]

Brant:

It sounds like you are beginning with such a firm dismissal that you are not even considering the data. That is fatal to any proper methodology in history or ethnohistory. Not seeing the difference between methods and issues in the method (such as finding anachronisms) is a warning sign to me.

Vogel is quite up front, even triumphalistic, in declaring that contrary evidence is "meaningless." With such a convenient methodology, is it surprising that only 19th evidence need be considered?

[Bill Hamblin]

The problem of anachronism in translation is much more complicated that Vogel understands. A famous Arab historian wrote a book entitled

[cinepro]

On what basis to you believe that the problem is "vastly different?" We have two texts that claim to be ancient but only exist in a modern language that purports to be a translation. That seems pretty similar to me.

Brant, what would it take for you to believe that the Histoire du Mexique did, in fact, have a French origin? How would you attempt to falsify it? Meaning, what tests would you devise to prove it untrue, instead of trying to prove that it is true?

[T-Shirt]

Cinepro,

I am just curious if you would consider responding to my questions asked a couple pages ago regarding your experiences with the spirit and Elder Dunn.

T-Shirt

[Beowulf]

Mr. Vogel:

Thank you for your amplified explanation of D&C 19. However, it has left me even more dubious about your position than before.

Your position that the reversal of stance by JS on universalism, as evidenced by D&C 19, just shows the extent of his pious fraud is truly alarming.

Since I do not accept the Universalist theory in the first place, such a reference does not bother me overmuch, but it SHOULD bother you a great deal, because it is such a whopping strike against the theory. Your dismissal of it as just evidence of JS' deviousness in the whole matter seems to me to mean that ANY wandering in JS' doctrinal positions can be explained away in the same way.

It becomes quite circular.

Regarding the letter to Nancy Rigdon, it seems to me that you are placing too much emphasis on parenthetical expressions. These are usually an artifact of the person's cultural environment rather than some deep expression of the person's hidden beliefs. (I have a friend who ends every phone conversation with "Rock On". This just shows his age, not his predilections for a certain kind of music.)

Beowulf

[cinepro]

I am just curious if you would consider responding to my questions asked a couple pages ago regarding your experiences with the spirit and Elder Dunn.

There is a distinct chance I was telling a parable to illustrate a point. I'll give you a few days to study it out in your mind and pray about it, and then get back to me on whether you think I was relating an authentic experience or not.

[T-Shirt]

I am just curious if you would consider responding to my questions asked a couple pages ago regarding your experiences with the spirit and Elder Dunn.

There is a distinct chance I was telling a parable to illustrate a point. I'll give you a few days to study it out in your mind and pray about it, and then get back to me on whether you think I was relating an authentic experience or not.

And, what point would that be?

T-Shirt

[cinepro]

[Brant Gardner]

cinepro:

Brant, what would it take for you to believe that the Histoire du Mexique did, in fact, have a French origin? How would you attempt to falsify it? Meaning, what tests would you devise to prove it untrue, instead of trying to prove that it is true?

Why the same ones I would use for the Book of Mormon, of course! <grin>. Apart from the easy flippancy of this answer it is actually fairly correct. You compare a text to the time and place it purports to describe. Only if it cannot be established for that time and place do you spend much time establishing the time period of the translation (unless, of course, that is the question being answered).

[Bill Hamblin]

Mr. Hamblin, it

[cinepro]

Brant said:

You compare a text to the time and place it purports to describe.

What criteria would you use for the comparison? What kind of a "miss" would it take for you to conclude it wasn't an authentic document?

--------------------

Bill, how do you get from "step 3" to "step 4"? Could you insert a step 3.5 that clarifies the point?

You seem to be saying that if someone ever lies, or experiences a delusion, then they cannot be a "prophet". Is that what you meant?

Also, since you are worried about equivocation about the definition of "prophet", can you define how you are using the term?

[kolobian]

I am impressed that such a seemingly innocuous concept as Occam's Razor could generate so much disagreement. I have gone the rounds on issues like this previously, but it is an issue of continuing concern.

Mr. Gardner states:

I find it ironic that Occam's Razor should be invoked against the Book of Mormon. If you do what should be done, which is examine all of the data, then the most parsimonious explanation of the Book of Mormon is that is just what it claims to be. That single explanation makes virtually all data fall simply into line with that one rather simple solution.

I am grateful to and admire all those who have done the work finding evidence for the Book of Mormon, but I still can't swallow this conclusion. What that would mean, if true (and it seems to be stated as though it is not only true, but that it would be perplexing for one not to see the truth of it) is that one would be making an intellectual mistake in not believing the Book of Mormon.

I'm sorry, but I just don't think that can be right. Consider the enormity of the ontological commitment you undertake. It would be an intellectual mistake to not believe that there is a God, people see angels, after we die we still exist in way that is matter but we go somewhere else and then later we become physically alive again, etc etc. Can any amount of evidence make it rationally preferable? I am dubious, at very best. It bothers me that Evangelicals are always saying that scholars have a "secular" bias preventing them from seeing that believing in Christ is more rational. Then they use a few cultural anamolies to try to convince people, intellectually, that it makes senes to believe that two millenia ago, someone died and then three days later, contrary to all available physiological evidence and, moreover, the sum of world history, came alive again. Its a losing batte. They are never going to win that fight, I think.

As it happens I have a close friend who apostatized from Christianity because he believed this sort of "we can prove it" business and ultimately felt betrayed when it wasn't true. Of course no one at FARMS is being duplicitous--don't mistake me for making that insinuation. But though I respect the scholarship, I think this is the one claim that we cannot make.

"Parsimony" is emphatically not just a matter of "how simple does the story sound when we tell it." It involves the number of things that must be posited for the proposed explanation to work. And of course, some things may be more difficult to posit than others. Positing all of the things I say above is extraordinary.

But I am very curious what you mean by the claim above. If it is more rational to believe the Book of Mormon than not to--if it is the most parsimonious explanation of the data--then what is happening? Are historians all going massively wrong by not using it? What about philosophers of ethics or sociologists or business people? As a true believer, I would be delighted if all of these groups read it. But I am in no way prepared to tell them their mistake is an intellectual one, that they are making a simple--even "ironic"--error. Perhaps its pusilanimity, but really, does anyone thinks so?

Here is what I think the problem is: We don't really know how good the tests are. The argument takes the form:

The Book of Mormon says X

Joseph Smith could not have known X

X is true

----

The Book of Mormon is true.

I would feel better about if this were an established methodology--if there were other instances in which this kind of reasoning had been successfully employed. Have other books been authenticated this way? Discredited this way? Unlikely, as to my knowledge their aren't many putative prophets taken seriously be a grou of scholars. In a world of one case, how sure are we? (By the way I have heard the same argument form used for the Qu'ran). Can we really rule things out this way? The metatheoretical problem I think is very large.

I really have no training in this, but I worry. What is the world of possible cases? How many possible claims is the Book of Mormon making? How many possible instances can they be tested against? By way of analogy, a statistics 101 textbook will point out that there really isn't anything significantly strange about happening upon your best friend in Rome on a summer visit. It sure seems improbable when you look at it from the perspective of: there is a huge number places in the world where one could go, and a huge spectrum of dates, etc etc. But maybe the denominator is huge as well, or there may be unseen constraining factors on the other side. When you consider the number of people you know, the number of days you travel, limited time frame of vacations, multiply by the number of years you have been doing this, etc etc. Is it a significant "coincidence"? Its just very hard to tell.

Again, how many claims does the Book of Mormon tacitly forward that are potentially testable. How large is the world of possible comparative samples? If there is a huge number of possiblilties on both sides, how signficant is the discovery of overlap? Remember the Bible Code? Similar idea. I'm not saying the work is not good or that the discoveries are not interesting, but I am saying that when we want to make claims about parsimony, I have not seen the evidence that grounds it in a way that even comes close to suggesting that the world of secular academy should really be using the Book of Mormon or risk error.

My last point, again to first quote Mr. Gardner:

The "parsimony" is only in that the naturalistic solution fits the naturalistic precondition - but then that is also only finding what you are looking for. Again - not a serious method nor a rigorous answer.

But "naturalism" is not a discipline. Is it anything more than the idea that we should be parsimonious about what we posit, to begin with?

thanks,

kolobian

[Beowulf]

Kolobian, you bring up a good point.

Tertullian admitted that Christianity was for "fools" (which he certainly was NOT, himself), and I see what he means. What rational person would believe it? (without faith, I mean)

A famous example of a man who set out to "prove" the BofM and finally grew morose and gave up is Tom Ferguson. He went down to Mesoamerica way back in the early 50s to look for the proof, and thought he would find it in just a year or two of digging around.

(And there's your LGT, operating full-blown a good half-century ago, btw.)

When it didn't happen, as Bill Hamblin has shown how difficult such a task can be, Tom Ferguson gave up. (He is a now a poster boy on the Tanner's web page as the great archeologist who lost his testimony. I have my doubts about that scenario, but he was certainly discouraged.)

Beowulf

On the other hand, as Brant insists, Occam's Razor can certainly be utilized to let the BofM speak for itself, rather than go through convoluted contortions trying to find evidence why it can't (speak for itself, that is).

[Bill Hamblin]

Although Occam's Razor is a useful principle in science and philosophy. I personally do not find it very useful in history. I believe Occam was actually making an argument for belief in God, because belief in a creator God is more parsimonious than belief in existence of the universe without God.

Attempts at using Occam's Razor in history tend to become reductionistic. In history the more complex explanations are generally more accurate. That is to say, there were hundreds of complex interlocking causes for the fall of the Roman Empire (for example) rather than just one or a few. Technically speaking this (complex multiplicity of causes) may not violate Occam's principle of parsimony, but as generally applied in history, it isn't very helpful.

[Dan Vogel]

By the way, Dan, have you read any of my published statements on this matter?

I have seen what

[kolobian]

Although Occam's Razor is a useful principle in science and philosophy. I personally do not find it very useful in history. I believe Occam was actually making an argument for belief in God, because belief in a creator God is more parsimonious than belief in existence of the universe without God.

Attempts at using Occam's Razor in history tend to become reductionistic. In history the more complex explanations are generally more accurate. That is to say, there were hundreds of complex interlocking causes for the fall of the Roman Empire (for example) rather than just one or a few. Technically speaking this (complex multiplicity of causes) may not violate Occam's principle of parsimony, but as generally applied in history, it isn't very helpful.

As I mentioned above, Occam's Razor seems logically innocuous. For two competing arguments, certeris paribus (assuming an equal probability for each premise being true, and assuming validity), there is a higher probability that the argument with fewer premises will be true.

This would seem to apply to any set of arguments. That said, however, I would be unwise not to defer in this matter to those who actually have expertise. I am interested to learn in such areas, though, so thank you. As a footnote, Cederman (2003) does argue that at times, factors other than parsimony may trump in theory construction. I have no qualms with this, I think.

[Brant Gardner]

kolobian:

Have other books been authenticated this way? Discredited this way? Unlikely, as to my knowledge their aren't many putative prophets taken seriously be a grou of scholars.

I have seen this basic question broached several times. The first part appears to want a secular (and accepted) methdology applied to the Book of Mormon as a text. Immediately after that request, however, is a denial that it is even possible because religion is involved. There is absolutely nothing logical that connects those two statements. If the Book of Mormon is historical, then historical methdologies may be applied. If it passes those tests, then it is historical - and I leave it to you to figure out what that means for the religious aspects.

If you are going to judge the text on a purely religious basis then you will either accept it on faith or reject it becuase you don't have faith in it. There is no need to speculate about whether or not other texts have been tested with the same tools.

The answer to the first question is that the disciplines of history and ethnohistory have basic guidelines an criteria that should guide one's research. I am unaware of any toolkit that comes pre-filled with precise tests for a text. Each text presents its own interesting and unique challenges. However, the principles that Bill Hamblin applies to the text are the same as those he uses when he writes secular history. The principle I apply are the same as I have used in writing secular ethnohistory.

It is strange that it is the proponents of the Book of Mormon who are most willing to deal with the text in a non-religious context. Dan Vogel can't believe in its claims of divine origin and therefore can't even examine the text for what it purports to be. You (kolobian) doubt that secular tools can be used because the book is associated with prophets.

Are you really afraid that good scholarship won't support your presuppositions and therefore must hide behind a fear of believing in modern prophets?

[Bill Hamblin]

Vogel

The important question is what JS believed about himself. Did he believe he was a prophet even though he knew the BofM was not historical?

That is not the important question. JS could have believed he was a prophet and be delusional. The important question is whether JS really talked to God, angels, had revelations, received gold plates, etc.

Even if everything I say about JS is true, it still would not prove him a false prophet.

This is only possible if you change the meaning of prophet, and I asked you nicely not to do that. Well, as nicely as I can, which may not be very nice on a cosmic standard. Nothing you have said about Moroni 7, etc. is at all convincing.

And judging by what you say below, you seem to hold a

[TOmNossor]

I have spoken with an Atheist who has clearly stated that in his mind the least parsimonious thing that could exist is God. Effectively to postulate that an omnipotent, omniscient, GENERALLY or WHOLLY UNKNOWABLE God is responsible for some such thing is the least parsimonious thing that one could suggest.

I think there is an implicit faith in the naturalistic associated with such a belief. From this grounding it is impossible for God to be the most parsimonious explanation of any phenomena. Personal revelation, personal prophesy, personal healings, visions,

[Bill Hamblin]

As a footnote, Cederman (2003) does argue that at times, factors other than parsimony may trump in theory construction. I have no qualms with this, I think.

What I really believe is: what is true is more important than what is parsimonious. Outside of hard experimental science parsimony is about evaluating the validity of arguments, not the discovery of truth. The problem is, valid arguments can be given for false propositions, and invalid arguments can be formulated for true propositions.

Furthermore, parsimony assumes we have a complete data set to evaluate; in history this is NEVER true, and for ancient history there is far more that we do not know than we know. Hence, parsimonious arguments based on incomplete data will ALWAYS be wrong, because they cannot incorporate unknown data and still be parsimonious. (E.g. the most parsimonious explanation for Judaism before the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls explained Judaism without reference to the Dead Sea Scrolls, and was quite wrong.)

[Quinn]

Yes. Now you

[sidewinder]

"Although Occam's Razor is a useful principle in science and philosophy. I personally do not find it very useful in history. I believe Occam was actually making an argument for belief in God, because belief in a creator God is more parsimonious than belief in existence of the universe without God."

It's overestimated. It's actually of little value in real debates on science. However, to the extent that it's applicable to science and philosophy, it's surely applicable to history.

No, Occam was not making an argument for belief in God. Yes, he believed in God. He was making arguments against "universals."

"Attempts at using Occam's Razor in history tend to become reductionistic."

Attempts to "use occam's razor" typically end up being rhetorical.

"Technically speaking this (complex multiplicity of causes) may not violate Occam's principle of parsimony,.."

well that's better.

[juliann]

Wrong. Not only see above, but consider this: Even if everything I say about JS is true, it still would not prove him a false prophet.

On what page did you define "prophet" in your book?