God And Absolute Knowledge

[Jason]

Then it should be a simple matter for you to articulate why.

Is anything that we are discussing really simple?

Strawson's point that we can't change who we are, and that all decisions are determined by who we are seems deterministic on the face of it.

But what is your basis for that change? Consider the origin of who you are. Even with an uncreated intelligence, our most basic character/nature just is.

Is it? Since we existed into an infinite past, did we ever have a "most basic" character?

I do not dispute that we have the ability to consciously change who/what we are, but again - why do we choose to do that? And why do we choose exactly who/what we would wish to be? If that choice does not flow from who/what we are already, then it must necessarily originate from a source other than ourselves. And we cannot have control over sources that are external.

I suppose you could argue that the capacity to choose would itself have to be present in the first place, and so the ability to change must be present in our character in order to be able to change our character.

However, it seems to be a basic tenet of LDS thought that everyone can chose their ultimate character.

There are two distinct concepts at play here. One is the ability to do otherwise. Even with the device implanted, the hitman does in fact have the ability to do otherwise. If the quatum state that controls the device is different, then he will do otherwise.

The other concept is the origin of the choice. It seems that you take issue with the fact that the hitman himself is not the source of his choice, since the hitman actually is able to do otherwise - but the selection of the specific alternative he acts upon is not made internally, but externally.

Moral responsibility cannot attach to one's actions if one had no control over them. In your example the hitman cannot influence events in any way, so the fact that the device acts randomly does not mean that he has any power of choice.

This is similar to how I view freedom. It's not about being able to do otherwise, but rather that choices are ultimately determined by the individual, not external factors.

But in a deterministic universe, the individual is determined by external factors, so there is no real distinction between the individual and external factors.

[johndoe]

Is anything that we are discussing really simple?

No. This is why it is important to explore the reasons for the assertions we make, rather than stating that they are obvious, or similar language.

Strawson's point that we can't change who we are, and that all decisions are determined by who we are seems deterministic on the face of it.

Strawson's point is that we cannot choose who we are initially, because such a thing is logically impossible. The second point is that if decisions do not flow from who we are, then they emanate from an external source, and therefore cannot contribute to our freedom.

Is it? Since we existed into an infinite past, did we ever have a "most basic" character?

I suppose this is speculation, but it seems that the scriptures must mean something when they state that we are given agency by God. I assume that if we go far enough into the past (beyond the point at which we were organized into spirits by God), that we did not have agency, which includes the power to make self-forming decisions. The concept that makes the most sense to me is that we were in some sort of dormant state from eternity, and that we were organized into spirits by God, thus giving us the ability to act and make choices. If this is true, then our intial character/nature is static from eternity to the point that we were organized into spirits. And that intial character/nature would be a fact of the universe, beyond our control.

Certainly alternate views are possible, but I don't see how one can believe that God gave us agency at some point in the past and that we have always been making self-forming choices from eternity.

I suppose you could argue that the capacity to choose would itself have to be present in the first place, and so the ability to change must be present in our character in order to be able to change our character.

However, it seems to be a basic tenet of LDS thought that everyone can chose their ultimate character.

As I stated above, the capacity to act freely would then have to be present from the infinite past in order for us not to have an "initial" character, and even then I'm not so sure.

We all have the same opportunity presented to us to accept God's offer to change our final character to be one with Him.

Moral responsibility cannot attach to one's actions if one had no control over them. In your example the hitman cannot influence events in any way, so the fact that the device acts randomly does not mean that he has any power of choice.

Exactly. He is able to do otherwise, but the source of the variation in acts is not under his control. In spite of his being able to do otherwise, he is still not free.

From this, one can derive that free acts must originate internally. So far, I agree. Where does the additional requirement that actual alternate choices are possible come from? Though you could certainly object (as I know Log would) to the use of probabilistic language, I would ask: how does the hitman acting randomly mean that he has greater power of choice? In the example I gave, it doesn't, as you recognized. Why does moving the origin of the choice from external to internal suddenly allow randomness to contribute to freedom?

But in a deterministic universe, the individual is determined by external factors, so there is no real distinction between the individual and external factors.

One can argue powerfully, as Strawson has, that whether the universe is deterministic or not, our basic nature is determined by external factors.

[Log]

I don't see why it would be necessary for us to be actually able to do otherwise for either of those types of statements to be "non-trivially" true.

The meaning of "trivially true" requires it.

We all agree that it is impossible for us not to sin in this life.

We do not all agree. In fact, some of us take the scriptures at face value on this question. It is true that all do, at some point in their life, yield to the Devil on some point or other, but it is not the case that all continually do; if so, none are possessed of the Holy Ghost, and the Atonement is in vain.

Does that make it somehow nonsensical to state that we ought not to sin? Or that if we were able not to sin, then X?

It would be a trivially true statment only if it were not true that we were able not to sin.

Moreover, I am of the opinion that it would be a curious habit the Lord would have if he regularly issued trivially true statements, would you not agree?

Moreover, it seems inconsistent at best to consign one's children to eternal flames for violating commandments which they literally had not power to keep, would you not agree?

[cksalmon]

R. E. Hobart argued in 1934, persuasively to my mind, that utterly undetermined choices (as required by liberterian free will) are simply outside the scope of moral praise or blame.

"In proportion as an act of volition starts of itself without cause it is exactly, so far as freedom of the individual is concerned, as if it had been thrown into his mind from withoutâ??'suggested' to himâ??by a freakish demon."

Unless an act of volition actually is determined by one's nature, he argues, praising or blaming the individual who acts volitionally is absurd.

See R. E. Hobart, "Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without It," in Peter Van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998), 365-373.

[Jason]

Strawson's point is that we cannot choose who we are initially, because such a thing is logically impossible. The second point is that if decisions do not flow from who we are, then they emanate from an external source, and therefore cannot contribute to our freedom.

If we can't chose who we are and who we are determines what we chose then isn't that a deterministic viewpoint?

I suppose this is speculation, but it seems that the scriptures must mean something when they state that we are given agency by God. I assume that if we go far enough into the past (beyond the point at which we were organized into spirits by God), that we did not have agency, which includes the power to make self-forming decisions. The concept that makes the most sense to me is that we were in some sort of dormant state from eternity, and that we were organized into spirits by God, thus giving us the ability to act and make choices. If this is true, then our intial character/nature is static from eternity to the point that we were organized into spirits. And that intial character/nature would be a fact of the universe, beyond our control.

I always thought that the gift of agency was tied in to the situation God placed us in and the Veil. By placing us in a situation where we could make greater moral progress than ever before, with good and evil present as options, and with our infinite past and own personal experience with God forgotten, God effectively gave us the agency we exercise in this life, as He created the situation and circumstances.

Exactly. He is able to do otherwise, but the source of the variation in acts is not under his control. In spite of his being able to do otherwise, he is still not free.

But being able to do otherwise is only one of the conditions I see as necessary for moral responsibility, not the ONLY condition. A necessary condition, but not the single defining one.

To be free, and to have moral responsibility for our actions;

1. There must be an absolute moral standard active in the universe.

2. We must have some knowledge of this standard - of good and evil.

3. We must be capable of chosing either good or evil.

4. The choice must be completely voluntary - under our conscious control.

Though you could certainly object (as I know Log would) to the use of probabilistic language, I would ask: how does the hitman acting randomly mean that he has greater power of choice?

Being able to act randomly doesn't give us greater power of choice, but in order to have any power of choice we must have the ability to chose between more than one option.

One can argue powerfully, as Strawson has, that whether the universe is deterministic or not, our basic nature is determined by external factors.

If our nature is determined by external factors then the universe is deterministic. I don't see how you could say our nature was determined completely by external factors and still argue that the universe is not deterministic.

[johndoe]

The meaning of "trivially true" requires it.

Thanks for the link, but I disagree that this definition requires alternate possibilities. Consider the case that these types of statements are made to refer to past events rather than future. There is no possibility in the present that past actions can be any other than what they were, yet these types of statements are still made. If you consider these types of statements when referring to the past trivially true, then this phrase doesn't seem to have significant meaning.

We do not all agree. In fact, some of us take the scriptures at face value on this question. It is true that all do, at some point in their life, yield to the Devil on some point or other, but it is not the case that all continually do; if so, none are possessed of the Holy Ghost, and the Atonement is in vain.

I have already clarified that I am referring to sin in the general case, not specific instances. You recognize that all do sin at some point in our lives. My point does not require that we continually sin. The statement that we ought not to sin applies equally as well in the general case as in specific cases.

With regards to taking the scriptures at face value, I don't see how such an interpretation as you are employing here can be construed as taking the scriptures at face value.

It would be a trivially true statment only if it were not true that we were able not to sin.

Yet it is not true that we are not able to sin, in the general case. The scriptures are clear on this. And I take them at face value.

Moreover, I am of the opinion that it would be a curious habit the Lord would have if he regularly issued trivially true statements, would you not agree?

Do you believe that the following is a trivially true statement?

D&C 101:53 Ought ye not to have done even as I commanded you, andâ??after ye had planted the vineyard, and built the hedge round about, and set watchmen upon the walls thereofâ??built the tower also, and set a awatchman upon the tower, and watched for my vineyard, and not have fallen asleep, lest the enemy should come upon you?

Or this?

Matt. 23:23 Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.

Or this?

Luke 10:13 Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon, which have been done in you, they had a great while ago repented, sitting in sackcloth and ashes.

So we have ought statements and conditionals, spoken by Christ, referring to past actions that were never realized. Oughts are value judgments, as can be conditionals. These statements have worth, even when referring to conditions that will never be true, such as is sometimes the case when they refer to past actions.

We have other examples in the scriptures where God's knowledge is not divulged to some extent even when the opportunity to do so is presented. Consider that God asked Adam in the garden of Eden where he was. He knew full well Adam's physical location, but asked the question for Adam's benefit. We also have the use of the word "endless", which is clarified in D&C 19 to not mean unending in a temporal sense.

Moreover, it seems inconsistent at best to consign one's children to eternal flames for violating commandments which they literally had not power to keep, would you not agree?

It would be inconsistent if LDS doctrine held to the idea that God has the power to dole out reward and punishment without regard to eternal laws which are external to Him, and by which even He is bound.

[johndoe]

If we can't chose who we are and who we are determines what we chose then isn't that a deterministic viewpoint?

The word "determines" here does not necessarily entail determinism. If you agree that having actual alternate possibilities as a requirement for free choices entails that the outcome of those choices do not have their origin in the individual making the choice, then you have essentially conceded that the concept of libertarian free will falls to the Problem of Luck. Libertarian philosophers would disagree with you.

I always thought that the gift of agency was tied in to the situation God placed us in and the Veil. By placing us in a situation where we could make greater moral progress than ever before, with good and evil present as options, and with our infinite past and own personal experience with God forgotten, God effectively gave us the agency we exercise in this life, as He created the situation and circumstances.

A scripture should be instructive.

Moses 4:3 Wherefore, because that Satan rebelled against me, and sought to destroy the agency of man, which I, the Lord God, had given him, and also, that I should give unto him mine own power; by the power of mine Only Begotten, I caused that he should be cast down;

Note that at this point, before Satan was cast out of heaven, God had already given man agency. So there was a point in time before our births when agency was given to us by God. Therefore, there was a point in time before God gave us our agency that we had no agency.

But being able to do otherwise is only one of the conditions I see as necessary for moral responsibility, not the ONLY condition. A necessary condition, but not the single defining one.

To be free, and to have moral responsibility for our actions;

1. There must be an absolute moral standard active in the universe.

2. We must have some knowledge of this standard - of good and evil.

3. We must be capable of chosing either good or evil.

4. The choice must be completely voluntary - under our conscious control.

None of the conditions above necessarily entail the libertarian requirement of actual alternate possibilites.

Being able to act randomly doesn't give us greater power of choice, but in order to have any power of choice we must have the ability to chose between more than one option.

But even in a deterministic universe, we do have the ability to choose between more than one option. The only difference is that our choice in a deterministic universe is a result of causes that can actually be comprehended.

If our nature is determined by external factors then the universe is deterministic. I don't see how you could say our nature was determined completely by external factors and still argue that the universe is not deterministic.

It seems you're getting stuck on the word "determined" again. Consider that there are proponents of libertarian free will who are not LDS. We LDS are a very small minority in our belief that our essence is eternal.

More importantly - please explain how our nature can be wholly internally caused.

[Macabus]

I agree with Bee Eff. How else would Patriarchal blessings work? I know mine ends with a conditional statement-having to do with my faithfulness. Thereby, one possibility is laid out based on my decisions. I'm also aware of others with conditional statements not adhered to and a very different path present in their lives.

--Macabus

[Jason]

The word "determines" here does not necessarily entail determinism. If you agree that having actual alternate possibilities as a requirement for free choices entails that the outcome of those choices do not have their origin in the individual making the choice, then you have essentially conceded that the concept of libertarian free will falls to the Problem of Luck. Libertarian philosophers would disagree with you.

I suppose I believe that choices come from the individual without being completely determined by their current state.

Note that at this point, before Satan was cast out of heaven, God had already given man agency. So there was a point in time before our births when agency was given to us by God. Therefore, there was a point in time before God gave us our agency that we had no agency.

This scripture could refer to our mortal state - Satan sought to destroy the agency that would be ours in this state by means of a different plan. I disagree that the scripture must mean that we had no agency at all before God gave it to us. It may indeed mean this, but I don't think it must mean this.

None of the conditions above necessarily entail the libertarian requirement of actual alternate possibilites.

That would be number 3 - we must have a real possibility of chosing either good or evil.

But even in a deterministic universe, we do have the ability to choose between more than one option. The only difference is that our choice in a deterministic universe is a result of causes that can actually be comprehended.

No we don't. In a deterministic universe the choice was effectively already made for us by external circumstances beyond our real control. There is only one choice that we will take when confronted with any options, and we have no choice as to which we will take - that choice has been pre-determined.

More importantly - please explain how our nature can be wholly internally caused.

I don't deny that external factors have an effect on our nature/character, merely that our nature/character is not wholly determined by them.

[Log]

Thanks for the link, but I disagree that this definition requires alternate possibilities.

If you want a non-trivially true statement concerning a conditional issued before the event, then you require a possibly true antecedent. Otherwise, you communicate nothing.

With regards to taking the scriptures at face value, I don't see how such an interpretation as you are employing here can be construed as taking the scriptures at face value.

Please demonstrate how my rendering departs from the face value of the scriptures.

Yet it is not true that we are not able to sin, in the general case. The scriptures are clear on this. And I take them at face value.

In order for the scripture to be true, one simply must since at least once in one's life. And that's all. The scriptures are clear that it is not necessarily the case that one must sin beyond the first sin, or else none are possessed of the Holy Ghost, which dwelleth not in unholy temples, and the Atonement is in vain, whereby men are granted the Holy Ghost.

Therefore, I am confused as to what you are trying to communicate by the words "the general case."

So we have ought statements and conditionals, spoken by Christ, referring to past actions that were never realized. Oughts are value judgments, as can be conditionals.

Moreover, each of these is a data point against determinism, for each was issued on the basis that they should have done otherwise, or should do otherwise, granting determinism, they had or have power to do. Clearly, one "should" not do otherwise than one has power to do, granting determinism, rendering these statements trivially true; such judgements, granting determinism, are devoid of meaning, as would be a judgement against a rock for following gravity in the absence of a physical support.

These statements have worth, even when referring to conditions that will never be true, such as is sometimes the case when they refer to past actions.

Indeed, these statements have worth as guides to choice for the audience, thereby implying they can do otherwise. Otherwise, these statements do not have worth.

We also have the use of the word "endless", which is clarified in D&C 19 to not mean unending in a temporal sense.

Not for all, as you well know.

It would be inconsistent if LDS doctrine held to the idea that God has the power to dole out reward and punishment without regard to eternal laws which are external to Him, and by which even He is bound.

Interesting - do you mean to suggest God is determined to create and slay at least some of his children?

[PacMan]

I'm going to break my own cardinal rule, and not read the thread before posting.

God does not know exactly what will happen.

If he did, God would be culpable for all sin. Thus, God cannot know, absolutely, what will happen, but only the probability of various events occuring.

Does this threaten many non-LDS view of God? How do they reconcile this fact?

That's why Eden was so important. Adam had to make the choice, or the atonement would have been necessary to fix God's mess-up...hence letting Adam and Eve 'choose for themselves.' Simply because one permits another to sin does not pass culpability.

PacMan

[johndoe]

If you want a non-trivially true statement concerning a conditional issued before the event, then you require a possibly true antecedent. Otherwise, you communicate nothing.

The conditional that Jesus used in my example did not have a possibly true antecedent. I don't believe that He was communicating nothing. As always, you read your own biases into the scriptures.

Please demonstrate how my rendering departs from the face value of the scriptures.

These scriptures, at face value, say nothing about whether or not determinism is true. It's interesting that you can't see that.

In order for the scripture to be true, one simply must since at least once in one's life. And that's all. The scriptures are clear that it is not necessarily the case that one must sin beyond the first sin, or else none are possessed of the Holy Ghost, which dwelleth not in unholy temples, and the Atonement is in vain, whereby men are granted the Holy Ghost.

Therefore, I am confused as to what you are trying to communicate by the words "the general case."

One sin is greater than zero sins.

Moreover, each of these is a data point against determinism, for each was issued on the basis that they should have done otherwise, or should do otherwise, granting determinism, they had or have power to do. Clearly, one "should" not do otherwise than one has power to do, granting determinism, rendering these statements trivially true; such judgements, granting determinism, are devoid of meaning, as would be a judgement against a rock for following gravity in the absence of a physical support.

You are not addressing my point, and you continue to beg the question.

Indeed, these statements have worth as guides to choice for the audience, thereby implying they can do otherwise. Otherwise, these statements do not have worth.

At the time these statements were made, the choices were in the past, and could not be changed. If all you are interested in is to continue to make the same unsupported assertion, then I have no interest in continuing this discussion with you.

Interesting - do you mean to suggest God is determined to create and slay at least some of his children?

I wonder what you mean by "slay".

Since, even in the libertarian view, it is obvious even to a God who cannot see our future choices that some of us will be "slain", then God, by creating at all, appears to want to create and slay at least some of His children - if you insist on looking at it that way.

[johndoe]

I suppose I believe that choices come from the individual without being completely determined by their current state.

Then we have come full circle, and you agree that choices have their origin within the individual. This is identical to Strawson's premise which you rejected before.

This scripture could refer to our mortal state - Satan sought to destroy the agency that would be ours in this state by means of a different plan. I disagree that the scripture must mean that we had no agency at all before God gave it to us. It may indeed mean this, but I don't think it must mean this.

I think that would be a very strained reading. For God to state that He had given us agency would be a meaningless or even untrue statement if we had already had agency, eternally.

That would be number 3 - we must have a real possibility of chosing either good or evil.

Words like "real" don't mean anything in these types of discussions. In a deterministic universe, everyone has alternates from which to choose. Just because the outcome of the choice is determined doesn't mean that there are no options.

No we don't. In a deterministic universe the choice was effectively already made for us by external circumstances beyond our real control. There is only one choice that we will take when confronted with any options, and we have no choice as to which we will take - that choice has been pre-determined.

Having libertarian free will doesn't help that situation at all. How is it better to randomly choose among alternatives rather than choosing one predictively?

I don't deny that external factors have an effect on our nature/character, merely that our nature/character is not wholly determined by them.

How can our nature even be partially chosen by us initially?

Jason, I'm getting tired of this discussion. It's been a good one, and you've expressed your position well. But I think we could go around and around on this forever.

If you want to get the last word in, that's fine. But I may decide not to post in this thread anymore.

[Log]

The conditional that Jesus used in my example did not have a possibly true antecedent.

As you noted, and as I agree, that is because they represent value judgements, and as I further note, the statements served as illustrations his audience could use to guide future choices, which communicate nothing unless the audience could, in fact, choose.

I don't believe that He was communicating nothing.

What, precisely, do you believe he was communicating, given determinism?

As always, you read your own biases into the scriptures.

Tu quoque.

These scriptures, at face value, say nothing about whether or not determinism is true. It's interesting that you can't see that.

At face value, they imply genuine choice. It is passing strange that you can't see that. "Ought"? "Should"? "If you do this, then I will do that"? "[Men] are free to choose"? I submit that my reading, that men have power to choose alternate paths, and are praiseworthy or blameworthy for their choice, is consistent with the plain reading of these scriptures, where deterministic readings require sophistic argumentation to support.

You are not addressing my point, and you continue to beg the question.

See above - you are not addressing my point.

At the time these statements were made, the choices were in the past, and could not be changed. If all you are interested in is to continue to make the same unsupported assertion, then I have no interest in continuing this discussion with you.

I believe I addressed this: the statements were made as guides to the choices of the audience, not those of whom he was speaking. Adios, I suppose.

I wonder what you mean by "slay".

Consign to the flames eternally, to be tortured forever, as the sons of perdition are - at least, their worm dieth not, correct?

Since, even in the libertarian view, it is obvious even to a God who cannot see our future choices that some of us will be "slain", then God, by creating at all, appears to want to create and slay at least some of His children - if you insist on looking at it that way.

Actually, it doesn't appear so, but I suspect you know that. Given libertarianism and the plan of salvation, we chose to be here of our own free will, with full understanding of the risks, freely accepted. Given determinism, we had no choice, and God knows precisely who will be slain from eternity to all eternity, and he ought to therefore have let them remain in their non-eternally-tortured state (after all, it would have been better for them that they had not been born). Yet, for some unknown reason, he doesn't. That requires a theodicy which has escaped all of orthodox theology from the beginning.

[Bee Eff]

I'm going to break my own cardinal rule, and not read the thread before posting.

That's why Eden was so important. Adam had to make the choice, or the atonement would have been necessary to fix God's mess-up...hence letting Adam and Eve 'choose for themselves.' Simply because one permits another to sin does not pass culpability.

PacMan

Eve's transgression is a topic I'd rather not discuss here as I believe that it would require overly much space and would derail the thread. I do not believe that Eve "needed" to transgress as she did. I believe that had Eve not transgressed another path to the same result would have been presented by God at some point. Yes, they did have to eat of the fruit at some point, but I do not believe that the pattern that Adam and Eve followed was necessarily the only method God had of reaching this point. If it was the only method, there is a fundamental flaw with Biblical belief, I do not believe that there is a fundamental flaw in Biblical belief. IMO, God did not manipulate Adam and Eve into transgressing.

I am not speaking of permitting the sin, I am speaking of setting up the sin.

[hagoth7]

I haven't been following this thread much for the last few days, but I have been thinking about it a fair amount.

I'll concede for the moment, for the purpose of argument, that the One responsible for setting things in motion might at least be argued to be culpable in things that went wrong.

If that argument has any merit, it might help further explain (i) why Christ volunteered to come down and atone, and/or perhaps (ii) why he was the only one capable and qualified to do so - by eternal laws of both justice and mercy.

Thoughts?

(Beeeff - hoping this doesn't derail the purposes of your thread)

[Bee Eff]

I haven't been following this thread much for the last few days, but I have been thinking about it a fair amount.

I'll concede for the moment, for the purpose of argument, that the One responsible for setting things in motion might at least be argued to be culpable in things that went wrong.

If that argument has any merit, it might help further explain (i) why Christ volunteered to come down and atone, and/or perhaps (ii) why he was the only one capable and qualified to do so - by eternal laws of both justice and mercy.

Thoughts?

(Beeeff - hoping this doesn't derail the purposes of your thread)

No problem, this pertains to the topic to a point.

This would hold merit, I think. You are then stating that given God's culpability in a deterministic paradigm, the sacrifice of Christ by God the Father* was required, not solely as a way out but as a means of meeting the demands of Justice?

*For LDS, Christ sacrificing himself is another aspect of the sacrifice that I am not referencing here as I believe it has further implications that this concept would appear to possibly demean.

[hagoth7]

...You are then stating that given God's culpability in a deterministic paradigm, the sacrifice of Christ by God the Father* was required, not solely as a way out but as a means of meeting the demands of Justice?

Not quite. His self-sacrifice, is how I would put it. More like it would be the honorable thing to do, knowing full well that the plan One was suggesting and setting into motion would have dire consequences on others. A heroic form of leadership.

However, as stated elsewhere, other than for the sake of argument, I'm not yet ready to concede that there was culpability.

*For LDS, Christ sacrificing himself is another aspect of the sacrifice that I am not referencing here as I believe it has further implications that this concept would appear to possibly demean.

Demeaning? How so? (That certainly wasn't my intent - not at all.)

[Bee Eff]

Not quite. His self-sacrifice, is how I would put it. More like it would be the honorable thing to do, knowing full well that the plan One was suggesting and setting into motion would have dire consequences on others. A heroic form of leadership.

However, as stated elsewhere, other than for the sake of argument, I'm not yet ready to concede that there was culpability.

Ok. Your post did get me thinking though, and the concept would relieve the issue of culpability should culpability have been existent.

Demeaning? How so? (That certainly wasn't my intent - not at all.)

No, I was attempting at heading off LDS indignation at the possible appearance of Christ's sacrifice being nothing more than a means of, for want of a different term, self-preservation. My comment there, without a disclaimer, could provoke a flurry of posts attacking/discussing the nature of the Atonement and the purposes thereof.

[Jason]

Then we have come full circle, and you agree that choices have their origin within the individual. This is identical to Strawson's premise which you rejected before.

Strawson's argument stated that we cannot change ourselves. I disagree with that.

I think that would be a very strained reading. For God to state that He had given us agency would be a meaningless or even untrue statement if we had already had agency, eternally.

If you already have agency I can still give you agency. You will then have more agency than you did before I gave you agency. It will be true that I gave you the agency you have, but you also had some before I added to it.

Words like "real" don't mean anything in these types of discussions. In a deterministic universe, everyone has alternates from which to choose. Just because the outcome of the choice is determined doesn't mean that there are no options.

Yes it does. That's the point. If your choice is already determined then you don't really have a choice.

Having libertarian free will doesn't help that situation at all. How is it better to randomly choose among alternatives rather than choosing one predictively?

The choice isn't random, it's just not pre-determined.

[MormonPeasant]

Since God is judge, jury, and executioner, so to speak, does his culpability really matter?

Without omniscience, how could God be the Perfect Judge?

(This is just a first impression so comment away.)

[Bee Eff]

Since God is judge, jury, and executioner, so to speak, does his culpability really matter?

The future is not a consideration of justice.

Culpability matters.

John 8:7 He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her.

If God were culpable he would not be worthy of judging. God is worthy of judging, so he cannot be culpable.

Without omniscience, how could God be the Perfect Judge?

(This is just a first impression so comment away.)

Who stated God was not omniscient? Omniscient - knowing everything that can be known.

The future does not exist, so it is not within the realm of omniscience.

[JDave]

To be in time is to have spatio-temporal relations within the first four dimensions. A movement in a higher dimension would not be perceived in the lower dimensions. So God would have parts and passions, but they would be in a higher dimension. When God appears to man He is presenting a projection of Himself onto only three dimensions.

...

I wanted to post a link to the paper I read that theorized along these lines. I know that it is not what you are currently discussing, but it is pertinent to the thread and I felt that some of you might be interested.

Here you go. Some Thoughts on Higher-dimensional Realms

[William James]

If I know a crime is about to be committed but, due to circumstances, could do nothing about it, am I culpable? So likewise, if God knows a sin is about to be committed, but by law (agency) can do nothing about it, how is He culpable?

Btw, I don't believe God knows the future with absolute certainty, just a high degree of probability, but I don't see how God knowing absolutely takes choice away from men.

I have written on this topic in the past on this board. I agree that God does NOT know the future with absolute certainty. I think he only "knows" it with a high degree of probability. However, I disagree with the proposition that absolute knowledge of God would leave free agency intact. Here's why: the only way that the future could be known with absolute certainty is if it were predetermined. I'm not talking about some outside force proactively forcing a result; rather, I'm talking about things simply being in motion to occur a certain way, like a bowling ball in motion that has a certain trajectory and is set to knock down only certain pins, in a certain order, and precisely a certain way. If there is only one possible result, then there is likewise no possibility that anything, including agency, could prevent the result from happening. While it might appear as though we had choice in a matter from our own perspective, the choice would be merely an illusion, it being known beforehand what we would choose.

Even if one could choose to believe that free agency and absolute omniscience of God are fully compatible notions, I believe one could not accept both views without also believing at least one of the following: (1) that all mankind will be saved (i.e., no one will be punished with eternal damnation); (2) that God is not perfectly just; or (3) that God has not taken any action (including creating us or endowing us with personality traits and weaknesses) to influence the circumstances that would eventually combine to cause a person to make choices that would merit eternal damnation.

I realize that some LDS people adopt a form belief number 1, saying that every person is better off for having chosen to come to Earth, and that even terrible sinners who screw up royally, fornicate, murder, rape, and reject the Gospel and wind up in the telestial kingdom are better off (i.e., happier) than someone who did not even choose to come to Earth and risk being in a probationary state. For those who adopt belief number 1, it seems to me that they must reject the idea of eternal damnation or outer darkness altogether. What say ye?