God And Absolute Knowledge

[Brade]

I may have read some of them before, but I will look up Frankfurt again and see what he has to say.

Incompatabilism?

HaHa. I guess that could work. I think Fischer would be the better read. Actually, if you're going to read Fischer you might was well read Frankfurt first because lots of compatibilists, including Fischer, make reference to Frankfurt cases.

[Lightbearer]

Your statements all require interpretation to read as you do.

So does your statements.

"Knowing all things" does not necessitate knowing things that do not exist. The future does not exist, nothing about it exists, it will exist, but does not currently exist. Given this, a statement "knows all things" does not necessitate a knowledge of future events that do not exist. This allows for free agency. Now, I believe that God does have an absolute knowledge concerning what God will do, but this is different than having an absolute knowledge of what I will or will not do. God I can accept knows absolutely the probabilities, but not the absolutes of future events.

I still do not see you answering the CFR, for just claiming that things do not exist in the future makes the scripture that says God knows the past, present, and future meaningless. I admit it is hard to get your "mind around" this concept, but you have not disproved my "interpretation" as you put it. What does it mean to state that "all things are present before Him"?

I would cite Jonah as an example of the knowledge of probability in statements concerning the future and not knowledge of an absolute future.

Are not all true prophecies prefaced with "if" when calling people to repentance? The probabilities exist only from our mortal perspective, not from God's. Jonah's problem was he did not want the people to repent and make his "prophecy" fail, it failed because of Jonah, not because of God or His foresight.

If in fact as you claim, God has an absolute knowledge of the future and is unlimited in his power, it would in fact be possible to present man and the stimuli surrounding man in such a manner that sin would not occur. As such, the manner of presentation is in fact the reason for the sin, unless of course God deals in probable future and not an absolute future.

You are saying that God rules and teaches His children from uncertainty, which cannot be the case. God does only that which is just and true, He does not condone sin nor is He the author of it. However He does allow us all complete agency and that is what condemns us, not God's "presentation."

I never claimed God did not "know all things." I claimed that God does not know things that are not real/existent, the future does not exist, it will exist, but it does not exist.

It seems like you are playing a semantics game, but I suppose it is a matter of perspective, but the future does exist in God's knowledge, I give the following as evidence:

(D&C 38:2) "The same which knoweth all things, for all things are present before mine eyes;"

In connection with:

(D&C 130:7) "But they reside in the presence of God, on a globe like a sea of glass and fire, where all things for their glory are manifest, past, present, and future, and are continually before the Lord."

What do you think that means? Especially the part about the future?

God "discover[ing] a truth that could 'undo' the immortality and eternal life of man" would imply that God did not have a perfect understanding of existence as it is. Not knowing, absolutely, what will occur in the currently non-existent future is completely different than not knowing everything that exists and the laws governign everything that exists. I believe that God's knowledge of probable futures is to the extent that it is nearly beyond probability and into the absolute, but I believe it is always possible for good to be chosen over evil, and vice versa, this threatens the concept of absolute knowledge of the future. Your claim there is based in a false premise.

Not knowing the future would be quite a handicap for God, because then He could never reveal anything with any certainty. I think the false premise is in you corner, you have not given anything to back up you claims, no scriptures only philosophical speculation on your part.

Also, knowing the state that is the end is different than knowing the future.

How is it? What does that mean? Does it mean as others have mentioned in this thread that Nephi could not say with absolute certainty that Mary was going to be the mother of the Son of God in the flesh? Or that Joseph Smith would be the choice seer whom God would raise up in the last days? Or Moses? Or even Christ Himself? What does that do to our confidence in revelations? Can we say... maybe it will come to pass? Or if God reveals to us in a blessing that a person will live... does that mean we should only say maybe? No I am sorry but your concept of God's omniscience is nonsensical. It second guesses Him at every turn and the Prophet Joseph said that if God did not know all things (both visible and invisible) then how could we have complete faith in Him unto life and salvation? I guess we will have to agree to disagree but I have never seen one reference from the scriptures or the prophets statements that confirm your theory.

[Jason]

HaHa. I guess that could work. I think Fischer would be the better read. Actually, if you're going to read Fischer you might was well read Frankfurt first because lots of compatibilists, including Fischer, make reference to Frankfurt cases.

Hmm, glancing over Frankfurt, it appears I did stumble on the idea of Frankfurt cases independently while arguing on another thread - from the other direction, as it were.

I guess that's proof that anyone could be a world-famous philosopher.

The basic idea seems to be "if there is some circumstance that prevents an agent from actually chosing between two options they are still morally responsible if they happen to desire and chose the only option really available."

My counter-argument is that they are morally culpable only if the option-restricting circumstance is not actually used, and are not morally culpable if it is.

The example I used on the other thread is some science-fiction form of "body control" that would force a hitman to carry out my plan for him to murder my wife regardless of his actual desires on the matter. My position is that if the hitman carries out his desires to murder my wife for money without my having to use my form of control, then he is in fact culpable for the murder - because I did not in fact restrict his choices, he just happened to chose the option I wanted him to.

If he gets cold feet at the last moment and I am forced to exercise my control over his actions in order to carry out my desires then the hitman is not culpable for the murder - as the party who controlled his actions I am, though he might be charged as an accomplice if he agreed to allowing me this form of "veto" over his actions.

So I guess I don't find Frankfurt cases convincing.

[johndoe]

The example I used on the other thread is some science-fiction form of "body control" that would force a hitman to carry out my plan for him to murder my wife regardless of his actual desires on the matter. My position is that if the hitman carries out his desires to murder my wife for money without my having to use my form of control, then he is in fact culpable for the murder - because I did not in fact restrict his choices, he just happened to chose the option I wanted him to.

If he gets cold feet at the last moment and I am forced to exercise my control over his actions in order to carry out my desires then the hitman is not culpable for the murder - as the party who controlled his actions I am, though he might be charged as an accomplice if he agreed to allowing me this form of "veto" over his actions.

So I guess I don't find Frankfurt cases convincing.

Maybe I misunderstood you on the other thread. What you describe above as your view related to the case you created is actually a compatibilist view, not libertarian. Per a libertarian view, the hitman would not be blameworthy regardless of whether you had to use your control device or not. The point, for a libertarian, is that he could not have chosen not to kill your wife, not that he actually did choose to kill her. Compatibilists would agree that if you do use the device, the hitman is not blameworthy.

This is why Frankfurt cases are considered by some to be so significant. It feels like there should be a difference in the level of moral responsibility in the 2 different cases (nonuse and use of the control device). It's not enough to convince libertarians of course. Ostler doesn't find Frankfurt cases compelling.

[wenglund]

If God knows what you will choose, then you cannot choose anything else. If you can't choose anything else, then you are not free in the libertarian sense. Libertarian freedom and God's knowledge of the future are not compatible. (Maybe you're actually a compatibilist? But that's not how you've been coming across in the other thread. What you wrote above is equivalent to johndoe's position.)

What if we rephrased it this way: "If God has foreseen what you will freely choose, then you will not freely choose any differetly than what God has foreseen".

With this rephrasing in mind, does the remainder of your argument follow? In other words, can you still conclude that "you are not free in the libertarian sense"?

Also, what if we were to rephrase this using the past tense rather than in the future tense: "If God knows what you have chosen, then you cannot have chosen anything else. If you cannot have chosen anything else, then you are not free in the libertarian sense."

Does that make sense to you? If not, why not?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Brade]

Hmm, glancing over Frankfurt, it appears I did stumble on the idea of Frankfurt cases independently while arguing on another thread - from the other direction, as it were.

I guess that's proof that anyone could be a world-famous philosopher.

The basic idea seems to be "if there is some circumstance that prevents an agent from actually chosing between two options they are still morally responsible if they happen to desire and chose the only option really available."

My counter-argument is that they are morally culpable only if the option-restricting circumstance is not actually used, and are not morally culpable if it is.

The example I used on the other thread is some science-fiction form of "body control" that would force a hitman to carry out my plan for him to murder my wife regardless of his actual desires on the matter. My position is that if the hitman carries out his desires to murder my wife for money without my having to use my form of control, then he is in fact culpable for the murder - because I did not in fact restrict his choices, he just happened to chose the option I wanted him to.

If he gets cold feet at the last moment and I am forced to exercise my control over his actions in order to carry out my desires then the hitman is not culpable for the murder - as the party who controlled his actions I am, though he might be charged as an accomplice if he agreed to allowing me this form of "veto" over his actions.

So I guess I don't find Frankfurt cases convincing.

Frankfurt cases help to bring out what compatibilist free will is and you summed it up nicely. Essentially, even if you couldn't have done otherwise it's still free will and thus you are morally responsible if it's the case that you were not compelled. I think Frankfurt cases are convincing in that they do show that a person can be morally responsible if determinism (or divine foreknowledge) is true and free will just means not being compelled. Of course, I reject that determinism is true (and divine foreknowledge) and that not being compelled is sufficient for free will.

I don't know Jason, I think you just need to come to over to the libertarian party and help us with our unique problems.

...just claiming that things do not exist in the future makes the scripture that says God knows the past, present, and future meaningless...What does it mean to state that "all things are present before Him"?

Thatâ??s just not true at all. Bee Eff might say that what is meant when the scriptures talk of God knowing the past, present and future is just that God knows with certainty the things heâ??s carried out and the plans he has for the future which he has the power to carry out. You may disagree with that interpretation as you please but itâ??s simply not true that â??claiming that things do not exist in the future makesâ? the scriptures youâ??re talking about â??meaninglessâ? since I just offered a possible meaning distinct from the meaning you think such utterances have.

Are not all true prophecies prefaced with "if" when calling people to repentance? The probabilities exist only from our mortal perspective, not from God's.

Please donâ??t take this as being meanly antagonistic because Iâ??m genuinely interested a response. I very curious to know what is meant when somebody says â??God is outside of timeâ?. I take that to mean that we see (experience?) time as ordered one moment or event after another and God experiences something different. I just simply do not know how to even conceptualize an account of outside-of-time-ness.

Outside-of-time-ness must mean something different than experiencing things as ordered sequences of events. If it doesnâ??t then itâ??s not saying anything beyond what being in time means and it would end up being useless as a move to avoid problems of free will. Thatâ??s of course granting that such a move can even possibly help out. I take that last point to be controversial since Iâ??ve never seen an account of exactly what outside-of-time-ness is or could even possibly mean.

Letâ??s consider God as being outside of time. Remember that being outside of time cannot mean experiencing things as a sequence or else it wonâ??t be able to even get off the ground. So, if God is outside of time can he himself have a thought A and then a different thought B? That canâ??t be the case since that would entail some order such that A was out and about and then B came about later. So does God outside of time just think A and B? In other words does God outside of time just have in his mind all things at the same moment (if we can even speak of moments)?

Maybe he does! And that might be a perfectly reasonable option for any other Christian denomination. But it just canâ??t work for the LDS. For one thing, youâ??d have to reject the idea that God has a body. If God has a body and is outside of time then he would not be able to move. Time is just a matter of a change in spatio-temporal relations of things. As soon as he goes to scratch his nose, BOOM, youâ??ve got time! This is because the little bits that make up his finger have gone from being in one place to being in another place. The only way to get around this is to say that when the LDS God is outside of time he can scratch his nose with his finger while his finger is at his side and motionless. And the more we try to describe this scenario the more absurd it starts to become in the context of LDS conceptions of God.

The only option is to suggest that when God is outside of time he is not spatio-temporally located anywhere. He couldnâ??t have parts or passions. There couldnâ??t be any change in any mental state. He would have to have all mental states at once. Do you see what this is starting to sound like? Certainly not like the LDS conception of God. You could believe that God is like the traditional Christian God when heâ??s outside of time and then when he comes in time he choses to take on a body in human form. In fact, a LDS friend of mine happens to think this very thing. Thatâ??s fine but Iâ??m interested in preserving the traditional notion of what an LDS God is and this just doesnâ??t sound like that.

So, sure, you can say, â??Oh, well, God knows all things and we have libertarian free will because God is outside of time.â? But then when you begin to describe God being outside of time youâ??ve lost the LDS conception of God. Not only that but itâ??s not even clear that outside-of-time-ness and having something be a certain way is consistent with it being possible for it to be another way for somebody in time.

This is starting to run into the problem that I explained above about the principle of explosion. There are a lot of positions that are perfectly reasonable. Iâ??m a libertarian but I think the compatibilist and determinist positions are reasonable if you prefer to hang on to some propositions which you might hold as properly basic at the expense of other propositions. This is just the nature of philosophy and the phrase â??You canâ??t have your cake and eat it tooâ? comes to mind. Major problems start to occur when people try to tell stories that entail contradictions like that God is outside of time but never does not have a body or that God knows all future acts perfectly but we have libertarian free will. These ideas are simply contradictory just as uttering â??I have a square circle in my pocketâ? is a contradiction for the reason that the concept â??square circleâ? implicitly entails a contradiction.

One more thing about outside-of-time-ness. Actually, this is not quite outside-of-time-ness (I think) but itâ??s another appeal to â??funnyâ? time business that people make. Some people, in trying to avoid talk of outside-of-time-ness might be tempted to appeal to the physics of relativity. They might describe the following state of affairs. When you look up into the night sky you will see some stars which have long since burned out. So, the actual state of affairs is that those specks of light are not stars anymore even though you continue to experience them as stars. Godâ??s knowledge is like this. God knows what will happen because it has already happened â??from his perspectiveâ? and weâ??re just experiencing things in order â??in our time.â?

Notice, though, that this doesnâ??t relieve any free will pressure and some strange things pop out of this idea. For one thing, if my choice has already happened and Iâ??m just now going through it what are we going to say about the spatio-temporal location of my consciousness. Am I really here? Or, am I where my choice actually happened? If Godâ??s knowledge is like the story of looking at stars is what I think Iâ??m experiencing now just delayed light traveling somewhere in the universe? Where am â??Iâ? really? I havenâ??t given this a idea a good treatment but I hope Iâ??ve at least sketched enough of the idea to see that it too is not a likely candidate for an LDS conception of Godâ??s knowledge, free will, and identity. For one thing, I really feel that Iâ??m making choices now and that Iâ??m really here and Iâ??m not just delayed light.

You are saying that God rules and teaches His children from uncertainty

Thatâ??s just not true at all. God teaches his children from true principles. Be nice, donâ??t beat your wife, eat healthy, etc. If God has the power to bring about his plans and the ability to show what his plans are then when he showed before Christ prophets what Christ would do it doesnâ??t follow that heâ??s teaching his children from uncertainty. All that follows is that heâ??s showing people what he has the power to bring about.

It seems like you are playing a semantics game, but I suppose it is a matter of perspective, but the future does exist in God's knowledge, I give the following as evidence:...[evidence]...What do you think that means? Especially the part about the future?

I think this is more than a semantics game. Itâ??s a deep philosophical puzzle. Iâ??m not going to explain what â??the part about the futureâ? might mean on the libertarian view because itâ??s already be given a pretty good treatment in this thread and others.

Not knowing the future would be quite a handicap for God, because then He could never reveal anything with any certainty.

Thatâ??s not true. God could not know what I will do on January 1, 2010 but know perfectly well what he will do on January 1, 2010. So, for one thing, he can at least reveal what he is going to do with certainty. Since what he is going to do is something itâ??s false that he could never reveal anything with any certainty.

How is it? What does that mean? Does it mean as others have mentioned in this thread that Nephi could not say with absolute certainty that Mary was going to be the mother of the Son of God in the flesh?

I donâ??t think Iâ??d be on board with people saying Nephi could not say with absolute certainty that Mary was going to be the mother of the Son of God in the flesh. If God can carry out his plans and part of his plans consist in having a women named Mary be the mother of his son in the flesh then I think Nephi could say with certainty that Mary would be the mother of the Son of God in the flesh even if God didnâ??t know whether Nephi was going to eat an apple or a banana the next day.

What does that do to our confidence in revelations?

Nothing because as I said God is at least powerful enough to carry out his own plans.

No I am sorry but your concept of God's omniscience is nonsensical. It second guesses Him at every turn and the Prophet Joseph said that if God did not know all things (both visible and invisible) then how could we have complete faith in Him unto life and salvation? I guess we will have to agree to disagree but I have never seen one reference from the scriptures or the prophets statements that confirm your theory.

I think youâ??re being a bit unfair here.

P.S. I typed all that up kind of fast and there are bound to be a ton of spelling and grammar errors. Be kind.

[Jason]

Maybe I misunderstood you on the other thread. What you describe above as your view related to the case you created is actually a compatibilist view, not libertarian. Per a libertarian view, the hitman would not be blameworthy regardless of whether you had to use your control device or not. The point, for a libertarian, is that he could not have chosen not to kill your wife, not that he actually did choose to kill her. Compatibilists would agree that if you do use the device, the hitman is not blameworthy.

If he has no choice at all - if the device that controls his actions is always active, regardless of his desires - then he is not culpable even if the device is forcing him to do what he would have done anyway.

If the universe is deterministic then "the control device" is always active and no one is culpable for anything, and as I understand compatabilism it proceeds from the base assumption of a deterministic universe.

It's only if the control is not active that he is culpable if he choses the immoral action anyway, because a situation where the control is not active is directly analagous to one in which the control device doesn't exist in the first place. In a situation where the hitman choses to murder my wife with no control device to force him to do so he is culpable. If the device has no real influence on the hitman's actions then it cannot mitigate his moral responsibility for them.

[johndoe]

What if we rephrased it this way: "If God has foreseen what you will freely choose, then you will not freely choose any differetly than what God has foreseen".

With this rephrasing in mind, does the remainder of your argument follow? In other words, can you still conclude that "you are not free in the libertarian sense"?

Also, what if we were to rephrase this using the past tense rather than in the future tense: "If God knows what you have chosen, then you cannot have chosen anything else. If you cannot have chosen anything else, then you are not free in the libertarian sense."

Does that make sense to you? If not, why not?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Wade, the concept of libertarian free will requires there to be an actual possibility for alternate choices. If God can infallibly know the results of our future choices, whether from the present or from a timeless perspective, then there are no actual alternate choices. To the libertarian, it would be a logical contradiction to state that you will not freely choose any differently than what God has foreseen, since choosing freely entails that it is impossible for the result to be infallibly foreseen.

Regarding the question as moved to the point of view of past actions, I'm not certain that divine timelessness is a viable option for libertarians. Chris has observed on another thread that, for the libertarian, it would seem that only the present has any real ontological validity. I think this is an important observation, but there is a real difference between the past and the future on a libertarian view. The past does exist in a sense, through history and memory. And one could assume that the past is fixed through God's perfect memory of it. However, the future, in the libertarian view, does not yet exist. Therefore, the past can be known and is fixed, but the future cannot be known and is not fixed.

Perhaps Chris will have more to add. I hope this helps.

[Brade]

If he has no choice at all - if the device that controls his actions is always active, regardless of his desires - then he is not culpable even if the device is forcing him to do what he would have done anyway.

If the universe is deterministic then "the control device" is always active and no one is culpable for anything, and as I understand compatabilism it proceeds from the base assumption of a deterministic universe.

The Frankfurt cases attempt to show that even with determinism making it the case that he could only go one way, so long as he was not compelled and he gets what he wanted then he acted freely. Locke gives a similar example in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. A man is transported to a room while sleeping. He wakes up and deliberates about whether to leave the room or not and decides to stay in the room. Unknown to the man the door was locked and he couldn't have left the room anyway but, according to Locke, the mans choice was voluntary even though the man didn't have the power to leave. Similarly, even the determinism says that we don't have the power to do other than we do if what we do is what we want to do and we're not compelled to do it by some neurosis then the act is a free act and we are morally responsible for it.

It's only if the control is not active that he is culpable if he choses the immoral action anyway, because a situation where the control is not active is directly analagous to one in which the control device doesn't exist in the first place. In a situation where the hitman choses to murder my wife with no control device to force him to do so he is culpable. If the device has no real influence on the hitman's actions then it cannot mitigate his moral responsibility for them.

I suggest that if you're reaction to the stories (Frankfurt like cases) is that the determinism still counts as compulsion or that you feel being able to do otherwise is necessary for free will then you're a libertarian.

Wade, the concept of libertarian free will requires there to be an actual possibility for alternate choices. If God can infallibly know the results of our future choices, whether from the present or from a timeless perspective, then there are no actual alternate choices. To the libertarian, it would be a logical contradiction to state that you will not freely choose any differently than what God has foreseen, since choosing freely entails that it is impossible for the result to be infallibly foreseen.

Regarding the question as moved to the point of view of past actions, I'm not certain that divine timelessness is a viable option for libertarians. Chris has observed on another thread that, for the libertarian, it would seem that only the present has any real ontological validity. I think this is an important observation, but there is a real difference between the past and the future on a libertarian view. The past does exist in a sense, through history and memory. And one could assume that the past is fixed through God's perfect memory of it. However, the future, in the libertarian view, does not yet exist. Therefore, the past can be known and is fixed, but the future cannot be known and is not fixed.

Well put John. I enjoyed reading that.

[johndoe]

If he has no choice at all - if the device that controls his actions is always active, regardless of his desires - then he is not culpable even if the device is forcing him to do what he would have done anyway.

If the universe is deterministic then "the control device" is always active and no one is culpable for anything, and as I understand compatabilism it proceeds from the base assumption of a deterministic universe.

It's only if the control is not active that he is culpable if he choses the immoral action anyway, because a situation where the control is not active is directly analagous to one in which the control device doesn't exist in the first place. In a situation where the hitman choses to murder my wife with no control device to force him to do so he is culpable. If the device has no real influence on the hitman's actions then it cannot mitigate his moral responsibility for them.

Thanks for the clarification. I believe that what you have stated demonstrates that the Frankfurt cases are a fairly approximate analogy, but not perfect. I imagine that this is the very reason that libertarians, such as Ostler, don't find them compelling.

So, in essense, you still view the hitman as having libertarian free will. If he chooses to kill your wife, he still could have chosen otherwise. His action would have been the same, but the critical element - his choice - still could have been different.

I think that's a valid response. Ultimately, the Frankfurt cases are an appeal to intuition using a counterexample. They are only effective so long as the counterexample truly addresses the core issue at stake. The trick would be to create a new counterexample that would actually address this issue in a way that would allow the discussion to move forward in ways that are new. A tall order.

[Jason]

Locke gives a similar example in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. A man is transported to a room while sleeping. He wakes up and deliberates about whether to leave the room or not and decides to stay in the room. Unknown to the man the door was locked and he couldn't have left the room anyway but, according to Locke, the mans choice was voluntary even though the man didn't have the power to leave.

I agree that the man's choice was voluntary, because if he had made the choice to leave and then discovered that the door was locked events would have played out differently than they did when he decided to stay without trying the door. There were at least two possible options available to the man, even if the choice was really between trying the door or not rather than leaving the room or not.

I suggest that if you're reaction to the stories (Frankfurt like cases) is that the determinism still counts as compulsion or that you feel being able to do otherwise is necessary for free will then you're a libertarian.

Essentially yes, I view determinism as equivelent to a compulsion and that a real possibility of doing otherwise is neccessary for moral responsibility to attach to your actions.

[wenglund]

Wade, the concept of libertarian free will requires there to be an actual possibility for alternate choices. If God can infallibly know the results of our future choices, whether from the present or from a timeless perspective, then there are no actual alternate choices. To the libertarian, it would be a logical contradiction to state that you will not freely choose any differently than what God has foreseen, since choosing freely entails that it is impossible for the result to be infallibly foreseen.

Regarding the question as moved to the point of view of past actions, I'm not certain that divine timelessness is a viable option for libertarians. Chris has observed on another thread that, for the libertarian, it would seem that only the present has any real ontological validity. I think this is an important observation, but there is a real difference between the past and the future on a libertarian view. The past does exist in a sense, through history and memory. And one could assume that the past is fixed through God's perfect memory of it. However, the future, in the libertarian view, does not yet exist. Therefore, the past can be known and is fixed, but the future cannot be known and is not fixed.

Perhaps Chris will have more to add. I hope this helps.

If you are correct (and I do appreciate the clarification), then it is the concept of libertarian free will, itself, that artificially creates the incompatibility between foreknowledge/pastknowledge and free will. Right?

So, if one rejects the libertarian concept as stated, then one is not obliged to grant that there is such an incompatibility, and may even logically conclude otherwise.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Brade]

If you are correct, then it is the concept of libertarian free will, itself, that artificially creates the incompatibility between foreknowledge/pastknowledge and free will. Right?

So, if one rejects the libertarian concept as stated, then one is not obliged to grant that there is such an incompatibility, and may even logically conclude otherwise.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

That's right. The idea of libertarian free will is what creates the incompatibility between foreknowledge and free will. Compatabilists do exactly what you say. They reject the libertarian concept of free will and then say that foreknowledge is compatible with free will. To the compatibilist free will does not mean being able to do otherwise. It means something like not being compelled by neurosis or a man with a gun to your head telling you to do such and such.

One problem (I don't know if problem is the right word) which isn't a huge threat to compatibilism but does help get libertarianism off the ground is that even the compatibilist and hard determinist will say that when they make a choice they do feel (inside) like they could have done otherwise. The libertarian runs with this and says "free will is just that!" The compatibilist says free will feels like being able to do otherwise but it's actually not that at all because being able to do otherwise isn't possible. But the libertarian will say the evidence for determinism isn't conclusive and the intuition (or phenomenology; the way it feels inside) is so strong that I can do otherwise that there doesn't seem to be a good enough reason to suppose that I can't do otherwise.

[Jason]

That's right. The idea of libertarian free will is what creates the incompatibility between foreknowledge and free will. Compatabilists do exactly what you say. They reject the libertarian concept of free will and then say that foreknowledge is compatible with free will. To the compatibilist free will does not mean being able to do otherwise. It means something like not being compelled by neurosis or a man with a gun to your head telling you to do such and such.

Which to me is the same as jettisoning the idea of free will and putting something that looks similar but is largely illusiory in its place.

In particular it does not satisfy, for me, the idea that God can be just while punishing someone who had no other option than to do what they did - no real moral responsibility.

[wenglund]

Which to me is the same as jettisoning the idea of free will and putting something that looks similar but is largely illusiory in its place.

Actually, it is jettesoning one human-generated abstract idea of free will for another human-generated abstract idea.

As for which is illusiory of the other, or even illusiory of the phenomena of "free will" itself? Who knows?--though if Kant is to be believed, both abstract ideas are illusiory.

The good news is, God continues to be who and what he is, and his gospel continues to flourish, and by way of whatever idea of free agency, much happiness and wonderful things have occured throughout the ages, and the world has progressed marvelously, and will continue to progress marvelously, all without many of us giving this issue much if any thought, let alone coming to some sort of a definitive resolution.

Sure, the ships of religious faith of some people have abandoned the safe harbors for deeper philosophical waters, and departed from their course towards the verdant land of promise, only to find themselves floundering or crashing upon the man-made shoals of this illusive question. And, to me, therein lay the real free-will dilemma.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[johndoe]

Actually, it is jettesoning one human-generated abstract idea of free will for another human-generated abstract idea.

As for which is illusiory of the other, or even illusiory of the phenomena of "free will" itself? Who knows?--though if Kant is to be believed, both abstract ideas are illusiory.

The good news is, God continues to be who and what he is, and his gospel continues to flourish, and by way of whatever idea of free agency, much happiness and wonderful things have occured throughout the ages, and the world has progressed marvelously, and will continue to progress marvelously, all without many of us giving this issue much if any thought, let alone coming to some sort of a definitive resolution.

Sure, the ships of religious faith of some people have abandoned the safe harbors for deeper philosophical waters, and departed from their course towards the verdant land of promise, only to find themselves floundering or crashing upon the man-made shoals of this illusive question. And, to me, therein lay the real free-will dilemma.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

I can agree with this. I don't really believe that revelation will ever clear up this matter, since I do not believe that we have any real need to know the correct answer to this debate. I look forward to the day when both libertarians and compatibilists may find ourselves in the celestial kingdom and have a good laugh about the whole thing. Wouldn't it be funny if we're both wrong?

Sure, it's an interesting topic, and I continue to be a compatibilist (at least for now). But it's being interesting doesn't really make it important.

[Brade]

I can agree with this. I don't really believe that revelation will ever clear up this matter, since I do not believe that we have any real need to know the correct answer to this debate. I look forward to the day when both libertarians and compatibilists may find ourselves in the celestial kingdom and have a good laugh about the whole thing. Wouldn't it be funny if we're both wrong?

Sure, it's an interesting topic, and I continue to be a compatibilist (at least for now). But it's being interesting doesn't really make it important.

I agree. Maybe we'll get to heaven and God will say "The existentialists had it right after all". Then we'll all feel really lame because it was definitely the sexiest "party" philosophy that nobody really took seriously.

[JDave]

So if we conceive of God as being an N-dimensional being (pick some N larger than four) then God would have every degree of freedom enjoyed by 3-dimensional beings. A 3D being can still make 2D movements. Therefore God is not restricted from being able to scratch His nose, or make any action. He is not restricted at all, but actually has many more degrees of freedom in ways that we can't easily imagine. If God interacts with us in this mortal world, His actions will affect the future. Therefore, God is permuting the system to achieve some desired results, but not at the loss of mankind's agency.

This higher-dimensional God has a perfect view of time and knows the future. This knowledge is of time works whether in a deterministic world or indeterministic. If we contend that we are in a indeterministic world, where people can choose A or B at time t1, and their decision is not necessarily a function of the past, then God still knows whether the choice is A or B.

By contending that the world is indeterministic, compatibilism is not an option.

By contending that God knows our choice, and it is fixed, libertarianism is not an option.

By eliminating compatibilism and libertarianism, we create a new option.

There is probably some inconsistency here, but I need some help because I don't see it yet. Please oblige.

[Chris Smith]

I'd like to take a crack at Jason's body-control case from my admittedly materialist perspective. But first, a little bit about what I understand freedom to mean.

I see "life" as a dilaectic-- a dialogue-- between circumstances internal to the agent and circumstances external to the agent. The key is that the interaction is two-way: there is input from outside the agent, but this is processed and responded to by an identity internal to the agent. At every moment what I become is a synthesis of the two. For me, the concept of freedom describes the condition in which the internal identity is more determinative at a given moment than are the external inputs that are present at that moment. Now, it is true that the internal identity itself was originally determined by exclusively external factors, and that it has continued to define itself in response to such factors. We therefore might say that it is merely the sum of certain outside influences. But when the agent was born, a boundary was created between the interior and the exterior of the agent. Those outside factors that created the agent became internal factors at the moment of the agent's birth. After that moment, it was no longer true to say that the agent was determined only by external factors, because at any moment after T₀ over the course of the agent's life it is the product of both its internal identity and of external inputs at the immediately prior moment.

In other words, what determines whether an act is "free" is the question of whether at a given moment, the agent's acts proceed more from its internal identity or more from the external conditions that obtained at the immediately preceding moment. To the extent that my internal identity is the dominant determinative factor, I act freely. To the extent that the external conditions are the dominant determinative factor, I do not act freely. But the crucial point is that only the factors that are present at the immediately prior moment really count in making this judgment. What this means is that given the set of moments T₀, T₁,... T_n-1, T_n, we can say that my freedom at any moment T_n should be evaluated in light of the factors that obtained at T_n-1. The only moment at which I have absolutely zero freedom, therefore, will be T₀, because at T₀ I had no identity in the prior moment; the determinative factors were therefore entirely external. This is not true at any other moment over the course of my lifetime.

A couple observations on the implications of all this. First of all, when I am an infant my identity is "weak". I to a large degree am a blank slate, and so external factors will tend to predominate at a given moment. But as I get older and accumulate more memories, my personality becomes stronger and is more determinative with respect to external factors. We can therefore say that freedom will tend to increase as we get further from T₀. Secondly, you might ask what constitutes the "boundedness" of internal factors. I would say that self-awareness is what creates that boundedness. Our analysis would not apply to a handgun or a tree, because these do not have a sense of self or an awareness of internality vs. externality. It is only in the context of such an awareness that it makes sense to speak of freedom.

Now, back to Jason's body-control example. What Jason is positing, if I understand him correctly, is that rather than overruling a person's identity, his machine actually changes the person's identity. The person's actions therefore proceed from his/her identity, but that identity is the very recent product of Jason's device. I do not believe that it would be possible to give a person a strong identity (which is required if Jason wants the person to kill his wife) without giving the person new memories. If the old memories are erased and new ones are implanted, I would argue that the old identity has died and a new one has been born. Though the new one technically has a low value of n, we can treat it as a high value since its memories simulate a lifetime of experience. I would argue that whatever this new-born agent does (assuming it is not externally constrained), it is culpable for. The old, now-dead agent, however, is not. If it were possible to restore the original memories and thus to resurrect the original personality, the original personality would not be culpable for any actions performed while it was dead.

I think that all of this accords very well with our intuitions. My intuition is that I was not free at birth, and that I had little freedom as an infant. Libertarian free will, I think, would demand that I was free at both times. My intuition is that "freedom" is something I experience to varying degrees in particular situations, and that the configuration of my identity at birth has little to do with the question of whether I am free or not at the present moment. Libertarian free-will, on the other hand, tries to view freedom in some sort of absolute, eternal perspective.

To be frank, I haven't the slightest why people feel compelled by their intuitions to adopt the libertarian position. I certainly don't. But then it's a free country, and they are free to adopt that position in accordance with their innermost identity and desires; I'm certainly not going to stop them!

-Chris

[Bee Eff]

So does your statements.

I still do not see you answering the CFR, for just claiming that things do not exist in the future makes the scripture that says God knows the past, present, and future meaningless. I admit it is hard to get your "mind around" this concept, but you have not disproved my "interpretation" as you put it. What does it mean to state that "all things are present before Him"?

Are not all true prophecies prefaced with "if" when calling people to repentance? The probabilities exist only from our mortal perspective, not from God's. Jonah's problem was he did not want the people to repent and make his "prophecy" fail, it failed because of Jonah, not because of God or His foresight.

You are saying that God rules and teaches His children from uncertainty, which cannot be the case. God does only that which is just and true, He does not condone sin nor is He the author of it. However He does allow us all complete agency and that is what condemns us, not God's "presentation."

It seems like you are playing a semantics game, but I suppose it is a matter of perspective, but the future does exist in God's knowledge, I give the following as evidence:In connection with:What do you think that means? Especially the part about the future?

Not knowing the future would be quite a handicap for God, because then He could never reveal anything with any certainty. I think the false premise is in you corner, you have not given anything to back up you claims, no scriptures only philosophical speculation on your part.

How is it? What does that mean? Does it mean as others have mentioned in this thread that Nephi could not say with absolute certainty that Mary was going to be the mother of the Son of God in the flesh? Or that Joseph Smith would be the choice seer whom God would raise up in the last days? Or Moses? Or even Christ Himself? What does that do to our confidence in revelations? Can we say... maybe it will come to pass? Or if God reveals to us in a blessing that a person will live... does that mean we should only say maybe? No I am sorry but your concept of God's omniscience is nonsensical. It second guesses Him at every turn and the Prophet Joseph said that if God did not know all things (both visible and invisible) then how could we have complete faith in Him unto life and salvation? I guess we will have to agree to disagree but I have never seen one reference from the scriptures or the prophets statements that confirm your theory.

ba81 responded to this fairly well, and I agree with what he has written for the most part so I will not respond to much of it, you may take his response as wholly in agreement with myself.

Some comments though.

You are requesting a CFR on my interpretation. I cannot provide a reference for my interpretation, my interpretation is my interpretation. All reference I would provide would be interpretted in this interpretation and as such would have the same problem. Yes, semantics play a role in interpretation of language. All our current scripture is semantic in nature. Semantics are at the heart of most Bible interpretational disagreements.

(D&C 38:2) "The same which knoweth all things, for all things are present before mine eyes;"

This says nothing of the future. The future does not exist, so anything in the future is not referenced by "all things."

(D&C 130:6-8 ) " 6 The angels do not reside on a planet like this earth;

7 But they reside in the presence of God, on a globe like a sea of glass and fire, where all things for their glory are manifest, past, present, and future, and are continually before the Lord.

8 The place where God resides is a great Urim and Thummim."

Does not necessitate your claims. Could easily be viewed as stating that God can see the plan for the future, or perhaps all possible futures, or any number of things.

Finally, you are making a mistake assuming I have ever claimed that God was "uncertain". God is absolute in his certainty. You state that I am claiming that God does not know all things because I claim that He probably does not know something that is non-existent. I claim that God knows all things, past, present and future. I simply claim that the future does not exist yet and so there is currently nothing to know at the present time, when the future exists, God knows it. God knows everything, but the future doesn't exist.

The future has no evidence for its existence.

[Bee Eff]

So if we conceive of God as being an N-dimensional being (pick some N larger than four) then God would have every degree of freedom enjoyed by 3-dimensional beings. A 3D being can still make 2D movements. Therefore God is not restricted from being able to scratch His nose, or make any action. He is not restricted at all, but actually has many more degrees of freedom in ways that we can't easily imagine. If God interacts with us in this mortal world, His actions will affect the future. Therefore, God is permuting the system to achieve some desired results, but not at the loss of mankind's agency.

This higher-dimensional God has a perfect view of time and knows the future. This knowledge is of time works whether in a deterministic world or indeterministic. If we contend that we are in a indeterministic world, where people can choose A or B at time t1, and their decision is not necessarily a function of the past, then God still knows whether the choice is A or B.

By contending that the world is indeterministic, compatibilism is not an option.

By contending that God knows our choice, and it is fixed, libertarianism is not an option.

By eliminating compatibilism and libertarianism, we create a new option.

There is probably some inconsistency here, but I need some help because I don't see it yet. Please oblige.

I dislike the desire to claim the extra-dimensional or supernatural. Why would God create anything not in the realm of his existence? Is there any scriptural support for the extra-dimensional/supernatural? Particularly in light of our technological capacity at the moment and our understanding of our limited understanding? Spirit does not necessitate another dimension or the supernatural.

[Brade]

So if we conceive of God as being an N-dimensional being (pick some N larger than four) then God would have every degree of freedom enjoyed by 3-dimensional beings. A 3D being can still make 2D movements. Therefore God is not restricted from being able to scratch His nose, or make any action. He is not restricted at all, but actually has many more degrees of freedom in ways that we can't easily imagine. If God interacts with us in this mortal world, His actions will affect the future. Therefore, God is permuting the system to achieve some desired results, but not at the loss of mankind's agency.

This higher-dimensional God has a perfect view of time and knows the future. This knowledge is of time works whether in a deterministic world or indeterministic. If we contend that we are in a indeterministic world, where people can choose A or B at time t1, and their decision is not necessarily a function of the past, then God still knows whether the choice is A or B.

By contending that the world is indeterministic, compatibilism is not an option.

By contending that God knows our choice, and it is fixed, libertarianism is not an option.

By eliminating compatibilism and libertarianism, we create a new option.

There is probably some inconsistency here, but I need some help because I don't see it yet. Please oblige.

I donâ??t think I was clear enough in my nose scratching example. I agree that an N dimensional being that can exist outside time can scratch his nose if he so desires. However, his nose scratching wouldnâ??t be anything like what I do when I lift my hand to my nose and drag the fingernail of my index finger across the surface of my nose over and over again. To be in time is to have certain spatio-temporal relations between things. To be out of time is to not have spatio-temporal relations between things since all that time is is for one little bit to be here and then for it to be not here and to be over there.

So for God to out of time is for him to be either everywhere or nowhere at all. He canâ??t be in some place and certainly canâ??t start moving his arms or fingers about because once he starts doing that heâ??s destroyed outside-of-time-ness. So, sure, Iâ??ll grant that he can scratch his nose but itâ??s not like anything I call nose scratching.

I havenâ??t even said anything in this post of free will and thatâ??s because just putting God outside of time should make this view unattractive to an LDS grappling with free will and divine foreknowledge since any account of God as being outside of time runs counter to LDS descriptions of what God is.

So, that view is only appealing to some other sort of Christian thatâ??s comfortable with God as something other than an embodied being. But, even then, as Iâ??ve already said I donâ??t think the idea does any legwork in solving the puzzle of making libertarian free will compatible with divine foreknowledge. We could say this. Supposing God is outside time and he knows by virtue of seeing the whole of time as one now-ness that Iâ??m will engage in X. That still just means, by the argument (or something like it) that it is not within my power to make it not the case that I engage in X since I cannot make something God believes is true, false. So, moving God outside time does not allow for libertarian free will. The most we could say is that the only being with libertarian free will is God. In that sense, libertarian free will exists. But thatâ??s not a very attractive sense for it to exists since Iâ??m not outside time like God is on this account.

I just donâ??t see an option inbetween libertarianism and compatibilism as you seem to think there is. Maybe there is as John has also suggested but for whatever reason, us â??3Dâ? beings arenâ??t getting it. Also, Iâ??ve already shown by the very nature of the logic by which we all operate this third option isnâ??t even possible. So, if it exists at all itâ??s going to have exist by virtue of some â??otherâ? logic. I donâ??t even want to think about what that would be like. In short, to get at what you seem to think is there youâ??d need a new logic system different than what we have. And then, at least down here in time, it seems like youâ??d be going through an awful lot of trouble when the compatibilist or libertarian accounts actually can do quite well for people. Which camp you end up falling into just sort of depends on your intuitions and the sacrifices (i.e. Godâ??s omniscience or genuine alternate possibilities) youâ??re willing to make.

I donâ??t know what else can be said about it.

[JDave]

I dislike the desire to claim the extra-dimensional or supernatural. Why would God create anything not in the realm of his existence? Is there any scriptural support for the extra-dimensional/supernatural? Particularly in light of our technological capacity at the moment and our understanding of our limited understanding? Spirit does not necessitate another dimension or the supernatural.

Things are only supernatural if we don't yet comprehend them.

God already created spirit bodies, which are different than the bodies we have here on this earth, which are different from the glorified bodies we will receive at the Resurrection. I think God has been shown to create things that are distinct from Him.

No, no scriptural support.

[JDave]

I don't think I was clear enough in my nose scratching example. I agree that an N dimensional being that can exist outside time can scratch his nose if he so desires. However, his nose scratching wouldn't be anything like what I do when I lift my hand to my nose and drag the fingernail of my index finger across the surface of my nose over and over again. To be in time is to have certain spatio-temporal relations between things. To be out of time is to not have spatio-temporal relations between things since all that time is is for one little bit to be here and then for it to be not here and to be over there.

To be in time is to have spatio-temporal relations within the first four dimensions. A movement in a higher dimension would not be perceived in the lower dimensions. So God would have parts and passions, but they would be in a higher dimension. When God appears to man He is presenting a projection of Himself onto only three dimensions.

So for God to out of time is for him to be either everywhere or nowhere at all. He can't be in some place and certainly can't start moving his arms or fingers about because once he starts doing that he's destroyed outside-of-time-ness. So, sure, I'll grant that he can scratch his nose but it's not like anything I call nose scratching.

If something changes from two-dimensional to three-dimensional it does not lose the properties of the first two dimensions. A higher-dimensional being does not become "everywhere or nowhere at all" just as a 3D object is not "everywhere and nowhere at all" with respect to a lower dimension. I would agree that His nose scratching is not like what we call nose scratching, since it would be at a higher dimension. But God could move in the lower three dimension, not the fourth, but also move in another higher dimension.

I haven't even said anything in this post of free will and that's because just putting God outside of time should make this view unattractive to an LDS grappling with free will and divine foreknowledge since any account of God as being outside of time runs counter to LDS descriptions of what God is.

I agree that a concept of God that is "everywhere" and "without parts or passions" is contrary to LDS doctrine. But I don't think that is a necessary conclusion for a higher-dimensional being.

But, even then, as I've already said I don't think the idea does any legwork in solving the puzzle of making libertarian free will compatible with divine foreknowledge.

I am not trying to maintain pure libertarian free will. As I stated, that is rejected because God's knowledge of our actions would fix them in time.

BTW, I very much agree with johndoe that this is interesting, but not important. I just wanted to clarify that I am just debating this because it is interesting to me.

[Lightbearer]

Finally, you are making a mistake assuming I have ever claimed that God was "uncertain". God is absolute in his certainty. You state that I am claiming that God does not know all things because I claim that He probably does not know something that is non-existent. I claim that God knows all things, past, present and future. I simply claim that the future does not exist yet and so there is currently nothing to know at the present time, when the future exists, God knows it. God knows everything, but the future doesn't exist.

The future has no evidence for its existence.

So how is this any different than the following statement:

(Jacob 7:7) "And ye have led away much of this people that they pervert the right way of God, and keep not the law of Moses which is the right way; and convert the law of Moses into the worship of a being which ye say shall come many hundred years hence. And now behold, I, Sherem, declare unto you that this is blasphemy; for no man knoweth of such things; for he cannot tell of things to come. And after this manner did Sherem contend against me."

Or the following:

(Alma 30:13-15) "O ye that are bound down under a foolish and a vain hope, why do ye yoke yourselves with such foolish things? Why do ye look for a Christ? For no man can know of anything which is to come. Behold, these things which ye call prophecies, which ye say are handed down by holy prophets, behold, they are foolish traditions of your fathers. How do ye know of their surety? Behold, ye cannot know of things which ye do not see; therefore ye cannot know that there shall be a Christ."

Is not this saying the same things you are? Do you see what direction this line of reasoning is going? If there is no future then how can there be prophecy? If it is a matter of interpretation then perhaps we should beware of "private interpretations"?