God And Absolute Knowledge

[Brade]

So how is this any different than the following statement:Or the following:Is not this saying the same things you are? Do you see what direction this line of reasoning is going? If there is no future then how can there be prophecy? If it is a matter of interpretation then perhaps we should beware of "private interpretations"?

Oh man. Lightbearer, if you can't see how the libertarian position is different than what Sherem and others are reported to have said in the Book of Mormon than either you've failed to understand the libertarian position or you're trying to mischaracterize what we're saying. I feel like this have been addressed well enough in this thread to get a grasp of it. Whether you agree with the libertarian position or not, Ostler has given a very thorough account of how the idea of libertarian free will is consistent with scriptural statements about prophecies and God's knowledge and the the like.

[Jason]

Now, it is true that the internal identity itself was originally determined by exclusively external factors, and that it has continued to define itself in response to such factors. We therefore might say that it is merely the sum of certain outside influences. But when the agent was born, a boundary was created between the interior and the exterior of the agent. Those outside factors that created the agent became internal factors at the moment of the agent's birth. After that moment, it was no longer true to say that the agent was determined only by external factors, because at any moment after T₀ over the course of the agent's life it is the product of both its internal identity and of external inputs at the immediately prior moment.

This seems a bit dodgy. In a deterministic universe, is there really a sharp boundary between "external" and "internal" factors? If the "internal" factors are all a result of the interaction of various external factors over time, then why bother to differentiate between the two?

Now, back to Jason's body-control example. What Jason is positing, if I understand him correctly, is that rather than overruling a person's identity, his machine actually changes the person's identity. The person's actions therefore proceed from his/her identity, but that identity is the very recent product of Jason's device.

My original example was that the device would only control a person's physical body, leaving the mind untouched.

A situation where the device worked on a mental level as well, imposing a new personality, goals, beliefs, etc. might be interesting to explore as well, but I don't think it would substantially change my conclusions.

If the new personality is artificially constructed then I agree with you that the culpability for any deeds performed by the new personality would rest with the constructors, not with the suppressed/destroyed original personality which occupied the body.

I think that all of this accords very well with our intuitions. My intuition is that I was not free at birth, and that I had little freedom as an infant. Libertarian free will, I think, would demand that I was free at both times.

I'm not sure about freedom on its most basic level, but to attach moral responsibility to one's actions requires knowledge that an infant does not possess. An infant is therefore not morally responsible for its actions.

To be frank, I haven't the slightest why people feel compelled by their intuitions to adopt the libertarian position. I certainly don't. But then it's a free country, and they are free to adopt that position in accordance with their innermost identity and desires; I'm certainly not going to stop them!

For me the issue rests almost entirely on moral responsibility. I can see no way to attach moral responsibility to a person's actions if they could not in fact have chosen to do other than they did.

[Bee Eff]

So how is this any different than the following statement:Or the following:Is not this saying the same things you are? Do you see what direction this line of reasoning is going? If there is no future then how can there be prophecy? If it is a matter of interpretation then perhaps we should beware of "private interpretations"?

Once again...

Prophecy is not foolishness, and I have never stated this.

I have never said that God does not know exactly what will happen, I have only stated that there are a number of possible futures and God knows all of these possibilities. These futures do not exist yet though, and so they are only possible futures and not absolute. Thus, which single existent future actually occurs is not known, and cannot be known, in a traditional sense. Edited to include: which in the preceding sentence.

I believe that God has faith in man. A knowledge of an absolute exact future does not allow for faith and hope. Faith and hope are central to our belief system, if such does not exist in God Himself, why should I exercise these ungodly attributes?

[Chris Smith]

This seems a bit dodgy. In a deterministic universe, is there really a sharp boundary between "external" and "internal" factors? If the "internal" factors are all a result of the interaction of various external factors over time, then why bother to differentiate between the two?

No; from an absolute perspective, there is no hard and fast distinction between internal and external. But we are not absolute beings, and do not have an absolute perspective. What we are is finite and self-aware beings-- emergent entities who result from a confluence of factors external to ourselves-- who have an awareness of a distinction between internality and externality. Determinism does not change the fact of self-awareness, and therefore does not negate the internal/external distinction. There's nothing dodgy about that.

My original example was that the device would only control a person's physical body, leaving the mind untouched.

Ah. Sorry. You gave a few different versions over the course of the two threads, and somewhere in there I lost track. Well, in the case of your controlling someone's body and forcing it to do something their mind wanted to do anyway, I would say that the person is culpable only for the desire, not for the action. The action was your doing; the fact is that external factors predominated in determining behavior, even if internal factors would have produced the same result.

For me the issue rests almost entirely on moral responsibility. I can see no way to attach moral responsibility to a person's actions if they could not in fact have chosen to do other than they did.

I believe this is a category confusion: a confusion of finite and absolute perspectives. Moral responsibility exists if 1) in a particular situation there are multiple options external to myself, and 2) in that situation my choice flows from my innermost being (rather than being compelled by, say, a body control device). When we ask from our finite perspective whether a person could have chosen otherwise than he did, we are asking whether there were any other external options open to him. We are not asking whether he was compelled by himself to do what he did. I think most people would agree that to be compelled by yourself does not constitute an excuse; in fact, it constitutes a fairly necessary precondition for moral responsibility. To try to transpose the "multiple options" requirement onto an absolute perspective, in my opinion, is a mistake.

Best,

-Chris

[Jason]

No; from an absolute perspective, there is no hard and fast distinction between internal and external. But we are not absolute beings, and do not have an absolute perspective. What we are is finite and self-aware beings-- emergent entities who result from a confluence of factors external to ourselves-- who have an awareness of a distinction between internality and externality. Determinism does not change the fact of self-awareness, and therefore does not negate the internal/external distinction. There's nothing dodgy about that.

So you're saying "we're simply more comfortable believing there is a difference."

Ah. Sorry. You gave a few different versions over the course of the two threads, and somewhere in there I lost track. Well, in the case of your controlling someone's body and forcing it to do something their mind wanted to do anyway, I would say that the person is culpable only for the desire, not for the action. The action was your doing; the fact is that external factors predominated in determining behavior, even if internal factors would have produced the same result.

I think we share the same general conclusions.

I believe this is a category confusion: a confusion of finite and absolute perspectives. Moral responsibility exists if 1) in a particular situation there are multiple options external to myself, and 2) in that situation my choice flows from my innermost being (rather than being compelled by, say, a body control device). When we ask from our finite perspective whether a person could have chosen otherwise than he did, we are asking whether there were any other external options open to him. We are not asking whether he was compelled by himself to do what he did.

It is only in an absolute (and religious) context that I think one can reliably assign moral responsibility in the first place. From a finite and limited mortal perspective we cannot tell whether real options were available and whether a person was really compelled to chose one or the other by what might be called deterministic factors or a libertarian choice. I can easily understand why someone who believed humans are limited to this lifespan only would find a deterministic universe acceptable. Seen from the mortal perspective it is logical, though not especially comforting.

For someone who believes human beings are infinite beings, having existed in some form both from an infinite past as well as continuing to exist into an infinite future, and that God will make absolutely just judgements of their moral responsibility and actions, determinism, to my mind at least, has some problems.

I think most people would agree that to be compelled by yourself does not constitute an excuse; in fact, it constitutes a fairly necessary precondition for moral responsibility. To try to transpose the "multiple options" requirement onto an absolute perspective, in my opinion, is a mistake.

What constitutes being "compelled by yourself" then becomes an issue.

[Chris Smith]

So you're saying "we're simply more comfortable believing there is a difference."

Not really. Rather, I'm saying that from our perspective, there is a difference.

I can easily understand why someone who believed humans are limited to this lifespan only would find a deterministic universe acceptable. Seen from the mortal perspective it is logical, though not especially comforting.

For someone who believes human beings are infinite beings, having existed in some form both from an infinite past as well as continuing to exist into an infinite future, and that God will make absolutely just judgements of their moral responsibility and actions, determinism, to my mind at least, has some problems.

You are right that I don't particularly believe in an afterlife, though neither do I entirely rule out the possibility. Nevertheless, I'm not sure I understand why the existence of an afterlife would create problems for the compatibilist. Could you comment some more on that?

-Chris

[Jason]

Not really. Rather, I'm saying that from our perspective, there is a difference.

But our perspective is not in accordance with the absolute, and might therefore be termed inaccurate.

You are right that I don't particularly believe in an afterlife, though neither do I entirely rule out the possibility. Nevertheless, I'm not sure I understand why the existence of an afterlife would create problems for the compatibilist. Could you comment some more on that?

The primary problem I see is the impossibility of attaching real moral responsibility in an absolute sense in a deterministic universe conflicting with the existence of a God that claims that He is absolutely just and will judge the moral responsibility of mankind and reward them according to their actions. If all their actions are pre-determined then the rewards are without merit, and God's justice is in fact arbitrary. It depends on conditions beyond the control of those who are rewarded or punished.

[johndoe]

The primary problem I see is the impossibility of attaching real moral responsibility in an absolute sense in a deterministic universe conflicting with the existence of a God that claims that He is absolutely just and will judge the moral responsibility of mankind and reward them according to their actions. If all their actions are pre-determined then the rewards are without merit, and God's justice is in fact arbitrary. It depends on conditions beyond the control of those who are rewarded or punished.

If I may chime in here, Jason, in a sense I feel your pain. I certainly can understand the resistance you have towards the idea that we are morally responsible for things that are ultimately beyond our control. However, it is not at all clear how adding an indeterministic element, as libertarianism does, helps that issue at all. Galen Strawson's basic argument essentially takes a similar path as your statement above to argue that it is simply impossible for free will to exist.

From the wikipedia article about Strawson:

In the free will debate, Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. He argues for this position with what he calls his "basic argument", which aims to show that no-one is ever ultimately morally responsible for their actions, and hence that no one has free will in the sense that usually concerns us. In its simplest form, the Basic Argument runs thus:

1. We do what we do, in a given situation, because we are what we are.

2. In order to be ultimately responsible for what we do, we have to be ultimately responsible for what we are â?? at least in certain crucial mental respects.

3. But we cannot, as the first point avers, be ultimately responsible for what we are, because, simply, we are what we are; we cannot be causa sui.

4. Therefore, we cannot be ultimately responsible for what we do.

"I like philosophers," said Strawson in 2003. "I love what they do; I love what I do â?? but they have made a truly unbelievable hash of all this. They've tried to make the phrase 'free will' mean all sorts of different things, and each of them has told us that what it really means is what he or she has decided it should mean; but they haven't made the slightest impact on what it really means, or on our old, deep conviction that free will is something we have."

I have an idea for a new case. I would like to see how you and Brade respond to it. I'll try to post later today if I have time.

[Chris Smith]

But our perspective is not in accordance with the absolute, and might therefore be termed inaccurate.

Philosophers have raised serious questions about whether an absolute perspective is either possible or desirable. Generally when philosophers talk about a God's-eye point of view today, they are referring to the sum of all perspectives. This implies that our perspective is one facet of the truth, and that although other facets or perspectives do exist, they are not mutually exclusive. So no, our perspective is not inaccurate. It is incomplete, perhaps, but not inaccurate.

The primary problem I see is the impossibility of attaching real moral responsibility in an absolute sense in a deterministic universe conflicting with the existence of a God that claims that He is absolutely just and will judge the moral responsibility of mankind and reward them according to their actions. If all their actions are pre-determined then the rewards are without merit, and God's justice is in fact arbitrary. It depends on conditions beyond the control of those who are rewarded or punished.

So then afterlife/eternity are not what create problems, but rather the presumption of divine judgment and eternal reward/punishment. Well, I can agree with you there. If I did believe in an afterlife, I'd be a universalist. But in the other thread I did very briefly mention that LDS have a way out of this problem that is not available to classical theists. According to LDS theology, God is like us in that he is an intelligence-- albeit a very great one-- and therefore a finite being and fellow-traveler. Like us, God is a brute fact of the universe. If all of that's true, then his intentions in imposing reward and punishment may be much the same as our criminal justice system: he is trying to ensure the peace and success of the society of progressing souls. According to this view, morality is not an ontological reality but rather a utilitarian necessity, even when viewed from God's perspective.

-Chris

[johndoe]

I wonder how the libertarians out there might respond to this.

Let's take the case of Jason, his hitman, and his desire to have his wife killed (poor woman!).

Rather than a simple mind control device, this time the hitman has implanted a control device that only activates when it detects that he is about to make a morally relevant choice. The hitman lives in a world of libertarian free will, so the device activates just at the moment that he is about to choose among various alternatives. The device then decides for him which alternative he is to choose, based on indeterministic quantum observations. The hitman then must go with the alternative the device has selected.

With this device implanted (the hitman didn't choose to have the device implanted, nor does he know it's there), the hitman kills Jason's wife. Is he blameworthy?

[Jason]

If I may chime in here, Jason, in a sense I feel your pain. I certainly can understand the resistance you have towards the idea that we are morally responsible for things that are ultimately beyond our control. However, it is not at all clear how adding an indeterministic element, as libertarianism does, helps that issue at all. Galen Strawson's basic argument essentially takes a similar path as your statement above to argue that it is simply impossible for free will to exist.

1. We do what we do, in a given situation, because we are what we are.

2. In order to be ultimately responsible for what we do, we have to be ultimately responsible for what we are â?? at least in certain crucial mental respects.

3. But we cannot, as the first point avers, be ultimately responsible for what we are, because, simply, we are what we are; we cannot be causa sui.

4. Therefore, we cannot be ultimately responsible for what we do.

Strawson's argument proceeds from the assumption that universe is deterministic (point 1 is essentially a restatement of that assumption).

Number 2 therefore also falls under question. In a libertarian universe, we can control what we are. We can make the decisions that alter our character.

Strawson's argument is therefore essentially that in a deterministic universe there is no free will. I happen to agree, but the argument has nothing to say about whether the universe is actually deterministic.

[Jason]

Philosophers have raised serious questions about whether an absolute perspective is either possible or desirable. Generally when philosophers talk about a God's-eye point of view today, they are referring to the sum of all perspectives. This implies that our perspective is one facet of the truth, and that although other facets or perspectives do exist, they are not mutually exclusive. So no, our perspective is not inaccurate. It is incomplete, perhaps, but not inaccurate.

Well, when I speak of a God's-eye point of view I am speaking of an absolute perspective, not a sum of perspectives.

So then afterlife/eternity are not what create problems, but rather the presumption of divine judgment and eternal reward/punishment.

I had the begining of a thought of how an eternal existence for human beings (from an infinite past to an infinite future) might have problems with a deterministic universe, but I'm afraid I haven't baked it properly yet, so onto the back-burner it goes to simmer for a bit and see if something develops.

According to LDS theology, God is like us in that he is an intelligence-- albeit a very great one-- and therefore a finite being and fellow-traveler. Like us, God is a brute fact of the universe. If all of that's true, then his intentions in imposing reward and punishment may be much the same as our criminal justice system: he is trying to ensure the peace and success of the society of progressing souls. According to this view, morality is not an ontological reality but rather a utilitarian necessity, even when viewed from God's perspective.

Actually I tend to think that morality is effectively independent of God. That is, if God had never existed good and evil would still be exactly what they are with God's existence. I think there is plenty of room in LDS theology for this idea.

[Jason]

Let's take the case of Jason, his hitman, and his desire to have his wife killed (poor woman!).

Actually I'm not married.

Rather than a simple mind control device, this time the hitman has implanted a control device that only activates when it detects that he is about to make a morally relevant choice. The hitman lives in a world of libertarian free will, so the device activates just at the moment that he is about to choose among various alternatives. The device then decides for him which alternative he is to choose, based on indeterministic quantum observations. The hitman then must go with the alternative the device has selected.

With this device implanted (the hitman didn't choose to have the device implanted, nor does he know it's there), the hitman kills Jason's wife. Is he blameworthy?

I would say no, so long as the hitman has no choice whether to obey the device. You have effectively removed the hitman's ability to make morally relevent choices, and without that ability he cannot be culpable of any of his actions.

[Chris Smith]

Hi Jason,

Our dialogue doesn't seem to really have anywhere it can go from here. So unless your half-baked idea becomes a fully-baked one and you decide to share it, I think I'll take advantage of this opportune moment to bow out and focus on meeting my mid-term paper deadlines! Thanks for the enjoyable conversation,

-Chris

[johndoe]

Strawson's argument proceeds from the assumption that universe is deterministic (point 1 is essentially a restatement of that assumption).

Number 2 therefore also falls under question. In a libertarian universe, we can control what we are. We can make the decisions that alter our character.

Strawson's argument is therefore essentially that in a deterministic universe there is no free will. I happen to agree, but the argument has nothing to say about whether the universe is actually deterministic.

Strawson makes no such assumption. You are projecting your own bias onto his argument.

Jason, you have already argued against determinism by asserting that if our choices depend on conditions beyond our control, then we have no free will. Now, you are stating that only per determinism are our choices determined by what/who we are. Following through logically, if our choices are determined by something other than what/who we are, then they are determined by conditions that are outside of our control. By your own assertion, we could have no free will if determinism is not true.

[johndoe]

Actually I'm not married.

I guessed that. If you were, I imagine you would not have chosen a wife as the victim in your hypothetical case!

I would say no, so long as the hitman has no choice whether to obey the device. You have effectively removed the hitman's ability to make morally relevent choices, and without that ability he cannot be culpable of any of his actions.

Perhaps we are making progress (though I am not very optimistic). So even though the hitman is able to do other than that which he does, he is still not free. So what is required for choices to be free?

[Log]

Here's a non-hypothetical data point. If determinism is true, then people cannot do other than that which they do. How then can moral culpability of the form "you ought to have done this" be assigned, or how could things like "if you had done that, I would have done this" be said and be non-trivially true, if determinism is true? For the scriptures do both of these.

[Zeta-Flux]

Here's a non-hypothetical data point. If determinism is true, then people cannot do other than that which they do. How then can moral culpability of the form "you ought to have done this" be assigned, or how could things like "if you had done that, I would have done this" be said and be non-trivially true, if determinism is true? For the scriptures do both of these.

I think the answer is the context. When one says "you ought to have done this" this is shorthand for "you ought to have done this if you wanted A to happen (or B not to happen)." In terms of moral laws, A=please God and B=damnation or unfortunate consequences. The statement "you ought to have done this" is not a statement about philosophical power, but a statement of instruction about what the person didn't know and/or should believe.

[johndoe]

Here's a non-hypothetical data point. If determinism is true, then people cannot do other than that which they do. How then can moral culpability of the form "you ought to have done this" be assigned, or how could things like "if you had done that, I would have done this" be said and be non-trivially true, if determinism is true? For the scriptures do both of these.

I don't see why it would be necessary for us to be actually able to do otherwise for either of those types of statements to be "non-trivially" true.

We all agree that it is impossible for us not to sin in this life. Does that make it somehow nonsensical to state that we ought not to sin? Or that if we were able not to sin, then X?

[Jason]

Strawson makes no such assumption. You are projecting your own bias onto his argument.

Well admittedly this is only a summary of his argument that I am viewing, but the deterministic assumption seems plain to me in this summary.

Jason, you have already argued against determinism by asserting that if our choices depend on conditions beyond our control, then we have no free will. Now, you are stating that only per determinism are our choices determined by what/who we are.

I'm not sure I am saying that. See below.

Following through logically, if our choices are determined by something other than what/who we are, then they are determined by conditions that are outside of our control. By your own assertion, we could have no free will if determinism is not true.

If who/what we are is something that we have no control over then yes, we have no free will. If, however, we have the ability to consciously change who/what we are, then since we have ultimate control over who or what we are morally responsible for it.An important tenet of LDS theology and Christianity in general seems to be that everyone in fact has the ability to change who and what they are for the better, and therefore everyone is ultimately responsible for their moral choices.

Hi Jason,Our dialogue doesn't seem to really have anywhere it can go from here. So unless your half-baked idea becomes a fully-baked one and you decide to share it, I think I'll take advantage of this opportune moment to bow out and focus on meeting my mid-term paper deadlines! Thanks for the enjoyable conversation,-Chris

Good luck with mid-terms.

Perhaps we are making progress (though I am not very optimistic). So even though the hitman is able to do other than that which he does, he is still not free. So what is required for choices to be free?

How is the hitman able to do other than what he does if the device controls all of his moral choices?

[Lightbearer]

Oh man. Lightbearer, if you can't see how the libertarian position is different than what Sherem and others are reported to have said in the Book of Mormon than either you've failed to understand the libertarian position or you're trying to mischaracterize what we're saying. I feel like this have been addressed well enough in this thread to get a grasp of it. Whether you agree with the libertarian position or not, Ostler has given a very thorough account of how the idea of libertarian free will is consistent with scriptural statements about prophecies and God's knowledge and the the like.

I thought that a libertarian was a political party... as for Ostler I have yet to hear him sustained as a prophet, seer, and revelator in Conference.

[Jason]

We all agree that it is impossible for us not to sin in this life. Does that make it somehow nonsensical to state that we ought not to sin? Or that if we were able not to sin, then X?

Actually it is possible for us not to sin, it just happens that only one person has managed a perfect record of not sinning in every instance. God's prediction that no one else is completely innocent is not a statement of possibility or probability, it is instaed an accurate prediction of the general outcome.

Since it is possible for us not to sin in any specific situation but we sometimes chose to do so anyway we are morally culpable for our choice.

[Lightbearer]

Once again...

Prophecy is not foolishness, and I have never stated this.

I have never said that God does not know exactly what will happen, I have only stated that there are a number of possible futures and God knows all of these possibilities. These futures do not exist yet though, and so they are only possible futures and not absolute. Thus, which single existent future actually occurs is not known, and cannot be known, in a traditional sense. Edited to include: which in the preceding sentence.

I believe that God has faith in man. A knowledge of an absolute exact future does not allow for faith and hope. Faith and hope are central to our belief system, if such does not exist in God Himself, why should I exercise these ungodly attributes?

No but you have stated that God cannot know for certain the absolute future. Which is essentially the same thing. Okay we can agree on this that God knows "all the possible futures" or the future (whatever it may turn out to be from our perspective.) Although I still do not think we can ever "surprise God" or do something that He does not already know. Of course God has faith, but it is from a different perspective than the way we exercise faith, the veil is not on His mind. We hope for things not seem which are true, He knows all truth and there is not anything that He does not know. We cannot comprehend in our present mortal condition all the things of God. Moses was told that we cannot behold all His glory and remain in the flesh on the earth. Why do you suppose this would be? I think if we knew all that God knew, while here in this mortal life it would effectively cancel out our agency. That is why when speaking of the gift of a seer Ammon said:

(Mosiah 8:13) "Now Ammon said unto him: I can assuredly tell thee, O king, of a man that can translate the records; for he has wherewith that he can look, and translate all records that are of ancient date; and it is a gift from God. And the things are called interpreters, and no man can look in them except he be commanded, lest he should look for that he ought not and he should perish. And whosoever is commanded to look in them, the same is called seer."

Now a Seer can know of things in the past, present, and future... which knowledge is given to him by God. I guess it is a different way of looking at things but I still must contend that God knows all things and there is not anything that He does not know and also that mankind is free to act and not be acted upon. So whether God knows the "absolute future" or if only possible alternate futures it is a moot point because whichever is the case He knows which of those alternate futures that we all will take.

[johndoe]

Well admittedly this is only a summary of his argument that I am viewing, but the deterministic assumption seems plain to me in this summary.

Then it should be a simple matter for you to articulate why.

If who/what we are is something that we have no control over then yes, we have no free will. If, however, we have the ability to consciously change who/what we are, then since we have ultimate control over who or what we are morally responsible for it.

But what is your basis for that change? Consider the origin of who you are. Even with an uncreated intelligence, our most basic character/nature just is. I do not dispute that we have the ability to consciously change who/what we are, but again - why do we choose to do that? And why do we choose exactly who/what we would wish to be? If that choice does not flow from who/what we are already, then it must necessarily originate from a source other than ourselves. And we cannot have control over sources that are external.

How is the hitman able to do other than what he does if the device controls all of his moral choices?

There are two distinct concepts at play here. One is the ability to do otherwise. Even with the device implanted, the hitman does in fact have the ability to do otherwise. If the quatum state that controls the device is different, then he will do otherwise.

The other concept is the origin of the choice. It seems that you take issue with the fact that the hitman himself is not the source of his choice, since the hitman actually is able to do otherwise - but the selection of the specific alternative he acts upon is not made internally, but externally.

This is similar to how I view freedom. It's not about being able to do otherwise, but rather that choices are ultimately determined by the individual, not external factors.

[johndoe]

Actually it is possible for us not to sin, it just happens that only one person has managed a perfect record of not sinning in every instance. God's prediction that no one else is completely innocent is not a statement of possibility or probability, it is instaed an accurate prediction of the general outcome.

My statement was referring to the general case. As you noted, it is an accurate predition of the general outcome that all of us will sin in this life. I don't think that it becomes nonsensical to then state that we ought not to sin (again, in the general case).