God And Absolute Knowledge

[JDave]

OK, I think I follow what you're saying. I very much agree with a few parts, but I don't see how everything holds together for you.

Given an infinite number of possibilities, it is entirely possible that the statements/prophecies made came from a series of probabilities that approached a probability of 100%, so close that one could say that the event was absolute and fixed in the future.

So, in your view, God does not know the future because it doesn't exist. But he knows the present perfectly. So much so that he can lay perfectly accurate odds on future events. Since some of these odds approach 100%, he chooses from among those to make prophecies. He does this in order to demonstrate to us that He knows the future, even though His knowledge of the future is really quite limited to those things with infinitesimally small probabilities of error.

I also believe that while free will is existent, do our choice become fixed at some point based on a choice made at some point in our past? Was there a choice that each of us made at one point or another that made another course of action so improbable that we had set our future to a predetermined path?

At what point does the predetermined path and foreknowledge of God cause God to have culpability? I very much agree with what you wrote here, and I think Libertarians in general would have to concede that we do mold ourselves into someone who acts a certain way. I just wonder how this affects your original question about how culpable God is. Take your following statement.

Not knowing an absolute and exact future does not imply that God is not nearly absolute in his knowledge of what will happen in the future.

Is God nearly culpable?

Peter and Judas were immediately present events, very little time between prophecy and event. I am sure that God can state what will happen with perfection at that point. Perhaps even given a few thousand years gap, or maybe even given a few millenia he could as well. This does not imply an absolute and exact knowledge of the future.

For God to state "with perfection" what will happen in the next five minutes He needs to know the future. You talk of 100% probabilities also implies this. God does know the future if he knows exactly what Peter and Judas are going to do within the next 24 hours. Peter surely felt horrible after the first two times he denied Christ. Why did he not resolve to change then? You are suggesting Christ knew exactly how horrible he would feel, and that it would not be quite enough to change him. It would be the horrible feeling after the third time that would do it. Not to mention that he knew exactly how Peter's wanderings would go in order to give him three opportunities to deny Christ. And he knew that there would be those people there who would challenge Peter. Of course since God has control over the birds He just restrained them from calling out until after Peter had that third denial. Considering all these things, how exact does God need to know details about the future before we just grant that He knows about it?

And I would still appreciate a response to my earlier post about Mary. Hundreds of years off with very specific human actions required. How could it be 100% likely that the young virgin, named Mary, from the proper lineage, would be in the right place at the right time?

Revelations is anything but specific. The language is such that it could be overly symbolic and metaphorical. ... Maybe "no man knoweth" simply because the timing is in reality a variable based on other variables.

I agree that Revelations is very vague and so are many prophecies. This does support the idea that the probabilities allow for a range of possibilities and the prophecy covers that range.

[johndoe]

Bee Eff, your response to Jason's point about Nephi's vision of Mary doesn't really respond to the strongest intent of the point he is making. Do you believe that Nephi actually saw Mary performing actions exactly as they would happen 600 years in the future, or that God showed Nephi some approximation or representation only? This question can be generally asked of visions of the future as revealed in scripture.

Bee Eff, could you address my question above? I'm very curious to see how you would address this.

[Brade]

Bee Eff, could you address my question above? I'm very curious to see how you would address this.

I don't know about Bee Eff but I'm happy to consider the possibility that the vision Nephi saw was just an approximation of the future. I would probably be inclined to describe something like that Christ being born of a virgin was God's plan and God has the power to carry out his own plans and the means to "show" people what he intends to carry out. The story of Peter is a bit more difficult to deal with. I haven't put too much thought into it but if pressed you might get me to just say that that particular story isn't accurate. Or I think I could describe a story where God, knowing the disposition of Peter, fashioned 3 situations where it was nearly certain the outcome would be what God thought it would be. I think an important, and often overlooked, aspect of the libertarian view of free will is that only some actions need to be free for free will to exist. That being the case, a third option off the top of my head might be to say that overall man has free will and that sometimes God, in fact, does limit the agency of men such that in certain circumstances it's right to say that a person or persons do not act freely and this is so that God can bring about his plans.

[Bee Eff]

Bee Eff, your response to Jason's point about Nephi's vision of Mary doesn't really respond to the strongest intent of the point he is making. Do you believe that Nephi actually saw Mary performing actions exactly as they would happen 600 years in the future, or that God showed Nephi some approximation or representation only? This question can be generally asked of visions of the future as revealed in scripture.

I believe that Nephi saw the event as he described it, knowing the infinite number of possibilities, God could conceivably have shown one of them.

[johndoe]

I don't know about Bee Eff but I'm happy to consider the possibility that the vision Nephi saw was just an approximation of the future. I would probably be inclined to describe something like that Christ being born of a virgin was God's plan and God has the power to carry out his own plans and the means to "show" people what he intends to carry out. The story of Peter is a bit more difficult to deal with. I haven't put too much thought into it but if pressed you might get me to just say that that particular story isn't accurate. Or I think I could describe a story where God, knowing the disposition of Peter, fashioned 3 situations where it was nearly certain the outcome would be what God thought it would be. I think an important, and often overlooked, aspect of the libertarian view of free will is that only some actions need to be free for free will to exist. That being the case, a third option off the top of my head might be to say that overall man has free will and that sometimes God, in fact, does limit the agency of men such that in certain circumstances it's right to say that a person or persons do not act freely and this is so that God can bring about his plans.

I don't think that this is necessarily unreasonable, but I do think it takes a creative view of the scriptures. I have been criticized on these boards for not taking the scriptures at face value by someone who accepts the Ostlerian view of LDS libertarian free will. I must say, I find that criticism odd in light of the current discussion.

While the approach of taking visions of the future as approximations certainly isn't hinted at in the text, I don't think it can be thrown out just for that reason. When we start to analyze other stories though, I think this view gets a little more difficult to defend. The story of Peter isn't really the most dramatic example of specific prediction of the future I think.

Consider the following passages from the BoM:

From Helaman chapter 9

25 And now behold, I will show unto you another sign, and see if ye will in this thing seek to destroy me.

26 Behold I say unto you: Go to the house of Seantum, who is the abrother of Seezoram, and say unto himâ??

27 Has Nephi, the pretended prophet, who doth prophesy so much evil concerning this people, agreed with thee, in the which ye have murdered Seezoram, who is your brother?

28 And behold, he shall say unto you, Nay.

29 And ye shall say unto him: Have ye murdered your brother?

30 And he shall stand with fear, and wist not what to say. And behold, he shall deny unto you; and he shall make as if he were astonished; nevertheless, he shall declare unto you that he is innocent.

31 But behold, ye shall examine him, and ye shall find blood upon the skirts of his cloak.

32 And when ye have seen this, ye shall say: From whence cometh this blood? Do we not know that it is the blood of your brother?

33 And then shall he tremble, and shall look pale, even as if death had come upon him.

34 And then shall ye say: Because of this fear and this paleness which has come upon your face, behold, we know that thou art guilty.

35 And then shall greater fear come upon him; and then shall he confess unto you, and deny no more that he has done this murder.

36 And then shall he say unto you, that I, Nephi, know nothing concerning the matter save it were given unto me by the power of God. And then shall ye know that I am an honest man, and that I am sent unto you from God.

37 And it came to pass that they went and did, even according as Nephi had said unto them. And behold, the words which he had said were true; for according to the words he did deny; and also according to the words he did confess.

This, to me, is even more dramatic than the episode with Peter. Nephi predicts an interview exactly. It's a short interview, and the folks asking the questions were actually given their questions by Nephi. But still, Seantum's answers and behavior were accurately predicted. That is quite a feat, one I think the libertarian doesn't have a good explanation for.

From 2 Nephi chapter 27

9 But the book shall be delivered unto a man, and he shall deliver the words of the book, which are the words of those who have slumbered in the dust, and he shall deliver these words unto aanother;

10 But the words which are asealed he shall not deliver, neither shall he deliver the book.

15 But behold, it shall come to pass that the Lord God shall say unto him to whom he shall deliver the book: Take these words which are not sealed and deliver them to another, that he may show them unto the learned, saying: aRead this, I pray thee. And the learned shall say: Bring hither the book, and I will read them.

16 And now, because of the glory of the world and to get again will they say this, and not for the glory of God.

17 And the man shall say: I cannot bring the book, for it is sealed.

18 Then shall the learned say: I cannot read it.

19 Wherefore it shall come to pass, that the Lord God will adeliver again the book and the words thereof to him that is not learned; and the man that is not learned shall say: I am not learned.

This, of course, is a prediction of the reaction of professor Anthon to Joseph Smith's request to translate characters from the plates. While less specific, this was given well over 2000 years before the event in question occurred. I don't see how the libertarian can explain this plausibly.

Lastly, I don't think it is consistent to assume that God can limit man's agency to bring about His purposes where morally relevant choices are at stake. I suppose it's possible, but it would need something relatively strong to back it up, I think.

[Jason]

God does put some limits on free choice. When things go too far in a society he destroys cities and sometimes entire peoples. However, He appears to do it only when He knows they have gone too far and will never repent.

[Bee Eff]

As to visions and such I don't really know my position on the subject with relation to God and an absolute, exact, knowledge of the future. I find that the concept of an absolute, exact, knowledge of the future strikes a chord in me as being not quite correct. I have prayed over the subject and that feeling does not change, neither does my mind on the subject. As such, I must study and ponder possible explanations. The vision argument may in fact be a breaking point in a stance against God having an absolute and exact knowledge of the future, I do not have an explanation that suffices for me in rebuttal to it.

I often present a strong and mule-headed position when discussing a topic. When I, in RL and in any other environment, study/discuss a subject, I am often very solid in my position, this forces the opposing view to provide strong arguments instead of weak arguments in response. I find this allows me a deeper understanding of all positions presented in the debate instead of approaching a group think position that does not explore the opposing views with as much enthusiasm. Drawbacks often include the polarization of the groups and thus you have fewer alternatives presented compared to taking a weaker position, but usually the few alternatives are discussed more in depth when polarization occurs (unless the discussion devolves into an exercise name calling as occurs in some forums.) Regardless of this, I recognize that I may be incorrect, and I am open to the possibility, I simply must remain open minded to alternatives. I feel that an unflinching opinion on the subject of religious philosophy/dogma was a large part of the problem that a large number of the pharisees and saducees had in the New Testament.

[johndoe]

I almost didn't post this, but I thought it was interesting. This is from the Ensign. The article doesn't identify the author.

Before going on, I think it should be stressed that leaders of the church have had differing opinions on the issue under discussion in this thread. The quote below is not intended to demonstrate that I think the church has an official stance on this.

http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?vgne..._&hideNav=1

From the March 2006 Ensign, article entitled "The Fulness of the Gospel: Agency"

We do not believe in a deterministic Godâ??that is, one who determines in advance the eventual fate of His children. Rather, we believe in a God who has perfect foreknowledge of the choices His children will make. He may use this foreknowledge to guide us or even to warn us, but He does not use it to preempt our agency. He allows us to become what we truly desire to become. As Elder James E. Talmage (1862â??1933) of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles wrote: â??[God] knows what each will do under given conditions, and sees the end from the beginning. His foreknowledge is based on intelligence and reason. He foresees the future as a state which naturally and surely will be; not as one which must be because He has arbitrarily willed that it shall be.â?

While the first sentence would seem to affirm the libertarian position, the clarification that follows actually shows that they do not refer to determinism as it is used by philosophers, but rather the concept that God directly causes our choices. The other part in bold contradicts the libertarian position.

[Brade]

I almost didn't post this, but I thought it was interesting. This is from the Ensign. The article doesn't identify the author.

Before going on, I think it should be stressed that leaders of the church have had differing opinions on the issue under discussion in this thread. The quote below is not intended to demonstrate that I think the church has an official stance on this.

http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?vgne..._&hideNav=1

From the March 2006 Ensign, article entitled "The Fulness of the Gospel: Agency"

While the first sentence would seem to affirm the libertarian position, the clarification that follows actually shows that they do not refer to determinism as it is used by philosophers, but rather the concept that God directly causes our choices. The other part in bold contradicts the libertarian position.

Interesting find John. I'm glad you decided to post it. As a libertarian it just looks to me like the author isn't being very philosophically precise. Saying that God has perfect foreknowledge of human choices, while avoiding talk of determinism as the future being sufficiently determined by the past and the laws of nature, is still a claim that a proposition about some future event, a choice in this case, is true or false and that such a proposition is knowable "perfectly." On this account any definition given by the author of what free will is cannot include the ability to do otherwise. It's sounds like he wants to say that an agent is free because God didn't compel or cause the agent's choice. As I'm sure you're aware, as a compatabilits, that sort of definition of free will is perfectly compatible with determinism or anything like it (i.e. God perfectly knowing the outcome of a persons deliberation).

Of course, as a libertarian, my claim is that lack of compulsion is not a sufficient condition to count something as free will even if it's a necessary condition. On the libertarian view the further ingredient is the ability to do otherwise. You don't seem to go this far in your judgement of the quote but it sure sounds very compatibilist to me. The statement "He allows us to become what we truly desire to become" just sounds like the compatibilist line of "getting what you want." Even if you're determined to act only one certain way given the past and the laws it may still be true that the act you perform is what you want and is therefore free.

In my first paragraph I suggested that the quote attempts to avoid talking about determinism proper as the future being known from the past and the laws. It seems the author wants to avoid that sort of talk but I'm not sure he does. He says "His foreknowledge is based on intelligence and reason. He foresees the future as a state which naturally and surely will be; not as one which must be because He has arbitrarily willed that it shall be." I think it would have been nice for the author to flesh this out a bit because what he means by "intelligence" "reason" and "naturally" might be something different from what I think they mean in this context. But, having not further explanation of the terms I'm just going to guess that he's saying that the way in which God knows the future of human deliberations is by virtue of having the intelligence such that one knows enough about the natural laws and the past and present. If that's what the author means then he's failed to avoid talking about determinism. But even if means something like "God is outside of time and just sees all things as now" or some such, the problem still isn't sidestepped. But again, using words like "reason" and "natural" make it seem unlikely he's talking about outside-of-time-ness.

But, as I think you're aware, libertarians have had a problem compatibilist views before there was any talk of determinism. Thousands of years ago the problem stemmed from the truth or falsity of statements about the future then moved to the problem of God having perfect foreknowledge and now the modern dialogue is mostly concerned with determinism. The libertarian sees all of these as a threat to genuine alternate possibilities which is a threat to the ability to do otherwise which the libertarian sees as a basic ingredient of free will. So, whether he avoids talking about determinism or not, the libertarian should have a problem with this talk of God knowing perfectly future states. It just doesn't matter, to the libertarian, whether God tells anyone about the future states or intervenes or even whether God knows the future states at all. The libertarian just has a problem with the mere possibility of future states (with respect to agent deliberation) being knowable at all.

I really don't have a problem at all with LDS compatibilists. My only problem is when LDS compatibilists assert that determinism (or something like it) is true

and that agents have free will in the sense of being able to do otherwise in the way that libertarians mean such a thing. There are no accounts in philosophy of a compatibilist position in which agents have libertarian free will for the simple fact that such a state of affairs entails a logical contradiction. Even Ayer, who is a compatibilist and says that agents can do otherwise ends up admitting that he doesn't mean "can do otherwise" in the same way the libertarian means the same utterance.

[JDave]

I almost didn't post this, but I thought it was interesting. This is from the Ensign. The article doesn't identify the author.

That is interesting. It seems that Talmage is a compatibilist.

His foreknowledge is based on intelligence and reason. ~Talmage

This part was interesting to me, because it states that God's knowledge is of a compatibilist nature -- not an "out of time" nature. I don't know if I agree with that quite yet.

The thing that does make really good sense to me is that God does know what will happen. How exactly that works I do not know. But all the examples posted point to a necessary conclusion that God knows the future. And LDS doctrine requires God not be culpable simply because He knows.

[Brade]

But all the examples posted point to a necessary conclusion that God knows the future.

That God knows the future is hardly a necessary fact since it's very easy to imagine a possible world in which God doesn't know the future. That's even easier for me since that possible world corresponds to what I think of this actual world. For something to be a necessary fact it must be the case that it turn out true in every possible world.

[mrmendoza]

Wow! Am I psycic or what?

I was just thinking about starting a thread by asking this question. I've been thinking for some years now that maybe Gods forknowledge is more on the order of knowing all of the possible probabilities given a particular set of circumstances as opposed to just knowing everything that is going to happen absolutely!

In the process of trying to explain to my older children how God knows not only what they've done but what also what they are going to do, they naturally came up with the excuse that since He knows all things then He must be controlling everything, therfore He, not they, was responsible for their wrongdoing!

But I, by then, already had a perfect example of just how, I believe, forknowledge really works. My oldest daughter was my example.

When she was about twelve, my wife and I would sometimes give her specific instructions as to some housework that she was supposed get done while we were away, shopping or something. We would warn her that we expected the work to be finished before we got back and even told her how long we would be gone. "Don't sit there watching TV. Get started now and then you'll have plenty of time to get it done." we'd say.

The thing was, we knew with an almost certainty, that she would not get the work done! We would laugh as we were on our way home, knowing that as soon as she saw us pull up to the driveway (we could see her through the window!) that she would jump up and start doing the work that she should have already finished!

Now our knowing what she was going to do was not because we caused her to do it, but because WE KNEW HER!

We would have been plesently surprised and pleased if she had done what she had been told, but because we knew her so well, we could have made bets as to what she was going to do! And won every time!

If we as mere imperfect mortals with a really poor idea about what's going on in the world can "prophesy" what our daughter was going to do, based on our knowledge about her, how much more can God who has known us from "before the beginning" tell us what we're going to do under any circumstance?

As for the details about what Mary, or Peter was going to do, even 600 years in the future, He had already known them well enough to say what they would do.

As for those of us that may, or may not, fail miserably in whatever we're called to do, such as Judas, I think he puts us in those kind of positions, not to make us fail, but to show us, come the day of judgement that we, not He, failed to do what we were supposed to do!

But just as we would have really perfered that our child just did as she was told, but allowed her to make that choice, even so our Heavenly Father has allowed us to choose!

Anyway, I've only discussed these kind of things with a few other of my LDS friends, and I wouldn't even think of bringing up the subject in SS or at the pulpit!

This thread has brought up a lot of good thoughts, both pro and con. Unfortunatly for me, while I'm not convinced of the "absolute" forknowledge of God, I'm not sure enough of my position to put it as anything but "highly spectulative"

Mike

[Bee Eff]

I almost didn't post this, but I thought it was interesting. This is from the Ensign. The article doesn't identify the author.

Before going on, I think it should be stressed that leaders of the church have had differing opinions on the issue under discussion in this thread. The quote below is not intended to demonstrate that I think the church has an official stance on this.

http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?vgne..._&hideNav=1

From the March 2006 Ensign, article entitled "The Fulness of the Gospel: Agency"

While the first sentence would seem to affirm the libertarian position, the clarification that follows actually shows that they do not refer to determinism as it is used by philosophers, but rather the concept that God directly causes our choices. The other part in bold contradicts the libertarian position.

I don't know, I think the two bolded portions when taken together lead more to the probablistic line of thought than the knowledge of an absolute exact future line of thought.

[Brade]

I don't know, I think the two bolded portions when taken together lead more to the probablistic line of thought than the knowledge of an absolute exact future line of thought.

It's possible when he says "perfect forknowledge" he means perfect knowledge of the probabilities of things working out certain ways but it doesn't sound like that's what he means to me. It sounds pretty compatibilistic if you ask me.

[JDave]

That God knows the future is hardly a necessary fact since it's very easy to imagine a possible world in which God doesn't know the future. That's even easier for me since that possible world corresponds to what I think of this actual world. For something to be a necessary fact it must be the case that it turn out true in every possible world.

I only meant necessary in order to fulfill the prophecies we have discussed so far. Other imaginable worlds where this is not that case are certainly imaginable. I really need to be careful with my absolutes. Sometimes I don't know my own strength, or my absolute's potential absoluteness.

Regarding God knowing the future in order to fullfill prophecy, the only other options I have heard are

1. God is perfectly aware of the probabilities and prophesies only things that are 100% probable.
   
2. God inspires and nearly coerces some people to do what He needs in order to bring to pass the prophecy.
   

#2 seems a little odd. Would God really put words into people's mouths? I have yet to hear an explanation of how #1 accounts for the prophecies mentioned so far.

[JDave]

I promised a reply to Log's argument about how Libertarian Free Will is mutually exclusive with God knowing the future. (I may have totally mis-stated that, feel free to correct.)

1. It has always been true known that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: Omnitemporality of Truth)
   
2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth. (Assumption: Infallible Foreknowledge)
   
3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 1 and 2)
   
4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone's power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing. (Assumption: Fixed Past)
   
5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 3 and 4)
   
6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (Necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness)
   
7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow. (From 5 and 6)
   
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning. (Assumption of Libertarian Free Will)
   
9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow. ( From 7 and 8 )(see Ostler, review of The Mormon Concept of God, 109 n. 15)
   

1. This needs to be restated, perhaps. It sounds like it has always been true in time, which would necessitate that the past predict the future. I have no problem with the concept, perhaps restated as : "It has always been known that I will sin tomorrow" I reflected my change in the above quote.
   
2. Agreed
   
3. Agreed
   
4. Agreed
   
5. Agreed
   

6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow.

   This seems to be the problematic statement for me. I think that the #1 had a slightly different assumption before my change, which affects #6. Here is my perceived problem. Refraining from sinning implies the need to be able to make a different choice, a classic LFW need. However, the ability to make that different choice is still available tomorrow. Tomorrow I choose to sin, even though I could have chosen to refrain. It is my choice that is known to God (see #1) The fixed nature of the choice stems from the assumption of a fixed past. The choice is fixed in time, not fixed in nature.
   
7. It is still in my power to refrain tomorrow, but God knows that I won't. He is aware of the choice I will make.
   
8. Agreed
   
9. Invalid because it is in my power and my choice will be made.
   

[johndoe]

I really don't have a problem at all with LDS compatibilists. My only problem is when LDS compatibilists assert that determinism (or something like it) is true

and that agents have free will in the sense of being able to do otherwise in the way that libertarians mean such a thing. There are no accounts in philosophy of a compatibilist position in which agents have libertarian free will for the simple fact that such a state of affairs entails a logical contradiction. Even Ayer, who is a compatibilist and says that agents can do otherwise ends up admitting that he doesn't mean "can do otherwise" in the same way the libertarian means the same utterance.

Good post, Brade. From his comments here, it seems that Jason holds a view similar to what you describe above. I had always thought that anyone who view it this way simply hasn't thought through the implications, but on the handful of free will threads we've had lately Jason has participated enough that I don't think he is ignorant of them. I suppose he may not have nailed down his exact view yet, but I think it will be difficult to marry libertarianism, a fundamentally incompatibilist position, with God's absolute foreknowledge.

[cjcampbell]

God does not know exactly what will happen.

If he did, God would be culpable for all sin. Thus, God cannot know, absolutely, what will happen, but only the probability of various events occuring.

Does this threaten many non-LDS view of God? How do they reconcile this fact?

God does know exactly what will happen because, from His perspective, it has already happened. God is no more culpable for sin than a witness to a bank robbery is responsible for the bank robbery. To the extent that God is culpable for sin in allowing us our agency, He has provided us the atonement of Jesus Christ.

[cjcampbell]

Which unfortunately does not explain how God could accurately predict the name of Jesus' mother 600 years before she was born.

Not only predict it, but show Mary to Nephi and Isaiah in a vision. God showed some of the prophets the crucifixion of Jesus -- not a representation of what might happen, but the actual event itself. When Moroni saw us and said he knew our doing, he actually saw us. He did not see a representation of one possible you driving to work. He saw you driving to work.

It is ludicrous to state that this makes God culpable for sin. Man has his agency. The mere fact that God saw us making the choices we do does not mean that we had no choice.

[Log]

Not only predict it, but show Mary to Nephi and Isaiah in a vision. God showed some of the prophets the crucifixion of Jesus -- not a representation of what might happen, but the actual event itself. When Moroni saw us and said he knew our doing, he actually saw us. He did not see a representation of one possible you driving to work. He saw you driving to work.

How, exactly, do you know what he saw?

[Brade]

Good post, Brade. From his comments here, it seems that Jason holds a view similar to what you describe above. I had always thought that anyone who view it this way simply hasn't thought through the implications, but on the handful of free will threads we've had lately Jason has participated enough that I don't think he is ignorant of them. I suppose he may not have nailed down his exact view yet, but I think it will be difficult to marry libertarianism, a fundamentally incompatibilist position, with God's absolute foreknowledge.

I don't just think it'll be difficult, I think it's not possible. In short, God knowing that P (with respect to an agents deliberation) tomorrow means that P and only P and not anything else. The libertarian view is that it's false that not anything else. So to marry the libertarian view and the compatibilist view is to end up with a theory that says "not anything else" and "it's false that not anything else." In other words you have a statement of the form "A and not A". Any conjunction "X and Y" can be simplified to it's individual parts "X" and "Y" on separate lines of an argument. So we have the following.

1. A and not A

2. A

3. not A

Any premise in an argument can be operated on by disjunction which is translated as â??orâ?. The truth value of a statement (remembering back to truth tables) â??P or Qâ? is true when both P and Q are true, true when only P is true and Q is false, true when only Q is true and P is false, and false when both P and Q are false. So far weâ??ve created a statement â??A and not Aâ? such that weâ??re asserting both â??Aâ? and â??not Aâ? are true. Weâ??ve simplified the parts of the conjunction. Since the simplifications are both true in virtue of having been true when they were part of a conjunction we can form true disjunctive statements from either â??Aâ? or â??not Aâ?. This is the rule of inference called addition and it holds here. It will look like this.

1. A and not A

2. A

3. not A

4. A or B

Now we have a true statement â??A or Bâ?. We can say that the statement is true because we know at least one of itâ??s parts is true from premise one, namely A. But now notice what happens. Weâ??ve created a disjunctive syllogism. A disjunctive syllogism has the following form.

1. p or q

2. not p

3. Therefore, q

Notice that we have formed the same ingredients. We have â??A or Bâ? and â??not Aâ?. Since â??A or Bâ? is already a true statement in virtue of A already being true by the assumption of premise one, B can stand for anything we could possibly imagine. The following is entailed.

1. A and not A

2. A

3. not A

4. A or B

5. Therefore, B

The argument is valid and cogent if one believes that premise one is true. Since B can stand for anything since the truth of the statement â??A or Bâ? is already set by the presence of A the argument goes on to prove that anything and everything is both true and false. This is called the principle of explosion and itâ??s the very reason we try to avoid contradictions of the form â??A and not Aâ? because when such a statement is asserted to be true it means anything and everything is both true and false.

The principle of explosion results if we try to assert a theory in which libertarian free will makes itâ??s way unchanged into a compatibilist theory. This is because libertarian free will means an agent has genuine alternate possibilities and any compatibilist theory, independent of this business of outside-time-ness, entails that an agent does not have genuine alternate possibilities even if itâ??s still maintained (which I hope that it is) that the agent has free will.

The compatibilist view implicitly entails that itâ??s false that an agent has genuine alternate possibilities and the libertarian view explicitly states that an agent must have genuine alternate possibilities. So you simply cannot have a compatibilist view that uses the libertarian concept of what free will is. Such a view contains an implicit contradiction which goes on to prove, by the principle of explosion, that pigs have wings, my body is made of fried shrimp, and that God is really the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

This is the problem with JDave's analysis of the argument Log posted. He agrees with premise eight which is a statement of libertarian free will but agrees with the prior premises that entail no alternate possibilities (even after he changes things around a bit). As I said before, it's a perfectly reasonable position, on my view, to think that God knows all things perfectly and you have free will. But you just have to be consistent and maintain that what you mean by free will is not what the libertarian means by free will. If you fail to make that distinction you've really fallen into a very big hole.

Not only predict it, but show Mary to Nephi and Isaiah in a vision. God showed some of the prophets the crucifixion of Jesus -- not a representation of what might happen, but the actual event itself. When Moroni saw us and said he knew our doing, he actually saw us. He did not see a representation of one possible you driving to work. He saw you driving to work.

It is ludicrous to state that this makes God culpable for sin. Man has his agency. The mere fact that God saw us making the choices we do does not mean that we had no choice.

How, exactly, do you know what he saw?

Thatâ??s exactly right. Itâ??s not clear from the record that what is meant is that God showed people the actual future. The libertarian is just going to say thatâ??s absurd because thereâ??s just no such thing as the actual future.

Look, I do a little computer animation and video editing as a hobby. Suppose I own several acres of land and decide that next year I want a new house built on a nice plot of my own land. Iâ??m wealthy enough to have the means to carry out my plans. I want to show my wife what I have in mind for our future house so I take some video of the plot of land and then composite a very convincing representation of what I have in mind using my 3D animation software. I render it all out and show her the video. A year later a nearly identical actual house sits in the very spot I envisioned it would. The video of my desire from a year ago and an actual video of the house on that spot look very similar and in this case we could rightly say I showed my wife my future plans which I had the power to carry out while itâ??s false that I showed my wife the actual future.

While Iâ??m not asserting that this is exactly what happens (how can I know that?) I can at least propose this sort of story with respect to Godâ??s prophecies and the visions people have of the future. Iâ??m nearly certain Godâ??s computer hardware and software is much more capable than mine. Additionally, I suspect God is even more capable of carrying out his own plans.

[Jason]

Good post, Brade. From his comments here, it seems that Jason holds a view similar to what you describe above. I had always thought that anyone who view it this way simply hasn't thought through the implications, but on the handful of free will threads we've had lately Jason has participated enough that I don't think he is ignorant of them. I suppose he may not have nailed down his exact view yet, but I think it will be difficult to marry libertarianism, a fundamentally incompatibilist position, with God's absolute foreknowledge.

If I could be convined that the real possibility of chosing between multiple options is unnecessary in order to attach moral responsibility to an action I might view the situation differently, but I haven't found any arguments to that effect that I find convincing.

I'd also note that the Ensign article posted earlier goes on to say that Elder McConkie taught that four conditions are necessary for agency. Number 4 is "We must possess an unfettered power of choice." I view "an unfettered power of choice" as the real capacity to choose any one or more of multiple options, in other words, the libertarian view.

[Brade]

If I could be convined that the real possibility of chosing between multiple options is unnecessary in order to attach moral responsibility to an action I might view the situation differently, but I haven't found any arguments to that effect that I find convincing.

Have you read Ayer, Fischer, or Frankfurt on compatibilism? They deal with the problem of free will in the context of determinism but their arguments, as far as I know, would work just as well on some account of divine foreknowledge. I think they provide some of the best arguments for moral responsibility without alternate possibility. Some cases of moral responsibility without alternate possibility have since come to be known as Frankfurt cases.

For the reasons I've outlined above I just don't think any harmony of libertarianism and compatibilism is possible. If you manage to do it I'd strongly suggest you submit your ideas as a paper to a philosophical journal because you will have accomplished something very remarkable.

I'd also note that the Ensign article posted earlier goes on to say that Elder McConkie taught that four conditions are necessary for agency. Number 4 is "We must possess an unfettered power of choice." I view "an unfettered power of choice" as the real capacity to choose any one or more of multiple options, in other words, the libertarian view.

With all due respect to Elder McConkie I think he's done quite a bit to confuse the issue in the Church. If he really does believe that God perfectly knows future free acts and that people have the genuine ability to do otherwise I'd just say that he believes an implicit contradiction. Such a view is not compatibilism and it's not libertarianism. I don't know what to call it other than contradictionism.

[Brade]

John Martin Fischer has an interesting account of compatibilism which he calls semicompatibilism. You might find that interesting. The consequence argument championed by Peter van Inwagen and Robert Kane, two very prominent libertarians, is often taken as the strongest argument against compatibilism. The appeal of Fischer's semicompatibilism is that, in his own words, "causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, quite apart from whether causal determinism rules out the sort of freedom that involves access to alternative possibilities." Fischer's semicompatibilism attempts to sidestep the consequence argument and so a semicompatibilist can agree wholeheartedly with the argument or reject it. It doesn't really matter to Fischer's compatibilism. As a libertarian I see some problems with Fischer's view but if you've not read it I don't want to spoil the fun and it may be just what you're looking for.

[Jason]

Have you read Ayer, Fischer, or Frankfurt on compatibilism? They deal with the problem of free will in the context of determinism but their arguments, as far as I know, would work just as well on some account of divine foreknowledge. I think they provide some of the best arguments for moral responsibility without alternate possibility. Some cases of moral responsibility without alternate possibility have since come to be known as Frankfurt cases.

I may have read some of them before, but I will look up Frankfurt again and see what he has to say.

With all due respect to Elder McConkie I think he's done quite a bit to confuse the issue in the Church. If he really does believe that God perfectly knows future free acts and that people have the genuine ability to do otherwise I'd just say that he believes an implicit contradiction. Such a view is not compatibilism and it's not libertarianism. I don't know what to call it other than contradictionism.

Incompatabilism?