"The Benefits of Belief" - Video

[pogi]

43 minutes ago, Analytics said:

If I am deterministically caused by the universe, that means the universe is the cause and I am the effect. That doesn't mean my free will isn't also part of the effect. Yes, I am tied to the universe. So is my free will. No, compatibilism doesn't really "cut those strings", but that isn't the point. The point isn't to deal with the abstract academic philosophical issue that you happen to be hung up on--it is to deal with reality. And in reality, there is a real sense in which I do in fact have free will.

If you can't cut the strings, then in what sense is a puppet free?

43 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Right. You said earlier, "Foreknowledge is not the same as precausation." But you didn't explain why that is true when it is God that has the foreknowledge but is false when it is Laplace's hypothetical demon that has the hypothetical foreknowledge. Remember that it was your argument that "everything could have been predicted [by Laplace's demon], but could not have been predicted by me" implies free will doesn't exist.

I said nothing of Laplace's demon - that was Carroll's quote.  But since you asked, it is not the foreknowledge of Laplace's demon that restricts freedom - it is the natural laws of the universe that he is calculating that restricts the freedom.  To Carroll, free-will is nothing more than our inability to predict our future, but not that we are without strings.   Predictive power is not the same as causal power.  Prediction, or not, there is still the inevitable cause.  There is a difference.  I stand by that statement that foreknowledge is not precausation.  Also, don't forget the part where I said we can't really say much about God's foreknowledge, if it is limited or not.  There is no official doctrine that you can attack here. 

43 minutes ago, Analytics said:

The point is closely tied to what I quoted Carroll as saying: "There's a sense in which you do have free will. There's also a sense in which you don't."

 Again, in which sense is a puppet free?  Does the fact that a puppet can't predict his next movement make him free?  According to Carroll, that is freedom. 

Edited September 24, 2018 by pogi

[Analytics]

5 minutes ago, pogi said:

If you can't cut the strings, then in what sense is a puppet free?

If there is nobody with free-will controlling the puppet, in what sense is it really a puppet?

5 minutes ago, pogi said:

I said nothing of Laplace's demon. 

You quoted Carroll as saying, "everything could have been predicted, but could not have been predicted by me." In context, when he said, "everything could have been predicted," he meant by Laplace's demon. Your argument started with that and went ergo no free well.

5 minutes ago, pogi said:

But since you asked, it is not the foreknowledge of Laplace's demon that restricts freedom - it is the natural laws of the universe that he is calculating that restricts the freedom.  To Carroll, free-will is nothing more than our inability to predict our future...

No, you misunderstand Carroll. For Carroll, free-will and consciousness are things that emerge in the complex systems known as human beings from the underlying laws of physics. Free will doesn't somehow mean that choices are not based upon what happens in our brain and that brain activity aren't governed by the laws of physics. Ironically, Carrol does believe we can predict the future when it comes to choices. However, rather than being based on particle physics, those predictions are made on the bases of models that are relevant to the domain of human behavior: psychology, sociology, economics, etc., which are all based on models that recognize that on the human scale, free-will exists. You can't model human behavior on the atomic scale. You can model human behavior using tools that are applicable on these macro scales. But those models are based on the concept that free will exists.

 

5 minutes ago, pogi said:

 Again, in which sense is a puppet free? 

When the puppet doesn't have a puppet master but instead has the ability to think and make his own choices, he is his own puppet master.

Do you believe that in some ultimate sense, God is subject to the ultimate laws of nature? If so, does that mean that God is a puppet who isn't free?

[pogi]

4 hours ago, Analytics said:

If there is nobody with free-will controlling the puppet, in what sense is it really a puppet?

In the sense that everything it thinks, says, feels, and does is inextricably tied to forces of pre-causation outside of it's own control.

4 hours ago, Analytics said:

No, you misunderstand Carroll. For Carroll, free-will and consciousness are things that emerge in the complex systems known as human beings from the underlying laws of physics. Free will doesn't somehow mean that choices are not based upon what happens in our brain and that brain activity aren't governed by the laws of physics. 

Illusions "emerge" from the underlying laws of physics too.  They are still no less illusions.  Free-will and consciousness "emerges" as a macro human perception (illusion), but which is ultimately determined by micro strings.  It is a real perception. I don't deny that.  That is all it is.  If you cannot choose other than what you choose, then you are not free to make other choices.  You are determined to choose, which is not freedom in any meaningful way. 

Compatibilism is a "quagmire of evasion".  Determinism is determinism. You can't cut the strings.  If all events are ultimately determined by previously existing causes (determinism) which compatibilism doesn't deny, then autonomy is an illusion. 

4 hours ago, Analytics said:

When the puppet doesn't have a puppet master but instead has the ability to think and make his own choices, he is his own puppet master.

You are not describing determinism (which compatibilists believe in). Compatibilism doesn't argue that there are no predetermined causes (puppet masters).

4 hours ago, Analytics said:

Do you believe that in some ultimate sense, God is subject to the ultimate laws of nature? If so, does that mean that God is a puppet who isn't free?

God is obedient to law, or he would cease to be God.  He chooses to be subject, he is not determined to be so (as compatibilists argue).  

Edited September 24, 2018 by pogi

[Analytics]

2 hours ago, pogi said:

In the sense that everything it thinks, says, feels, and does is inextricably tied to forces of pre-causation outside of it's own control.

Illusions "emerge" from the underlying laws of physics too.  They are still no less illusions.  Free-will and consciousness "emerges" as a macro human perception (illusion), but which is ultimately determined by micro strings.  It is a real perception. I don't deny that.  That is all it is.  If you cannot choose other than what you choose, then you are not free to make other choices.  You are determined to choose, which is not freedom in any meaningful way. 

Compatibilism is a "quagmire of evasion".  Determinism is determinism. You can't cut the strings.  If all events are ultimately determined by previously existing causes (determinism) which compatibilism doesn't deny, then autonomy is an illusion. 

You are not defining determinism (which compatibilists believe in). Compatibilism doesn't argue that there are no predetermined causes (puppet masters).

God is obedient to law, or he would cease to be God.  He chooses to be subject, he is not determined to be so (as compatibilists argue).  

It appears we are coming to an impasse. But I personally find a lot of philosophy somewhat tedious and pointless, so maybe there are some subtleties here that I'm missing.

And maybe it's just me, but your puppet analogy seems to confuse the issue. Regardless of whether a puppet has a puppet master, it is subject to the laws of physics. A puppet without a puppet master fully obeys all laws of physics as the force of gravity pushes it against the ground and the laws of inertia cause it to lay there motionless. The laws of physics would describe everything about an inert puppet: its mass, acceleration, temperature, atomic energy, etc. I would think a puppet analogy is about how the basic laws of physics cause a puppet to behave in a lifeless way and about how something else causes it to act in complex, whimsical patterns with what appears to be considered purpose. But if that something else is the same laws of physics that would otherwise cause it to act in simple patterns without purpose, why use a puppet analogy at all?

(No need to reiterate how you think minds in a physical world that obey the laws of physics don't really have free choice. I get your point. I'm just saying your puppet analogy sucks.)

But the question that remains is what is free will? What does that mean? As far as I can tell, you define "free will" as the ability to completely defy the laws of physics. In other words, if a non-physical spirit completely transcends all known and unknown laws of physics and causes matter to move in a way that violates those laws, then that is a manifestation of free will. But anything that obeys the laws of physics are, by definition, not free because they are slaves to natural law.

[pogi]

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

And maybe it's just me, but your puppet analogy seems to confuse the issue. Regardless of whether a puppet has a puppet master, it is subject to the laws of physics. A puppet without a puppet master fully obeys all laws of physics as the force of gravity pushes it against the ground and the laws of inertia cause it to lay there motionless. The laws of physics would describe everything about an inert puppet: its mass, acceleration, temperature, atomic energy, etc. I would think a puppet analogy is about how the basic laws of physics cause a puppet to behave in a lifeless way and about how something else causes it to act in complex, whimsical patterns with what appears to be considered purpose. But if that something else is the same laws of physics that would otherwise cause it to act in simple patterns without purpose, why use a puppet analogy at all?

(No need to reiterate how you think minds in a physical world that obey the laws of physics don't really have free choice. I get your point. I'm just saying your puppet analogy sucks.)

You are taking the analogy to be too literal a comparison and are completely missing the point.  No analogy is a perfect comparison, that is not their purpose.  Any way, it wasn’t my analogy.  I give all credit to Sam Harris.  You don’t seem to disagree with any of the videos I posted of him.  This suggests that you don’t understand his position.  His book that you love is built on the premise that free will is an illusion.

The analogy's strength is in comparing how humans are like puppets in that humans are inextricably tied to forces of pre-causation outside of their own control.  Do not take the analogy any further than that and you will see the point of it.  Take it or leave it, the problems with compatibilism don’t go away with or without the analogy.

The human state is no more or no less determined then a life-less puppet.  I don’t need any analogy to make that point.  We are no more or no less determined than a bacteria or a virus (which make choices, by the way).  We are no more capable of making alternate decisions then they are. 

 https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/01/100114143310.htm

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/02/170206130405.htm

1 hour ago, Analytics said:

But the question that remains is what is free will? What does that mean? As far as I can tell, you define "free will" as the ability to completely defy the laws of physics. In other words, if a non-physical spirit completely transcends all known and unknown laws of physics and causes matter to move in a way that violates those laws, then that is a manifestation of free will. But anything that obeys the laws of physics are, by definition, not free because they are slaves to natural law.

Given the laws of physics alone, that is an excellent question!  What exactly is free-will?  Please define it for me.

My argument is that it doesn't exist except as an illusion - a feeling, a sense of freedom.  It is as empty as the freedom of E. coli.

Edited September 24, 2018 by pogi

[Analytics]

29 minutes ago, pogi said:

You are taking the analogy to be too literal a comparison and are completely missing the point.  No analogy is a perfect comparison, that is not their purpose.

I get your point. I just don't like the analogy you are using to make it. Your mileage may vary. 🙂

 

29 minutes ago, pogi said:

Given the laws of physics alone, that is an excellent question!  What exactly is free-will?  Please define it for me.

My argument is that it doesn't exist except as an illusion.

If you can't define it, how can you say whether it really exists or not?

Answering your question, here is a quote from Carroll:

One popular definition of free will is “the ability to have acted differently.” In a world governed by impersonal laws, one can argue that there is no such ability. Given the quantum state of the elementary particles that make up me and my environment, the future is governed by the laws of physics. But in the real world, we are not given that quantum state. We have incomplete information; we know about the rough configuration of our bodies and we have some idea of our mental states. Given only that incomplete information—the information we actually have—it’s completely conceivable that we could have acted differently.

This is the point at which free-will doubters will object that the stance we’ve defended here isn’t really free will at all. All we’ve done is redefine the notion to mean something completely different, presumably because we are too cowardly to face up to the desolate reality of an impersonal cosmos.

I have no problem with the desolate reality of an impersonal cosmos. But it’s important to explore the most accurate and useful ways of talking about the world, on all relevant levels. Admittedly, some formulations of “free will” go well beyond anything that a poetic naturalist would be willing to countenance. There is what is called libertarian freedom. This has nothing to do with the political free-market idea of libertarianism. Rather, it’s the position that human agency introduces an element of indeterminacy into the universe; people are not governed by the impersonal laws of physics; they have a distinct ability to shape their own futures. It’s a denial that there could be anything like Laplace’s Demon, who could know the future before it happened.

There’s no reason to accept libertarian freedom as part of the real world. There is no direct evidence for it, and it violates everything we know about the laws of nature. In order for libertarian freedom to exist, it would have to be possible for human beings to overcome the laws of physics just by thinking. A poetic naturalist says that we can have two very different-sounding ways of describing the world, a physics-level story and a human-level story, which invoke separate sets of concepts and yet end up being compatible in their predictions concerning what happens in the world. A libertarian thinks that the right way to talk about human beings ends up making predictions that are incompatible with the known laws of physics. We don’t need to do such dramatic violence to our understanding of reality just to make peace with the fact that we make choices as we go through the day.

Carroll, Sean. The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself (pp. 380-382). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

 

[pogi]

 

16 hours ago, Analytics said:

If you can't define it, how can you say whether it really exists or not?

I can define it just fine.  I was wondering how one would define it without God (there seems to be many different definitions floating around the compatibilist world).  They seem to twist it into something other than the way it is used by every-day people. 

16 hours ago, Analytics said:

Answering your question, here is a quote from Carroll:

Quote

One popular definition of free will is “the ability to have acted differently.” In a world governed by impersonal laws, one can argue that there is no such ability. Given the quantum state of the elementary particles that make up me and my environment, the future is governed by the laws of physics. But in the real world, we are not given that quantum state. We have incomplete information; we know about the rough configuration of our bodies and we have some idea of our mental states. Given only that incomplete information—the information we actually have—it’s completely conceivable that we could have acted differently.

 

Is that the definition of free will that he subscribe to then - "the ability to have acted differently"?

I am really confused at his position then.  Most compatibilists define free will as "the freedom to act according to their own motivation".  Compatibilists don't believe that we "could have done otherwise".  They are causal determinists. 

Here is Carroll's argument in a nut shell:

1) On one level (quantum state) we are causally determined and could not have acted differently. 

2) On another level (human perception), our lack of information makes it "conceivable" that we could have acted otherwise.  

What a strange argument!  'Given our ignorance, it is completely conceivable...'  That is not an argument based on reason, it is an argument based on ignorance! 

He is NOT arguing that we could do otherwise.  He is only arguing that it seems as if we could.  In other words, given enough information, free-will may not be what it seems!  It is almost like he is admitting it is an illusion.  He says, on the ground level - no, free will doesn't exist.  On the human perception level, our ignorance only makes it seem as if it does exist. 

The other problem is that the secondary level he is talking about (human perception), is itself only an illusion.  Compatibilists don't deny that consciousness is an illusion.  See Dan Dennett for example, on the illusion of consciousness.  So, if free will is a product of human consciousness, and human consciousness is an illusion, can we conclude that a product of illusion is anything other than illusion? 

Quote

Carroll’s compatibilism rests solely on the fact that we talk as if we had dualistic choices, even if we don’t. As he says, “I can sensibly think of myself as an agent making choices.” Yes, of course he does, as do we all, for it does seem to us and others that we could have chosen otherwise. But we couldn’t have. The notion that we could have is an illusion.

https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2018/08/28/sean-caroll-on-free-will/

 

Edited September 25, 2018 by pogi

[SeekingUnderstanding]

35 minutes ago, pogi said:

I can give you the common definition

I can define it just fine.  I was wondering how one would define without God.  They seem to twist it into something other than the way it is used by every-day people. 

Is that the definition of free will that he subscribe to then - "the ability to have acted differently"?

I am really confused at his position then.  Most compatibilists define free will as "the freedom to act according to their own motivation".  Compatibilists don't believe that we "could have done otherwise".  They are causal determinists. 

Here is Sam's argument in a nut shell:

1)On one level (quantum state) we are causally determined and could not have acted differently. 

2) On another level (human perception), our lack of information makes it "conceivable" that we could have acted otherwise.  

He is NOT arguing that we could do otherwise.  He is only arguing that it seems as if we could.  In other words, given enough information, free-will may not be what it seems!  It is almost like he is admitting it is an illusion.  He says, on the ground level - no, free will doesn't exist.  On the human perception level, our ignorance only makes it seem as if it does exist. 

The other problem is that the secondary level he is talking about (human perception), is itself only an illusion.  Compatibilists don't deny that consciousness is an illusion.  See Dan Dennet for example, on the illusion of consciousness.  So, if free will is a product of human consciousness, and human consciousness is an illusion.  Can we conclude that a product of illusion is anything other than illusion? 

I will just point out that church's unofficial stance on God's omniscience is just as at odds with free will. Anybody's omniscience implies determinism which is directly in conflict with free will. 

[pogi]

23 minutes ago, SeekingUnderstanding said:

I will just point out that church's unofficial stance on God's omniscience is just as at odds with free will. Anybody's omniscience implies determinism which is directly in conflict with free will. 

There are many different ideas/interpretations of omniscience and what it means in Mormon theology:

https://www.sunstonemagazine.com/pdf/021-17-23.pdf

I would also disagree with the conclusion that omniscience, or foreknowledge (Laplace's demon), implies CAUSAL determinism, for reasons I have already discussed.      

Edited September 25, 2018 by pogi

[Gray]

46 minutes ago, pogi said:

There are many different ideas/interpretations of omniscience and what it means in Mormon theology:

https://www.sunstonemagazine.com/pdf/021-17-23.pdf

I would also disagree with the conclusion that omniscience, or foreknowledge (Laplace's demon), implies CAUSAL determinism, for reasons I have already discussed.      

Given the assumption that we always existed (past eternal), do you think there are any implications about free will from that aspect of Mormon doctrine?

Mormon theology is just as materialistic as the secular perspective. Where is free will derived from in Mormonism?

Edited September 25, 2018 by Gray

[Analytics]

52 minutes ago, pogi said:

 

I can define it just fine.  I was wondering how one would define it without God (there seems to be many different definitions floating around the compatibilist world).  They seem to twist it into something other than the way it is used by every-day people. 

Is that the definition of free will that he subscribe to then - "the ability to have acted differently"?

I am really confused at his position then. 

Hi Pogi,

If you'd like to better understand his position, I'd suggest you read the book. He doesn't get to the chapter on "Freedom to Choose" until chapter 44, and the material here does depend on a lot of the material he covers earlier, including what science knows and doesn't know, emergent purpose, entropy, the arrow of time, memory, causes, consciousness, how quantum mechanics should be interpreted, poetic naturalism, incorrectly mixing vocabularies across different domains of applicability, etc.

The more fundamental impasse, though, is you seem to be hung up on a particular philosophical question that is of interest to you, while poetic naturalists are more interested in accurately describing the world. There is no guarantee that what the poetic naturalist is trying to do will satisfy your philosophical quagmire. But at the same time, there is no guarantee that your philosophical quagmire has anything to do with an accurate description of the real world.

This conversation keeps reminding me of an economics professor I had. He often referred to the joke where a group of academics found themselves shipwrecked on a deserted island. They had a crate of canned food, but no tools including no knifes or screw drivers, much less an actual can opener. The engineers and scientists in the group came up with several exotic and dubious-sounding ways to open the cans and access the food. After listening to them grope for a solution to the problem and feeling smugly skeptical about whether any of them would work, the economist figured out an elegant solution to the problem. He said, "I have an idea! Let's assume a can opener!"

From my seat, you are criticizing some philosophical implications of naturalism that you find particularly troubling, and aren't that open to considering how the poetic naturalism paradigm deals with these issues. Okay. I know that there are some naturalists who also think the way you do. But it seems that your particular solution to these paradoxes is to wave the problems away by conveniently assuming God and free will.

Anyway, thanks for engaging with me on this topic. You've given me a lot to think about (although the idea that I've really been thinking is an illusion), and I really appreciate it (although you have know way of knowing if I am an actual thinking person with such feelings and not a soulless zombie who is mindlessly controlled by laws of physics that drive his brain and actions). But time constraints are forcing me to choose to politely bow out of this conversation (such choice also being, of course, another illusion).

[pogi]

19 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Hi Pogi,

If you'd like to better understand his position, I'd suggest you read the book. He doesn't get to the chapter on "Freedom to Choose" until chapter 44, and the material here does depend on a lot of the material he covers earlier, including what science knows and doesn't know, emergent purpose, entropy, the arrow of time, memory, causes, consciousness, how quantum mechanics should be interpreted, poetic naturalism, incorrectly mixing vocabularies across different domains of applicability, etc.

The more fundamental impasse, though, is you seem to be hung up on a particular philosophical question that is of interest to you, while poetic naturalists are more interested in accurately describing the world. There is no guarantee that what the poetic naturalist is trying to do will satisfy your philosophical quagmire. But at the same time, there is no guarantee that your philosophical quagmire has anything to do with an accurate description of the real world.

This conversation keeps reminding me of an economics professor I had. He often referred to the joke where a group of academics found themselves shipwrecked on a deserted island. They had a crate of canned food, but no tools including no knifes or screw drivers, much less an actual can opener. The engineers and scientists in the group came up with several exotic and dubious-sounding ways to open the cans and access the food. After listening to them grope for a solution to the problem and feeling smugly skeptical about whether any of them would work, the economist figured out an elegant solution to the problem. He said, "I have an idea! Let's assume a can opener!"

From my seat, you are criticizing some philosophical implications of naturalism that you find particularly troubling, and aren't that open to considering how the poetic naturalism paradigm deals with these issues. Okay. I know that there are some naturalists who also think the way you do. But it seems that your particular solution to these paradoxes is to wave the problems away by conveniently assuming God and free will.

Anyway, thanks for engaging with me on this topic. You've given me a lot to think about (although the idea that I've really been thinking is an illusion), and I really appreciate it (although you have know way of knowing if I am an actual thinking person with such feelings and not a soulless zombie who is mindlessly controlled by laws of physics that drive his brain and actions). But time constraints are forcing me to choose to politely bow out of this conversation (such choice also being, of course, another illusion).

Thanks for the discussion.  It's been fun.  

I have been reading about Carroll's poetic naturalism and don't feel that I am ignoring his arguments.  I do think it is an aptly named philosophy, I just find that he takes too much poetic license.  All he is doing is poetically sweeping cuasational determinism under the rug. 

[pogi]

1 hour ago, Gray said:

Given the assumption that we always existed (past eternal), do you think there are any implications about free will from that aspect of Mormon doctrine?

Mormon theology is just as materialistic as the secular perspective. Where is free will derived from in Mormonism?

I don't think pre-existence has any implications on free-will, that I can think of. 

The fundamental problem with free will is found in causal determinism.  Mormonism doesn't seem to support causal determinism.  There are two materialistic realms of truth - the physical realm and the spiritual realm.  I don't pretend to understand what laws spiritual material obeys (but it seems to abide by different laws than physics) and how it is compatible with physical material and laws, but the interaction between the two seems to allow for free will.  Like all things spiritual, it is a matter of faith.  We have the ability to choose to live in the physical world, but not of the physical world.  We can choose between the two material realms which seem to have different laws. 

Causal determinism is the death blow free will and moral responsibility.  Mormon creationism doesn't seem to imply causal determinism.  Mormon creationism suggests that all matter has free will and is therefore not causally determined, rather it is willfully obedient.  Creation was performed through the willful obedience of all matter to God's word.  God spoke and waited for the elements to obey.

Edited September 25, 2018 by pogi

[Gray]

22 minutes ago, pogi said:

I don't think pre-existence has any implications on free-will, that I can think of. 

The fundamental problem with free will is found in causal determinism.  Mormonism doesn't seem to support causal determinism.  There are two materialistic realms of truth - the physical realm and the spiritual realm.  I don't pretend to understand what laws spiritual material obeys (but it seems to abide by different laws than physics) and how it is compatible with physical material and laws, but the interaction between the two seems to allow for free will.  Like all things spiritual, it is a matter of faith.  We have the ability to choose to live in the physical world, but not of the physical world.  We can choose between the two material realms which seem to have different laws.  

Causal determinism is the death blow free will and moral responsibility.  Mormon creationism doesn't seem to imply causal determinism.  Mormon creationism suggests that all matter has free will and is therefore not causally determined, rather it is willfully obedient.  Creation was performed through the willful obedience of all matter to God's word.  God spoke and waited for the elements to obey. 

Good point about the idea of all elements "obeying" God. But could they ever choose to disobey God? I don't know if this is ever addressed. If they could choose to disobey, certainly this could be determined empirically - we'd see random examples of particles disobediently breaking the laws of physics, while others of the same kind obey.

In Mormonism there is no immaterial matter - even if "spiritual" matter follows different laws of physics, it has to still follow some kind of laws, right? Even God is subject to laws. Does God have free will?

According to 2 Nephi 2, our free will became activated when we started to know good from evil, but of course that predates the pre-existence doctrines and Mormon materialism stuff.

I'm not trying to make an argument really - I don't have any settled conclusions myself on the subject.

[The Nehor]

5 minutes ago, Gray said:

Good point about the idea of all elements "obeying" God. But could they ever choose to disobey God? I don't know if this is ever addressed. If they could choose to disobey, certainly this could be determined empirically - we'd see random examples of particles disobediently breaking the laws of physics, while others of the same kind obey.

We do. Whenever you cannot find a matching sock it is because its pair decided that inertia or gravity were just not for it and God had to damn the sock to hell for its disobedience.

[pogi]

2 hours ago, Gray said:

Good point about the idea of all elements "obeying" God. But could they ever choose to disobey God? I don't know if this is ever addressed. If they could choose to disobey, certainly this could be determined empirically - we'd see random examples of particles disobediently breaking the laws of physics, while others of the same kind obey.

I think that outer-darkness, where God spoke to the unorganized matter, is the state of lawlessness.  I don't know, perhaps even then there are laws which they are subject to.  Perhaps it is simply a matter of whom (which laws) you chose to obey.  One leads to order, meaning, morality, purpose, etc. The other leads to chaos and indifference (nihilism really - a rejection of all spiritual law and moral reason).  

There are passages which suggest that the elements are perfectly obeyed to the word of God, but suggests that they do indeed choose to obey his word.  It seems that the physical world is currently living a lower law in it's fallen state, and will eventually be cleansed to live a higher law of paradisaical glory. 

Quote

Moses 7

48 And it came to pass that Enoch looked upon the earth; and he heard a voice from the bowels thereof, saying: Wo, wo is me, the mother of men; I am pained, I am weary, because of the wickedness of my children. When shall I rest, and be cleansed from the filthiness which is gone forth out of me? When will my Creator sanctify me, that I may rest, and righteousness for a season abide upon my face?

Quote

 

Hel 12

7 O how great is the nothingness of the children of men; yea, even they are less than the dust of the earth.

8 For behold, the dust of the earth moveth hither and thither, to the dividing asunder, at the command of our great and everlasting God.

9 Yea, behold at his voice do the hills and the mountains tremble and quake.

10 And by the power of his voice they are broken up, and become smooth, yea, even like unto a valley.

11 Yea, by the power of his voice doth the whole earth shake;

12 Yea, by the power of his voice, do the foundations rock, even to the very center.

13 Yea, and if he say unto the earth—Move—it is moved.

14 Yea, if he say unto the earth—Thou shalt go back, that it lengthen out the day for many hours—it is done;

15 And thus, according to his word the earth goeth back, and it appeareth unto man that the sun standeth still; yea, and behold, this is so; for surely it is the earth that moveth and not the sun.

16 And behold, also, if he say unto the waters of the great deep—Be thou dried up—it is done.

17 Behold, if he say unto this mountain—Be thou raised up, and come over and fall upon that city, that it be buried up—behold it is done.

 

 

2 hours ago, Gray said:

In Mormonism there is no immaterial matter - even if "spiritual" matter follows different laws of physics, it has to still follow some kind of laws, right? Even God is subject to laws. Does God have free will?

As I explained to Analytics earlier,  "God is obedient to law, or he would cease to be God (The "or" implies choice free of causation).  He chooses to be subject, he is not determined to be so, as compatibilists argue", that is the difference. 

2 hours ago, Gray said:

According to 2 Nephi 2, our free will became activated when we started to know good from evil, but of course that predates the pre-existence doctrines and Mormon materialism stuff.

I'm not trying to make an argument really - I don't have any settled conclusions myself on the subject.

I think Adam and Eve had the basic ability to chose without causal determinism (free will) even before the knowledge of good and evil. They had the ability to chose to eat the fruit or not, for example.  But the knowledge of good and evil was required for moral agency. 

Edited September 25, 2018 by pogi