Is It Okay To Just "Believe" The Church Is True...

[mfbukowski]

Why not? Knowing that P implies that you believe that P. Believing that P, however, doesn't imply that you know that P. To know that something is the case you've got to (1) believe it, (2) have good reasons for believing it, and (3) it's got to be true (this is obviously a departure from Cobalt's unusual view that you can know that P where P is false). Often enough we believe things which turn out to be false and so we have cases where we believe something but don't know it (even if we think we know it) because it's false and false things can't be know (to be true).

I would argue that this is according to the language game you are using. There are many senses of the word "know" including, I think as you have pointed out, pragmatic senses, like : "I know roofing".

Other times it is used to convey nothing more or less than a state of certainty "higher than" belief

And then of course we have many theories of truth and whether or not it is even a relevant concept. I have posted this before and I am sure I will post it again.

There isn't even a very clear definition of what "true" even means accepted by philosophers. That's why they argue about it so much.

[mfbukowski]

Brade

Also considering moral principles, do you feel you could not say "I know that murder is wrong"?

[elguanteloko]

There isn't even a very clear definition of what "true" even means accepted by philosophers. That's why they argue about it so much.

Ah, the irony, Mr. Bukowski!

Why don't YOU, of all people the one who claims here to be a 'pragmatist', take what philosophers treat in pragmatist terms? They don't argue about 'it' because there isn't an 'it' to argue about. They form concepts and attempt to justify them using different well defined formulas of the concept of 'truth'... but saying there isn't a clear definition is pretty ignorant. There are plenty of them and probably too many of them. Those definitions may not hold or may even be contradictory under scrutiny but saying philosophers don't define what 'truth' is to them is wrong.

I got a good chuckle at you posting that video again, though.

[mfbukowski]

Ah, the irony, Mr. Bukowski!

Why don't YOU, of all people the one who claims here to be a 'pragmatist', take what philosophers treat in pragmatist terms? They don't argue about 'it' because there isn't an 'it' to argue about. They form concepts and attempt to justify them using different well defined formulas of the concept of 'truth'... but saying there isn't a clear definition is pretty ignorant. There are plenty of them and probably too many of them. Those definitions may not hold or may even be contradictory under scrutiny but saying philosophers don't define what 'truth' is to them is wrong.

I got a good chuckle at you posting that video again, though.

Next time maybe you could respond to what I actually said instead of what I didn't say. I am not about to enter into another monumental waste of time responding to you, so don't be surprised if I don't.

The purpose of the post was to underline the fact that there are many definitions of truth. Rorty accepts none of them, and I think he might be right.

[mfbukowski]

Here's an interesting reply to Boghossian's critique of Rorty and other "relativist" positions (whatever that means) as found in the Bog's book "Fear of Knowledge" often quoted hereabouts.

If anyone actually wants to get into a substantive discussion of this, we can take it to another thread, depending on the OP

http://markelikalderon.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/EpistemicRelativism.pdf

[Brade]

Brade

Also considering moral principles, do you feel you could not say "I know that murder is wrong"?

No.

[mfbukowski]

No.

So how do moral utterances differ from propositions?

Are you pretty much straight positivist in your thinking? Correspondence theory, I know already, ok- so right now which philosopher is "closest" to your personal point of view?

Just curious! It could help in discussions with you so I know "where you are coming from".

Of course in ordinary speech most would agree that it is "true" that "murder is wrong", and so it is clear that your interpretation of "truth" is certainly not the common sense one.

[Brade]

Of course in ordinary speech most would agree that it is "true" that "murder is wrong", and so it is clear that your interpretation of "truth" is certainly not the common sense one.

Slow down for me here, why is it clear that my interpretation of truth is not the common sense one?

[mfbukowski]

Slow down for me here, why is it clear that my interpretation of truth is not the common sense one?

My point was simply that the "man in the street", if asked the question "Is it 'true' that murder is wrong" would answer in the affirmative.

Did I misunderstand your "no" reply- it was a bit confusing since there was a sort of double negative in the way I wrote the question, unfortunately.

Edit: He might also say: "I know right from wrong"

Edited November 1, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Brade]

My point was simply that the "man in the street", if asked the question "Is it 'true' that murder is wrong" would answer in the affirmative.

Did I misunderstand your "no" reply- it was a bit confusing since there was a sort of double negative in the way I wrote the question, unfortunately.

Edit: He might also say: "I know right from wrong"

I think you might have misunderstood my 'no' reply. Or perhaps I misunderstood your question. Here's how I thought it through. You asked:

do you feel you could not say "I know that murder is wrong"?

To say 'yes' would, I think, be to say this:

I feel I could not say "I know that murder is wrong".

But I do feel I could say "I know that murder is wrong". So I said 'no'. Does that make sense? I intended to affirm a sort of man-in-the-street response.

[mfbukowski]

But I do feel I could say "I know that murder is wrong". So I said 'no'. Does that make sense? I intended to affirm a sort of man-in-the-street response.

AH! Ok- my fault then- so it appears that according you your pov, one can only "know" statements which are "true", and I think that you would affirm "truth" as a correspondence of some kind to what is real? And what is real is empirical reality?

If I am on the right track, which I might very well not be, my question would be then, on your correspondence theory of truth, to what do "true" statements regarding morals "correspond"?

I am just trying to get a feel for which schools of philosophy are closest to your position, so we don't have to go through a lot of preliminary discussion about basics.

Logical positivists for example share with you (I think- because I don't know what you think) the view that one can only know what is true- and a view that true propositions must be verifiable, but for this reason do not think moral statements can be "true".

But you do, I think, so I am just trying to figure out how to categorize your positions.

[Brade]

AH! Ok- my fault then- so it appears that according you your pov, one can only "know" statements which are "true", and I think that you would affirm "truth" as a correspondence of some kind to what is real? And what is real is empirical reality?

If I am on the right track, which I might very well not be, my question would be then, on your correspondence theory of truth, to what do "true" statements regarding morals "correspond"?

I am just trying to get a feel for which schools of philosophy are closest to your position, so we don't have to go through a lot of preliminary discussion about basics.

Logical positivists for example share with you (I think- because I don't know what you think) the view that one can only know what is true- and a view that true propositions must be verifiable, but for this reason do not think moral statements can be "true".

But you do, I think, so I am just trying to figure out how to categorize your positions.

It's a good question ("to what do "true" statements regarding morals "correspond"?"), and one, I'm sorry to confess, I'm not adequately prepared to answer. I'm familiar with the trouble logical positivists run into regarding moral statements, and I'm somewhat familiar with the response to it (if my memory serves me it was emotivism), but I've not sorted through the moral stuff deeply enough to have a strong opinion. Also, I have some hesitance with regards to schools of thought, if only because schools of thought weren't heavily emphasized in my training - most of my classes simply involved reading papers, sorting out the arguments being made, strengthening those arguments if need be, and then assessing them.

In any event, when I first learned of emotivism I had an immediate revulsion to it, but over the years I've softened to the position a bit. If that's the position I endorse, then, of course, I recognize that my utterance of "I know that murder is wrong" would, contrary to what I've recently said (or implied), not be say that there is a proposition (i.e. "murder is wrong") and that proposition is true (since, after all, on this view there are no such things as moral propositions; only sentences which appear to express propositions but don't), but would rather be to say something like "I know I feel yucky about murder".

[Brade]

Anyway, as to the question in the subject line, it appears that from most people the answer is 'yes, it's ok to just believe the Church is true'. Here's a related question: Is it ok to not believe the Church is true?

[mfbukowski]

It's a good question ("to what do "true" statements regarding morals "correspond"?"), and one, I'm sorry to confess, I'm not adequately prepared to answer. I'm familiar with the trouble logical positivists run into regarding moral statements, and I'm somewhat familiar with the response to it (if my memory serves me it was emotivism), but I've not sorted through the moral stuff deeply enough to have a strong opinion. Also, I have some hesitance with regards to schools of thought, if only because schools of thought weren't heavily emphasized in my training - most of my classes simply involved reading papers, sorting out the arguments being made, strengthening those arguments if need be, and then assessing them.

In any event, when I first learned of emotivism I had an immediate revulsion to it, but over the years I've softened to the position a bit. If that's the position I endorse, then, of course, I recognize that my utterance of "I know that murder is wrong" would, contrary to what I've recently said (or implied), not be say that there is a proposition (i.e. "murder is wrong") and that proposition is true (since, after all, on this view there are no such things as moral propositions; only sentences which appear to express propositions but don't), but would rather be to say something like "I know I feel yucky about murder".

I appreciate your frankess!

There are various problems of course with "I know I feel yucky about murder" too- since it is hard to see how such a sentence could be "true" in the schema you are presenting. Perhaps you are actually a serial killer and you are lying about your feelings about murder so that we don't lock you up- and I think you would have a hard time presenting this view as "true" or worthy of saying you "know" it.

But I am just raising issues for you to think about. I just want to point out that there are many schools of philosophy which differ from the tacit assumptions you are making about truth, that's all, and that perhaps you should reserve judgement on whether or not Mormonism could be "true" until you have thoroughly reviewed more ways of looking at the issues.

As always, I wish you well in your quest!

[mfbukowski]

Anyway, as to the question in the subject line, it appears that from most people the answer is 'yes, it's ok to just believe the Church is true'. Here's a related question: Is it ok to not believe the Church is true?

I haven't seen any non-believers in jail yet. What do you mean by "ok"?

I'll be back later.

[Brade]

I appreciate your frankess!

There are various problems of course with "I know I feel yucky about murder" too- since it is hard to see how such a sentence could be "true" in the schema you are presenting.

I'm not sure I see how it's hard to see how such a sentence could be true on my schema since 'Brade feels yucky about murder' does express a proposition. In the schema I'm presenting 'Brade feels yucky about murder' isn't any different than 'Brade feels happy about ice cream'.

Perhaps you are actually a serial killer and you are lying about your feelings about murder so that we don't lock you up- and I think you would have a hard time presenting this view as "true" or worthy of saying you "know" it.

Right, if I were lying about how I felt toward murder, then I wouldn't know that I felt yucky about it, because I wouldn't feel yucky about it. So the statement expressed by me 'I know I feel yucky about murder' would turn out false.

But I am just raising issues for you to think about. I just want to point out that there are many schools of philosophy which differ from the tacit assumptions you are making about truth, that's all, and that perhaps you should reserve judgement on whether or not Mormonism could be "true" until you have thoroughly reviewed more ways of looking at the issues.

Fair enough. For the record, I don't actually claim to know whether Mormonism is true or not. It very well could be. I do, however, believe the best available evidence taken in whole weighs against the Church being what the Church's authorities claim it is. That isn't to say that it isn't what it claims it is, but at least to say that I don't have good reason for believing that it is.

As always, I wish you well in your quest!

The quest is most of the fun.

[jadams_4242]

Rather than to "know" it's true?

While most wouldn't ever come right out and say it, I feel there's somewhat of a stigma around saying you believe the church is true.

I would be interested to know how many here "believe" rather than "know".

if you just beleive any church is true does that not give you desire to earnestly and steadfastly seek out to find?????

[mfbukowski]

I'm not sure I see how it's hard to see how such a sentence could be true on my schema since 'Brade feels yucky about murder' does express a proposition. In the schema I'm presenting 'Brade feels yucky about murder' isn't any different than 'Brade feels happy about ice cream'.

But that's not the statement I quoted. The above statement is a third-person statement, the statement I quoted was "I feel yucky about murder"

The question I was asking is if first person subjective statements can be considered "true" in your system. Making it a third person statement makes in principle at least, empirical.

That is essentially the difference Nagel is pointing out in my siggy- though on a different subject- the difference between a first and third person point of view.

Edited November 2, 2011 by mfbukowski

[TAO]

I'm not sure I see how it's hard to see how such a sentence could be true on my schema since 'Brade feels yucky about murder' does express a proposition. In the schema I'm presenting 'Brade feels yucky about murder' isn't any different than 'Brade feels happy about ice cream'.

Yeah, it's true from your perspective, because you can experience the yuckiness yourself. To us though, it is subjective in it's 'trueness' because of the communication gap... you can't properly have us feel what 'yucky' actually is to you =P. "Yucky" is just a word you relate to a certain feeling, and which we relate to a certain feeling, which may or may not be the same and we use it to try and relate, even if those feelings aren't quite the same =). We can't actually tell if our relation is actually accurate or not. We can only theorize that it is accurate.

Right, if I were lying about how I felt toward murder, then I wouldn't know that I felt yucky about it, because I wouldn't feel yucky about it. So the statement expressed by me 'I know I feel yucky about murder' would turn out false.

Not particularly, I believe you can lie to yourself. Or in the least case, I can lie to myself, and I theorize that you can based on that 'truth' from my perspective. It just is particularly difficult. =) And in our schema of things, we use our sense to determine that there is no reason to mistrust you, which is why we believe that you aren't lying. But it is because of our subjective theory, not because we know objectively that you actually aren't lying.

Fair enough. For the record, I don't actually claim to know whether Mormonism is true or not. It very well could be. I do, however, believe the best available evidence taken in whole weighs against the Church being what the Church's authorities claim it is. That isn't to say that it isn't what it claims it is, but at least to say that I don't have good reason for believing that it is.

But how do you fit this evidence together? Evidence is just there, until you create a theory, and fit it in your paradigm. Evidence can be assembled differently and in different patterns to create totally new theories and totally new paradigms. And because it can do this, theories turn out to be subjective, I think. The problem is, we all are justifying our positions implicitly with a theory, which is then supported by the evidences we observe. But we could re-arrange the evidences and come up with a totally new theory, which would be just as subjective as the theory we currently use.

I guess what I'm trying to say is that 'truth' and 'objectivity' does not lie with one side or another. Nah, truth doesn't lie with one side or another, it simply exists. It is the theory, and the paradigm we create based on those 'truths' or 'objectivities' that lies with one side or another. What is 'believable' lies with one side or another. Subjectiveness lies with one side or another. Or at least that's my theory, which is rather ironic ;-).

The quest is most of the fun.

What is your name?

What is your quest?

What is your favorite color?

Sorry, random sporadicness =).

Edited November 2, 2011 by TAO

[TAO]

Hmmm... mfbukowski... I was just thinking about the definition of objectiveness. Wouldn't the definition of what is objective from our POV be anything we can experience but cannot describe? Like I mean, with no theories attached, that is, with no pre-concieved notions (if that's possible at all). Sorry, I was just thinking and had to blurb =D.

[Brade]

But that's not the statement I quoted. The above statement is a third-person statement, the statement I quoted was "I feel yucky about murder"

The question I was asking is if first person subjective statements can be considered "true" in your system. Making it a third person statement makes in principle at least, empirical.

That is essentially the difference Nagel is pointing out in my siggy- though on a different subject- the difference between a first and third person point of view.

Ahh, right. My mistake (in going from "I..." to "Brade..."). One of my favorite papers to do with all that is this one.

[Storm Rider]

Anyway, as to the question in the subject line, it appears that from most people the answer is 'yes, it's ok to just believe the Church is true'. Here's a related question: Is it ok to not believe the Church is true?

Okay to whom? It depends on the person. Is it okay for an apostle to not believe? What about a relief society president? Is it okay to have doubts? Of course. Does one state their disbelief in rebellion or humbly? Did one first have a strong testimony and now does not? There are too many variable here to provide a simple answer.

We are humans and humans live by hope and by faith. We are acted upon and we act while bearing consequences for our actions. We choose to react in certain ways, which also makes us liable. We are just human and we are all sinners. We fail, we fall, we get up again and we move on. Sometimes moving on, by our choice, takes us from the path of righteousness. The penitent will always return. Peace,

[mfbukowski]

Ahh, right. My mistake (in going from "I..." to "Brade..."). One of my favorite papers to do with all that is this one.

Looks interesting- I will read it and get back to you.

[mfbukowski]

Hmmm... mfbukowski... I was just thinking about the definition of objectiveness. Wouldn't the definition of what is objective from our POV be anything we can experience but cannot describe? Like I mean, with no theories attached, that is, with no pre-concieved notions (if that's possible at all). Sorry, I was just thinking and had to blurb =D.

For me, objectivity, to put it in 25 words or less, is essentially how replicable an experience is.

If I see a mirage or a pink elephant, or God appears to me, you have no way to know if I am lying or not- that is "subjective". But it can be true that I saw a pink elephant, though let us now assume that the pink elephant was a hallucination, or optical illusion etc.

Or in the case of a mirage- we in the west see those often on desert roads etc in the summer especially. You could even point them out to your friends in the car and say "Do you see that mirage?" and they would confirm it is true that there is a mirage and that the mirage is "real"

So if you said "I see a mirage at the base of that mountain over there", that would be a statement that was objectively true, about something that was real, and yet was an illusion.

But the observation is totally dependent on the circumstances of the moment- 5 minutes later it might "be there" or not, tomorrow it might be there or not etc.

Or in the case of the pink elephant, if I saw it- I might actually ask you if you saw it. If you did too, we would have something that was some kind of phenomenon- perhaps an illusion, perhaps real, etc. It is still pretty "subjective" but not completely, because like the mirage, we both saw it.

Now if we go over and put a net over it, and experience it from different angles, and touch it, and smell it, it is getting pretty darn "objective".

If we take it to the zoo, and they all have the same experiences, and more people see it and sample its DNA and test it all etc- then it becomes totally "objective" and gets written up in the scientific literature, and gets called Elephantus Taosis-Bukowsksis we have just "discovered" (defined and brought into the language and literature) what is called a "new species" of pigmy pink elephant.

Now it is totally objective. Science believes it exists, and the culture has defined it as "real".

So we went from a first glance, "subjective" pink elephant possible "hallucination" to a full-fledged scientific, "objective" discovery- merely because many people made the same observation.

Now what does the idea of "truth" have to do with this progression? Not much. It is a pretty useless word in describing it. Was it "true" that I saw the mirage/ pink elephant? I say yes, perhaps some would say no. Who would be right? It's pretty irrelevant and arbitrary.

Did it become "true" when more people saw it? The answer is just as arbitrary.

Is it "true" that "undiscovered species exist"? I think so- but what exactly are they? Are they butterflies or whales? Plants or tree-size animals that walk and have never been seen by humans? The term "true" here is pretty irrelevant- we use it and know what it means, but only in a GIVEN CONTEXT. You can't set down strict rules for what is "true" if you want to describe the way we use the word in every context- because such "rules" don't exist in language. Language itself is contextual.

Enough of this - I could rattle on forever.

So is it "true" that God appeared to Joseph? Of course!

[Avatar4321]

Rather than to "know" it's true?

While most wouldn't ever come right out and say it, I feel there's somewhat of a stigma around saying you believe the church is true.

I would be interested to know how many here "believe" rather than "know".

to some it is given to know to others it is given to believe on their words.

I dont see a problem with that at all. But at the same time we should always be seeking greater light and knowledge. at some point we all will learn that its true. it's when we start concluding that we never will that i see a problem