Is It Okay To Just "Believe" The Church Is True...

[HeatherAnn]

Anyway, as to the question in the subject line, it appears that from most people the answer is 'yes, it's ok to just believe the Church is true'. Here's a related question: Is it ok to not believe the Church is true?

If you want to be socially accepted in an lds ward (congregation) - then NO, it isn't ok to vocally express that you do not believe the church is true.

If the church was a business, testimony meeting could be considered a series of commercials based on the semantic theory of truth. What many, including life-long members of the church, don't consider is the meaning of the words they use. Many words are said without thinking, but out of habit & TRADITION!! (cue Fiddler on the Roof music).

[KevinG]

I am disturbed by a rote testimony or prayer - but someone failing to practice their religion properly is not a condemnation of those practices of beliefs. The very reason there is an LDS comedian is that we do fail to live up to best practices.

Edited November 3, 2011 by DaddyG

[HeatherAnn]

I am disturbed by a wrote testimony or prayer - but someone failing to practice their religion properly is not a condemnation of those practices of beliefs. The very reason there is an LDS comedian is that we do fail to live up to best practices.

Don't get me wrong, DaddyG. I love testimony meeting - sometimes it's the most genuine part of the month's church meetings. Some get annoyed when people cry, or go on & on about stories - but I love them! I just think it's important to "be born again" - to good news (gospel) of what words mean & be more conscious how we use them - not just for others, but for our own spiritual development. As one of the GA's said, it's not the words that inspire the spirit, but it's the thoughts & feelings (spirit in which it's said).

You'd think that comedian was LDS, but he's not... so we're not the only ones who struggles this way.

[mfbukowski]

Delete. Dang. I thought I knew how to work these here computer thingys.

So much for that thought.

Edited November 3, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

duplicate

Edited November 3, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Brade]

Brade:

Augh! I hate it when this happens! I will attempt to re-format this now, but I might not be able to.

I can email you the text file if that is easier

YGPM

[mfbukowski]

delete- errors

Edited November 3, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

delete

Edited November 3, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

Ahh, right. My mistake (in going from "I..." to "Brade..."). One of my favorite papers to do with all that is this one.

http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/00-01/phil235/a_readings/perry_indexical.html

Hey, thanks for that- a very interesting article with a lot of twists and turns- I really enjoyed it. I kept thinking he was arguing in favor of a position, I would be writing in the margins furiously showing how that position was wrong- and then he would agree that it didn't work. Then he would do it again, and again.

But finally, I realized that he is coming from a similar position that I am, but I am a bit more contextual than he is, more later Wittgensteinian perhaps than he is, but nevertheless, the search for an understanding of contextual propositions is definitely one of my major interests. And that becomes fundamentally what the paper is about.

But the best surprise of all was his reference to David Kaplan, who was one of my professors at UCLA- and his mention of Montague, one of the co-authors of my elementary textbook used in my logic class as an undergrad. Montague and Kalish were both profs there also while I was there- unfortunately, Montague was murdered soon after I left UCLA. Yes, I am an old guy! I got my bachelors there in 1970.

So once I saw all that, I knew exactly where they were coming from. But I abandoned that direction and headed more into Wittgenstein and Pragmatism- who are kind of "common ancestors" to both Perry's view and Quine et al and more where I am coming from with Rorty. So because I abandoned that view, I did not keep up with the literature along that branch, especially since I also abandoned academics a few years after that during grad school, because I felt that was a fruitless bough.

They seek to come up with a logic a la Frege which can deal with contextual language where Rorty gives up on bothering with that viewpoint altogether.

But the basis of both is how one deals with contextual meaning, and the problem of subjectivity- the "I" statements. They stress the logic, later Wittgenstein stresses the context and how the flux of context makes logic totally dependent on meaning and therefore fairly useless. So by analogy, one might say that Frege sees language as a brick wall with each word locked in stone, one brick next to the other, each row of bricks forming a proposition, and perhaps a string of propositions forming a theory. If that is the way Frege sees it, Wittgenstein sees language as a river of contexts, with each eddy in the river forming its own "language game"- really a mini-language all in itself.

So you appear presently to be on the Frege- Kaplan- Perry Branch and I am on the Rorty- Wittgenstein branch. Ok, that makes sense with what we have seen here, and how you are struggling with contextual logic- my view of the church takes a more contextual approach, you essentially have a different philosophy of language than I do, but with common roots.

Let me address a couple of points in the essay for a bit- the quotes are from the essay linked to in your quote above by Perry.

I suppose Perry would call me an advocate of what he calls "limited accessibility"- the idea, along with Rorty, that we all largely create out own "realities"

Perry says:

Such a theory of propositions of limited accessibility seems acceptable, even attractive, to some philosophers. [7] Its acceptability or attractiveness

will depend on other parts of one's metaphysics; if one finds plausible reasons elsewhere for believing in a universe that has, in addition to our common world, myriads of private perspectives, the idea of propositions of limited accessability will fit right in. [8] I have no knockdown argument against such propositions, or the metaphysical schemes that find room for them. But I believe only in a common actual world. And I do not think the phenomenon of essential indexicality forces me to abandon this view.

So in essence, Perry here admits that his arguments would not work against someone like Rorty who arguably, in a linguistic context (as opposed to a causal context) does not believe in a "common actual world", but in a world which can only be spoken about linguistically and is therefore unknowable non-linguistically. So for Rorty, our "common world" is linguistic and not in Perry's sense "actual". (So for Rorty there is nothing for language to "correspond" to - hence no correspondence theory of truth)

But on the other hand, I do not totally subscribe to Rorty's view, because I think he makes some fundamental errors in his assessment of the self as totally contingent and derived from language.

But then we get to what is Perry's conclusion about the problem of essential indexicals, and I have underlined what is to me the most important point:

The proposal, then, is that there is not an identity, or even an isomorphic correspondence, but only a systematic relationship between the belief states one is in and what one thereby believes. The opposite assumption, that belief states should be classified by propositions believed, seems to be built right into traditional philosophies of belief. Given this assumption, whenever we have believers in the same belief state, we must expect to find a proposition they all believe, and differences in belief state lead us to expect a difference in proposition believed. The bulk of this essay has consisted in following such leads to nowhere (or to propositions of limited accessibility).

Consider a believer whose belief states are characterized by a structure of sentences with indexicals or relativized propositions (those marked 'true' in a very comprehensive exam, if we are dealing with an articulate sincere adult). This structure, together with the context of belief -- the time and identity of the speaker -- will yield a structure of de re propositions. The sequence of objects will consist of the values which the indexicals take in the context. The open propositions will be those yielded by the relativized proposition when shorn of its indexical elements. These are what the person believes, in virtue of being in the states he is in, when and where he is in them. [9]

This latter structure is important, and classifications of believers by what they believe is appropriate for many purposes. For example, usually, when a believer moves from context to context, his belief states adjust to preserve beliefs held. As time passes, I go from the state corresponding to 'The meeting will begin' to the one corresponding to 'The meeting is beginning' and finally to 'The meeting has begun'. All along I believe of noon that it is when the meeting begins. But I believe it in different ways. And to these different ways of believing the same thing, different actions are appropriate: preparation, movement, apology. Of course, if the change of context is not noted, the adjustment of belief states will not occur, and a wholesale change from believing truly to believing falsely may occur. This is what happened to Rip Van Winkle. He awakes in the same belief states he fell asleep in twenty years earlier, unadjusted to the dramatic change in context, and so with a whole new set of beliefs, such as that he is a young man, mostly false.

We have here a metaphysically benign form of limited accessibility. Anyone at any time can have access to any proposition. But not in any way. Anyone can believe of John Perry that he is making a mess. And anyone can be in the belief state classified by the sentence 'I am making a mess'. But only I can have that belief by being in that state.

Dang.

I wish he had gotten to that point a few pages earlier- rather than describing all the WRONG paths we might go down.

So essentially I agree with him! I wouldn't put it that way- he is coming from a different language game than I am, but essentially we are in agreement.

SO WHAT DOES ALL THIS HAVE TO DO WITH THIS THREAD??

The bottom line for me are these important sentences:

All along I believe of noon that it is when the meeting begins. But I believe it in different ways. And to these different ways of believing the same thing, different actions are appropriate This is what happened to Rip Van Winkle. He awakes in the same belief states he fell asleep in twenty years earlier, unadjusted to the dramatic change in context, and so with a whole new set of beliefs, such as that he is a young man, mostly false

This is pretty much exactly what I believe about Mormonism. One can take it all in a literal context, or one can believe it in a different way, in a more symbolic, linguistic context. Alter the context and the same sentence which was true, becomes false. This of course is an incredible over-simplification, but hopefully you get the idea.

Put the creation story in a literal context, and one may see it as "false". Take it in a symbolic context, and it becomes "true". Yet of course some of stories may be literally true some not- but the bottom line is that IT ALL DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT. THAT IS THE NATURE OF BELIEF ITSELF.

Dang.

I really wish he got to that point earlier.

Edited November 3, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

This is a great video of my old prof Kaplan talking about this- the first part is an excellent summary of the history of the problem.

I would be on the Wittgenstein "anti-formalist" side of the equation.- around minute 8-10. Kaplan is 100% UCLA and since he taught me what I know, guess what- that's also the way I see things. But he is a formalist, silly old man

[mfbukowski]

A good article on anti-formalism-" these is my folks".

http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/rbannis1/AmCult/H47%235.html

A really good line:

Hence antiformalists, James especially, wished to make more room for "faith." See especially James Will to Believe" (1897) and his Varieties of Religious Experience (1902).

So for me, it is James view of the nature of religious experience which finally convinced me that it was ok to believe in such things, but that was the path I was on. I couldn't stand Frege Carnap and Church (Alonzo Church) and those formalists like Kaplan.

Then 10 years later I found Mormonism.

[HeatherAnn]

...This is pretty much exactly what I believe about Mormonism. One can take it all in a literal context, or one can believe it in a different way, in a more symbolic, linguistic context. Alter the context and the same sentence which was true, becomes false. This of course is an incredible over-simplification, but hopefully you get the idea.

Put the creation story in a literal context, and one may see it as "false". Take it in a symbolic context, and it becomes "true". Yet of course some of stories may be literally true some not- but the bottom line is that IT ALL DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT. THAT IS THE NATURE OF BELIEF ITSELF.

I agree.

I've never heard anyone testify that donkeys can talk,

but I have repeatedly heard people know that the scriptures are true.

You know what I'd love... is to have an open-minded spiritual scripture study... finding different ways to liken the scriptures to us.

Not from a prescribed lesson, but from each's heart & soul & life's experiences.

[Palerider]

Hey, thanks for that- a very interesting article with a lot of twists and turns- I really enjoyed it. I kept thinking he was arguing in favor of a position, I would be writing in the margins furiously showing how that position was wrong- and then he would agree that it didn't work. Then he would do it again, and again.

But finally, I realized that he is coming from a similar position that I am, but I am a bit more contextual than he is, more later Wittgensteinian perhaps than he is, but nevertheless, the search for an understanding of contextual propositions is definitely one of my major interests. And that becomes fundamentally what the paper is about.

But the best surprise of all was his reference to David Kaplan, who was one of my professors at UCLA- and his mention of Montague, one of the co-authors of my elementary textbook used in my logic class as an undergrad. Montague and Kalish were both profs there also while I was there- unfortunately, Montague was murdered soon after I left UCLA. Yes, I am an old guy! I got my bachelors there in 1970.

So once I saw all that, I knew exactly where they were coming from. But I abandoned that direction and headed more into Wittgenstein and Pragmatism- who are kind of "common ancestors" to both Perry's view and Quine et al and more where I am coming from with Rorty. So because I abandoned that view, I did not keep up with the literature along that branch, especially since I also abandoned academics a few years after that during grad school, because I felt that was a fruitless bough.

They seek to come up with a logic a la Frege which can deal with contextual language where Rorty gives up on bothering with that viewpoint altogether.

But the basis of both is how one deals with contextual meaning, and the problem of subjectivity- the "I" statements. They stress the logic, later Wittgenstein stresses the context and how the flux of context makes logic totally dependent on meaning and therefore fairly useless. So by analogy, one might say that Frege sees language as a brick wall with each word locked in stone, one brick next to the other, each row of bricks forming a proposition, and perhaps a string of propositions forming a theory. If that is the way Frege sees it, Wittgenstein sees language as a river of contexts, with each eddy in the river forming its own "language game"- really a mini-language all in itself.

So you appear presently to be on the Frege- Kaplan- Perry Branch and I am on the Rorty- Wittgenstein branch. Ok, that makes sense with what we have seen here, and how you are struggling with contextual logic- my view of the church takes a more contextual approach, you essentially have a different philosophy of language than I do, but with common roots.

Let me address a couple of points in the essay for a bit- the quotes are from the essay linked to in your quote above by Perry.

I suppose Perry would call me an advocate of what he calls "limited accessibility"- the idea, along with Rorty, that we all largely create out own "realities"

Perry says:

So in essence, Perry here admits that his arguments would not work against someone like Rorty who arguably, in a linguistic context (as opposed to a causal context) does not believe in a "common actual world", but in a world which can only be spoken about linguistically and is therefore unknowable non-linguistically. So for Rorty, our "common world" is linguistic and not in Perry's sense "actual". (So for Rorty there is nothing for language to "correspond" to - hence no correspondence theory of truth)

But on the other hand, I do not totally subscribe to Rorty's view, because I think he makes some fundamental errors in his assessment of the self as totally contingent and derived from language.

But then we get to what is Perry's conclusion about the problem of essential indexicals, and I have underlined what is to me the most important point:

Dang.

I wish he had gotten to that point a few pages earlier- rather than describing all the WRONG paths we might go down.

So essentially I agree with him! I wouldn't put it that way- he is coming from a different language game than I am, but essentially we are in agreement.

SO WHAT DOES ALL THIS HAVE TO DO WITH THIS THREAD??

The bottom line for me are these important sentences:

This is pretty much exactly what I believe about Mormonism. One can take it all in a literal context, or one can believe it in a different way, in a more symbolic, linguistic context. Alter the context and the same sentence which was true, becomes false. This of course is an incredible over-simplification, but hopefully you get the idea.

Put the creation story in a literal context, and one may see it as "false". Take it in a symbolic context, and it becomes "true". Yet of course some of stories may be literally true some not- but the bottom line is that IT ALL DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT. THAT IS THE NATURE OF BELIEF ITSELF.

Dang.

I really wish he got to that point earlier.

Coming very late to this discussion and haven't even read the past posts (sorry) but it seems to me that the church sells the Mormon story on a very literal level (or context) but then when one starts to carefully study early church history and things start to go awry or discrepencies pop up, suddenly we have a group of people wanting to give us a whole new contextual way of looking at the doctrine and the history that will make everything feel better.....

[mfbukowski]

Coming very late to this discussion and haven't even read the past posts (sorry) but it seems to me that the church sells the Mormon story on a very literal level (or context) but then when one starts to carefully study early church history and things start to go awry or discrepencies pop up, suddenly we have a group of people wanting to give us a whole new contextual way of looking at the doctrine and the history that will make everything feel better.....

I think you are totally wrong.

But let's grant that you are right, for the sake of discussion. In that case my response is "so what?"

Many Protestants read the Bible literally, and then you have guys like Tillich and Kirkegaard. Your point?

Do you think that those thinkers are interested in Luther's biography? Or corrupt popes? Or the Inquisition?

Edited November 4, 2011 by mfbukowski

[HeatherAnn]

Coming very late to this discussion and haven't even read the past posts (sorry) but it seems to me that the church sells the Mormon story on a very literal level (or context) but then when one starts to carefully study early church history and things start to go awry or discrepencies pop up, suddenly we have a group of people wanting to give us a whole new contextual way of looking at the doctrine and the history that will make everything feel better.....

I think you're right in a way... there's a lot invested - a life time of belief (pride), missionary experiences, tithing, temple marriage, family, friends, sometimes a job/career that is influenced by one's church standing. There's too many reasons to justify the belief than to question it. And why question any belief... UNLESS it's causing you or another harm. I think that is the question to ask when we consider beliefs (which are never 100% true, given our extremely limited awareness). Are they functional or dysfunctional beliefs?

It really depends on how you interpret everything, especially religious doctrine, since it has the power to either help (ie placebo efffect) or harm (ie mental illnesses, the majority of which are considered to be rooted in misunderstandings of religous doctrine).

Edited November 4, 2011 by HeatherAnn

[KevinG]

I have run into very few people for which historical inconsistencies were the cause of their loss of faith. A few more cited them as the straw that broke the already strained camels back. Even more were due to not experiencing the fruits of the gospel be it because of family dysfunction or offense given by other Mormons.

Being a convert who did not believe because of family, social pressure or any advantage gained from said belief- I just don't see the LDS experience being one where people, especially adults are generally kept from information or history outside of dysfunctional relationships where questioning was not allowed and teachings consisted of "we" are always perfect while "they" are always sinful and wrong. The paradox of this is apostates from controlling families are often just as stubborn in their disbelief as their family was in their unquestioning belief.

So as to the OP... just believing is not only OK but probably healthy when it comes to leaving one's self open to new information and evaluating it in light of ones current beliefs and knowledge. I see those who can bend with new information being much less likely to lose faith altogether than those who are rigid in their belief structure. Given we mortals all see through a glass darkly rigidity probably isn't a safe stance.

[HeatherAnn]

Matt 13:34 “All these things spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables; & without a parable spake he not unto them”

Scriptural symbolic lessons teach about the pain of realizing something isn't what you think & then realizing something better.

The story of Jesus' birth - about being "born again" to good news ("gospel"). Labor isn't easy, but afterward, the reward is worth it.

Not putting old wine in new wine botttles... sometimes, we cling to old beliefs when they no longer work for us.

The idea of pruning the olive branches... cutting off the old harmful beliefs (& related feelings/behavior) so that it may bring forth goodness.

Mark 2:27 “The sabbath was made for man, & not man for the sabbath.”

*Religious rituals are to help us spiritually, they are not spirituality themselves.

“And be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, & acceptable, & perfect, will of God.” - Romans 12:2

“Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus” Phil 2:5

Overall, I’m grateful for many high standards I was taught religiously, (despite depressing shame) – because it was a good foundation, until I learned more… Those values that are of God, should not be thrown out just because I have a more open mind of “good” & “evil.” Putting on the mind of Christ is realizing the higher law (the spirit within, not just appearance), living in harmony with reason & intuition to do our best in doing God’s will.

1 Cor 13:11 “When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things.”

And yet also...

Mark 10:15 “Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein.”

Edited November 5, 2011 by HeatherAnn

[juliann]

Coming very late to this discussion and haven't even read the past posts (sorry) but it seems to me that the church sells the Mormon story on a very literal level (or context) but then when one starts to carefully study early church history and things start to go awry or discrepencies pop up, suddenly we have a group of people wanting to give us a whole new contextual way of looking at the doctrine and the history that will make everything feel better.....

It's not that you don't have a legitimate observation on some levels but it is becoming increasingly difficult to "sell" this complaint as well when the church itself is behind things like the Joseph Smith Project. We all expect to continue to learn more information and that by its very nature requires a "new contextual way of looking". I look forward to it and find it increasingly odd that this is considered as a negative. In this day and age it might a little irrational to think an institution (which the church is on one level) won't or shouldn't protect its brand.

[mfbukowski]

nevermind

Edited November 7, 2011 by mfbukowski