God: The Ultimate Author Of Evil?

[cksalmon]

Okay, so I program my robot to have the desire, beliefs, and preferences to kill my wife, and make him sophisticated enough to have self-consciousness. He kills my wife. Is he praise worthy/blame worthy now?

So, the robot desires to kill your wife and is self-consciously aware that it desires to kill your wife and does kill your wife? Interesting question. I'll get back to you. (My hesitancy is due to my skeptical fascination about the possibility of artificial intelligenceâ??not moral agency, per se. I think it is a good and interesting question.)

If you've been following the thread, however, you'll see how this analogy fails to capture my theological perspective. Neither you nor I are God, nor are you, in your analogy, properly analogous to God.

Your desire, in your analogy, is to murder/have murdered your wife. I've argued that, biblically, what we can know about God's priorities in creation include that he demonstrate his hatred for evil and his mercy for evildoers.

If we pull the camera further back, on my view, it is you who would be the recipient either of God's wrath or God's mercy. It is your evil that would be on trial.

God, on the other hand, is and never will be in the dock. He just is the judge, jury, and executioner (and, indeed, in countless cases the pardoner via Christ).

To quote the Apostle Paul (in Romans 9):

You will say to me then, "Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, "Why have you made me like this?" Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honored use and another for dishonorable use? What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory....

I hope, but don't assume, that you won't find fault with the fact that I attempt to be slavishly consistent with what I consider revealed scripture.

Best.

cks

[Zeta-Flux]

Honestly, I couldn't answer that. I don't know.

In response, I would say that I don't think I've at all suggested that God is "constrained by logic." With no offense meant, I just don't know it might mean to propose that God is "constrained by logic." Does not compute. Logic, in the sense I intend, is just not tantamount to any sort of extrinsic constraining force at all. To roast the old chestnuts: is God in any meaningful sense constrained by the fact that he cannot create a married bachelor? Or, that he cannot create a circular square? Hardly! These are not really extrinsic constraints at all but rather are representative of the necessary condition of the possibility of meaningful utterance.

Yes, that is what I meant. Can God choose to create a meaningless existence? I've heard some people say yes; but I'd imagine you would say no.

I'm just paraphrasing Paul at this point (or Paul's OT quotationsâ??see Romans 3):

Moral evil is, for Paul, intrinsic: no one does good, not even one. None is righteous, no, not one. No one understands; no one seeks for God.

These are universal charges. If this condition is to be countermanded, extrinsic goodness is the only solution. This ties in with my supposition, gleaned from Romans 9 and Romans 11 and elsewhere, that God shuts up all humans under the prison of sin and only releases them from that prison as he sees fit. Since I take Paul's letter to be true, God-breathed scripture, I am left with the conclusion that, left on their own, all humans are inherently depraved and evil. Intrinsic badness; extrinsic goodness.

I see. You were making a faith-based claim from your interpretation of the scriptures. I personally do not read those verses the way you do, but I now understand what you were trying to say.

Best,

Zeta-Flux

[cksalmon]

Hi Zeta--

I see. You were making a faith-based claim from your interpretation of the scriptures. I personally do not read those verses the way you do, but I now understand what you were trying to say.

Sure, it's ultimately a faith-based claim. No argument there. The "faithbasedness" of the claim, I would suggest, however, is rooted in the fact that I consider the bible authoritative and I'm not aware of a better way to assimilate the totality of the biblical witness into a coherent worldview than the one I currently possess.

I'm certainly open to other options. But, in this case, I find Paul's usage of those OT quotations to be fairly straightforward. How do you understand these verses from Rom 3?

What then? Are we Jews any better off? No, not at all. For we have already charged that all, both Jews and Greeks, are under the power of sin, as it is written: "None is righteous, no, not one; no one understands; no one seeks for God. All have turned aside; together they have become worthless; no one does good, not even one." "Their throat is an open grave; they use their tongues to deceive." "The venom of asps is under their lips." "Their mouth is full of curses and bitterness." "Their feet are swift to shed blood; in their paths are ruin and misery, and the way of peace they have not known." "There is no fear of God before their eyes." Now we know that whatever the law says it speaks to those who are under the law, so that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may be held accountable to God.

Best.

Chris

[Zeta-Flux]

Hi Zeta--

Sure, it's ultimately a faith-based claim. No argument there. The "faithbasedness" of the claim, I would suggest, however, is rooted in the fact that I consider the bible authoritative and I'm not aware of a better way to assimilate the totality of the biblical witness into a coherent worldview than the one I currently possess.

I'm certainly open to other options. But, in this case, I find Paul's usage of those OT quotations to be fairly straightforward. How do you understand these verses from Rom 3?

Best.

Chris

I understand them to be speaking poetically (I think the quotation comes from Isaiah if I'm not mistaken) and in particular hyperbolically. Frankly, I have never understood Romans, and not for a lack of trying. Particularly chapter 9, verses 19 and on. In my mind, at least, the hypothetical question is very important. Why does God find fault? Paul seems to just jump out of his chair, accuse the asker of speaking against God, and proceed to not only NOT answer the question, but say in effect "If God made you into a toilet, shut up and take it and be damned!" Unless, of course, you don't think this is talking about salvation and damnation...

Anyway, maybe we could start another thread and talk about Romans. I'd enjoy discussing it.

[cksalmon]

I understand them to be speaking poetically (I think the quotation comes from Isaiah if I'm not mistaken) and in particular hyperbolically. Frankly, I have never understood Romans, and not for a lack of trying. Particularly chapter 9, verses 19 and on. In my mind, at least, the hypothetical question is very important. Why does God find fault? Paul seems to just jump out of his chair, accuse the asker of speaking against God, and proceed to not only NOT answer the question, but say in effect "If God made you into a toilet, shut up and take it and be damned!" Unless, of course, you don't think this is talking about salvation and damnation...

Anyway, maybe we could start another thread and talk about Romans. I'd enjoy discussing it.

Hi Zeta--

I don't understand what it would mean for Paul to be speaking/quoting in hyperbolic poetic language. It seems an attempt to lessen or mitigate the very real intention of Paul's words. Of course I take this passage to be speaking about damnation and salvation. What does it mean, on your view, that Paul was speaking (or, making use of OT passages) in a poetic way? Practically, what does that work out to, interpretatively? (Feel free to start a separate thread; I'll probably participate.)

If you wish me to speculate beyond what scripture states, though, I'll disappoint you. I take the hypothetical very seriously as well. But, I also take its implications as inspired. When Paul asks, "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God" I take that as a bibilically-warranted license to ask the same question.

Frankly, I have never understood Romans

That may be because it is a difficult book (which it is), or because its plain message in unpalatable. Or, indeed, for some other reason of which I'm not aware.

My response would be (to quote Paul, from Rom 3): "Let God be true though every one were a liar."

I haven't been presented a consistent, alternative explanation as to what Paul is driving at in Romans. I'm wondering what, specifically, a poetic interpretation might entail that would dissuade me from what I deem to be a straightforward reading of the scripture.

Best.

Chris

[Log]

Then you understand how I felt. I responded to your argument by providing a compatibilist alternative to the definition of freedom that was assumed in your premises. The alternative I offered was plausible and had real, meaningful content. Your argument was thereby rendered circular. You responded to my argument by providing a libertarian alternative to my definition of will that had no content except a negation of the compatibilist definition, and therefore no real plausibility. Your attempt to render my argument circular as I had done to yours, therefore, amounted to nothing more than a bare denial that my argument was true.

I don't know how much more simply I can put this - a limitation of my poor communication skills, no doubt - your conclusion is entailed by premise 1, therefore your argument is circular. Hence, tu quoque.

An interesting argument. Since rocks do not produce "willed actions", it is difficult to know how they could be blameworthy or praiseworthy for them.

The actions of rocks, exactly like those of humans (including their "wills" per se), are, on your view, entirely determined by prior states of affairs. If humans are moral agents, so also are rocks.

A better point of comparison would be a robot.

We may as well stick with rocks. It simplifies things and introduces no tertiary matters.

I see our being pawns of the universe as simply an unsettling brute fact of existence that cannot be philosophized away, however much we might wish to.

I see the opposite - I see our ultimate freedom as the unsettling brute fact of existence. Once upon a time, I believed in compatibilism.

Oh, how I wish I still could.

As for your quote from Ostler, it is an interesting, but in my opinion unsatisfactory account.... The problem with libertarian free-will is its inability to give an account of how agency is compatible with indeterminacy. An undetermined event is one that is not "decided" by something that already exists. If it were decided by something that already exists, it would be determined rather than undetermined. The question is how we can attribute any undetermined event or action to human choice, and yet have it remain undetermined. Presumably, a truly undetermined event would be a truly random one.

Here's a challenge: show that "determined" and "random" are jointly exhaustive explanatory categories. If you can do this, then you can claim to have proven libertarianism false. (As an aside, you will also have proven the theory of intelligent design false.)

[Zeta-Flux]

Hi Zeta--

I don't understand what it would mean for Paul to be speaking/quoting in hyperbolic poetic language.

I don't either! (Read the next two paragraphs and this should become clear.) I read the original words (i.e. the stuff in Isaiah) as being hyperbolic in nature. I do not believe Isaiah was speaking in a philosophical sense regarding the depravity of man. Rather, the way I read it, he was bemoaning how Israel had rejected God yet again. His statement that no man sought for God, as I read it, is poetic license; not a statement that every single person alive was not seeking after God.

It seems an attempt to lessen or mitigate the very real intention of Paul's words.

I understand how you would see this. I think you might similarly see why it puzzles me when Paul quotes Isaiah to establish his point that we are all under sin. I just do not read Isaiah as preaching that point (in a philosophical sense), and yet Paul doesn't seem to be speaking about how some of Israel and/or mankind is highly susceptible to sin and most of them keep falling, but rather that they are entirely within its power and all mankind is evil. It almost seems to me like Paul is taking the quote out of context to bolster his assertions.

Of course I take this passage to be speaking about damnation and salvation. What does it mean, on your view, that Paul was speaking (or, making use of OT passages) in a poetic way? Practically, what does that work out to, interpretatively? (Feel free to start a separate thread; I'll probably participate.)

Should I start it on the Pundits forum, so we have less interruption? Or would you like a larger audience participation?

If you wish me to speculate beyond what scripture states, though, I'll disappoint you. I take the hypothetical very seriously as well. But, I also take its implications as inspired. When Paul asks, "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God" I take that as a bibilically-warranted license to ask the same question.

Okay, but do you take that as validly answering the question itself, or simply answering some types of questioners and their intent? Frankly, I'm not asking God that question and I'm not speaking back to Him. He will judge me however He judges me. But I am asking the preacher, so he can explain to me why I should think that the God he preaches of is good, when the God he preaches of has made me into a vessel of wrath, with the intent to damn me, to show us how good He is. Other scriptures tell us that God desires to save all men. How are these two things compatible?

[Zeta-Flux]

I don't know how much more simply I can put this - a limitation of my poor communication skills, no doubt - your conclusion is entailed by premise 1, therefore your argument is circular.

I'm puzzled by this sentence. All valid arguments have their conclusions entailed by their premises. That does not make them circular. Are you rather trying to claim that his premise was chosen only with the intent to entail the premise? If not, I don't follow. If so, feel free (as he has suggested) to offer another plausible definition that does not entail his conclusion. Otherwise, the claim that the premise was chosen only with the conclusion in mind is mooted by the fact that you cannot conceive of another premise which offers a similar definition; thus justifying the stance that the premise was chosen because he couldn't think of a better one (or is the most natural choice) and not because it merely entailed what it did entail. Phew!

[Log]

I'm puzzled by this sentence. All valid arguments have their conclusions entailed by their premises.

There is a significant letter here. I underlined it to make it clear.

That does not make them circular.

If D -> ~L, and someone asserts D, that is the same as asserting ~L.

Mr. Smith asserted D. He then asserted a couple more superfluous premises. The conclusion of his argument was ~L. That's called "circular reasoning," because the conclusion was a premise of the argument. In order to not be a circular argument, D or ~L must be the conclusion and both must not be premises to his argument.

[Zeta-Flux]

There is a significant letter here. I underlined it to make it clear.

If D -> ~L, and someone asserts D, that is the same as asserting ~L.

Mr. Smith asserted D. He then asserted a couple more superfluous premises. The conclusion of his argument was ~L. That's called "circular reasoning," because the conclusion was a premise of the argument. In order to not be a circular argument, D or ~L must be the conclusion and both must not be premises to his argument.

I would argue that the argument you gave above does not really depend on the fact that Mr. Smith only used one premise to assert D. If that is the case, your first quotation is moot. As is the argument that "circular reasoning" is when conclusions follow from their premises.

I would further argue that circular reasoning only occurs when one posits premises with the purpose of obtaining a certain conclusion, and the premises have equally valid/probable/likely alternate forms. I believe you need to produce those equally likely alternate premises to justify a claim of circular reasoning.

In other words, your claim that 'D cannot be a premise or the argument is circular' is false, unless you can evidence an alternate premise D' to D that accomplishes the (purported) purpose of D, and D' does not entail ~L.

[cksalmon]

If D -> ~L, and someone asserts D, that is the same as asserting ~L.

So, I suppose you and Chris are evenly presumptive, per your view? I can't view your ( more charitably than that.

And, then we must go deeper, I suppose.

Best.

Chris

[Log]

So, I suppose you and Chris are evenly presumptive, per your view? I can't view your ( more charitably than that.

Quite.

And, then we must go deeper, I suppose.

That's why I have laid out the challenge thusly:

Here's a challenge: show that "determined" and "random" are jointly exhaustive explanatory categories. If you can do this, then you can claim to have proven libertarianism false. (As an aside, you will also have proven the theory of intelligent design false.)

And there's no reason any of the compatibilists / determinists reading the thread can't have their shot at it.

[Log]

I would argue that the argument you gave above does not really depend on the fact that Mr. Smith only used one premise to assert D. If that is the case, your first quotation is moot. As is the argument that "circular reasoning" is when conclusions follow from their premises.

What in the frying helicopter are you talking about? Nobody - I repeat, nobody - said "circular reasoning is when conclusions follow from their premises." Circular reasoning is when your conclusion is packaged as a premise in your argument. Smith did precisely that. I pointed it out. JohnDoe agreed. It appears CKS is willing to concede such is the case.

I would further argue that circular reasoning only occurs when one posits premises with the purpose of obtaining a certain conclusion, and the premises have equally valid/probable/likely alternate forms. I believe you need to produce those equally likely alternate premises to justify a claim of circular reasoning.

Argument noted and dismissed (see above).

In other words, your claim that 'D cannot be a premise or the argument is circular' is false, unless you can evidence an alternate premise D' to D that accomplishes the (purported) purpose of D, and D' does not entail ~L.

Opinion noted and dismissed (see above).

[Zeta-Flux]

Log,

What in the frying helicopter are you talking about? Nobody - I repeat, nobody - said "circular reasoning is when conclusions follow from their premises." Circular reasoning is when your conclusion is packaged as a premise in your argument.

First, you said essentially what you claim nobody has said, when you said "I don't know how much more simply I can put this - a limitation of my poor communication skills, no doubt - your conclusion is entailed by premise 1, therefore your argument is circular." You only later clarified your meaning to include the idea of "packaging", but that is an essential point and shouldn't have been left out.

Second, circular reasoning does not depend on whether one packages the conclusion in one premise, or more than one premise. The number is irrelevant.

Third, while I agree that circular reasoning is when one packages a conclusion in the premises, I disagree with the manner in which you propose that such packaging is evidenced. One does not evidence packaging by the number of steps needed to go from a premise to a conclusion; or how easy it is to see that they are equivalent. Rather, packaging is seen by evidencing alternative premises that exhibit why it was wrong to assume the initial premise. You seem to disagree with this, as evidenced by your "Opinion noted and dismissed (see above)" comment. I think I have a small chance of convincing you that more is needed to evidence circular reasoning, so I'll give an example.

Example: In mathematics, we often prove that one or more statements are equivalent to one or more alternative statements. In other words A<->B. The logical deduction of this equivalence is not circular reasoning.

If one were to trying to prove B, and to do so merely asserted A first, that certainly would be circular. However, if one has reason to believe A (i.e. A is the only reasonable statement to make in a certain context), then B does follow, and it isn't circular to conclude B from A, because A was not assumed merely to prove B. Whether or not A and B are close to each other or not is irrelevant. What really matters is whether or not the choice of A as a premise really was justified by the context.

I hope this clarifies.

[cksalmon]

Should I start it on the Pundits forum, so we have less interruption? Or would you like a larger audience participation?

Pundits would be fine. I do hate how slow that forum moves, but, perhaps contradictorily, I also like how thorough and reasoned responses can be there.

It's like playing chess on gameknot.com, where one has a minimum of three days to make one's next move.

I'll leave it to your discretion, though. I don't particularly care much one way or the other, but I can imagine myself having to search on page 2 or 3 of the D&D forum in order to respond to substantive queries and arguments.

I probably won't move quickly.

Best.

Chris

[Log]

This will be the last time I address this issue to you, ZF.

Log,

First, you said essentially what you claim nobody has said, when you said "I don't know how much more simply I can put this - a limitation of my poor communication skills, no doubt - your conclusion is entailed by premise 1, therefore your argument is circular." You only later clarified your meaning to include the idea of "packaging", but that is an essential point and shouldn't have been left out.

I assume everyone can read Smith's argument and understand it. I'm unaware of any rational reason I am somehow expected to clarify the meaning of "circular argument"; I assume everyone can understand premise 1 of Smith's argument is the assertion of determinism, which assertion by itself definitionally entails that libertarianism is false, which happens to be the conclusion of his argument. But the truth of premise 1 is precisely the point at issue. I do believe I ran through all of this in my posts prior to this one.

That's why I have issued a challenge: prove that "determined" and "random" are jointly exhaustive explanatory categories. You will have thus proven libertarianism (and, as an added bonus, the theory of intelligent design) false.

Second, circular reasoning does not depend on whether one packages the conclusion in one premise, or more than one premise. The number is irrelevant.

This is not a point at issue.

Third, while I agree that circular reasoning is when one packages a conclusion in the premises, I disagree with the manner in which you propose that such packaging is evidenced. One does not evidence packaging by the number of steps needed to go from a premise to a conclusion; or how easy it is to see that they are equivalent. Rather, packaging is seen by evidencing alternative premises that exhibit why it was wrong to assume the initial premise. You seem to disagree with this, as evidenced by your "Opinion noted and dismissed (see above)" comment.

I disagree indeed, because you're flatly incorrect. One's motivation is not relevant. Postulating alternative premises is unnecessary. If, within a single argument, a premise thereof is the conclusion thereof, then you have argued in a circle. I don't doubt that, as a determinist, Smith would of course view determinism as the most reasonable assumption. This does not render the argument valid.

I think I have a small chance of convincing you that more is needed to evidence circular reasoning, so I'll give an example.

Example: In mathematics, we often prove that one or more statements are equivalent to one or more alternative statements. In other words A<->B. The logical deduction of this equivalence is not circular reasoning.

If one were to trying to prove B, and to do so merely asserted A first, that certainly would be circular. However, if one has reason to believe A (i.e. A is the only reasonable statement to make in a certain context), then B does follow, and it isn't circular to conclude B from A, because A was not assumed merely to prove B. Whether or not A and B are close to each other or not is irrelevant. What really matters is whether or not the choice of A as a premise really was justified by the context.

I hope this clarifies.

It does not clarify. I hope you can realize the fundamental difference between showing an "if and only if" relationship between two statements, and something of this form.

Given D -> ~L by definition of L,

D

A

B

C

__

~L

And this is precisely what has happened.

Premise 1) An action that I perform in in a given moment is "willed" by me only if it is determined by my state-of-mind or state-of-being in a previous moment.

By definition of "determined," and "libertarian freedom," you get this directly:

Conclusion) No action that is "willed" by me in a given moment satisfies the conditions of libertarian freedom.

There's nothing else to talk about. The premise is the conclusion. This is what Chris termed "a definitional fallacy," which is a species of begging the question, or arguing in a circle.

[Zeta-Flux]

This will be the last time I address this issue to you, ZF.

You are certainly free to not to respond if you do not enjoy the conversation. I appreciate the warning, and will not expect more interaction unless you change your mind.

I assume everyone can read Smith's argument and understand it. I'm unaware of any rational reason I am somehow expected to clarify the meaning of "circular argument"; I assume everyone can understand premise 1 of Smith's argument is the assertion of determinism, which assertion by itself definitionally entails that libertarianism is false, which happens to be the conclusion of his argument. But the truth of premise 1 is precisely the point at issue. I do believe I ran through all of this in my posts prior to this one.

I won't speak for Chris Smith, but as I understand it, libertarianism only contradicts some forms of determinism. Further, his premise 1 didn't assume determinism forced upon an agent by prior states of the universe, but from prior states of the agent itself (without reference to the universe being deterministic). Even libertarians claim that agents *determine* their choices in some way. etc...

That's why I have issued a challenge: prove that "determined" and "random" are jointly exhaustive explanatory categories. You will have thus proven libertarianism (and, as an added bonus, the theory of intelligent design) false.

How do you define random? Most people define it as that which is not caused by previous states.

This is not a point at issue.

Then why did you previously quote me, adding an underline below "es"?

I disagree indeed, because you're flatly incorrect. One's motivation is not relevant. Postulating alternative premises is unnecessary. If, within a single argument, a premise thereof is the conclusion thereof, then you have argued in a circle.

First, that is an interesting position to take. Maybe I'm being too much of a mathematician here, but we do that all of the time. We call such a happening a "corollary". One thing trivially proves another thing. One trivially knows A->B and one proves A. Then they conclude B. The real question is whether A is justified/proved or not.

Second, I think you mistook my use of the word "packaging" to imply "motivation". Maybe a better way to say it would be "the unjustified assumption of a premise, which trivially leads to a conclusion". Whether or not the positor knew the assumption was unjustified is irrelevant (i.e. their intention is irrelevant).

It does not clarify. I hope you can realize the fundamental difference between showing an "if and only if" relationship between two statements, and something of this form.

Given D -> ~L by definition of L,

D

A

B

C

__

~L

Yes, I completely understand this argument. My example was supposed to help you by making things easier, but I can definitely work with this. The argument you gave is valid, as long as premises D, A, B, and C are justified. Clearly, A, B, and C are superfluous. However, to show that the argument is circular one needs to show that D is not justified. [i can think of LOTS and LOTS of arguments like this that I teach in my college class--hopefully without those superfluous arguments--and they are not circular because D is justified. If you've ever taken a math class, you know that many times everything reduces to using the definitions of statements.]

Let me give another example:

C

------

C

Is this argument circular? As weird as it sounds, at least from a mathematicians perspective, it depends on the context. Is one trying to prove C? Or is one trying to show that C implies C? If the second option, then the argument is sound and not circular. It accomplishes its purpose; via basic 1st order logic principles. If one is trying to prove C, then this argument will be circular, UNLESS C is an axiom. In that context, the argument is sound, and the best argument one can give! It all depends on the context. In other words, it depends on how one justifies the premises.

Now, I think I understand your position a little better. You view Chris Smith's Premise #1 as a rewording of determinism. You view determinism as the antithesis of libertarianism. As such, by merely asserting determinism, Chris Smith is using circular logic; he is positing something that trivially proves what he wishes to conclude.

On the other hand, many of us believe that Premise #1 is not a statement that the universe is deterministic, but a simple statement of what it *means* to have the ability to make a choice. It implies that certain things are deterministic, which implies that libertarian free will doesn't work. We might be wrong that Premise #1 is the most natural statement of what it means to make a choice. But, until someone demonstrates otherwise, it is the natural thing to assume. Assuming it, and then concluding libertarianism doesn't work, is not circular reasoning, under these hypotheses, unless and until one demonstrates that Premise #1 is the wrong thing to assume. (Positing that there is another mysterious option is valid to do. But it doesn't demonstrate that one should drop the previous assumptions. Only that there *might* be alternatives [which apparently cannot be explained].)

Best,

Zeta-Flux

[Log]

So, I suppose you and Chris are evenly presumptive, per your view? I can't view your ( more charitably than that.

After pondering for a while, I take it back; no, Chris and I are not evenly presumptive.

Blake's argument, which I posted, is both valid and sound.

You, Chris, ZF, and JD agree that we are not free, as free is used in that argument.

I understand the definition of "free" to mean "able to do otherwise." Moreover, this definition entails "unconstrained."

"Determined" means "constrained." "Constrained" entails "coerced," and "coerced" can mean "constrained."

That is why I suggested, and will continue to suggest, that compatibilists should find a new word, other than "free," to describe "choices that are determined and uncoerced."

I've no idea what word that would be.

[Chris Smith]

Zeta-Flux has done a good job of answering Log on this issue. His last 2 paragraphs in his most recent post, I think, are well-stated. My Premise 1 does not give a deterministic account of the universe at large. Rather, it gives a fairly common-sense account of what it means to "will" an action. It is an account to which I can conceive no alternative that is consistent with libertarian freedom. Neither is my Premise 1 equivalent with my conclusion. My conclusion was that willed actions cannot be free in a libertarian sense. Certainly Log could undermine my argument if he were able to problematize my Premise 1 or to offer a plausible alternative account of "willing" that does not entail my conclusion. But the accusation of circular argumentation is incomprehensible to me.

As for the analogy between people and rocks, here is the problem I see with that argument. When a conscious agent acts, the action is determined by factors internal to the agent. Even if those factors were themselves the product of a complex of other causes external to the agent, we can nevertheless say that the action we designate as praiseworthy or blameworthy is at least proximately attributable to the state that is presently inherent in the agent. When a rock "acts", it is only because it was moved by an outside agent. There is no sense in which the influence of outside causes were mediated through processes internal to the agent. There is also no sense in which the blameworthy or praiseworthy action is attributable to a state inherent in the rock. The rock itself, therefore, cannot be said to be either praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Let's take this up a notch in complexity: what about a handgun? When a handgun is used to kill someone, there is both a sense in which outside causes are mediated through processes internal to the handgun and a sense in which the blameworthy action is proximately attributable to the state that is inherent in the agent. And indeed, there is a large segment of our society that feels that handguns are blameworthy for the violence that plagues us, and that wants to do away with them. Whether you view handguns as blameworthy will likely depend upon whether you feel the violence that occurs by means of them is more likely to be positive and redemptive or more likely to be negative and destructive.

When we raise this to the level of conscious agents, both the mediation of external causes through internal processes and the attributability of actions to inherent states are true to a much greater degree than in the cases of either the rock or the handgun. In this case, all external factors have been sufficiently intertwined in the agent's interior that they are unrecognizable, and the result is a single emergent entity that may act in a variety of ways depending upon its internal state. To a much greater degree than the handgun, the most recognizable cause in any action carried out by a conscious agent is the conscious agent itself. (To this point, I suspect the other compatibilists here would agree with me. In the following, they might not.) From a strictly objective perspective, we could probably say that none of the agent's actions are any more inherently blameworthy or praiseworthy than those of a rock or a handgun. But since we are a society of conscious agents that relies upon certain kinds of action (and the avoidance of other kinds) for its continuing peace and happiness, we assign blame and praise to emergent agents enacting those kinds of actions. While our assignment of blame may be mitigated by an awareness that such agents are determined by complexes of external factors, we also have to deal with the brute fact that an agent's internal state is what it is and produces the kind of action that it produces, and therefore disrupts the peace and happiness of society. The assignment of blame is our attempt to deal with this brute fact. It relies not upon the cosmic perspective assumed by libertarians, but upon the limited human perspective of our society. (I should add that for Mormons, for whom intelligences are eternal and necessary entities, the cosmic perspective might be analogous to the human perspective of our society. We might suggest that, in assigning blame and praise, God is merely attempting to deal with the brute fact that some intelligences' internal states produce action that disrupts the agreed-upon "plan of salvation".)

Best,

-Chris

[Chris Smith]

You, Chris, ZF, and JD agree that we are not free, as free is used in that argument.

I agree that we are not free in a libertarian sense. I deny that libertarian freedom is reconcilable with any meaningful account of "willing".

I understand the definition of "free" to mean "able to do otherwise." Moreover, this definition entails "unconstrained."

"Determined" means "constrained." "Constrained" entails "coerced," and "coerced" can mean "constrained."

When I make a choice, I "determine" which of the options available to me I will actualize. Alternatively, we could say that I "constrain" the list of options so that only one is enacted. In order to be "free" in a libertarian sense, my action must be undetermined and unconstrained. Ergo, no choice I make can be "free" in a libertarian sense, and no "free" action in a libertarian sense can have been chosen. This is the basic problem to which I am pointing in my five-premise argument.

That is why I suggested, and will continue to suggest, that compatibilists should find a new word, other than "free," to describe "choices that are determined and uncoerced."

I've no idea what word that would be.

You may suggest this all you like, but of course I am not constrained to accede to your suggestion. In fact, I may well be constrained to do the opposite. I trust you will not take great offense at my spurning your request, since if determinism is true your arguments suggest I am merely a pawn of the universe and cannot be held accountable for my actions.

Best,

-Chris

[Log]

Neither is my Premise 1 equivalent with my conclusion.

Except it is.

Premise 1) An action that I perform in in a given moment is "willed" by me only if it is determined by my state-of-mind or state-of-being in a previous moment.

By definition of "determined," and "libertarian freedom," you get this directly:

Conclusion) No action that is "willed" by me in a given moment satisfies the conditions of libertarian freedom.

There's nothing else to talk about. The premise is the conclusion. This is what Chris termed "a definitional fallacy," which is a species of begging the question, or arguing in a circle.

I have no need to problematize premise 1; I have shown the argument is circular. If you want to take determinism with regards to human will as axiomatic, then you have again begged the question, since that is precisely what is at issue.

That you cannot conceive of an alternative to premise 1 does not render your argument other than circular.

This is going nowhere, so I am going elsewhere.

[Chris Smith]

Except it is.

I hate to sound like a broken record, but no it isn't.

This is going nowhere, so I am going elsewhere.

Sorry to hear that. It's been fun.

[johndoe]

Okay, so I program my robot to have the desire, beliefs, and preferences to kill my wife, and make him sophisticated enough to have self-consciousness. He kills my wife. Is he praise worthy/blame worthy now?

This is an interesting hypothetical that should help us get to the heart of the matter, I think.

Eddy Nahmias posits that the entire question of free will is really a subset of the mind/body problem. This strikes me as a very insightful observation. The hypothetical we have here seems to have been created with the intent of having the compatibilist respond that, yes, the robot is blameworthy in this case. Such a judgment would lead the libertarian to triumphantly declare that determinism indeed reduces us to the level of complex robots.

It would seem that our intuition tells us that we must be more than mere automatons. Libertarians feel that determinism reduces us to this level. But why? Going back to the mind/body problem - the libertarian intuits that determinism entails that our mind is wholly defined by our brains, i.e. that consciousness itself would simply be a collection of biochemical processes that could be duplicated in the lab were our technology sophisticated enough to do so. On this view, consciousness would be an emergent property.

I reject that consciousness is emergent. Per LDS doctrine, it would seem that consciousness is tied to the uncreated intelligence. Therefore, I do not believe that consciousness can be recreated through technology. The hypothetical robot, while it may very effectively imitate self-awareness, cannot actually be self-aware. In that sense, the robot cannot be blameworthy. Only conscious entities can be praiseworthy/blameworthy, and only to the extent that their volition is not constrained by external factors.

[johndoe]

Zeta-Flux has done a good job of answering Log on this issue. His last 2 paragraphs in his most recent post, I think, are well-stated. My Premise 1 does not give a deterministic account of the universe at large. Rather, it gives a fairly common-sense account of what it means to "will" an action. It is an account to which I can conceive no alternative that is consistent with libertarian freedom. Neither is my Premise 1 equivalent with my conclusion. My conclusion was that willed actions cannot be free in a libertarian sense. Certainly Log could undermine my argument if he were able to problematize my Premise 1 or to offer a plausible alternative account of "willing" that does not entail my conclusion. But the accusation of circular argumentation is incomprehensible to me.

I'm sorry Chris, but this is indeed circular, as is Log's presentation of Ostler's argument. In both cases, definitions are presented by assumption that seem to be the only sensical options to the presenter, but which are not non-controversial. In essense, each argument tries to make its preferred position the default position by asserting that its posited definition must hold unless proven mistaken.

I don't think this is a useful way to dialogue.

[Log]

I'm sorry Chris, but this is indeed circular, as is Log's presentation of Ostler's argument. In both cases, definitions are presented by assumption that seem to be the only sensical options to the presenter, but which are not non-controversial.

JD - Blake's argument was not circular. It is both valid and sound - you agree with the conclusion, in fact, that we are not free as per the definition of libertarian free will.