God: The Ultimate Author Of Evil?

[JDave]

I agree with johndoe. Another way of phrasing the idea: Bracketing constraint, one always and inevitably does what one most wants to do at any given time.

And if what we most want to do gets radically changed, that is because we now most want to change what we previously had most wanted to do?

I agree that we make the choices we want to. But if the factors affecting those choices include thoughts in my head, doesn't that imply that all my thoughts are completely predetermined? Isn't this (thought) the area where we allow for the enticing towards good or bad? Is all that enticing predetermined? God being God he inevitably was going to entice me to good at that moment?

I apologize that all I have are questions. I think I am coming to understand the determinism point of view, but these are a few of the hazy spots for me. Thanks!

[johndoe]

I very much doubt that Joseph Smith was using the Merriam-Webster online dictionary when he chose "entice" as the best translation for what Lehi said, so the dictionary entry seems extraneous.

I don't happen to have a copy of a dictionary comptemporary to the translation of the BoM, so today's dictionary is the best tool I have to rely on when needing to understand what words mean. I generally assume that the meaning of words hasn't changed from Joseph Smith's time until now, unless I have evidence that this has occurred. Do you have such evidence in the case of "entice"? If so, please share.

No, merely that since it says that "the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself," that it means that "enticement" cannot be the only factor.

I agree that enticement isn't the only factor. My intent was simply to point out that free will can coexist with enticement.

I feel that if all of our decisions are determined by what enticements we are subject to that we are not free.

I tend to agree, but in this case, it would probably be necessary to more narrowly define what you mean. Here is where I would agree that the dictionary definition is not sufficient.

I wonder why you call it determinism at all if you are appealing to internal forces. Wouldn't that lead to the same "black box" problem of luck that you say the libertarianism view leads to?

Because the actual definition of what determinism is has nothing to do with whether our decisions are caused by internal or external elements.

Regarding the problem of luck applying to determinism, the formal philosophical Problem of Luck cannot be applied to determinism. It is a problem that is very specific to libertarianism. But if you are referring to the arbitrary nature of what determines our eternal destiny, then I do believe you have a point. I just don't see it as a problem. I don't see it as a problem mainly because I see no escape from arbitrariness in the grand scheme of things, regardless of what you believe. Libertarianism is no better than determinism in this regard.

I would agree, so long as we are not compelled to make a choice in accordance with our nature and character - that is, that we could have chosen otherwise. So yes, we need to have the capability to make choices that we wouldn't want to make in order to really be free.

I don't mean to be disrespectful, but to help you understand my mindset...

The statement above seems silly to me, to the point of being nonsensical. So, we can be free if we do what we want, but only if we aren't coerced into doing that which we would have otherwise (i.e, without coercion) done anyway. Oh, and by the way, we have to be able to do that which we don't really want too. Do you see why I have a problem with this?

I also believe our nature and character can be altered and re-made by our choices.

So do I. But I also believe that altering our nature and character doesn't come about ex-nihilo. We have to have a desire first.

[cksalmon]

Yes, I asked them immediately after receiving your private message and I told you that. I feel this conversation is not as productive as I had hoped, it seems I approached it in a way that was too flip for your taste, you took offense, and now would rather be caught up in peripheral issues. Perhaps I should have simply emailed you about it to see what you had to say. Either way, forget I asked, I'll find someone else to talk to about it.

Too late.

First, a few considerations to frame the discussion*:

(1) God had the power to refrain from creating a world in which there is no evil. (Moreover, God will, in fact, create such a world in the future.)

(2) God has never in the past and will never in the future perform any evil act.

(3) Humans do perform evil acts and can, thus, be considered evil, at least in that sense (whether originally or thoroughly is another discussion).

(4) God created all humans with the perfect knowledge that they would perform evil acts, even though he was able to bring it about that they would not (and, again, will do this in the future).

(5) God so providentially orchestrated his creation that moral evil would inevitably result just as long as he refrained from intervening.

(6) God does so restrain his intervention in countless instances, thereby ensuring that moral evil will follow.

You have objected to the idea that God can be ultimately responsible for evil and yet not be evil himself. This is because, I believe, you hold that if God is ultimately responsible for evil, it necessarily follows that he is himself evil. Specifically, you stated, "Perhaps ck can explain how God can be the complete author of evil when he could have otherwise not done so, yet not be evil."

I would assume that you would deny the proposition, "The LDS God was able to bring about creation such that moral evil would not exist." After all, if you believed that the LDS God was so able, then it would make no sense to criticize the God I believe in for not availing himself of this ability.

Much in this discussion hinges on one's understandings of God's power and God's morality. To put your objection in perspective, let's consider some of these issues in the context of LDS theology. I assume:

(7) The LDS God was not able to guarantee that moral evil would not follow from his creation.

( Regardless, the LDS God created (which I assume is a noncontroversial point).

From the conjunction of (7) and ( , it follows that

(9) The ultimate reason moral evil exists in this world is because the LDS God chose to create.

Thus,

(10) The LDS God is ultimately responsible for the moral evil in this world.

One might attempt to argue that the LDS God does not know the future. Thus, proponents of this view might argue that the LDS God did not certainly know that moral evil would follow from his creation. Perhaps he can be absolved on this ground? No, he cannot be. Even assuming his ignorance that moral evil would follow from his creation, he still created even though he was unable (and assumedly knew he was unable) to create a world such that moral evil would not exist. Thus, he is still ultimately responsible and (10) stands. But, whatever the LDS God's knowledge of the future entails, we can be confident that he indeed foresaw moral evil. GP (p. 17) tells us that

(11) Moral evil necessitating the Atonement of Christ is a part of the LDS Plan of Salvation ("We needed a Savior to pay for our sins and teach us how to return to our Heavenly Father").

Thus,

(12) The LDS God chose to create even though knew he could not guarantee the absence of moral evil and, in fact, foresaw that moral evil would arise (and [10] stands).

Another consideration that I haven't seen elsewhere addressed: it is, I suppose, possible that the LDS God created under constraint or because he did not possess libertarian freewill. In other words, though he knew he could not guarantee the absence of moral evil in his creation, and though he perfectly foreknew that moral evil would in fact follow from his creation, he was unable to refrain from creating.

This doesn't seem likely. First, this position must posit that the LDS God did not possess libertarian freedom in the act of creating—but libertarian freedom is an essential tenet granted to God's human creatures by most LDS. It would be quite odd to insist that humans possess libertarian freedom, but that the LDS God either didn't or, possibly, still doesn't.

Assuming compatibilistic freedom for God(?) and humans (shout out to johndoe) doesn't seem to provide a way out of the quandary, either—at least not a straighforward one.

For if the LDS God possessed compatiblistic freedom in creation (and was thus, say, determined by some higher deity to create in accordance with the LDS God's own desires), then we still face a situation in which the LDS God desired to and did create a world that he perfectly foreknew would contain moral evil. And, if compatibilism is true, then the LDS God is still formally (though not perhaps, in this case, ultimately) responsible for creating moral evil in this world.

I assume you would reject this view in light of its compatibilistic assumptions, though it might provide some food for thought for johndoe.

I conclude, then, that both our theologies posit that our respective Gods are ultimately responsible for moral evil in this world.

The difference between our views is that I hold that God was actually able to prevent moral evil and yet didn't; you, that God was incapable of preventing moral evil and yet created anyway, fully aware that moral evil would result.

The question, for our respective positions, then becomes, "Why?"

Best.

cks

*I will refrain from prefacing my convictions with "I believe." That can be assumed. If I state an opinion or a merely tentative belief/understanding, I'll so note it.

[Log]

The saving grace of the LDS godhead is that we agreed to participate in this creation, with full knowledge of the bad stuff some of us would do.

[JDave]

Is one of the evidences for compatibilism (is that the correct term?) scriptures like Hel. 10:5, where it is stated that Nephi won't ask that which is contrary to the will of God? That is, his nature is now such that he will not ask contrary to the will of God.

[Log]

Is one of the evidences for compatibilism (is that the correct term?) scriptures like Hel. 10:5, where it is stated that Nephi won't ask that which is contrary to the will of God? That is, his nature is now such that he will not ask contrary to the will of God.

It is possible that we humans have libertarian free will, while God does not; and it is possible that if we are sufficiently obedient, he remakes our nature like unto his.

[Jason]

The statement above seems silly to me, to the point of being nonsensical. So, we can be free if we do what we want, but only if we aren't coerced into doing that which we would have otherwise (i.e, without coercion) done anyway. Oh, and by the way, we have to be able to do that which we don't really want too. Do you see why I have a problem with this?

Okay, lets say we take a man in prison. But lets say that this man for whatever reason prefers prison to freedom. Since he would chose to stay in prison if he had the opportunity to leave, is he in fact free to go whenever he wishes?

No, he's not. Whether he wants to leave or not, he is not free to chose to leave. Any choice by him to stay is a false choice - he had no real alternative.

[cksalmon]

Okay, lets say we take a man in prison. But lets say that this man for whatever reason prefers prison to freedom. Since he would chose to stay in prison if he had the opportunity to leave, is he in fact free to go whenever he wishes?

No, he's not. Whether he wants to leave or not, he is not free to chose to leave. Any choice by him to stay is a false choice - he had no real alternative.

Why is it a "false choice," if, in fact, it is actually the choice he desires to make and, in fact, does make?

Like johndoe, I don't see the issue here, no offense.

You appear to be arguing that he is not really free because he cannot choose to do something he just has no desire at all to choose to do. But, that just is compatibilism.

Why must he be thwarted in his attempt to do something that he really just does not wish to do in order to be free? The analogy seems hopelessly flawed to me. I don't get it. I'm sure it makes sense to you, but she's so high above me.

Best.

cks

[Log]

You appear to be arguing that he is not really free because he cannot choose to do something he just has no desire at all to choose to do. But, that just is compatibilism.

He is not free because he has no power to execute an alternative choice. To be free to do X and/or Y requires power to execute X and/or Y.

[Log]

1. It has always been true that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: Omnitemporality of Truth)
   
2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth. (Assumption: Infallible Foreknowledge)
   
3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 1 and 2)
   
4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone's power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing. (Assumption: Fixed Past)
   
5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 3 and 4)
   
6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (Necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness)
   
7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow. (From 5 and 6)
   
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning. (Assumption of Libertarian Free Will)
   
9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow. (From 7 and (see Ostler, review of The Mormon Concept of God, 109 n. 15)
   

So, let us address the real argument.

[Zeta-Flux]

cksalmon,

There are a few problems, in my opinion, with your reasoning, although I think you make some valid points in reference to the general idea that the Mormon conception of God is free from (some of) the problems associated with creation of evil.

As I understand it (and this will go without saying throughout) in Mormon thought, God creates kingdoms with laws, places self-existing beings within those kingdoms, and gives them the ability to obey or disobey, with the purpose in mind of helping said beings improve. God does not have the power to improve said beings in any other way. By not creating kingdoms and providing the chance for success (and failure) God would sin.

In Protestant thought, God created all things from nothing. His creation is a means for Him to provide Himself glory; including by saving and damning.

In Mormon thought, God provides the means for beings to choose good or evil. In Protestant thought, God created beings to be good or evil, so He can show the righteous how good He is by punishing the wicked. Your argument seems to postulate that a Deity who provides opportunities for good or evil is just as culpable as the Deity who forces evil to happen; as long as in both universes the purpose of said Deity is good. Strangely, I would agree, if that were the only story. However, it is not. In Mormon thought, we believe man knows good from evil. And, as far as I personally can contemplate the act, to create a universe to my glory involving misery and death, when I could have as equally created a universe to my glory without those things*, is evil, and I'd be the sponsor of it.

*If you believe that God could not have created a universe ex nihilo to His glory without evil, then your conception of God differs from that of some whom I've talked with; and as least from a strictly logical standpoint I couldn't fault you.

[cksalmon]

He is not free because he has no power to execute an alternative choice. To be free to do X and/or Y requires power to execute X and/or Y.

No. I still don't get it, log. I'm not genuinely free just so long as I cannot do something I personally really just have no desire whatsoever to do? It's an odd sort of freedom that requires that I simply must be able to do something I just really don't want to do. What would be the test case? An external constraint that forces me to attempt to do something I just don't desire to do such that I am thwarted in the attempt to act against my own personal preference?

Best.

cks

[Log]

No. I still don't get it, log. I'm not genuinely free just so long as I cannot do something I personally really just have no desire whatsoever to do?

You are not free to do something you personally really just have no desire whatsoever to do if you have not power to do something you personally really just have no desire whatosever to do. It's really not that hard.

It's an odd sort of freedom that requires that I simply must be able to do something I just really don't want to do.

Calling it odd doesn't pass for demonstrating that it's odd; any other kind of "freedom" just seems to me to be so much nonsense.

[Zeta-Flux]

1. It has always been true that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: Omnitemporality of Truth)
   
2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth. (Assumption: Infallible Foreknowledge)
   
3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 1 and 2)
   
4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone's power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing. (Assumption: Fixed Past)
   
5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 3 and 4)
   
6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (Necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness)
   
7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow. (From 5 and 6)
   
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning. (Assumption of Libertarian Free Will)
   
9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow. (From 7 and (see Ostler, review of The Mormon Concept of God, 109 n. 15)
   

So, let us address the real argument.

Log,

I think as Mormons we could make this argument even stronger by simply talking about the fact that Christ freely chose to perform the atonement, God told this to people before it happened, and God is not a liar.

But, be that as it may, I think this argument actually in many ways avoids the real issue, from the Mormon perspective. And that is that we reject philosophical limits on God, and rejoice in the revelation that comes through our prophets. Sure they haven't revealed whether or not God's knowledge is infallible, or whether we have libertarian free will. But they have revealed that we have free will, and that God knows the future and we can rely on that fact. When we try to use our reasoning, especially with regards to philosophical restrictions on God, in order to justify a argument whose conclusion flies in the face of revealed knowledge from the scriptures, from our manuals, and even from the modern prophets, we do ourselves a huge disservice.

That said, let me dissect the argument. First, we do not know for certain if truth is omnitemporal. Second, we do not know whether God's foreknowledge is infallible in the philosophical sense. Third, we do not know how long God has believed/known things. Fourth, we do not know if the past is fixed (in the philosophical sense). etc... What we do know is that the scriptures and modern prophets universally declare that God knows the future. What that means is left for us to discover by revelation from God.

I will share two interesting philosophically minded things I figured out. (1) The whole point of God's foreknowledge is that it allows for backwards causation. To show that His foreknowledge is incompatible with a fixed past is just silly; and misses the point that when God reveals things about the future this very act of revelation allows the future to affect the past. (2) If God knows the present, and the theory of relativity is true, and God exists in space, then he must know things faster than light can communicate them. It follows that He can impart knowledge of the future.

[Log]

But they have revealed that ... God knows the future and we can rely on that fact.

Run a word search for "Biblical Support for the Open View of God."

Since this is the crux of your response to Ostler, take it up with him. I don't find your position persuasive in the light of the Scriptures.

[Zeta-Flux]

You are not free to do something you personally really just have no desire whatsoever to do if you have not power to do something you personally really just have no desire whatosever to do. It's really not that hard.Calling it odd doesn't pass for demonstrating that it's odd; any other kind of "freedom" just seems to me to be so much nonsense.

With regards to libertarian free will, I have to agree with cksalmon. It just never made sense that to have agency I also had to have the power to both choose to steal an apple and choose not to steal an apple. I think we have the power to choose one or the other, but not the power to choose one and the power to choose the other.

Run a word search for "Biblical Support for the Open View of God."Since this is the crux of your response to Ostler, take it up with him. I don't find your position persuasive in the light of the Scriptures.

Just to make sure we are on the same page, what do you believe my position is?

[Log]

With regards to libertarian free will, I have to agree with cksalmon. It just never made sense that to have agency I also had to have the power to both choose to steal an apple and choose not to steal an apple.

Ha ha. Funny. Word play. You must have the power to execute both choices, or else you are not free when you act.

I think we have the power to choose one or the other, but not the power to choose one and the power to choose the other.

If you have not power to act in diverse ways, you are not free when you act.

Just to make sure we are on the same page, what do you believe my position is?

From what I've read, my presumption is you're a determinist/compatibilist. If you're not, then what's with the cutesy word games?

[cksalmon]

You are not free to do something you personally really just have no desire whatsoever to do if you have not power to do something you personally really just have no desire whatosever to do. It's really not that hard.

Well, it is for me, log. Really. I'm not blowing smoke here.

In what sense does genuine freedom necessitate that I be able to do something I would just never choose to do in the first place? You seem to have the cart before the horse here. Why would I need the power to do something I just don't desire to do in order to be genuinely free? The point is: I don't want to do X; I will not choose to do X; I am completely free to do (and to choose to do, obviously) what I actually really desire to do (call it Y).

And, I will state it again, just in light of its commonsensical approbation: it really is odd that whether or not I am genuinely free should be determined in the light of my inability to do something I simply and absolutely do not wish to do.

At any further remove, you're just affirming a belief in the libertarian understanding of free will, which is fine. But, I just can't go there with you. I reject your foundational premise: viz., that I simply must be absolutely free to do things I absolutely don't want to do in order to be genuinely free.

Best.

cks

PS. This is an argument I have had with Arminians. It only stands to reason that I would thusly clash, philosophically, with hyper-Arminians. I guess I've said my piece on that matter.

[Log]

I reject your foundational premise: viz., that I [ ] must be [ ] free to do things ... in order to be genuinely free.

The words "simply", "absolutely, and "I absolutely don't want to do" are entirely superfluous to this discussion. You must have power to do multiple things in order to be free.

I propose compatibilists find a new word, other than "free," to describe what they're talking about.

[Jason]

In what sense does genuine freedom necessitate that I be able to do something I would just never choose to do in the first place?

To be free to choose between good and evil you must be able to choose either good or evil. It doesn't matter if you never want to chose evil - to make a real choice you must have a real ability to make either choice.

In the prisoner example, the prisoner is not free to choose to get out of jail because the guards and walls confine him. The fact that he wants to stay is irrelevent to whether he is free to leave. It doesn't matter whether he wants to stay or go, he will stay. The choice of whether he stays or goes is not his. Without the ability to influence whether he stays or goes there is no real choice - what he wants is completely irrelevent.

I'm really puzzled as to why this isn't obvious.

[cksalmon]

I propose compatibilists find a new word, other than "free," to describe what they're talking about.

And, I would propose that libertarians with regard to human freedom find a new word to describe genuine "freedom" that does not require the apparent ability to act freely under constraint, such that they would be thwarted in their constrained attempt to do something they just have no personal desire to do.

I would further propose that we are at an impasse here. I don't find your perspective compelling; I'd guess that you are similarly unenamored with mine.

Best.

cks

[Zeta-Flux]

Ha ha. Funny. Word play. You must have the power to execute both choices, or else you are not free when you act.

See, I disagree with this. (I also find your characterization of my words inappropriate.) In fact, I think the power to execute both choices is precluded by the fact that the universe only allows one choice out of the two. You cannot do both. You have the power to do one OR the power to do the other. You do not have the power to do both. It's like the example given before of the man in the jail. Except that the jail is the universe, and it literally prevents you from having the power to do both things (although it doesn't, independent of yourself, necessitate one or the other). The claim that you have the power to do both is an illusion (and I might argue [if it didn't detract from my main point which you seemed to miss, and is repeated below] that this parallels the argument that determinism doesn't allow real choice).

From what I've read, my presumption is you're a determinist/compatibilist. If you're not, then what's with the cutesy word games?

Cutesy word games? Um... pointing out that the prophets have unilaterally, and unequivocably, preached that God knows the future is not playing word games. Pointing out that philosophy detracts from the argument on that point is the antithesis of word games. At any rate, whether or not I'm a determinist/compatibilist has nothing to do with my main point, which is: the use of philosophy in an attempt to convince others that God does not know the future* runs contrary to our roots and history and the words of the living prophets.

*Not to say that the prophets are clear on how God knows the future, or the philosophical basis for this knowledge (i.e. whether it is infallible); but they are clear that He does know the future. I personally find it very strange that you continue to preach against this notion, when on another thread you took umbrage at others speaking against the words of the apostles.

[cksalmon]

In the prisoner example, the prisoner is not free to choose to get out of jail because the guards and walls confine him. The fact that he wants to stay is irrelevent to whether he is free to leave. It doesn't matter whether he wants to stay or go, he will stay. The choice of whether he stays or goes is not his. Without the ability to influence whether he stays or goes there is no real choice - what he wants is completely irrelevent.

If I may, Jason, I'd point out the manifest flaw in your reasoning here.

(1) The prisoner actually wants to stay. (You have stated as much.)

(2) The prisoner, by personally and knowingly acting on his own desire to stay, is not really acting freely just because if it were the case that he desired to do something other than what he actually does desire to do (that is, something which he does not and will not desire to do), then he is obviously constrained in his choices, the set of which, admittedly (per your argument), just does not include the choice to attempt to leave the prison.

I'm really puzzled as to why this isn't obvious.

Me, too!

Best.

cks

[Jason]

See, I disagree with this. (I also find your characterization of my words inappropriate.) In fact, I think the power to execute both choices is precluded by the fact that the universe only allows one choice out of the two. You cannot do both. You have the power to do one OR the power to do the other. You do not have the power to do both. It's like the example given before of the man in the jail. Except that the jail is the universe, and it literally prevents you from having the power to do both things (although it doesn't, independent of yourself, necessitate one or the other). The claim that you have the power to do both is an illusion (and I might argue [if it didn't detract from my main point which you seemed to miss, and is repeated below] that this parallels the argument that determinism doesn't allow real choice).

You need the capability to do either, not the power to do both. Yes you will make only one choice, but if you always could only make one choice then you were not truly free to choose between the alternatives. Only if you could have chosen either possibility was there a real choice involved.

[JDave]

And if what we most want to do gets radically changed, that is because we now most want to change what we previously had most wanted to do?

I agree that we make the choices we want to. But if the factors affecting those choices include thoughts in my head, doesn't that imply that all my thoughts are completely predetermined? Isn't this (thought) the area where we allow for the enticing towards good or bad? Is all that enticing predetermined? God being God he inevitably was going to entice me to good at that moment?

I apologize that all I have are questions. I think I am coming to understand the determinism point of view, but these are a few of the hazy spots for me. Thanks!

cksalmon,

I realize that it is a bit of an impasse on some of the issues you've been discussing. I find the subject a bit intriguing, as I haven't studied it before. Could you please address how compatibilism addresses the questions I raised in my previous post (included here).