God: The Ultimate Author Of Evil?

[cksalmon]

cksalmon,

There are a few problems, in my opinion, with your reasoning...

Hi Zeta--

I've been meaning to get back to this and apologize for the delay. Hope to respond soon.

Best.

Chris

[cksalmon]

cksalmon,

There are a few problems, in my opinion, with your reasoning...

As I understand it (and this will go without saying throughout) in Mormon thought, God creates kingdoms with laws, places self-existing beings within those kingdoms, and gives them the ability to obey or disobey, with the purpose in mind of helping said beings improve. God does not have the power to improve said beings in any other way. By not creating kingdoms and providing the chance for success (and failure) God would sin.

I don't follow your reasoning here. In what sense would God sin by not providing his creatures the ability to sin?

In Protestant thought, God created all things from nothing. His creation is a means for Him to provide Himself glory; including by saving and damning.

Yes. I agree.

In Mormon thought, God provides the means for beings to choose good or evil.

I take it that you refer to libertarian freedom, here. Am I reading you correctly?

In Protestant thought, God created beings to be good or evil, so He can show the righteous how good He is by punishing the wicked.

I wouldn't phrase it in this manner. See my post to johndoe above. I wouldn't state that God created beings to be good or evil, but that God created beings to be either vessels of mercy or vessels of wrath. Moral evil is intrinsic; moral goodness is extrinsic.

Your argument seems to postulate that a Deity who provides opportunities for good or evil is just as culpable as the Deity who forces evil to happen;

A minor quibble. I don't believe God forces evil to happen. I believe he has so providentially arranged his creation that moral evil is inevitable; I do not believe he "forces evil to happen" (or, in other words, that he constrains some of his creatures to perform evil).

as long as in both universes the purpose of said Deity is good.

Yes.

Strangely, I would agree, if that were the only story. However, it is not. In Mormon thought, we believe man knows good from evil.

As do traditional Christians. That inherent knowledge, in fact, is the basis of God's judgment against moral evil. (See Romans 1, for example.)

And, as far as I personally can contemplate the act, to create a universe to my glory involving misery and death, when I could have as equally created a universe to my glory without those things*, is evil, and I'd be the sponsor of it.

But, the LDS God is just as ultimately culpable for the existence of moral evil in this world as is the traditionally-Christian God, as I've argued. You seem to be saying that the God I believe in is evil because he is more powerful (and, thus, could have prevented moral evil from following from his creation) than the LDS God (who is less powerful and could not create without moral evil following). I would reject the premise that if God was able to create a world without moral evil, but did not do so, he is himself evil. I don't believe that that follows. But, I do manifestly grant that God is "the sponsor of it."

If I'm reading you correctly at this point, then I'll take this as sort of a backhanded compliment to the God I believe in. Yes, I do think he had the power to create such that moral evil would not follow. I also believe that he did not desire to do so, at least for the reasons I outlined above in my response to johndoe.

*If you believe that God could not have created a universe ex nihilo to His glory without evil, then your conception of God differs from that of some whom I've talked with;

No, I don't differ. I'm on board with that.

Best.

Chris

[Zeta-Flux]

Dear cksalmon,

Thank you for your reply. I hope I can answer your questions.

I don't follow your reasoning here. In what sense would God sin by not providing his creatures the ability to sin?

It doesn't follow from reason so much as from our doctrine. Sin is disobeying the laws of the kingdom to which one belongs. One of the laws of the celestial world is to lift others, or at least provide the opportunity to lift them. Choosing not to do so would be a sin of omission. I think Joseph Smith put it well when he said something along the lines of: God, finding Himself among other intelligences, desired to lift them up, because of His love.

I take it that you refer to libertarian freedom, here. Am I reading you correctly?

No. I'm talking about providing a framework for moral choice, by providing laws.

Moral evil is intrinsic; moral goodness is extrinsic.

Could you expand this?

A minor quibble. I don't believe God forces evil to happen. I believe he has so providentially arranged his creation that moral evil is inevitable; I do not believe he "forces evil to happen" (or, in other words, that he constrains some of his creatures to perform evil).

This surprises me. Do you believe that God's creation is not constrained to do exactly what God created it to do? In what way is the universe free of God's creation? Did He not intend all of the consequences of the creation? (Are you just asserting that God's creation is limited by logic? etc...?) This, I think, gets to the heart of the issue.

You seem to be saying that the God I believe in is evil because he is more powerful (and, thus, could have prevented moral evil from following from his creation) than the LDS God (who is less powerful and could not create without moral evil following).

No, I thought you believed that God forced evil upon certain beings when He could have accomplished the same purpose without doing so. I think your answers to my questions above will clarify. So, my claim of evil didn't come from power, so much as how that power was used.

[Skylla]

Everyone: Keep your comments on the topic please.

[cksalmon]

Hi Zeta--

This surprises me. Do you believe that God's creation is not constrained to do exactly what God created it to do? In what way is the universe free of God's creation? Did He not intend all of the consequences of the creation? (Are you just asserting that God's creation is limited by logic? etc...?) This, I think, gets to the heart of the issue.

The issue here is the way in which we respectively understand constraint, I think. I do affirm a universal divine decree, but would deny that such constitutes "constraint" in the real-time performance of human actions. I would suggest, rather a compabilistic definition of free willâ??call it C:

(if I can remember the phraseology I used in my Masters thesis)

C. Agent S chooses freely with respect to any action A at any time t just so long as Agent S performs action A voluntarily.

No, I thought you believed that God forced evil upon certain beings when He could have accomplished the same purpose without doing so.

Not really. Actually, sort of the opposite. I would affirm that God ultimately decreed moral evil precisely because it was is logically impossible for God to accomplish the greater good of self-disclosure in its absence.

Best.

Chris

[Zeta-Flux]

Not really. Actually, sort of the opposite. I would affirm that God ultimately decreed moral evil precisely because it was is logically impossible for God to accomplish the greater good of self-disclosure in its absence.

Got it. That answered my question pretty thoroughly and well. Two further questions.

1. Do most Protestants similarly feel that God is constrained by logic?

2. Could you expand upon your point about extrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness?

By the way, to respond to some earlier comments, I'm not of the opinion that a more powerful God is more impressive. I liken it to set theory. One of the popular things to do nowadays is conceive of bigger and bigger cardinals. At the very top of the hierchy of assumptions, of course, is when one simply assumes 1=0. Similarly, the most powerful God is simply one who isn't constrained by logic. But such a being does not appeal to me.

Cheers,

Pace

[cksalmon]

Got it. That answered my question pretty thoroughly and well. Two further questions.

1. Do most Protestants similarly feel that God is constrained by logic?

Honestly, I couldn't answer that. I don't know.

In response, I would say that I don't think I've at all suggested that God is "constrained by logic." With no offense meant, I just don't know it might mean to propose that God is "constrained by logic." Does not compute. Logic, in the sense I intend, is just not tantamount to any sort of extrinsic constraining force at all. To roast the old chestnuts: is God in any meaningful sense constrained by the fact that he cannot create a married bachelor? Or, that he cannot create a circular square? Hardly! These are not really extrinsic constraints at all but rather are representative of the necessary condition of the possibility of meaningful utterance.

2. Could you expand upon your point about extrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness?

I'm just paraphrasing Paul at this point (or Paul's OT quotationsâ??see Romans 3):

9 What then? Are we Jews any better off? No, not at all. For we have already charged that all, both Jews and Greeks, are under the power of sin, 10 as it is written: "None is righteous, no, not one; 11 no one understands; no one seeks for God. 12 All have turned aside; together they have become worthless; no one does good, not even one." 13 "Their throat is an open grave; they use their tongues to deceive." "The venom of asps is under their lips." 14 "Their mouth is full of curses and bitterness." 15 "Their feet are swift to shed blood; 16 in their paths are ruin and misery, 17 and the way of peace they have not known." 18 "There is no fear of God before their eyes."

Moral evil is, for Paul, intrinsic: no one does good, not even one. None is righteous, no, not one. No one understands; no one seeks for God.

These are universal charges. If this condition is to be countermanded, extrinsic goodness is the only solution. This ties in with my supposition, gleaned from Romans 9 and Romans 11 and elsewhere, that God shuts up all humans under the prison of sin and only releases them from that prison as he sees fit. Since I take Paul's letter to be true, God-breathed scripture, I am left with the conclusion that, left on their own, all humans are inherently depraved and evil. Intrinsic badness; extrinsic goodness.

Best.

Chris

[Chris Smith]

1. It has always been true that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: Omnitemporality of Truth)

2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth. (Assumption: Infallible Foreknowledge)

3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 1 and 2)

4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone's power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing. (Assumption: Fixed Past)

5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 3 and 4)

6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (Necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness)

7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow. (From 5 and 6)

8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning. (Assumption of Libertarian Free Will)

9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow. (From 7 and 8. )(see Ostler, review of The Mormon Concept of God, 109 n. 15)

So, let us address the real argument.

Your #8 is not called the "Assumption of Libertarian Free Will" for no reason. You are engaging in a definitional fallacy. I think it should be patently obvious to anyone who gives this issue some thought that not only is compatibilism a defensible model, but in fact compatibilist free will is the only meaningful kind. Consider the following argument.

Premise 1) An action that I perform in in a given moment is "willed" by me only if it is determined by my state-of-mind or state-of-being in a previous moment.

Premise 2) An action in a given moment that is determined by a state in a previous moment cannot have been otherwise.

Premise 3) An action that is "willed" by me in a given moment cannot have been otherwise. [Follows from 1 and 2.]

Premise 4) No action that cannot have been otherwise satisfies the conditions of libertarian freedom.

Conclusion) No action that is "willed" by me in a given moment satisfies the conditions of libertarian freedom. [Follows from 3 and 4]

With respect to the topic at hand, I think CKS has done an excellent job making his case. I have long felt that the Calvinist perspective is the most biblical and most logically coherent position available to the Evangelical Christian. No position, of course, can claim to be completely biblical, since the Bible contains both the view of God as completely sovereign (which at the time of Christ was nearly-universal among theologically-educated Jews) and remnants of an earlier, more anthropomorphic understanding of the deity as a fickle being with less-than-total sovereignty. The Calvinist position also cannot claim to be completely logically coherent, since it requires redefining God's "goodness" in an other-than-moral sense (which I believe is disallowed by its usage in the Bible), as well as positing a bifurcation of some kind in the divine will (so as to explain why God's biblically-expressed ambition to extend salvation to all people evidently will not be fulfilled). Ultimately these are all contradictions rooted in the Bible itself rather than in the mind of the Calvinist, so CKS can hardly be held accountable for them. He has done the best that can be done with the biblical data, and is to be commended for sticking by his conclusions in the face of some uncomfortable implications. Of course, I think it would be more commendable to recognize the contradictions in the biblical text for what they are rather than to attempt a rationalization as Calvinists (and all other evangelicals) do. Once one is liberated from the need to develop a view that is slavishly consistent with the biblical data, one's options are expanded considerably; one may even escape some of the afore-mentioned uncomfortable implications.

Best,

-Chris

[Chris Smith]

1. Do most Protestants similarly feel that God is constrained by logic?

This does seem to be a fairly pervasive notion, though I have never understood why, myself. It was always my understanding as an Evangelical that God is the ground of logic; why should he be constrained by it (except willingly)?

[Log]

Your #8 is not called the "Assumption of Libertarian Free Will" for no reason. You are engaging in a definitional fallacy....

Premise 1) An action that I perform in in a given moment is "willed" by me only if it is determined by my state-of-mind or state-of-being in a previous moment. [Assumption: Compatibilism]

Tu quoque.

I think it should be patently obvious to anyone who gives this issue some thought that not only is compatibilism a defensible model, but in fact compatibilist free will is the only meaningful kind.

Whatever.

[Chris Smith]

Log,

You defined "freedom" in terms of power, with which I do not think a compatibilist would disagree. But you defined "power" as the ability to alter future events. Since determinism holds that the future is fixed, you conclude that under determinism humans lack the power to alter future events. This is your argument in a nutshell. As a compatibilist, I would offer an alternative account of what it means to have power (and therefore freedom). I would define power as the ability to choose what I most desire to choose. This is not inconsistent with determinism, since under a compatibilist model what I most desire to choose in a given moment will always (barring constraints) be identical to my pre-determined choice in the next moment.

What I am wondering is whether you, as an advocate of libertarian free-will, could provide an alternative to my account of what it means to "will" an action-- namely, whether you can suggest an alternative that is consistent with the libertarian model. If not, then I am not guilty of a definitional fallacy. If so, then I will leave it to your readers to judge whether under your alternative definition the concept of "will" retains enough of its content to remain both plausible and meaningful.

Best,

-Chris

[Log]

What I am wondering is whether you, as an advocate of libertarian free-will, could provide an alternative account of what it means to "will" an action that is consistent with the libertarian model. If not, then I am not guilty of a definitional fallacy.

My ability (or lack thereof at the present time) does not render you guiltless of a definitional fallacy. Premise 1 is precisely the point at issue.

[Chris Smith]

My ability (or lack thereof at the present time) does not render you guiltless of a definitional fallacy. Premise 1 is precisely the point at issue.

To the contrary, what is at issue is the meaning of the modifier "free". Circular reasoning (which, since the point at issue is a definition, I termed "a definitional fallacy") occurs when the conclusion is in the premises. You argued for your definition of freedom by assuming your definition of freedom. By contrast, my argument against your definition of freedom assumes a particular definition of "will". Unless in addition to the definition of freedom you are contesting the definition of "will"-- namely, by positing an alternative to my (I think) rather conventional account of it-- I am not guilty of circular reasoning.

-Chris

[Log]

Circular reasoning (which, since the point at issue is a definition, I termed "a definitional fallacy") occurs when the conclusion is in the premises.

Premise 1, as given by you above, is the assertion that "if something is 'willed' then it is wholly determined." This assertion entails the falsity of libertarian free will perforce, which asserts that "if something is 'willed' then it is not necessarily determined." Thus, you have committed what it pleases you to call "a definitional fallacy."

It is not necessary for me to posit an alternative account of "will" to point out you have simply assumed yours.

There's no point to "my assertion > your assertion" games. Neither can be demonstrated by examining reality; the scriptures use conditional language which, on its face, entails that choices aren't determined, or, at the least, that God does not know which choices will be made, as Blake Ostler pointed out. In either case, each assertion leads directly to what we mean by "free".

So, no, it is not the case that anyone with half a brain concedes compatibilism is the only reasonable outlook. I object to that.

[Chris Smith]

Sigh. I typed a response, but the Internet ate it. I guess I'll try again.

Premise 1, as given by you above, is the assertion that "if something is 'willed' then it is wholly determined." This assertion entails the falsity of libertarian free will perforce, which asserts that "if something is 'willed' then it is not necessarily determined." Thus, you have committed what it pleases you to call "a definitional fallacy."

It is not necessary for me to posit an alternative account of "will" to point out you have simply assumed yours.

Your objection that my first premise "entails the falsity of libertarian free will perforce" is not really an objection. After all, the entire purpose of my demonstration was to show that the presumed existence of human willing entails the falsity of libertarian free will (and vice-versa). To point out that my demonstration succeeded certainly does not prove me guilty of fallacious reasoning! The truth is that if you hope to undermine my argument, you do, in fact, need to posit an alternative account of "will". Your job is to either falsify my first premise or to render my argument circular by demonstrating that the libertarian model has its own cogent and coherent account of human willing to offer as an alternative to the fairly conventional account I have offered. (Alternatively, you might accept the implication of my argument and merely deny that human willing actually occurs in any meaningful sense.)

There's no point to "my assertion > your assertion" games. Neither can be demonstrated by examining reality; the scriptures use conditional language which, on its face, entails that choices aren't determined, or, at the least, that God does not know which choices will be made, as Blake Ostler pointed out. In either case, each assertion leads directly to what we mean by "free".

So, no, it is not the case that anyone with half a brain concedes compatibilism is the only reasonable outlook. I object to that.

What I said was that "I think it should be patently obvious to anyone who gives this issue some thought that not only is compatibilism a defensible model, but in fact compatibilist free will is the only meaningful kind." While I certainly could have phrased this statement more sensitively, I did not say (nor did I imply) anything about the size of libertarians' brains or their ability to reason. I recognize that logical and mechanical concerns are not the only thing at issue here; partisans of both sides also have scriptural and traditional impetus, as well as particular theological concerns like defending God's sovereignty or his goodness. The emotional revulsion LoaP earlier expressed toward Calvinism is certainly par for the course, and I can understand why someone who is invested in a particular view for one reason or another might be willing to shelve logical or mechanical difficulties. Still, it remains my assertion that compatibilism escapes such difficulties whereas libertarianism does not, whatever may be their comparative strengths with respect to theodicy.

[johndoe]

Chris Smith,

I have to agree with Log here. It seems to me that your argument does fall to the same fallacy.

While it is my opinion that compatibilism is more logically coherent than libertarianism, I will be the first to admit that both views are reasonable positions to hold. Ultimately it is the definition of what it means to be free (which is so closely related to what it means to will that I don't think the two can be so neatly separated, at least when discussing what it means to freely will) that is the issue under debate. To make an assumption about either in one of the argument's premises is circular, IMO.

Perhaps to get past this, you could formulate an argument that attempts to conclude that this assumption is valid?

[johndoe]

cksalmon,

Thanks for your clarifications in your response to my last post addressed to you. Good input. I apologize for forgetting to include demonstration of God's mercy as part of my understanding of your position. I believe you've stressed this before, and it is a very important item.

I do hope you'll come back with more thoughts about applying God's nature as definitional good to us. Considering Skylla's post, perhaps this should have its own thread.

[Log]

JD, thank you. I cannot tell you how bad it sucks to make good faith arguments only to have them simply, barely, denied.

Let me throw this bomb too.

Premise 1) An action that I perform in in a given moment is "willed" by me only if it is determined by my state-of-mind or state-of-being in a previous moment.

Premise 2) An action in a given moment that is determined by a state in a previous moment cannot have been otherwise.

Premise 3) An action that is "willed" by me in a given moment cannot have been otherwise. [Follows from 1 and 2.]

Premise 4) No action that cannot have been otherwise satisfies the conditions of libertarian freedom.

Conclusion) No action that is "willed" by me in a given moment satisfies the conditions of libertarian freedom. [Follows from 3 and 4]

Premise 5) Humans are blameworthy and praiseworthy for their "willed" actions only if the actions could have been otherwise.

Conclusion 2) No humans are blameworthy and praiseworthy for their "willed" actions. [Follows from 3 and 5]

I suspect someone will object to premise 5 at this point, but it appears that unless you wish to claim rocks are blameworthy and praiseworthy, you're stuck with it.

Here's a post where Blake Ostler responds to compatibilism:

It is probably unwise to jump into this thread, but Iâ??m going to do it. My LFW leanings with emphasis on the agent causal view (and emergentism to boot) are well known. Let me begin with the observation that JNSâ??s view of character or personality reifies it into an established and fixed thing. It is a logical category mistake in my view. Character is merely the way we usually act â?? and that can and does change. It not a thing, a fixed entity or anything of that nature. Thus, it is not any type of â??thingâ? that causes our acts in any way. â??Characterâ? is merely a generalization about behavior. Our â??characterâ? reflects the way we haven chosen; not the way we may choose now or in the future. Further, it is not the kind of thing that could be a cause. Indeed, as Geoff has pointed out, that is what repentance is all about.

So here are the challenges of compatibilism. How can determinism (or fatalism of any sort) be compatible with moral responsibility? When we assess blame to a person S for doing an action A, we imply that S should have done something else â?? i.e., refrained from doing A. However, it makes little sense to suggest that S should have refrained from doing A if it was literally impossible for S to do so given the circumstances in which S was situated. I havenâ??t seen any kind of response to this basic argument and I believe that it is decisive.

There is also the consequence argument which states that if what S does at t1 is the result of the laws and conditions at any given time prior to t1, then what S does is not up to S at t1 in any relevant sense. JNSâ??s argument from eternal intelligences doesnâ??t solve this problem. Here is why: if I do something because I choose to do it, for reasons I consider, then what I do must be decided: (a) after I have considered the relevant reasons; and (b) because of of the fact that I considered the relevant reasons. Given determinism, neither (a) nor (b) can be the case. Given determinism, what I do was determined and concluded long before (even eternally before) I ever considered any reasons at all for my action at t1. Further, I donâ??t do anything because of the reasons I consider, but because of a-rational conditions that occurred before I ever considered relevant reasons for acting at t1. Thus, determinism is inconsistent with rationally guided decisions and actions - and thus it also inconsistent with morally responsible action because moral responsibility requires that we can sometimes act rationally.

JNS argument that the fact that I was around when the determining causes were concluded to result in A solves this problem is actually unsound since, given the fact that an intelligence is uncreated, there is never a time when I was able to decide or determine anything. The determining conditions are logically and chronologically prior to what I am and do and therefore JNSâ??s argument is logically invalid and more than a bit of a red herring.

Finally, the notion that what I do isnâ??t up to me if libertarianism is true, as JNS argues, is simply false on the agent causal view. The prior causal factors are organized into a new synthesis of novel action by an agent as the final cause necessary to make a decision or to act. As some have noted, I believe that neural dynamics that focuses on non-linear systems and the activity of the brain supports such a view. However, that is an empirical question. The notion that I am the one who makes a decision by causing the decision to be made is precisely what is required for responsible agency.

Here is how agent causation solves the problem. When we choose, we choose in a situation that includes our entire prior history and genetic make-up and from this nexus of prior causes and conditions, we have a basic power to choose by creatively synthesizing the prior data into a new and creative reality. That is what an agent is â?? a creative organizer. Thus, each choice includes who and what we are â?? but it also includes the ability to creatively interact with this nexus in a dynamic of new synthesis of the prior data. Thus, what we have been can be creatively organized into something novel and creative in the moment of decision. Because this act of organizing the prior data is a creative dynamic with feed-back loops that allow the prior data to be given new meaning and put into novel patterns, we are responsible for our creation, but we are also choosing based upon what we bring to the moment of choice: prior history, DNA, values and so forth. JNS says that I havenâ??t solved this problem in my book â?? well, I believe that is the solution and I donâ??t see anything beyond his bare assertion without reason or supporting evidence for his assertion.

Finally, as Geoff has pointed out, JNSâ??s view also founders on the view that God lacks LFW but is a puppet to all that has gone before. When God tells us that his goal is to bring about the immortality and eternal life of all humankind, he is literally lying on JNSâ??s view. When JNS tells us that what is needed for repentance is some new causal input to transcend our established sinful nature, he cannot provide anything that can actually accomplish that result given that God is bound by the prior states of the universe before ever we acted or thought about it.

Finally, JNS, I suppose that if youâ??re right, every word you wrote must be forgiven because every letter was fated and determined long before you ever thought about or even read Geoffâ??s post. There cannot be any rational basis to response because it was determined long before there was any thought about it.

Finally Jeff G., as a constructivist I simply reject your absolutist view of reified natural laws. We notice and name regularities; but there is nothing to suggest that natural laws are not all ceteris paribus laws that allow for infinite variety. If that is so, then calling something that is new and novel a violation of natural law not only begs the question â?? it misunderstands the nature of natural law altogether.

[Chris Smith]

JD, thank you. I cannot tell you how bad it sucks to make good faith arguments only to have them simply, barely, denied.

Then you understand how I felt. I responded to your argument by providing a compatibilist alternative to the definition of freedom that was assumed in your premises. The alternative I offered was plausible and had real, meaningful content. Your argument was thereby rendered circular. You responded to my argument by providing a libertarian alternative to my definition of will that had no content except a negation of the compatibilist definition, and therefore no real plausibility. Your attempt to render my argument circular as I had done to yours, therefore, amounted to nothing more than a bare denial that my argument was true.

However, your last post genuinely advances the discussion, so perhaps we can move beyond this quibble about what constitutes a circular argument. You wrote,

Let me throw this bomb too.

Premise 5) Humans are blameworthy and praiseworthy for their "willed" actions only if the actions could have been otherwise.

Conclusion 2) No humans are blameworthy and praiseworthy for their "willed" actions. [Follows from 3 and 5]

I suspect someone will object to premise 5 at this point, but it appears that unless you wish to claim rocks are blameworthy and praiseworthy, you're stuck with it.

An interesting argument. Since rocks do not produce "willed actions", it is difficult to know how they could be blameworthy or praiseworthy for them. A better point of comparison would be a robot. Say we create a robot whose hardware and software are complex enough that they give the impression of consciousness. We could, of course, be certain that the actions of such a robot are determined entirely by its hardware and its software (the latter of which would have to be capable of self-revision, as is the human consciousness). Could we describe such a robot's actions as blameworthy or praiseworthy? I believe we could. I deny the need for the requirement that actions have been able to be otherwise in order for responsibility to exist. In fact, I think that such a requirement would render responsibility impossible. An action that could have been otherwise would be one that was not determined by the robot's hardware and software. The robot therefore could not be considered responsible for it.

I do, however, recognize that under determinism there is a very real sense in which we are pawns of the universe. Although we can be proximate causes and bear immediate responsibility for our actions, we do not bear ultimate responsibility. Your premise 5 above denies that proximate responsibility is sufficient for praise- or blame-worthiness; only ultimate responsibility will suffice. I would suggest suggest that proximate responsibility is sufficient for praise- or blame-worthiness, but that the compatibilist must also keep in mind the distinction between ultimate and proximate blame. While we might conclude that an individual is blameworthy for certain evil actions, we should yet view that individual with some sympathy and understanding because we recognize that the ultimate responsibility for his or her evil lay elsewhere. Compatiblism thus sees the world in terms of shades of gray rather than in blacks and whites, and demands a sympathetic understanding of all people where libertarianism might not.

I see our being pawns of the universe as simply an unsettling brute fact of existence that cannot be philosophized away, however much we might wish to.

As for your quote from Ostler, it is an interesting, but in my opinion unsatisfactory account. It seems to me that he is arguing that the creative agent "bring to the moment of choice" its "prior history, DNA, values and so forth," but also has "a basic power to choose by creatively synthesizing the prior data into a new and creative reality". This basically amounts to a power of self-determination. When libertarians appeal to self-determination, they are basically accepting the compatibilist account of a "willed action" as one that is determined by the prior self, and so are moving the locus of indeterminacy from the moment of decision to the moment of self-determination. This does not resolve our problem. The objection that an action can only have been "willed" if it proceeds from a prior self applies just as well to actions that occur within the self as to actions external to the self. In other words, if we believe in true self-determination-- i.e. that you are in control of your own self and your own destiny rather than being controlled by something else-- then we have to believe that the present self determines the future self, just as the present self determines the future action.

The problem with libertarian free-will is its inability to give an account of how agency is compatible with indeterminacy. An undetermined event is one that is not "decided" by something that already exists. If it were decided by something that already exists, it would be determined rather than undetermined. The question is how we can attribute any undetermined event or action to human choice, and yet have it remain undetermined. Presumably, a truly undetermined event would be a truly random one.

One option is to speak of partial determinacy and partial indeterminacy. One could speak of "factors" that make up the self: past determining factors on the one hand, and truly random determining factors on the other. Of course, this still does not give us libertarian freedom. Under such a model the self is still "determined", albeit by a sort of divine dice-rolling rather than by exclusively past factors as in determinism. The self, under this model, still does not really have the power of self-determination. It has it even less so, in fact, because to the extent that it is determined by a random factor, it does not even have compatibilistic freedom anymore!

Johndoe wrote,

Perhaps to get past this, you could formulate an argument that attempts to conclude that this assumption is valid?

I will think about this. My conviction that my first premise is valid, however, may have more to do with the absence of any coherent alternative than with my ability to logically demonstrate it. If I come up with a logical demonstration, I'll let you know. But for the moment, I am falling behind on my German homework (and there's a quiz tomorrow)!

Best,

-Chris

[cksalmon]

if I do something because I choose to do it, for reasons I consider, then what I do must be decided: (a) after I have considered the relevant reasons; and ( B) because of of the fact that I considered the relevant reasons. Given determinism, neither (a) nor ( B) can be the case. Given determinism, what I do was determined and concluded long before (even eternally before) I ever considered any reasons at all for my action at t1.

This sounds less like an argument against compatibilism than it does merely a denial that what compabilists believe is actually true. The compabilist just does believe that (a) and ( B) certainly can be the case. That is, after all, what makes us theological "compatibilists."

Again, I define compatibilism as follows:

C. Agent S is free with respect to Action A at any given time t just so long as Agent S performs Action A voluntarily.

Ostler equates an unnuanced compatilibillism with fatalism ("So here are the challenges of compatibilism. How can determinism (or fatalism of any sort) be compatible with moral responsibility?"). In purely philosophical terms, I think he has some warrant for doing so: " Fatalism is the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do." While I would not use that term, I don't necessarily find it overly offensive to my view, either. (But, I would suggest that Ostler has not interacted fairly, at least in the post you've referenced, with the actual claims of theological compatibilists.)

At one point in time, I was convinced that Agent S's action A at any given time t could be simultaneously actually inevitable while not being logically necessary. This line of thought involved making a hard and controversial) distinction between a purely logical power to contrary and an actual situation-enmeshed lack of power to contrary. Or, in other words, while an agent faces no logically-necessary constraint in the performance of a given action, he does not have the power to prefer to do other than which he actually does. Or, again, an agent always and infallibly does what he most wants to do at any given time.

While my thesis panel had no manifest problem with the assertion, I'm not sure I still agree with myself, but I still think it is a fascinating topic to explore.

At any rate, the argument to fatalism as precluding moral agency is, for the compatibilist, largley moot. That is simply because, for the compatibilist, the issue is not contracausal freedom but freedom to act according to one's desires and preferences.

Best.

cks

[Jason]

An interesting argument. Since rocks do not produce "willed actions", it is difficult to know how they could be blameworthy or praiseworthy for them. A better point of comparison would be a robot. Say we create a robot whose hardware and software are complex enough that they give the impression of consciousness. We could, of course, be certain that the actions of such a robot are determined entirely by its hardware and its software (the latter of which would have to be capable of self-revision, as is the human consciousness). Could we describe such a robot's actions as blameworthy or praiseworthy? I believe we could.

So if I build a robot and program it to kill my wife, and the robot kills my wife, then the robot is worthy of my praise and the blame of others?

[Jason]

Again, I define compatibilism as follows:

C. Agent S is free with respect to Action A at any given time t just so long as Agent S performs Action A voluntarily.

What does "voluntarily" mean in this instance?

If S has no capability to chose anything other than A, then in what sense is chosing A "voluntary"?

[cksalmon]

So if I build a robot and program it to kill my wife, and the robot kills my wife, then the robot is worthy of my praise and the blame of others?

My elaboration of the post to which you're responding above might help clarify. I think, in this analogy, you would be worthy of blame because you desired to and did murder your wife. In the analogy you propose, I assume the robot had no desires or preferences of his own; he had no self-consciousness. The robot is, then, merely the murder weapon used to kill your wife. Since compatibilists readily acknowledge personal agency (beliefs, desires, preferences, etc.), the analogy falls apart. Best.cks

What does "voluntarily" mean in this instance? If S has no capability to chose anything other than A, then in what sense is chosing A "voluntary"?

See my elaboration above.

[Jason]

My elaboration of the post to which you're responding above might help clarify. I think, in this analogy, you would be worthy of blame because you desired to and did murder your wife. In the analogy you propose, I assume the robot had no desires or preferences of his own; he had no self-consciousness. The robot is, then, merely the murder weapon used to kill your wife. Since compatibilists readily acknowledge personal agency (beliefs, desires, preferences, etc.), the analogy falls apart. Best.cksSee my elaboration above.

Okay, so I program my robot to have the desire, beliefs, and preferences to kill my wife, and make him sophisticated enough to have self-consciousness. He kills my wife. Is he praise worthy/blame worthy now?

[johndoe]

JD, thank you. I cannot tell you how bad it sucks to make good faith arguments only to have them simply, barely, denied.

I didn't mean to ruffle your feathers earlier. Hopefully, the conversation will be more productive going forward.

Let me throw this bomb too.

Premise 5) Humans are blameworthy and praiseworthy for their "willed" actions only if the actions could have been otherwise.

Conclusion 2) No humans are blameworthy and praiseworthy for their "willed" actions. [Follows from 3 and 5]

I suspect someone will object to premise 5 at this point, but it appears that unless you wish to claim rocks are blameworthy and praiseworthy, you're stuck with it.

I do object, as Chris Smith has. I don't agree that determinism entails that rocks must be blameworthy and praiseworthy. In any case, probably the best way to address this would be to go to the quote from Ostler that you provided. I'll break it up a bit. I will also be using quotes from a conversation that Ostler had on the Garden of Forking Paths blog. The whole thing is quite lengthy, but is a good read. While it would likely go over the head of anyone not familiar with the philosophical discussion, I think at a minimum anyone could read it and get out of it that very intelligent and knowledgeable people can and do discuss this, then come away with different conclusions. Of course, the discussion there was outside of the context of LDS doctrine.

Here's the link:

http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forki...hould_we_b.html

It is probably unwise to jump into this thread, but Iâ??m going to do it. My LFW leanings with emphasis on the agent causal view (and emergentism to boot) are well known. Let me begin with the observation that JNSâ??s view of character or personality reifies it into an established and fixed thing. It is a logical category mistake in my view. Character is merely the way we usually act â?? and that can and does change. It not a thing, a fixed entity or anything of that nature. Thus, it is not any type of â??thingâ? that causes our acts in any way. â??Characterâ? is merely a generalization about behavior. Our â??characterâ? reflects the way we haven chosen; not the way we may choose now or in the future. Further, it is not the kind of thing that could be a cause. Indeed, as Geoff has pointed out, that is what repentance is all about.

I strongly disagree with Ostler's assertion that character cannot be a cause of choices. He himself later in this very quote seems to recognize that character at least plays a causative role in our choices. Such an assertion would require some type of evidence or argument to back it up, I think.

So here are the challenges of compatibilism. How can determinism (or fatalism of any sort) be compatible with moral responsibility? When we assess blame to a person S for doing an action A, we imply that S should have done something else â?? i.e., refrained from doing A. However, it makes little sense to suggest that S should have refrained from doing A if it was literally impossible for S to do so given the circumstances in which S was situated. I havenâ??t seen any kind of response to this basic argument and I believe that it is decisive.

So far, this is very much like the discussion we've had on this thread - this is more an assertion of Ostler's intuition than an argument. He feels this is a decisive argument, but essentially all he is doing is asking how can it be that moral responsibility implies something other than being able to choose otherwise. I would say that assessing blame to a person S for doing an action A does not need to imply that S was actually able to do something else. If S is the kind of person that does action A, then why wouldn't S be properly blamed when he does in fact A? It seems to make little sense to blame S for doing A when S actually could have notAed. Is S a blameworthy person or not? If yes, then why wouldn't S consistently A?

There is also the consequence argument which states that if what S does at t1 is the result of the laws and conditions at any given time prior to t1, then what S does is not up to S at t1 in any relevant sense. JNSâ??s argument from eternal intelligences doesnâ??t solve this problem. Here is why: if I do something because I choose to do it, for reasons I consider, then what I do must be decided: (a) after I have considered the relevant reasons; and ( because of of the fact that I considered the relevant reasons. Given determinism, neither (a) nor ( can be the case. Given determinism, what I do was determined and concluded long before (even eternally before) I ever considered any reasons at all for my action at t1. Further, I donâ??t do anything because of the reasons I consider, but because of a-rational conditions that occurred before I ever considered relevant reasons for acting at t1. Thus, determinism is inconsistent with rationally guided decisions and actions - and thus it also inconsistent with morally responsible action because moral responsibility requires that we can sometimes act rationally.

The consequence argument is significant, though I'm not sure that Ostler has really expressed it well. I might take issue with some of the statements above, but it is probably more productive to just address the consequence argument (CA) itself. Compatibilist philosopher Eddy Nahmias has stated that the CA is a self-defeating argument for libertarians. It does not argue for libertarian free will, but rather against compatibilist free will. And if it obtains against free will in a deterministic world, it would seem to obtain against free will in an indeterministic world also. From Joe Campbell:

You claim, Blake, that the Consequence Argument is more intuitive than the others but I think that the same intuitions that drive the Consequence Argument may be used to show that the free will thesis is false. It is not the Consequence Argument is more intuitive, it is that the thesis of determinism makes it easier to express these intuitions.

Here is a nice summary of the Mystery Argument from van Inwagenâ??s â??The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom.â? Here he is trying to argue that even angles cannot have free will.

â??â?¦ either â??the sheaf of possible futuresâ?? relative to each moment has only one member or it has more than one. If it has only one, the world of angels is deterministic. And then where is their free will? (Their freedom is the freedom to add to the actual past. And they can only add to the actual past in accordance with the laws that govern the way angels change their properties and their relations to one another with time.) If it has more than one, then the fact that one possible future rather than another, equally possible, future becomes actual seems to be simply a matter of chance. And then where is their free will?â? (van Inwagen, 191â??2)

There are similar quotes in G. Strawsonâ??s version of the Ultimacy Argument from â??Free Will.â?

Libertarians â??have to show how indeterminism (the falsity of determinism) can help with free will and, in particular, with moral responsibility.â? (