God: The Ultimate Author Of Evil?

[johndoe]

johndoeâ??wait, are you are a scifi buff? I'm interested in how you would approach the blame/approbation question anent the apparently "moral" actions of a sentient AI. But, now, I fear, I'm derailing the thread LOAP created in my honor.

Oh well, carry on.

Chris

I do enjoy scifi, both to read/watch and to write.

I think the key word here is "apparently". I don't believe that it is possible for AI to actually be sentient, only to mimic sentience very well. So no, I don't think AI can be blameworthy, though I do think it would be appropriate to act as if it were. Which bring me to my next post...

[johndoe]

I could also argue that the entire history of law recognizes this - that the person is only culpable if he could reasonably have chosen some other alternative. If he had no real choice in the matter then he is no more culpable than Poe's pendulum.

Since we've brought law into the picture...

Let's assume that there is a scientific breakthrough that establishes once and for all, without a doubt, that determinism is true. To top it off, Pres. Monson announces from the pulpit during general conference that he's received a revelation to the same effect. Libertarians the world over decry that free will truly is simply an illustion.

So do you think, in that situation, that nobody should be punished for commiting crimes? Why or why not?

[johndoe]

Chris,

I apologize for taking so long to get back to this. It has been a busy weekend.

Hi JD,

I will amend # 4 to read "a cause" rather than "the cause". Notice that the argument does not require that this be the only condition for moral responsibility, but only that it be a condition for moral responsibility. I think both sides can probably agree that it is. Fair enough?

I believe that this change helps strengthen your argument against one objection (objecting against the negation of the role of environment), but I donâ??t see that this modification helps against the more serious objection based on the principle of transfer of non-responsibility. Consider that on a materialist view or on any other view (such as cksalmonâ??s) where there is a point in the past that is prior to our existence. Any cause of any of our choices, per determinism, can be traced back to that point (and presumably beyond). Therefore it could be argued that it is not true that we are even partially the ultimate cause of our choices. The LDS idea of uncreated intelligence as core of our nature seems to escape this criticism, but Iâ??m not completely certain that it does.

Let's take the case of two successive temporal states, the former we shall call "A" and the latter we shall call "B". I think we can posit three possibilities as to the relationship between the two states. According to the first possibility, state B follows deterministically from state A. According to the second possibility, state B is only partially determined by state A. According to the third possibility, state B is not at all determined by state A. Presumably the third possibility can be rejected without objection, since we can all observe that there appears to be a logical, causal relationship between any two successive states. Deciding between the other two possibilities, however, may be more difficult. There is also the question of whether one possibility might be true for some states, whereas the other is true for other states. This, I think, would be the case according to many advocates of libertarian free-will: successive states follow deterministically from one another except in the case of "choosing", in which case the usual determinism is mitigated by a mysterious indeterministic factor. So how do we arbitrate between these possiblities? I think that the premise of moral responsibility can aid us here.

So far I think this is spot on. I believe than an agent causal account of libertarian free will does posit that most events are deterministic, excepting choices that are free. I think that the agent causal libertarian would even accept that some choices (i.e. those that are not free) are deterministic.

If B follows deterministically from A, then A is culpable for B in the sense that B is inherent in A even before it is actualized. B proceeds quite inevitably from the very essence of A.

In a sense this is true, but as I pointed out above, the libertarian could argue that we should not stop there, but continue to the earlier past, to the point before our own temporal existence began. In this case, B ultimately follows from the set of states and conditions that deterministically caused A, not from A itself.

If B is partly undetermined, A cannot be said to be entirely culpable for it. Recall that we said that A is a state. In other words, it is static, fixed, and incapable of "action", per se. B, however, is variable. It could take one of several forms, depending on the amount of indeterminacy that we allow. To the extent that B is undetermined, A is capable of doing exactly nothing that will decide the outcome of B. A therefore has control of what it will become in the next moment only to the extent that the deterministic factor predominates; to the extent that the indeterministic factor predominates, I at moment A have no control over what I will become at moment B.

I tend to agree with this. The reasoning here is essentially a formulation of the problem of luck. The only response Iâ??ve seen to this from the libertarian side is to continue to appeal to mystery by asserting that since we donâ??t know (nor can we know) how the indeterministic factor operates to bring about one alternate choice over another, we cannot state that the difference necessarily does not originate in the individual making the choice. This explanation isnâ??t very convincing. It brings home a comment I posted earlier summarizing an observation by Eddy Nahmias â?? while the libertarian has significant arguments against determinism, positive arguments for libertarianism tend to be weak.

In my opinion, the advocate of libertarian free-will can get around this problem only by denying that "all causes temporally precede their effects."

I donâ??t think the libertarian has to deny this premise. An agent causal view allows this to be true, I think. On that view, the agent causes the decision-event to take place (perhaps even deterministically), and the indeterministic choosing of one alternate rather than another causes the subsequent acting on that choice. It feels like there is a clear chronological sequence here. For that reason, I also think that the libertarian would object to your premise 11). I donâ??t believe he would accept that an effect must necessarily follow the cause from any point in the causeâ??s temporal extension.

After all is said and done, I am skeptical that it is possible to formulate an unassailable argument for either side of this debate.

[Chris Smith]

Hi JD,

Thanks for replying.

Consider that on a materialist view or on any other view (such as cksalmonâ??s) where there is a point in the past that is prior to our existence. Any cause of any of our choices, per determinism, can be traced back to that point (and presumably beyond). Therefore it could be argued that it is not true that we are even partially the ultimate cause of our choices.

I don't deny this. To the extent that free-will is defined in terms of being an ultimate cause, I would deny that it exists. However, I think that the concepts of culpability and praiseworthiness, much like those of honor and shame, are social conventions that help to regulate society and to maintain its peace and well-being. The distinction between ultimate causes and primary causes makes little difference from the pragmatic perspective of folks on the ground. For me, the major question with respect to "moral evils" is not who we blame or how we assign culpability, but rather how we restore both victims and offenders to full wholeness and participation in polite society. I would acknowledge a sense in which all offenders, no matter how culpable, are nevertheless themselves victims of circumstance. I actually see this as a constructive perspective; while it may not satisfy those who see evil as black and good as white, it mitigates our sometimes-dangerous flight-or-fight sense of embattlement by pure evil. It also promotes a more nuanced understanding of the "other".

The LDS idea of uncreated intelligence as core of our nature seems to escape this criticism, but Iâ??m not completely certain that it does.

To a large degree, I think it does. While an intelligence at any given moment is still wholly determined by prior circumstances, at least some of those circumstances are always internal, conscious choices originating from the intelligence itself. Unlike the case of a materialistically-determined agent in either a non-theist or Protestant worldview, for the LDS intelligence there is never an alpha-moment at which the intelligence has nothing but brute fact to thank for its configuration.

On the other hand, there is an old saying that you never step into the same river twice. I think that is as true of selves as of rivers. While there may be a causal, logical relationship between my selves at two different moments, there is also a very real sense in which I am not the same person I was five minutes, days, or years ago. Nor am I the same person I will be at future moments. If the LDS intelligence is viewed this way, then its self at any given moment can be said to owe its configuration entirely to brute fact, because in truth this self only just came into existence and had no control over its configuration prior to its birth. Of course, the self at only a single moment cannot be said to be a conscious, thinking entity. It is only when extended over multiple moments that the self has time to engage in meaningful thought-processes. So maybe this objection doesn't really mean anything.

Another consideration that might create problems for the eternal-intelligences evasion is if we accept (as I do) the B-theory of time. The B-theory of time says that, just as all points in three dimensional space are equally real, so also are all moments in time. In this view, we might think of the universe as a static, four-dimensional block. Conceived this way, the LDS intelligence's configuration throughout its entire history-- however eternal-- is just as much a brute fact as the configuration of anything else that exists.

Just some things to ponder over crumpets.

I donâ??t think the libertarian has to deny this premise. An agent causal view allows this to be true, I think. On that view, the agent causes the decision-event to take place (perhaps even deterministically), and the indeterministic choosing of one alternate rather than another causes the subsequent acting on that choice. It feels like there is a clear chronological sequence here.

After pondering this for the past few days, I don't know that this is true. I don't understand agent causation well enough to be able to say for sure, but I think it is a form of what I called present-causation-- only with a very different spin than what I, as an heir of Parmenides and of the majority Western tradition, at first assumed. Notice that Blake did not posit that the agent exists equally in past and present, but rather that at the present s/he creatively recombines past factors into a new identity. I'm guessing that the agent-causal model draws heavily on the Heraclitan/Whiteheadian proposal that Becoming, rather than Being, is the fundamental principle of reality. According to this view, only the present has any real ontological validity; the past exists only as memory, and the future only as potentiality. I don't think thinkers of this sort would view the present as a state so much as a sort of fluid process engaging in the continual generation of memories. If this is what Blake is getting at, then it is sufficiently alien to my perspective that I can't really even wrap my mind around it, let alone know how (or care) to respond. That could just be my narrow-mindedness at work. Or it could be my impatience with radically-revisionist accounts of reality that in my opinion are based more on intuition and rhetorical flourish than on any kind of rationale. Take your pick.

After all is said and done, I am skeptical that it is possible to formulate an unassailable argument for either side of this debate.

I'm inclined to agree. I reject libertarian free-will primarily because its proponents cannot account for it and because I see no realistic, empirical reason to believe in it. Absent the rather arbitrary premise of absolute moral responsibility, it has no appeal that I can detect. Determinism, on the other hand, has the nice side-effect of being comprehensible and of neatly fitting most of what we know about reality.

Best,

-Chris

[Jason]

Compatibilists have consistently argued that a moral agent can be viewed as blameworthy or praiseworthy for his actions because he chooses to do what he most wants to do at any given time.

So let's go even more science-fictiony. Let's say I develop some method of completely taking over someone's body while leaving their conscious mind untouched. I hire the hitman to kill my wife as described previously, but I use my body-control technique on him, just to be sure he does what I want him to. He wants to kill my wife, and is fully aware of what he is doing and in agreement, but his body is also carrying out my program when he actually kills her.

Is he culpable?

Or how about observers? I invite several people to watch a special TV program. When they all arrive I surprise them by showing the aforementioned hitman killing my wife, broadcast live via camera. All of the guests hate my wife and fully agree that she should be killed, and they cheer when the hitman carries out my program.

They were aware of the situation and agreed fully with the hitman's actions, though they were not in a position to change the results in any way.

Are they culpable?

[Jason]

Since we've brought law into the picture...

Let's assume that there is a scientific breakthrough that establishes once and for all, without a doubt, that determinism is true. To top it off, Pres. Monson announces from the pulpit during general conference that he's received a revelation to the same effect. Libertarians the world over decry that free will truly is simply an illustion.

So do you think, in that situation, that nobody should be punished for commiting crimes? Why or why not?

No, they should not.

If there is entirely no choice in the matter then punishment is non-sensical. In fact, "crime" becomes impossible.

However, people (it no longer makes sense to call them criminals in such a world) might be detained for the purpose of preventing further harm to others.

[Jason]

I have read most of the pages on this thread, but not all. I am wondering if the following scripture has been discussed.

It would appear that God created man from the onset as something bad. So bad in fact that the moment He created him, He was so repulsed and could not stand to be in man's presence. God, in His omniscence, KNEW that he was creating something bad when he did it. And yet he set the ball rolling anyway.

Doesn't make much sense to me. Unless the creator was evil.

"The natural man" here is not to be read as the original state that God created him in, but rather the state of man after the fall. In other words, it became the natural state of man because of human agency.

In the LDS view, God didn't rcreate human agency. He "gave" it to us in the sense that he placed us in a position to exercise it without undue restriction.

[adx]

God is the ultimate author of evil, because we are put in a world where our good will eventually fails.

If people become evil, it's certainly not because they liked to be evil when they were pious. If they could, they would construct the world so that they would stay moral.

(The idea of devil doesn't make things any better, because you could use the same reasoning in regard to him.)

[Jason]

God is the ultimate author of evil, because we are put in a world where our good will eventually fails.

Can God place us in a world where we cannot do evil without abriging our freedom?

If people become evil, it's certainly not because they liked to be evil when they were pious. If they could, they would construct the world so that they would stay moral.

Do you mean construct a world where it is impossible to be immoral? What would such a world look like?

[johndoe]

Hi JD,

Thanks for replying.

I don't deny this. To the extent that free-will is defined in terms of being an ultimate cause, I would deny that it exists. However, I think that the concepts of culpability and praiseworthiness, much like those of honor and shame, are social conventions that help to regulate society and to maintain its peace and well-being. The distinction between ultimate causes and primary causes makes little difference from the pragmatic perspective of folks on the ground. For me, the major question with respect to "moral evils" is not who we blame or how we assign culpability, but rather how we restore both victims and offenders to full wholeness and participation in polite society. I would acknowledge a sense in which all offenders, no matter how culpable, are nevertheless themselves victims of circumstance. I actually see this as a constructive perspective; while it may not satisfy those who see evil as black and good as white, it mitigates our sometimes-dangerous flight-or-fight sense of embattlement by pure evil. It also promotes a more nuanced understanding of the "other".

I agree with this. While the argument I outlined is effective at nullifying the compatibilist position, it is essentially a version Strawson's basic argument, and is equally effective at arriving at the conclusion that free will simply cannot exist. This is not satisfying. Clearly there is some sense in which we are free and in which rocks are not. I also view reward and punishment in an LDS context as not something that God metes out to us but rather something that we receive as natural consequences of our desires. I see God as our advocate, who tries to bring us as much happiness as we allow Him.

To a large degree, I think it does. While an intelligence at any given moment is still wholly determined by prior circumstances, at least some of those circumstances are always internal, conscious choices originating from the intelligence itself. Unlike the case of a materialistically-determined agent in either a non-theist or Protestant worldview, for the LDS intelligence there is never an alpha-moment at which the intelligence has nothing but brute fact to thank for its configuration.

On the other hand, there is an old saying that you never step into the same river twice. I think that is as true of selves as of rivers. While there may be a causal, logical relationship between my selves at two different moments, there is also a very real sense in which I am not the same person I was five minutes, days, or years ago. Nor am I the same person I will be at future moments. If the LDS intelligence is viewed this way, then its self at any given moment can be said to owe its configuration entirely to brute fact, because in truth this self only just came into existence and had no control over its configuration prior to its birth. Of course, the self at only a single moment cannot be said to be a conscious, thinking entity. It is only when extended over multiple moments that the self has time to engage in meaningful thought-processes. So maybe this objection doesn't really mean anything.

I agree here also. I believe that the real difference in views here is not from the perspective of humanity, but from the perspective of God. We are what we are in either case, and our initial natures are outside of our control. In my view, they are simply a fact of the universe while in a more traditional Christian view, they are determined by God.

Another consideration that might create problems for the eternal-intelligences evasion is if we accept (as I do) the B-theory of time. The B-theory of time says that, just as all points in three dimensional space are equally real, so also are all moments in time. In this view, we might think of the universe as a static, four-dimensional block. Conceived this way, the LDS intelligence's configuration throughout its entire history-- however eternal-- is just as much a brute fact as the configuration of anything else that exists.

I don't know much about the B-theory of time. I don't know that it would change how I view things, but I do see that this would be problematic for LDS who accept libertarian free will.

After pondering this for the past few days, I don't know that this is true. I don't understand agent causation well enough to be able to say for sure, but I think it is a form of what I called present-causation-- only with a very different spin than what I, as an heir of Parmenides and of the majority Western tradition, at first assumed. Notice that Blake did not posit that the agent exists equally in past and present, but rather that at the present s/he creatively recombines past factors into a new identity. I'm guessing that the agent-causal model draws heavily on the Heraclitan/Whiteheadian proposal that Becoming, rather than Being, is the fundamental principle of reality. According to this view, only the present has any real ontological validity; the past exists only as memory, and the future only as potentiality. I don't think thinkers of this sort would view the present as a state so much as a sort of fluid process engaging in the continual generation of memories. If this is what Blake is getting at, then it is sufficiently alien to my perspective that I can't really even wrap my mind around it, let alone know how (or care) to respond. That could just be my narrow-mindedness at work. Or it could be my impatience with radically-revisionist accounts of reality that in my opinion are based more on intuition and rhetorical flourish than on any kind of rationale. Take your pick.

Good observation. I've long thought that temporal symmetry is a problem for libertarians. I did ask Log once if he considered to past to exist (or something to that effect). I believe he responded that it does exist through memory and the recording of history. That doesn't sound significantly different from what you propose here - that only the present has any real ontological validity. I believe that for theists, at least, this is a real issue. Consider that per the libertarian position, it is unknowable why one would choose to A rather than notA, not only beforehand but afterwards as well. How can God judge someone for Aing when not even He can know why that someone choose to do so rather than not?

I'm inclined to agree. I reject libertarian free-will primarily because its proponents cannot account for it and because I see no realistic, empirical reason to believe in it. Absent the rather arbitrary premise of absolute moral responsibility, it has no appeal that I can detect. Determinism, on the other hand, has the nice side-effect of being comprehensible and of neatly fitting most of what we know about reality.

I agree with this as well. My, aren't I agreeable today! Libertarian free will seems to add an unnecessary element of mystery with no real practical benefit of doing so, other than agreeing more closely with the intuition of a certain segment of the population.

[johndoe]

No, they should not.

If there is entirely no choice in the matter then punishment is non-sensical. In fact, "crime" becomes impossible.

However, people (it no longer makes sense to call them criminals in such a world) might be detained for the purpose of preventing further harm to others.

It seems that you recognize that even where your theory assigns zero responsibility it can still be necessary (or useful) from a practical standpoint to apply punishment/reward. I would agree.

On your view, assuming my hypothetical world where it is assured that determinism is true, is there no qualitative difference between the degree of moral responsibility of the hitman who kills for money (while fully aware of the moral implications of such an act) and the person who kills during an extreme schizophrenic episode who is unable to percieve reality?

[johndoe]

So let's go even more science-fictiony. Let's say I develop some method of completely taking over someone's body while leaving their conscious mind untouched. I hire the hitman to kill my wife as described previously, but I use my body-control technique on him, just to be sure he does what I want him to. He wants to kill my wife, and is fully aware of what he is doing and in agreement, but his body is also carrying out my program when he actually kills her.

Is he culpable?

Congratulations, Jason. You have created what is known as a Frankfurt-style case. Something similar was first proposed by Harry Frankfurt in 1969. These types of cases have spurred considerable debate. You may be surprised to know that this type of example was originally created to argue against the libertarian concept of the need for actual alternate possibilities for freedom. (In fact, if you follow the link to the garden of forking paths blog I provided earlier, you can see that Blake Ostler makes reference to this type of case in one of his responses, noting that he never found them very compelling.)

The version of this example that I've seen has the control technique as only an insurance policy. IOW, it is dormant. It would have been used only in the event that the hitman chickens out and decides not to go through with it. This caveat makes the example more useful. In that case, yes, the hitman is culpable. He did exactly what he would have done if the mind control technique weren't in place at all. What is significant is that he had no choice in the matter. There was no alternate possibility. Yet most people recognize that there should be a difference in the level of responsibility of the hitman if he decides to kill the wife or if the mind control device is employed to force him to kill her. The concept of libertarian free will recognizes no such difference - in either case, he is not responsible per the libertarians.

Or how about observers? I invite several people to watch a special TV program. When they all arrive I surprise them by showing the aforementioned hitman killing my wife, broadcast live via camera. All of the guests hate my wife and fully agree that she should be killed, and they cheer when the hitman carries out my program.

They were aware of the situation and agreed fully with the hitman's actions, though they were not in a position to change the results in any way.

Are they culpable?

Clearly, observers with no causal relationship to the crime cannot be culpable for it. I think compatibilists and libertarians would agree on that. The observers are culpable for whatever moral fault is involved with their own intellectual assent to murder, but not for the murder itself.

[Jason]

On your view, assuming my hypothetical world where it is assured that determinism is true, is there no qualitative difference between the degree of moral responsibility of the hitman who kills for money (while fully aware of the moral implications of such an act) and the person who kills during an extreme schizophrenic episode who is unable to percieve reality?

No, there isn't. In a fully deterministic world, the hitman has the same responsibility for his attitudes towards killing for money that the schizophrenic does - zero. Neither could have chosen to be other than they are, and so neither may be punished with any justice.

There may be practical differences in how they are restrained or treated in such a world, but there is no moral difference between the two. Or between these two and a landslide or hurricane, for that matter.

[Jason]

The version of this example that I've seen has the control technique as only an insurance policy. IOW, it is dormant. It would have been used only in the event that the hitman chickens out and decides not to go through with it. This caveat makes the example more useful. In that case, yes, the hitman is culpable. He did exactly what he would have done if the mind control technique weren't in place at all. What is significant is that he had no choice in the matter. There was no alternate possibility. Yet most people recognize that there should be a difference in the level of responsibility of the hitman if he decides to kill the wife or if the mind control device is employed to force him to kill her. The concept of libertarian free will recognizes no such difference - in either case, he is not responsible per the libertarians.

If he had no choice whether to accept the body control technique then I would agree that he is not culpable. I could have acheived exactly the same results by chosing some random passerby off the street. If he chose to accept the body control as an "insurance policy" and was not actually in control of his body at the time of the murder then he is culpable as an accomplice to the murder - the person who had actual control - me, in this example - is the party ultimately responsible for the murder.

It is not justice to punish people for what they would have done, only for what they actually did do.

Since we're talking science fiction, that's the central dilemma behind the movie The Minority Report. Unfortunately the movie chickens out a bit by showing that the system can be manipulated - someone who knows his predicted future is able to partially avert it (the predicted time of Crow's death is off by a few seconds, and it becomes an accident instead of an emotionally-charged murder), and it turns out the pre-cogs can be fooled by mistaking actual events for echoes of previously predicted events. Whether someone who doesn't know his predicted future can in fact avert it is left unanswered in the film, though it is implied by the existence of other minority reports.

Clearly, observers with no causal relationship to the crime cannot be culpable for it. I think compatibilists and libertarians would agree on that. The observers are culpable for whatever moral fault is involved with their own intellectual assent to murder, but not for the murder itself.

My view is that they would not be culpable for the murder but might be charged as accomplices after the fact if they do not report the murder.

[Chris Smith]

Since we're talking science fiction, that's the central dilemma behind the movie The Minority Report.

My first ever blog post used Paycheck to illustrate something like the compatibilist model.

[Jason]

My first ever blog post used Paycheck to illustrate something like the compatibilist model.

I haven't seen Paycheck, though I have read the story it's based on.

[Chris Smith]

Libertarian free will seems to add an unnecessary element of mystery with no real practical benefit of doing so, other than agreeing more closely with the intuition of a certain segment of the population.

I think that's a great way of putting it.

I haven't seen Paycheck, though I have read the story it's based on.

You should check it out. Libertarian or no, I think you'd enjoy the movie. I know I did.

[Jason]

Since we're talking science fiction, that's the central dilemma behind the movie The Minority Report. Unfortunately the movie chickens out a bit by showing that the system can be manipulated - someone who knows his predicted future is able to partially avert it (the predicted time of Crow's death is off by a few seconds, and it becomes an accident instead of an emotionally-charged murder), and it turns out the pre-cogs can be fooled by mistaking actual events for echoes of previously predicted events. Whether someone who doesn't know his predicted future can in fact avert it is left unanswered in the film, though it is implied by the existence of other minority reports.

Now that I think about it some more, the movie might address the issue with Burgess' predicted murder of Anderton at the conclusion of the film. Burgess decides to commit suicide instead, which would indicate that you can choose to do something other than the pre-cogs predicted. Anderton and Burgess both theorize that the pre-cogs have predicted the murder, and we the audience know that they have in fact predicted it, but neither Burgess nor Anderton had actually viewed the prediction at the time Burgess makes his choice, meaning that Anderton's knowledge of his predicted murder may not be the only factor that allowed him to change his choice to not murder Crow (though, bizzarely, his knowledge of the prediction was required in order to lead him to the situation where he could encounter Crow in the first place).

Agatha also seems to be able to see a possible future for Anderton's son Sean even though that future did not occur, and had no possibility of occurring at the time she spoke of it.

[johndoe]

No, there isn't. In a fully deterministic world, the hitman has the same responsibility for his attitudes towards killing for money that the schizophrenic does - zero. Neither could have chosen to be other than they are, and so neither may be punished with any justice.

There may be practical differences in how they are restrained or treated in such a world, but there is no moral difference between the two. Or between these two and a landslide or hurricane, for that matter.

If the libertarian view describes the world as it actually is, then I don't see why there would be a need for a difference in the theoretical view and the practical matter of dealing with folks who have broken laws. Consider also that per the purely theoretical libertarian understanding, in a deterministic universe it would be perfectly acceptable to use coercion and mind control to keep people from engaging in criminal behavior, since the libertarian would posit that no real freedom is being taken from such people.

I find that view very problematic. Again, my own intuition resists this sort of thing so strongly that it's hard for me to understand how it can be acceptable.

[Jason]

If the libertarian view describes the world as it actually is, then I don't see why there would be a need for a difference in the theoretical view and the practical matter of dealing with folks who have broken laws.

You are essentially correct as far as mortal existence goes, except that it could be argued that our legal sysetm is based on libertarian assumptions - that is, that it only grants punishment for those it judges could have chosen otherwise, so in a universe where determinism had been proven there might well be practical differences.

However, when we consider an eternal perspective and a God who claims to be absolutely just who will award man according to his actions we start to run into problems with the deterministic viewpoint.

Consider also that per the purely theoretical libertarian understanding, in a deterministic universe it would be perfectly acceptable to use coercion and mind control to keep people from engaging in criminal behavior, since the libertarian would posit that no real freedom is being taken from such people.

In a deterministic universe without the capacity for choice there are no moral or immoral actions. There's just "a bunch of stuff that happened," predetermined from beginning to end.

I find that view very problematic. Again, my own intuition resists this sort of thing so strongly that it's hard for me to understand how it can be acceptable.

Being disgusted by the logical implications inherent to a deterministic universe seems an odd reason to reject a libertarian point of view.

[johndoe]

Being disgusted by the logical implications inherent to a deterministic universe seems an odd reason to reject a libertarian point of view.

I am rather put off not by logical implications of determinism, but rather logical implications of libertarianism.

I think I feel this discussion winding down. It has been a good one overall. Thanks to everyone who chimed in.

[Jason]

I am rather put off not by logical implications of determinism, but rather logical implications of libertarianism.

No, you were put off by how a libertarian might view a determinisitc universe. You've effectively illustrated one of the reasons a libertarian believes that the universe cannot be deterministic, not a fault in the libertarian viewpoint.

[cksalmon]

My first ever blog post used Paycheck to illustrate something like the compatibilist model.

Hi Chrisâ??

Much of your argument to determinism seems to be anticipated in R. E. Hobart's 1934 article, "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It" (as found in Mind 63 (1934): 1-27, or perhaps closer at hand (in your library, no doubt), Peter Van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999), 343-255.

A stunning article, to my mind.

Wondering if you've read it.

The Other Chris

[Chris Smith]

Hi Chrisâ??

Much of your argument to determinism seems to be anticipated in R. E. Hobart's 1934 article, "Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It" (as found in Mind 63 (1934): 1-27, or perhaps closer at hand (in your library, no doubt), Peter Van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999), 343-255.

A stunning article, to my mind.

Wondering if you've read it.

The Other Chris

Hi Chris,

I've not read either. I've read quite a bit on the libertarian side of this question (see my Wikipedia article on John Sanders for proof of that!) but not much on the determinist side. But if you're saying my argument was anticipated by a "stunning article", I'll take that as a compliment. :-) I've heard that Daniel Dennett makes an argument along these lines also, though of course he also discusses at great length the biology of consciousness, so is leaps and bounds beyond what I've argued here. I will check out the articles you mentioned once the semester's over and I have time for leisure reading again. Thanks,

-Chris