God: The Ultimate Author Of Evil?

[Jason]

If I may, Jason, I'd point out the manifest flaw in your reasoning here.

(1) The prisoner actually wants to stay. (You have stated as much.)

(2) The prisoner, by personally and knowingly acting on his own desire to stay, is not really acting freely just because if it were the case that he desired to do something other than what he actually does desire to do (that is, something which he does not and will not desire to do), then he is obviously constrained in his choices, the set of which, admittedly (per your argument), just does not include the choice to attempt to leave the prison.

The prisoner's own desires do not constrain him. The reason he can't leave is not his desire - he can't leave because the guards and the walls prevent him from leaving. If his desire were exactly opposite he still couldn't leave - therefore his desire is irrelevent as to whether he has the ability to chose to leave or not. Since he has no ability to leave he has no choice to make on whether he goes or stays.

A similar example. I want to fly completely unaided by any technology. I have no choice in this matter, because I can't in fact fly unaided. Because I have no capability to fly unaided I cannot choose to fly unaided, regardless of my feelings on the matter. I have no choice of whether to fly unaided or not.

Now, if I don't want to fly at all, there is still no real choice for me. I may not want to fly, but it is not my feelings that actually keep me on the ground, it is my inability to fly unaided, regardless of my feelings on the matter.

[cksalmon]

You need the capability to do either, not the power to do both. Yes you will make only one choice, but if you always could only make one choice then you were not truly free to choose between the alternatives. Only if you could have chosen either possibility was there a real choice involved.

K. So, you're not a compatibilist with regard to human freedom. That's fine. johndoe and I seem to be jointly against you at this point (though he and I are no doubt far removed from each other at other, very significant, and relevant, points). But, I reject your fundamental proposition. What is the argument for it?

Best.

cks

[Log]

*Not to say that the prophets are clear on how God knows the future, or the philosophical basis for this knowledge (i.e. whether it is infallible); but they are clear that He does know the future.

I would redirect you towards Ostler's discussion of this exact point, and ask you to address his evidence directly.

But, I reject your fundamental proposition. What is the argument for it?

I posted it already.I'm out.

[JDave]

If I may, Jason, I'd point out the manifest flaw in your reasoning here.

(1) The prisoner actually wants to stay. (You have stated as much.)

(2) The prisoner, by personally and knowingly acting on his own desire to stay, is not really acting freely just because if it were the case that he desired to do something other than what he actually does desire to do (that is, something which he does not and will not desire to do), then he is obviously constrained in his choices, the set of which, admittedly (per your argument), just does not include the choice to attempt to leave the prison.

Wow, this doesn't seem at all like the response I would have expected. You have ardently argued that freedom does NOT require being able to act against what one most desires. So if one truly desires to stay in prison, and is simultaneously required to stay in prison, that requirement is not conflicting with their desires. Therefore it is not at all infringing on their freedom to choose.

Similarly God cannot lie. It is a requirement or else He will no longer be God. Is this requirement limiting His freedom?

[Jason]

K. So, you're not a compatibilist with regard to human freedom. That's fine. johndoe and I seem to be jointly against you at this point (though he and I are no doubt far removed from each other at other, very significant, and relevant, points). But, I reject your fundamental proposition. What is the argument for it?

I don't understand your objection. What does "fee choice" mean if it doesn't mean "the ability to choose any one (or more) of several available options"?

[cksalmon]

The prisoner's own desires do not constrain him. The reason he can't leave is not his desire - he can't leave because the guards and the walls prevent him from leaving.

So, the prisoner's desire not to leave is irrelevant? Your version of freedom requires that the prisoner desire to attempt to do something he does not actually desire to do?

I don't accept that, frankly. And I think I've demonstrated my point. Your line of argumentation can only lead to a trivially-true conclusion, Jason.

May the derailments subside.

Best.

cks

[cksalmon]

Wow, this doesn't seem at all like the response I would have expected. You have ardently argued that freedom does NOT require being able to act against what one most desires. So if one truly desires to stay in prison, and is simultaneously required to stay in prison, that requirement is not conflicting with their desires. Therefore it is not at all infringing on their freedom to choose.

Similarly God cannot lie. It is a requirement or else He will no longer be God. Is this requirement limiting His freedom?

You've misunderstood me, JDave. I do not at all believe that God possesses compatibilist freedom. Nor have I asserted such.

[Jason]

So, the prisoner's desire not to leave is irrelevant? Your version of freedom requires that the prisoner desire to attempt to do something he does not actually desire to do?

No, it requires that he have the capacity to do something that he may not desire to do, not that he actually attempt it.

[JDave]

You've misunderstood me, JDave. I do not at all believe that God possesses compatibilist freedom. Nor have I asserted such.

So dismiss the part about God. What about that prisoner? Is he restrained in his freedom because he is required to do what he already wants to do?

What does God possess? Probably not libertarian freedom given your views...

[johndoe]

1. It has always been true that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: Omnitemporality of Truth)
   
2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth. (Assumption: Infallible Foreknowledge)
   
3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 1 and 2)
   
4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone's power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing. (Assumption: Fixed Past)
   
5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 3 and 4)
   
6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (Necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness)
   
7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow. (From 5 and 6)
   
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning. (Assumption of Libertarian Free Will)
   
9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow. (From 7 and (see Ostler, review of The Mormon Concept of God, 109 n. 15)
   

So, let us address the real argument.

The real argument? This is a naked assertion of libertarian free will accompanied by irrelevant bluster. Very much like you and Jason have done.

cksalmon is very correct that we are at an impasse.

I reassert that we all simply look to logic to find rational reasons to believe in that which our intuition already tells us.

[johndoe]

I propose compatibilists find a new word, other than "free," to describe what they're talking about.

Reading this, I don't know whether to laugh, or to cry.

[johndoe]

Chris, before all the derailing, you posted a good, substantive post concerning the OP of this thread. I will comment tomorrow.

[Log]

The real argument? This is a naked assertion of libertarian free will accompanied by irrelevant bluster. Very much like you and Jason have done.

Thanks. You reaffirm my original reasoning in departing this "discussion."

I reassert that we all simply look to logic to find rational reasons to believe in that which our intuition already tells us.

I testify your assertion is flat wrong in greater than zero cases.

[johndoe]

Thanks. You reaffirm my original reasoning in departing this "discussion."

As you wish. I wonder if anyone else might look over the argument you posted, noting specifically #8, and still come to the conclusion that this is a convincing argument for the logical necessity of libertarian free will.

Circular logic is not very impressive.

I will just state that it is unfortunate that the discussion has degenerated to the level it has. With all due respect, Log, your posts bear a large portion of the blame for that.

[johndoe]

Wow, this doesn't seem at all like the response I would have expected. You have ardently argued that freedom does NOT require being able to act against what one most desires. So if one truly desires to stay in prison, and is simultaneously required to stay in prison, that requirement is not conflicting with their desires. Therefore it is not at all infringing on their freedom to choose.

Similarly God cannot lie. It is a requirement or else He will no longer be God. Is this requirement limiting His freedom?

Chris was summarizing Jason's logic, not detailing his own.

For my part, I would respond to Jason by noting that he is trying to take advantage of a flaw in the analogy to arrive at the conclusion he wants. We all agree that coerced acts are not free. Jason is trying to assert that the prisoner's act of staying in prison is not free because he is coerced to stay. But this isn't true. The prisoner wants to stay. Whether or not he is actually able to leave is irrelevant, and would only be relevant if he did, in fact, want to leave, in which case his act of staying would be coerced.

[JDave]

Chris was summarizing Jason's logic, not detailing his own.

For my part, I would respond to Jason by noting that he is trying to take advantage of a flaw in the analogy to arrive at the conclusion he wants. We all agree that coerced acts are not free. Jason is trying to assert that the prisoner's act of staying in prison is not free because he is coerced to stay. But this isn't true. The prisoner wants to stay. Whether or not he is actually able to leave is irrelevant, and would only be relevant if he did, in fact, want to leave, in which case his act of staying would be coerced.

Thanks,

That makes sense.

Sorry for going off-topic so much. The derailment became the major topic for a while and I didn't realize it was a derailment. I will make my question in a separate topic.

[Jason]

I still don't understand the objection.

What does "free will" mean if it doesn't mean "the ability to chose any one or more of several alternate choices"?

So to have free will we must have alternatives and be capable of chosing any of them. The prisoner only has one option - he must stay - and so he has no free will in the matter of whether he stays or goes. His desire to stay is irrelevent to whether he has a real choice to make.

[Zeta-Flux]

I would redirect you towards Ostler's discussion of this exact point, and ask you to address his evidence directly.

Ostler does not address my point in the link you provided. He only addresses the issue of what philosophical positions some Mormons have taken, and whether the scriptures can be reconciled with such philosophies. I think you'd agree with me that many scriptures can be reconciled with many different (and often contrary, and/or incorrect) philosophies. Ostler does not attempt to reconcile the words of the modern prophets to such philosophies; in fact I saw very few quotes from them--which is not representative of how much they have spoken on the subject. This is a big weakness in his reasoning.

[Log]

I will just state that it is unfortunate that the discussion has degenerated to the level it has. With all due respect, Log, your posts bear a large portion of the blame for that.

With due respect I submit it is yours, and zeta's, personal attacks and / or slurs which bear the blame.

[johndoe]

With due respect I submit it is yours, and zeta's, personal attacks and / or slurs which bear the blame.

Edited: Nevermind. I don't want to go there.

[johndoe]

Chris,

Back to the original topic.

Too late.

First, a few considerations to frame the discussion*:

(1) God had the power to refrain from creating a world in which there is no evil. (Moreover, God will, in fact, create such a world in the future.)

(2) God has never in the past and will never in the future perform any evil act.

(3) Humans do perform evil acts and can, thus, be considered evil, at least in that sense (whether originally or thoroughly is another discussion).

(4) God created all humans with the perfect knowledge that they would perform evil acts, even though he was able to bring it about that they would not (and, again, will do this in the future).

(5) God so providentially orchestrated his creation that moral evil would inevitably result just as long as he refrained from intervening.

(6) God does so restrain his intervention in countless instances, thereby ensuring that moral evil will follow.

You have objected to the idea that God can be ultimately responsible for evil and yet not be evil himself. This is because, I believe, you hold that if God is ultimately responsible for evil, it necessarily follows that he is himself evil. Specifically, you stated, "Perhaps ck can explain how God can be the complete author of evil when he could have otherwise not done so, yet not be evil."

While you don't address this directly, it seems to me that in both your view and the LDS view, God is not able to bring to pass specific surpassing good without allowing evil to exist or causing evil to exist. In your case, I believe that the good in question is God's being able to show a portion of His nature (wrath). I believe this comes from Paul. So God's being able to do so is considered to have a greater positive value than the negative value of the existence of the evil necessary for this to come to pass. On the LDS side, God does have additional limitations to His power that you would not agree with, but as you correctly point out below, even in the LDS view, God could have chosen not to create. Per the LDS view, the progression of some of the intelligences is the surpassing good that has a greater positive value than the negative value of the enabling of evil. This presupposes that the soul-building type of progression that LDS doctrine posits cannot exist without the opposition of all things spoken of in the BoM.

One might attempt to argue that the LDS God does not know the future. Thus, proponents of this view might argue that the LDS God did not certainly know that moral evil would follow from his creation. Perhaps he can be absolved on this ground? No, he cannot be. Even assuming his ignorance that moral evil would follow from his creation, he still created even though he was unable (and assumedly knew he was unable) to create a world such that moral evil would not exist. Thus, he is still ultimately responsible and (10) stands. But, whatever the LDS God's knowledge of the future entails, we can be confident that he indeed foresaw moral evil.

I think that this reasoning is good. I also believe that it would be unreasonable to assume that God could not foresee that moral evil would result from creation, even if we assume that libertarian free will obtains, and God is not able to infallible foreknow our future decisions.

I would like to point out an advantage that the view of libertarian free will has over my own. God could not know beforehand which of the intelligences would ultimately be exalted, and which would ultimately become sons of perdition. Thus, God shares no blame for instantiating (creating) an intelligence that He foreknew would ultimately be damned. In my own view, I have to account for God knowingly instantiating folks that will ultimately be damned. This is a somewhat tricky question that I'll deal with more below.

I conclude, then, that both our theologies posit that our respective Gods are ultimately responsible for moral evil in this world.

The difference between our views is that I hold that God was actually able to prevent moral evil and yet didn't; you, that God was incapable of preventing moral evil and yet created anyway, fully aware that moral evil would result.

The question, for our respective positions, then becomes, "Why?"

I agree with your conclusion. I have tried to briefly address the question of why in my comments above.

To continue with the problem I have noted for myself above, for quite a while I have considered that all intelligences are better off for God's enabling power, even the sons of perdition. I am not completely satisfied with this answer. In another thread, Log (whose opinions I do value in spite of our recent spat) has pointed out that LDS scriptures state that it would have been better for them not to have been born. Clearly, to hold to the view that all are improved, I have to understand this scripture in a way that is at odds with its most natural reading. While I don't think this is impossible, I am not completely comfortable with it. I am now toying with the idea that there is intrinsic value in the soul-building process itself, regardless of the outcome. And that the value of going through the process may justify a negative outcome. I only have preliminary thoughts along these lines. I will have to dedicate more thought to it.

I've been thinking lately about your position that what is good is defined by God's nature. How do you feel God's nature as yardstick can be applied to us? I have some thoughts on this, but I'd like to hear what you think first.

[wenglund]

'Dark spirit matter'? Do you mean that there might be puddles of pure evil out there somewhere, like on Star Trek?

Evil is actions which are immoral. Evil beings are beings which typically engage in evil acts. Evil spirits, likewise, are simply spirits which typically engage in evil acts.

I don't know about Star Trek, but I believe in dark spiritual matter as well as material spiritual light. Here is how I view each:

What Is Light?

To me, light is righteous and godly spirit matter, elements, or intelligence; and it is the medium through which these things flow and are organized. It is both intangible and concrete in its manifestations: the intangible manifestations of light consist of all truths, thoughts, values, hopes, beliefs, faiths, etc., which act upon the spiritual and physical creations to make them godly. The concrete manifestations of light consist of all of the purified spirit matter which constitute the character, dispositions, attributes, and qualities of all things godly. Light is also the source and medium through which the qualities of joy and peace are bestowed. In general, light is a state of love and life.

What Is Darkness?

Darkness is unholy spirit matter, elements, or intelligence; and it is the medium through which these things flow and are organized. Darkness, like light, has both intangible and tangible qualities: the intangible manifestations of darkness consist not only of all lies, misconceptions, aberrant values, inglories, false hopes, false faith, and unbelief, but it also consists of the figurative absence of light--i.e. spiritual ignorance, blindness, confusion, etc. The concrete manifestations of darkness are found represented by the presence of impure and corruptible spirit matter. This dark spiritual material constitutes the character, dispositions, attributes, and qualities of all things carnal, sensual, and devilish. Darkness is the source and medium through which the spiritual qualities of guilt, sorrow, and turmoil are bestowed, and it creates a state of greed, hate, envy, and death.

The "conscience".

As with the physical universe, the realm of spirits is governed by eternal laws, not the least of which is the laws of obedience (when we obtain any blessing from God, it is by obedience to the laws upon which the blessings are predicated) and its inverse. When one's actions are in conformity with light, one becomes endowed with an increased measure of light. And, when one's actions are in conformity with darkeness, one becomes endowed with an increased measure of darkeness.

And, when one is blessed with a measure of light, one then becomes materially endowed with a measure of joy, peace, love, and life; whereas, when one is punished with a measure of darkness, one then becomes endowed with a measure of guilt, sorrow, turmoil, greed, hate, envy, and death.

One may know if one has been obedient or disobedient by the "feel" they get based on the material endowment of light or darkness in consequence of one's thoughts and actions.

To me, this only makes sense in some respects if one considers light and darkness to be material in nature. How can one "feel" or "sense" the essense of spiritual light or darkness, or become materially changed thereby, without light and darkness being spiritually material in nature?

So, to me, evil is not only conceptual in nature and action, but it also has a "feel" to it, and it is a state in which one is filled with spiritual darkness as a result of one's actions.

But, I can respect if others view things differently.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[wenglund]

I am wondering if the debate over "free will" may be somewhat resolved by looking at freedom in terms of degrees rather than in binary terms of absolutes. The freedom of agency can be somewhat limited by a variety of factors (ignorance, scope of options, imbalance of consequences and the severe nature of the consequences of choices, interests and motivations, etc.) without "free will" being entirely eliminated.

I don't think it is possible for finite and fallible humans to have absolute "free will", though I think they do have varying degrees thereof.

Because of physical and practical limitations, while I may freely choose to take the high or low road to my desired destination, I am not free to choose to simultaneously take both roads.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Jason]

To me, this only makes sense in some respects if one considers light and darkness to be material in nature. How can one "feel" or "sense" the essense of spiritual light or darkness, or become materially changed thereby, without light and darkness being spiritually material in nature?

So, to me, evil is not only conceptual in nature and action, but it also has a "feel" to it, and it is a state in which one is filled with spiritual darkness as a result of one's actions.

An interesting idea. I know that I have been able to sense when traumatic or "evil" events have occurred in a place at times, and I have certainly been able to sense evil in people now and then, so that would give some support to the idea that there is some sort of residue left behind, but I'm not sure if that means it is a material that can be considered seperately from a being.

[cksalmon]

Hi john--

While you don't address this directly, it seems to me that in both your view and the LDS view, God is not able to bring to pass specific surpassing good without allowing evil to exist or causing evil to exist. In your case, I believe that the good in question is God's being able to show a portion of His nature (wrath). I believe this comes from Paul. So God's being able to do so is considered to have a greater positive value than the negative value of the existence of the evil necessary for this to come to pass.

Yes, just so. I would merely add that God's demonstration of wrath again sin is only half the picture. The other half is mercy for sinners. I take this from Romans 9. The entire chapter is instructive (and, indeed, if one accepts Romans 9 as true scripture, I think it effectively precludes belief in libertarian freedom), but I'll just provide the heart of the passage:

"What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory"

On my view, then, the surpassing good is God's self-disclosure. I don't think your summary statement is incorrect (and, indeed, I'm fairly sure I've used essentially the same phraseology in past discussions), but I would now probably phrase it a bit differently. Rather than saying, "God desires to reveal his wrath against sin (which is true)," I would probably say, "God desires to reveal what he is like." To flesh that out a bit: God is supremely and ultimately holy in every sense; he is utterly unlike anything that is not. To reveal what he is like, then, he providentially instantiated evil so that his own holy character might be radically counterposed.

Additionally, God desired to disclose himself as loving and merciful. Thus, he providentially planned actually to demonstrate his mercy by rescuing and transforming his elect people from their own sinful natures and make them (in some measure) like himself (this is most fully seen in the Atonement).

Neither of those desires (to disclose his utter and intrinsic opposition to evil and to disclose his rescuing mercy towards those who are evil) would have a proper logical object in the absence of moral evil.

On the LDS side, God does have additional limitations to His power that you would not agree with, but as you correctly point out below, even in the LDS view, God could have chosen not to create. Per the LDS view, the progression of some of the intelligences is the surpassing good that has a greater positive value than the negative value of the enabling of evil. This presupposes that the soul-building type of progression that LDS doctrine posits cannot exist without the opposition of all things spoken of in the BoM.

Odd that we're both speaking in terms of opposition, here. I don't see any flaws in your reasoning (assuming certain LDS-specific beliefs). I think this is a productive way to approach the issue.

I would like to point out an advantage that the view of libertarian free will has over my own. God could not know beforehand which of the intelligences would ultimately be exalted, and which would ultimately become sons of perdition. Thus, God shares no blame for instantiating (creating) an intelligence that He foreknew would ultimately be damned. In my own view, I have to account for God knowingly instantiating folks that will ultimately be damned. This is a somewhat tricky question that I'll deal with more below.

As do I, to be sure. One possible difference between our positions sticks out to me (at least in terms of ultimate emphasis). For proponents of your position, God ultimately instantiates the conditions of the possibility of moral evil because of (or certainly in light of) the resultant moral(?) benefit to his creatures.

On my view, God instantiates the conditions of the inevitability of moral evil for self-serving reasons (I don't mean that in a pejorative sense). As John Piper has phrased it: "God is the most God-centered being in the universe." It is certainly a manifest good for God's creatures to know him as he really is, but that good results secondarily, I think.

I've been thinking lately about your position that what is good is defined by God's nature. How do you feel God's nature as yardstick can be applied to us? I have some thoughts on this, but I'd like to hear what you think first.

This is a fascinating topic to me. I hope to respond soon.

Best.

Chris