God: The Ultimate Author Of Evil?

[wenglund]

Does math exist? They're not material, but someone created varoius branches of math.

Math is, in a way, material, and takes the form of mapped neurons and synapses.

However, I am not sure it makes sense to materially equate math with evil. To see why, answer these questions:

Do evil spirits exist?

And, if so, then how does one distinguish between an evil spirit and a non-evil spirit?

Is there a way to sense evil and evil spirits?

Now, answer these same questions replacing the word "evil" with the word "math".

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Zeta-Flux]

Nothing circular about it. All that needs to be applied initially is common sense. Free will is the ability to choose for oneself. Determinism is to have choices made for you.

I think you are misunderstanding determinism. It is exactly your claim that determinism implies choices are made for you that is circular. Most people who believe this implication only do so by commiting the modal fallacy.

[Zeta-Flux]

No, I don't believe there is such a thing as "evil" or "love," for that matter, outside a being-specific instantiator. That is certainly not to say that I believe evil or love is "material" in nature. That strikes me as patently absurd. It would be tantamount to stating that "2" is a material entity.

Not all of the universe is material; even in the material portions. There are also interactions between materials (although some scientists would say that these are mediated by material...). At any rate, I think your answer would be "yes" in the sense "there exist evil interactions" (even if such interactions require material which is intelligent). Is that a fair assessment? Or do you completely divorce the interactions from the intent of the actions (and if so, do you claim that the intent itself is also not existing as evil)?

[Log]

I think you are misunderstanding determinism. It is exactly your claim that determinism implies choices are made for you that is circular. Most people who believe this implication only do so by commiting the modal fallacy.

Would you then assert Blake Ostler has committed the modal fallacy in his arguments for libertarian free will? Can you demonstrate such?

[wenglund]

No, I don't believe there is such a thing as "evil" or "love," for that matter, outside a being-specific instantiator. That is certainly not to say that I believe evil or love is "material" in nature. That strikes me as patently absurd. It would be tantamount to stating that "2" is a material entity.

To your way of thinking, do evil spirits exist outside a being-specific instantiator?

And, if so, then how does one distinguish between an evil spirit and a non-evil spirit?

Can evil and evil spirits be sensed?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Zeta-Flux]

Would you then assert Blake Ostler has committed the modal fallacy in his arguments for libertarian free will? Can you demonstrate such?

Dear Log,

Point 1: Blake Ostler does not (as jwhitlock did) merely assert that determinism is to have your choices made for you. In fact, I am not aware that he ever makes the claim that determinism (by itself) forces lack of agency. His arguments are much more sophisticated, and discuss multiple *types* of determinism, multiple forms of choice, and so forth. There is also:

Point 2: I used the word "most" to quantify my statement.

I hope this clarifies my meaning. A friend of mine introduced me to the "modal fallacy" after he read about it in Blake's works; so I doubt Blake commits the fallacy himself.

Best,

Zeta-Flux

[johndoe]

Nothing circular about it. All that needs to be applied initially is common sense. Free will is the ability to choose for oneself. Determinism is to have choices made for you. If you want to get into deeper philosophical reasoning, feel free. However, I don't see any need to go further than the above until valid reasoning can be presented as to why the common sense, obvious contradiction between the two may not be the case.

Simply asserting that free will is incompatible with determinism by definition is indeed circular. You have offered no arguments, only your own intuition (while at the same time stating that I am oversimplifying by stating that where one falls on this depends on our intuition, apaprently without noticing the irony). Determinism is not to have choices made for you. I do not feel the need to go into this further with you. It is obvious that you have not studied this issue in any kind of depth.

Evidently, compatibilism requires a redefinition of "free" in order for it to fit. Or is that not the case?

Interesting that you should bring this up in light of the BofM passages I quoted. Note the clear difference in the passages between things that act for themselves, and things that are acted upon.

There is no agreed upon definition of free in the context of this discussion. This matter has been debated for centuries. At no time has it been universally agreed that libertarian free will is some type of default position that others have to prove false.

I would suggest that empirical evidence of the material universe not be confused with the subject of this discussion, which is the free will of individuals, who are certainly beings empowered to act for themselves. Matter, in that it is acted upon, is deterministic in nature. Spirit / intelligence, which acts for itself, is libertarian in nature. Perhaps by compatibilism you refer to the combination of matter and spirit; however, the matter portion still is acted upon, and the individual spirit is what acts for itself - as empowered by God - in directing the matter associated with it as a body.

Empirical evidence is indeed a side issue. I probably shouldn't have brought it up.

Indeed, perhaps this is the crux of the discussion, in that God has given us - as spirit individuals - agency to act for ourselves, while matter has its course determined for it. Compatibilism would seem to be an attempt to improperly mix the two, when in reality matter and spirit combined are still subject to a hierarchical structure of free will by the individual involved.

But what does it mean for us to act for ourselves? What is required for us to act for ourselves? These questions have no universally accepted answer. I would think that you would at least be able to see that it is reasonable to disagree with your position.

[cksalmon]

To your way of thinking, do evil spirits exist outside a being-specific instantiator?

I don't understand the question, I suppose. Are not evil spirits (assuming their existence) being-specific instantiators of evil?

Are spirits not beings? It's like asking, "Does 'apple' exist outside of apple-specific instantiators?" (Say, Granny Smith, for example.) To my mind, that's just a really stupid question. But, I'm not a Platonist, all LDS polemics to the contrary notwithstanding.

[johndoe]

There are couple of quotes from Joseph Smith in today's lesson that indicate to me that he was not a determanist.

This would indicate that Joseph felt that "free agency" meant making choices without enticement.

Yet what does the Book of Mormon say? jwhitlock already quoted this one:

2 Nephi 2:16 - Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other.

You misunderstand the quote from Joseph Smith. If we were unable to resist enticement, then we would indeed not be free.

Determinism does not entail that we cannot resist the devil's (or God's) enticement.

And this is the viewpoint I've expressed earlier - that men cannot be condemned for things they weren't ultimately responsible for.

I am getting rather tired of folks simply asserting libertarianism as true simply because they think it is obvious. It is begging the question to merely assume that if the universe is deterministic we cannot be ultimately responsible for our actions.

[jwhitlock]

I think you are misunderstanding determinism. It is exactly your claim that determinism implies choices are made for you that is circular. Most people who believe this implication only do so by commiting the modal fallacy.

Please.

The discussion here concerns theological determinism, which consists of God either knowing all of our decisions in advance, or of decreeing our actions in advance. Perhaps this was not clear from the discussion, but I have been discussing in the context of the latter definition - a God who decrees our actions in advance. While others have tried to broaden the discussion into a more general definition of determinism, that has not been my intent.

No modal fallacy there.

[jwhitlock]

Simply asserting that free will is incompatible with determinism by definition is indeed circular. You have offered no arguments, only your own intuition (while at the same time stating that I am oversimplifying by stating that where one falls on this depends on our intuition, apaprently without noticing the irony). Determinism is not to have choices made for you. I do not feel the need to go into this further with you. It is obvious that you have not studied this issue in any kind of depth.

Then please read my post to Zeta above. I would have thought it obvious that a broad discussion of determinism would so dilute the discussion that it wouldn't have been productive. Perhaps in order to simplify things for you, I should have used "predestination" instead.

Hence, my comments still stand within the more narrow definition of theological predestination - not related to omniscience - that I have been using.

There is no agreed upon definition of free in the context of this discussion. This matter has been debated for centuries. At no time has it been universally agreed that libertarian free will is some type of default position that others have to prove false.

Well, then feel free to discuss this in the context of agency instead, including the ability to "act for oneself" - which is what the discussion is really about.

But what does it mean for us to act for ourselves? What is required for us to act for ourselves? These questions have no universally accepted answer. I would think that you would at least be able to see that it is reasonable to disagree with your position.

The simplest definition I am using within the context being discussed is that with the choices available to us, we are free (or have the agency) to act for ourselves in making those choices. We are also free to submit (or not) to any compulsion or influence we desire in making those choices.

As for your last statement concerning disagreements, I am not sure where you are coming from. Have I indicated in any way that my understanding is perfect in this or that others are being unreasonable? I have simply stated that free will and determinism (with the clarified definitions I have provided) appear to me to be incompatible, and that rationalizations justifying compatibilism appear to me to be far more complex than the more common sense view of the incompatible nature of the two. As I have noted, any evidence - other than a curt dismissal of me because of a perceived lack of "depth" in the subject - is something I would like to take a look at.

So. Any clear evidence?

[Zeta-Flux]

Please.

The discussion here concerns theological determinism, which consists of God either knowing all of our decisions in advance, or of decreeing our actions in advance. Perhaps this was not clear from the discussion, but I have been discussing in the context of the latter definition - a God who decrees our actions in advance. While others have tried to broaden the discussion into a more general definition of determinism, that has not been my intent.

No modal fallacy there.

While that might have been your intent, using that definition of determinism as an argument against compatibilism is merely engaging in equivocation. Compatibilists do not use that definition of determinism.

[jwhitlock]

While that might have been your intent, using that definition of determinism as an argument against compatibilism is merely engaging in equivocation. Compatibilists do not use that definition of determinism

Then please feel free to enlighten me concerning what definition they do use, and then I'll continue the discussion from a predestinational standpoint, which is what I was more interested in.

[wenglund]

I don't understand the question, I suppose. Are not evil spirits (assuming their existence) being-specific instantiators of evil?

I guess I understood your use of the phrase "being-specific instantiators" differently than how you may have meant it.

To me, evil is both a mental construct and a spiritual essence (dark spirit matter). But, I am trying to understand your position.

How do you define "evil"?

Are spirits not beings?

Yes and no. To me, there are embodied spirits and unembodied spiritual matter. But, I am trying to understand your position.

How do you answer your own question?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Zeta-Flux]

They don't use a "predestinational" standpoint. At least not all of them. Determinism, in their view, usually means something along the lines of the definition given at wikipedia: Wiki-determinism

With regards to the interplay between God's knowing the future, and our free will, I like what Joseph Smith said: "I believe in the fall of man, as recorded in the Bible; I believe that God foreknew everything, but did not foreordain everything; I deny that foreordain and foreknow is the same thing. He foreordained the fall of man; but all merciful as He is, He foreordained at the same time, a plan of redemption for all mankind."

[sean0scott]

Just thought I'd plug my favorite professor! (Sorry if this has already been referenced)

Joseph Smith and the Problem of Evil

This is just one version; I couldn't find an online version of the copy I have, but this hits all the main points.

[jwhitlock]

They don't use a "predestinational" standpoint. At least not all of them. Determinism, in their view, usually means something along the lines of the definition given at wikipedia: Wiki-determinism

The wikipedia article contains predestination as part of the definition. See the section on theological determinism.

[johndoe]

Then please read my post to Zeta above. I would have thought it obvious that a broad discussion of determinism would so dilute the discussion that it wouldn't have been productive. Perhaps in order to simplify things for you, I should have used "predestination" instead.

It appears we've been talking past each other to a certain extent. I do not believe that God decrees our future decisions, only that He does foreknow them (though even this isn't necessary for the type of determinism I accept to obtain).

[LifeOnaPlate]

Yes, and I had hoped the mods would have seen fit to change your offensive subtitle, per your puported request. Alas, it apparently isn't to be. Did you really ask them to do so? (I mean, c'mon, they certainly edited your mere misspelling quickly enough, per your documented request.)

We all hope for things, Life. Our hopes do not seem to be convergent at this time.

cks

Yes, I asked them immediately after receiving your private message and I told you that. I feel this conversation is not as productive as I had hoped, it seems I approached it in a way that was too flip for your taste, you took offense, and now would rather be caught up in peripheral issues. Perhaps I should have simply emailed you about it to see what you had to say. Either way, forget I asked, I'll find someone else to talk to about it.

[Jason]

Yet what does the Book of Mormon say? jwhitlock already quoted this one:

2 Nephi 2:16 - Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other.

What do you feel "enticed" means in this context?

And if it means "influenced by outside forces" how does it square with "the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself"?

You misunderstand the quote from Joseph Smith. If we were unable to resist enticement, then we would indeed not be free.

Determinism does not entail that we cannot resist the devil's (or God's) enticement.

Could you explain that a little more, because as I understand it determinism holds that ALL of our actions are the results of the "enticement" of external forces.

I am getting rather tired of folks simply asserting libertarianism as true simply because they think it is obvious. It is begging the question to merely assume that if the universe is deterministic we cannot be ultimately responsible for our actions.

I think it's self-evident. If we have no actual ability to alter our decisions then how can we be considered responsible for having made them?

If you can answer that question then you might have a serious argument for determinism.

[Jason]

To me, evil is both a mental construct and a spiritual essence (dark spirit matter). But, I am trying to understand your position.

'Dark spirit matter'? Do you mean that there might be puddles of pure evil out there somewhere, like on Star Trek?

How do you define "evil"?

Evil is actions which are immoral. Evil beings are beings which typically engage in evil acts. Evil spirits, likewise, are simply spirits which typically engage in evil acts.

[johndoe]

What do you feel "enticed" means in this context?

Precisely what enticed always means. From Merriam-Webster online:

Main Entry: en

[Jason]

Precisely what enticed always means. From Merriam-Webster online:

I very much doubt that Joseph Smith was using the Merriam-Webster online dictionary when he chose "entice" as the best translation for what Lehi said, so the dictionary entry seems extraneous.

Are you suggesting that when the BoM indicates that we are enticed by both God and Satan, that this actually means we are somehow not influenced at all by any external force?

No, merely that since it says that "the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself," that it means that "enticement" cannot be the only factor.

Do you feel that if Satan tempts us, we are somehow no longer free?

I feel that if all of our decisions are determined by what enticements we are subject to that we are not free.

Some proponents of determinism may view it that way. There is something called the zygote argument from a philospher named Al Mele that argued against comptabilism on similar grounds. As LDS, however, I view it differently. Our choices are ultimately determined by our uncreated, eternal natures, that existed as intelligences before we were organized into spirits. Therefore, results of our choices stem ultimately internally rather than from external sources.

From your POV, what does it mean for our decisions to be the result of internal rather than external forces?

I wonder why you call it determinism at all if you are appealing to internal forces. Wouldn't that lead to the same "black box" problem of luck that you say the libertarianism view leads to?

And it feels self-evident to me that if we make a decision that is completely in accordance with our nature and character, then that decision is free.

I would agree, so long as we are not compelled to make a choice in accordance with our nature and character - that is, that we could have chosen otherwise. So yes, we need to have the capability to make choices that we wouldn't want to make in order to really be free.

I also believe our nature and character can be altered and re-made by our choices.

[JDave]

And it feels self-evident to me that if we make a decision that is completely in accordance with our nature and character, then that decision is free. The libertarian argument, to me, sounds like we are only free if we are actually able to make a choice that we don't really want to make. To which I respond: huh?

This is interesting. Are we not enticed to go against our nature? If we succumb to that enticing, was that true to our nature?

[cksalmon]

This is interesting. Are we not enticed to go against our nature? If we succumb to that enticing, was that true to our nature?

I agree with johndoe. Another way of phrasing the idea: Bracketing constraint, one always and inevitably does what one most wants to do at any given time.

Best,

cks