The Book of Mormon's Use of the Tower of Babel and the Adamic Language as the Power of God

[CV75]

On 3/15/2017 at 10:08 AM, Benjamin Seeker said:

To sum it up, in Moses 6 the pure language is called priesthood. Enoch's use of the pure language references priesthood theology and is described as being "given him" by "God." Similarly, the Jaredite's written language is powerful "even as" God, and it was confounded at the tower event, which strongly implies that it is the "one language" or Adamic language described in Gen 11.

A couple of (hopefully not too tangential) thoughts:

I think language can refer to more than speech and symbolism. As you suggested with the Moses 6:6-7 reference, “this same Priesthood” could also refer to revelation (v 3), sacrifice and prayer (v 3-4), the book of remembrance (v 5, and this could be both an accounting of secular and spiritual events and ideas), the children (v 6; the connection between "children", "seed" and "priesthood" being more evident in the covenant of Abraham*), and teaching to read and write (the preservation, rather remembrance, of the “Word”, v 6).

An example is Mosiah 24:4-7: “And he appointed teachers of the brethren of Amulon in every land which was possessed by his people; and thus the language of Nephi began to be taught among all the people of the Lamanites. And they were a people friendly one with another; nevertheless they knew not God… But they taught them that they should keep their record, and that they might write one to another. And thus the Lamanites began to increase in riches, and began to trade one with another and wax great, and began to be a cunning and a wise people, as to the wisdom of the world…” The language opened up social interaction on a number of levels: public (“friendly”), news and vital statistics (“record”), commerce (“one to another”  and “trade”), accounting (“riches”), government, taxes, arts and science (“wisdom of the world”). While Zion has the Priesthood involved with all aspects of life, evidently the language in this instance was not a priesthood application (“nevertheless they knew not God”).

You've mentioned in other threads about priesthood instances (namely the initiation of dispensations) being conveyed or conferred by the "voice" of God, which naturally entails language. I've always thought hat the stewardship of Adam was a priesthood responsibility that entailed the naming (organizing, accounting for, even the generating and hybridizing, or husbanding, the "seed" of non-human life*, etc.) of animals.

* reminds me of the role of genetic code as language

Edited March 17, 2017 by CV75
* reminds me of the role of genetic code as language

[CV75]

One more tangent: While John 1:1 is rightly interpreted to refer to Christ as the Word, it might also have another level of meaning:

“In the beginning was the Word [the Priesthood Order¹], and the Word [Priesthood Order²] was with God, and the Word [Priesthood Order³] was God.”

Order¹ refers to the order (Word as law) in which God lives; Order² is the order (Word as power or command) which God possesses and gives; Order³ is the order (Word as generational code or family council) that is God (rather, constitutes what God is, or makes Him what He is).

This can still refer to Jesus, as He explains in scripture that He is the Law, the Light (power), and the Life (one with the Father).

Edited March 18, 2017 by CV75

[Benjamin Seeker]

3 hours ago, CV75 said:

One more tangent: While John 1:1 is rightly interpreted to refer to Christ as the Word, it might also have another level of meaning:

“In the beginning was the Word [the Priesthood Order¹], and the Word [Priesthood Order²] was with God, and the Word [Priesthood Order³] was God.”

Order¹ refers to the order (Word as law) in which God lives; Order² is the order (Word as power or command) which God possesses and gives; Order³ is the order (Word as generational code or family council) that is God (rather, constitutes what God is, or makes Him what He is).

This can still refer to Jesus, as He explains in scripture that He is the Law, the Light (power), and the Life (one with the Father).

If you were penning a sacred text, this could result in a very cool CV75 translation of John 1:1. 🙃

[CV75]

5 hours ago, Benjamin Seeker said:

If you were penning a sacred text, this could result in a very cool CV75 translation of John 1:1. 🙃

So much for tangents!

[mfbukowski]

On 3/15/2017 at 7:08 AM, Benjamin Seeker said:

Over in the Book of Mormon as fiction thread, there was a discussion about how much of the tower of Babel narrative the Book of Mormon really adopts. An intertextual examination of Ether vs. Gen. 11's account of the tower of babel is enlightening, I think. 

Here is the introduction to the tower narrative in the Book of Mormon with its KJV counterpart below:

 

Ether 1 is using the same phraseology from KJV Genesis 11, consisting of two phrases with some variation that are presented in the same sequence. In terms of sequence, it's notable that Gen. 11 employs the each phrase twice with some variation. Ether 1 seems to follow suit, but only paraphrasing the second of two concepts.

Another point of contact is that Ether 1:33 describes the Lord swaring or speaking. While the content of the God's speech in Gen. 11 doesn't make direct reference to scattering, the Lord's speech in Gen. 11 could be summed up as the Lord swearing to scatter the people, considering that scattering is explicitly what the people want to avoid in Gen 11:4 and the result of the Lord's confounding according to verses 8 and 9.

Obviously, both Gen 11 and Ether 1 describe the edifice as a "tower."

Moving onto verse 34 and its KJV counterpart:

 

Another parallel use of language. I've bolded only exact words matches so as to highlight the way that the Book of Mormon apparently borrows and adapts the words of God from Gen 11 and puts them into Jared's mouth in Ether 1.

The title page of the Book of Mormon also describes the tower narrative:

The first two concepts we are already familiar with (two of the primary aspects of the original Genesis narrative, also emphasized in Ether 1), and now we have the idea that "they were building a tower to get to heaven" also present in the Book of Mormon text.

Again, I've bolded only the matching language (even partials), to illustrate how the Book of Mormon appears to adapt the language of the KJV Gen 11. All of this is to say, the Book of Mormon text as it stands, clearly invokes many of the primary aspects of tower narrative and uses exact or similar language from the KJV to do so.

While the BOM text doesn't mention the name Babel or the idea of one language, the possibility that the Jaredites language is the pure or Adamic language can be inferred from the Book of Mormon and Moses. For example, Moroni describes the written language of the Jaredites as "mighty even as [God]" and "overpowering" of those that read them (Ether 12:24). The text clarified earlier that this written language had been "confounded" (Ether 3:24), and it's safe to assume this has reference to the tower event. The comparison of the power of the Jaredites written language to the power of God is paralleled by the description of language in Moses . For example, Moses 6:6-7 describes the "pure and undefiled" language of Adam and his children and calls it a "priesthood." A few generations later Enoch's language is described as powerful:

It can be assumed that the text has Enoch speaking Adamic, but there is also an implication that he is using it differently than others around him. Maybe he knows more of it or uses it in conjunction with God's power. Also, this verse clearly parallels the description of Melchizedek and his priesthood or the "order of the Son of God" in JST Gen 14:

To sum it up, in Moses 6 the pure language is called priesthood. Enoch's use of the pure language references priesthood theology and is described as being "given him" by "God." Similarly, the Jaredite's written language is powerful "even as" God, and it was confounded at the tower event, which strongly implies that it is the "one language" or Adamic language described in Gen 11.

I am coming to this thread late in the game, I find it to be quite important and you are unquestionably, to me, on to something very important in the gospel.   I have been out of town and out of touch for a week or so.

There were two major trends in philosophy which are relevant to this discussion- one was phenomenology which was mostly practiced in Europe and is also called "Continental" philosophy, and the other is called "Analytical" philosophy as practiced in Britain and the US.  Both of these philosophies were highly concerned with language and how it affects reason and our definitions and construction of "reality" as we know it.

A leading philosopher who is relevant to this thread from the analytical side is Richard Rorty, another philosopher from the Continental side is Hans-Georg Gadamer.

It is hard to characterize the position of any philosopher in a very few words, much less characterize the positions of two philosophers in those few words, but both of these philosophers coming from different traditions have come to very similar conclusions.  Both of them agree that the interpretation of language ("Hermeneutics") is of prime importance in our understanding of reality.

In fact in my clumsy attempt to define both their positions at the same time I think this sentence does a fair job: 

Reality, as we know it and speak of it and think of it, is defined by language.

In fact, to me that is almost a tautology- it seems self evident to me that the only way we can communicate as humans is through some kind of language so what we know as humans MUST be based in language.  In fact I would say that in a discussion about reality, the way we organize what we can know about reality is organized through language.

That should be obvious- we cannot discuss reality or anything about it without language.  Language itself IS the basis for any discussion and the way we organize the language in any discussion IS the way reality is organized for us in our individual perceptions.  

This discussion itself is a discussion about the priesthood organizing reality through language and that is abundantly clear in any scripture which says that God organized the world through his WORD, or gave a command, and the elements obeyed.  Jesus commanded the elements and calmed the seas, by his verbal command. Genesis says that God "called" day and night into existence and "called" the day and the morning the "first day".   There are almost too many examples to be quoted about the "power of God's word" which parallel the power of the priesthood.

A summary of Gadamer's positions are given here: 

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gadamer/

A summary of Rorty's position in his own words, is found here:

https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language

A video about some of Jean Piaget's theories and techniques is found here"

http://linguistics2011.blogspot.com/2011/04/constructivism.html           

 

Scriptures:

Gen 1: 1-9

Book of Moses 2:1-16

John 1:1-5

D&C 50:17-30

 

Once you see this, you see it everywhere.  Without language, mankind has no power over nature, there is no science, no understanding, no intellectual attainments, just groveling as animals.  All of humanity's ability to create humanized worlds is gone.  Without language and parents training children how to survive, you have a lone and naked baby in the wilderness.  Even primates communicate and of course so do other animals, but they do not create worlds.  They cannot survive in environments hostile to their biology; with language we can survive on the moon or other planets by taking our own world with us, our worlds organized by human intelligence and therefore language.

 

God, the Man of Holiness, through Adam, figuratively or literally, gave us culture, language and the commandments which allow us to survive peacefully.   I would argue that philosophers like Rorty and Gadamer give us the basis for a complete Mormon theology but don't tell anyone.  They might steal the idea.

 

Actually, this principle is why I became Mormon.   I knew that man organized his worlds through language, I just didn't know that the Man who did it was the Man of Holiness.

 

 

[Ahab]

Some good thoughts there mski but you didn't mention how reality exists even when we can't find words to express it... those unspeakable things.

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, Ahab said:

Some good thoughts there mski but you didn't mention how reality exists even when we can't find words to express it... those unspeakable things.

Tell me how to explain color to a blind man, yet there it is.  What is the difference in words between yellow and red?

We have direct experience- "things as they are".   Communication spirit to spirit is, I think, "things as they are".  Imagine the way you know your wife, the way you know how to swim or handle a hammer if you are a carpenter, they way you know your way home from work.  No need for verbal communication in any of these.

As Rorty says

Quote

 

To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states.  To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences, there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.

     Truth cannot be out there- cannot exist independently of the human mind- because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there.  The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.  Only descriptions of the world can be true or false.  The world on its own- unaided by the describing activities of human beings- cannot."   Richard Rorty- Contingency Irony and Solidarity, P 5.

 

To say that "truth is not out there" is not to say that "things as they are" are not out there.  Things are not truth, truth is not things.  Truth is a property of sentences, not things.  There are no "true" chairs or tables, there are only true or false beliefs

Edited March 21, 2017 by mfbukowski

[Wondering Muse]

Sound itself and vibrations have power. Some sounds are said to heal and also create shapes. Look up Cymatics, it is very interesting. There are eastern religions that use their voices for healing and think of some tonal phrases as spiritual in nature. Chanting "Ohm" and whatnot. I have no doubt that the Pure Adamic language of God likely has perfect tones and therefore is full of power. As was already stated, God spoke and formed creation.

[Ahab]

14 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Tell me how to explain color to a blind man, yet there it is.  What is the difference in words between yellow and red?

We have direct experience- "things as they are".   Communication spirit to spirit is, I think, "things as they are".  Imagine the way you know your wife, the way you know how to swim or handle a hammer if you are a carpenter, they way you know your way home from work.  No need for verbal communication in any of these.

As Rorty says

To say that "truth is not out there" is not to say that "things as they are" are not out there.  Things are not truth, truth is not things.  Truth is a property of sentences, not things.  There are no "true" chairs or tables, there are only true or false beliefs

Truth to me is the same as reality, rather than only something that is a property of sentences.  So to my mind a 'true chair" is what a chair really is in reality, rather than a "false chair" which in my mind is not really a chair at all.

And to my mind, too, spirit to spirit communication is one mind communicating with another mind, by what ever means necessary.  Do you get what I mean when I say that?

Sometimes words are woefully inadequate but they're pretty much all that we have to communicate with each other unless we can find some other way to share what we think.

[clarkgoble]

15 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

To say that "truth is not out there" is not to say that "things as they are" are not out there.  Things are not truth, truth is not things.  Truth is a property of sentences, not things.  There are no "true" chairs or tables, there are only true or false beliefs

Depends upon who you are looking at of course. Heidegger disagrees with the above or at least sees truth as correspondence of sentences as a secondary derived sense of the original sense of truth as aletheia or unconcealment. Although he admits in his later period this isn't the actual greek view of truth and that aletheia proper as unconcealment is much more the possibility of truth. 

For Hebrew use truth usually was of things rather than sentences.  

Edited March 21, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Depends upon who you are looking at of course. Heidegger disagrees with the above or at least sees truth as correspondence of sentences as a secondary derived sense of the original sense of truth as aletheia or unconcealment. Although he admits in his later period this isn't the actual greek view of truth and that aletheia proper as unconcealment is much more the possibility of truth. 

For Hebrew use truth usually was of things rather than sentences.  

Thanks- an interesting article, but coming from analytical philosophy I would disagree with many of the statements like "truth means reliable" or Hazony's quote

Quote

From these and other examples, we see that in biblical Hebrew, that which is true is something that is reliable, steadfast, faithful; while that which is false is something that cannot be counted upon, or which appears reliable but is not. In these instances, truth and falsity are simply qualities of objects or persons, which parallel the English usage of terms such as reliable, steadfast, or faithful. There is no question, therefore, of truth and falsity referring to any kind of correspondence between speech and reality, for in these cases, there is no speech involved. There are only objects and persons.

I am a Pragmatist- I agree that in a general way we use the word "truth" to describe beliefs which are "reliable".  Perhaps in Hebrew it is a common usage to refer to a "true tent peg" if it is a reliable tent peg, but that would be an odd usage in modern contemporary English I think.

His last sentence above I think leaves a lot to be desired- I would maintain that there are MANY problems with the conclusion that "There is no question, therefore, of truth and falsity referring to any kind of correspondence between speech and reality, for in these cases, there is no speech involved. There are only objects and persons." since the very sentence he uses demonstrates NO such correspondence, and he uses speech to make his point!

Clearly there IS "speech involved" if one CALLS- using language- a tent peg "true" BECAUSE it is "reliable"

In fact one is DEFINING the peg as "true" because of its USAGE IN HEBREW, which is of course, a language.  He is saying in effect that Hebrew may be translated in such a way that "true" can mean "reliable" in Hebrew.   Yes there is, he alleges, "correspondence" between the Hebrew word for "truth" (which unfortunately I do not know) and the English word for "reliable"

So using that as a proof somehow for the correspondence theory of truth is I think, an untenable position.  He discusses only DESCRIPTIONS of things - not things themselves which in principle cannot be discussed because things themselves are not human mental states. 

This is a position I think Rorty would take against the good professor.

On the other hand, as a Pragmatist I have no problem with the statement that "We use the word 'true' to describe our experience in believing ideas which have proven to be reliable or sometimes even things shown to be reliable".

For me as for Rorty, the gulf between the world "that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states.  To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences, there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations."

I don't think there is an ontological category of "reliability" which the word describes or with which it "corresponds".  If a human finds some belief or tool "reliable" that is a human mental state, not a state of the world. A wrench can be a "reliable" hammer in a pinch.  A rock can be a "reliable" tent peg- reliability has nothing to do with the world or what is "reliable" except what is reliable to a person in a given situation.

And that is the danger of the correspondence theory, in my opinion.  I think that is the central category error that leads to Platonic Forms and the reality of universals which eventually leads to Scholasticism and errors like the idea that bread can be transformed into flesh by simply changing it's "substance" while keeping its same "appearances".

In our example here, one might be tempted to think that using a rock as a "reliable" tent peg means that we have transferred the ten peg's "reliability" to the rock so that ontologically, in substance the rock is a "true tent peg" which simply APPEARS to be a rock.   THAT is the kind of error I am arguing against in the final analysis and I think it is what Rorty means when he speaks of Pragmatism abolishing the "appearance/reality" distinction.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzynRPP9XkY

Them's my dos centavos 

Edited March 21, 2017 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, Ahab said:

Truth to me is the same as reality, rather than only something that is a property of sentences.  So to my mind a 'true chair" is what a chair really is in reality, rather than a "false chair" which in my mind is not really a chair at all.

And to my mind, too, spirit to spirit communication is one mind communicating with another mind, by what ever means necessary.  Do you get what I mean when I say that?

Sometimes words are woefully inadequate but they're pretty much all that we have to communicate with each other unless we can find some other way to share what we think.

I do understand spirit to spirit communication, and agree with that.  I think that is pretty much non-linguistic communication.  I think most direct experiences are non-linguistic.  You see colors and their harmonies and which colors "go well" with others but that is not linguistic until you SAY "gold goes well with blue" (especially if you went to UCLA)

A chair in reality is nothing until you call it one or you are looking for a place to sit.  After 2 hours wandering in a museum while your mind is totally occupied looking at art, ANYTHING is a "chair".  Watching a parade, a curbstone is a perfect "chair" and you can call it a "true chair" if you like.

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Depends upon who you are looking at of course. Heidegger disagrees with the above or at least sees truth as correspondence of sentences as a secondary derived sense of the original sense of truth as aletheia or unconcealment. Although he admits in his later period this isn't the actual greek view of truth and that aletheia proper as unconcealment is much more the possibility of truth. 

For Hebrew use truth usually was of things rather than sentences.  

One more point about Hazony's quote which I just noticed 

https://www.timesandseasons.org/index.php/2016/08/35605/

Quote

In these instances, truth and falsity are simply qualities of objects or persons, which parallel the English usage of terms such as reliable, steadfast, or faithful.

Here he is begging the question of correspondence quite clearly!  He has "qualities paralleling" English usage.  What are these things called "qualities" if not linguistic conventions?  How are they "real"?

He has invented the category of a "quality" as an abstract entity and then maintaining it "parallels" the English usage!

And THEN he concludes 

Quote

There is no question, therefore, of truth and falsity referring to any kind of correspondence between speech and reality, for in these cases, there is no speech involved. There are only objects and persons.

So based on the presupposition of "qualities paralleling" English he concludes a "correspondence between speech and reality".  So he uses one human linguistically originated word "quality" not surprisingly "paralleling English usage" because it IS English usage.  It need not "parallel" usage- it IS an English usage.  So he has one English usage corresponding to another and concluding that one usage is "reality" while the other is mere language.

VERY problematic!

Edited March 21, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

36 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Thanks- an interesting article, but coming from analytical philosophy I would disagree with many of the statements like "truth means reliable" or Hazony's quote

Just to be clear, Hazony is talking about how the word usually translated truth functions in regular Hebrew speaking. So he's just making a linguistic point. Later on he makes some epistemological points primarily based upon Jeremiah but that's an other matter entirely.

Quote

I am a Pragmatist- I agree that in a general way we use the word "truth" to describe beliefs which are "reliable".  Perhaps in Hebrew it is a common usage to refer to a "true tent peg" if it is a reliable tent peg, but that would be an odd usage in modern contemporary English I think.

It's an archaic usage in English although it does still persist. So to talk of truing a wheel or if your spouse is true to you come out of that more archaic sense.

Quote

His last sentence above I think leaves a lot to be desired- I would maintain that there are MANY problems with the conclusion that "There is no question, therefore, of truth and falsity referring to any kind of correspondence between speech and reality, for in these cases, there is no speech involved. There are only objects and persons." since the very sentence he uses demonstrates NO such correspondence, and he uses speech to make his point!

Clearly there IS "speech involved" if one CALLS- using language- a tent peg "true" BECAUSE it is "reliable"

He's more just speaking of how language isn't treated as an abstract entity in itself nor are there abstract entities like sentences or propositions that are true as opposed to objects. He's not denying language entirely since of course as you note we speak about true things. But as you noted above, that'd be a weird way to speak in English due to the huge influence starting with early modernism of sentences as true. And arguably the influence of philosophy on Latin, French and German use before that.

To say something is reliably the thing it appears to be is certainly to use speech though. However what makes a sentence true isn't how well the sentence represents some state of affairs but rather how well an object represents itself to be the object it shows itself to be over time. This is significant for a variety of reasons. First it emphasizes a dynamic rather than static conception of truth. English tends to privilege true and false as static properties rather than a dynamic process. Second the representation isn't merely linguistic but is a much broader type of significance. Thus I'd argue a broader sense of semiotics is entailed rather than just language.

Quote

Here he is begging the question of correspondence quite clearly!  He has "qualities paralleling" English usage.

But correspondence usually discussed is the correspondence between either an idea in mind or an abstract proposition corresponds to states of affairs. We can of course talk about correspondence in other situations. So Peirce for instance will talk about correspondence but all he means is the correspondence of an interpretant to an object in a dynamic process. It's thus not correspondence in the sense of the Cartesian tradition. For Peirce the type of correspondence that ultimately matters is the immediate object with the dynamic object (how the object presents itself compared to what it is); the immediate object to the immediate interpretant (how the object presents itself compared to the immediate result of significant to an interpretation); or the dynamic object to the final interpretant (how the object is versus the fated interpretation given sufficient time and community). Yet in a real sense none of this is correspondence in the Cartesian or neoKantian traditions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth

Edited March 21, 2017 by clarkgoble

[Ahab]

3 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

A chair in reality is nothing until you call it one or you are looking for a place to sit.  After 2 hours wandering in a museum while your mind is totally occupied looking at art, ANYTHING is a "chair".  Watching a parade, a curbstone is a perfect "chair" and you can call it a "true chair" if you like.

I skipped the part we agree on, evidently. (edit: I slipped over the part that I think we agree on)

On the "true chair" idea I am apparently more particular than you are about that. I do not call anything I can sit on a chair. A "true chair" has 4 legs and a back with a seat that is approximately 22 inches from the floor it stands on, for example. Some stools come close but in reality are not true chairs. And walls are still walls even though some walls can be sat on. So walls are not true chairs. Etc. And that is only a little bit that I know about true chairs.

Edited March 22, 2017 by Ahab

[mfbukowski]

3 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

To say something is reliably the thing it appears to be is certainly to use speech though. However what makes a sentence true isn't how well the sentence represents some state of affairs but rather how well an object represents itself to be the object it shows itself to be over time. This is significant for a variety of reasons. First it emphasizes a dynamic rather than static conception of truth. English tends to privilege true and false as static properties rather than a dynamic process. Second the representation isn't merely linguistic but is a much broader type of significance. Thus I'd argue a broader sense of semiotics is entailed rather than just language.

But correspondence usually discussed is the correspondence between either an idea in mind or an abstract proposition corresponds to states of affairs. We can of course talk about correspondence in other situations. So Peirce for instance will talk about correspondence but all he means is the correspondence of an interpretant to an object in a dynamic process. It's thus not correspondence in the sense of the Cartesian tradition. For Peirce the type of correspondence that ultimately matters is the immediate object with the dynamic object (how the object presents itself compared to what it is); the immediate object to the immediate interpretant (how the object presents itself compared to the immediate result of significant to an interpretation); or the dynamic object to the final interpretant (how the object is versus the fated interpretation given sufficient time and community). Yet in a real sense none of this is correspondence in the Cartesian or neoKantian traditions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth

I understand what you are saying because I have read enough Heidegger and Gadamer AND Peirce to understand and appreciate their jargon, but unfortunately to me, that is exactly what it is, and it just BEGS to be misunderstood and to mystify the simple issues I think Wittgenstein, for example, would see. I see it all as horribly imprecise and confusing and again, tantamount to being a new Scholasticism.  Catholic philosophers can make a convincing case for Scholasticism even today, and no one in their right mind would doubt their intelligence or the power of their philosophy- for them.  http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/contemporary-scholasticism.html

But it is not my culture, philosophically speaking and I find it mystifying and imprecise and confusing.

That said, now let me put on my analytical hat and discuss how I see the position you are presenting, and yes I know enough to understand that you are presenting it accurately.

Quote

However what makes a sentence true isn't how well the sentence represents some state of affairs but rather how well an object represents itself to be the object it shows itself to be over time.

I have no idea what "some state of affairs" could be or how an object could "represent itself to be the object it shows itself to be over time"

First of all is that "state of affairs" a state of the world or a human mind?  Perhaps that is assuming a Cartesian duality which is not present but what precisely then is this mysterious "state of affairs"?  I find the phrase vague.

How does an object "represent itself to be the object it shows itself to be over time"?

How does a chair "show itself" to be ANYTHING?  In our earlier analogy I suppose that after walking a long way, to a given individual, a curbstone could "show itself" to be a "chair", but clearly that is not a "state of affairs" of the curbstone but of the individuals need to rest on a surface higher than the ground.   HE sees the curbstone AS a "chair".

Wittgenstein would show that as a "seeing as" as opposed to "seeing".

He gives the example of a drawing of a rabbit which can be "seen as" a duck

What is this object "showing itself" to be?  How does an object decide how it wants to show itself?  To me it is clearly a case of the observer seeing the object "as" what it is necessary or expedient or useful to see it as.   Again, one might see a wrench "as" a hammer, or even see a rock "as" a hammer if necessary to perhaps drive a tent stake into the ground.  I personally have used rocks as hammers in this situation many times.

I find it difficult to imagine that the rock is "showing itself to be a hammer", it is I who see its usefulness in the situation

And I believe that this is a stronger interpretation for Mormon philosophy, because one can say that God takes "matter unorganized" and organizes it for his use.  Matter unorganized does not "show itself" to be a potential world, or carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen does not "show itself" to be a potential human being.   In a theological context I think we need to see elements "AS" material to be organized- not seeing elements as "showing themselves" to be potential beings.

THAT for me is the bottom line in choosing the best paradigm for compatibility with Mormon doctrine in which the Human Intelligence of God - the light which permeates the universe or multiverse - or the "Priesthood" as represented in this thread- "sees matter unorganized" and organizes it

"Here is matter unorganized, let us go down and organize a world like the others we have created"  NOT "Here is matter unorganized showing itself to be a world"

But again I think we see the bottom line in essentially the same way- objects can appear differently to us according to our needs and purposes and what matters is that we achieve a purposeful and desirable end to the activity we are attempting.  I think the choice is which semantics communicates more clearly and of course I prefer mine.

Also, regarding Peirce, I find the fact that he needs to create his own terminology a problem similar to that of Heidegger.   I understand why he does it- natural languages do not lend themselves to show anything more than what natural languages CAN show.  I have repeated the Rorty quote in my siggy a million times here and shown the Rorty video as well and no one understands Rorty any clearer than the average person would understand Heidegger

So I do not know the answer to that.   I do not think philosophers need to "dumb down" their positions for those who are not trained "in the ministry".

On the other hand, in theology as opposed to philosophy I think jargon can be a handicap since the objective of theology is to help the average believer, not a specialist

 

Edited March 22, 2017 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

3 hours ago, Ahab said:

I skipped the part we agree on, evidently.

On the "true chair" idea I am apparently more particular than you are about that. I do not call anything I can sit on a chair. A "true chair" has 4 legs and a back with a seat that is approximately 24 inches from the floor it stands on, for example. Some stools come close but in reality are not true chairs. And walls are still walls even though some walls can be sat on. So walls are not true chairs. Etc. And that is only a little bit that I know about true chairs.

I think that is more an issue of writing a good definition than anything.  I agree chairs are not stools or walls. You are picking out words to define other words and saying nothing about what is in the world as opposed to what is a human mental state, or whether or not that is an appropriate dichotomy.   It says nothing about "truth" and why your idea of a "true chair" is itself "true"

 

[Ahab]

5 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

I think that is more an issue of writing a good definition than anything.  I agree chairs are not stools or walls. You are picking out words to define other words and saying nothing about what is in the world as opposed to what is a human mental state, or whether or not that is an appropriate dichotomy.   It says nothing about "truth" and why your idea of a "true chair" is itself "true"

 

Definitions are important when trying to communicate ideas. The "truth" idea is about what is real in reality, as opposed to what is not real.  

Let's think of something that isn't true or real in reality "as it is" even though we could describe it or draw a picture of it, or better yet have a computer generate an image of it.  A flying pink elephant, for example, with really big ears that flap like the wings of a bird.  Dumbo, let's call it. 

Can you see how Dumbo isn't something that exists in reality "as it is" even though we can see it/him move around on a TV screen?

Or how about Star Wars?  Again not something that is true or real in reality.

Or anti-Mormon misrepresentations of truth? How about that as an example.

There is truth, and there are lies (or false presentations).  Things which are, and things that people think are true but really are not.

You may need to mind-meld with me before you can know what I mean. Words are open to false interpretations as well a conduit to see truth as it is wherever it is.

[clarkgoble]

14 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

I understand what you are saying because I have read enough Heidegger and Gadamer AND Peirce to understand and appreciate their jargon, but unfortunately to me, that is exactly what it is, and it just BEGS to be misunderstood and to mystify the simple issues I think Wittgenstein, for example, would see. I see it all as horribly imprecise and confusing and again, tantamount to being a new Scholasticism.

Well I think the scholastics were very careful and precise with their language. Admittedly Heidegger, especially the later Heidegger, invokes far more poetic and metaphoric language. There are reasons for that move. But my point was more just to raise that there are significant philosophical movements that don't adopt the view you outlined, not to argue they are correct.

However you can get the same ideas in the analytic tradition with the externalist tradition.

Quote

I have no idea what "some state of affairs" could be or how an object could "represent itself to be the object it shows itself to be over time"

Two separate issues there. State of affairs is the typical way of expressing how things are somewhat independent of language in the analytic tradition as I'm sure you're aware. Those who adopt a strong linguistic idealism can say that this is itself tied to language and not independent of it of course.

The second part is really little more than the question of what drives the sign process: the interpreter or the object. Typically in the western tradition the knower has been privileged over the objects known. However there are positions that make that more equitable or even put the emphasis on the object rather than the knower. It's really just alternative descriptions of the same phenomena.

Quote

I find it difficult to imagine that the rock is "showing itself to be a hammer", it is I who see its usefulness in the situatio

But the question is how you see that utility. It's not just coming out of you but also your environment.

[mfbukowski]

55 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Well I think the scholastics were very careful and precise with their language. Admittedly Heidegger, especially the later Heidegger, invokes far more poetic and metaphoric language. There are reasons for that move. But my point was more just to raise that there are significant philosophical movements that don't adopt the view you outlined, not to argue they are correct.

However you can get the same ideas in the analytic tradition with the externalist tradition.

Two separate issues there. State of affairs is the typical way of expressing how things are somewhat independent of language in the analytic tradition as I'm sure you're aware. Those who adopt a strong linguistic idealism can say that this is itself tied to language and not independent of it of course.

The second part is really little more than the question of what drives the sign process: the interpreter or the object. Typically in the western tradition the knower has been privileged over the objects known. However there are positions that make that more equitable or even put the emphasis on the object rather than the knower. It's really just alternative descriptions of the same phenomena.

But the question is how you see that utility. It's not just coming out of you but also your environment.

Yes I know something about externalism, it is pretty metaphysical imo.

Descriptions are linguistic. That is not debatable. There is no standard for truth available for determining internality or externality. I think if we stick to clarifying language that will be a great step forward.

 

[clarkgoble]

6 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Yes I know something about externalism, it is pretty metaphysical imo.

Descriptions are linguistic. That is not debatable. There is no standard for truth available for determining internality or externality. I think if we stick to clarifying language that will be a great step forward.

An other way to think of the issue is what types of descriptions are most useful. 

[Ahab]

26 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

An other way to think of the issue is what types of descriptions are most useful. 

Whatever works to convey the idea, I think. Different strokes for different folks is fairly obvious, which pretty much rules our the idea that there is only one best method to communicate ideas about truth or reality.

Even direct revelation from God doesn't work with everybody with most people needing at least some experience with Satan before they learn the difference between Satan and God.

[Ahab]

Hmm, language of Adam = the method Adam used to communicate with God which God also used to communicate with Adam = direct revelation from God to Adam and direct communication from Adam to God = an undefiled language = an undefiled method of communication, spirit to spirit (mind to mind) = through the power of God's priesthood = through the power of Jesus Christ = in the name of Jesus Christ.

By golly I think I'm onto something here.

[mfbukowski]

3 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

An other way to think of the issue is what types of descriptions are most useful. 

Oh yes I agree totally

But for Mormons, trying to explain philosophically how God organizes matter unorganized I think that the idea that human intelligence organizes our perceptions of what is "real" is clearly a more useful explanation than that matter unorganized some how "reveals itself" to us.

Not to mention in my opinion, the scientific evidence for the scientific "fact" that our brains organize the chaos of photons and environmental vibrations striking our bodies into what we linguistically call chairs and tables, mountains and lakes and all we speak of.

We may have the raw experience of wetness and being immersed - which of course are also linguistic descriptions - without saying it is a "lake" in which we are immersed.

Of course we cannot speak of raw experience without making it linguistic, but I think we know what color is before we call it "red".

Science tells us that light of a certain frequency strikes our eye and we call that "red".   There is no "red" in science, only various frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum.   It takes a human brain to turn those frequencies into colors we can speak about and argue if it is "red" or "burgundy" we are experiencing.   We do not see angstrom units, we see colors as a raw experience.   It is irrelevant if the "red" is internal or external- it is what we speak about as "red" as naming the experience.   We might dream about something "red" and describe that dream in the same terms as if the red car in the dream were "real" but the fact remains that the experience itself was of "redness"- when spoken of.

Wittgenstein actually has patches of color printed in Philosophical Investigations to distinguish the experience from the word.  I am too lazy to figure out how to do that here.

Again, it is the point Magritte makes here, as has been pointed out by Kevin C and others.

We are likely to say that this is a pipe, yet of course it is not.  In fact this is an image of a painting of a pipe.  The experience of red is not the word "red". And "real pipes" are always found in the environment and never with a background like this, floating in an oddly colored tan space in two dimensions.

Our minds are organizing these angstrom units into what we see as an image of a pipe, but science tells us what we are experiencing are photons hitting our retina.  Of course that itself is another description in language, isn't it?

In some small way we are organizing matter unorganized just by reading this page.

But of course we know this but for some reason it is always an issue in these discussions.

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, Ahab said:

Hmm, language of Adam = the method Adam used to communicate with God which God also used to communicate with Adam = direct revelation from God to Adam and direct communication from Adam to God = an undefiled language = an undefiled method of communication, spirit to spirit (mind to mind) = through the power of God's priesthood = through the power of Jesus Christ = in the name of Jesus Christ.

By golly I think I'm onto something here.

Yes, that is it EXACTLY, gold star for Ahab!

AND God's mind organizing reality through the priesthood as well if we want to get back to the OP!!

We do in a tiny teeny way what God does on a macro scale.  God/Adam gives us the cultural language necessary to envision Himself, and then gives us the directions to organize our culture according to the commandments through scripture

All of this is by the power of His intelligence and priesthood and his ability to organize matter unorganized- and then he passes those ethical and moral instructions to us through language until we can master spiritual understanding to get a "testimony" for ourselves- IE spiritual communication from Him directly.

First the milk- linguistic rules, then the meat- direct personal revelation!