Does secularism replace religion with other superstitions?

[Analytics]

Thinking more about this and how mfbukowski has responded, my point has nothing to do with what is true and what isn't.  Further, it isn't even about whether we should believe something or shouldn't believe something.

Rather, it's about whether or not a proposition is scientifically justifiable. Whether something is or isn't scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether or not it is ultimately true.  Rather, it means that there is sufficient evidence that is scientifically compelling to warrant belief.  The border between what is and isn't scientifically justifiable might be a bit gray, and what is and isn't scientifically justifiable are moving targets without 100% consensus.  Further, somebody might have perfectly valid reasons to deliberately choose to believe something that isn't scientifically justifiable.

However, if one concedes that some truth propositions have general scientific justification and that others don't, then the concepts of superstition and magical thinking are well-defined. 

[mfbukowski]

33 minutes ago, Analytics said:

Thinking more about this and how mfbukowski has responded, my point has nothing to do with what is true and what isn't.  Further, it isn't even about whether we should believe something or shouldn't believe something.

Rather, it's about whether or not a proposition is scientifically justifiable. Whether something is or isn't scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether or not it is ultimately true.  Rather, it means that there is sufficient evidence that is scientifically compelling to warrant belief.  The border between what is and isn't scientifically justifiable might be a bit gray, and what is and isn't scientifically justifiable are moving targets without 100% consensus.  Further, somebody might have perfectly valid reasons to deliberately choose to believe something that isn't scientifically justifiable.

However, if one concedes that some truth propositions have general scientific justification and that others don't, then the concepts of superstition and magical thinking are well-defined. 

Define truth.  You keep using the term without defining it.

"Some truth propositions have general scientific justification"?  What does that mean?

You:
 

Quote

 

"Thinking more about this and how mfbukowski has responded, my point has nothing to do with what is true and what isn't."....

" Whether something is or isn't scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether or not it is ultimately true"....

"However, if one concedes that some truth propositions have general scientific justification and that others don't, then the concepts of superstition and magical thinking are well-defined."

 

If this is NOT talking about truth, pray tell what is?

And what is "ultimate truth"?

Will you promise me to actually listen to this?  Just stop when the interviewer cuts in, ok?  There is nothing to be said about "truth"- it is undefinable.  Justification is the best we can do.  Truth is what works and feels good, that's about all.

 

 

 

[Analytics]

10 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Define truth.  You keep using the term without defining it.

The only way I've used the word "truth" is to emphasize that it is not what I'm talking about.  If you insist I provide a definition, here is a definition:

1- the true or actual state of a matter:

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/truth?s=t

If you'd like to use a different definition that's fine--regardless of what definition you use, it isn't what I'm talking about.

10 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

"Thinking more about this and how mfbukowski has responded, my point has nothing to do with what is true and what isn't."....

" Whether something is or isn't scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether or not it is ultimately true"....

"However, if one concedes that some truth propositions have general scientific justification and that others don't, then the concepts of superstition and magical thinking are well-defined."

If this is NOT talking about truth, pray tell what is?

And what is "ultimate truth"?

All I'm claiming is that something being scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether something is "true".  When I'm saying that, I'm not claiming some logical proof about the relationship between scientific justifiability and "truth". Rather, I'm merely pointing out that whether or not it is "true" is outside of the scope of my point.  Since it is outside the scope of my point, there is no need for me to define it. 

 

[Analytics]

28 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Will you promise me to actually listen to this?  Just stop when the interviewer cuts in, ok?  There is nothing to be said about "truth"- it is undefinable.  Justification is the best we can do.  Truth is what works and feels good, that's about all.

The video claims there is nothing to be said about truth.  Likewise, I'm not saying anything about truth.  What's the issue?

You keep asking me to define a word that you don't think is definable.  Why?  The word and concept have nothing to do with my point.

[The Nehor]

3 hours ago, Analytics said:

Do I have that right?  If so, I think I get the point, but it seems like an incredibly priggish thing to say that isn't all that interesting.

Best summary of philosophy in general I have ever read. 5 out of 5 stars, would read again.

[mfbukowski]

10 hours ago, Analytics said:

 

All I'm claiming is that something being scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether something is "true".  

 

 

10 hours ago, Analytics said:

 Likewise, I'm not saying anything about truth.  What's the issue?

What exactly WAS that post about then?

Listen to yourself!

[Mars]

analytics,

i got the impression that you gave a negative value judgment on religious thinking - likening it to magical thinking - by way of saying that those who engage in such thinking are prone to confirmation bias.  it suggested that those who use religious experience to confirm religious thinking are leading themselves on.  did i understand correctly?

as i understood the magical thinking definition per wikipedia, it was speaking in generalities that those who think reward or punishment follow action or inaction while on earth, and that thinking existing within the realm of religion or spiritual frameworks (don't look at porn, you'll fry in hell), is incorrect because the causal link is not supportable, provable, or reasonable.  did i understand correctly?

[Analytics]

8 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

 

What exactly WAS that post about then?

Listen to yourself!

On this thread I've been talking about superstition, cognitive bias, and magical thinking.

[Analytics]

14 minutes ago, Mars said:

analytics,

i got the impression that you gave a negative value judgment on religious thinking - likening it to magical thinking - by way of saying that those who engage in such thinking are prone to confirmation bias.  it suggested that those who use religious experience to confirm religious thinking are leading themselves on.  did i understand correctly?

as i understood the magical thinking definition per wikipedia, it was speaking in generalities that those who think reward or punishment follow action or inaction while on earth, and that thinking existing within the realm of religion or spiritual frameworks (don't look at porn, you'll fry in hell), is incorrect because the causal link is not supportable, provable, or reasonable.  did i understand correctly?

That isn't exactly where I'm coming from.  I'm not making a negative value judgment on magical thinking--I'm just trying to call it what it is.  For example, professional athletes often have superstitious rituals they perform before games.  I have no problem in general with them doing them--in fact they can probably be beneficial in terms of helping the athlete to  get into the right mental state.  But it is still superstitious.

I see many religious lifestyles in the same way.  Religion might help people live happier and better lives, and it might even be "true" (not that I know what "true" means).  But it could still be based on magical thinking.

[Mars]

4 minutes ago, Analytics said:

That isn't exactly where I'm coming from.  I'm not making a negative value judgment on magical thinking--I'm just trying to call it what it is.  For example, professional athletes often have superstitious rituals they perform before games.  I have no problem in general with them doing them--in fact they can probably be beneficial in terms of helping the athlete to  get into the right mental state.  But it is still superstitious.

I see many religious lifestyles in the same way.  Religion might help people live happier and better lives, and it might even be "true" (not that I know what "true" means).  But it could still be based on magical thinking.

I see - thank you for the clarification.

[Analytics]

13 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

 

What exactly WAS that post about then?

Listen to yourself!

I went back and reviewed this thread.  I was talking about superstition and magical thinking. 

The first time the word "true" was used in this thread is when you asked me how I knew my metaphysics were true.

I said I didn't know what the word "true" meant, and also said I didn't know why this was a desirable property of my metaphysics.

Since then you've continued to hound me for a definition of true, insisting that this is central to my point.  I've continued to deny that.

If I've been unclear I apologize, but it's time to seriously call into question your reading comprehension.  The only thing I can think of is you made some assumptions about my views, and were talking to what you assumed were my views rather than what I've actually said.

[mfbukowski]

 

7 hours ago, Analytics said:

I went back and reviewed this thread.  I was talking about superstition and magical thinking. 

The first time the word "true" was used in this thread is when you asked me how I knew my metaphysics were true.

I said I didn't know what the word "true" meant, and also said I didn't know why this was a desirable property of my metaphysics.

Since then you've continued to hound me for a definition of true, insisting that this is central to my point.  I've continued to deny that.

If I've been unclear I apologize, but it's time to seriously call into question your reading comprehension.  The only thing I can think of is you made some assumptions about my views, and were talking to what you assumed were my views rather than what I've actually said.

On 1/14/2016 at 11:56 AM, Analytics said:

.Rather, it's about whether or not a proposition is scientifically justifiable. Whether something is or isn't scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether or not it is ultimately true

Likewise.

I am still trying to figure out what you mean by "ultimately true".  I want to know what you think "ultimate truth" is.  Is that clear enough?

The only "truth" that can be defined is contextual truth.  The words "ultimately true" have no meaning to me.

Apparently you did not think your own metaphysical assertions were true.  These were the assertions:

On 1/13/2016 at 7:53 AM, Analytics said:

In general, people want to find metaphysical meaning in the world and are prone to cognitive bias.  If somebody endeavors to live a life governed by reason but doesn't completely eradicate superstitious thought, it isn't that they traded one superstition for another, it's that they failed to completely eradicate magical thinking and cognitive bias from their lives.

 

I asked you whether or not you thought this was "true".

Now you speak of "ultimate truth" as opposed to "justification"

Please explain the difference.  In fact CFR that there IS a difference. 

  YOU brought up "ultimate truth"- not me.  I just wanted to know if you really believed those assertions.   If you do not believe them, why did you post them?

 

 

Edited January 16, 2016 by mfbukowski
Added emphasis

[Analytics]

On January 16, 2016 at 10:17 PM, mfbukowski said:

 

Likewise.

I am still trying to figure out what you mean by "ultimately true".  I want to know what you think "ultimate truth" is.  Is that clear enough?

The only "truth" that can be defined is contextual truth.  The words "ultimately true" have no meaning to me.

Apparently you did not think your own metaphysical assertions were true.  These were the assertions:

I asked you whether or not you thought this was "true".

Now you speak of "ultimate truth" as opposed to "justification"

Please explain the difference.  In fact CFR that there IS a difference. 

  YOU brought up "ultimate truth"- not me.  I just wanted to know if you really believed those assertions.   If you do not believe them, why did you post them?

 

 

I didn't say anything about "ultimate truth" other than to reiterate for the 20th time that it is not what I was talking about.  But if you'd like a definition of "ultimate truth," here is one: the ultimate truth is that which is exactly like a pastrami sandwich.  Inserting the definition into what I said:

Thinking more about this and how mfbukowski has responded, my point has nothing to do with what is true and what isn't.  Further, it isn't even about whether we should believe something or shouldn't believe something.

Rather, it's about whether or not a proposition is scientifically justifiable. Whether something is or isn't scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether or not it is exactly like a pastrami sandwich.

You could insert just about any definition into this this and it still holds true.  That is because the only reason I used the phrase "ultimate truth" is to emphasize that it isn't what I'm talking about.  You don't need to know the definition of a word in order not to talk about it, do you?

Regarding your CFR, scientific justification is the body of science that shows a given model corresponds reasonably well to the real world. In contrast, a pastrami sandwich is a zesty meal you get at the deli.

Edited January 17, 2016 by Analytics

[volgadon]

3 hours ago, Analytics said:

 

I didn't say anything about "ultimate truth" other than to reiterate for the 20th time that it is not what I was talking about.  But if you'd like a definition of "ultimate truth," here is one: the ultimate truth is that which is exactly like a pastrami sandwich.  Inserting the definition into what I said:

Thinking more about this and how mfbukowski has responded, my point has nothing to do with what is true and what isn't.  Further, it isn't even about whether we should believe something or shouldn't believe something.

Rather, it's about whether or not a proposition is scientifically justifiable. Whether something is or isn't scientifically justifiable doesn't imply whether or not it is exactly like a pastrami sandwich.

You could insert just about any definition into this this and it still holds true.  That is because the only reason I used the phrase "ultimate truth" is to emphasize that it isn't what I'm talking about.  You don't need to know the definition of a word in order not to talk about it, do you?

Regarding your CFR, scientific justification is the body of science that shows a given model corresponds reasonably well to the real world. In contrast, a pastrami sandwich is a zesty meal you get at the deli.

Define zesty scientifically.

[thesometimesaint]

10 minutes ago, volgadon said:

Define zesty scientifically.

Do you want Green or Red Chili Sauce on your Burrito?

Edited January 17, 2016 by thesometimesaint

[Zakuska]

On 1/12/2016 at 9:32 AM, Gray said:

Just curious, what do you think are the new superstitions? I kind of consider many natural remedies in that realm. Maybe they're not technically superstitions, but they operate in the same headspace. 

Intrestingly... many of the natural remedies of yesteryear... have become the medicine of today.

[thesometimesaint]

12 minutes ago, Zakuska said:

Intrestingly... many of the natural remedies of yesteryear... have become the medicine of today.

True, but only after extensive testing.

[volgadon]

56 minutes ago, thesometimesaint said:

Do you want Green or Red Chili Sauce on your Burrito?

The correct answer is Christmas.

[mfbukowski]

13 hours ago, Analytics said:

Regarding your CFR, scientific justification is the body of science that shows a given model corresponds reasonably well to the real world.

Oh gosh, not again.  Yes you again re-assert the same thing you have been saying from the beginning.  Correspondence.

 

Quote

 

Vagueness or circularity

Either the defender of the correspondence theory of truth offers some accompanying theory of the world, or he or she does not.

If no theory of the world is offered, the argument is so vague as to be useless or even unintelligible: truth would then be supposed to be correspondence to some undefined, unknown or ineffable world. It is difficult to see how a candidate truth could be more certain than the world we are to judge its degree of correspondence against.

On the other hand, immediately the defender of the correspondence theory of truth offers a theory of the world, he or she is operating in some specific ontological or scientific theory, which stands in need of justification. But the only way to support the truth of this theory of the world that is allowed by the correspondence theory of truth is correspondence to the real world. Hence the argument is circular.^[8]

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correspondence_theory_of_truth

This is what I have been arguing.

This is what Rorty argues against.  You pretend it is about "justification" instead of "truth, but repeatedly what you are really arguing is the correspondence theory of truth.  You cannot specify any difference, though I have asked repeated.

Honestly you are obviously a bright guy, but it is evident that you do not understand the issues here

Quote

 

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to, or with, a fact—a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). This basic idea has been expressed in many ways, giving rise to an extended family of theories and, more often, theory sketches. Members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, conditions, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences.

The correspondence theory of truth is often associated with metaphysical realism. Its traditional competitors, pragmatist, as well as coherentist, verificationist, and other epistemic theories of truth, are often associated with idealism, anti-realism, or relativism. In recent years, these traditional competitors have been virtually replaced (at least from publication-space) by deflationary theories of truth and, to a lesser extent, by the identity theory (note that these new competitors are typically not associated with anti-realism). ....

The objection that may well have been the most effective in causing discontent with the correspondence theory is based on an epistemological concern. In a nutshell, the objection is that a correspondence theory of truth must inevitably lead into skepticism about the external world, because the required correspondence between our thoughts and reality is not ascertainable. Ever since Berkeley’s attack on the representational theory of the mind, objections of this sort have enjoyed considerable popularity. It is typically pointed out that we cannot step outside our own minds to compare our thoughts with mind-independent reality. Yet—so the objection continues—on the correspondence theory of truth, this is precisely what we would have to do to gain knowledge. We would have to access reality as it is in itself, independently of our cognition, and determine whether our thoughts correspond to it. Since this is impossible, since all our access to the world is mediated by our cognition, the correspondence theory makes knowledge impossible (cf. Kant 1800, intro vii). Assuming that the resulting skepticism is unacceptable, the correspondence theory has to be rejected, and some other account of truth, an epistemic (anti-realist) account of some sort, has to be put in its place (cf., e.g., Blanshard 1941.)

This type of objection brings up a host of issues in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and general metaphysics. All that can be done here is to hint at a few pertinent points (cf. Searle 1995, chap. 7; David 2004, 6.7). The objection makes use of the following line of reasoning: “If truth is correspondence, then, since knowledge requires truth, we have to know that our beliefs correspond to reality, if we are to know anything about reality”. There are two assumptions implicit in this line of reasoning, both of them debatable.

(i) It is assumed that S knows x, only if S knows that x is true—a requirement not underwritten by standard definitions of knowledge, which tell us that S knows x, only if x is true and S is justified in believing x. The assumption may rest on confusing requirements for knowing x with requirements for knowing that one knows x.

(ii) It is assumed that, if truth = F, then S knows that x is true, only if S knows that x has F. This is highly implausible. By the same standard it would follow that no one who does not know that water is H₂O can know that the Nile contains water—which would mean, of course, that until fairly recently nobody knew that the Nile contained water (and that, until fairly recently, nobody knew that there were stars in the sky, whales in the sea, or that the sun gives light). Moreover, even if one does know that water is H₂O, one’s strategy for finding out whether the liquid in one’s glass is water does not have to involve chemical analysis: one could simply taste it, or ask a reliable informant. Similarly, as far as knowing that x is true is concerned, the correspondence theory does not entail that we have to know that a belief corresponds to a fact in order to know that it is true, or that our method of finding out whether a belief is true has to involve a strategy of actually comparing a belief with a fact—although the theory does of course entail that one obtains knowledge only if one obtains a belief that corresponds to a fact.

More generally, one might question whether the objection still has much bite once the metaphors of “accessing” and “comparing” are spelled out with more attention to the psychological details of belief formation and to epistemological issues concerning the conditions under which beliefs are justified or warranted. For example, it is quite unclear how the metaphor of “comparing” applies to knowledge gained through perceptual belief-formation. A perceptual belief that p may be true, and by having acquired that belief, one may have come to know that p, without having “compared” (the content of) one’s belief with anything.

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#9.1

In short, this is what Rorty says in a minute or two in his video.  That is why I quote it as often as I do.  The whole idea that any description of a salami sandwich or a quark, or a vision of the Savior "corresponds to reality" is still a "description" of "reality"

It is totally irrelevant if you call it "truth" or "justification" or "xtmrapkins"- the word is meaningless and makes no sense when it supposedly describes a "reality" other than direct experience, and direct experience cannot be described in a way which will capture the full experience.

"Pastrami Sandwich" does not in anyway correspond to the rich experience of biting into that piece of heaven that is the "reality" of a pastrami sandwich.  James makes the exact same point with a sizzling onion topped steak compared to the word "steak" on a menu.  I compare it to describing the experience of "red".

If words "correspond" to reality, why can you not capture the experience of "red" and describe it fully to a blind man?

How do these squiggles on a page : "Pastrami Sandwich" express the flavor to someone who has never had a Pastrami sandwich?

More importantly how can they KNOW that it corresponds or doesn't correspond???  How does one get beyond our perceptions of "reality" to "reality itself"?

We have reached the end of this.  I would love to sit down with you and talk about it for as long as necessary, but that is not possible.  You can decide that I do not know how to read, but I assure you I do.

 

Quote

But if you'd like a definition of "ultimate truth," here is one: the ultimate truth is that which is exactly like a pastrami sandwich.

I know, you didn't actually say that.

Edited January 18, 2016 by mfbukowski

[Analytics]

10 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

This is what Rorty argues against.  You pretend it is about "justification" instead of "truth, but repeatedly what you are really arguing is the correspondence theory of truth.  You cannot specify any difference, though I have asked repeated.

Just to clarify this "pretending" allegation, do you think I'm lying about what I believe, or are you saying I don't really believe what I think I believe?  In either case, it's ironic that you are so adamant that the label "correspondence" corresponds perfectly with my thoughts.  I can only guess that the real reason you insist on believing this about me is that it's useful for you to do so.  Pragmatism in action!

[mfbukowski]

4 hours ago, Analytics said:

Just to clarify this "pretending" allegation, do you think I'm lying about what I believe, or are you saying I don't really believe what I think I believe?  In either case, it's ironic that you are so adamant that the label "correspondence" corresponds perfectly with my thoughts.  I can only guess that the real reason you insist on believing this about me is that it's useful for you to do so.  Pragmatism in action!

This is not personal at all.

No I just think what you post is not analytical, and that is not necessarily your fault.  You are imbued with the culture of Cartesian dualism like most other laymen in our culture, but you are quite vociferous about it to the point that you do not recognize it.  You believe in an external "reality" beyond what you can see and touch or experience.  All there is that we can know about is what we can experience, and that includes spiritual experience.

 I think the largest obstacle Mormons have to conquer is sectarian dualist thinking incorporated into Christianity 1800 years ago.

It is incoherent, and known to be incoherent for probably 250 years.

This thinking, yours included, is pervasive in this culture and leads to virtually every discussion on this board in one form or another.  Does the Book of Mormon and the Book of Abraham and Mormon doctrine and our understanding of God and everything we believe "correspond to reality"??

You are one of the poster-boys for much of what is wrong with this view- it leads to confused thinking and Mormonism needs to rise above this all and grasp those philosophical beliefs which will give us doctrinal vitality.

Kant, Hume, and others demolished these views in the 18th century .

It's about time that we forget about this drivel and get on with building the kingdom.  So I oppose it vigorously every time I see it and have time to oppose it.

I may be weird, but I consider it a duty.

 

Edited January 18, 2016 by mfbukowski

[Analytics]

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

This is not personal at all.

No I just think what you post is not analytical, and that is not necessarily your fault.  You are imbued with the culture of Cartesian dualism like most other laymen in our culture, but you are quite vociferous about it to the point that you do not recognize it.  You believe in an external "reality" beyond what you can see and touch or experience.  All there is that we can know about is what we can experience...

This is a substantial impasse.  You insist that I believe in an external "reality" beyond what can be seen, touched, or experienced.  In contrast, I happen to be quite sure that I am 100% agnostic about any proposed reality beyond what can be seen, touched, or experienced. 

I have to believe at this point you are just trolling me.  You are calling me a Cartesian dualist now?  Please.

[mfbukowski]

35 minutes ago, Analytics said:

This is a substantial impasse.  You insist that I believe in an external "reality" beyond what can be seen, touched, or experienced.  In contrast, I happen to be quite sure that I am 100% agnostic about any proposed reality beyond what can be seen, touched, or experienced. 

I have to believe at this point you are just trolling me.  You are calling me a Cartesian dualist now?  Please.

If you believe that statements "correspond" to reality, you are a dualist.  Statements = 1, Reality=2 . Two realms which "correspond" to eachother

Are you telling me now that they do not?  

I am saying that they do not.  That is the basis of all of this.  "There are no facts, only interpretations"

If you believed this you could not possibly agree with Dawkins.  I am convinced you still do not understand the problem.

Edited January 18, 2016 by mfbukowski

[Analytics]

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

If you believe that statements "correspond" to reality, you are a dualist.  Statements = 1, Reality=2 . Two realms which "correspond" to eachother

Are you telling me now that they do not?  

I am saying that they do not.  That is the basis of all of this.  "There are no facts, only interpretations"

If you believed this you could not possibly agree with Dawkins.  I am convinced you still do not understand the problem.

What if I said the following?

"The Newtonian laws of motion correspond reasonably well to how most of the planets are observed to travel around the sun."  Does that make me a subscriber to the correspondence theory of truth?

Or more generally, what if I said "this interpretation corresponds reasonably well with what is observed."  Does that make me a subscriber to the correspondence theory of truth?

Edited January 18, 2016 by Analytics

[mfbukowski]

6 hours ago, Analytics said:

What if I said the following?

"The Newtonian laws of motion correspond reasonably well to how most of the planets are observed to travel around the sun."  Does that make me a subscriber to the correspondence theory of truth?

Or more generally, what if I said "this interpretation corresponds reasonably well with what is observed."  Does that make me a subscriber to the correspondence theory of truth?

The key is to remember that all we have is experiences and then their verbal interpretation.

If "planet" in your vocabulary refers to an experience of observation and you think of it that way, you are not taking a correspondence view.  But no one who thinks that way will mention "external reality" or "ultimate truth" or "The way things really are".  We never do it, because we know we cannot speak of such "things".

All we can speak about is observations and interpretation of observations.  Newton found regularities in what is observable which are useful for predicting the apparent motion of certain observable phenomena we call "stars".  There are no "Laws of Motion", there are observable regularities which have been adjusted historically which now appear to be so predictable they never vary.  Yet of course some day they MIGHT vary.

Astronomy is a great example actually.  What you see is NEVER "reality" - the reality is unknowable.  Some of the observations may differ with "reality" by thousands of years.  In astronomy one can never speak of "the way things are" or "truth" because one never knows anything about what is "out there" at this moment.

So just think of that analogy for EVERYTHING.  No one can see "reality"- all we see is what our eyes and instruments which are extensions of our eyes and brains can process.

What "color" are cosmic rays?  They are part of the electromagnetic spectrum yet our eyes cannot detect them so we do not speak of their "color".  We cannot "know" their color.

Even asking what color they "really are" makes no sense.  Why not? because they "really" have no color because the human brain cannot interpret that data.

Do undiscovered species "exist"?  You might say "yes".  But what do you know about a species that has not yet been added to the list of phenomena not yet experienced by humanity?  It is ridiculous to say that something which is not known "exists".  

So the problem is thinking that way you are saying "represents" or "corresponds" to anything other than something we can experience. That's all we get, and there cannot be more.  If you think of "planets" as a name for a regularly observed phenomenon, you will probably be consistent in your speech about them

Pretend you are wearing colored glasses you can never take off.  You will never know the way things "really are" because you are restricted by your human body.  Imagine what it would like to have sonar like a bat or be able to see cosmic rays or smell like a bloodhound or even see atoms.

If you could see what we call "atoms" how would "external reality" be different??  Immersed in the atoms of the air? Seeing organic molecules changing when someone burns the toast?  What color would 02 molecules be?

I see the world as if I am wearing magic glasses that allow me to see what I see instead of all that other distracting chaos of "stuff" and only see what is important to me.  I find that insight very valuable.

So I broke my promise and replied.  I hope it helped