Vogel Responds To Apologist Brian Hales

[mfbukowski]

Hey mfb,

This confuses the experience of constraint with the cause of the experience of constraint. You seem to be saying I experience myself as constrained because I experience myself as constrained.

Nope. There's no "because". Constraint is a fact of life- it has nothing to do with some dualistic "thing" out there I cannot experience. It just IS my experience. This is the issue of free will vs determinism. The bottom line is that everyone agrees that we experience ourselves as "free"- ie: that choice is not illusory. I really can decide to log on or not to log on, or read a book or go to the store instead. The whole alleged "problem" of free will vs determinism is a confusion of my first- person experience of being free and the fact that from a third person point of view, some one else, like perhaps God, could in principle "know" what I am going to do, and therefore, I cannot do otherwise.

I would say that the entire "problem" is simply confusing what others observe or could in principle observe about us- in other words, confusing a third person perspective, with a first person perspective- ie: what we actually experience. We all experience choice subjectively, and we also know subjectively that we cannot fly or put our hands through walls unless they are hallucinations or mirages or optical illusions- smoke and mirrors etc. That is what defines our experience of a "wall"- in fact one might say the definiton of a "wall" is "something you can't put your hand through". That is what we MEAN by the word- "an inability to go through a thing experience". Even when we speak metaphorically of a "wall between nations" or people what we mean is some impenetrable barrier. That is what we experience as a "wall".

That is a tautology which has no practical value whatsoever. The fact is that we can observe a causal relationship between our experience of constraint and observed "things" when accurately perceived (i.e. what we call reality). Unlike your tautology, this observation is actually useful for enhancing our subjective experience.

OK now I have to call you a dirty name. You are a correspondence dualist, that's all! Take that! Again, you have "accurate perceptions" with no way of telling what an "inaccurate perception" is without an appeal to a dualistic measure. The experience of the perception of the wall predicts on its own- to use your prediction criteria- that I will not be able to put my hand through the wall. It requires no postulated "world" beyond my experience of the perception of the wall. If a magician would be able to appear to go through the wall- we would know it is a "trick" and that the perception was illusory- that the wall was not "real"- because what we expected to experience- that one cannot go through walls- was contradicted by the other experience- that he did in fact go through the wall. And the applauding audience confirms that neither was a hallucination- it is clear that they also saw the same thing, which they applaud as a "trick"

As for the quote from Searle, his point is very similar to the point I made in my post above. Namely, in a complex system the highest level of organization is essential to the system's operation, and it's certainly accurate to speak of this level as a causal agent from a certain point of view; but from another point of view the causal powers of this level can be considered illusive, since they're completely explained and determined by interactions happening at lower organizational levels.

Frankly, I am not totally comfortable with the direction he takes here either. I am really a "Humean" being (sorry) on this point on causality- I think it depends on where you decide to cut the pie and rather arbitrarily assign what you want to define as a "cause". We have no trouble in ordinary usage with calling things "causes" but when you get into the logic of it all, it becomes pretty arbitrary.

I think where Searle goes wrong is in his idiosyncratic uses of the concepts of "ontology" and "irreducibility" in trying to distinguish consciousness from the solidity of a wheel. Normally the term "ontology" refers to the study of the "objective" realm; to say consciousness has its own "subjective ontology" is simply to say that it has "phenomenology". That's what distinguishes consciousness from a wheel: consciousness has phenomenology, whereas a wheel does not. As for saying phenomenology is irreducible whereas solidity is not, this is just something we say to make ourselves feel good. Both the phenomenology of a brain and the solidity of a wheel are functionalities produced by interactions at lower levels of organization. (Phenomenology consists basically of self-reflexive logic and recognition processes occuring in the physical brain.) Both functionalities would cease to exist if the parts were separated from the system, but both systems are presumably fully capable of being broken down and explained in terms of their parts, if you had the time and technology to do so. (Nagel's protestations notwithstanding.)

I tend to agree- but again I like Nagel big time! But I am definitely uncomfortable with Searle's explanation of a "first person" ontology- not quite sure what that means yet, but his position is seen as so important I am trying to understand it better. Yet for Nagel, it becomes more of an issue of a point of view, or perspective, which I like much better. It is clear to me that starting with a proposition in either the third person or first person, you cannot logically ever reach a conclusion "crossing categories"- ie: if you start with a first person proposition, you cannot have a third person conclusion or vice versa.

That to me creates a great gulf just logically and linguistically- there is no need to postulate some kind of "ontology" there- but I could be wrong.

I'm not sure how this speaks to my point, which is that we need a set of operative concepts to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate perceptions, and your purely phenomenological account of knowledge apparently offers none.

You can only have "accuracy" where there is some measure of "inaccuracy" and in many subjective statements- not all- there is no way to know if they are accurate or inaccurate, and a third party is stuck with that fact that they cannot be known to be "correct" by further experiment or not. "I love you" as an example.

This statement is a bit afield of the statement it's responding to, so I'm not sure how to respond. But as an aside, I'm really a Buddhist at heart. On one influential interpretation, Siddhartha was a reductionist who felt the self is nothing more than a completely determined material aggregate whose sense of autonomy, integrity, and freedom is a complete illusion. Like me, he rejected the notion that phenomenology constitutes its own "ontology", and the moral implications he drew from this insight are very similar to the ones I draw from it. Though living as I do in a more comfortable age, I take a rather more optimistic view.

You might find this post interesting.

Indeed it was interesting- some really good observations. I have done some serious looking at both Buddhism and Taoism and one of the things which I liked about Mormonism was its affinities with Eastern thought.

But again, this is why I assert a non-contingent self- I think this is where Rorty and Eastern thought both miss the mark. The bottom line for me, is that we can believe that the "self" is contingent all we want until one actually faces death- and at that moment there is suddenly no doubt whatsoever that "I"- the thing which wants to live- exists!

It is not an issue of vocabularies or ideologies or the "illusion" of whether or not I exist- at that moment I think it takes someone who is obsessed with their ideology to the point of insanity - and then, I am sure with a horrendous internal fight- to just let go and cease existing. Maybe I am wrong.

But I think that it is clear that I experience a definite sense that "I" am not contingent- that I am not just another manifestation of the environment, or a group of atoms in the ocean of atoms. If there is an "ontology" of the self at all I think it would lie somewhere in that experience.

Edited September 28, 2011 by mfbukowski

[why me]

Precisely Dan!

This is a common theme in apologetic rhetoric. They demand absolute "proof" for said arguments, and if you cannot provide explicit proof from "first hand" accounts, then they think they are on solid ground for dismissing it as gossip, unfounded rumor or at the very least they can chalk it up to a biased interpretation from an "anti-Mormon."

When one calls the lds religiion false, it is good to have conclusive proof for doing so. And of course, critics lack conclusive proof. The heresay that critics pick and choose from has been around for quite some time. For afterall, even at the time of Joseph Smith the heresay was fanning the flames against the mormons. How to separate fact from heresay as fact? Not easy at times. But what do we have? We have eleven witnesses who give a first hand account of what happened to them. And these 11 people never denied what did happen to them. It would only have taken two or tthree of them to come forward and deny it and the lds church would have come tumbling down. But instead they go to their deathbeds with the truth on their lips. Now that is firsthand fact.

We also know that even when Emma disagreed with polygamy she never denied her experiences with the book of mormon. She had complete faith that her husband was a prophet and the book of mormon was what it claimed to be. How to explain all this and these are all first hand accounts?

[Chris Smith]

There's no "because".

This is a perfect example of the reductio ad absurdum inherent in a purely phenomenal account of reality.

The whole alleged "problem" of free will vs determinism is a confusion of my first- person experience of being free and the fact that from a third person point of view, some one else, like perhaps God, could in principle "know" what I am going to do, and therefore, I cannot do otherwise.

With this, I completely agree.

OK now I have to call you a dirty name. You are a correspondence dualist, that's all!

As I've said before, I'm basically a critical realist. I think an unqualified "correspondence theory" is naive, but I fully agree with the principle correspondence theorists are getting at, which is that for all practical purposes, we have to assume a least a functional dualism. There just is some kind of functionally representational relationship between perception and something that constrains our experience (i.e. reality). I'm only close to pragmatism in my first principles-- in that I recognize that we can only ever have functional knowledge of things; we know nothing about things in themselves.

Again, you have "accurate perceptions" with no way of telling what an "inaccurate perception" is without an appeal to a dualistic measure.

Exactly. There is no way to differentiate accurate from inaccurate perceptions without the use of at least a functional dualism. That's what I've been trying to say. That's why a purely phenomenal account of reality is pragmatically inadequate.

You can only have "accuracy" where there is some measure of "inaccuracy" and in many subjective statements- not all- there is no way to know if they are accurate or inaccurate, and a third party is stuck with that fact that they cannot be known to be "correct" by further experiment or not. "I love you" as an example.

As far as I'm concerned, the statement "I love you" would be true if it's functional-- that is, if its implications are predictively valid. This actually could be tested in various ways by a third party, especially if we have a clear idea of what the person means by the statement. For example, we could look for a rush of endorphins in the subject's brain whenever the object of his affections is near. We could look for increased heart rate and other biological indicators. We could have the subject marry his supposed beloved, and see if the relationship lasts and is happy. If we had a better understanding of brain science, we could even read the person's mind in order to determine his sincerity.

In other words, your profession of love for me purports to describe a real state of things with real implications for my experience. Thus, it can be just as really accurate or inaccurate as any other statement.

The bottom line for me, is that we can believe that the "self" is contingent all we want until one actually faces death- and at that moment there is suddenly no doubt whatsoever that "I"- the thing which wants to live- exists! ... At that moment I think it takes someone who is obsessed with their ideology to the point of insanity - and then, I am sure with a horrendous internal fight- to just let go and cease existing.

That's only because you haven't reached enlightenment yet. (And I'm only half-joking about that. I used to deeply dread my own mortality, but it's funny what you can reconcile yourself to with the help of a little philosophy.)

Peace,

-Chris

Edited September 29, 2011 by Chris Smith

[mfbukowski]

This is a perfect example of the reductio ad absurdum inherent in a purely phenomenal account of reality.

With this, I completely agree.

As I've said before, I'm basically a critical realist. I think an unqualified "correspondence theory" is naive, but I fully agree with the principle correspondence theorists are getting at, which is that for all practical purposes, we have to assume a least a functional dualism. There just is some kind of functionally representational relationship between perception and something that constrains our experience (i.e. reality). I'm only close to pragmatism in my first principles-- in that I recognize that we can only ever have functional knowledge of things; we know nothing about things in themselves.

Well I agree it would make communication with naive dualists easier, as seen on this thread even, but I just don't believe it. It kind of presents a "best of both worlds" scenario, but I think there is a deep inconsistency there. I am less than an expert on this pov- which I freely admit and maybe I am wrong, but it seems rather arbitrary how one decides which model to use between a functionalist view and a "real" view.

Exactly. There is no way to differentiate accurate from inaccurate perceptions without the use of at least a functional dualism. That's what I've been trying to say. That's why a purely phenomenal account of reality is pragmatically inadequate.

On that first sentence we are about one word apart.

I might say this:

Exactly. There is no way to differentiate accurate from inaccurate perceptions without the use of at least a functional dualism description.

A functional "description" is Pragmatic, a functional "dualism" is, as I see it, a Cartesian leftover which brings a whole new world into existence that there is no reason to postulate.

And I am not talking about a "phenomenal" account of reality, I am talking about a "pragmatic" account of reality- so if I change one other word in that next sentence, perhaps you will be able to see how off base it is.

That's why a purely phenomenal pragmatic account of reality is pragmatically inadequate

Obviously that makes it self-contradictory- so there is a huge difference between a "pragmatic" account and a "phenomenal" account. What is the difference? For me, "experience" is itself not a purely "phenomenal" approach; language itself has pragmatically evolved- it IS in itself a tool with meanings which are actually functional tools. So when one uses language one is not describing pure "phenomena" one is describing as Royce might say the "tools which the race has found indispensable".

Linguistically expressed experience IS itself a pragmatic tool, not a "representation" of anything- phenomena included. A "description" is an interpreted, brain-filtered functional linguistic expression.

That's only because you haven't reached enlightenment yet. (And I'm only half-joking about that. I used to deeply dread my own mortality, but it's funny what you can reconcile yourself to with the help of a little philosophy.)

An interesting article!

In reality I personally have no fear of death that I am aware of.

If I get hit by a bus tomorrow, I am ready. No big deal.

But I have had some rather odd life experiences in the last three or four years, having personally known and had reason to be somewhat close, in some cases VERY close ( my mother) to 16 or 17 people who have passed away, some in my presence, some visited soon before, others to comfort family members soon after, their deaths.

I have found that some who think they are ready to pass, aren't, while others who one would think are not even close to being ready, are. But I have not seen one who would not have lingered longer if they could have, had they not been in pain etc. I think the drive for self-preservation is about as "properly basic" as anything can be, regardless of if one has reached "enlightenment" or not, and I think that is itself a strong argument for a self which is properly basic and non-contingent.

Nobody goes out thinking they are just a bundle of "vocabularies".

Edited September 29, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

Chris:

Are you going to this?

Religion and Neuroscience

by Dr. Thandeka and Dr. George Northoff

Place: Haddon Conference Center

Time: Oct. 6, 7-9pm

Center for Process Studies

Oh- and I just edited that last post. For some reason, two words I meant to show as strike-throughs were not properly formatted.

Edited September 29, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Chris Smith]

it seems rather arbitrary how one decides which model to use between a functionalist view and a "real" view.

What's the difference? If something constrains and determines our experience, then it's real in the only sense that could ever possibly be relevant to us. What criterion of reality is even available to us besides functionality?

A functional "description" is Pragmatic, a functional "dualism" is, as I see it, a Cartesian leftover which brings a whole new world into existence that there is no reason to postulate.

There's that positivism again.

How are you going to give a functional description without employing some kind of functional dualism?

Linguistically expressed experience IS itself a pragmatic tool, not a "representation" of anything- phenomena included. A "description" is an interpreted, brain-filtered functional linguistic expression.

I've actually used the phrase "functional representation" only in relation to perception, not language. But it's not wholly inaccurate to apply it to language, as well. When I say a symbol-system is "functionally representative," I mean it's a useful pragmatic tool for interacting with something other than just the symbol-system itself. Which, I think, all human experience attests. Language helps us deal with phenomena, and phenomena help us deal with "reality". Each set of symbols renders usable something beyond itself.

Edited September 30, 2011 by Chris Smith

[Chris Smith]

I won't be going to the neuroscience conference, no. I'm living in Sacramento rather than Claremont while I study for my qualifying exams.

But I have had some rather odd life experiences in the last three or four years, having personally known and had reason to be somewhat close, in some cases VERY close ( my mother) to 16 or 17 people who have passed away, some in my presence, some visited soon before, others to comfort family members soon after, their deaths.

I'm sorry to hear that. Sounds like a rough ride.

I think the drive for self-preservation is about as "properly basic" as anything can be, regardless of if one has reached "enlightenment" or not, and I think that is itself a strong argument for a self which is properly basic and non-contingent.

Yes, the survival instinct is strong-- though not, it seems, equally strong for everyone. But I'm puzzled by your suggestion that this implies a non-contingent self.

Nobody goes out thinking they are just a bundle of "vocabularies".

Of course not. There are way more processes involved in the phenomenology of consciousness than just linguistic ones. <grin>

Edited September 30, 2011 by Chris Smith

[LifeOnaPlate]

The descriptor has to do with your desire to deride him personally and professionally.

Did you get on Dan's case for using the same tactic in the thread title and in referring to Hales as "Apologist Brian Hales"?

[BrianHales]

Hello again.

I'm sorry to be slow to respond. Dan emailed me inviting a response (to his response). I understand that he may be bothered because I classified him as an "accuser." I can see his point. On my website his quotes are not necessarily those of an "accuser," but more as a "reporter." Hence, I apologize to him on this account and have changed the titles on the website.

I don't think Todd Compton would mind me adding that he attended my Sunstone presentation and was equally and understandably bothered that he was listed in the "accuser" category along with Dan. I apologized to him for that as well. It is indeed unfortunate that my language alone would create a problem, when the historical data is really what we need to be discussing.

On the other hand, Dan Vogel labels me an “apologist” apparently without concern. It is loaded language, but I don’t mind being an apologist because I am a believer that Joseph Smith was a virtuous man and a true prophet of the living God.

I expect that in another setting, Dan would own the title of “accuser.” He asserts that Joseph Smith was a “well intentioned ‘pious deceiver’… someone who prevaricated for 'good' reasons… an individual who deceives in God’s name while holding sincere religious beliefs.” (Joseph Smith: The Making of a Prophet, Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2004, viii). Dan also labels Joseph as a “sincere fraud,” “pious fraud,” and “religious pretender” (viii, xvii, xix). This seems to be accusatory language.

I wish I had more time to involve myself with blogging discussion boards. I’m afraid my books, which will not be out until late next year, will have to be my next contribution to the ongoing discussions.

Thanks to all,

Brian Hales

[mfbukowski]

What's the difference? If something constrains and determines our experience, then it's real in the only sense that could ever possibly be relevant to us. What criterion of reality is even available to us besides functionality?

There's that positivism again.

How are you going to give a functional description without employing some kind of functional dualism?

I've actually used the phrase "functional representation" only in relation to perception, not language. But it's not wholly inaccurate to apply it to language, as well. When I say a symbol-system is "functionally representative," I mean it's a useful pragmatic tool for interacting with something other than just the system itself. Which, I think, all human experience attests. Language helps us deal with phenomena, and phenomena help us deal with "reality". Each set of symbols renders usable something beyond itself.

Glad to see Bro Hales is here, so back to the OP, and as I said, I won't carry on about this topic we have been discussing. If you want to carry on, Chris, of course we can do it on another thread or privately.

But this is highly relevant to our discussion- it is a video I saw a few years ago and which this discussion has reminded me about- I highly recommend it if you have not seen it before

[Chris Smith]

Glad to see Bro Hales is here, so back to the OP, and as I said, I won't carry on about this topic we have been discussing. If you want to carry on, Chris, of course we can do it on another thread or privately.

OK, that's fine. I really need to get back to work, anyway! I can feel the deadlines closing in around me.

http://www.ted.com/t...of_insight.html

Interesting, for sure. She's a great speaker. I have no objection to that kind of religion.

Edited September 30, 2011 by Chris Smith

[Cobalt-70]

Power comes partly from being right. If I make predictions that turn out to sustained by observational data, that grants me considerable power, especially in an academic establishment that makes predictive validity its power-principle.

And, on a larger scale, the nation that makes science and technology a major policy objective could easily wipe out a nation whose religious fundamentalism dictates a rejection of science.

However, just because you are scientifically right, does not necessarily mean that you are religiously right. Otherwise, there would be no creationists (who are always wrong from a scientific perspective), and no school boards in Texas trying to write pseudoscience into the curriculum. Scientists hold power within the scientific community and among the rational, but hold very little power among creationists. Power is transmitted differently between these two communities: In the scientific community, power is acquired through publication and peer review. In the religious community, power is transmitted through charisma, tradition, and sometimes law. Merely being scientifically right on a consistent basis does not create power within the the religious community.

I agree that religious power doesn't help you build tanks and fighter planes. But those with religious power are able to benefit from the the results of scientific discoveries and inventions even though they dispute the fundamentals of science. They could not produce science using their religious power, but they can use their religious power to acquire money so that they will be in a position to consume science.

Edited September 30, 2011 by Cobalt-70

[KevinG]

Consecration, charity, service, sobriety, focus, shared language and values, inspiration, healing, mercy, forgiveness...

These are just a few examples of the power religious communities have at their call. These are not mutually exclusive from scientific endeavor.

Just ask Philo Farnsworth.

[Chris Smith]

Scientists hold power within the scientific community and among the rational, but hold very little power among creationists.

The gains scientists have made among religious people over the last hundred years or so have been pretty incredible, when you consider how different the two communities' power-norms are.

I agree that religious power doesn't help you build tanks and fighter planes. But those with religious power are able to benefit from the the results of scientific discoveries and inventions even though they dispute the fundamentals of science. They could not produce science using their religious power, but they can use their religious power to acquire money so that they will be in a position to consume science.

You also have to take social capital into account. The scientists have tremendous power within our legal system, whereas the fundamentalists are tremendously constrained and face judicial sanction and public outcry if they interfere too overtly. We reward the scientists with social capital because they give us useful stuff, and we take it away from the fundamentalists because their political interference is generally counterproductive.

Don't get me wrong; I'm not saying those who are right always win. But I am saying that being right tilts the scales a bit more in your favor, especially if there are norms and institutions in place that reward rightness.

Peace,

-Chris

[Cobalt-70]

This is kind of like saying "I'm not an atheist- I just don't believe in God". If language is the only way we can "represent" (your word not mine) objective reality and the only way we can "acquire" knowledge is through language, please explain how that "objective reality" gets put into language- and what possible relevance it could have that it magically "exists" outside language.

It sounds as if you are speaking of some magic realm we cannot see or talk about- I have given up bothering with trying to find that "missing link" to what we cannot see or speak about.

I think you are indeed a "closet" constructivist!

I'm not. The problem I have with constructivism is that it postulates that knowledge is constructed subjectively, and not discovered from an external reality. But if that were the case, there would be no knowledge without the existence of the human mind. I think that's incorrect. Knowledge can be constructed subjectively by humans, but knowledge can also be constructed by computers, or by other natural processes that create readable information. In fact, I don't think we should be using the baggage-laden term "knowledge" at all, because it implies from the beginning that it exists solely in the human mind, whereas far more often than not, it exists elsewhere--in writing, in the stars of the night sky, in the position of the meniscus in a mercury thermometer relative to markings on the side of the tube, in the reflections of Joseph Smith's seer stone, in computer databases, in the brains of animals, etc. A better word than knowledge would be text, or even better, markings.

So I disagree with constructivism because it privileges the human mind above other reality. You could just as easily say that the mind does not exist at all, and that all the processes that occur in the human brain, which constructivists say create knowledge, are just markings. Our brain is marked by patterns in our neurons and synapses--markings that are essentially the same as other forms of markings like writing (text), or like electrical patterns in a computer.

That said, I don't agree with positivism, either, for almost the same reasons. If we envision knowledge as markings, rather than logos, then there is no rational, logical mind which can create an ultimate model of reality based on sensory experience.

[Dan Vogel]

Brian,

I see you changed “Accuser” to “Reporter” in the title of your webpage: “Dan Vogel as an [sic] Reporter of Sexual Impropriety.” While it’s an improvement, it’s far from satisfactory. It in no way addresses your misrepresentations of my position, which you still haven’t addressed or defended.

It is indeed unfortunate that my language alone would create a problem, when the historical data is really what we need to be discussing.

So, why don’t you? Why don’t you defend your accusations of me? Why did you focus only on language?

On the other hand, Dan Vogel labels me an “apologist” apparently without concern. It is loaded language, but I don’t mind being an apologist because I am a believer that Joseph Smith was a virtuous man and a true prophet of the living God.

There’s nothing wrong with being an apologist. The question is: are you more than that? Where is the balanced view in your handling of my comments?

I expect that in another setting, Dan would own the title of “accuser.” He asserts that Joseph Smith was a “well intentioned ‘pious deceiver’… someone who prevaricated for 'good' reasons… an individual who deceives in God’s name while holding sincere religious beliefs.” (Joseph Smith: The Making of a Prophet, Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2004, viii). Dan also labels Joseph as a “sincere fraud,” “pious fraud,” and “religious pretender” (viii, xvii, xix). This seems to be accusatory language.

You see it as accusatory, but some extreme anti-Mormons see it as apologetic because I use the terms “sincere”, “pious”, and “religious” in association with JS’s name. These terms are unavoidable when articulating my thesis. Only an apologist would label a historian an “accuser” of JS. Another historian wouldn’t make it so personal. Feel free to call me a critic if you like.

In an email, Brian said this:

If you are willing, I would enjoy continuing an exchange privately via email on the topic of Joseph Smith's reported sexual polyandry. You seemed quite confident that the historical data supports the position that he indeed practiced it.

Maybe a starting point would be to look at the supportive evidences. I've tried to accumulate every known evidence and post it on my website.

http://www.josephsmi...artExcerpt.html

Would you have any interest in sharing the number one best evidence that Joseph Smith practiced sexual polyandry?

I will give my response to this publicly. In my view, he's trying to take advantage of an area where we can't reasonably expect to have evidence. We're lucky to have what we do have. I read D&C 132 as JS's repenting of his polyandrous marriages. Nevertheless, he’s attempting to construct an argument from silence precisely because it’s based on an unreasonable demand of the historical record. If he believes these polyandrous marriages were special and different than what is assumed normally under such circumstances, the burden is his to establish his thesis. And it’s not the default position when he finds the evidence weak or ambiguous. Brian invented the phrase “polyandrous sexuality” rather than “polyandrous marriage” as if there’s a legitimate distinction.

Edited September 30, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[mfbukowski]

Interesting, for sure. She's a great speaker. I have no objection to that kind of religion.

Me neither. That's the kind I have, at least in my head. It happens to be co-extensive with a few other beliefs about man and God too, but that's pretty close!

[mfbukowski]

I'm not. The problem I have with constructivism is that it postulates that knowledge is constructed subjectively, and not discovered from an external reality. But if that were the case, there would be no knowledge without the existence of the human mind.

To me, that's like saying if there were no humans, there still would be cups of coffee, but they would be in the fruit of the coffee bush. There sure would not be a word for "knowledge" or the concept of knowledge as we know it, or anything else we can speak about using human language.

I want to vacate this thread, because I said I would way back, if Bro Hales appeared, and he has, and it appears the discussion about the OP is going forward. Maybe in another place or time we can continue this, but frankly I have been through it a lot of times and am kind of tired of repeating all this stuff.

[Cobalt-70]

Text is the only way? Illiterate people don’t acquire knowledge?

...

I realize authorial intentionality is a problem, but that doesn’t mean that all interpretations are equally valid. Believing the four headed beast in Ezekiel and Revelations is a description of a spaceship isn’t a valid reading of those books. There are other ways at arriving at a more probable reading that is consistent with the cultural background of the text. That’s why it’s important to see how the BOM and JS’s revelations participated in the discourse of the time.

...

I’m not sure how you decide who the winner is? But it should be decided by who has the best arguments and evidence according to the standards and values of the scholarly community. Hence, when I want to understand the Bible’s text a Mormon or Evangelical interpreter doesn’t come to mind.

On the first point, I refer to "text" in a very loose way. Text is any form of marking, and marking does not necessarily require the intervention of the human mind. Other natural processes (I say "other" because I think that what most people call the "human mind" is a natural process) can mark as well. To speak is to mark a column of air with a pattern of pressure waves, and even the illiterate can "read' these markings, unless they are also deaf.

On the second and third points, I never said, and I don't agree with the idea, that all interpretations are equally valid. Like I said before, I think relativism is misguided. Some interpretations are more valid than others. However, their validity is determined by power. (And, I should just make clear, I don't necessarily mean the power of human beings. A rolling boulder has more power than a king if you are in its path.)

[ldsfaqs]

The problem is not "hearsay" evidence, it's how GOOD and accurate it is COMPARED to other known evidences and testimony.

I find the evidences and testimony that Joseph DID NOT have "sex" with any of his "sealed" wives (at least known) to be much more so where the good evidence actually resides.

Mormons are discerning..... Anti-mormons like Vogel are not, by considering any factoid as valid while ignoring other factoids that have much more validity. Joseph said the Church wasn't practicing Polygamy (they weren't, only the sealing ordinance), and Emma swore to her death bed that he never practiced polygamy (as well as lots of other evidences and testimony's).

Edited October 3, 2011 by ldsfaqs

[mfbukowski]

Text is any form of marking, and marking does not necessarily require the intervention of the human mind.

No, I won't say it

No, I won't say it

No, I won't say it........