Vogel Responds To Apologist Brian Hales

[Dan Vogel]

The other day I was perusing Brian Hales’s website. He has authored several books on Mormon polygamy—Setting the Record Straight: Mormon Fundamentalism, Modern Polygamy and Mormon Fundamentalism: The Generations After the Manifesto, and a forthcoming two-volume Joseph Smith’s Polygamy: History and Theology. His website includes a page titled

“Dan Vogel as an Accuser” http://www.josephsm.../DanVogel.html

On this page, he briefly criticizes my use of some early sources. Ironically, it is accusatory of me and implies that I have intentionally misused these sources. So I decided to respond to him here (and on another board) and invite him via email to comment if he wishes. I’ll quote each paragraph of his critique along with his footnote and then respond.

While no writer or researcher claims perfect accuracy in his or her published works, It appears that Daniel Vogel goes beyond available evidence resulting in assertions that consistently seem to portray Joseph Smith in a negative light.

The accusation of going “beyond available evidence” is one of Hales’ favorite apologetic strategies. For example, he thinks historians go beyond the evidence when they use secondhand or hearsay testimony or make reasonable inferences from the evidence. He believes that he is not obligated to deal with evidence unless it’s both firsthand and explicit. This has lead Hales to adopt the extreme apologetic position that JS didn’t have sex with any of the twelve married women he polyandrously married because he personally thinks JS wouldn’t have done that, and he defends his position by accusing those who believe otherwise of “going beyond available evidence”. However, because there was no stated restriction on such marriages, shouldn’t Hales see his own theory as going beyond the evidence? He thinks he is simply demanding that his opponents produce explicit evidence of JS having sexual relations with married women, but he is doing more than that. He is asserting a position as well, based on an inference--which is that these marriages were for eternity only. The problem is which inference is more reasonable? And which is based on unfounded assumptions about what a prophet can and cannot do? Actually, no one was saying anything about JS having sex with his wives—it was an unspoken assumption—until Hales felt the need to defend JS by making an imaginary distinction in JS’s behavior towards the married and unmarried women he married.

Vogel misquotes a statement allegedly from Martin Harris, stating that Levi Lewis accused Joseph Smith of trying to seduce Eliza Winters, rather than correctly citing the statement as Lewis purportedly quoting Martin Harris.[1] This error transforms a dubious account into a firsthand allegation.

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[1] Dan Vogel, Early Mormon Documents, Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002, 4:296 and Joseph Smith: The Making of a Prophet, Salt Lake City: Signature Book, 2004, 178; see also Richard S. Van Wagoner, Mormon Polygamy: A History. Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1989, 4; George D. Smith, Nauvoo Polygamy: “… but we called it celestial marriage”, Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2008, 29; Grant H. Palmer, “Sexual allegations against Joseph Smith, 1829-1835,” undated [after 1999], unpublished manuscript, Michael Marquardt Collection, Marriot Library Special Collections, University of Utah, photocopy in possession of the author, page one.

Levi Lewis’s statement appears in Early Mormon Documents, but the comment that Hales refers to is from my biography. The other sources are irrelevant to his examination of my work. Here is the statement in my biography to which Hales alludes:

Perhaps the testimony of Levi Lewis, son of Nathaniel Lewis, provides a clue as to Joseph Jr.’s early beliefs on marriage. Lewis, whose wife Sophia was present when Emma lost her infant, remembered hearing both Joseph and Martin Harris say that “adultery was no crime.” While this may be exaggerated, Lewis more specifically accused Joseph of attempting to “seduce” Eliza Winters, a close friend of Emma, and claimed that on at least one occasion Martin Harris defended Joseph’s behavior toward the seventeen year old by saying “he did not blame Smith for his (Smith’s) attempt to seduce Eliza Winters &c.”9

Obviously if Lewis is reporting Harris’s defense, Lewis was among those who knew of the allegations against JS. The fact that he was reporting Harris’s defense means that he was making such an allegation himself, and that Harris didn’t deny it. The bolded words show that contrary to Hales’s assertion I did attribute the words to Harris, as reported by Lewis. There was no attempt by me to portray the Lewis source as a firsthand account. That doesn’t mean Lewis’s statement isn’t historically useful. It was published and Harris (or Joseph Smith for that matter) had plenty of opportunity to deny it.

In addition concerning Eliza Winters, Vogel asserts that in an interview decades later she did not "confirm or deny" the Levi Lewis allegation, when in fact, available evidence does not disclose whether the incident was even discussed.[2] Here Vogel goes beyond the evidence in his assertion.

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[2] Dan Vogel, Early Mormon Documents, Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002, 4:346.

The footnote to the previous excerpt from my book reads:

9. Levi Lewis, statement, in “Mormonism,” Susquehanna Register and Northern Pennsylvanian 9 (1 May 1834): 1 (EMD 4:296 97). Elizabeth neither confirmed nor denied Lewis’s accusation when interviewed in 1880. See [Frederick G. Mather], “The Early Mormons. Joe Smith Operates at Susquehanna,” Binghamton Republican, 29 July 1880 (EMD 4:346 60). She married Elisha Squires (d. 1871) in 1837 and was still living with her only son, Stanley, in Oakland in 1887 (Rhamanthus M. Stocker, Centennial History of Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania [Philadelphia: R. T. Peck and Co., 1887], 557; see also EMD 4:346).

Whether or not Lewis’s report was discussed, Winters didn’t take the opportunity to deny what Lewis so famously reported in 1833, just as Harris and JS didn’t. Since writing this it was discovered that Harris accused Winters of having a “******* child” in a public meeting in Nov. 1832, and she was unsuccessful in suing Harris (see BYU Studies 45/4 [2006]: 113-16). This might explain her reluctance in broaching the subject.

Regarding another accusation, Vogel writes: “His [Joseph Smith’s] July 1830 trial in South Bainbridge included testimony accusing him of improper conduct with two of Josiah Stowell’s daughters, Miriam and Rhoda.”[3] In fact, no trial records are extant and I have been unable to identify any “testimony accusing him of improper conduct” matching Vogel’s description. This error carries the potential of turning non-evidence into evidence.

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[3] Dan Vogel, ed., Early Mormon Documents, Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1996, 4:206 fn 9; Vogel seems certain regarding the daughters identities and it appears that he is probably correct, but no records naming them as participants have been found. See Jessee, Dean C., ed. The Papers of Joseph Smith: Volume 1, Autobiographical and Historical Writings. Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1989, 254, n. 2.

The problem here is that I did not claim a trial record existed, or that the information came from a trial record. This is what I said:

Of possible relevance to Joseph Smith’s early concept of complex marriage is a report from Harmony, Pennsylvania, that he and his scribe Martin Harris said “adultery was no crime” and that as early as 1828 he was already pursuing extramarital affairs (V.A.4, LEVI LEWIS STATEMENT, 1834). In June 1829 Smith’s dictation would include discussion of adultery versus God-inspired plural marriage (Jacob 2:30). His July 1830 trial in South Bainbridge included testimony accusing him of improper conduct with two of Josiah Stowell’s daughters, Miriam and Rhoda (see I.A.15, JOSEPH SMITH HISTORY, 1839, 45). In 1844, while publicly denying apostate accusations of secret polygamy, he admitted that similar charges on his character had been made as early as 1827. "I had not been married scarcely five minutes, and made one proclamation of the Gospel," Smith recalled, "before it was reported that I had seven wives" (Smith 1948, 6:410).

Note that I referenced JS’s 1838-39 History, where it says:

After a few more such attempts, the court was detained for a time, in order that two young women (daughters to Mr Stoal<wel>150 with whom I had at times kept Company; might be sent for, in order, if possible to elicit something from them which might be made a pretext against me. The young Ladies arrived and were severally examined, touching my character, and conduct in general but particularly as to my behaviour towards them both in publick and private, when they both bore such testimony in my favor, as left my enemies without a pretext on their account.

You don’t have to be a genius to figure out the nature of the prosecution’s questioning. Although not explicitly stated, there is no attempt to disguise or hide what is obviously being implied.

Note also that this interpretation is supported by JS’s own public confession in 1844: "I had not been married scarcely five minutes, and made one proclamation of the Gospel," Smith recalled, "before it was reported that I had seven wives" (Smith 1948, 6:410). This quote from History of the Church 6:410 was among the items discussed by Hales and me in a series of emails in 2009.

On February 1, 2009, Hales wrote to ask why “in Joseph Smith: The Making of a Prophet (pages 513-14), you mention the charges of being a ‘disorderly person’ etc. but don’t mention any actually [actual] testimony accusing JS of improper conduct with the two girls.”

Evidently Hales was reading my footnote in EMD as a claim that the trial record included the charge of JS’s improper conduct with Stowell’s daughters, despite my reference to JS’s 1838-39 History.

On February 10, 2009, I responded:

I don't have any source besides JS's History. I think the idea of calling two females to testify of JS's behavior “both in public and private” in the hope of impugning JS's character implies very strongly there was a sexual element to the accusations. Although he wasn't explicit, I don't think JS was hiding that aspect of the story, especially since he was exonerated. His 1844 confession that he was accused of polygamy shortly after his marriage in South Bainbridge shows that such accusations were being made since 1827 in the town where Stowell lived. I think that is the simplest reading of these texts, and any other interpretation is going to sound strained or lawyerly.

Despite this explanation, Hales responded on February 12, 2009: “The footnote seems to indicate that manuscript documentation for ‘testimony accusing him of improper conduct’ during the trial actually exists, so I wanted to be sure and have a look at it.”

On February 24, 2009, I replied: “I didn't intend to imply some other source besides JS's account. If I had one, I would have cited it for sure.”

On March 1, 2009, Hales wrote:

I appreciate the clarification on your footnote. For me, it seems that the wording indicates that testimony actually exists, rather than it is just assumed to exist.

This is obviously an unlikely reading of my footnote, but to insist on his reading even after his error was pointed out is stubborn and dishonest. Hales continued: “I’m sure you agree that antagonists and protagonists must guard against going beyond the evidence in our claims. I expect my upcoming books will be scrutinized for such things.” Oddly, Hales is oblivious to the fact that his interpretation of my statement goes beyond what I actually said, and that it rests on personal reading. Regardless, with this inane defense he manages to avoid discussion of what JS’s History states.

But our discussion didn’t end here. Hales moved from this to another inane and unlikely interpretation of JS’s 1844 statement.

On March 5, 2009, Hales wrote:

I had a question. You wrote that “His [Joseph Smith’s] 1844 confession that he was accused of polygamy shortly after his marriage in South Bainbridge shows that such accusations were being made since 1827.” Joseph Smith’s actual quotation indicates the accusation of polygamy came after he started proclaiming the gospel: “I had not been married scarcely five minutes, and made one proclamation of the Gospel, before it was reported that I had seven wives.” It is hard to know what Joseph Smith meant by “proclamation of the Gospel.” But this doesn’t appear to be a confession that he was accused of polygamy five minutes after he was married. Rather, five minutes after he first proclaimed the gospel he was accused. Without knowing what he meant, the exact chronology is unclear and claiming JS confessed to polygamy accusations in 1827 seems to go beyond the evidence. I hope you won’t excuse this as simply “apologetic rhetoric” because it seems to be a valid observation.

On March 11, 2009, I responded:

Of course, any text deconstructs when one demands more precision from it than circumstances of its creation can warrant. I think JS’s 1844 statement is intentionally hyperbolic and exaggerated. But it quite clearly refers to the New York period. Even your reading of five minutes after proclaiming the gospel alludes to his 1830 trials since he said it was for that reason that he was tried—“I was visited by a constable, and arrested by him on a warrant, on the charge of being a disorderly person, of setting the country in an uproar by preaching the Book of Mormon, etc.” (DHC 1:88). This [reading] ties in with JS’s 1844 statement. Contrary to your reading, it can be read as follows:

“I had not been married scarcely five minutes [before it was reported that I had seven wives], and made one proclamation of the Gospel, before it was [again] reported that I had seven wives.”

The two events were separated by three years, but the Stowell sisters were at both events. It won’t due to simply argue that JS’s 1844 statement isn’t precise, and therefore it is unusable. That’s quibbling.

It can be seen from the foregoing that Hale’s attempt to escape the implications of JS’s 1844 statement IS simple “apologetic rhetoric” and polemic and that my use of it is based on reasonable historical inference.

Problems such as these demonstrate that interpretive accounts, whether antagonistic and apologetic, must be referenced to the actual historical documents in order to avoid misunderstanding.

The only thing Hales succeeded in demonstrating is that readers of his critiques need not trust his judgment, because they are liable to be incomplete, misrepresentative, and violate the rule of charity, which states that in debate you must respond to your opponents argument in its strongest form. Blake Ostler praised the authors of The New Mormon Challenge for observing this rule:

In all of my a dealings with these good men, I have been impressed by their charity and kindness. My assessment is that they are genuinely good people and I like them. In addition, the authors are in fact among the finest Evangelical scholars. It is refreshing to deal with Evanglicals who engage the presumption of the rule of charity. That is, rather than attack a caricature of Mormonism, these authors have made an informed and good-faith attempt to present our arguments and beliefs in their strongest form. They present their best take on Mormonism and then honestly assess problems that arise given these beliefs. Thus, their arguments are worthy of both respect and considered response.

http://www.fairlds.o...rmon_Challenge/

It comes down to a simple rule—“critique others as you would have them critique you.”

Edited September 22, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[wenglund]

Hi Daniel,

If I recall correctly, Brian comes to the publication table with a heavy legal background, which likely disposed him to operating according to much stricter rules of evidence than you may be accustomed to as a hobbyist historian. To him, hearsay and inferences may very well go "beyond the evidence."

And, from what I have read of you over the years, I am not sure it is inaccurate for Brian to suggest that your personal interpretation of the evidence tends to be negative towards Joseph and the spiritual things he helped bring forth---not that you aren't entitled to your opinion.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Dan Vogel]

Wade,

If I recall correctly, Brian comes to the publication table with a heavy legal background, which likely disposed him to operating according to much stricter rules of evidence than you may be accustomed to as a hobbyist historian. To him, hearsay and inferences may very well go "beyond the evidence."

Actually, Brian is a biologist and works as an anesthesiologist, which might explain why his knowledge of historical methodology (like yours) is so weak. Historians unlike courts of law do not automatically throw out hearsay evidence (although there are exceptions in law). However, this is not how Hales was using the criticism of going beyond the evidence. He was implying that I was misquoting or manufacturing the evidence—which is quite different.

And, from what I have read of you over the years, I am not sure it is inaccurate for Brian to suggest that your personal interpretation of the evidence tends to be negative towards Joseph and the spiritual things he helped bring forth---not that you aren't entitled to your opinion.

I’m inclined to believe that your bias is operating in your comments here. As non-believer assessments of JS go, my position is the most charitable—to the point that I’m accused of being a JS “apologist” by a certain faction of the critics.

Edited September 22, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[Chris Smith]

A nice defense, Dan. It sounds as if Hales, like many other Mormon scholars, has been influenced by Richard Anderson's fallacious methodology of dismissing all second-hand evidence as "hearsay" evidence that doesn't have to be addressed. This of course confuses the rules of the courtroom with the rules of historical scholarship. Given that apologists view non-member historians as "accusers," I suppose it's not surprising that they'd borrow the language of courtroom defense. But that's just not how historians operate. To quote David Hackett Fischer's book Historian's Fallacies, "Hearsay evidence is not categorically invalid in historical research, nor is it always inadmissable in a court of law, popular belief notwithstanding" (Fischer, p. 54). Gilbert Garraghan goes so far as to say that most evidence comes from "indirect" witnesses, and Louis Gottschalk says a second-hand source can be treated as an "original" source as long as appropriate tests of its accuracy are applied.

[wenglund]

Wade,

Actually, Brian is a biologist and works as an anesthesiologist, which might explain why his knowledge of historical methodology (like yours) is so weak.

I appreciate your unwittingly providing us with a clear example of how your assertions may go beyond the evidence. There is nothing evinced in what I said that would suggest that my understanding of historical methodology is "so weak." Someone with more than a hobbyist background in historical methodology may likely have known this, and not jumped to your false conclusion.

.

Historians unlike courts of law do not automatically throw out hearsay evidence (although there are exceptions in law)

In other words, the rules of evidence for historians are not as strict as they are for lawyers and judges--which is essentially what I said. I am glad you confirmed my understanding of historical methodology as compared with jurisprudence.

However, this is not how Hales was using the criticism of going beyond the evidence. He was implying that I was misquoting or manufacturing the evidence—which is quite different.

The alleged "misquote" was only one of several examples he provided in support of his essential point about going beyond the evidence. Here is another: "In addition concerning Eliza Winters, Vogel asserts that in an interview decades later she did not "confirm or deny" the Levi Lewis allegation, when in fact, available evidence does not disclose whether the incident was even discussed.[2] Here Vogel goes beyond the evidence in his assertion." So, contrary to what you said above, it is, in part, how Hale's was using the criticism. Someone with more than a hobbyist background in historical methodology may have known this.

I’m inclined to believe that your bias is operating in your comments here. As non-believer assessments of JS go, my position is the most charitable—to the point that I’m accused of being a JS “apologist” by a certain faction of the critics.

Evidently, both our biases are in operation--not that it matters.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[wenglund]

A nice defense, Dan. It sounds as if Hales, like many other Mormon scholars, has been influenced by Richard Anderson's fallacious methodology of dismissing all second-hand evidence as "hearsay" evidence that doesn't have to be addressed. This of course confuses the rules of the courtroom with the rules of historical scholarship. Given that apologists view non-member historians as "accusers," I suppose it's not surprising that they'd borrow the language of courtroom defense. But that's just not how historians operate. To quote David Hackett Fischer's book Historian's Fallacies, "Hearsay evidence is not categorically invalid in historical research, nor is it always inadmissable in a court of law, popular belief notwithstanding" (Fischer, p. 54). Gilbert Garraghan goes so far as to say that most evidence comes from "indirect" witnesses, and Louis Gottschalk says a second-hand source can be treated as an "original" source as long as appropriate tests of its accuracy are applied.

It is fallacious to assume that it is somehow fallacious for one to adhere to stricter rules of evidence than required by historiography. It isn't. It simply marks a difference of opinion. Otherwise, one must absurdly conclude that the rules of evidence in jurisprudence are fallacious.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Edited September 21, 2011 by wenglund

[Chris Smith]

Wade,

Calling Dan Vogel a "hobbyist historian" is just inane. Dan's accomplishments rival almost anyone you can name in the discipline of Mormon history. If Dan is just a hobbyist, then that certainly reflects badly on all the "professionals" who with all their grant money haven't accomplished half of what Dan has accomplished. There are plenty of people who find reasons to disagree with some of Dan's conclusions-- myself among them-- but I don't know any self-respecting historian who would deride him as a "hobbyist". Richard Bushman, in fact, likes Dan and takes his work very seriously. Dan is cited more than any other author in Rough Stone Rolling.

Peace,

-Chris

[Dan Vogel]

Thanks, Chris. It surprises me how often this assumption about hearsay and secondhand testimony is repeated. This assumption is never invoked if the testimony is from a Mormon source. Richard Anderson doesn’t hesitate to claim over a hundred sources where the BOM witnesses affirmed their testimonies, all but a handful being directly from the witnesses themselves. He is even willing to use the very questionable second-hand testimony of Wilhelm Poulson to counter my interpretation of the eight witnesses. This appeal to courts of law and hearsay testimony is only an apologetic devise to avoid the implications of adverse evidence.

Edited September 22, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[wenglund]

Wade,

Calling Dan Vogel a "hobbyist historian" is just inane. Dan's accomplishments rival almost anyone you can name in the discipline of Mormon history. If Dan is just a hobbyist, then that certainly reflects badly on all the "professionals" who with all their grant money haven't accomplished half of what Dan has accomplished. There are plenty of people who find reasons to disagree with some of Dan's conclusions-- myself among them-- but I don't know any self-respecting historian who would deride him as a "hobbyist". Richard Bushman, in fact, likes Dan and takes his work very seriously. Dan is cited more than any other author in Rough Stone Rolling.

Peace,

-Chris

Chris,

Actually, what is inane is to suggest that the descriptor "hobbyist historian" is somehow inane because Vogel has written several historical books and is widely quoted in others. The descriptor doesn't have to do with Vogel's notoriety in historical circles, but with history not being his chosen profession.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Chris Smith]

It is fallacious to assume that is somehow fallacious for one to adherence to stricter rules of evidence than required by historiography. It isn't. It simply marks a difference of opinion. Otherwise, one must absurdly conclude that the rules of evidence in jurisprudence are fallacious.

Historians and criminal lawyers have different objectives. Historians are asking what is the most probable account of what happened in the past. Criminal lawyers are asking whether the guilt of an accused person can be definitively proven. The rules of evidence in criminal law are designed to err on the side of protecting the innocent. Since most of the people historians write about are dead and no longer need to be protected, we don't have that bias. The rules of criminal law are fallacious only when used for a purpose to which they are not suited.

[Chris Smith]

The descriptor doesn't have to do with Vogel's notoriety in historical circles, but with history not being his chosen profession.

The descriptor has to do with your desire to deride him personally and professionally.

[Dan Vogel]

Wade,

I appreciate your unwittingly providing us with a clear example of how your assertions may go beyond the evidence. There is nothing evinced in what I said that would suggest that my understanding of historical methodology is "so weak." Someone with more than a hobbyist background in historical methodology may likely have known this, and not jumped to your false conclusion.

Yes, Wade, you did give us evidence to make a reasonable inference that your understanding of historical methodology is wrong in the matter of hearsay testimony. Also notice that Hales didn’t not make that argument—you did! You own it, so don’t try to make it look otherwise.

In other words, the rules of evidence for historians are not as strict as they are for lawyers and judges--which is essentially what I said. I am glad you confirmed my understanding of historical methodology as compared with jurisprudence.

Nice try, Wade. But you did not make this argument. You said just the opposite. Otherwise your criticism makes no sense.

So far, Wade, you have shown us that you were wrong in assuming Hales’ background; wrong in assuming historians follow hearsay rules in law; wrong in assuming Hales’ unspoken motivations for criticizing me. If I were you, I would quit this line of argument. It can only get worse.

The alleged "misquote" was only one of several examples he provided in support of his essential point about going beyond the evidence.

Actually, there were three accusations: misquote, misrepresent, and manufacture, which is what I said (“misquoting or manufacturing”).

Here is another: "In addition concerning Eliza Winters, Vogel asserts that in an interview decades later she did not "confirm or deny" the Levi Lewis allegation, when in fact, available evidence does not disclose whether the incident was even discussed.[2] Here Vogel goes beyond the evidence in his assertion." So, contrary to what you said above, it is, in part, how Hale's was using the criticism. Someone with more than a hobbyist background in historical methodology may have known this.

First, my statement didn’t go beyond the evidence and didn’t misrepresent the source. My statement only violated Hales notion about what needs to be the case for me to use the phrase. Second, how is this not covered by my statement above that Hales accused me of “misquoting or manufacturing” evidence? Wade, you really need to read what I’m saying and not invent quibbles to cover over your mistakes.

Try to contribute something more useful in future post, Wade. Thanks.

Edited September 22, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[wenglund]

Like many other Mormon scholars, has been influenced by Richard Anderson's fallacious methodology of dismissing all second-hand evidence as "hearsay" evidence that doesn't have to be addressed.

I haven't read all that Richard LLoyd Anderson has written, but what I have read doesn't fit your caricature. From what I can tell, he doesn't so much dismiss second-hand evidence or view it as unnecessary to address, rather, he addresses it, though he reasonably defers to first-hand or primary evidence where available and in conflict with the second-hand evidence. To see what I mean, I invite the reader to peruse this online article:

Joseph Smith's New York Reputation Reexamined

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Dan Vogel]

Wade,

Actually, what is inane is to suggest that the descriptor "hobbyist historian" is somehow inane because Vogel has written several historical books and is widely quoted in others. The descriptor doesn't have to do with Vogel's notoriety in historical circles, but with history not being his chosen profession.

You chose these words, and you chose to use them. Why? To diminish me in some respect, right? Admit it. It was ad hominem.

[Dan Vogel]

Wade,

It is fallacious to assume that is somehow fallacious for one to adherence to stricter rules of evidence than required by historiography. It isn't. It simply marks a difference of opinion. Otherwise, one must absurdly conclude that the rules of evidence in jurisprudence are fallacious.

You have referred to me as a “hobbyist historian”—so, I’m curious as to what lofty heights you have risen to challenge standard historical standards? I see, if Wade is wrong, the rules of jurisprudence are fallacious! Shockingly, arrogant!

I don’t know about you Chris, but I’m getting bored with Wade's line of argument.

Edited September 21, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[stemelbow]

I think your first point is a good one--the one regarding the quoting of Lewis. Hales seems to have misread you.

On the second point he wins. I don't see any reason to assume, as you did, that JS' history describes anything regarding testimony accusing him of bad behavior. I only see JS saying the two girls or women were brought in in some hope to get unbecoming behavior out of them. Your wording was quite misleading, it seems.

You each get a point. Good job.

[wenglund]

Historians and criminal lawyers have different objectives. Historians are asking what is the most probable account of what happened in the past. Criminal lawyers are asking whether the guilt of an accused person can be definitively proven. The rules of evidence in criminal law are designed to err on the side of protecting the innocent. Since most of the people historians write about are dead and no longer need to be protected, we don't have that bias. The rules of criminal law are fallacious only when used for a purpose to which they are not suited.

Contrary to your dogmatic assertion, not all historians, or lawyers for that matter, fit your stereotypical objectives. Historians can have other objectives (like presenting a faith-promoting account) and reasonably adhere to a stricter set of rules for evidence than is required by historiographical standards. To me, it is not fallacious for them to do so.

Besides, the general rules of evidence for historians are rather subjective in their application. As intimated in the Anderson article I linked to above, what may be considered as primary evidence by one historian, may be considered secondary by another, and the credibility and weight assigned to a given piece of secondary or hearsay evidence by one historian, may be quite different from that assigned by another historian. In other words, there are varying degrees to which historians adhere to and interpret the general rules of evidence, and it is doubtful that anyone well acquainted with historiography would consider such differences as fallacious. I don't believe they are, any more than it is fallacious for some historians to adhere to stricter rules than required by historical methodologies. But, to each their own.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Dan Vogel]

Stemelbow,

On the second point he wins. I don't see any reason to assume, as you did, that JS' history describes anything regarding testimony accusing him of bad behavior. I only see JS saying the two girls or women were brought in in some hope to get unbecoming behavior out of them. Your wording was quite misleading, it seems.

I think you are missing the subtle distinctions in my response. Hales accused me of implying the trial record itself had testimony in this regard, when no trial record was available. So, I’m mostly concerned here with Hales misreading my statement, which was based on JS’s History, not necessarily on whether or not the accusation was true. Despite my attempt to correct him, Hales insisted on misrepresenting my statement, and he managed to do that without acknowledging JS’s own History was behind my statement. Put that with JS’s 1844 sermon that he was accused of having seven wifes in New York, and I think what I said was quite reasonable. So, in misrepresenting me, Hales wins nothing.

[wenglund]

Wade,

You chose these words, and you chose to use them. Why?

Because it is an accurate categorization, as it is for me as well.

To diminish me in some respect, right?

Wrong.

Admit it. It was ad hominem.

I admit that you have unwittingly provided yet another example in support of Brian's claim that your assertions tend to go beyond the evidence. In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that the apt descriptor was ad hominem, let alone meant to be ad hominem, and now I have provided firsthand evidence to confirm it was not. Someone correctly schooled in historical methodology would likely have know this.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[William Schryver]

I consider Dan Vogel a competent researcher. His Early Mormon Documents series is a valuable resource for students and historians of early Mormon history, and he deserves commendation for it.

On the other hand, I consider Vogel a stunningly poor historian. His magnum opus, Joseph Smith - The Making of a Prophet, is an amalgam of shoddy history and mediocre fiction. One would be hard pressed to identify within that volume a single page that would not provide several examples of the kinds of fallacies so ably described in David Hackett Fischer's Historians' Fallacies - Toward a Logic of Historical Thought.

In my judgment, Brian Hales's criticism of Vogel's historical modi operandi is extremely accurate. Vogel is a transparent propagandist. As a historian, his mediocrity is only exceeded by the indiscriminate receptivity of his target audience.

Other than that, he seems like a personable fellow.

Edited September 21, 2011 by William Schryver

[wenglund]

Wade, You have referred to me as a “hobbyist historian”—so, I’m curious as to what lofty heights you have risen to challenge standard historical standards?

Were I challenging standard historical standards, then your request for credentials may be appropriate. But, I clearly am not. If you think I am, then this (along with the several other false conclusions you jumped to on this brief thread) doesn't speak well for your abilities to accurately comprehend and/or interpret, and by extension your abilities as a hobbyist historian.

I see, if Wade is wrong, the rules of jurisprudence are fallacious!

No, again you jumped to yet another false conclusion (are you going for a record?) If Chris is right (I don't believe he is), then by extension jurisprudence is fallacious. And, yes, his suggesting that may be, as you say, shockingly arrogant. LOL

Shockingly, arrogant! I don’t know about you Chris, but I’m getting bored with Wade's line of argument.

For my part, I am rather enjoying how you repeatedly and unwittingly substantiate throughout this brief thread the very claim from Brian you intended to negate. You're a funny guy!

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Edited September 21, 2011 by wenglund

[stemelbow]

Thanks for the response.

Stemelbow,

I think you are missing the subtle distinctions in my response. Hales accused me of implying the trial record itself had testimony in this regard, when no trial record was available. So, I’m mostly concerned here with Hales misreading my statement, which was based on JS’s History, not necessarily on whether or not the accusation was true.

I think his point was clear, and it appears you missed it. You said explicitly that the trial included testimony of improper conduct. But your source for that was something completely different. Joseph's words only suggest the two women were brought in for questioning in hopes to get something out of them. There was no testimony included at all in the trial on those grounds. On this point, Hales clearly wins. On the other, I give you a point.

Despite my attempt to correct him, Hales insisted on misrepresenting my statement, and he managed to do that without acknowledging JS’s own History was behind my statement. Put that with JS’s 1844 sermon that he was accused of having seven wifes in New York, and I think what I said was quite reasonable. So, in misrepresenting me, Hales wins nothing.

I've clarified my reasons for saying as much. I disagree that an accusation commented on in 1844 by Smith is somehow indicative of the trial containing such testimony.

[Dan Vogel]

Wade,

Contrary to your dogmatic assertion, not all historians, or lawyers for that matter, fit your stereotypical objectives. Historians can have other objectives (like presenting a faith-promoting account) and reasonably adhere to a stricter set of rules for evidence than is required by historiographical standards. To me, it is not fallacious for them to do so.

Besides, the general rules of evidence for historians are rather subjective in their application. As intimated in the Anderson article I linked to above, what may be considered as primary evidence by one historian, may be considered secondary by another, and the credibility and weight assigned to a given piece of secondary or hearsay evidence by one historian, may be quite different from that assigned by another historian. In other words, there are varying degrees to which historians adhere to and interpret the general rules of evidence, and it is doubtful that anyone well acquainted with historiography would consider such differences as fallacious. I don't believe they are, any more than it is fallacious for some historians to adhere to stricter rules than required by historical methodologies. But, to each their own.

What you are describing here is fictitious. No one, not even faithful historians apply this standard you are defending consistently as a methodology. Apologists only invoke it as a defense against testimony they don’t like. And no serious critic is going to prefer second-hand testimony over reliable first-hand testimony. It’s situational and depends on the kinds of available evidence and how they play off one another. The objection raised here is to your implied assertion that there is a legitimate methodology that systematically excludes hearsay testimony. There isn’t.

[Dan Vogel]

Will,

In my judgment, Brian Hales's criticism of Vogel's historical modi operandi is extremely accurate. Vogel is a transparent propagandist. As a historian, his mediocrity is only exceeded by the indiscriminate receptivity of his target audience.

We know that you don’t like critical works about JS and that you are predisposed to side with Hales because of your “indiscriminate receptivity of his target audience”. But your “judgment” isn’t of such universal acclaim—even here on this board—that you don’t have to be specific about why you think Hales’ criticism is “extremely accurate”. So, feel free to elaborate without going off topic.

[Chris Smith]

Contrary to your dogmatic assertion, not all historians, or lawyers for that matter, fit your stereotypical objectives. Historians can have other objectives (like presenting a faith-promoting account)

I would suggest that if one's objective is to provide a faith-promoting account, then one is doing something other than what we normally mean by "historical scholarship." There's nothing preventing one from claiming that label, but in doing so, one should be aware that the community of historians will jealously guard the term. Our marketability comes from our cultural authority, and our cultural authority comes from the perception that history is a sort of scientific enterprise-- that we're trying to discover what really happened in the past rather than just telling the most comforting stories the evidence will allow.

and reasonably adhere to a stricter set of rules for evidence than is required by historiographical standards. To me, it is not fallacious for them to do so.

The community of historians has developed certain methodological norms which seem to facilitate the creation of true narratives about the past. While some degree of debate about those norms is perfectly healthy, clearly some methods are better than others. This is why the community has embraced the most seemingly reliable methods as norms.

Peace,

-Chris