Vogel Responds To Apologist Brian Hales

[mfbukowski]

I could be wrong, not knowing all the nuances of your chosen system of thought,

You are.

but since perception is a function of a mind, you appear to me to be saying something tautological (like Chris mentioned before)—call it circular or question-begging, if you like—specifically: “what can you perceive that isn’t perceived.” Since no one, not even an objectivist questions this, it is a trivial point and philosophically uninteresting.

The point is not perception- the point is knowledge. The point is that we cannot KNOW anything about "the world" outside of our mind and language conditioned perceptions. I would love to live in a world in which this statement was in fact tautological where everyone knew this, but there are still people, you included apparently who think there is some "final state of facts" existing out there in the world which our perceptions somehow mirror accurately, that there is a correspondence of some kind between what is "real" and what we see, that we can through observation create some kind of "mirror of reality" in language and take that language to exactly correspond to that external reality in an objectively correct way.

That idea of mirroring reality and correspondence to "facts" is what I am saying cannot be done. If you find that tautological, fine. I mean Evolution itself can be seen as tautological in the statement "What survives, survives".

I suppose whoever agrees with me might find my statement tautological- that reality is what our collective minds create and express in language is "objective" reality while that which my personal mind creates and is not communicable is "subjective" reality, such a person would agree instantly and say "Of course reality is what our minds create! That's a tautology"! But I don't think that set of individuals includes you.

Following my central thesis, tautologies are in the eye of the beholder, as is everything else.

I don’t believe society creates reality—reality exists independent of humans.

Not a reality we can talk about - since language is symbols. We can speak metaphorically about it of course. To make this statement intelligently I think you need to provide an epistemology which shows how it is we can know anything about this "reality" which exists independently of our perceptions of it. You just told me, above, :

perception is a function of a mind

And now you are telling me that we can know and perceive things which are NOT a "function of our minds" which "exist independent of humans"

How can that be??

Whether or not we have direct access to it is a different matter (a notion that is itself problematic in my mind).

No kidding.

For example, the existence of dinosaurs is a part of reality that is not contingent on humans

If you are talking about written scientific articles which define the word "dinosaur", when they lived, what species they were etc, of course all that science is not only "contingent" on human knowledge- it IS part of "human knowledge"- part of the theoretical constructs we have made regarding our collective experiences of old bones which people have dug up and created explanations for.

I am not going to argue if they "exist" independent of us or not- clearly that is a semantic issue which if you push too far, gets into some pretty silly stuff like some of those French sociologists you mentioned earlier.

Yes, and this too is a trivial observation. And you can certainly experience something (reality) without having language to name or math to explain it. Language and math are contingent on humans; they are merely tools.

Well if you are an expert in how children learn language, and are willing to take on people like Piaget, I might be willing to listen, but I don't think that is the case since you are not explaining yourself well.

Your comments seem fairly philosophically naive. You define no epistemology or state your epistemological position, and yet make statements like this. I don't know if I need to explain all the history of philosophy to you or what. With Chris- I know he is close to a Pragmatist postion, that he is familiar with William James et al, but with you, I have no clue where you are coming from and you state no philosophical position to help me.

Now, I doubt Hales will find this arcane and esoteric philosophical maneuvering helpful.

Well I am sure brother Hales needs no help from me, but that is irrelevant to my position of course. I just know that for me your entire case is pretty much irrelevant and rather trivial.

[wenglund]

I don’t believe society creates reality—reality exists independent of humans. Whether or not we have direct access to it is a different matter (a notion that is itself problematic in my mind). For example, the existence of dinosaurs is a part of reality that is not contingent on humans. The way we chose to talk about it (rather than another way) is socially constructed. This should be distinguished from other things that ARE socially constructed—like religion, government, and society itself....And you can certainly experience something (reality) without having language to name or math to explain it. Language and math are contingent on humans; they are merely tools.

In a practical, though quite superficial sense, i can see what you are saying.

However, try stripping your mind of all linguistic-based cognition (in other words try reverting your mind to its fetal state--I was going to crack a joke here, but resisted the temptation), amd see if you can conceptualize, let alone perceive or know "reality". I think you will find that all you may "experience" is a cacophony of inexplicable and incoherent sensations, though you wouldn't even be able to describe them as such. Is that your idea of "reality"?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Edited September 24, 2011 by wenglund

[mfbukowski]

If you think perception is not culturally conditioned, read this:

http://plato.stanfor...upplement1.html

The point is often linked quite explicitly to relativistic themes. Thus Ruth Benedict tells us that “no man sees the world with pristine eyes” (1934, p. 2), while Edward Sapir urges that "even comparatively simple acts of perception are very much more at the mercy of the social patterns called words than we might suppose" (1929, p. 210). And here is Whorf:

We

dissect

nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds …We

cut nature up

and

organize

it into concepts, and ascribe significance…. We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe (1956, pp. 213-14]).

The anthropologist John Beattie tells us it is an “epistemological commonplace” that

people see what they expect to see, and that the categories of their perception are largely if not wholly determined by their social and cultural background. So members of different cultures may see the world they live in very differently. And it is not just a matter of reaching different conclusions about the world from the same evidence; the very evidence which is given to them as members of different cultures may be different (1966, p. 75).

Here is Nelson Goodman:

Perception depends heavily on conceptual schemata. “There is no innocent eye.” The raw material of vision cannot be extracted from the finished product. Our schemata may change and evolve, be revised or replaced, be suggested or informed, by factors of all kinds; but without some schema there is no perception (1972, p. 142).

The influence of concepts and beliefs on perception was also cornerstone of the new philosophy of science that emerged in the 1960s. In a typical passage Thomas Kuhn tells that various visual illusions (of the sort described above) suggests that

…something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see (1970b, p. 113).

In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. …Practicing in different worlds …[the proponents of competing paradigms] see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction (1970b, p. 150).

And Paul Feyerabend:

Given appropriate stimuli, but different systems of classification (different ‘mental sets’), our perceptual apparatus may produce perceptual objects which cannot be easily compared (1993, p. 166)

The recurring theme in such passages, which are easily multiplied, is that our concepts and beliefs, language and culture, can exert a strong influence on how we perceive the world.

Edited September 24, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Chris Smith]

I would love to live in a world in which this statement was in fact tautological where everyone knew this, but there are still people, you included apparently who think there is some "final state of facts" existing out there in the world which our perceptions somehow mirror accurately, that there is a correspondence of some kind between what is "real" and what we see, that we can through observation create some kind of "mirror of reality" in language and take that language to exactly correspond to that external reality in an objectively correct way.

I don't think any educated person thinks our perceptions "mirror" the world in an objectively correct way. One needs only the barest familiarity with optical illusions and atomic theory to know that's false. But the observation that perception doesn't perfectly "mirror" reality doesn't give us license to say there's no relationship between the two. Clearly, under normal circumstances, perception "represents" reality to us in some way that enables us to manipulate it in subjectively beneficial ways. In other words, perception generally acts as a symbol that points to something beyond itself. If we were to deny this, then we would have no way of distinguishing between healthy perception and perceptual hallucination. But clearly there is a difference, and the difference is non-trivial.

Edited September 24, 2011 by Chris Smith

[Chris Smith]

Speaking of atomic theory, I spent much of the morning reading about the Greek philosopher Democritus, who wrote in the early 4th century BC. He wrote, “Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, color by convention: in reality there is only atoms and void.” But he also taught that reality exists for subjects only in terms of their experience, which for them is the real. "The appearance," he said, "is truth." I like this fellow. He struck, in 400 BC, what I'd call a healthy balance between pragmatism and materialistic reductionism.

Edited September 24, 2011 by Chris Smith

[mfbukowski]

I don't think any educated person thinks our perceptions "mirror" the world in an objectively correct way

I wish you were right, but I don't think you are. I think most people do not think about it.

One needs only the barest familiarity with optical illusions and atomic theory to know that's false.

Yeah, but most people are not thinking about the implications of that. Maybe you do- but let me tell you- I have had to explain this again and again and again- and most people have no clue what I am talking about and keep accusing me of "solipsism" when I bring it up.

The whole key is that in many ways all of reality is perceived subjectively, colored with our cultural and personal prejudices- and the only unifying factor is language, and language is a metaphor or symbol. People don't think that way generally. My dad tells me of trying to tell his great grandmother about atomic theory- that the chair she was sitting in was made of little particles buzzing around and she thought he had lost his mind. Educated people may stop and think about it, but that is not their normal way to interact with the world.

But the observation that perception doesn't perfectly "mirror" reality doesn't give us license to say there's no relationship between the two.

Hmmmm- I know what you are saying but you are assuming from the beginning now that there are two different "things" with a "relationship" between them- that's three definitions you now need to describe what you are saying. First there's "reality" independent of perception, what's that? Then there's "perception" itself- some kind of little mirror or picture I guess- as yet undefined- and then there's the "relationship between the two"- ie: how the perception fits into the "reality". Two ideas - two things- two somethings with an unexplained interaction!

All I'm doing is saying you can't make that differentiation- that it's all one "thing" we call "experience". The experience IS the reality.

Clearly, under normal circumstances, perception "represents" reality to us in some way

Yeah, see, that's the problem. How does it represent reality? Again, you have an it- the perception, the undefined process of representation, and us somehow receiving the representation.

that enables us to manipulate it in subjectively beneficial ways. In other words, perception generally acts as a symbol that points to something beyond itself.

You still have the problem of how it does that, and what it "points to". Much better to pull out Occams razor and just slice all this stuff away! For all practical purposes, the world consists of our experience of it. That is the central thesis of Pragmatism.

If we were to deny this, then we would have no way of distinguishing between healthy perception and perceptual hallucination. But clearly there is a difference, and the difference is non-trivial.

The mere fact that clearly there is a difference- in experience itself- explodes the need to explain it. The only people who think that they are actually brains in a vat are in mental institutions. I mean you can be a solipsist all you want until your wife disagrees with you about something.

Suddenly you have no doubt that there is at least one "other" in the universe.

[mfbukowski]

Speaking of atomic theory, I spent much of the morning reading about the Greek philosopher Democritus, who wrote in the early 4th century BC. He wrote, “Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, color by convention: in reality there is only atoms and void.” But he also taught that reality exists for subjects only in terms of their experience, which for them is the real. "The appearance," he said, "is truth." I like this fellow. He struck, in 400 BC, what I'd call a healthy balance between pragmatism and materialistic reductionism.

Agreed!

Throw in some Heraclitus, and as far as I am concerned, the rest of Philosophy has just been a footnote to those guys.

It all goes downhill with Plato and Aristotle!

[mfbukowski]

For anyone actually interested, I would highly recommend Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. (Not the Tractatus- which he later repudiated)

It's not philosophy in the usual sense- it's like a therapy session on the nature of language, full of thought experiments. That was a life-changing book for me. It's beyond anything written before or after in my most humble opinion. It's ultimately why I quit academic philosophy- all the answers had been worked out, and philosophy kind of solved itself for me. I saw philosophy as a therapy session and suddenly I was cured- so I didn't need the "doctor" anymore!

People sometimes have trouble understanding it because they are looking for him to present a view of reality or a theory- it's not like that.

It's a case by case example of how language is used, which culminates in you coming to the conclusion Wittgenstein himself has reached. He is teaching you to see how he sees- it's like a manual of linguistic experiments more than a philosophical treatise- amazing book!

It's like having the answer sheet for every possible philosophical problem.

Edited September 24, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Chris Smith]

most people have no clue what I am talking about and keep accusing me of "solipsism" when I bring it up.

That's probably because you don't qualify your rejection of correspondence theory by substituting some other epistemological model that makes sense of our experience of contingency. If you're going to knock someone off the boat, you've at least got to throw them a life raft. Otherwise they're just going to get back on the boat.

Hmmmm- I know what you are saying but you are assuming from the beginning now that there are two different "things" with a "relationship" between them- that's three definitions you now need to describe what you are saying. First there's "reality" independent of perception, what's that? Then there's "perception" itself- some kind of little mirror or picture I guess- as yet undefined- and then there's the "relationship between the two"- ie: how the perception fits into the "reality". Two ideas - two things- two somethings with an unexplained interaction!

All I'm doing is saying you can't make that differentiation- that it's all one "thing" we call "experience". The experience IS the reality.

Wrong. You have to make that distinction. It is basic to human experience. As I said before, there is healthy perception and then there are perceptual hallucinations. I would define reality as "that which constrains experience," and the relationship between perception and reality as, perhaps, "functional representation". But however you define these terms, the distinction is non-trivial and eminently pragmatic.

For all practical purposes, the world consists of our experience of it.

That is so horrifically impractical, mfb, that I'm baffled you keep insisting on it. When I had a fever of 104 degrees, I hallucinated that my parents were fighting and throwing things. Thankfully, this experience did not represent reality. And recognizing that distinction is important, because it saves me from reacting in an embarassing or non-useful way.

Peace,

-Chris

[Chris Smith]

Throw in some Heraclitus

Yuck!

[Dan Vogel]

Wade,

However, try stripping your mind of all linguistic-based cognition (in other words try reverting your mind to its fetal state--I was going to crack a joke here, but resisted the temptation), amd see if you can conceptualize, let alone perceive or know "reality". I think you will find that all you may "experience" is a cacophony of inexplicable and incoherent sensations, though you wouldn't even be able to describe them as such. Is that your idea of "reality"?

I sort of understand what you mean in a superficial completely exaggerated way. You really think a fetus is analogous? An infant (fetus is going too far) not only doesn’t have language, it doesn’t even have a fully developed brain. I thought you might use non-verbal abused children or the deaf before there was sign language. I have already acknowledged the importance of language as a tool and how it shapes our experiences, but it hardly justifies the radical relativism that usually goes along with this observation.

Edited September 25, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[LeSellers]

An infant (fetus is going too far) not only doesn’t have language, it doesn’t even have a fully developed brain. I thought you might use non-verbal abused children or the deaf before there was sign language. I have already acknowledged the importance of language as a tool and how it shapes our experiences, but it hardly justifies the radical relativism that usually goes along with this observation.

Yet I see my grandchildren struggle to tell me what they are thinking. I can see their minds working, but lacking the words to describe it, and getting extremely frustrated with both me and themselves.

It reminds me of the first months of my mission: I knew what I wanted to say, but was wholly unable to get my point across.

My Jacquie's grandfather had a stroke a decade before he died. He was healthy, but could not speak. For those ten years, his wife would routinely lament that she knew he would by trying to tell her something, but was completely unable to articulate his thought, and the frustration was easy to see: tears would well up in his eyes and he'd get a look whose motivation was unmistakable.

We had a topic on the veil: whether it lifted slowly. I believe that children arrive in the world with knowledge they cannot reveal, not because it is beyond description (although it may very well be), but because the erstwhile messengers cannot frame the words. But the time they can, these memories are lost to them (and to us).

Lehi

[Dan Vogel]

Bukowski,

You define no epistemology or state your epistemological position, and yet make statements like this. I don't know if I need to explain all the history of philosophy to you or what. With Chris- I know he is close to a Pragmatist postion, that he is familiar with William James et al, but with you, I have no clue where you are coming from and you state no philosophical position to help me.

I’m not interested in trying to resolve the nature of reality debate with you. My main concern is to expose your relativism, despite your denial, and to shut down your apologetic use of it.

If you think perception is not culturally conditioned, read this: …

I did. Did you?

“The point is often linked quite explicitly to relativistic themes. … We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe. …”

Prior to this you claimed that you weren’t a relativist.

The conclusion of your excerpt states: “The recurring theme in such passages, which are easily multiplied, is that our concepts and beliefs, language and culture, can exert a strong influence on how we perceive the world.”

No objectivist would reject this rather trivial observation. Who would argue that there aren’t various ways to describe reality? The problem is the “equally valid” assertion that goes with relativism. Genesis is not an equally valid description of creation as what science offers. Geocentric description of the solar system is not equally valid as a heliocentric one. Relativism is popular because of its promise of a utopian world where everyone gets along, where there are no ideologies, and no one tries to colonize the other. Not surprisingly the marginalized are attracted to it.

David Hume said that when knowledge is against the person, the person is against knowledge. This little subterfuge has been going on a long time, and we are not likely to resolve it any time soon. So, there is no use trying to make it appear like we are stuck in different paradigms and can’t understand one another, because I think we do.

Edited September 26, 2011 by Dan Vogel

[mfbukowski]

That's probably because you don't qualify your rejection of correspondence theory by substituting some other epistemological model that makes sense of our experience of contingency. If you're going to knock someone off the boat, you've at least got to throw them a life raft. Otherwise they're just going to get back on the boat.

Wrong. You have to make that distinction. It is basic to human experience. As I said before, there is healthy perception and then there are perceptual hallucinations. I would define reality as "that which constrains experience," and the relationship between perception and reality as, perhaps, "functional representation". But however you define these terms, the distinction is non-trivial and eminently pragmatic.

That is so horrifically impractical, mfb, that I'm baffled you keep insisting on it. When I had a fever of 104 degrees, I hallucinated that my parents were fighting and throwing things. Thankfully, this experience did not represent reality. And recognizing that distinction is important, because it saves me from reacting in an embarassing or non-useful way.

Peace,

-Chris

How about something like "objective reality is that which unifies objective experience (or observations)?"

"Constrained" seems to be more like it limits experience- and I don't think that is the right word, even if Peirce liked it. He was not really a "full" Pragmatist imo, and still too married to a hint of Cartesian dualism.

Reality doesn't "constrain" experience- otherwise we would not be able to experience what it is to be "constrained"! "Constraint" is itself an experience- so reality cannot "constrain" experience when it is an experience itself.

You have not addressed that point yet, that I recall.

The problem even with that first sentence is that it does not allow subjective experiences to be "real" in that limited definition, and I am not about to say that the statement "I am hungry" or "I am in love" does not say something about "reality", or that such statements cannot be true or false.

Clearly one can lie about either of those.

[mfbukowski]

I’m not interested in trying to resolve the nature of reality debate with you. My main concern is to expose your relativism, despite your denial, and to shut down your apologetic use of it.

Whatever importance that is supposed to have. Do you think I think that "relativism" is a dirty word or something? I asked you that in my first response to you- and you can't answer it unless you do in fact address the nature of reality.

Sticks and stones will break my bones but "Relativist" will never hurt me.

That word only means something in a context in which it is explained, which of course you have refused to do. In some cases I am a relativist, and in others I am not. It's a complicated world where people don't fit into boxes, you know.

Incidentally, at the end of your post, you put what are allegedly my words in quote boxes.

These are not my words, and of course you conveniently don't provide a link to the alleged quotes. I am sure this is some kind of error, I am not yet ready to assume that you are deliberately confusing me with someone else.

I do know that in many cases on these boards, this is a tactic used by some to make the argument about the argument instead of about the topic. I am sure you would not stoop to such a tactic.

The rest of your post is based on an alleged misunderstanding of the quote I posted- which is complicated by the misquote at the end.

I would appreciate it if you cleaned to post up and re-ask the question so we can resume the discussion if you are so inclined.

Edited September 26, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

Who would argue that there aren’t various ways to describe reality? The problem is the “equally valid” assertion that goes with relativism. Genesis is not an equally valid description of creation as what science offers. Geocentric description of the solar system is not equally valid as a heliocentric one. Relativism is popular because of its promise of a utopian world where everyone gets along, where there are no ideologies, and no one tries to colonize the other. Not surprisingly the marginalized are attracted to it. You seem to imply this when you said:

I just went back and noticed this little tidbit and though I am as willing as anyone to let this thread die, I just couldn't let this stand.

The issue is not "various ways to describe reality", the issue is what description fits the purpose of the discourse. You throw around words like "valid" without any apparent understanding of the various ways philosophers have used the term, nor do you make any attempt to describe the sense in which you are using it.

No one doubts that Genesis does not give a scientific explanation of the way the universe came to be- by calling it "less valid" than such an explanation says so much about your misunderstanding of the issues that one wonders if it should be addressed or not.

Obviously the "validity" of an explanation depends on what questions one is asking. This is not "relativism", it is common sense. If one wants to know what the ancient Hebrews thought about God and creation, one would think that the explanation in Genesis not only is a "valid" statement of that position, but perhaps one of the few extant accounts available which might give us any evidence whatsoever of what they believed.

Surely you understand symbolic writings, surely you understand that the plays of Shakespeare (or whoever wrote them- that irrelevant issue is for you historians to figure out) are not to be taken scientifically either. So it's a little hard to understand why you would say such a thing about Genesis.

David Hume said that when knowledge is against the person, the person is against knowledge. This little subterfuge has been going on a long time, and we are not likely to resolve it any time soon. So, there is no use trying to make it appear like we are stuck in different paradigms and can’t understand one another, because I think we do.

Well if anyone is "against knowledge" it is certainly not me. And no, I think we are very, very far apart in paradigms. I can't for the life of me figure out what paradigm you are even using.

[wenglund]

An infant (fetus is going too far) not only doesn’t have language, it doesn’t even have a fully developed brain.

Perhaps you are the exception, but most people's brains are continually developing--we develop innumerable neural networks throughout our lifetime. For us, there is no such thing as a "fully developed brain."

I thought you might use non-verbal abused children or the deaf before there was sign language. I

Did you forgot that language is both verbal and non-verbal?

I have already acknowledged the importance of language as a tool and how it shapes our experiences...

Yes, but I don't think you fully realize the extent to which language (verbal and non-verbal) is our experience--which is why I proposed the thought experience.

...but it hardly justifies the radical relativism that usually goes along with this observation.

To your way of thinking, what degree of relativism is justified?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Edited September 26, 2011 by wenglund

[mfbukowski]

That's probably because you don't qualify your rejection of correspondence theory by substituting some other epistemological model that makes sense of our experience of contingency. If you're going to knock someone off the boat, you've at least got to throw them a life raft. Otherwise they're just going to get back on the boat.

Well I think my position is a well-established one philosophically in the Pragmatic tradition.

On John Dewey:

Dewey begins with the observation that the world as we experience it both individually and collectively is an admixture of the precarious, the transitory and contingent aspect of things, and the stable, the patterned regularity of natural processes that allows for prediction and human intervention. Honest metaphysical description must take into account both of these elements of experience. Dewey endeavors to do this by an event ontology. The world, rather than being comprised of things or, in more traditional terms, substances, is comprised of happenings or occurrences that admit of both episodic uniqueness and general, structured order. Intrinsically events have an ineffable qualitative character by which they are immediately enjoyed or suffered, thus providing the basis for experienced value and aesthetic appreciation. Extrinsically events are connected to one another by patterns of change and development; any given event arises out of determinant prior conditions and leads to probable consequences. The patterns of these temporal processes is the proper subject matter of human knowledge–we know the world in terms of causal laws and mathematical relationships–but the instrumental value of understanding and controlling them should not blind us to the immediate, qualitative aspect of events; indeed, the value of scientific understanding is most significantly realized in the facility it affords for controlling the circumstances under which immediate enjoyments may be realized.

It is in terms of the distinction between qualitative immediacy and the structured order of events that Dewey understands the general pattern of human life and action. This understanding is captured by James’ suggestive metaphor that human experience consists of an alternation of flights and perchings, an alternation of concentrated effort directed toward the achievement of foreseen aims, what Dewey calls “ends-in-view,” with the fruition of effort in the immediate satisfaction of “consummatory experience.” Dewey’s insistence that human life follows the patterns of nature, as a part of nature, is the core tenet of his naturalistic outlook.

Dewey also addresses the social aspect of human experience facilitated by symbolic activity, particularly that of language. For Dewey the question of the nature of social relationships is a significant matter not only for social theory, but metaphysics as well, for it is from collective human activity, and specifically the development of shared meanings that govern this activity, that the mind arises. Thus rather than understanding the mind as a primitive and individual human endowment, and a precondition of conscious and intentional action, as was typical in the philosophical tradition since Descartes, Dewey offers a genetic analysis of mind as an emerging aspect of cooperative activity mediated by linguistic communication. Consciousness, in turn, is not to be understood as a domain of private awareness, but rather as the fulcrum point of the organism’s readjustment to the challenge of novel conditions where the meanings and attitudes that formulate habitual behavioral responses to the environment fail to be adequate. Thus Dewey offers in the better part of a number of chapters of Experience and Nature a response to the traditional mind-body problem of the metaphysical tradition, a response that understands the mind as an emergent issue of natural processes, more particularly the web of interactive relationships between human beings and the world in which they live.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/dewey/

Edited September 26, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

Yes, but I don't thinking you fully realize the extent to which language (verbal and non-verbal) is our experience--which is why I proposed the thought experience.

See that last paragraph of the Dewey quote above.

[Chris Smith]

How about something like "objective reality is that which unifies objective experience (or observations)?"

No,this definition doesn't work. A shared delusion doesn't become "real" by virtue of being shared. I think you'd agree that you and I could be "unified" in misperceiving an object in a way that prevents us from usefully manipulating it. I prefer to define reality in light of the following observations:

1) I experience myself as determined and constrained in important ways. (When I choose, for example, I choose among a limited number of options.)

2) By understanding and manipulating "things" in my phenomenal world, I can change those constraints. (By opening a door, for example, I create the option of walking through the doorway.)

3) The phenomenal things and the constraints they impose are functionally persistent, meaning they seem to remain in force even when I'm not perceiving them. (If I leave the stove on and forget about it, for example, the house may burn down.)

4) There are, however, exceptions to rules #2 and #3. On rare occasions, something in my phenomenal world turns out to be non-persistent. Or, on the other hand, it may be persistent but I may be misperceiving it in a way that prevents effective manipulation.

Given these four observations, it behooves me to think of my phenomenal experience as ideally but not always functionally representative of a "real world" which is perception-independent. In common parlance, this is what we generally mean when we speak of "[objective] reality". Even if this is just a useful fiction, it accounts for the major features of my experience and equips me to deal with them in subjectively useful ways.

The problem even with that first sentence is that it does not allow subjective experiences to be "real" in that limited definition, and I am not about to say that the statement "I am hungry" or "I am in love" does not say something about "reality", or that such statements cannot be true or false.

Since I happen to think your experiences of hunger and love are the products of chemical states in the brain, I think those statements say just as much about objective reality as the statement "I am sitting in a chair", and can be just as true or false. (I would add that your experience of hunger is just as capable of being a misperception as my experience of sitting in a chair. Some people confuse hunger with thirst, for example, and as a result they gain weight.)

I am also willing to grant that subjective experiences as such can be "subjectively real." But that's a different kind of reality, one that shouldn't be confused with reality in the objective sense.

Peace,

-Chris

Edited September 26, 2011 by Chris Smith

[mfbukowski]

1) I experience myself as determined and constrained in important ways. (When I choose, for example, I choose among a limited number of options.)

2) By understanding and manipulating "things" in my phenomenal world, I can change those constraints. (By opening a door, for example, I create the option of walking through the doorway.)

3) The phenomenal things and the constraints they impose are functionally persistent, meaning they seem to remain in force even when I'm not perceiving them. (If I leave the stove on and forget about it, for example, the house may burn down.)

4) There are, however, exceptions to rules #2 and #3. On rare occasions, something in my phenomenal world turns out to be non-persistent. Or, on the other hand, it may be persistent but I may be misperceiving it in a way that prevents effective manipulation.

Given these four observations, it behooves me to think of my phenomenal experience as ideally but not always functionally representative of a "real world" which is perception-independent. In common parlance, this is what we generally mean when we speak of "[objective] reality". Even if this is just a useful fiction, it accounts for the major features of my experience and equips me to deal with them in subjectively useful ways.

I know- you have said that before, BUT:

Reality doesn't "constrain" experience- otherwise we would not be able to experience what it is to be "constrained"! "Constraint" is itself an experience- so reality cannot "constrain" experience when it is an experience itself.

You have not addressed that point yet, that I recall.

Notice that your point number 1, above, basically makes my point.

You said

"I experience myself as determined and constrained in important ways" so the constraint is not necessarily coming from the "world" - it is coming from your EXPERIENCE of "the world".

Then you said:

"Even if this is just a useful fiction, it accounts for the major features of my experience and equips me to deal with them in subjectively useful ways."

So I have no objection to you believing a useful fiction which helps you deal subjectively with the world- just KNOW that it IS a "useful fiction" which I have no need for, perhaps as you would call my religious belief a "useful fiction" which subjectively helps me give meaning to my life

I suppose we all have "useful fictions"- to others- but I suppose I believe mine to be just as real as you believe yours to be.

Since I happen to think your experiences of hunger and love are the products of chemical states in the brain, I think those statements say just as much about objective reality as the statement "I am sitting in a chair", and can be just as true or false. (I would add that your experience of hunger is just as capable of being a misperception as my experience of sitting in a chair. Some people confuse hunger with thirst, for example, and as a result they gain weight.)

I actually have no problem with that terminology with chemical states "causing" mental states, with the proviso that mental states also cause chemical states. When a bear is charging you in the woods- I have no doubt that your phenomenological perception that a bear is charging causes all kinds of chemical changes all through your body.

The question is which causes which? I could just as easily say that "spiritual matter" causes the mental states- and vice versa- matter is matter.

I am also willing to grant that subjective experiences as such can be "subjectively real." But that's a different kind of reality, one that shouldn't be confused with reality in the objective sense.

Agreed, and if you ever catch me making that mistake- let me know. But I don't think I do make that mistake.

Subjective statements usually start with the world "I"- and follow the syntax of the first personal singular- so their logic is entirely different- so it should be fairly easy to spot them.

A good book on this: John Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology. I happen to be reading it right now.

[Chris Smith]

"I experience myself as determined and constrained in important ways" so the constraint is not necessarily coming from the "world" - it is coming from your EXPERIENCE of "the world".

I'm not sure I understand this line of argument. So, for example, in order to be constrained from walking through a wall, I must first perceive a wall-- is that what you're trying to say? But that doesn't work for all perceptions or all types of constraint.

With regard to perceptions, consider a case in which I hallucinate a wall but find myself still able to walk through it. In such a case, perception of a thing is insufficient for it to constrain me. (A friend of mine once hallucinated a naked man standing in the middle of the road. She stopped driving, then a car passed her by and drove through the naked man. She then realized this was a hallucination-- i.e. a perception that does not impose efficacious constraints-- and went on her way.The moral of this story: drugs are bad.)

With regard to constraints, consider a more fundamental kind of constraint: the structure of thought. Our thought processes are constrained-- I would even say determined-- by reasoning circuits in the brain. I'm incapable of solving certain types of math problems. This is a constraint imposed by the computational limitations of my brain, not by objects I perceive in my phenomenal world. People with defective reasoning circuits experience things like panic attacks and depression. These are constraints which evidently come from the world itself, not from our experience of it. The structure of thought is the structure of thought regardless of one's knowledge of brain chemistry.

So I have no objection to you believing a useful fiction which helps you deal subjectively with the world- just KNOW that it IS a "useful fiction" which I have no need for, perhaps as you would call my religious belief a "useful fiction" which subjectively helps me give meaning to my life.

I have no objection to religious belief that's self-consciously subjective, but I do object when that belief makes inaccurate predictive claims on the objective world or attempts to place all other beliefs on equal footing, resulting in counterproductive behavior. In other words, I object to category confusion between objective and subjective reality. Unfortunately, such category confusion seems to be integral to most religious systems and basic to their transformative power.

I actually have no problem with that terminology with chemical states "causing" mental states, with the proviso that mental states also cause chemical states.

This is debatable. IMO, it would be more accurate to say mental states are chemical states. Although we experience it as a unified, linear process, thought is actually the result of thousands of reasoning circuits working in coordination to analyze practical problems. Each of those reasoning circuits can in turn be broken down into a variety of component processes-- and so on down to the level of subatomic particles. Each of these represents a different level of organization. It's dubious to speak of a higher level of organization "causing" changes at a lower level, since the behavior of the higher-level system is actually just a combination of lower-level processes. Don't get me wrong; it is the combination that enables the system to perform a useful function. The higher level of organization is essential. But does it act as a causal agent on its own components? That's entirely a matter of perspective.

The question is which causes which? I could just as easily say that "spiritual matter" causes the mental states- and vice versa- matter is matter.

You can say whatever you want, but some claims have predictive value while others do not.

Peace,

-Chris

Edited September 26, 2011 by Chris Smith

[mfbukowski]

I'm not sure I understand this line of argument. So, for example, in order to be constrained from walking through a wall, I must first perceive a wall-- is that what you're trying to say?

Yep.

But that doesn't work for all perceptions or all types of constraint.

Sure it does. I clearly experience the fact that I can't fly. I have no doubt about that and never have. Even if I wanted to fly, I would quickly experience falling if I jumped off of something. That experience would be incontrovertible evidence of my inability to fly- or that I am "constrained" by gravity.

With regard to perceptions, consider a case in which I hallucinate a wall but find myself still able to walk through it. In such a case, perception of a thing is insufficient for it to constrain me. (A friend of mine once hallucinated a naked man standing in the middle of the road. She stopped driving, then a car passed her by and drove through the naked man. She then realized this was a hallucination-- i.e. a perception that does not impose efficacious constraints-- and went on her way.The moral of this story: drugs are bad.)

But even correspondence theorists make provisions for mistakes, mirages, hallucinations etc. Her belief that your friend saw a naked man would be just as unjustifiable to a correpondence theorist as it would be to a Pragmatist.

I'm incapable of solving certain types of math problems. This is a constraint imposed by the computational limitations of my brain, not by objects I perceive in my phenomenal world. People with defective reasoning circuits experience things like panic attacks and depression. These are constraints which evidently come from the world itself, not from our experience of it. The structure of thought is the structure of thought regardless of one's knowledge of brain chemistry.

Surely handicapped people who are born without legs experience the world differently than the rest of us- as do the blind, the deaf, etc. Surely there are "constraints"; on all of us, but I would argue that they are constraints we experience

With regard to constraints, consider a more fundamental kind of constraint: the structure of thought. Our thought processes are constrained-- I would even say determined-- by reasoning circuits in the brain.

Well this is an interesting point of view. As I mentioned, I am reading a book by John Searle about this very point and I think that you are confusing what is "subjective" and "objective", I think as I have said before.

He discusses the complexity of a system and whether or not its complexity can properly be reducible to its microstructures, and Searle's conclusion is that it IS in certain cases. The case he examines is that of a wheel rolling downhill- and the question of a wheel's feature of "solidity". We all know that on a micro level, a wheel is composed of atoms and molecules, and is not solid and at some level where the rubber meets the road there is an interaction between the molecules of the road- also not solid and the molecules of the wheel. But yet, is the feature of ;solidness; properly applied to the wheel on even this micro level?

His conclusion is that it is properly applicable- that the system feature of solidity is found in the wheel even at this micro level, precisely because the entire system of the wheel is affected and moved- precisely because of the interactions at this molecular level. So it is proper to say that the micro features of the molecular level cause the solidity of the entire system in this case. (pages 48 and 49) The trajectory of each molecule is affected by the behavior of the entire wheel

He then makes the point that consciousness is a feature of the brain in the same way that solidity is a feature of the wheel.</p>

This is what Searle says about this very point (page 49-50)</p>

<div>

<br />

<br />

We are reluctant to think of consciousness as just a<br />

biological feature of the brain, in part because of our<br />

dualistic tradition, but also because we tend to suppose<br />

that if consciousness is irreducible to neuronal behavior<br />

then it must be something extra, something “over and<br />

above” neuronal behavior. And of course consciousness,<br />

unlike solidity, is not ontologically reducible to physical<br />

microstructures. This is not because it is some extra<br />

thing; rather, it is because consciousness has a first-person,<br />

or subjective, ontology, and is thus not reducible to<br />

anything that has a third-person, or objective, ontology.3<br />

In this brief discussion I have tried to explain how consciousness<br />

can have “physical” causal consequences, and<br />

why there is nothing mysterious about that fact. My conscious<br />

intention-in-action causes my arm to go up. But of<br />

course, my conscious intention-in-action is a feature of<br />

my brain system, and as such at the level of the neurons<br />

it is constituted entirely by neuronal behavior. There is no<br />

ontological reductionism in this account, because at no<br />

point are we denying that consciousness has an irreducible<br />

first-person ontology. But there is a causal reduction.<br />

Consciousness has no causal powers beyond the powers<br />

of the neuronal (and other neurobiological) structures.

</div>

Where he is going with this is to come up with an illustration of how we can see consciousness as "causative"; of, say, moving my arm, and yet save its uniqueness by the fact that it is a "first person ontology" and not a "third person ontology". Logically what you say about your personal internal states in first person language, cannot be reducible to third person statements. That means that what you see or feel in the "first person" cannot be logically reduced or even translated to what other say about those same matters in the third person- the logic just does not work.</p>

<p> </p>

<p>My saying "I am hungry" is not logically reducible to some statement about my blood sugar level, or whatever kind of observed medical data you want to present. Or look again at the quote from Nagel in my siggy- it is fundamentally saying the same thing I am right now. But Searle's point is stronger imo, because he allows that consciousness and micro brainstates are mutually causative, and yet are on a different ontological level, not like the wheel rolling down hill at all at least in that respect.</p>

<p> </p>

<p>That link to the Searle book might really help this discussion if you ever have a chance to read that first chapter- 78 pages in all.</p>

<p> </p>

<div>

I have no objection to religious belief that's self-consciously subjective, but I do object when that belief makes inaccurate predictive claims on the objective world or attempts to place all other beliefs on equal footing, resulting in counterproductive behavior. In other words, I object to category confusion between objective and subjective reality.

</div>

<div> </div>

<div>Agreed, and I think this is precisely the point ultimately that I am making as supported by both Searle and Nagel.</div>

<div>

<div> </div>

<p>Unfortunately, such category confusion seems to be integral to most religious systems and basic to their transformative power.</p>

<p>

</p>

<p> </p>

<p>On that, we would disagree. Clearly Buddhism, Taoism and other Eastern religions transform individuals while saying that the "world is illusion", a point of view not unlike my own, and I think a point which is neglected in Mormonism as we have known it because Mormonism is still "stuck" in a Neoplatonic, dualistic sectarian philosophical system because the Restoration was properly a religious movement without a philosophical base, and I think we are now perhaps seeing a glimmer of movement away from that toward a firmer philosophical grounding more appropriate to an understanding of religious experience and its "reality".</p>

</div>

<p> </p>

<div>

This is debatable. IMO, it would be more accurate to say mental states <em>are</em> chemical states. Although we experience it as a unified, linear process, thought is actually the result of thousands of reasoning circuits working in coordination to analyze practical problems. Each of those reasoning circuits can in turn be broken down into a variety of component processes-- and so on down to the level of subatomic particles. Each of these represents a different level of organization. It's dubious to speak of a higher level of organization "causing" changes at a lower level, since the behavior of the higher-level system is actually just a combination of lower-level processes. Don't get me wrong; it is the combination that enables the system to perform a useful function. The higher level of organization is essential. But does it act as a causal agent on its own components? That's entirely a matter of perspective.

</div>

<div> </div>

<div>See of course the Searle quotes etc above.</div>

<p> </p>

<div>

You can say whatever you want, but some claims have predictive value while others do not.

</div>

<div> </div>

<div>Uh huh. </div>

<div> </div>

<div>Until last week no one doubted that anything could move faster than the speed of light. Until a while ago, no one doubted that Pluto was a planet. Scientific predictive value is not exactly immutable and unchangeable either </div>

Edited September 27, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

I have no idea why the above post is formatted as it is. Fortunately it is mostly readable.

I am trying to re-format it now

Later:

Sorry - gotta go - got about half way done. I don't have a clue what happened- hope it is legible

Edited September 27, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Chris Smith]

Hey mfb,

Sure it does. I clearly experience the fact that I can't fly. I have no doubt about that and never have. Even if I wanted to fly, I would quickly experience falling if I jumped off of something. That experience would be incontrovertible evidence of my inability to fly- or that I am "constrained" by gravity.

This confuses the experience of constraint with the cause of the experience of constraint. You seem to be saying I experience myself as constrained because I experience myself as constrained. That is a tautology which has no practical value whatsoever. The fact is that we can observe a causal relationship between our experience of constraint and observed "things" when accurately perceived (i.e. what we call reality). Unlike your tautology, this observation is actually useful for enhancing our subjective experience.

As for the quote from Searle, his point is very similar to the point I made in my post above. Namely, in a complex system the highest level of organization is essential to the system's operation, and it's certainly accurate to speak of this level as a causal agent from a certain point of view; but from another point of view the causal powers of this level can be considered illusive, since they're completely explained and determined by interactions happening at lower organizational levels.

I think where Searle goes wrong is in his idiosyncratic uses of the concepts of "ontology" and "irreducibility" in trying to distinguish consciousness from the solidity of a wheel. Normally the term "ontology" refers to the study of the "objective" realm; to say consciousness has its own "subjective ontology" is simply to say that it has "phenomenology". That's what distinguishes consciousness from a wheel: consciousness has phenomenology, whereas a wheel does not. As for saying phenomenology is irreducible whereas solidity is not, this is just something we say to make ourselves feel good. Both the phenomenology of a brain and the solidity of a wheel are functionalities produced by interactions at lower levels of organization. (Phenomenology consists basically of self-reflexive logic and recognition processes occuring in the physical brain.) Both functionalities would cease to exist if the parts were separated from the system, but both systems are presumably fully capable of being broken down and explained in terms of their parts, if you had the time and technology to do so. (Nagel's protestations notwithstanding.)

But even correspondence theorists make provisions for mistakes, mirages, hallucinations etc. Her belief that your friend saw a naked man would be just as unjustifiable to a correpondence theorist as it would be to a Pragmatist.

I'm not sure how this speaks to my point, which is that we need a set of operative concepts to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate perceptions, and your purely phenomenological account of knowledge apparently offers none.

Clearly Buddhism, Taoism and other Eastern religions transform individuals while saying that the world is illusion, a point of view not unlike my own.

This statement is a bit afield of the statement it's responding to, so I'm not sure how to respond. But as an aside, I'm really a Buddhist at heart. On one influential interpretation, Siddhartha was a reductionist who felt the self is nothing more than a completely determined material aggregate whose sense of autonomy, integrity, and freedom is a complete illusion. Like me, he rejected the notion that phenomenology constitutes its own "ontology", and the moral implications he drew from this insight are very similar to the ones I draw from it. Though living as I do in a more comfortable age, I take a rather more optimistic view.

You might find this post interesting.

Peace,

-Chris

Edited September 28, 2011 by Chris Smith