Mormon Times Article on If/And Conditionals

[Daniel Peterson]

Okay then, if Joseph Smith's capacities, limitations, culture, mood, etc. produced the if/and conditionals, how are they evidence of an underlying Hebrew text?

Sigh. Did I say that Joseph Smith's capacities, limitations, culture, mood, etc. produced the if/and conditionals?

Answer: No, I didn't.

Hence, your question is moot.

I do believe, however, that revelation is typically (though not always) mediated through the capacities, limitations, culture, mood, etc. of the person receiving the revelation. I was contesting your claim that Joseph Smith didn't do it, but that God did it, simpliciter. I don't believe that Joseph was a puppet on a string. There were at least two minds involved, interacting.

Precisely how the revelation of the Book of Mormon occurred, and what all the factors involved might have been, I do not know. Whether all of the factors always interacted in precisely the same way, I cannot tell. As I believe I've pointed out, I have no unified theory on these matters. The data are insufficient for the construction of such a theory. Joseph was asked, and expressly declined to elaborate on such things. I don't pretend to know more than the sources say.

[Brade]

I finished one of the major items on my list much more quickly than I had anticipated -- gee, I'm good -- and so, like a dog to its . . . whatever, I'm back. Briefly.

We can never, I think, definitively say with absolute 100% certainty, that x is a Semiticism. We can say that it seems extremely likely to be one, but, historically speaking, few non-trivial claims can be established with mathematical certainty. We're typically dealing with induction (and limited, spotty data) rather than with deduction from fully-formed and perfectly clear premises.

I have to admit that I'm not quite sure that I understand you. But I'll give it a try.

That an act occurred is, it seems to me, usually a very clearly distinct fact from the motivation for the act. Thus, for instance, we might be absolutely certain that Franky shot Johnny. Three hundred eyewitnesses saw the deed, Franky's fingerprints were all over the murder weapon (which was registered to Franky), and etc. However, since Officer Krupke fatally shot Franky right after Franky shot Johnny, and since Franky confided in nobody and left no note, we may never understand the motive. Perhaps there will be some clues, even some fairly well-founded conjectures, but perhaps not. The lack of a motive for Franky's action, however, in no way casts doubt upon the fact that Franky shot Johnny, or, for that matter, that Johnny was shot by Franky, or, to make it even more abstract, that there was a fatal shooting.

Likewise, that an expression in Matthew or John is a Semiticism can be established to a high degree of confidence without our knowing a single thing about the translator, his motives, his knowledge of Greek and/or Hebrew and/or Aramaic, his state of mind at the time of his translation, or anything else of that kind.

That "if/and" conditionals occur in Hebrew is certain, as is the fact that the Book of Mormon claims to have emerged from a group of Hebrews. That they occur in the English Book of Mormon is reasonably well established. That they do not otherwise occur in English is pretty securely established. All these facts, taken together, suggest -- though they do not prove -- that the Book of Mormon, in this case, manifests a Semiticism that is consistent with its claimed origin. We can affirm this without knowing anything about the translator at all.

Does that make sense? Does it help?

Thanks for the response. Makes sense to me.

[Brade]

I think the assumption that he is in this to have it make sense is...... well, you know what they say about assumptions.

[Fifth Columnist]

Sigh. Did I say that Joseph Smith's capacities, limitations, culture, mood, etc. produced the if/and conditionals?

Answer: No, I didn't.

Hence, your question is moot.

I thought we were discussing the specific translation of the if/and conditionals, but apparently you thought we were discussing the BOM translation generally.

Let me repost what I said before with a few slight clarifications to remove any misunderstanding.

I'm not asking for a grand unified theory of translation. I would just like ANY plausible explanation that accounts for who conducted the translation of the if/and conditionals. So far three options have been put forth for translators: God, God's translation department, or Joseph Smith. I think you rightly recognize the latter one is DOA for this particular apologetic argument. That leaves God or his translation department. Unfortunately, those are almost as problematic.

My point is that Joseph Smith could not have been responsible for the if/and conditionals. The only people left are God and/or his angels.

I do believe, however, that revelation is typically (though not always) mediated through the capacities, limitations, culture, mood, etc. of the person receiving the revelation. I was contesting your claim that Joseph Smith didn't do it, but that God did it, simpliciter. I don't believe that Joseph was a puppet on a string. There were at least two minds involved, interacting.

Precisely how the revelation of the Book of Mormon occurred, and what all the factors involved might have been, I do not know. Whether all of the factors always interacted in precisely the same way, I cannot tell. As I believe I've pointed out, I have no unified theory on these matters. The data are insufficient for the construction of such a theory. Joseph was asked, and expressly declined to elaborate on such things. I don't pretend to know more than the sources say.

I'm not disputing any of this except in the specific context of the if/and conditionals. They cannot have come from Joseph Smith or they are not evidence of an underlying Hebrew text.

You do not need a unified theory on these matters to answer the question of who was responsible for the translation of the if/and conditionals.

[Daniel Peterson]

My answer is that I don't know, that I can't know, that I don't think it particularly important, that I don't know what the motivation would be, that I continue to think the discovery of an apparent Semiticism like this one in the Book of Mormon significant, and that I see no serious reason not to do so.

I don't know how the translation process worked, in this particular passage or anywhere else. That Joseph Smith's mind, being involved (as it apparently was), might have been subject to some of the same factors that lead to contamination from the original language in ordinary translations seems to me distinctly possible. I don't say that that was so, however, because I don't and can't know that.

Consider Esperanto-language Text A, which claims to have been translated from a hypothetical Text B, written in Klingon. A native Esperanto speaker who also speaks fluent Klingon, reading Text A, discovers that it does indeed have certain features that are typical of Klingon but unheard of in any period or regional dialect of Esperanto. It is reasonable for that speaker to conclude that these Klingonesque features strengthen the claim of Text A to have been translated from Text B even in the absence of any knowledge whatever concerning who translated it, how many translators there were, when and/or where precisely the translation was done, why the Klingonisms survived translation, and etc. This is in fact, mutatis mutandis, arguably the case with the gospel of Matthew, as well as with many other texts from the ancient world.

[Chris Smith]

Perhaps some kind of "lexical" model of inspiration could explain it. For each word, Joseph received by inspiration its full range of lexical meanings, and had to make some kind of judgment between them.

[Fifth Columnist]

My answer is that I don't know, that I can't know, that I don't think it particularly important, that I don't know what the motivation would be, that I continue to think the discovery of an apparent Semiticism like this one in the Book of Mormon significant, and that I see no serious reason not to do so.

I think your theory has a pretty serious flaw when you can't come up with any plausible explanation for how to get from A to B, i.e., who translated the particular hebraism in question.

I don't know how the translation process worked, in this particular passage or anywhere else. That Joseph Smith's mind, being involved (as it apparently was), might have been subject to some of the same factors that lead to contamination from the original language in ordinary translations seems to me distinctly possible. I don't say that that was so, however, because I don't and can't know that.

How could it even be possible for Joseph Smith's mind to be involved in the if/and conditionals and still rely on them as some indication of an underlying Hebrew text?

Edit to add: It looks like Chris is trying to help you out on this one.

Consider Esperanto-language Text A, which claims to have been translated from a hypothetical Text B, written in Klingon. A native Esperanto speaker who also speaks fluent Klingon, reading Text A, discovers that it does indeed have certain features that are typical of Klingon but unheard of in any period or regional dialect of Esperanto. It is reasonable for that speaker to conclude that these Klingonesque features strengthen the claim of Text A to have been translated from Text B even in the absence of any knowledge whatever concerning who translated it, how many translators there were, when and/or where precisely the translation was done, why the Klingonisms survived translation, and etc. This is in fact, mutatis mutandis, arguably the case with the gospel of Matthew, as well as with many other texts from the ancient world.

That's a good hypothetical . . . if we assume that we have no knowledge whatsoever concerning who was involved in translating it. Your hypothetical doesn't clarify that the Klingon features produce exceptionally bad Esperanto grammar. So much so that any translator would know not to do such a thing. Under your hypothetical, I suppose that we can simply assume that the translator didn't know what he was doing when he produced the exceptionally bad Esperanto grammar.

However, let's assume that we know the following two things: (1) we know that the person who recorded the translation in Esperanto had no ability whatsoever to translate Klingon into Esperanto and (2) an omniscient, omnipotent, perfect being revealed the translation to said person. That makes it a really hard to figure out how such poor grammar could pass through the translation. It can't be the recipient's fault or it wouldn't constitute evidence of an underlying Klingon text. It's also hard to believe that it is the fault of the perfect being since, well, he is perfect.

[Fifth Columnist]

Perhaps some kind of "lexical" model of inspiration could explain it. For each word, Joseph received by inspiration its full range of lexical meanings, and had to make some kind of judgment between them.

At least you are trying to bridge the gap. That would be one heck of a translation process if Joseph received the full range of lexical meanings for each word and then had to choose one. Also, maybe Joseph chose the wrong meaning thereby explaining the presence of the if/and conditionals.

[Chris Smith]

At least you are trying to bridge the gap. That would be one heck of a translation process if Joseph received the full range of lexical meanings for each word and then had to choose one.

I agree. Especially since he would also have to be somehow inspired as to the words' order and grammatical function. The "divine dictation" and "conceptual inspiration" models would be a lot more workable in practice, but it doesn't seem to me that either of those are compatible with the apologetic under discussion here.

Also, maybe Joseph chose the wrong meaning thereby explaining the presence of the if/and conditionals.

Yeah, that was the idea.

[Daniel Peterson]

I think your theory has a pretty serious flaw when you can't come up with any plausible explanation for how to get from A to B, i.e., who translated the particular hebraism in question.

I don't have a theory.

For the nth time.

How could it even be possible for Joseph Smith's mind to be involved in the if/and conditionals and still rely on them as some indication of an underlying Hebrew text?

Good grief.

I don't know -- as I believe I've said several times before -- how the translation process worked, but it's not at all difficult for me to imagine several ways in which such a thing might have happened.

Edit to add: It looks like Chris is trying to help you out on this one.

And, if so, I appreciate it, even though I don't feel the need of any help. I'm quite comfortable with things as they stand.

Unlike me, Chris is a decent person.

That's a good hypothetical . . . if we assume that we have no knowledge whatsoever concerning who was involved in translating it. Your hypothetical doesn't clarify that the Klingon features produce exceptionally bad Esperanto grammar.

I didn't feel the need. I don't regard the "if/and" as "exceptionally bad." As I said before -- I think we're into the boring repetition phase of this exchange now -- I don't think that the "if/and" conditional was incomprehensible to its English-speaking readers. If it was, I've encountered no evidence of that.

However, let's assume that we know the following two things: (1) we know that the person who recorded the translation in Esperanto had no ability whatsoever to translate Klingon into Esperanto and (2) an omniscient, omnipotent, perfect being revealed the translation to said person. That makes it a really hard to figure out how such poor grammar could pass through the translation. It can't be the recipient's fault or it wouldn't constitute evidence of an underlying Klingon text. It's also hard to believe that it is the fault of the perfect being since, well, he is perfect.

Your expectations of what God would do, or would allow, are obviously far more specific than mine. I'm really quite serenely unperturbed by the "if/and" conditionals in the Original Manuscript and the 1830 first edition. Perhaps, for his own purposes -- which he may well have disclosed fully to you but has not vouchsafed to me -- he was no more troubled by them than I am.

[mfbukowski]

Perhaps some kind of "lexical" model of inspiration could explain it. For each word, Joseph received by inspiration its full range of lexical meanings, and had to make some kind of judgment between them.

Sounds reasonable to me.

In my opinion what was happening here is that Joseph was receiving "Hebraic thought patterns" which he then spoke using his own words.

[mfbukowski]

I think your theory has a pretty serious flaw when you can't come up with any plausible explanation for how to get from A to B, i.e., who translated the particular hebraism in question.

How is this in any way even possibly knowable? Even coming up with a theory would be unprovable anyway- what's your point?

[mfbukowski]

At least you are trying to bridge the gap. That would be one heck of a translation process if Joseph received the full range of lexical meanings for each word and then had to choose one. Also, maybe Joseph chose the wrong meaning thereby explaining the presence of the if/and conditionals.

Your mechanistic model is absurd.

Have you ever translated anything in your life? You try to capture the flavor and nuances of the original which can be quite quite different from a literal translation. And yet this "translation" was inspired.

Ask Beethoven how he "received" his Fifth Symphony and whether or not any notes were out of place and how they might have been improved. Who could possibly know alternative phrasing for any given passage?

If you are interested in scientific data, why are you asking questions which are in principle not answerable scientifically? You are being methodologically inconsistent.

What data could possibly answer you? Even attempting to answer these questions is a waste of time. How could Shakespeare have ended Hamlet differently?

[mfbukowski]

I don't have a theory.

For the nth time.

Good grief.

I don't know -- as I believe I've said several times before -- how the translation process worked, but it's not at all difficult for me to imagine several ways in which such a thing might have happened.

And, if so, I appreciate it, even though I don't feel the need of any help. I'm quite comfortable with things as they stand.

Even if you came up with a theory, whether or not it was correct would be unknowable, so even creating a theory is irrelevant to knowing the truth. Any reasonable explanation would remain that- a reasonable explanation of something unknowable.

That's just the way things are sometimes. There are just things in this world which will remain unknowable, especially when they involve the internal workings of someone else's mind.

[Chris Smith]

Even if you came up with a theory, whether or not it was correct would be unknowable, so even creating a theory is irrelevant to knowing the truth. Any reasonable explanation would remain that- a reasonable explanation of something unknowable.

That's just the way things are sometimes. There are just things in this world which will remain unknowable, especially when they involve the internal workings of someone else's mind.

On the other hand, it is useful to know whether workable explanations exist, even if we are not likely to be able to decide which one is true. For example, if my theory is that Joseph Smith plagiarized a book written in Africa in the 3rd century A.D., then it is not enough for me to say, "Well, how he got ahold of it is unknowable, but the evidence strongly suggests that he did!" Unless I can show that there is at least one plausible way he could have had access to it, my theory will be essentially dead in the water, even if I have identified fairly strong parallels between the two works. Thus if I want to persuade others of my theory, it is incumbent upon me to produce at least one such plausible scenario.

So, it's not as though Fifth Columnist's questions are absurd, or this is a useless thought experiment, even if it is ultimately impossible to decide among the plausible explanations the thought experiment produces.

[Brant Gardner]

On the other hand, it is useful to know whether workable explanations exist, even if we are not likely to be able to decide which one is true. . . . Thus if I want to persuade others of my theory, it is incumbent upon me to produce at least one such plausible scenario.

Shameless promotion notice follows:

I realize that it is useless for this particular conversation, but I have a manuscript submitted which lays out my theory of the translation process. Whether anyone believes it or not, I think I can provide an explanation for the type of translation we have in the Book of Mormon. As Dr. Peterson has noted, it is not a single process, but one which used different methods for different reasons. I believe that I can show which methods were used in which instances, and why they used when they were. I attempt an explanation for how one translates with seer stones, and how that process generates the features of the text. Heck, I even toss in an explanation for why Oliver couldn't translate when it really appears that Joseph believed that he could.

I examined the text for evidence to support three possible types of translation; literalist, functional, and conceptual. I had thought that I would find only one of them. I found all three. Most often, the text is a functional equivalence. There are specific conditions where the evidence points to a literalist translation and a couple of cases where I believe I can demonstrate that there is only a conceptual connection to the underlying plate text. It is probably not a surprise to any who might remember any of my comments on the translation process, but I cannot find sufficient support for the Hebrew language hypothesis. There are so many excellent LDS scholars who have supported that hypothesis that I confess I am a little nervous to be in the opposing camp, but at least we will have a specific argument and analysis to frame the examination.

Now--if I can only get my publisher to give us the green light to start editing and get it ready.

[Uncertain]

Maybe. Maybe not.

I'm inclined to resist notions that physics and chemistry, because they're quantifiable, are legitimate ways of knowing, while history, which resists quantification, is not -- or, anyway, is less legitimate.

Hi Daniel,

This thread has progressed considerably since I left and I haven't read all the responses yet but I wanted to clear up some misunderstandings. I am not arguing history is a less legitimate way of knowing depending on how you would define "knowing". I would argue when it comes to determining the underlying truth of what the universe really is the less rigorous and precise the methodology used the less confidence we should have that we have accurately determined what the underlying "truth" really is. For example I can with high accuracy weight the mass of an object and have great confidence in the results. There may be very well supported events in history I can say the same thing but in many cases historical reconstruction produces far more ambiguous results. So if you define "knowing" at arriving at those conclusions which accurately describe how the universe really is than yes physics and chemistry are more legitimate ways of knowing than history. In large part because they are quantifiable and reproducible. If on the other hand knowing is described as producing results which can be enlightening and helpful but which don't necessarily accurately reflect what really is. Than yes history, religion etc. can be just as legitimate as the hard sciences.

Unless you misspoke, you seem to be operating on the basis of an extraordinarily weird definition of "random coincidence."

Hmm, I was responding to your point here:

The monkeys-at-typewriters gambit isn't especially convincing in this instance. The "if/and" conditional isn't random; it pertains to the very linguistic tradition from which the original text claims to come, yet isn't characteristic (to put things mildly) of the linguistic tradition within which the English text resides.

I was trying to point out coincidences are coincidences because they seemingly fit some larger picture. If they didn't then they wouldn't be coincidences. Therefore the fact if/and conditionals seems to fit the larger BOM picture in no way means they can't be coincidences. The fact they do fit the larger picture is the very reason they are of interest. This seems like a straightforward use of coincidence to me what "weird definition" do you claim I am using?

But, of course, this hasn't been established with regard to the "if/and" conditionals in the Book of Mormon, though it has been asserted with some vigor.

Again, the burden of proof is not on the critic to show they are coincidences the burden of proof is on the person claiming they are not coincidences. And as of yet the apologetic argument has not met this burden.

I'm unpersuaded, though.

Well I'm unpersuaded the if/and conditionals are due to ancient Hebrews very occasionally slipping in if/and conditionals in a sea of normal conditionals. Or by the appeal to some sort of translation ex deus machina where on rare occasions the unknown translation process decides to include improper conditionals for inexplicable reasons. So we can both be unpersuaded together .

Best,

Uncertain

[mfbukowski]

On the other hand, it is useful to know whether workable explanations exist, even if we are not likely to be able to decide which one is true. For example, if my theory is that Joseph Smith plagiarized a book written in Africa in the 3rd century A.D., then it is not enough for me to say, "Well, how he got ahold of it is unknowable, but the evidence strongly suggests that he did!" Unless I can show that there is at least one plausible way he could have had access to it, my theory will be essentially dead in the water, even if I have identified fairly strong parallels between the two works. Thus if I want to persuade others of my theory, it is incumbent upon me to produce at least one such plausible scenario.

So, it's not as though Fifth Columnist's questions are absurd, or this is a useless thought experiment, even if it is ultimately impossible to decide among the plausible explanations the thought experiment produces.

I agree with your point completely, but I think that several "plausible explanations" have been offered, including your earlier comments, my comments, and now Brant's comments, which actually allude to evidence he has found, to show that Fifth's continued nagging lacks substance. I think That Fifth is so intent on going after Dr. P's confession that he doesn't know the unknowable, that Fifth is not reading the rest of the thread.

[mfbukowski]

I think that methodologically we LDS need to learn that we cannot gain more certainty on issues which do not admit of certainty by their very nature, by cloaking our arguments in quasi-scientific arguments, and admit that it all comes down to "revelation" and we can't know all the answers on many of these questions.

You cannot build a bridge out of spider webs and chewing gum no matter how solid you can make it look. I had a client who was an engineer who used to design machine tools used in space travel and which needed incredibly close tolerances. He would refer to those who made such arguments as "trying to machine cold butter".

[Uncertain]

Uncertain, have you read that tongue in cheek article with the same level of critical attention you seem to apply to LDS apologetic material?

There are rather obvious errors such as "lo a word meaning no or not". The word "lo" in the Hebrew lexicon means to see or behold. "lo" as a prefix means no or not. But it does not show up in seven of the ten commandments.

The twelve element chiamus Patterson contrived is not a chiasmus. A "twelve part perfect inverse parallelism" where the second twelve elements do not parallel or invert the first six even remotely.

Those are errors that even an untrained eye can catch.

Glenn

Again the point of the article was to illustrate Hebracisms can and do occur by random chance. Therefore simply because Hebracisms are present does not mean the text was written by ancient Hebrews. For the sake of argument suppose Patterson was completely incorrect in the examples you give above. Does this in any way substantially weaken the main thesis that Hebracisms do and can occur by random chance? Are all the Hebracisms identified by Patterson in Green eggs and ham spurious? Are you arguing all Hebracisms in any text must be due to real Hebrews? Dr. Peterson already conceded this point probably because it is self evidently true that Hebracisms can and do occur by random chance.

I do strive to apply the very same standards of critical examination to critical arguments as to apologetic ones. Here is a post where I make the very same point I am making in this thread except aimed at a critical argument.

"I am immediately suspicious of any argument dependent on personal probabilistic intuition. There is amply evidence (I can provide examples if you like) that as human beings we are just not very good at probabilistic intuition even experts. We have a pronounced tendency to place undue weight on things we view as "unlikely" events. Hence I find the critical argument concerning Comoro/Moroni to be unconvincing. Because the heart of the argument is an appeal to probabilistic intuition i.e(based on my probabilistic intuition such a pairing is unlikely to happen by random chance therefore JS borrowed this pairing). No attempt is made to rigorously estimate exactly how unlikley such a pairing would be. Also keep in mind even if it is very unlikley the question is not how likely is it that Comoro/Moroni would randomly be paired together. The question is given all possible such word pairings in the BOM and all possible such word pairings in the world how likely is it that purely by random chance a word pairing in the BOM would match such a pairing from the real world. "

It is flawed methodology whether an apologist or critic is doing it.

Best,

Uncertain

[WalkerW]

Shameless promotion notice follows:

I realize that it is useless for this particular conversation, but I have a manuscript submitted which lays out my theory of the translation process. Whether anyone believes it or not, I think I can provide an explanation for the type of translation we have in the Book of Mormon. As Dr. Peterson has noted, it is not a single process, but one which used different methods for different reasons. I believe that I can show which methods were used in which instances, and why they used when they were. I attempt an explanation for how one translates with seer stones, and how that process generates the features of the text. Heck, I even toss in an explanation for why Oliver couldn't translate when it really appears that Joseph believed that he could.

I examined the text for evidence to support three possible types of translation; literalist, functional, and conceptual. I had thought that I would find only one of them. I found all three. Most often, the text is a functional equivalence. There are specific conditions where the evidence points to a literalist translation and a couple of cases where I believe I can demonstrate that there is only a conceptual connection to the underlying plate text. It is probably not a surprise to any who might remember any of my comments on the translation process, but I cannot find sufficient support for the Hebrew language hypothesis. There are so many excellent LDS scholars who have supported that hypothesis that I confess I am a little nervous to be in the opposing camp, but at least we will have a specific argument and analysis to frame the examination.

Now--if I can only get my publisher to give us the green light to start editing and get it ready.

And I am beyond excited to read this!

[Glenn101]

Again, the burden of proof is not on the critic to show they are coincidences the burden of proof is on the person claiming they are not coincidences. And as of yet the apologetic argument has not met this burden.

Best,

Uncertain

Why does anyone have to prove that a Hebraic if/and conditional is not a coincidence? That is again trying to prove a negative. The burden of proof is upon the critic to prove or at least show some evidence that they are coincidences. All the apologist has to do is show that they are there, and legitimate. I do not recall anyone disputing that the if/and conditional is not Hebraic. I am not sure what the argument is by some that the passages identified as if/and conditionals are not really if/and conditionals.

The discovery of Hebraic structures, idioms, etc. is still ongoing. This work has been put forth as evidence that the Book of Mormon has Hebraic roots. Not proof, just evidence. Right now, the preponderance of evidence points towards Hebraic roots for the Book of Mormon. It is up to the critic to show otherwise, by a preponderance of evidence. That is what the critics have failed to do.

Glenn

[Uncertain]

Why does anyone have to prove that a Hebraic if/and conditional is not a coincidence? That is again trying to prove a negative.

No it's not, there is an entire branch of statistics (hypothesis testing) devoted to determining if a given series of observations are likely to be due to chance. In fact showing that an observation is likely not due to random chance is almost always included in any scientific manuscript. It is standard procedure. There are very good reasons for this and those reasons don't go away just because we start talking about the BOM.

The burden of proof is upon the critic to prove or at least show some evidence that they are coincidences.

The burden of proof is on the one making the claim. If an apologists is claiming a series of observations are not due to random chance they have to back this up. Again this is absolutely standard procedure and there are good reasons for this. Otherwise anyone can easily claim anything they wish without having to back up that claim with rigorous methodology. I would write up a manuscript claiming the more tigers in a zoo the higher the crime rate and conclude my article with "prove me wrong critics!". The literature would be littered with unsubstantiated claims waiting for someone to address each one and prove them wrong. It is far easier to make unsubstantiated claims than it is to rigorously evaluate such claims.

More to the point if apologists can't show if/and conditionals are likely not due to random chance this greatly weakens their argument why in the world should I believe they are probably due to ancient Hebrews when reasonable alternative possibilities have not been ruled out?

The discovery of Hebraic structures, idioms, etc. is still ongoing. This work has been put forth as evidence that the Book of Mormon has Hebraic roots. Not proof, just evidence. Right now, the preponderance of evidence points towards Hebraic roots for the Book of Mormon. It is up to the critic to show otherwise, by a preponderance of evidence. That is what the critics have failed to do.

Glenn

(bold added by me)

This is debatable a matter for reasoned discussion. It is certainly not a questioned settled by assertion.

Best,

Uncertain

[William Schryver]

Perhaps some kind of "lexical" model of inspiration could explain it. For each word, Joseph received by inspiration its full range of lexical meanings, and had to make some kind of judgment between them.

Mmmmm

[William Schryver]

Shameless promotion notice follows:

I realize that it is useless for this particular conversation, but I have a manuscript submitted which lays out my theory of the translation process. Whether anyone believes it or not, I think I can provide an explanation for the type of translation we have in the Book of Mormon. As Dr. Peterson has noted, it is not a single process, but one which used different methods for different reasons. I believe that I can show which methods were used in which instances, and why they used when they were. I attempt an explanation for how one translates with seer stones, and how that process generates the features of the text. Heck, I even toss in an explanation for why Oliver couldn't translate when it really appears that Joseph believed that he could.

I examined the text for evidence to support three possible types of translation; literalist, functional, and conceptual. I had thought that I would find only one of them. I found all three. Most often, the text is a functional equivalence. There are specific conditions where the evidence points to a literalist translation and a couple of cases where I believe I can demonstrate that there is only a conceptual connection to the underlying plate text. It is probably not a surprise to any who might remember any of my comments on the translation process, but I cannot find sufficient support for the Hebrew language hypothesis. There are so many excellent LDS scholars who have supported that hypothesis that I confess I am a little nervous to be in the opposing camp, but at least we will have a specific argument and analysis to frame the examination.

Now--if I can only get my publisher to give us the green light to start editing and get it ready.

I will, naturally, withhold judgment until after I read all of what you have to say on the matter. I