Mormons and the First Cause

[Ambrose]

His argument in short is that all that can be seen about "causes" is that no logical connection can be seen between two events- event A may always preceed B and we can infer causation, but no logically necessary connection can be drawn. We cannot know with a priori certitude that A was the "cause" of B, just that it preceded it. I think he is right. Scientifically of course we observe and conclude about causes through induction, but that is a different type of argument. The proof of God as a first cause cannot be inductively shown because we cannot see God- but we still cannot logically prove the existence of a first cause.

Please, forgive my inability to adequately discuss these questions, as I am still young in my studies in philosophy, theology, of St. Thomas and those inspired by him. I should also point out that I use a poor translation of the Summa (the new one should be arriving soon).

St. Thomas, in building his cathedral of Catholic doctrine (the Summas), laid foundations that we cannot avoid walking on. Whether we are to explore the theology of St. Thomas or the philosophy of Hume, our knowledge must begin with just that, knowledge, or a knowledge of knowledge. This epistemological question is fundamental to a Catholic; this is fundamental to a Mormon, for as the saint says, " . . . faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected."

Again, I must apologize as I attempt to answer you, mfbukowski, as I am not a student; I am a young private reader who is trying to piece together an adequate knowledge of these things.

The first article of the second question (STh. I, QII, A2) tells us how St. Thomas goes about answering anything. "Demonstration can be made in two ways. One is through the cause, and is called propterquid, and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration quia. This is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause."

St. Thomas, revealing that great Catholic tradition that matter is good, does not divorce his reason from his experience. He will depart drastically at some points from the classical philosopher in showing the unity of the senses and the intellect. "But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, but not the fact that it is in some way united to the body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas, and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating in things abstract (STh. I, QLXXXV, AI)."

Aristotle, as that great forerunner of Christian philosophy, took great notice of the senses and their relation to our knowledge. " . . . the beginning of our knowledge is from the senses", he says (Metaphysics I, I; see also Posterior Analytics, II, 19).

This is the start of the great middle road that St. Thomas forges. For he also sees that we know things in another faculty, affirming what Aristotle says, "the universal is known by reason, and the singular is known by sense."

St. Thomas' Five Ways of demonstrating the existence of God is built upon this solid epistemology: That what we experience is indeed reality. From that reality comes all our knowledge and all of our arguments.

"From effects proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects, though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence (STh. I, QII, A2)."

Hume's objection rests on a faulty epistemology and the reduction of the concrete to the abstract. St. Thomas' argument rests on the concrete and reveals the abstract by it.

I seem to recall elsewhere in the Summa, perhaps it is there in the Five Ways, that St. Thomas argues for our knowledge of causation. But I am still far to unfamiliar with the text to speak definitively. If you have not yet,--although, I am certain you have--check out Lonergan's Insight, as it was wonderfully helpful in the formation of my epistemology which might be rightly called a shadow of St. Thomas'.

[soren]

Well good, I don't know Feser, but with a quick Google I see he is a young and upcoming Thomist who might have a new twist on this whole thing. Maybe you can teach me something valuable, but I think Thomism as a whole is long gone and can't hold a candle to analytical philosophy- I am pretty much a Willam James- Wittgenstein guy, so it could be an interesting discussion. I also see that Feser teaches or has taught at both LMU and Pasadena City both of which are just a few miles from me in either direction. Maybe I will like his stuff and go say hello.

It is clear to me that Thomism in general owes much to Aristotle obviously but certainly Aquinas was a great perpetuator of what I see as a major error which at first led to the great apostasy and later kept it alive, and that error was Neoplatonism.

But if this guy has cracked it open, that would make for an interesting discussion since I am a prejudiced old man, but still willing to learn from a "whippersnapper" (in the unlikely possibility I am wrong)

You already know Hume's argument, but for those who don't I'll post the customary Wikipedia link : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume

Another quickly found site seems to have a good discussion of Hume is here: http://www.spaceandmotion.com/Philosophy-David-Hume-Philosopher.htm

That site includes an actual quote from Hume, which is a novel idea:

The key to the whole argument imo is found in that last sentence "that these words are absolutely without meaning" which is the attitude which makes Hume the father of much of modern philosophy in the English language- it was he who understood that philosophy is not about what is "real" whatever that means, but indeed if we are to have rational discussions they will ultimately be about language itself and the logic thereof since arguments themselves by necessity are about words and how we define them. Language is all we have to communicate with and about- everything else is by definition non-communicable.

His argument in short is that all that can be seen about "causes" is that no logical connection can be seen between two events- event A may always preceed B and we can infer causation, but no logically necessary connection can be drawn. We cannot know with a priori certitude that A was the "cause" of B, just that it preceded it. I think he is right. Scientifically of course we observe and conclude about causes through induction, but that is a different type of argument. The proof of God as a first cause cannot be inductively shown because we cannot see God- but we still cannot logically prove the existence of a first cause.

If I understand anything about Feser from my literally five minute long google research, it seems that he finds that this very approach, which arguably defines "postmodernism" as what is wrong with the world.

So I would love to hear and discuss what it is that Hume got wrong since I am so deeply into that paradigm and frankly I think that Mormonism itself benefits from that paradigm whereas you will be forced into defending a view which looks very much like a Catholic point of view. But I am here to learn!

Second edit:

Oh yeah, and I agree that about the best out there right now from a Mormon pov is Ostler and McMurrin- also Paulsen is really great. Just google them and you will find some good stuff! I think I am pretty much a McMurrin pragmatist to be honest with you if you want a label, but it has been a while since I have read him.

mfbukowski,

I have just read over your posts with great interest, but I am only going to respond to the first one, since most everything else you stay stands upon it. You mention that Thomists don't understand what category mistakes are. This is a disappointing surprise, since the entire notion of category mistakes appeals to a principle of Aristotelian logic that is thoroughly imbibed in Thomistic philosophy. Aristotle's Organon beings with a short treatise on the Categories, in which he defines the ten highest genera of beings signified by non-composite expressions. Whether his division into ten categories is the right way to divide up being is disputable, but his basic idea, that you should not reason about relations as if they were a substances or substances as if they were properties, etc., is the same idea Ryle made again centuries later (and yet now seems to get all the credit for).

Hume's argument against causation is itself founded on a category error, which he inherited from Berkeley. Berkeley rejected the notion of universal concepts on the grounds that he could not find any in his own thoughts, because everything he can think of is a particular, not s universal. It is clear from his argument that Berkeley does not at all understand the theory of forms in either the Aristotelian or Platonist version. The giveaway is when Berkeley writes, "whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape or color...

[mfbukowski]

double post

[mfbukowski]

mfbukowski,

I have just read over your posts with great interest, but I am only going to respond to the first one, since most everything else you stay stands upon it.

Thank you for your very cogent post; I appreciate the opportunity to look at this question anew with someone who is as well-versed in this area as I know you are.

But I am afraid that we are so far apart that we may not have much to really talk about.

I read with interest your point about Aristotle's "categories" and must admit that you have a point, though of course as you mention, what Aristotle meant by "categories" is quite different from what Ryle meant by "categories", but of course you are right that he knew that confusing them was a logical error.

I think that what we are discussing here is a question, not of philosophy, but of meta-philosophy. The question really is about what the nature of

philosophy is and what kinds of questions are appropriate for philosophical discourse, and I think as I mentioned in my earlier posts, there is such a large disconnect between Thomism and linguistic analysis in a broad sense, that communication between us on these issues is nearly impossible.

I do not in any way mean to disparage the Catholic tradition, but just say that I disagree with it; I suppose it follows as well from its premises as any other system, but what I disagree with are the central premises.

One of the underlying assumptions of analytical philosophy is that the only medium of reasoning we have is linguistic and therefore it is relevant to philosophy to discuss the way we ordinarily think and speak of things, and especially in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, with whom I agree, ordinary language usage is of utmost importance.

On the other hand, Thomism has its own special terminology which has nothing to do with ordinary usage.

I think it is clear from your post that terms like "idea" "imagination" "accidents" "particulars" etc. have very different meanings for a Thomist than they do for the "man in the street" or in ordinary usage, so communication can become difficult. A classic example of this are the terms "Being" and "nature"- for the man in the street, "being" has virtually no meaning whatsoever- except perhaps in the context of "human being", and "nature" means what we see outside of cities- trees and fields, mountains and foliage etc. Of course we also have "human nature" but when the ordinary man of common sense speaks of human nature it means something quite different than it does to a Thomist who is discussing the "Nature" of man or more so, the "Nature of God".

I think any man on the street after a little training perhaps would understand why discussing the "color of virtue" makes no sense, or why a few men in uniform is not "The Navy" or why it is metaphorical to speak of "the voice of the earth", but it would be far less clear for that man to instantly apprehend that some of the categories you mention, like the category mistake you hold so obvious- the difference between "imaginable" and "understandable" and why one is "universal" and the other "particular".

Aristotle would agree with this statement, and it would pose him no troubles, because he divides the operations of cognition in to acts of imagination and acts of understanding. Imagination is the faculty for perceiving, remembering, and recombining experiences sensible objects. Understanding is the faculty that apprehends the natures of things. By definition, no universal concept is an object of imagination because sensible objects are necessarily particulars.

By seeking for universal ideas in the imagination, Berkeley reveals a very basic confusion about the classical theory he is attempting to refute. By assuming that universal concepts must be imaginable, rather than understandable, Berkeley attributes to them a property they could not possibly have, and that is the definition of a category mistake.

Hume's argument is a corollary to Berkeley's, and commits the same error. He critiques the notion of cause by examining whether it is an object of sensation.

Hume must answer the question "Is causation thinkable?" but he only answers the question "Is the concept of cause in the imagination?" The negative answer that he finds to the second question, which any Aristotelian or Thomist would have seen coming, implies no necessary conclusion to the first question.

The point I would like to make is that it is clear to virtually no one but a Thomist that in fact the "imagination" is a faculty for "perceiving"- the ordinary man on the street would not think he is "imagining" when he is "perceiving". Walking down the street he thinks he sees things as they are in their ever changing relationships, not static "accidents" in time and space held together by the imagination as an old silent movie holds together its various frames.

"Understanding" a sentence or a foreign language is not usually what we think of as "apprehending the nature of things", yet you have used the word "understanding" in that context.

"By definition, no universal concept is an object of imagination because sensible objects are necessarily particulars"

is a very interesting sentence, which I would suggest is a question-begging definition which ultimately flaws your central argument. If it is true "by definition" it is because, I would maintain, you are indeed defining the terms themselves in a peculiar way to make them "true".

It may be clear to you as a Thomist- almost axiomatic perhaps- that what you mean by a "universal concept" requires "imagination" and that sensible objects are "necessarily particulars" because as you say yourself THIS IS HOW YOU ARE DEFINING THE TERMS.

To me, "sensible objects" are things existing in time and space which we perceive as objects. Were we not to perceive them, we would not call them

"objects". The perception comes before their existence in a sense- I can think of nothing which exists which has not been perceived by a person, can you? Of course I would argue that we can in some sense "perceive" God's influence through the spirit, but that is another issue.

Because I have taken philosophy courses, I know what you mean by "particulars" and "accidents", but to the man on the street accidents are things to be avoided at all costs because they cause one's insurance costs to go up and may cause injuries.

Now I am not trying to be smart-alecky here, because clearly being on the side of "ordinary language" does not in any way imply that one is in fact right, or that anything I have said is "true"

But these facts illustrate the great gulf in methodology which separates us.

Your system is based on a constructed network of special definitions which has evolved literally over millenia to explain the details of your faith; my philosophical approach is based on a very different methodology - that of looking at the way the ordinary man speaks to uncover the hidden logic of the way he thinks, and that methodology is based almost entirely on the philosophy of the 20th century.

I don't think two approaches could be more opposed.

The intelligibility of causation is clear from the experience of motion. We do not merely see events in sequence, but we experience change and continuity at once. At one moment I see my hand in one place, then I see the same hand move to another place. The presence of continuity in change is grounds to posit a real distinction between subject and accident, and then between potency and act. From the latter real distinction it is possible to draw out all the terms necessary for the first mover argument.

We experience change and continuity at once because that is the nature of experience; the term "stream of consciousness" describes it well. It is only if one posits that change is not the normal state of the universe (Aristotle/Plato vs Heraclitus) that one sees change as needing a dualism between subject and accident, potency and act.

I just move my hand from here to there, that's all. One movement, no infinite regress of fractional movements a la Zeno, one experience of continuity of change, a movement of my hand, no paradoxes. We now live in a world of Einstein, not Ptolemy. The rest is unreal and unnecessary abstraction masquerading as something "real", a dualism introduced artificially by a system of question-begging definitions.

[mfbukowski]

Hume's objection rests on a faulty epistemology and the reduction of the concrete to the abstract. St. Thomas' argument rests on the concrete and reveals the abstract by it.

Thank you for your post.

I noticed that most of it was based on summarizing Aquinas' argument but not telling me why it works or doesn't work.

Maybe you could explain the above quote in your own words and tell me what it means because I am having trouble understanding it. How does one reduce the concrete to the abstract?

It sounds so abstract to me that I am not sure what you are saying, and frankly I am not sure you understand it either. Not that it's your fault- I think it is not understandable.

[soren]

Thank you for your very cogent post; I appreciate the opportunity to look at this question anew with someone who is as well-versed in this area as I know you are.

But I am afraid that we are so far apart that we may not have much to really talk about.

I read with interest your point about Aristotle's "categories" and must admit that you have a point, though of course as you mention, what Aristotle meant by "categories" is quite different from what Ryle meant by "categories", but of course you are right that he knew that confusing them was a logical error.

I think that what we are discussing here is a question, not of philosophy, but of meta-philosophy. The question really is about what the nature of

philosophy is and what kinds of questions are appropriate for philosophical discourse, and I think as I mentioned in my earlier posts, there is such a large disconnect between Thomism and linguistic analysis in a broad sense, that communication between us on these issues is nearly impossible.

I do not in any way mean to disparage the Catholic tradition, but just say that I disagree with it; I suppose it follows as well from its premises as any other system, but what I disagree with are the central premises.

One of the underlying assumptions of analytical philosophy is that the only medium of reasoning we have is linguistic and therefore it is relevant to philosophy to discuss the way we ordinarily think and speak of things, and especially in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, with whom I agree, ordinary language usage is of utmost importance.

On the other hand, Thomism has its own special terminology which has nothing to do with ordinary usage.

I think it is clear from your post that terms like "idea" "imagination" "accidents" "particulars" etc. have very different meanings for a Thomist than they do for the "man in the street" or in ordinary usage, so communication can become difficult. A classic example of this are the terms "Being" and "nature"- for the man in the street, "being" has virtually no meaning whatsoever- except perhaps in the context of "human being", and "nature" means what we see outside of cities- trees and fields, mountains and foliage etc. Of course we also have "human nature" but when the ordinary man of common sense speaks of human nature it means something quite different than it does to a Thomist who is discussing the "Nature" of man or more so, the "Nature of God".

I think any man on the street after a little training perhaps would understand why discussing the "color of virtue" makes no sense, or why a few men in uniform is not "The Navy" or why it is metaphorical to speak of "the voice of the earth", but it would be far less clear for that man to instantly apprehend that some of the categories you mention, like the category mistake you hold so obvious- the difference between "imaginable" and "understandable" and why one is "universal" and the other "particular".

The point I would like to make is that it is clear to virtually no one but a Thomist that in fact the "imagination" is a faculty for "perceiving"- the ordinary man on the street would not think he is "imagining" when he is "perceiving". Walking down the street he thinks he sees things as they are in their ever changing relationships, not static "accidents" in time and space held together by the imagination as an old silent movie holds together its various frames.

"Understanding" a sentence or a foreign language is not usually what we think of as "apprehending the nature of things", yet you have used the word "understanding" in that context.

is a very interesting sentence, which I would suggest is a question-begging definition which ultimately flaws your central argument. If it is true "by definition" it is because, I would maintain, you are indeed defining the terms themselves in a peculiar way to make them "true".

It may be clear to you as a Thomist- almost axiomatic perhaps- that what you mean by a "universal concept" requires "imagination" and that sensible objects are "necessarily particulars" because as you say yourself THIS IS HOW YOU ARE DEFINING THE TERMS.

To me, "sensible objects" are things existing in time and space which we perceive as objects. Were we not to perceive them, we would not call them

"objects". The perception comes before their existence in a sense- I can think of nothing which exists which has not been perceived by a person, can you? Of course I would argue that we can in some sense "perceive" God's influence through the spirit, but that is another issue.

Because I have taken philosophy courses, I know what you mean by "particulars" and "accidents", but to the man on the street accidents are things to be avoided at all costs because they cause one's insurance costs to go up and may cause injuries.

Now I am not trying to be smart-alecky here, because clearly being on the side of "ordinary language" does not in any way imply that one is in fact right, or that anything I have said is "true"

But these facts illustrate the great gulf in methodology which separates us.

Your system is based on a constructed network of special definitions which has evolved literally over millenia to explain the details of your faith; my philosophical approach is based on a very different methodology - that of looking at the way the ordinary man speaks to uncover the hidden logic of the way he thinks, and that methodology is based almost entirely on the philosophy of the 20th century.

I don't think two approaches could be more opposed.

We experience change and continuity at once because that is the nature of experience; the term "stream of consciousness" describes it well. It is only if one posits that change is not the normal state of the universe (Aristotle/Plato vs Heraclitus) that one sees change as needing a dualism between subject and accident, potency and act.

I just move my hand from here to there, that's all. One movement, no infinite regress of fractional movements a la Zeno, one experience of continuity of change, a movement of my hand, no paradoxes. We now live in a world of Einstein, not Ptolemy. The rest is unreal and unnecessary abstraction masquerading as something "real", a dualism introduced artificially by a system of question-begging definitions.

mfbukowski,

This is a conversation I have wanted to have with a Mormon for a very long time, and I regret that I must delay responding for a few weeks. I am in the middle of some intensive coursework that I would have to sacrifice in order to give this post the reply it deserves. Nevertheless, I will respond in about two and a half weeks when time will allow me again. If this thread is closed at that time, I will start a new one.

[BCSpace]

Would it be fair to say that Mormons still accept a First Cause of the Universe, considering we believe in eternal intelligence? Would intelligence thus be the First Cause?

I think our theology addresses a first cause for esch universe (the implication of many Gods), but it does not address any ultimate First Cause.

[Ahab]

I think our theology addresses a first cause for esch universe (the implication of many Gods), but it does not address any ultimate First Cause.

It may just be semantics, but I think by "universe" you mean galaxy, since in my mind the "universe" is one place which consists of everything in existence, including the space between galaxies and planets and the other things out there in... well, space, or the universe.

Other than that, though, I agree that our theology addresses the fact that there is no ultimate First Cause for everything, in the general sense, although there is a First Cause for each thing that happens, specifically.

[BCSpace]

I think our theology addresses a first cause for esch universe (the implication of many Gods), but it does not address any ultimate First Cause.

It may just be semantics, but I think by "universe" you mean galaxy, since in my mind the "universe" is one place which consists of everything in existence, including the space between galaxies and planets and the other things out there in... well, space, or the universe.

In String theory, scientists postulate not only other levels of the existing universe (other dimensions), but also other universes which are created (via a Big Bang) by smashing two branes together (yes, it's spelled b-r-a-n-e). There are as of yet no bounds to this universe other than age so I can mentally assign God on a universal level. I can handle a galactic level, but I think the universal level will turn out to be more accurate.

[zerinus]

It may just be semantics, but I think by "universe" you mean galaxy, since in my mind the "universe" is one place which consists of everything in existence, including the space between galaxies and planets and the other things out there in... well, space, or the universe.

Other than that, though, I agree that our theology addresses the fact that there is no ultimate First Cause for everything, in the general sense, although there is a First Cause for each thing that happens, specifically.

Was there a time (if "time" is the right word) where nothing existed, by which I mean no created thing?

[zerinus]

In String theory, scientists postulate not only other levels of the existing universe (other dimensions), but also other universes which are created (via a Big Bang) by smashing two branes together (yes, it's spelled b-r-a-n-e). There are as of yet no bounds to this universe other than age so I can mentally assign God on a universal level. I can handle a galactic level, but I think the universal level will turn out to be more accurate.

Elder Richard G. Scott, who is physicist as well as an Apostle, says that God "has created numberless cosmos and populated them with worlds". I have always wondered what he means by "cosmos". Does he mean galaxies or does he mean parallel universes? By "cosmos" I think people generally understand a universe, which contains many stars and galaxies.

[BCSpace]

Was there a time (if "time" is the right word) where nothing existed, by which I mean no created thing?

Would you accept matter unorganized? If so, I would say yes that there was such a time and probably many such times. Also, what is "matter unorganized"? is it a swirling cloud of gravitationally associated hydrogen atoms? Is it pure energy (from which matter is created at the rate of e=mc2)?

[zerinus]

Would you accept matter unorganized? If so, I would say yes that there was such a time and probably many such times. Also, what is "matter unorganized"? is it a swirling cloud of gravitationally associated hydrogen atoms? Is it pure energy (from which matter is created at the rate of e=mc2)?

I don't think you read my post very carefully. I said no created thing, not just anything. "Matter unorganized" is not a created thing.

[mfbukowski]

mfbukowski,

This is a conversation I have wanted to have with a Mormon for a very long time, and I regret that I must delay responding for a few weeks. I am in the middle of some intensive coursework that I would have to sacrifice in order to give this post the reply it deserves. Nevertheless, I will respond in about two and a half weeks when time will allow me again. If this thread is closed at that time, I will start a new one.

Great- I will look forward to it- I have been wanting to discuss it with a Catholic too!

[Ahab]

Was there a time (if "time" is the right word) where nothing existed, by which I mean no created thing?

No, and all the things that weren't created at one time and were later created at another time were created from the things that were already in existence, in some form or another.

Nothing was created from out of nothing, because from nothing you can only get nothing, unless you add something to the nothing, and at that point it's the something that is added to the nothing from which that "new" thing is created, except that it's not really "new" because that "new" thing came from the something which was added to the nothing, with that something being something that was already in existence.

[zerinus]

No, and all the things that weren't created at one time and were later created at another time were created from the things that were already in existence, in some form or another.

Nothing was created from out of nothing, because from nothing you can only get nothing, unless you add something to the nothing, and at that point it's the something that is added to the nothing from which that "new" thing is created, except that it's not really "new" because that "new" thing came from the something which was added to the nothing, with that something being something that was already in existence.

I chose my words carefully, trying to follow the pattern established by Joseph Smith in these words:

There are two personages ... by whom all things were created and made,

that are created and made,

whether visible or invisible ... (Lectures on Faith, 5:2.)

He chooses his words very carefully so as to exclude creation ex-nihilo. I had tried to do the same. So I will rephrase my question in these words: Was there a time when no created thing existed?

[Ahab]

I chose my words carefully, trying to follow the pattern established by Joseph Smith in these words:

There are two personages ... by whom all things were created and made,

that are created and made,

whether visible or invisible ... (Lectures on Faith, 5:2.)

He chooses his words very carefully so as to exclude creation ex-nihilo. I had tried to do the same. So I will rephrase my question in these words: Was there a time when no created thing existed?

Like what, maybe, for example?

A rock, maybe? No, because the elements from which that rock was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of rock, like a mountain, from which rocks are formed or created.

A drop of water, maybe? No, because the elements from which that water was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of water, like an ocean, from which that water was formed or created.

A chicken, maybe? No, because the elements from which that chicken was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of chickens, like the seed and sperm of another chicken, or chickens, from which that chicken was formed or created.

A dog, maybe? No, because the elements from which that dog was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of dogs, like the seed and sperm of another dog, or dogs, from which that dog was formed or created.

A man, maybe? No, because the elements from which that man was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of people, like the seed and sperm of another person, or persons, from which that person was formed or created.

What? What could there possibly be that did NOT come from God or something else that was capable of reproducing itself after its own kind?

[zerinus]

Like what, maybe, for example?

A rock, maybe? No, because the elements from which that rock was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of rock, like a mountain, from which rocks are formed or created.

A drop of water, maybe? No, because the elements from which that water was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of water, like an ocean, from which that water was formed or created.

A chicken, maybe? No, because the elements from which that chicken was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of chickens, like the seed and sperm of another chicken, or chickens, from which that chicken was formed or created.

A dog, maybe? No, because the elements from which that dog was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of dogs, like the seed and sperm of another dog, or dogs, from which that dog was formed or created.

A man, maybe? No, because the elements from which that man was created have always existed, in some form or another, either as a part of God or another source of people, like the seed and sperm of another person, or persons, from which that person was formed or created.

What? What could there possibly be that did NOT come from God or something else that was capable of reproducing itself after its own kind?

This is getting to be fun! I will try again. Was there a time when nothing had yet been created, either ex-nihilo (if you believe in ex-nihilo creation), or out of preexistent "elements" (if you believe in that kind of creation, as LDS do)?

[Ahab]

This is getting to be fun! I will try again. Was there a time when nothing had yet been created, either ex-nihilo (if you believe in ex-nihilo creation), or out of preexistent "elements" (if you believe in that kind of creation, as LDS do)?

I'm glad you're having fun with this. I'm really not trying to make this difficult.

My answer again, is: No, other than the things that were created from "preexistent" elements, if by "preexistent" you're referring to things that were already in existence. Those things were created, they just weren't created from nothing, because as I explained earlier, it isn't possible to get something from nothing, and it's even very difficult if not impossible to get nothing from something.

[zerinus]

I'm glad you're having fun with this. I'm really not trying to make this difficult.

My answer again, is: No, other than the things that were created from "preexistent" elements, if by "preexistent" you're referring to things that were already in existence. Those things were created, they just weren't created from nothing, because as I explained earlier, it isn't possible to get something from nothing, and it's even very difficult if not impossible to get nothing from something.

It may be that I am not undetstanding your meaning; but it seems to me that you are being deliberately evasive and/or illogical here. The essence of my queation and your answer appears to me to be as follows:

Q

. Was there a time when nothing had yet been created?

A

. No, other than the things that were created from "preexistent" elements.

It could be that my mind is not registering things correctly, but that appears to me to be an illogical and/or evasive answer.

[Ahab]

It may be that I am not undetstanding your meaning; but it seems to me that you are being deliberately evasive and/or illogical here. The essence of my queation and your answer appears to me to be as follows:

Q

. Was there a time when nothing had yet been created?

A

. No, other than the things that were created from "preexistent" elements.

It could be that my mind is not registering things correctly, but that appears to me to be an illogical and/or evasive answer.

I'm not trying to be evasive or illogical. I'm trying to give you as clear an answer as I know how to give you.

Maybe it would help if I explain what I mean by "created", which, to me, is all about "organization".

With that in mind, I'll now rephrase your question as it is coming through to me, to let you see what I think you are asking.

Q. Was there a time when nothing had yet been organized?

A. No, other than the things that were already organized. (I cut out the part about "from what" to try to make my point more clear).

Maybe I am being a bit illogical here, because I'm mentioning things that were organized rather than talking about only the things that were not organized, yet, but my reason for doing that is to point out there were things that were organized even while there were some other things that were not organized, yet, and I can see a relation between the things that weren't organized and the things that were organized because I can see that the things that were not organized were things that came from the things that were organized.

For example, a pile of rocks that wasn't organized coming from rocks that were organized.

I'll also try to get to what I think is the main point in your question like this:

Q. Was there a time when nothing was organized?

A. No, because there has always been something, rather than nothing, and what there was was organized to the extent that it was organized, even though there was some other stuff of that same stuff that was not organized.

I hope that makes a little more sense to you now.

Putting my thoughts into another person's mind isn't always an easy thing for me to do, and I can't do it alone.

[zerinus]

I'm not trying to be evasive or illogical. I'm trying to give you as clear an answer as I know how to give you.

Maybe it would help if I explain what I mean by "created", which, to me, is all about "organization".

With that in mind, I'll now rephrase your question as it is coming through to me, to let you see what I think you are asking.

Q. Was there a time when nothing had yet been organized?

A. No, other than the things that were already organized. (I cut out the part about "from what" to try to make my point more clear).

Maybe I am being a bit illogical here, because I'm mentioning things that were organized rather than talking about only the things that were not organized, yet, but my reason for doing that is to point out there were things that were organized even while there were some other things that were not organized, yet, and I can see a relation between the things that weren't organized and the things that were organized because I can see that the things that were not organized were things that came from the things that were organized.

For example, a pile of rocks that wasn't organized coming from rocks that were organized.

I'll also try to get to what I think is the main point in your question like this:

Q. Was there a time when nothing was organized?

A. No, because there has always been something, rather than nothing, and what there was was organized to the extent that it was organized, even though there was some other stuff of that same stuff that was not organized.

I hope that makes a little more sense to you now.

Putting my thoughts into another person's mind isn't always an easy thing for me to do, and I can't do it alone.

Thank you. I am sure I am the one who is being obtuse here. But to continue the discussion, maybe I should rephrase my question as follows:

Q

. Was there a time when nothing had yet been organized by an intelligent being?

[Ahab]

Thank you. I am sure I am the one who is being obtuse here. But to continue the discussion, maybe I should rephrase my question as follows:

Q

. Was there a time when nothing had yet been organized by an intelligent being?

My answer: No, and I consider ALL kinds of life-forms to be some kind of intelligent being.

[zerinus]

My answer: No, and I consider ALL kinds of life-forms to be some kind of intelligent being.

Thank you. By "nothing" meant to include life forms that might themselves have been organized by a higher life form. Let me see if I can rephrase my question differently so as to exclude that possibility:

Q

. Was there a time when nothing (including other life forms) had been organized by a (higher) life form and intelligent being?

[Ahab]

Thank you. By "nothing" meant to include life forms that might themselves have been organized by a higher life form. Let me see if I can rephrase my question differently so as to exclude that possibility:

Q

. Was there a time when nothing (including other life forms) had been organized by a (higher) life form and intelligent being?

Are you asking, in other words, if there was ever a time when God was all there was in existence... with God defined as a kind of being comprised of different persons and with that kind of being also being the best creator/organizer in all of existence... and yet with God having nothing to create/organize other than the kind of being God is?

If so, No, I really don't think so.

I believe all kinds of being in existence today have always been in existence as that kind of being, with no beginning to any kind of being in existence, although there have always been some micro-evolution type changes among each kind of being which can be regarded as a somewhat of a "new" creation. Furthermore, I also believe there have always been rocks and bodies of water (like lakes and rivers and oceans) and elements like carbon and oxygen, as well as the more basic building block elements which comprise all matter in existence.

Those are the things I believe God, as a kind of being, has always created (or organized) throughout all of eternity, as opposed to there only being that kind of being and nothing else in existence for that kind of being to create/organize.