Are cureloms imaginary?

[Honorentheos]

3 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

I don't accept a clear division between mind and world so I just don't by this line of reasoning at all. There's no clear place we can make the divide you make. Take just your comment "five senses." I recognize you're speaking loosely, so forgive me for going pedantic but I think it important. There's simply not five senses. There are hundreds if not more sensory inputs. But they are pre-processed in various ways before reaching my awareness. By the time I'm aware of them they're already integrated. To give an example when I look at my keyboard I don't see color patches that I then consciously interpret to make a keyboard. Rather as it comes to my consciousness it comes as a slew of different objects including coming as a keyboard..

It seems to me that we need to decide if we are discussing your view of Alma 32 regardless of the content of Alma 32 (meaning it's acceptable to add or ignore the text as one will) or the original argument that when one takes Alma 32 and the LoF together, Smith proposes a concept of faith that conflates faith with choice and motivation.

I say that because the line of reasoning isn't that far off from my own, but isn't answering the central issue I feel I've raised multiple times without answer. To state it again if another way - Where do you believe the evidence obtained comes from other than from what the seed already contained at the time of planting?

As an aside, my own view of mind is one of a finite regressive hierarchy of processes that descend to the almost binary within neurons. These combine at varying levels, compete or cooperate, and engage in varying ways that is much more organic than mechanical and appear much more definite when we attempt to observe them rationally. But as I noted, it's difficult to describe them as requiring engagement with the material world while being part of the material world. It's complicated, but again more of a diversion in the discussion regarding Alma 32. Either the evidence proposed is brought inside of the seed, protected, and grows. Or it is a description of something more like an actual experiment which I argue it uses no other language to make this case other than the word 'experiment'.

You seem shocked by my own argument that if a person's relationship with the object of faith evolves as one protects it from unbelief that I appear to be ignoring this change as evidence. That's not the argument. The argument is that the entire process is nothing more than a recipe for establishing and deepening a bias. Giving place to an idea, ignoring counter evidence, making room for belief and having a hope that the idea is valid will almost certainly lead to a person gaining a greater conviction that this idea IS, in fact, valid.

MFB is wrong to say I thought he was arguing that Alma 32 was describing the scientific method. Rather, my argument is with the outcome he proposed which would be similar to what one uses the scientific method to achieve. As noted above, I'm arguing it wouldn't but is a a good description for developing and confirming a bias in favor of a particular position. He is correct in that I'm arguing on behalf of the scientific method in this case, precisely because it's a process that has proven to be valuable in overcoming bias and preconceptions. Does it encompass all that is worthwhile and perhaps necessary for a person to live a meaningful and rich life? I'd argue no. But when it comes to figuring out whether or not something is deserving of one's trust it's a good tool for the job.

3 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

But again you're creating an opposition that I'm not sure I agree with. What do you mean by misheard? I suspect you simply mean that when given to consciousness it's given with an "as" structure. So I hear I noise that's given to me as a dog bark. When I investigate I realize it's not a dog. So I agree about investigation, but I think we have to be careful how we discuss senses here. This is far more complex than you are suggesting.

I'm arguing that the mind interpreting inputs assigns meaning to them that can be understood clearly to be one thing but upon investigation turn out to be wrong. It's not given as a dog bark, it's given as a noise. The mind returns it as a dog bark and you probably jump, run, or otherwise experience a deeply engrained flight-or-fight response. The biologically evolved response favors being wrong in this way because being wrong increases the likelihood of survival. As you know, but just to get it in the thread, the opposite response of misinterpreting a real threat as something deserving further investigation first probably doesn't get passed down genetically as that organism gets to be lunch to the thread. Likewise, we have biological incentives for protecting worldviews that can be really distorted. Our primitive ancestors didn't need to be overly scientifically motivated. They did need to cohere with small tribal groups and protect their psychological health. The point is that one must be open to investigation and results that conflict with our initial returned interpretation of an input. It's complex in actual function but the concept is not. Be skeptical.

 

3 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

I already recognized that was your belief. It's not at all clear to me why you think that. And again we have to be clear what sense of inner we are speaking of. You appear to be meaning inner as mind. But that's not at all clear. Maybe it just means inner to the person in an opposition between person and what's not the person. That makes no appeal to mind. There are other ways to deal with inner that deal closely with the text. Say 28 where the seed is said to be "planted in your heart" -- but what does he mean by heart? We can't assume he means something like a dualist conception of mind.

Coming from God in what sense? Again, that's not at all negligible. You're taking that as clear revelation but it's not at all clear that's what he's saying. 

The allying with pursuing faith I do agree with. Indeed that's the whole start. It's the rest I'm much more skeptical of.

Again, let's go back to this question I pose above: Where do you believe the evidence obtained comes from other than from what the seed already contained at the time of planting?

Edited July 14, 2017 by Honorentheos

[Honorentheos]

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

HUH?

Where did I say that Alma 32 is a description of the scientific method?

AND suppose it is!  Suppose for one second I totally goofed up and said it is a perfect description of Kuhn's paradigms

Please note that it is YOU who is protecting the scientific methodology as a paradigm.

I have no problem with protecting paradigms- that is precisely what humans do in creating their own myths.  Look in the mirror!!

Your Cartesianism is just blatant and you don't even see it.  "Correspondence" through and through!

Choosing the right tool for the job is essential in this reality that we are in which fails to be all nails. But I get why it's all nails and pragmatic hammers for you. It makes it easy to ensure one never has to engage with a thought or idea that is uncomfortable.

I AM arguing for the scientific method being the better tool for discovering how reliable a proposition may be. As noted in my comment to Clark above, you're misreading what I said but that's not surprising. This private language you use to play at superiority seems to work with some on this board but you and I know what's what. Rock on, Amigo!

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, RevTestament said:

Had to chuckle at this. Can I put it in my signature?

Absolutely!

[Gray]

2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

They don't know and the study, which I've linked to here before, needs replication. It might be epigenetic but it might also be due to physical changes in the mother and hormones as well. We really don't know much here. But I certainly find the twin studies to be very intriguing. 

I rather doubt it'll be one thing. It'll probably be a complex manifestation from dozens if not hundreds of genes and the environment during both fetal development and development during adolescence. It would seem likely that there's not one cause either but that it could be caused in multiple ways. i.e. gay is a pretty wide catch-all term describing a common set of behaviors but not a common physiological state.

 

I wouldn't be surprised if you're right. And of course the birth order thing doesn't tell us anything about lesbians.

Edited July 14, 2017 by Gray

[Honorentheos]

1 hour ago, RevTestament said:

Had to chuckle at this. Can I put it in my signature?

I'm reminded of a joke that was popular for a couple of days back in middle school.

"There once were three penguins who decided to go sledding. They all climbed to the top of the hill. The first penguin dives onto his belly and as he slides quickly down the hill shouts, "Yipppeeeeeee!" The second penguin follows, and as he slides down on his belly also shouts, "Yipppeeeeeee!". The third penguin pauses for a moment, then also dives on his belly while shouting, "Raaaadddiiiooooooooo!"

Get it?

[mfbukowski]

25 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

Choosing the right tool for the job is essential in this reality that we are in which fails to be all nails. But I get why it's all nails and pragmatic hammers for you. It makes it easy to ensure one never has to engage with a thought or idea that is uncomfortable.

Uncomfortable?  Try this on for size

 

Quote

 

The Deflationary Theory of Truth

First published Thu Aug 28, 1997; substantive revision Mon Oct 4, 2010

According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’.

There are many implications of a theory of this sort for philosophical debate about the nature of truth. Philosophers often make suggestions like the following: truth consists in correspondence to the facts; truth consists in coherence with a set of beliefs or propositions; truth is the ideal outcome of rational inquiry. According to the deflationist, however, such suggestions are mistaken, and, moreover, they all share a common mistake. The common mistake is to assume that truth has a nature of the kind that philosophers might find out about and develop theories of. For the deflationist, truth has no nature beyond what is captured in ordinary claims such as that ‘snow is white’ is true just in case snow is white. Philosophers looking for the nature of truth are bound to be frustrated, the deflationist says, because they are looking for something that isn't there.....

1. History of Deflationism

The deflationary theory has been one of the most popular approaches to truth in the twentieth century, having received explicit defense by Frege, Ramsey, Ayer, and Quine, as well as sympathetic treatment from many others. (According to Dummett 1959, the view originates with Frege.) The following passages all contain recognizable versions of the doctrine, though they differ on points of detail.

It is worthy of notice that the sentence ‘I smell the scent of violets’ has the same content as the sentence ‘it is true that I smell the scent of violets’. So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. (Frege 1918)

Truth and falsity are ascribed primarily to propositions. The proposition to which they are ascribed may be either explicitly given or described. Suppose first that it is explicitly given; then it is evident that ‘It is true that Caesar was murdered’ means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and ‘It is false that Caesar was murdered’ means no more than Caesar was not murdered. They are phrases which we sometimes use for emphasis or stylistic reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by the statement in our argument….In the second case in which the proposition is described and not given explicitly we have perhaps more of a problem, for we get statements from which we cannot in ordinary language eliminate the words ‘true’ or ‘false’. Thus if I say ‘He is always right’, I mean that the propositions he asserts are always true, and there does not seem to be any way of expressing this without using the word ‘true’. But suppose we put it thus ‘For all p, if he asserts p, p is true’, then we see that the propositional function p is true is simply the same as p, as e.g. its value ‘Caesar was murdered is true’ is the same as ‘Caesar was murdered’. (Ramsey 1927)

…it is evident that a sentence of the form "p is true" or "it is true that p" the reference to truth never adds anything to the sense. If I say that it is true that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, or that the proposition "Shakespeare wrote Hamlet" is true, I am saying no more than that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet. Similarly, if I say that it is false that Shakespeare wrote the Iliad, I am saying no more than that Shakespeare did not write the Iliad. And this shows that the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ are not used to stand for anything, but function in the sentence merely as assertion and negation signs. That is to say, truth and falsehood are not genuine concepts. Consequently there can be no logical problem concerning the nature of truth. (Ayer 1935).

 

But this is only the Stanford Dictionary and what do they know?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/#HisDef

Oh yeah you are right that I am just afraid of the truth and YOU are the only one who has it!

Keep digging amigo!

And while we are at it let's throw in something on Correspondence with some emphasis thrown in

 

Quote

 

The Correspondence Theory of Truth

First published Fri May 10, 2002; substantive revision Thu May 28, 2015

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to, or with, a fact—a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). This basic idea has been expressed in many ways, giving rise to an extended family of theories and, more often, theory sketches. Members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, conditions, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences.

The correspondence theory of truth is often associated with metaphysical realism. Its traditional competitors, pragmatist, as well as coherentist, verificationist, and other epistemic theories of truth, are often associated with idealism, anti-realism, or relativism. In recent years, these traditional competitors have been virtually replaced (at least from publication-space) by deflationary theories of truth and, to a lesser extent, by the identity theory (note that these new competitors are typically not associated with anti-realism). Still more recently, two further approaches have received considerable attention. One is truthmaker theory: it is sometimes viewed as a competitor to, sometimes as a more liberal version of, the correspondence theory. The other is pluralism: it incorporates a correspondence account as one, but only one, ingredient of its overall account of truth.

 

Get up to speed!

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/

Edited July 14, 2017 by mfbukowski

[Honorentheos]

8 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Uncomfortable?  Try this on for size

 

But this is only the Stanford Dictionary and what do they know?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/#HisDef

Oh yeah you are right that I am just afraid of the truth and YOU are the only one who has it!

Keep digging amigo!

Alright, let's play for reals rather than dance. Is faith synonymous with choice and motivation? If not, how not?

Edited July 14, 2017 by Honorentheos

[clarkgoble]

4 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

Alright, let's play for reals rather than dance. Is faith synonymous with choice and motivation? If not, how not?

Doesn't that presuppose there's an univocal use of 'faith' in scriptures and Mormonism? I certainly don't think there is.

[Honorentheos]

5 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Doesn't that presuppose there's an univocal use of 'faith' in scriptures and Mormonism? I certainly don't think there is.

This hand is dealt to MFB. Your question is about the content of the seed.

ETA: You pragmatist Mormons have to acknowledge that you can't be engaged collectively and also coherently. Each of you must participate in your own game to be coherent. Otherwise it will always seem like you are answering or engaging with ideas that you bring private content to but we haven't sorted. If intentional, it's deceitful or you're being inconsistent with your philosophical views. If unintentional, then one should become aware when doing it.

Edited July 14, 2017 by Honorentheos

[mfbukowski]

11 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

Alright, let's play for reals rather than dance. Is faith synonymous with choice and motivation? If not, how not?

LOL

Define your terms.  I have no clue what you are talking about.  This is how mush gets created by asking questions like this

Edited July 14, 2017 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

If you want synonyms use a dictionary.

Philosophy doesn't come out of dictionaries

[mfbukowski]

8 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Doesn't that presuppose there's an univocal use of 'faith' in scriptures and Mormonism? I certainly don't think there is.

Yup, agree

One of the most ambiguous words ever- there are so many contexts!

[Honorentheos]

2 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

If you want synonyms use a dictionary.

Philosophy doesn't come out of dictionaries

Language is central to the question and you should not avoid it just because it got specific. Come on, man!

[Honorentheos]

1 minute ago, mfbukowski said:

Yup, agree

One of the most ambiguous words ever- there are so many contexts!

As noted, you've got your own hand to deal with. Come on, man!

[mfbukowski]

5 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

Language is central to the question and you should not avoid it just because it got specific. Come on, man!

Read Wittgenstein

 

Quote

 

3.3 Meaning as Use

“For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI43). This basic statement is what  underlies the change of perspective most typical of the later phase of Wittgenstein’s thought: a change from a conception of meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the investigation. Traditional theories of meaning in the history of philosophy were intent on pointing to something exterior to the proposition which endows it with sense. This ‘something’ could generally be located either in an objective space, or inside the mind as mental representation. As early as 1933 (The Blue Book) Wittgenstein took pains to challenge these conceptions, arriving at the insight that “if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was itsuse” (BB 4). Ascertainment of the use (of a word, of a proposition), however, is not given to any sort of constructive theory building, as in the Tractatus. Rather, when investigating meaning, the philosopher must “look and see” the variety of uses to which the word is put. An analogy with tools sheds light on the nature of words. When we think of tools in a toolbox, we do not fail to see their variety; but the “functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects” (PI 11). We are misled by the uniform appearance of our words into theorizing upon meaning: “Especially when we are doing philosophy!” (PI 12)

So different is this new perspective that Wittgenstein repeats: “Don’t think, but look!” (PI66); and such  looking is done vis a vis particular cases, not generalizations. In giving the meaning of a word, any explanatory generalization should be replaced by a description of use. The traditional idea that a proposition houses a content and has a restricted number of Fregean forces (such as assertion, question and command), gives way to an emphasis on the diversity of uses. In order to address the countless multiplicity of uses, their un-fixedness, and their being part of an activity, Wittgenstein introduces the key concept of ‘language-game’. He never explicitly defines it since, as opposed to the earlier ‘picture’, for instance, this new concept is made to do work for a more fluid, more diversified, and more activity-oriented perspective on language.

 

Keep digging deeper and deeper.   https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#MeanUse

 

Edited July 14, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

27 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

It seems to me that we need to decide if we are discussing your view of Alma 32 regardless of the content of Alma 32 (meaning it's acceptable to add or ignore the text as one will) or the original argument that when one takes Alma 32 and the LoF together, Smith proposes a concept of faith that conflates faith with choice and motivation.

I try to be careful and be clear whether I'm discussing an exegesis of Alma 32 or some other text. As I said I don't think there is an univocal sense of faith. So Alma 32 doesn't necessarily tell us how the word is used in Lectures on Faith (which by and large weren't written by Joseph Smith -- see this paper for an argument about authorship issues. I don't think the scholarship has changed much since then) I'd also distinguish Joseph's comments in his sermons from the D&C. The time period also is quite significant.

30 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

I say that because the line of reasoning isn't that far off from my own, but isn't answering the central issue I feel I've raised multiple times without answer. To state it again if another way - Where do you believe the evidence obtained comes from other than from what the seed already contained at the time of planting?

I think I've answered that. I think Alma isn't discussing competing evidence at all. He's only discussing testing the object itself (in this case his words). I've been pretty consistent in noting that your attempt to inject external evidence is acontextual. 

I can completely understand why you want to ask that question. But as soon as you do we're talking general epistemology rather than exegesis. I'm more than willing to discuss epistemology, but we have to be clear what we're doing.

Quote

You seem shocked by my own argument that if a person's relationship with the object of faith evolves as one protects it from unbelief that I appear to be ignoring this change as evidence. That's not the argument. The argument is that the entire process is nothing more than a recipe for establishing and deepening a bias. Giving place to an idea, ignoring counter evidence, making room for belief and having a hope that the idea is valid will almost certainly lead to a person gaining a greater conviction that this idea IS, in fact, valid.

Part of the problem is that you're not at all clear when you're discussing exegesis of Alma 32 and when you're making generalized epistemological claims. Again, I don't mind discussing that topic but we're then not really discussing Alma 32. So my objection was purely relative to the exegetical question.

Quote

MFB is wrong to say I thought he was arguing that Alma 32 was describing the scientific method. Rather, my argument is with the outcome he proposed which would be similar to what one uses the scientific method to achieve.

While there are some similarities with science or at least abduction in Alma 32 there are important differences. The first is that within science we're testing competing theories. Even when it seems like we're only testing one theory there should be at least a null hypothesis at play. There's nothing like that in Alma 32. Likewise within science a hypothesis is a proposition from which we draw out inferences to test. That's simply not present in Alma 32. Now those differences aren't that surprising if Alma 32 is much more similar to Hebrew linguistic and conceptual use such as argued by Yoram Hazony. There are some similarities to generalized pragmatic approaches to epistemology as well. But again I think we have to be careful to pay attention to differences as well - even though I'll often bring up the similarities to pragmatism.

Quote

I'm arguing that the mind interpreting inputs assigns meaning to them that can be understood clearly to be one thing but upon investigation turn out to be wrong. It's not given as a dog bark, it's given as a noise. The mind returns it as a dog bark and you probably jump, run, or otherwise experience a deeply engrained flight-or-fight response. The biologically evolved response favors being wrong in this way because being wrong increases the likelihood of survival. As you know, but just to get it in the thread, the opposite response of misinterpreting a real threat as something deserving further investigation first probably doesn't get passed down genetically as that organism gets to be lunch to the thread. Likewise, we have biological incentives for protecting worldviews that can be really distorted. Our primitive ancestors didn't need to be overly scientifically motivated. They did need to cohere with small tribal groups and protect their psychological health. The point is that one must be open to investigation and results that conflict with our initial returned interpretation of an input. It's complex in actual function but the concept is not. Be skeptical.

I'm a Peircean pragmatist so I definitely would never argue for cutting off inquiry. 

I'd note that your discussion is really more about brain than mind. Or even nervous system. Certainly though I agree with bias. I don't think that has much to do with Alma's presentation but certainly it has a lot to do with generalized epistemology. Now if you want to discuss epistemology rather than Alma 32 I'm game. I don't think Alma 32 can easily be extended to a generalized epistemology, beyond perhaps working off the emphasis on test.

[Honorentheos]

8 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

LOL

Define your terms.  I have no clue what you are talking about.  This is how mush gets created by asking questions like this

Just to point out for the kiddies that this entire derail to the OP came about because you were sloppy in conflating faith and motivation, and doing so by hinting at the LoF.

But also, I hope the trend of your getting really, really shifty when someone gets specific is noticed by anyone who thinks something meaningful was being said when you did so. We agree the whole thing is mush. That's been my argument from the get go. One simply can't look at Alma 32 and the LoF and find a coherent and consistently useful way to understand what faith even means. Clark dismissed the combining of the two right out of the gate, and we've been going around and around ever since just trying to keep the discussion aligned with the actual content of Alma 32. I'm hopeful we're close if we can determine if all evidence cited in Alma 32 was contained in the seed or if it can be demonstrated that Alma 32 supports a view of faith that includes more than protecting the idea one gives place to initially.

But yeah, mush.

[mfbukowski]

46 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

 

MFB is wrong to say I thought he was arguing that Alma 32 was describing the scientific method. Rather, my argument is with the outcome he proposed which would be similar to what one uses the scientific method to achieve. As noted above, I'm arguing it wouldn't but is a a good description for developing and confirming a bias in favor of a particular position. He is correct in that I'm arguing on behalf of the scientific method in this case, precisely because it's a process that has proven to be valuable in overcoming bias and preconceptions. Does it encompass all that is worthwhile and perhaps necessary for a person to live a meaningful and rich life? I'd argue no. But when it comes to figuring out whether or not something is deserving of one's trust it's a good tool for the job.

 

Contradictory mush.

It wouldn't be good but it would be good.

Great stuff.

We are TALKING about a meaningful life, not getting to the moon.

Waste of time.

Bye.  

[Honorentheos]

3 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Contradictory mush.

It wouldn't be good but it would be good.

Great stuff.

We are TALKING about a meaningful life, not getting to the moon.

Waste of time.

Bye.  

And that's how you play the private language game with a pragmatist.

Edited July 14, 2017 by Honorentheos

[mfbukowski]

3 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

Just to point out for the kiddies that this entire derail to the OP came about because you were sloppy in conflating faith and motivation, and doing so by hinting at the LoF.

But also, I hope the trend of your getting really, really shifty when someone gets specific is noticed by anyone who thinks something meaningful was being said when you did so. We agree the whole thing is mush. That's been my argument from the get go. One simply can't look at Alma 32 and the LoF and find a coherent and consistently useful way to understand what faith even means. Clark dismissed the combining of the two right out of the gate, and we've been going around and around ever since just trying to keep the discussion aligned with the actual content of Alma 32. I'm hopeful we're close if we can determine if all evidence cited in Alma 32 was contained in the seed or if it can be demonstrated that Alma 32 supports a view of faith that includes more than protecting the idea one gives place to initially.

But yeah, mush.

CONTEXT IS MEANING and you dare of speaking of distinct meanings of faith and motivation.

Let's talk about transubstantiation- it's much clearer than this nonsense

Angels in the same space or different space would look like a substantial conversation (yes pun intended) after this.

[clarkgoble]

12 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

ETA: You pragmatist Mormons have to acknowledge that you can't be engaged collectively and also coherently. Each of you must participate in your own game to be coherent. Otherwise it will always seem like you are answering or engaging with ideas that you bring private content to but we haven't sorted. If intentional, it's deceitful or you're being inconsistent with your philosophical views. If unintentional, then one should become aware when doing it.

Huh? What do you mean by engaged collectively?

Also note there are quite a few differences within the fairly broad category of pragmatism. In particular scholars typically see big gaps between the classic pragmatists and the neo-pragmatists like Putnam or Rorty. Also Rorty at the end acknowledged he wasn't really a pragmatist. Even among the main groups there are differences. So Rorty admits big differences from Dewey, despite a strong influence. Putnam breaks with Peirce over epistemology. And there were infamous debates between Putnam and Rorty on a wide number of things. Peirce thought James had screwed up pragmatism so badly that he changed his thought's name to pragmaticism. All that ignores the more minor figures both in the classic era like Schiller or Royce or in the contemporary era like Misak or Haack.

The "game" issue is much more Wittgenstein than the pragmatists, although he's a huge influence on Rorty and Rorty makes extensive use of the notion. While I find the game metaphor helpful at times, I also think it obscures some things. 

Mark here is much more Rorty and Wittgenstein and a heavy does of Dewey. I'm much more Peirce, Heidgger, Gadamer and Ricouer with a bit of Dewey along with an idiocyncratic take on Derrida. In particular Mark and I disagree over realism -- Peirce was a thoroughgoing realist and his type of pragmatism arises out of his background in physics, chemistry and logic. My own background is actually primarily physics and math so that might explain why I'm more sympathetic to Peirce than Rorty.

 

[RevTestament]

3 minutes ago, Honorentheos said:

Just to point out for the kiddies that this entire derail to the OP came about because you were sloppy in conflating faith and motivation, and doing so by hinting at the LoF.

But also, I hope the trend of your getting really, really shifty when someone gets specific is noticed by anyone who thinks something meaningful was being said when you did so. We agree the whole thing is mush. That's been my argument from the get go. One simply can't look at Alma 32 and the LoF and find a coherent and consistently useful way to understand what faith even means. Clark dismissed the combining of the two right out of the gate, and we've been going around and around ever since just trying to keep the discussion aligned with the actual content of Alma 32. I'm hopeful we're close if we can determine if all evidence cited in Alma 32 was contained in the seed or if it can be demonstrated that Alma 32 supports a view of faith that includes more than protecting the idea one gives place to initially.

But yeah, mush.

Um, no, I contend that this entire derail came about because a certain poster drug all of Mormonism into his answer of why Cureloms are imaginary, and subsequent responses to him. At this point I think the OP has been answered to the extent that it is going to get answered. so I am just enjoying the show, and haven't requested the thread get closed.

[mfbukowski]

For someone actually interested

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#MeanUse

 

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3.4 Language-games and Family Resemblance

Throughout the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein returns, again and again, to the concept of language-games to make clear his lines of thought concerning language. Primitive language-games are scrutinized for the insights they afford on this or that characteristic of language. Thus, the builders’ language-game (PI 2), in which a builder and his assistant use exactly four terms (block, pillar, slab, beam), is utilized to illustrate that part of the Augustinian picture of language which might be correct but which is, nevertheless, strictly limited. ‘Regular’ language-games, such as the astonishing list provided in PI 23 (which includes, e.g., reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, making up a story, reading it, play-acting, singing catches, guessing riddles, making a joke, translating, asking, thanking, and so on), bring out the openness of our possibilities in using language and in describing it.

Language-games are, first, a part of a broader context termed by Wittgenstein a form of life (see below). Secondly, the concept of language-games points at the rule-governed character of language. This does not entail strict and definite systems of rules for each and every language-game, but points to the conventional nature of this sort of human activity. Still, just as we cannot give a final, essential definition of ‘game’, so we cannot find “what is common to all these activities and what makes them into language or parts of language” (PI 65).

It is here that Wittgenstein’s rejection of general explanations, and definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions, is best pronounced. Instead of these symptoms of the philosopher’s “craving for generality”, he points to ‘family resemblance’ as the more suitable analogy for the means of connecting particular uses of the same word. There is no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one, essential core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore, common to all uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI 66). Family resemblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize different uses of the same concept. Such boundaries and exactness are the definitive traits of form—be it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general form of a proposition adumbrated in the Tractatus. It is from such forms that applications of concepts can be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now eschews in favor of appeal to similarity of a kind with family resemblance.

3.5 Rule-following and Private Language

One of the issues most associated with the later Wittgenstein is that of rule-following. Rising out of the considerations above, it becomes another central point of discussion in the question of what it is that can apply to all the uses of a word. The same dogmatic stance as before has it that a rule is an abstract entity—transcending all of its particular applications; knowing the rule involves grasping that abstract entity and thereby knowing how to use it.

Wittgenstein begins his exposition by introducing an example: “… we get [a] pupil to continue a series (say ‘+ 2’) beyond 1000—and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012 (PI 185)”. What do we do, and what does it mean, when the student, upon being corrected, answers “But I did go on in the same way”? Wittgenstein proceeds (mainly in PI 185-243, but also elsewhere) to dismantle the cluster of attendant questions: How do we learn rules? How do we follow them? Wherefrom the standards which decide if a rule is followed correctly? Are they in the mind, along with a mental representation of the rule? Do we appeal to intuition in their application? Are they socially and publicly taught and enforced? In typical Wittgensteinian fashion, the answers are not pursued positively; rather, the very formulation of the questions as legitimate questions with coherent content is put to the test. For indeed, it is both the Platonistic and mentalistic pictures which underlie asking questions of this type, and Wittgenstein is intent on freeing us from these assumptions. Such liberation involves elimination of the need to posit any sort of external or internal authority beyond the actual applications of the rule.

These considerations lead to PI 201, often considered the climax of the issue: “This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.” Wittgenstein’s formulation of the problem, now at the point of being a “paradox”, has given rise to a wealth of interpretation and debate since it is clear to all that this is the crux of the general issue of meaning, and of understanding and using a language. One of the influential readings of the problem of following a rule (introduced by Fogelin 1976 and Kripke 1982) has been the interpretation, according to which Wittgenstein is here voicing a skeptical paradox and offering a skeptical solution. That is to say, there are no facts that determine what counts as following a rule, no real grounds for saying that someone is indeed following a rule, and Wittgenstein accepts this skeptical challenge (by suggesting other conditions that might warrant our asserting that someone is following a rule). This reading has been challenged, in turn, by several interpretations (such as Baker and Hacker 1984, McGinn1984, and Cavell 1990), while others have provided additional, fresh perspectives (e.g., Diamond, “Rules: Looking in the Right Place” in Phillips and Winch 1989, and several in Miller and Wright 2002).

Directly following the rule-following sections in PI, and therefore easily thought to be the upshot of the discussion, are those sections called by interpreters “the private-language argument”. Whether it be a veritable argument or not (and Wittgenstein never labeled it as such), these sections point out that for an utterance to be meaningful it must be possible in principle to subject it to public standards and criteria of correctness. For this reason, a private-language, in which “words … are to refer to what only the speaker can know—to his immediate private sensations …” (PI 243), is not a genuine, meaningful, rule-governed language. The signs in language can only function when there is a possibility of judging the correctness of their use, “so the use of [a] word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands” (PI 261).

3.6 Grammar and Form of Life

Grammar, usually taken to consist of the rules of correct syntactic and semantic usage, becomes, in Wittgenstein’s hands, the wider—and more elusive—network of rules which determine what linguistic move is allowed as making sense, and what isn’t. This notion replaces the stricter and purer logic, which played such an essential role in the Tractatus in providing a scaffolding for language and the world. Indeed, “Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373). The “rules” of grammar are not mere technical instructions from on-high for correct usage; rather, they express the norms for meaningful language. Contrary to empirical statements, rules of grammar describe how we use words in order to both justify and criticize our particular utterances. But as opposed to grammar-book rules, they are not idealized as an external system to be conformed to. Moreover, they are not appealed to explicitly in any formulation, but are used in cases of philosophical perplexity to clarify where language misleads us into false illusions. Thus, “I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct to say ‘I know what you are thinking’, and wrong to say ‘I know what I am thinking.’ (A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.)” (Philosophical Investigations 1953, p.222).

Grammar is not abstract, it is situated within the regular activity with which language-games are interwoven: “… the word ‘language-game’ is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (PI 23). What enables language to function and therefore must be accepted as “given” are precisely forms of life. In Wittgenstein’s terms, “It is not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) in judgments that is required” (PI 242), and this is “agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” (PI 241). Used by Wittgenstein sparingly—five times in the Investigations—this concept has given rise to interpretative quandaries and subsequent contradictory readings. Forms of life can be understood as changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc; this appeal to forms of life grounds a relativistic reading of Wittgenstein. On the other hand, it is the form of life common to humankind, “shared human behavior” which is “the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language” (PI 206). This might be seen as a universalistic turn, recognizing that the use of language is made possible by the human form of life.

 

 

Edited July 14, 2017 by mfbukowski

[Honorentheos]

On ‎7‎/‎11‎/‎2017 at 5:54 PM, Honorentheos said:

Oh? Joseph Smith made a weird claim that faith is the primary motivation force that MFB echos in his post. In Joseph Smith's view faith is why people wake up, get out of bed, and basically do what they do in a day.

The ALMA 32 portrait of faith is one of chosing to believe, so in the case of Mormonism I think the two get conflated into one meaning. But that does damage to how most people use the term faith, and would not associate it so closely with simple motivation for action or even choice.

But assuming the Joseph Smith perogative, we would then find faith in conflict with the question of free will if faith is the primary motivating force for every single action people undertake. That creates a dilemma. One is either compelled to act and their faith is pre-determined if one follows the logic behind the illusion of free will. Or one is arguing that faith itself in only possible if the illusion of free will is wrong and free will is a thing.

I don't see that as equivocating at all.

Here's my first position in the discussion. In regards to Alma 32, the question is if faith is effectively an act of volition. I maintained it describes it that way and have seen no reason to reconsider brought up in the thread that relates to the actual wording of Alma 32. I've also argued that if one has to combine Alma 32 with the LoF one has to determine how they can be made compatible. I agree part of the issue comes with there being inconsistent thinking behind Alma and the LoF, but I think this extends to all of Mormonism. Cowdery was likely influential on the views contained in the BoM, Ridgon on the views in the LoF. Smith seems to be happy to engage with ideas with little to no regard to their consistency. This is normal for all of us as we age, mature, and change. But for Smith it all has the implication of coming directly from a divine source that gives it a veneer of permanence.

[clarkgoble]

58 minutes ago, Gray said:

I wouldn't be surprised if you're right. And of course the birth order thing doesn't tell us anything about lesbians.

Yeah, although even if these preliminary studies don't pan out they do at least point out how complex the question can be.