Is Mormonism And Science Compatible? Attn Bcspace

[mfbukowski]

"Experiences that are replicable" doesn't answer the question of why they are replicable. I quoted Putnam saying that realism "[...]is the only view of science that doesn't make it a miracle." Would you address that, please? I haven't seen you attacking any of the criticisms against your view at all.

Sure, but that's not what we're talking about here.

And why is this possible, mf? Don't you think saying that our senses tell us something about the world around when we see a car that's rapidly approaching our way, possibly going to kill us, is more justified than saying our senses just happen to agree with other people's perceptions for some reason when we, subjectively, arrange things in particular ways?

But remember that in Mormonism God and Jesus have a body of flesh and bones. They are, in principle, objectively verifiable by everyone if they wanted themselves to be shown.

Because while you are very entertained demanding exact definitions of things like tables and cups, the late Wittgenstein would dismiss you as being way too simplistic.

I know about it and that's why I keep asking about about what you think... because I don't think you really get it.

The sound of a violin sounds more abrasive and rugged due to the rough friction between the bow and the strings, while the sound of a trumpet is louder, more continuous and smooth, and with undertones which produce a darker, thicker sound than that of the violin.

Knock yourself out:

http://plato.stanfor.../supervenience/

http://plato.stanfor.../physicalism/#4

Weekends are horribly busy for me- I will get back to you!

Edit: Hi Stak- good to see you here!

Edited August 10, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Ahab]

Maybe I just have not been direct enough.

This is the simplest explanation of my view I can come up with:

All linguistic discourse is metaphor and symbols. We open up our mouths and make sounds or make squiggles on paper or pixels on a screen.

Squiggles and noises and pixels are not chairs tables planets or anything "real" - they are squiggles and noises which are symbols and signs.

They are metaphors.

Scientific squiggles and noises tell us about metaphors which humanity has seen useful for manipulating the world around us.

Religious squiggles and noises tell us about metaphors which humanity has seen useful for explaining what is important to us, what we should do, what to value, and what our place is in the world in which we all interact.

We each pick which sets of squiggles and metaphors from each category help us best to put together a world view which helps us make sense of all this world we each experience

Does that help any?

Yes, but now let's get into what happens when a person actually sees or hears or touches or smells or tastes something which is actually real, rather than just talking about squiggles and metaphors. At that point they might know something, huh, but then again, they might not even understand what they are seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting even though it is right there in front of their face.

[supersnail]

OK, look at the reasons people give you for believing in God. The reasons they give are most of the time about feelings they had that they believe were caused by a heavenly beings or they think the complexity of the universe and the world make it rather clear that there was a Creator, etc. If these reasons are seriously put into doubt, do you think people can still believe in the Christian God or in the Mormon God? I seriously, SERIOUSLY doubt it. If good reasons (not "proof", that's naive) are not necessary for God to exist (there could exist a completely unknown God), it is at least necessary for people to believe in Him.

I don't dispute that faith is required to believe in the unique claims of Mormonism. That is another way of saying that intellectualism isn't sufficient to believe.

Faith is not required to recognize the validity of Mormon apologetics, however. Apologetics just reveals flaws in the reasons given for disbelief. If you will, it is skepticism toward "skepticism." I say this to point out that Mormon apologetics or Christian apologetics more generally isn't representative of some prevalent notion that belief is or can be based only on science, philosophy, or theological exegesis.

The reasons I have for believing have nothing to do with others' feelings caused by whatever, or the complexity of the universe. I do have my own reasons for believing that would be hard to validate objectively. I just don't feel like putting them out there in front of people some of whom could care less. For me, they are actually stronger than any intellectual argument I could make (and I could make some good ones for monotheism and for Mormonism in particular). I do not claim they are scientific. On the other hand, it is not justified to say they are incompatible with science. Contradiction with science is not why they stand out to me, because while perhaps unexpected, my experiences do not invalidate any scientific theory, and nor do they cause me to even question any scientific theory.

The grounds on which I believe are reasonable to me. Of course they wouldn't be adequate for you, but I am not trying to convert you. At most, I'm only trying to reveal weaknesses in the arguments of misguided skeptics who say that science is incompatible with religion, and I'm not the one who raised the question in the first place.

By the way, the biggest Christian Church in the world, the Catholic Church, believes we can reason from created beings to God's existence with certainty through reason alone. Brave position, don't you think?

I was going to get into what the Catholic Church actually says about faith and reason (I gather you realize it's more complicated than you're summing up), but actually it is beside the point. Like Mormonism, Catholicism would be compatible with science regardless of what Catholics say that is *about* their religion, in other words, regardless of their meta-religious claims. In the same vein, Richard Dawkins' beliefs (or if you prefer, his rhetoric designed to influence "the popular masses") about religion and science have absolutely no bearing on whether Dawkins' theory of replicators is compatible with a claim of religion. Now, I do find myself preferring some of Gould's evolutionary ideas for certain reasons, but in principle I could accept Dawkins' theories while rejecting his meta-scientific claims.

It puzzles me how anyone could read "Truth Cannot Contradict Truth" and still arrive at the conclusion that religion needed to be attacked to gain acceptance for evolution. The Catholic and LDS positions (or Mormonism's neutral stand), and the approaches of others such as mainline Protestants and Anglicans, are more representative of Christianity than the various YEC denominations/churches. This is relevant if we are talking about if religion is inherently incompatible with science or if Christianity is generally incompatible with science.

Only very uneducated people on the subject attempt to. For example, trying to measure the effect of Mormon blessings in the sick would be a pretty easy thing to do, but if God did decide to act in only a few cases where the patients would get cured, this influence is too small for it to be of any statistical significance. What we can do is to say that God's influence has been very negligible give the size of the population and make the case against God totally weak or implausible. Please raise your level of conversation here and stop thinking that people like me want to PROVE (as in Mathematics) that God doesn't exist with science. That's just too naive to be of any interest.

The topic of this thread is, is Mormonism compatible with science. The unlikelihood of some claim of Mormonism does not mean Mormonism is incompatible with science. Something could very well be unlikely in some necessarily limited probabilistic sense and accepted on faith without invalidating any scientific theory.

If a Mormon makes a claim about prayer that can be evaluated using a testable hypothesis, by all means go ahead and falsify it. Even in that scenario, though, one could argue that the test itself makes assumptions.

Earlier in this thread, statements were made that in effect denied multiple causation. Essentially it was said that evolutionary theory excluded agents because it didn't specify them, which of course is untenable, but actually the assertion that evolution must unfold without God is common. In actual fact, an asteroid hitting the earth even becomes a part of evolution, and this kind of thing is rarely disputed. The difference is that religion claims there is an intelligence behind an event or series of events (not necessarily the Chicxulub impact), but this shouldn't be a problem because we have no difficulty with the idea of a sentient horticulturist, with free will, intervening in evolution, for example.

The Chicxulub crater wasn't even discovered until the 1970s. Had evolutionary theory ever precluded a massive asteroid collision? No. It would have made little sense at any point to say that impact events were "incompatible" with science, though even Darwin might have been incredulous about such a big event. The fact that we're talking about a powerful agent, God, and not an impact event does not fundamentally change the matter that evolutionary theory has validity regardless of claims about things for which there may yet be no known mechanism or empirical evidence.

My objection was not that a scientific theory or method was actually being utilized to try to "prove" God doesn't exist. Obviously, no actual scientific theory or method was being used. (Throwing a copy of On the Origin of Species at me may be an abuse of natural selection, but surely it is through no fault of the theory itself.) What was being used to prove God's non-influence was a mistaken unstated philosophical assumption, one that denied the possibility of confluent principles/processes or the possibility of exogenous things becoming part of a system.

As John Lennox pointed out in their debate at the natural history museum, even Dawkins had trouble with the issue of agents, suggesting that God in influencing evolution should be as obvious as a person driving a car. Sorry, but Dawkins knows better than that. He knows full well that evolution is a process occurring over a long period of time and is a kind of process where God's presence would not need to be that obvious for him to influence it, regardless of Dawkins' ideas about convergence and contingency.

Dawkins' use of Occam's razor to reject God's influence does not address that Mormonism's concept of God is not being submitted as an alternate scientific theory in the first place, and denial of God's influence isn't a part of evolutionary theory properly stated. We should not treat evolution as if it were derived backward from a conclusion about the world's formation or H. sapiens.

You would be correct to say that Occam's razor doesn't actually rule out anything, imprecise rhetoric invoking the principle notwithstanding. Theory choices based on the principle are tentative. Setting aside that the creation story, explicitly pertaining to the earth alone (Moses 1:35), doesn't contain a theory about something repeatable or an explanation of how God did it, even if Occam's razor is used to reject God's influence tentatively there is no dissonance in a person's simultaneously believing in God's influence on the basis of faith, and applying Occam's razor in scientific activity because the principle tends to work. Religious beliefs need not interfere with scientific theory construction, because ultimately the truth of the beliefs cannot be ruled out, for reasons provided even by the philosophy of science.

Unless you want me to necessarily demonstrate prayer efficacy in particular, you seem to want me to accept the implausibility of God for the sake of discussion. That's a big what-if. I am merely arguing in a general way that religion is not incompatible with science. The probability of this or that religious belief being true is beside the point, because the improbability of various religious beliefs is accepted in principle. I'm willing to accept that some of these are "implausible" from the viewpoint of simplicity or lack of data, because it is clear from the history of science that many "implausible" propositions that never were incompatible with science have later been favored. Implausibility is provisional in nature, though the concept leads (probabilistically) to desired results in scientific fields.

Ironically, by suggesting that "only very uneducated people" have difficulty with these issues, it is implied that what I am proposing is already commonplace. And I would agree, it is. We often hear religious people say we don't know all there is to know, and they accept both religious beliefs and scientific theories that don't support those beliefs or necessarily contradict them either. altersteve's answer (http://www.mormondia...entry1209159837) is somewhat illustrative. When we think about science as a practical activity of using and building theories that have to do with regularities and patterns, including ones that may be obscured or intersected by other patterns, what I'm talking about becomes even clearer.

Going to heaven and bodily resurrection, are these doctrines part of science or part of religion or neither? It doesn't seem to be a part of science (although what we know about biology and physics make it VERY implausible that someone would have resurrected 2000 years ago). It also doesn't seem to be a part of what you call "religion" here because these things are not strictly about ultimate meaning.

There may be some miscommunication here. My own words in an earlier post were "ultimate reality." What I'm saying is that even if science is about ultimate reality in the realist sense (which it arguably is not), and even if religious claims pertain to nature or matter in some sense, scientific theories by their nature cannot rule out God's influence. Science does not have to converge on religious claims for a specified time period for religion not to be incompatible with science.

That does goes beyond what Gould said in his exposition of NOMA. Gould's point about religion as being moral theism is valid, and I have no major disagreement with NOMA, but NOMA is not the only "reconciliation" proposal. Mormonism makes truth claims and even existence claims and historical claims, but these are not ultimately or typically put forward as scientific claims, in spite of whatever impression apologetics might give. So we hear Mormons testify that the Book of Mormon is true, usually without a connotation of scientific plausibility.

You see, think of the difference between philosophy and religion with regards to approaches to "the meaning of life" and "moral value". It isn't like religion is, under Gould's NOMA, reduced to philosophy. This is because religion offers a bunch of statements like "God loves you" or "God has a body of flesh and bones" or "God works miracles" or "The Priesthood can cure the sick", etc.

All this to say that if you want a peace treatise between religion and science of the type you talk about, then it seems like you would leave a LOT of religious beliefs behind (which I would be glad to say is good). The type of "religion" you think isn't in conflict with science is very very little of what constitutes most religions.

I suggest that creation scientists examine what they are doing if they intend it as something more than apologetics, but otherwise I am not proposing that religion be narrowed in any way. The existing claims of the LDS Church and Catholicism--to use the two largest churches in the U.S. as examples--are not incompatible with science. This is not the same thing as saying they are currently supported by science or even formulated in such a way as to be considered using the methods and principles of science.

Atheist scientists who allow their positions on theism and religion to influence their theory choices/construction and research question choices should also reconsider what they are doing.

I agree but I still do think there is plenty of value in people like Dawkins of Hitchens in that they get their hands dirty in addressing the popular masses when philosophers and theologians are too quick to forget what the pious in the street actually believes. They focus more on the very bad social consequences of religious beliefs. I see what they do as performing an integral part in the transformation of society from an angle crude enough to wake the pious out of their "dogmatic slumber".

Hitchens didn't claim to be a scientist. With Dawkins, the appearance of a prominent evolutionary biologist attacking religion is considerably more confusing (even though in some ways I prefer Dawkins to Hitchens). Dawkins' feigned naivete about philosophy in debates like these, or his rhetoric encouraging lazy reasoning in the audience, does not help increase acceptance of scientific theories among the religious (to the extent they don't already accept them) or help answer whether science and religion are compatible. As you suggest, Dawkins has other priorities.

It's easier to get more media attention than Gould when Gould is dead. Dawkins is an extremist. There are plenty of scientists and agnostics who accept NOMA and even atheists who see the value of religion.

By way of conclusion, I don't mean to tar all atheists posting in this thread with the same brush. To the degree that everything I'm saying is obvious and one does not identify with the ideas I've criticized or has disassociated themselves from them, he or she should feel free to keep disowning them and continue repudiating them publicly. Or they can go on allowing their followers, and fans of "Religulous" and "South Park," to persist in their flawed thinking because it is convenient for an anti-religious agenda.

Edited August 11, 2012 by supersnail

[mfbukowski]

Yes, but now let's get into what happens when a person actually sees or hears or touches or smells or tastes something which is actually real, rather than just talking about squiggles and metaphors. At that point they might know something, huh, but then again, they might not even understand what they are seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting even though it is right there in front of their face.

Yes.

So?

Please notice that my approach in fact makes personal religious experience as "real" as anything else in the world for the individual who experiences it.

[mfbukowski]

"Experiences that are replicable" doesn't answer the question of why they are replicable. I quoted Putnam saying that realism "[...]is the only view of science that doesn't make it a miracle." Would you address that, please? I haven't seen you attacking any of the criticisms against your view at all.

I have no problem with your answer to this, at least this much of it:

... if I can see that there is no reason to think that your brain is relevantly different from my own, then I can assume that you experience very similar things to what I experience when I hear a violin.

That works for me.

Did you think that I thought we could have experiences without an intact brain or something? I don't think that.

I don't doubt for a minute that our experiences are not very similar, the point is simply that that is unknowable and it cannot be expressed in language- which is precisely why it is unknowable.

And why is this possible, mf? Don't you think saying that our senses tell us something about the world around when we see a car that's rapidly approaching our way, possibly going to kill us, is more justified than saying our senses just happen to agree with other people's perceptions for some reason when we, subjectively, arrange things in particular ways?

Again, as shown above, I do think we arrange things subjectively in similar ways. I think the species would not have survived too long if we hadn't- I mean there are lions and tigers and bears, oh my! out there.

The problem is not in what is objectively observable- lions and tigers and bears- and speeding cars- that we all see together with out little tribe of hunters but those instances of subjective experience which we do not share. One shout from someone in the hunting party confirms the scientific objective observation that the mastadon is about to squash us all and a glance over the shoulder replicates the observation verbally communicated.

But in the cave that night with the fire flickering on the walls and the paintings of the hunt completed, not every one will see the gods perhaps we personally might see. Not every one will decide on the same war paint for the next day, nor will everyone be a good archer or have a limp from an earlier hunt which went bad. These subjective personal differences shape our very sense of reality and we all have our subjective perspectives and points of view which are different from others, but of course we share many observations together.

Surely you cannot deny the reality of cultural differences in perception- it is well documented scientifically.

But remember that in Mormonism God and Jesus have a body of flesh and bones. They are, in principle, objectively verifiable by everyone if they wanted themselves to be shown.

Oh I haven't forgotten. In fact this belief is what makes Mormonism so powerful and in principle scientific and materialistic.

By the way I do not deny physicalism because it is materialistic- I deny it because it does not acknowledge a subjective point of view. I am a good Phenomenologist in that regard- I would love to see a science of the subjective.

Because while you are very entertained demanding exact definitions of things like tables and cups, the late Wittgenstein would dismiss you as being way too simplistic.

LOL!! That was a good one!

My goal was to summarize 100 years of philosophy in about 100 words- and you charge me with being simplistic?? Guilty as charged!!

I know about it and that's why I keep asking about about what you think... because I don't think you really get it.

Get what? My objective is not to learn every possible "ism" in every possible philosophy text book- my goal as a good ironist and wannabe strong poet is to create a coherent vocabulary to get me through life and hopefully beyond. If you want to criticize what I say, go for it. On the other hand if all you want to talk about is what philosophers believe - that's nice, but I'm busy building my own ark here. If what they've done shows me I'm wrong I want to know about it, but I have my own construction job going, thank you very much.

The sound of a violin sounds more abrasive and rugged due to the rough friction between the bow and the strings, while the sound of a trumpet is louder, more continuous and smooth, and with undertones which produce a darker, thicker sound than that of the violin.

Well that's some nice poetry but I don't think its a very good philosophical description. We have a few category errors there- sound can be "dark" or "rugged"? We might want to debate the color of virtue if we are going this way- I think it is green- how about you?

The point was that simply you can't describe experiences verbally especially to those who have not experienced them. You gave it a good shot but I don't think you proved your point.

Knock yourself out:

http://plato.stanfor.../supervenience/

http://plato.stanfor.../physicalism/#4

Thanks for the links, very interesting stuff which brings this old man up to date on a few items I had definitely missed out on. But I don't think it makes much difference in the way I view things- old dogs and new tricks doncha know?

I especially like the end of the physicalism article:

17. Concluding Remarks and Further Questions

That completes our discussion of physicalism. It is sketchy in certain places, and this suggests that there is much further work to be done before we arrive at a final assessment of the doctrine of physicalism and the role that it plays in contemporary thought. In the future, however, it would seem to me to be a good idea to think at least about the following:

(a) The prospects for supervenience definitions of physicalism. While supervenience, and more generally modal, definitions of physicalism are attractive, they do raise problems of a difficult nature—such as the blockers problem and the necessary beings problem. At the time of writing it is unclear how these difficulties will be resolved.

(b) The relation between, and the adequacy of, the theory-conception and the object-conception of the physical. It seems clear that our thinking about the physical is anchored in part in the ordinary idea of a physical object and in part in the idea of physics. But it seems equally clear that these two ideas can and do come apart. What are the consequences of this for the notion of physicalism?

© The role of physicalism in philosophy of mind. As we have seen for both Nagel and Williams questions about physicalism are really questions about objectivity in disguise. This raises the more general issue of whether arguments and theses in philosophy of mind (and other areas of philosophy) that are formulated in terms of physicalism are necessarily formulated in that way. Perhaps physicalism here is simply getting in the way of a proper understanding of how these problems work?

I think I will stick with Nagel on this one.

What I see as deficient in the entire physicalist enterprise especially supervenience as far as I presently understand it, no one has looked at it from the point of view of the philosophy of language and frankly I am not sure that supervenience actually explains anything. It's just kind of emergent dualism in a new set of clothes?

Maybe I am wrong. Maybe I am an old dog just having trouble mastering the new tricks. But I am not seeing how this is relevant to Mormonism.

Nagel is, because the reality of the subjective perspective is, and Nagel's argument appeals to me because he seems to understand that it's all language all the way down through all the rather ephemeral "properties" and "relations" and "orders"- it still all boils down the fact that you see the world differently than I do and it is possible to do that without either of us being "wrong".

For me, that's the bottom line. The world's a pretty complicated place, and I just don't think that reductionism works.

[Evangeline]

The sound of a violin sounds more abrasive and rugged due to the rough friction between the bow and the strings, while the sound of a trumpet is louder, more continuous and smooth, and with undertones which produce a darker, thicker sound than that of the violin.

I'm not really following much of this conversation, but this comparison of two musical instruments stood out to me and I had to say something. I would disagree with how the instruments have been characterized. For one thing, both instruments are capable of creating a variety of timbres (or "tone colours") as well as different volumes. By manipulating the bow in different ways, for instance, the violin can be both "abrasive and rugged" at one point, and "smooth and continuous" at another. It can also be very loud and very soft. Talking in generalities, however, the idea that a trumpet has a "darker, thicker" sound than a violin is quite a mischaracterization IMO, since the trumpet is more often described as having a "bright, strong, piercing tone." http://musicdept.wlu.edu/MUS120/chapter1-2.htm Almost the opposite of what I would consider "dark" and "thick." All of these descriptors of timbre, however, are subjective (what is "dark" and "thick" to one person could admittedly be "bright" and "piercing" to another) and completely insufficient in allowing someone who has never heard either instrument to know exactly what they sound like.

[mfbukowski]

I'm not really following much of this conversation, but this comparison of two musical instruments stood out to me and I had to say something. I would disagree with how the instruments have been characterized. For one thing, both instruments are capable of creating a variety of timbres (or "tone colours") as well as different volumes. By manipulating the bow in different ways, for instance, the violin can be both "abrasive and rugged" at one point, and "smooth and continuous" at another. It can also be very loud and very soft. Talking in generalities, however, the idea that a trumpet has a "darker, thicker" sound than a violin is quite a mischaracterization IMO, since the trumpet is more often described as having a "bright, strong, piercing tone." http://musicdept.wlu.../chapter1-2.htm Almost the opposite of what I would consider "dark" and "thick." All of these descriptors of timbre, however, are subjective (what is "dark" and "thick" to one person could admittedly be "bright" and "piercing" to another) and completely insufficient in allowing someone who has never heard either instrument to know exactly what they sound like.

What?

A different description of reality ??? Clearly both can't be True!! Where is the physical proof that you are correct?

What do you think this is- poetry??

We could start a whole thread on this and it would be about like this one.

Edited August 11, 2012 by mfbukowski

[Evangeline]

I found a cute little anecdote showing the difficulty of describing instruments' timbres:

http://www.fiddlehea...tings/tone.html

Talking Tone is Harder than it Sounds

Words which describe the tonal qualities of violins and other instruments

Attempting to describe tone or timbre with mere words is tricky for even the best musicians. Even more difficult with non-players who don't know the instrument or the lingo.

Case in point: My filmscoring teacher in music school told a story of when he was writing a jazzy piano theme for a CBC Television program. The show's producer had been asking for small corrections to the score, finally requesting the music be more "snakey." "What the heck is snakey," my teacher asked, totally perplexed. "You know," said the producer slowly, "sna-a-a-a-key," as if this would help.

Edited August 11, 2012 by Evangeline

[Alvino]

I'm not really following much of this conversation, but this comparison of two musical instruments stood out to me and I had to say something. I would disagree with how the instruments have been characterized. For one thing, both instruments are capable of creating a variety of timbres (or "tone colours") as well as different volumes. By manipulating the bow in different ways, for instance, the violin can be both "abrasive and rugged" at one point, and "smooth and continuous" at another. It can also be very loud and very soft. Talking in generalities, however, the idea that a trumpet has a "darker, thicker" sound than a violin is quite a mischaracterization IMO, since the trumpet is more often described as having a "bright, strong, piercing tone." http://musicdept.wlu.../chapter1-2.htm Almost the opposite of what I would consider "dark" and "thick." All of these descriptors of timbre, however, are subjective (what is "dark" and "thick" to one person could admittedly be "bright" and "piercing" to another) and completely insufficient in allowing someone who has never heard either instrument to know exactly what they sound like.

(also as a response to mfbukowski)

A basic distinction that is not being made by those who say the word "subjective" in conversations here is a basic distinction in the philosophy of language between the what the words are and what they refer to.

Notice that there are descriptions of sounds that are very easy to agree with. For example, if I say that, given the sound of an instrument, there is a second one whose only difference was that the lower overtones were louder than the same overtones of the first instrument, and that the higher overtones and harmonics of the second one were much diminished compared to those of the first one, then we would have a pretty easy idea of how the sounds of both would differ while playing the same note. Notice this is a way to describe to someone the sound of an instrument that she probably has never heard.

The only problem with descriptions of the type expressed here by me and your different words, Evangeline, is that we haven't really agreed in what I mean by rugged and thick and dark and that's why we disagree. You see, we have no reason to think that normally functioning auditory systems differ in subjective perception (by subjective perception I mean the actual "feel" or "experience of listening") and we have much evidence that they don't differ much. An example with vision is how we answer the question, "How do we know that this person is color blind?" We just don't cross our arms and say, "Well, we can't see what this person see so, therefore, we are wasting our time trying to investigate whether he/she can see colors as we do", right? In the same way it seems to me that we can agree, if we took the time to agree in the terms, in describing subjective experiences such as that of sounds or visions in remarkably uniform ways.

And notice that in none of these do we need to actually "feel" what the other person is feeling as if we could get inside that person's mind. The confusion is on the terms, not the experiences.

[shalamabobbi]

Whatever the solution to the problem you pose here, you need to bear in mind what Niles Eldredge and Stephen Gould came up with to explain the virtual stasis of evolution (the lack of transitional forms): Punctuated equilibria. Their theory was designed to explain the absence of hard evidence for actual evolutionary change by formulating the idea that evolution only took place very quickly and in isolated areas under stress. That reduces the statistical likelihood that fossils will be left in adequate numbers to be found by paleontologists and geologists.

I'm not sure if I understand the intent of your comment, but running simulations on a computer results in long periods of relative stasis separated by brief (relatively)moments of rapid change.

The moments of change are more frequent earlier on and finally after a long while there is no more improvement.

This has nothing to do with the rate of mutation (though that is not all that is going on), as that is going on all along at the same rate in the background. It has to do with something coming along that is better in some way than what went before.

That is why the ratio of bad mutation to beneficial mutation is irrelevant since the bad continually gets swept under the carpet by the status quo. But when an improvement comes along it very quickly takes over the scene.

The degree of variation in the genome that currently exists cannot be explained as occurring from one reproducing pair of individuals 6000 years ago or from 4 couples 4000 years ago- whether one accepts gradual change or punctuated change.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_genetic_variation

[mfbukowski]

(also as a response to mfbukowski)

A basic distinction that is not being made by those who say the word "subjective" in conversations here is a basic distinction in the philosophy of language between the what the words are and what they refer to.

Notice that there are descriptions of sounds that are very easy to agree with. For example, if I say that, given the sound of an instrument, there is a second one whose only difference was that the lower overtones were louder than the same overtones of the first instrument, and that the higher overtones and harmonics of the second one were much diminished compared to those of the first one, then we would have a pretty easy idea of how the sounds of both would differ while playing the same note. Notice this is a way to describe to someone the sound of an instrument that she probably has never heard.

The only problem with descriptions of the type expressed here by me and your different words, Evangeline, is that we haven't really agreed in what I mean by rugged and thick and dark and that's why we disagree. You see, we have no reason to think that normally functioning auditory systems differ in subjective perception (by subjective perception I mean the actual "feel" or "experience of listening") and we have much evidence that they don't differ much. An example with vision is how we answer the question, "How do we know that this person is color blind?" We just don't cross our arms and say, "Well, we can't see what this person see so, therefore, we are wasting our time trying to investigate whether he/she can see colors as we do", right? In the same way it seems to me that we can agree, if we took the time to agree in the terms, in describing subjective experiences such as that of sounds or visions in remarkably uniform ways.

And notice that in none of these do we need to actually "feel" what the other person is feeling as if we could get inside that person's mind. The confusion is on the terms, not the experiences.

It's debatable as to whether or not words refer to things at all- usually the meaning of a word derives from its use, at least according to the later Wittgenstein:

<a name="Mea">3.3 Meaning as Use

“For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI 43). This basic statement is what underlies the change of perspective most typical of the later phase of Wittgenstein's thought: a change from a conception of meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the hinge of the investigation. Traditional theories of meaning in the history of philosophy were intent on pointing to something exterior to the proposition which endows it with sense. This “something” could generally be located either in an objective space, or inside the mind as mental representation. As early as 1933 (The Blue Book) Wittgenstein took pains to challenge these dogmas, arriving at the insight that “if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use” (BB 4). Ascertainment of the use (of a word, of a proposition), however, is not given to any sort of constructive theory building, as in the Tractatus. Rather, when investigating meaning, the philosopher must “look and see” the variety of uses to which the word is put. So different is this new perspective that Wittgenstein repeats: “Don't think but look!” (PI 66); and such looking is done vis a vis particular cases, not thoughtful generalizations. In giving the meaning of a word, any explanatory generalization should be replaced by a description of use. The traditional idea that a proposition houses a content and has a restricted number of Fregean forces (such as assertion, question and command), gives way to an emphasis on the diversity of uses.

http://plato.stanfor...ttgenstein/#Mea

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/

Edited August 11, 2012 by mfbukowski

[volgadon]

You see, we have no reason to think that normally functioning auditory systems differ in subjective perception (by subjective perception I mean the actual "feel" or "experience of listening") and we have much evidence that they don't differ much.

Then why do some people feel that Bedouin music is an intolerable caterwaul akin to slowly and painfully garroting an agitated alleycat, yet others are completely enchanted by the wistful, yearning melodies that speak of wild, empty spaces that speak to their souls like nothing else does.

[Robert F. Smith]

Let me ask this the best way I feel comfortable asking it.

Are you aware of another reference for that other than the huge, most obvious one?

No. Not sure what you have in mind. Perhaps something esoteric?

[Robert F. Smith]

First of all, you don't need to be monistic to be free of friction with science; you could take the approach of saying - a particular - religion and science talk about different things. Hard to pull it off if you say "religion" as it stands today treats of different things, though. Also, you can believe in the supernatural and still don't conflict with science; science doesn't get this metaphysical, that pertains to philosophy.

Thirdly, that you are a monist and naturalistic doesn't mean you won't conflict with science.... I have no idea where you get that weird idea from. Look: "Hi, I'm John. A completely material God told me that evolution is a charade perpetrated by Satan, who is also material. By the way, everything is material." There you go. That's a monism, naturalism and conflicts with science.

A good caricature, but it doesn't advance the discussion.

Mormonism is guilty in your eyes by association with all other religions, none of which (in your opinion) differ substantially from any other. It is necessarily difficult to differentiate a very advanced sentient being(s) from a "God" who is wholly other, necessary, and not part of the contingent universe created wholly by Him. Both are "gods," but they are not logically compatible.

I said in post #511,

What I was referring to here has to do with testable (theoretically falsifiable) Mormon claims on the one hand (they assert that God is part of an entirely natural universe, a universe in which the Book of Mormon describes an actual series of civilizations which existed in the New World during a very specific period of time), along with the correspondence theory of truth on the other -- in which convergences of claims which match scientific reality confirm the hypothesis. No supernatural assumptions apply.

I said:

This leaves a large area available for professional testing by fully scientific means. Not vague or insubstantial matters, but significant issues examined within the canons of scientific and historical inquiry. Should be fairly straightforward, right? Indeed, let us make it easy for you: You be the judge of the evidence in the case. Just you. No jury. Can you set aside your apriori judgements and biases long enough to render fair judgment? I addressed this issue at the end of my post # 511 also, but you didn't bite the hook. THere is something scary and unpredictable about dealing with realia.

Alvino said:

I don't know what you are talking about here, Robert, to be honest. I read your post #511 but couldn't see anything interesting to answer there. Seems hard for me to see what points you are making, if you are at all.

We both like science and the scientific method. Science likes to deal with realia. Perhaps we could address the issues you raise through actually confronting the earthly claims of Mormonism via that scientific method. Couldn't we then extrapolate from the results to those areas less amenable to direct scientific testing -- God doesn't normally put himself on display for scientific measurement and testing like some alien who crashed at Roswell. Couldn't we address the Book of Mormon, for example, the way any document examiner, archeologist, or literary analyst might to obtain hard evidence?

In other words, arguing over theoretical "would haves" and "could haves" seems pointless when we have a suspect whom we can test for GSR (gun shot residue) in order to help solve the crime. We can leave the voodoo out of it and concentrate solely on the hard evidence. Doesn't that seem rational? I prefer coming to grips with the issues in a practical way rather than mouthing mumbo jumbo till the cows come home.

How about you? What do you make of Supersnail's off-hand notion of "the idea of a sentient horticulturist, with free will, intervening in evolution."

Edited August 11, 2012 by Robert F. Smith

[Robert F. Smith]

Duplicate.

Edited August 11, 2012 by Robert F. Smith

[Robert F. Smith]

The degree of variation in the genome that currently exists cannot be explained as occurring from one reproducing pair of individuals 6000 years ago or from 4 couples 4000 years ago- whether one accepts gradual change or punctuated change.

http://en.wikipedia....netic_variation

Why would one want to posit such recent sources of variation?

Eldredge and Gould were discussing lack of fossil evidence for transitional forms in speciation, and the need for very long periods of equilibrium in which no changes occurred, punctuated by very brief periods of change or transition to new forms, even if they only occur as a series of small steps.

In fact, however, many observers confuse genetic variation within species with evolution -- which it is not. Adaptation within a species merely uses the already extant genetic variation available. Survival of the fittest. This is not part of speciation.

[Alvino]

It's debatable as to whether or not words refer to things at all- usually the meaning of a word derives from its use, at least according to the later Wittgenstein:

http://plato.stanfor...ttgenstein/#Mea

http://plato.stanfor...ries/reference/

These are ideas of meaning, not a theory of truth. That the meaning and the sense of a word are derived from its use is not an argument by itself to say it doesn't correspond with reality (since, remember, there is something we can do with a word for which the meaning, even if discovered through how it's used, has now been determined) and neither to say, if you don't like the correspondence theory of truth, that it is not referring to anything but its uses (again, the meaning is discovered by the uses but what it means may refer to something). What you quoted is talking about meaning and sense, not about reference, and how we clarify what one is trying to speak by looking at the uses of the word. This is evidenced by the following: "a change from a conception of meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the hinge of the investigation." Representations, meaning, and sense are not the same as reference or truth though they greatly help to determine whether something is actually true or not.

Edited August 11, 2012 by Alvino

[Alvino]

Then why do some people feel that Bedouin music is an intolerable caterwaul akin to slowly and painfully garroting an agitated alleycat, yet others are completely enchanted by the wistful, yearning melodies that speak of wild, empty spaces that speak to their souls like nothing else does.

Pain can trigger pleasure but it would be a mistake to say that pain is pleasure. One can distinguish between how one is provoked by a piece of music from how the music actually sounds (notes, a higher or lower pitch, instruments that are being played, and even more subtle differences in sound). One can also distinguish between how Velázquez's Las Meninas looks like and any judgments we can pass on its aesthetic value.

[Alvino]

A good caricature, but it doesn't advance the discussion.

...Dude, the point is not that that is a portrayal of Mormonism or of any existing religion but only that it is possible to be a naturalist materialist monist and STILL disagree with science.

Mormonism is guilty in your eyes by association with all other religions,

No.

none of which (in your opinion) differ substantially from any other.

No.

It is necessarily difficult to differentiate a very advanced sentient being(s) from a "God" who is wholly other, necessary, and not part of the contingent universe created wholly by Him. Both are "gods," but they are not logically compatible.

I take it you are not a Mormon? God in Mormonism is not necessary, not not part of the contingent universe, and the universe was not created wholly by Him. But, again, I wasn't saying the view I expressed of a materialist God was Mormonism's or any other religion's.

We both like science and the scientific method. Science likes to deal with realia. Perhaps we could address the issues you raise through actually confronting the earthly claims of Mormonism via that scientific method. Couldn't we then extrapolate from the results to those areas less amenable to direct scientific testing -- God doesn't normally put himself on display for scientific measurement and testing like some alien who crashed at Roswell.

Ironically, this is a caricature of your own religion (if you are Christian). After all, didn't Christ invite Thomas to touch the marks of His crucifixion?

Couldn't we address the Book of Mormon, for example, the way any document examiner, archeologist, or literary analyst might to obtain hard evidence?

Sure we could, who said we couldn't?

In other words, arguing over theoretical "would haves" and "could haves" seems pointless when we have a suspect whom we can test for GSR (gun shot residue) in order to help solve the crime. We can leave the voodoo out of it and concentrate solely on the hard evidence. Doesn't that seem rational? I prefer coming to grips with the issues in a practical way rather than mouthing mumbo jumbo till the cows come home.

Have at it. However, I do perceive a tendency in how you are saying what you are saying to disregard a very important part of science: the questions of what constitutes good evidence and bad evidence, and of what conclusions should be drawn from what data we find. Find evidence, by all means, but don't forget these questions.

How about you? What do you make of Supersnail's off-hand notion of "the idea of a sentient horticulturist, with free will, intervening in evolution."

I find it to be mumbo jumbo with the intent of being mouthed till the cows come home.

Edited August 11, 2012 by Alvino

[shalamabobbi]

Why would one want to posit such recent sources of variation?

Good question. Why indeed is it done?

Eldredge and Gould were discussing lack of fossil evidence for transitional forms in speciation, and the need for very long periods of equilibrium in which no changes occurred, punctuated by very brief periods of change or transition to new forms, even if they only occur as a series of small steps.

In fact, however, many observers confuse genetic variation within species with evolution -- which it is not. Adaptation within a species merely uses the already extant genetic variation available. Survival of the fittest. This is not part of speciation.

I guess I'm still not sure where you are heading.

Are you saying that life forms in your view were placed upon the earth over vast periods of time by God? That the generally accepted view of evolution isn't correct? That the fossil evidence supports this?

If so what is your interpretation of ring species? Are the variations at the extreme ends different species since they cannot interbreed or are they the same species since they are connected by variations with each other that can?

And next question. If the variation were to occur over time rather than the spatial dimension what difference if any would that make?

[mfbukowski]

These are ideas of meaning, not a theory of truth. That the meaning and the sense of a word are derived from its use is not an argument by itself to say it doesn't correspond with reality (since, remember, there is something we can do with a word for which the meaning, even if discovered through how it's used, has now been determined) and neither to say, if you don't like the correspondence theory of truth, that it is not referring to anything but its uses (again, the meaning is discovered by the uses but what it means may refer to something). What you quoted is talking about meaning and sense, not about reference, and how we clarify what one is trying to speak by looking at the uses of the word. This is evidenced by the following: "a change from a conception of meaning as representation to a view which looks to use as the hinge of the investigation." Representations, meaning, and sense are not the same as reference or truth though they greatly help to determine whether something is actually true or not.

Yeah, that's because the later Wittgenstein's theory of truth is highly complex and it isn't clear HOW it could be classified at all. It is most like a deflationary theory of truth, not unlike Rorty's- the idea being that there is really not much that can be said about "truth", but correspondence to reality ain't it!

The point I am making however is that it is clear from nearly all of analytical philosophy that truth is regarded as a property of propositions not things.

If you are a believer in correspondence we can go there if you like, but I don't think the theory is tenable in the long run. Be ready to answer every classic objection to correspondence and a few others I might have dreamed up!

The ultimate problem is the one I think I have cited here before and that is how does one, first define this elusive "correspondence" since words are not things, and secondly, how does one get outside language to "check" the correspondence between the proposition and "reality" and return and report - in language- whether or not the proposition "corresponds" correctly- whatever that could mean in this context.

I could be wrong but I don't think there is anybody who has had more than a semester of philosophy out there who believes in simple, naive correspondence the way you hear it expressed on this board. Of course I could be wrong. It happened once in 1985 I think, but of course it was debatable.

[mfbukowski]

Pain can trigger pleasure but it would be a mistake to say that pain is pleasure.

Highly debatable. Ever scratch a mosquito bite til it bleeds?

It's exactly the same problem as above- the problem is how you characterize subjective- or really any experience in language. Simple correspondence just doesn't make it.

Edited August 11, 2012 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

Lest anybody think I am making this stuff up, I suppose I would resort to the good old argument from authority so y'all know that there is at least something to what I am saying:

There are many implications of a theory of this sort for philosophical debate about the nature of truth. Philosophers often make suggestions like the following: truth consists in correspondence to the facts; truth consists in coherence with a set of beliefs or propositions; truth is the ideal outcome of rational inquiry. According to the deflationist, however, such suggestions are mistaken, and, moreover, they all share a common mistake. The common mistake is to assume that truth has a nature of the kind that philosophers might find out about and develop theories of. For the deflationist, truth has no nature beyond what is captured in ordinary claims such as that ‘snow is white’ is true just in case snow is white. Philosophers looking for the nature of truth are bound to be frustrated, the deflationist says, because they are looking for something that isn't there.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/

There is, after all, a reason I got out of academic philosophy. There's nothing there.

I got in because it was, I thought, the "love of wisdom" and it turned out to be the "love of language". Do you want to spend your life deconstructing language?

Not I, thank you very much!

But the bottom line here for Mormonism is that don't let anyone tell you that direct spiritual experience is not "real" and has no philosophical foundation.

You don't have to understand all the whys and wherefores- unless you want to. But just know that the whys and wherefores are there if you ever want to dig them out. It's all just words and words are NOT experiences. And what is beyond experience? If you ever experience it and put it into words, please tell me

But that doesn't mean naive realism is true either.

Whatever you say, trust me, it gets complicated. So get into it and learn it or stay out of the business. Financial traders don't start doing interest rate swaps on the first day, but everyone thinks they are an expert on philosophy without taking course 1. I don't know why that is!?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interest_rate_swap

Of course Seth Payne could probably tell you about both!

[Robert F. Smith]

Robert F. Smith, on 09 August 2012 - 09:12 PM, said:

As a human, Adam and Eve were created the same way all humans are "created," and they were born as mewling infants just like the rest of us. The Brethren say that the Creation Story is figurative.

Let me ask this the best way I feel comfortable asking it.

Are you aware of another reference for that other than the huge, most obvious one?

Brigham Young,

“Though we have it in history that our Father Adam was made of the dust of this earth and that he knew nothing about his God previous to being made here, yet it is not so; and when we learn the truth we shall see and understand that he helped to make this world and was the chief manager in that operation.

“He was the person who brought the animals and the seeds from other planets to this world and brought a wife with him and stayed here. You may read and believe what you please as to what is found written in the Bible. Adam was made from the dust of an earth, but not from the dust of this earth. He was made as you and I are made, and no person was ever made upon any other principle.” Journal of Discourses, 3:319.

Spencer W. Kimball, “The Blessings and Responsibilities of Womanhood,” Ensign, Mar. 1976, 70,

“And I, God, created man in mine own image, in the image of mine Only Begotten created I him; male and female created I them. [The story of the rib, of course, is figurative.]”

Bruce R. McConkie,

For those whose limited spiritual understanding precludes a recitation of all the facts, the revealed account, in figurative language, speaks of Eve being created from Adam's rib. (Moses 3:21-25.) A more express scripture, however, speaks of "Adam, who was the son of God, with whom God, himself, conversed." (Moses 6:22. Italics added.) In a formal doctrinal pronouncement, the First Presidency of the Church (Joseph F. Smith, John R. Winder, and Anthon H. Lund) said that "all who have inhabited the earth since Adam have taken bodies and become souls in like manner," and that the first of our race began life as the human germ or embryo that becomes a man. (See Improvement Era, November 1909, p. 80.) (From "Eve and the Fall," in Woman [1988] p. 60).

“Scant knowledge is available to us of Eve (the wife of Adam) and her achievements in pre-existence and in mortality. Without question she was like unto her mighty husband Adam in intelligence and in devotion to righteousness during both her first and second estates of existence. She was placed on earth in the same manner as was Adam, the Mosaic account of the Lord creating her from Adam's rib being merely figurative. (Moses 3:20-25.)” [From Mormon Doctrine 2nd ed. [1966], p. 242]

John A. Widtsoe,

Symbolism. Naturally, the very essence of these fundamental truths is not known to man, nor indeed can be. We know things only so far as our senses permit. Whatever is known, is known through symbols. The letters on the written page are but symbols of mighty thoughts that are easily transferred from mind to mind by these symbols. Man lives under a great system of symbolism. Clearly, the mighty, eternal truths encompassing all that man is or may be, cannot be expressed literally, nor is there in the temple any attempt to do this. On the contrary, the great and wonderful temple service is one of mighty symbolism. By the use of symbols of speech, of action, of color, of form, the great truths connected with the story of man are made evident to the mind. (Rational Theology, 120)

The earthly ordinances of the Gospel are themselves only reflections of heavenly ordinances. For instance, baptism, the gift of the Holy Ghost and temple work are merely earthly symbols of realities that prevail throughout the universe; but, they are symbols of truths that must be recognized if the Great Plan is to be fulfilled. The acceptance of these earthly symbols is part and parcel of correct earth life, but being earthly symbols they are distinctly of the earth, and cannot be accepted elsewhere than on earth. [1915 Melchizedek Priesthood Manual (“Work for the Dead,” UGHM, 6:33)]

Hugh Nibley, The Message of the Joseph Smith Papyri: An Egyptian Endowment, 2nd ed., xxix.

“The Mormon endowment… is frankly a model, a presentation in figurative terms. As such, it is flexible and adjustable; for example, it may be presented in more languages than one, and in more than one medium of communication. But since it does not attempt to be a picture of reality, but only a model or analogue to show how things work, setting forth the pattern of man’s life on earth with its fundamental whys and wherefores, it does not need to be changed or adapted greatly through the years; it is a remarkably stable model, which makes its comparison with other forms and traditions, including the more ancient ones, quite valid and instructive… Those who have been to the temple hundreds of times know that “age cannot wither… nor custom stale [its] infinite variety.” What [the] few bits of information [about parallels in other religions and cultures] do is to supply a new dimension to the experience, along with the assurance that a wealth of newly found records confirms the fundamental thesis of its antiquity and genuineness.”

[Robert F. Smith]

Quote: I said,

It is necessarily difficult to differentiate a [Mormon] very advanced sentient being(s) from a [non-Mormon] "God" who is wholly other, necessary, and not part of the contingent universe created wholly by Him. Both are "gods," but they are not logically compatible.

I take it you are not a Mormon? God in Mormonism is not necessary, not not part of the contingent universe, and the universe was not created wholly by Him. But, again, I wasn't saying the view I expressed of a materialist God was Mormonism's or any other religion's.

Perhaps the above labeling in brackets will help. As I suspected, you did not follow my meaning at all.

Quote: I said,

We both like science and the scientific method. Science likes to deal with realia. Perhaps we could address the issues you raise through actually confronting the earthly claims of Mormonism via that scientific method. Couldn't we then extrapolate from the results to those areas less amenable to direct scientific testing -- God doesn't normally put himself on display for scientific measurement and testing like some alien who crashed at Roswell.

Alvino said:

Ironically, this is a caricature of your own religion (if you are Christian). After all, didn't Christ invite Thomas to touch the marks of His crucifixion?

Since Mormons are Christian, I prefer to use the term "non-Mormon," just for clarity. The normative Judeo-Christian-Muslim view is that God is wholly other and necessary, all else (including us) being contingent. This puts the normative, non-Mormon God entirely outside the realm of science.

Quote: I said,

Couldn't we address the Book of Mormon, for example, the way any document examiner, archeologist, or literary analyst might to obtain hard evidence?

Alvino said,

Sure we could, who said we couldn't?

I was merely proposing a meaningful way of approaching a fair evaluation of Mormonism, not suggesting that anyone had disagreed yet.

Quote: I said,

In other words, arguing over theoretical "would haves" and "could haves" seems pointless when we have a suspect whom we can test for GSR (gun shot residue) in order to help solve the crime. We can leave the voodoo out of it and concentrate solely on the hard evidence. Doesn't that seem rational? I prefer coming to grips with the issues in a practical way rather than mouthing mumbo jumbo till the cows come home.

Alvino said,

Have at it. However, I do perceive a tendency in how you are saying what you are saying to disregard a very important part of science: the questions of what constitutes good evidence and bad evidence, and of what conclusions should be drawn from what data we find. Find evidence, by all means, but don't forget these questions.

Good. You be the judge of the evidence and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom.

Item #1. Accidental discovery in the Fall of 1969. I was examining the introductory cuneiform sign list, transliterations, and meanings of a student then at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I noted the Akkadian sign for "grain; barley," which was transliterated as še'um. I remembered such a word in the Book of Mormon, sheum at Mosiah 9:9 as the name of a food plant. In fact, a number of non-biblical words of foreign origin are defined within the Book of Mormon in ways which correspond to reasonably good etymologies known from ancient Near Eastern languages. Some even being attested as reasonable by prominent non-Mormon scholars.