Why Is Moroni'S Promise, A Mormon Belief, Considered A Valid Epistemic Test Of Mormon Belief?

[wenglund]

Since Moroni's promise has nothing to do with things objectively testable, so your analogy doesn't apply.

Since I was responding to your answer to your own question, and since your answer used the unqualified "anythning," in relation to wishes, it does apply.

Now, if you would like to restate your answer in a qualified way, then I am fine with that.

However, even if you do so, I don't think it will render your answer any less problematic.

For example, let's say I wish that when I read your response I will feel a profound sense of appreciation and gratitude that you finally get what I am saying. Will Moroni 10 validate this non-objectively testable wish as "truth"?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Honorentheos]

LOL

"Beware of maya"

-George Harrison

You say so much about your ignorance by belittling in this way, my friend.

Kali Comes to Call

Those who shout, "Beware of Maya!" malign Maya, for the universe always gives us what we ask for. When we call on the Goddess to ask Her for mundane boons, which bind us to limited forms, She appears to us as Maya; when we pray to Her power and energy She manifests as Shakti; and to those few who relate to Her maternally she reveals Herself as Ma, God the Mother. Those who remain stuck in Maya do so because they fail to redirect their urge to individuation from Maya to Chit; they are carried along by the current of their karmas, and the karmic currents of those near and dear to them. Those who learn to define themselves eventually begin to define their surroundings. Some of the greatest explorers of Chit develop a self-expression of such accuracy and force that they become true wonderworkers.

We who look at Kali commonly look with eyes that blend Chit with Maya.

I have to admit, I find your declaration, "Beware of Maya!" humorous. There is so much of the individual, and of maya, in your argument that it borders on self-blindness.

But perhaps by answering the question, "please be so kind as to explain how your view of "ideas" does not need to deal with "objects" contrary to the assertion made by MP and demonstrated in my post" you can show how this is not actually the case. Otherwise, your brand of pragmatism still seems to be all about you and separation from others, history, or context.

I don't think this is unreasonable to request.

Edited July 4, 2011 by Honorentheos

[Honorentheos]

I'm sorry; do you have firsthand knowledge about the truth of some proposition about reality sans sensory input?

No?

Then your position seems self-contradictory.

Actually, Log, this is an interesting statement.

When you say sensory input, are you suggesting that you can demonstrate the results of applying the Moroni Promise are on equal footing with, say, holding an apple in your hand?

If so, you are actually getting back to the point of the OP.

Frankly, your first statement is the essence of the argument made in the OP - the Moroni Promise is interpreted based on input defined by Mormon beliefs. The actual event "B" that occurs after one prays is irrelevent compared to the explaination. Anything could happen as "B", sensory or otherwise.

And if you are open to it, you will find that just about everything has happened as "B", including negative answers, neutral answers, and positive answers. Yet, when discussing other people's "B", all that matters to the hearer is the explaination one has already accepted not the result "B".

[mfbukowski]

Honor:

Dewey's Metaphysics

Underlining added

Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics first took shape in articles that he wrote during the decade after the publication of Studies in Logical Theory, a period when he was attempting to elucidate the implications of instrumentalism. Dewey disagreed with William James’s assessment that pragmatic principles were metaphysically neutral. (He discusses this disagreement in “What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical,” published in 1908.) Dewey’s view was based in part on an assessment of the motivations behind traditional metaphysics: a central aim of the metaphysical tradition had been the discovery of an immutable cognitive object that could serve as a foundation for knowledge. The pragmatic theory, by showing that knowledge is a product of an activity directed to the fulfillment of human purposes, and that a true (or warranted) belief is known to be such by the consequences of its employment rather than by any psychological or ontological foundations, rendered this longstanding aim of metaphysics, in Dewey’s view, moot, and opened the door to renewed metaphysical discussion grounded firmly on an empirical basis.

Dewey begins to define the general form that an empirical metaphysics should take in a number of articles, including “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1905) and “Does Reality Possess Practical Character?” (1908). In the former article, Dewey asserts that things experienced empirically “are what they are experienced as.” Dewey uses as an example a noise heard in a darkened room that is initially experienced as fearsome. Subsequent inquiry (e.g., turning on the lights and looking about) reveals that the noise was caused by a shade tapping against a window, and thus innocuous. But the subsequent inquiry, Dewey argues, does not change the initial status of the noise: it was experienced as fearsome, and in fact was fearsome. The point stems from the naturalistic roots of Dewey’s logic. Our experience of the world is constituted by our interrelationship with it, a relationship that is imbued with practical import. The initial fearsomeness of the noise is the experiential correlate of the uncertain, problematic character of the situation, an uncertainty that is not merely subjective or mental, but a product of the potential inadequacy of previously established modes of behavior to deal effectively with the pragmatic demands of present circumstances. The subsequent inquiry does not, therefore, uncover a reality (the innocuousness of the noise) underlying a mere appearance (its fearsomeness), but by settling the demands of the situation, it effects a change in the inter-dynamics of the organism-environment relationship of the initial situation–a change in reality.

There are two important implications of this line of thought that distinguish it from the metaphysical tradition. First, although inquiry is aimed at resolving the precarious and confusing aspects of experience to provide a stable basis for action, this does not imply the unreality of the unstable and contingent, nor justify its relegation to the status of mere appearance. Thus, for example, the usefulness and reliability of utilizing certain stable features of things encountered in our experience as a basis for classification does not justify according ultimate reality to essences or Platonic forms any more than, as rationalist metaphysicians in the modern era have thought, the similar usefulness of mathematical reasoning in understanding natural processes justifies the conclusion that the world can be exhaustively defined mathematically.

Second, the fact that the meanings we attribute to natural events might change in any particular in the future as renewed inquiries lead to more adequate understandings of natural events (as was implied by Dewey’s fallibilism) does not entail that our experience of the world at any given time may as a whole be errant. Thus the implicit skepticism that underlies the representational theory of ideas and raises questions concerning the veracity of perceptual experience as such is unwarranted. Dewey stresses the point that sensations, hypotheses, ideas, etc., come into play to mediate our encounter with the world only in the context of active inquiry. Once inquiry is successful in resolving a problematic situation, mediatory sensations and ideas, as Dewey says, “drop out; and things are present to the agent in the most naively realistic fashion.”

These contentions positioned Dewey’s metaphysics within the territory of a naive realism, and in a number of his articles, such as “The Realism of Pragmatism” (1905), “Brief Studies in Realism” (1911), and “The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem” (1915), it is this view that Dewey expressly avows (a view that he carefully distinguishes from what he calls “presentational realism,” which he attributes to a number of the other realists of his day). Opposing narrow-minded positions that would accord full ontological status only to certain, typically the most stable or reliable, aspects of experience, Dewey argues for a position that recognizes the real significance of the multifarious richness of human experience.

Dewey offered a fuller statement of his metaphysics in 1925, with the publication of one of his most significant philosophical works, Experience and Nature. In the introductory chapter, Dewey stresses a familiar theme from his earlier writings: that previous metaphysicians, guided by unavowed biases for those aspects of experience that are relatively stable and secure, have illicitly reified these biases into narrow ontological presumptions, such as the temporal identity of substance, or the ultimate reality of forms or essences. Dewey finds this procedure so pervasive in the history of thought that he calls it simplythe philosophic fallacy, and signals his intention to eschew the disastrous consequences of this approach by offering a descriptive account of all of the various generic features of human experience, whatever their character.

Dewey begins with the observation that the world as we experience it both individually and collectively is an admixture of the precarious, the transitory and contingent aspect of things, and the stable, the patterned regularity of natural processes that allows for prediction and human intervention. Honest metaphysical description must take into account both of these elements of experience. Dewey endeavors to do this by an event ontology. The world, rather than being comprised of things or, in more traditional terms, substances, is comprised of happenings or occurrences that admit of both episodic uniqueness and general, structured order. Intrinsically events have an ineffable qualitative character by which they are immediately enjoyed or suffered, thus providing the basis for experienced value and aesthetic appreciation. Extrinsically events are connected to one another by patterns of change and development; any given event arises out of determinant prior conditions and leads to probable consequences. The patterns of these temporal processes is the proper subject matter of human knowledge–we know the world in terms of causal laws and mathematical relationships–but the instrumental value of understanding and controlling them should not blind us to the immediate, qualitative aspect of events; indeed, the value of scientific understanding is most significantly realized in the facility it affords for controlling the circumstances under which immediate enjoyments may be realized.

It is in terms of the distinction between qualitative immediacy and the structured order of events that Dewey understands the general pattern of human life and action. This understanding is captured by James’ suggestive metaphor that human experience consists of an alternation of flights and perchings, an alternation of concentrated effort directed toward the achievement of foreseen aims, what Dewey calls “ends-in-view,” with the fruition of effort in the immediate satisfaction of “consummatory experience.” Dewey’s insistence that human life follows the patterns of nature, as a part of nature, is the core tenet of his naturalistic outlook.

Dewey also addresses the social aspect of human experience facilitated by symbolic activity, particularly that of language. For Dewey the question of the nature of social relationships is a significant matter not only for social theory, but metaphysics as well, for it is from collective human activity, and specifically the development of shared meanings that govern this activity, that the mind arises. Thus rather than understanding the mind as a primitive and individual human endowment, and a precondition of conscious and intentional action, as was typical in the philosophical tradition since Descartes, Dewey offers a genetic analysis of mind as an emerging aspect of cooperative activity mediated by linguistic communication. Consciousness, in turn, is not to be understood as a domain of private awareness, but rather as the fulcrum point of the organism’s readjustment to the challenge of novel conditions where the meanings and attitudes that formulate habitual behavioral responses to the environment fail to be adequate. Thus Dewey offers in the better part of a number of chapters of Experience and Nature a response to the traditional mind-body problem of the metaphysical tradition, a response that understands the mind as an emergent issue of natural processes, more particularly the web of interactive relationships between human beings and the world in which they live.

These views are later modified by Nagel who has a better developed view of the subjective

[KevinG]

Hi DaddyG.

I appreciate your comment, and think it illustrates the first part of my statement very well. That being, "You acted in a certain manner and the desired outcome was achieved". This is certainly justification that the Moroni Promise worked for you, whether in an expected or unexpected way.

What happened was neither expected or particularly desired at the time. In retrospect it was a blessing. At the time it made my life very complex and required me to change myself in fundamental ways. The premise that the Mormons get their desired outcomes is weak and my experience does not reflect it.

After all the pages and pages of this thread I still have yet to see those unfamiliar with the experience of an LDS testimony of a witness of Jesus Christ and His Gospel describe Moroni, Alma and James in anything other than a superficial way.

My conclusion is that Calvinists and Atheists don't get the LDS.

[Hughes]

I'm sorry; do you have firsthand knowledge about the truth of some proposition about reality sans sensory input?

No?

Then your position seems self-contradictory.

The test isn't a test of sensory input, but an evaluation of the validity of a test of truth based solely on subjective feelings.

If there are "a number" of them, you ought have no problem identifying two or three.

(Of course, "zero" is "a number", too.)

Lehi

IF you must know...

1) Historicity of Christ

2) Personal experience with Christ himself.

For those who do not believe in God, and in His ability to fulfil His promises, I agree it is not a valid test; but for those who do it is.

Even for those who believe in God it can be used to say anything (subjective) is true.

That's why I referenced Mormon 9:1-6 in this context. Even if you don't believe in God, one can be convincingly persuaded that there is a God by firsthand sensory input. I was an atheist when I received this evidence, which resulted in my not being an atheist anymore.

I used to be an Atheist as well, however I couldn't ever be LDS, so I don't see how you're connecting the two. Believers in God are not automatically LDS.

[Honorentheos]

Hi DaddyG,

I was once a Mormon with what I considered a very real testimony of the church. I had very strong convictions based on Moroni's promise that not only the church was true, but more importantly that my sins were forgiven by a real, living, and loving Redeemer and I had been born anew, as described in Alma 5. The later was so fundamental to my testimony that long after I found myself unable to believe the foundation myths of the LDS faith I still attended meetings under the belief that as long as I was basically going to maintain a relationship with my Savior, it didn't matter if I didn't believe in the church.

Truth is, I have since realized that this is a hard thing for a person to do even with emotional conviction of the veracity of a Christ-as-God belief.

It became impossible once I also came to see the Christ-myth as just that.

The question isn't if the Moroni's Promise can serve as a person's foundation for belief. It can. The question is if it's valid as an epistemic test of Mormon beliefs, since it is founded on one itself. Can you say that your experience justified your belief in the response? I'd say it does - for you. It's an aesthetic claim to justified belief.

I consider this to be at the heart of the OP, and why even if I disagree with Wade England's beliefs I won't argue with him because of his last statements - aesthetic knowledge can be just that as long as we accept it for what it is.

What it doesn't do, and can't do, is tell us anything about the validity of Mormon truth claims overall. If we accept the traditional definition of knowledge as "justified, true belief", then one has to be able to effectively explain why another person can have an aesthetically justified belief that they applied Moroni's Promise, but either received no answer or in some cases felt it was the wrong thing to do.

My argument is that a person can do this only by using LDS explanations not by justified belief. It's simply belief when a person tells another that the reason they didn't receive an answer was they didn't sincerely believe. Or why a muslim is less justified in believing in the Koran based on similar aesthetic justification of their own beliefs. Or maybe like you explaining that a current atheist can't understand why you feel as you do. You are not justified in these beliefs, they're just beliefs.

My current direction in discussion with MFB is to question the role that normalization would play in his argument since he seems to isolate everyone from one another and every "thing" in his attempt to claim pragmatism is the answer. I could see valid ways he could explain it with some conditions, but he is skittish about the discussion turning into a trap so he won't commit to anything. It's probably wise. Not very honest, but hey it works for him. Don't call other posters honesty into question. -Ares

[LeSellers]

IF you must know...

I "mustn't", but you were telling us you had.

1) Historicity of Christ

No one can conclusively show that Jesus actually lived using scientific evidence.

That's not to say (and far, far from it) that I do not believe He did. But I'm not going to make any claim of His "historicity", 'cause there ain't none.

2) Personal experience with Christ himself.

Now that would be worth discussing.

How do you know it was Christ?

How do you know what you were experiencing was not just a bit of undigested cheese?

How do you know your experience was "true"?

Can you prove it?

Lehi

[Hughes]

I "mustn't", but you were telling us you had.

No one can conclusively show that Jesus actually lived using scientific evidence.

That's not to say (and far, far from it) that I do not believe He did. But I'm not going to make any claim of His "historicity", 'cause there ain't none.

Now that would be worth discussing.

How do you know it was Christ?

How do you know what you were experiencing was not just a bit of undigested cheese?

How do you know your experience was "true"?

Can you prove it?

Lehi

No one is claiming scientific evidence when talking about history, "Historical evidences" yes.

And I trust my relationship with God/Christ as my experience matches what the Bible teaches.

And no, subjective truths can't be proven or demonstrated objectively.

[KevinG]

This all boils down to "since I can't see it" or "since it hasn't happened to me" or even "since it happened but I was convinced it didn't" therefore "it cannot have really happened to you".

[KevinG]

No one is claiming scientific evidence when talking about history, "Historical evidences" yes.

And I trust my relationship with God/Christ as my experience matches what the Bible teaches.

And no, subjective truths can't be proven or demonstrated objectively.

So you don't believe in revelation without historical evidence? Would you have no faith in Christ if the historical evidence wasn't there? (BTW- this does not concede the point that historical evidence is lacking for the Book of Mormon).

Evidence never convinced me of Christ. The Holy Spirit did. Remember the admonition of Christ to Thomas.

[Hughes]

So you don't believe in revelation without historical evidence? Would you have no faith in Christ if the historical evidence wasn't there? (BTW- this does not concede the point that historical evidence is lacking for the Book of Mormon).

Evidence never convinced me of Christ. The Holy Spirit did. Remember the admonition of Christ to Thomas.

I believe in revelation that is supported by evidence (historical, scriptural).

Christ told Thomas to believe (based on the present physical evidence he presented). Your point?

[KevinG]

I believe in revelation that is supported by evidence (historical, scriptural).

Christ told Thomas to believe (based on the present physical evidence he presented). Your point?

John 20:29Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast ^aseen me, thou hast believed: ^bblessed are they that have not seen, and yethave ^cbelieved.

My point is that those who have faith in Jesus Christ without having evidence are considered blessed by the Savior, not deceived, hallucinating, fooled, errant... Blessed.

[Honorentheos]

John 20:29Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast ^aseen me, thou hast believed: ^bblessed are they that have not seen, and yethave ^cbelieved.

My point is that those who have faith in Jesus Christ without having evidence are considered blessed by the Savior, not deceived, hallucinating, fooled, errant... Blessed.

But isn't this the essence of what the OP is getting at? You are using scripture to defend belief in scripture. Again, ok as aesthetic, but...

[Honorentheos]

This all boils down to "since I can't see it" or "since it hasn't happened to me" or even "since it happened but I was convinced it didn't" (my emphasis added) therefore "it cannot have really happened to you".

Again, this is what I was talking about before. You are searching within your LDS-belief-based explanations to define other people's "B", rather than seeking to normalize the justification by expanding your experience to take other's experiences into consideration.

[KevinG]

But isn't this the essence of what the OP is getting at? You are using scripture to defend belief in scripture. Again, ok as aesthetic, but...

That was adderssing Hughes post not the OP. Although it always amuses me to find evangelicals using the same arguments against Mormons that atheists use against evangelicals.

[KevinG]

Again, this is what I was talking about before. You are searching within your LDS-belief-based explanations to define other people's "B", rather than seeking to normalize the justification by expanding your experience to take other's experiences into consideration.

You have it backwards. LDS did not try to define other peoples view of truth, revelation or knowledge in the OP. It was the other way around.

If I had a nickel for every time someone narrowly and erronilusly defined an aspect of my belief then proceeded to argue against the erronious description... I'd have a lot of nickels.

If someone has a discussion with me that isn't an attempt at a "gotcha" for Mormons they find I am very open minded and flexible with definitions and descriptions of their understanding of revelation, truth and religion.

This thread is drowning under its own assumptions.

[Honorentheos]

That was adderssing Hughes post not the OP. Although it always amuses me to find evangelicals using the same arguments against Mormons that atheists use against evangelicals.

I'm equal opportunity here. I'd use the same argument on both.

[Honorentheos]

You have it backwards. LDS did not try to define other peoples view of truth, revelation or knowledge in the OP. It was the other way around.

If I had a nickel for every time someone narrowly and erronilusly defined an aspect of my belief then proceeded to argue against the erronious description... I'd have a lot of nickels.

If someone has a discussion with me that isn't an attempt at a "gotcha" for Mormons they find I am very open minded and flexible with definitions and descriptions of their understanding of revelation, truth and religion.

This thread is drowning under its own assumptions.

DaddyG,

I think most critics would argue that to truly evaluate the truth claims of the LDS church, you have to take a broader view. When we discuss topics such as Joseph Smiths polygamy, his treatment of Emma, the nature of the BoA translation (with the facs being pretty damning in my view), the question of first vision narratives, BoM context, the flaws in the inspired biblical translation compared to recent manuscript finds, the apparent racism of the church, current views on homosexuality, etc, etc, we see a picture that is more inclusive of evidence, and outside of the LDS narrative for explaining it's truth claims.

Being here on a site that deals with LDS apologetics I suspect you have means of accounting for any and all of the above. Which is good. It's where I think the majority of critics, especially non-theistic critics, feel the more legitimate and justifiable discussions should occur.

It's the due diligence required when leaving behind aesthetic truth for something more inclusive.

Edited July 5, 2011 by Honorentheos

[Honorentheos]

Bukowski,

Thank you for sharing this quote. Would you mind adding in some clarification on your thoughts regarding this phrase you highlighted? Specifically, how you think this occurs and what you specifically think it actually means?

Thanks.

Dewey stresses the point that sensations, hypotheses, ideas, etc., come into play to mediate our encounter with the world only in the context of active inquiry. Once inquiry is successful in resolving a problematic situation, mediatory sensations and ideas, as Dewey says, “drop out; and things are present to the agent in the most naively realistic fashion.”

Edited July 5, 2011 by Honorentheos

[Okrahomer]

John 20:29Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast ^aseen me, thou hast believed: ^bblessed are they that have not seen, and yethave ^cbelieved.

My point is that those who have faith in Jesus Christ without having evidence are considered blessed by the Savior, not deceived, hallucinating, fooled, errant... Blessed.

[mfbukowski]

And no, subjective truths can't be proven or demonstrated objectively.

Gosh.

I know I have heard that somewhere before....

[mfbukowski]

Bukowski,

Thank you for sharing this quote. Would you mind adding in some clarification on your thoughts regarding this phrase you highlighted? Specifically, how you think this occurs and what you specifically think it actually means?

Thanks.

Dewey sees everything in terms of an organism in its environment- for people our environment is cultural and linguistic. But the basic concept is that we are presented with a problem to resolve- it could be an intellectual puzzle or mowing the lawn.

The organism then alters itself and/or the environment to bring itself into a state of stasis - it solves the problem. The relationship between the organism and the environment is now back to "normal" and the cycle is complete.

1- The lawn needs mowing. It looks terrible. I am uncomfortable. I go and get the lawnmower, (tool- instrumentality) mow the lawn, and then it looks good. I go in and take a nap.

2- I read about the Adam-God theory, and think how could it be that a prophet could have said that? I study it out, and come to some resolution of the problem because FAIR explained it to me, or whatever. I am now back to normal.

3- You read things about the church which make you uncomfortable. You re-construct your world view by deciding the church is not true. You are happy with your decision, and life resumes in a new way.

4- A scientist is conducting an experiment and gets some strange data. He cannot explain it. He revises the hypothesis and re-creates what he sees as "true" and now the data matches his perception of the hypothesis.

He publishes the result and gets the Nobel Prize.

5- A rabbit has no place to hide after a fire. He finds a new area to live in, digs a hole and moves in. He is now cozy and safe in his burrow.

In each case, the organism has either altered itself or altered its environment to bring its reality into a state of "normalcy".

It has re-constructed its world using various instrumentalities to make it "true", has solved the problem, or done "what works".

But also it has in a sense "progressed"- it has reached a new state it has never been in before- in the case of the scientist, "science has advanced"; in the case of apologetics and even for the rabbit- new behaviors, new ways of doing things have been reinforced- new tools have been generated, and its world - its reality-is different

Edited July 5, 2011 by mfbukowski

[KevinG]

I'm equal opportunity here. I'd use the same argument on both.

Hahahaha! An honest reply!

[KevinG]

DaddyG,

I think most critics would argue that to truly evaluate the truth claims of the LDS church, you have to take a broader view. When we discuss topics such as Joseph Smiths polygamy, his treatment of Emma, the nature of the BoA translation (with the facs being pretty damning in my view), the question of first vision narratives, BoM context, the flaws in the inspired biblical translation compared to recent manuscript finds, the apparent racism of the church, current views on homosexuality, etc, etc, we see a picture that is more inclusive of evidence, and outside of the LDS narrative for explaining it's truth claims.

Being here on a site that deals with LDS apologetics I suspect you have means of accounting for any and all of the above. Which is good. It's where I think the majority of critics, especially non-theistic critics, feel the more legitimate and justifiable discussions should occur.

It's the due diligence required when leaving behind aesthetic truth for something more inclusive.

I don't believe in inerrancy. I recommend Bushmans Rough Stone Rolling for a treatment of many of the issues cites above. Some are not as damning as our critics make them out to be. But then as you said the site is about apologetics and each of these will invariably make their way through the cycle again. Stay tuned.

P.S. If I were trying to help someone receive a spiritual witness of anything apologetics is not the place I'd start or end.