Why Is Moroni'S Promise, A Mormon Belief, Considered A Valid Epistemic Test Of Mormon Belief?

[Montgomery Price]

Chocolate and vanilla can't exist at once? You're scaring me dude.

Your fears are unfounded. Would you please be try and not interpret my argument in the worst way possible? Of course I didn't mean that chocolate and vanilla literally can't exist at the same time in reality. It's an imprecise analogy. The chocolate and vanilla represent sources of experience that aren't as established as the existence of ice cream. I don't need to explain this to you. Can't believe you missed it.

No need to yell. I have no idea what you are talking about. I do not recall using the word "knowledge" and I am not sure what we are comparing here. It helps to use full sentences without pronouns, like "they" "one" or the "other".

Please write a full sentence with nouns in the usual places if you want people to understand you. It also helps to link to the post you are quoting. This has been a long thread.

So you're saying that when you bear your testimony, you've never used the word "know"? It's quite obvious that many people use their personal experiences as justifications for their claims to knowledge. And there is need to "yell" because you've completely ignored the argument and have instead rambled on about how I can't fix the problem, when you haven't tried either!

Here is a reworded version:

If there's no basis for comparison of subjective spiritual experiences, then on what basis do you behave as if the spiritual experiences have been compared and one can be considered to produce knowledge and the other not?

Edited July 1, 2011 by Montgomery Price

[Deborah]

What explanation do you have for following your spiritual experiences that wouldn't also provide excuse for someone else to follow an incompatible experience?

Sigh. You are assuming everyone follows the same path to come to a conclusion. At least for LDS there is more than just getting the elated feeling. Study is involved and no one can hold on to a testimony without continual study and praying and getting answers along the way.

[Montgomery Price]

Sigh. You are assuming everyone follows the same path to come to a conclusion. At least for LDS there is more than just getting the elated feeling. Study is involved and no one can hold on to a testimony without continual study and praying and getting answers along the way.

What makes you think that I assumed that? I thought I made it clear that I am asking for the difference between the two paths that explains why one is preferred over the other. The fact that they are different yet we can't decide between the two is the problem.

[mfbukowski]

BTW, the "why?" question was pretty important. Can you answer it, please?

What why question? You could at least link to it.

A correspondence theory of truth is not the same thing as Realism, mf. I can accept pragmatism and still be a Realist. We need no real access to "what is the case independent of our experiences" to accept it exists whether we are here to see it or not. If we stop existing, whatever produced our experience of the apple would still continue to exist (THE apple, not what we perceive); that is what is objective.

Pragmatists do not think the world flips on and off if they are looking or not. I don't know where you get this stuff. In the other sentence, you are asserting your view of Realism. That's nice. I thought you were asking me what I thought.

What we mean by the apple is a specific form and texture, etc. Those are experience entirely through the sense. That is one thing and in that sense when we speak of apples we only mean what we experience, that's fine with me.

OK

However, there is a difference between saying that that is all we mean by apple and saying that that is all there exists about the apple or that it is wrong to think that there is something which causes those experiences in me. All you have been saying is that subjective experiences make "what produces the experience of an apple" unknowable or even non-deducible.

Very confusing grammar. I never once said that "subjective experiences make "what produces the experience of an apple" unknowable or even non-deducible." Never once, much less "All I have said is.."

Show me a link for that one! There are a zillion things we can know about apples which are both subjective and objective.

Why? Because your position makes of science a miracle, to quote Putnam (as someone has been quoting him in this boards, I don't recall who that person was). To think that the light that hits my retina and all the mechanisms of vision can't be said to give rise to what I name computers and desks and books when I see them, seems to me rather ludicrous. Just as I find it incredibly reasonable to think that LSD produces chemical reactions in my brain that make me hallucinate, there is "stuff" that make me see and that makes me feel though I don't perceive them but I can find out, through science, how the whole of the parts work.

Nope, not even close. Can't you see the difference between subjective and objective? I am not a solipsist or anything close. We cannot talk about such a "stuff" because all we can know is what is experienced objectively (by all of us) or by us individually (subjectively)

When I blink and I see objects going off I think it is reasonable to suppose that light has something to do with my experience of vision and that vision wouldn't be there if light isn't there. To say that light, though partially, cause vision along with other factors, is to state what is as demonstrable as anything is. The options, like the one you are proposing, seem extremely unconvincing. Science has made your view quite incredible.

I never said anything like this. Science is collective observation- we all agree there is a computer on the desk. We all see it. It does not blink on and off when we go to sleep. It's still there in the morning. It can be weighed, tested and does what computers do. It exists objectively because we all see it. It is an objective experience because it is an experience we can all have. Let's all go see the Eiffel Tower. Extremely objective- most people in the world have at least seen pictures of it. It is a collective objective human experience which can be experienced by anyone. Yet we all have our individual associations with it. I remember a picture I took of an unusual angle looking straight up the interior- so i have my subjective experience of the Eiffel tower, and we all have some level of experience of it objectively. You don't share what I have seen of it, or my picture, because that is subjective. Yet I know you have at least seen a picture of it., even though I don't know if you have a subjective experience of it or not. Your personal experience of it is yours and you may describe it, but it cannot really be shared fully because it is "in your head".

Yet it exists objectively in everyone's experience.

If it was a pink elephant that only I saw, it would be a subjective experience AND a hallucination, unless of course I had just discovered a new species of elephants which were pink. It would remain subjective in that case until I showed it to others which would make it "objective" because others

No need for threats, mf, I think I've been pretty respectful with you.

Yes, and that is why I am responding

[Pahoran]

lol I'm not even trying for this explanation to be "established" at all. I'm not saying they lied but that this explanation is more likely than the God explanation.

Exactly as I said. You think they lied; you originally blurted out that they lied; but you haven't the vertebrae to stand by your unsupported accusation, so you're trying to wriggle around it while still relying upon it.

I previously wrote:

You are quibbling. The investigators said: "We dreamed that you would come." Crazy Glove says, "They lied for the first case about the dream and in the process then got to believe afterwards." Now you are backpedalling, but that's beside the point. "They lied" doesn't dismiss an "explanation," it dismisses the evidence.

And now you respond:

If we are investigating you of whether you committed a crime or not... I don't think we would call you the "investigator". Oh, man, you are incredible.

This is amazing!

I've never thought you particularly well-informed about Mormon things, but this has to take the cake.

Bernard reported his experience with a family he taught when he was a missionary. People being taught by the missionaries are routinely called "investigators."

And you, not knowing that, are so triumphant in your all-pervasive ignorance that you think you can ridicule me because I said something you didn't understand!

Here's a suggestion: why don't you go away and learn something, then come back when you're actually informed?

Then, when you presume to school us about something, you might actually have some credibility.

Just a suggestion.

Regards,

Pahoran

[mfbukowski]

If there's no basis for comparison of subjective spiritual experiences, then on what basis do you behave as if the spiritual experiences have been compared and one can be considered to produce knowledge and the other not?

I don't think that nor have I ever said that (that the Mormon spiritual experience produces "knowledge" where others do not) I don't believe that is true. You are arguing with too many people at once and got confused.

I am also quite sure I never said that there is "no basis for comparison" of spiritual experiences. I have repeatedly said that the "cause" of such experiences cannot be ascertained with precision due to their complexity.

The word "know" reflects an individual's sense of certainty about a statement, nothing more, nothing less. I share John Dewey's view of that as expressed in the book "On Certainty". So indeed in a testimony it is proper to say "I know the church is true" which for me is approximately the equivalent of "I am certain that living the principles of the church gives one the best possible path to becoming the best possible person one can be".

So for me, "I know x is true" says nothing about the status of some "reality" which cannot be experienced; it is about how certain I am that my experiences are "true" in the sense of efficacious for me in very particular ways.

That applies to scientific truth and subjective truth as well- experience is experience. So just as science is efficacious objectively for getting things done, and is therefore "true", belief in the church is efficacious for giving my life subjective meaning and is therefore "true".

So I see that indeed the church is the"best possible path" which I can define, quite precisely, but it is beyond the scope of this thread to do so. It is based on principles from the Didache- the "Way of Life"- I see this as the best possible path for humans to become the best they can be- the supreme value being the affirmation of life in all things- but that is another thread or six.

I think that God teaches us the best path we are ready for, so one cannot compare individual paths any more than one can compare how one child learns as "superior" to the way another child learns. That was the point I tried to express in your Jack and Jill thing, but you didn't get it.

I hope somebody is actually reading this.

[mfbukowski]

People being taught by the missionaries are routinely called "investigators."

And you, not knowing that, are so triumphant in your all-pervasive ignorance that you think you can ridicule me because I said something you didn't understand!

I have to agree that is a game changer.

He isn't LDS at all!

[elguanteloko]

What why question? You could at least link to it.

Post #278, you said "God can only be "known" subjectively, on a personal level." and I asked why that was.

Pragmatists do not think the world flips on and off if they are looking or not.

Neither am I saying that. Man, that doesn't even follow from what I'm saying at all.

I don't know where you get this stuff. In the other sentence, you are asserting your view of Realism. That's nice. I thought you were asking me what I thought.

I don't get that from anywhere since I'm not saying that.

OK

Very confusing grammar. I never once said that "subjective experiences make "what produces the experience of an apple" unknowable or even non-deducible." Never once, much less "All I have said is.."

That's all you have been discussing with me so that is indeed all you have been saying with regards to this issue.

Show me a link for that one! There are a zillion things we can know about apples which are both subjective and objective.

You are missing the point, mf. The point is that there is more to "the apple" than our mere experiences (even more than with your use of "objective"; IOW, there is more to the apple than the "subjective" + "objective" experiences of it). We may only get to know what our experiences tell us but that there is more is quite easily deducible.

Nope, not even close. Can't you see the difference between subjective and objective? I am not a solipsist or anything close. We cannot talk about such a "stuff" because all we can know is what is experienced objectively (by all of us) or by us individually (subjectively)

This is quite incongruent. If you accept that other people are experiencing the same apple then you accept something you can't possibly "talk about" since you can't "talk about" other people's experience; you infer other people's experience. If so, why not be able to deduce what you are also NOT experiencing if you can infer it, namely, the "extra" stuff of the apple?

This is what my central criticism of your position is and I think that's enough of your post to answer for now.

Edited July 1, 2011 by elguanteloko

[mfbukowski]

This is quite incongruent. If you accept that other people are experiencing the same apple then you accept something you can't possibly "talk about" since you can't "talk about" other people's experience; you infer other people's experience. If so, why not be able to deduce what you are also NOT experiencing if you can infer it, namely, the "extra" stuff of the apple?

Not close.

ALL of what we talk about is other people's experience- what we cannot talk about is other people's subjective experience. Like why the red I see is the same or different from the red you see. It is not possible to talk about that.

All we can talk about is what we all experience- that is objective experience- experience we all share.

There is no point in carrying this on- again, it appears you are not reading my posts.

I will discuss it further with anyone else if they like. I never learn with you- I always think you are so close to understanding it, and then we go backwards. It isn't hard at all, if you actually read the words.

Post #278, you said "God can only be "known" subjectively, on a personal level." and I asked why that was.

Holy cow. Because he cannot be objectively seen. Got a picture of him? Nobody does. Having a picture would make him "objective". How can you ask that? He can only be experienced in our "hearts".

THAT was your big question? No objective "evidence" remember? You even said that yourself!

So, you think God does in fact cause or promote your religious experience but have no demonstrable evidence. Got it.

No communication here whatsoever.

Edited July 1, 2011 by mfbukowski

[elguanteloko]

Not close.

ALL of what we talk about is other people's experience- what we cannot talk about is other people's subjective experience.

Begging the question. To say that you talk about other people's experiences you are already assuming that they have certain experiences. I'm not saying you go all the way to solipsism, though, all I'm saying is that if you say other people have, for example, the experience of the apple, then you have to admit you are talking about something of which you don't know about even the existence of (though you may very well justify their existence and I'll be on your side there).

Then, since you can infer (and quite correctly, I think) that other people ARE having similar experiences to those you are having, then you can infer things you don't experience. So, to use as an excuse against the "external world" the fact that you don't perceive it (though you can infer it) won't work.

Like why the red I see is the same or different from the red you see. It is not possible to talk about that.

For Pete's sake, mf, how many times do I have to repeat that I'm not talking about the experience itself as being something that can be communicated or be aware of when it is experienced by others? All I'm saying is that if you agree that I have some experience similar to one of your experiences while you have NO IDEA how that experience feels like to me, then you can deduce other people's experience AT LEAST to the degree of saying they exist without ever experiencing them.

All we can talk about is what we all experience- that is objective experience- experience we all share.

The point is that what you are saying leaves absolutely no room for saying others have experiences that we all share AT ALL since you keep on saying you can't experience them (this is the case because you just set up your standard for knowledge in your own experience).

There is no point in carrying this on- again, it appears you are not reading my posts.

I will discuss it further with anyone else if they like. I never learn with you- I always think you are so close to understanding it, and then we go backwards. It isn't hard at all, if you actually read the words.

I can even put it in a nicer format:

P0 Either you can infer something you don't experience or you can't. (I put this for clarity's sake)

P1 You say people have experiences similar to yours (so as to say the "objective", according to your definition, exists).

P2 If you say other people have experiences similar to yours (as required by your definition of "objectivity), then you have inferred the existence of things you are NOT experiencing.

P3 You can infer something you don't experience. (from P2 and P3)

C: Since you can infer things you do NOT experience (P4), then to say that "The "extramental or external world" is something one can't even infer the existence of BECAUSE one is not experiencing it" is an invalid objection.

Edited July 1, 2011 by elguanteloko

[Montgomery Price]

I don't think that nor have I ever said that (that the Mormon spiritual experience produces "knowledge" where others do not) I don't believe that is true. You are arguing with too many people at once and got confused.

I am also quite sure I never said that there is "no basis for comparison" of spiritual experiences. I have repeatedly said that the "cause" of such experiences cannot be ascertained with precision due to their complexity.

Then what did you mean when you said this:

No one can do this because we do not have someone else's personal experiences!

Why can't you see this? There is no basis for comparison because we are all different people with different backgrounds and psychological makeups!

Even if you believe there is no basis for comparison, we can know that there must be some difference that exists between the two paths which explains the contradicting conclusions, even if we can't find it. I'm asking for someone to provide that specific element which allows one experience to be preferred over the other. So far, every element you wish to add is either circular or just nonsensical like suggesting that your crush Annie exist simply because you strongly prefer Annie over Ruth.

So for me, "I know x is true" says nothing about the status of some "reality" which cannot be experienced; it is about how certain I am that my experiences are "true" in the sense of efficacious for me in very particular ways.

So just as science is efficacious objectively for getting things done, and is therefore "true", belief in the church is efficacious for giving my life subjective meaning and is therefore "true".

The problem is that Mormonism holds that these spiritual experiences originate independently of our subjective experience and that these experiences are valid justification to then claim you "know" some objective spiritual truth. This is what Mormonism teaches and you seem to be completely ignoring how this creates a problem and go on to redefine "truth" as something you simply prefer but can't justify like a flavor of ice cream. Why should I care about that sort of truth when I'm considering the claim to an objective truth? How strongly you "know" you prefer something gives you no basis for declaring you have "knowledge" of the objective source in question... so why are you talking about whether a preference can be "true" in a sense unrelated to objectivity? It's not in question and is not useful to the discussion. Seriously, get over it.

I think that God teaches us the best path we are ready for, so one cannot compare individual paths any more than one can compare how one child learns as "superior" to the way another child learns. That was the point I tried to express in your Jack and Jill thing, but you didn't get it.

Individual paths lead to incompatible conclusions. By this we can therefore know that there are differences in the paths which explain this contradiction. If we can't find that difference that allows us to prefer one claim to objective knowledge over a contradictory claim, then the only reasonable action is to take no action.

How does claiming that God will teach us the best path help us to decide between contradictory paths that are all reported as being preferred by God? If we know there is a contradiction, we know there is a difference... and in what way can we expose the crucial differences in these paths without comparison? As long as the difference remains hidden and unexplained, you have no basis for claiming any objective knowledge based on your experiences. You admit this, yet miss how this causes an enormous problem for Mormonism.

[wenglund]

An epistemic test is a methodology for choosing between divergent faith paths.

Perhaps.

However, I have found it useful in discussions such as this to distinguish between epistemic tests as a means for discerning what is the "truth" and epistemic tests as a means for deciding where one wishes to go and how best to get there. The former is educationally oriented, whereas the later is operationally oriented. The former is more about what is right, whereas the later is more about what works.

Too often discussions like this mistakenly focus on the former at the expense of the later. I am trying to prevent that from happening here.

We are talking about the objective development of knowledge because you testify that you "know" and not that you prefer this choice because of some presumed outcome.

Wrong. First, testimony bearers use the word "know" in a subjective sense. They are making a statement of personal faith, not general fact. They are expressing informally what is in their hearts and minds, and not formally presenting scholastic philosophic papers (I mentioned this last point so as to avoid the common trap of over-precision of language).

Second, quite often, if not most often, believing members say they "know" the restored gospel is true because of what they have experienced and how their lives have been positively influenced through living the gospel. They "know" the gospel is "true" precisely because of the outcomes in their lives.

My point is that it doesn't help your case to consider reliability to be unsuitable.

You are mistaken.

This doesn't get us any further to the truth...

It doesn't get us closer to objective/definitive truths in this life, but that is not a reasonable expectation in matters of faith, nor does it make sense for personal decision-making where differing preferences are a factor and where ultimate outcomes may be uncertain or even unknown.

...it simply eliminates what you believe can't lead us there.

It eliminates a nonsensical impediment to viable means for getting there.

Sure, for the sake of the argument, I can grant that a method that attempts to establish reliability doesn't apply, but obviously, this simple fact doesn't mean your method is any better.

No one is arguing otherwise? But, better than what?

It must be evaluated based on it's own merits, regardless of whether my method fails.

I said as much.

So, I have repeatedly requested an explanation for why someone can prefer one experience over the other with any method?

We have repeatedly answered you. Either you haven't understood, or you aren't listening.

If there is no proper method to compare and conclude that one experience is superior to the other, then why do we behave as if they have been compared and one is better?

But, there are methods for comparative analysis in matters of faith. They just don't include inter-rater reliability--for good reason (though they may include test-retest reliability, inter-method reliability, and internal consistency). Rather, they include things like workability, suitability, cost/benefit analysis (non-monetary), fruits, etc., and other such things commonly employed in the marketplace of ideas.

These methods are used quite often, as attested by numerous conversions from faiths to faiths.

The preference is not in question, the source is.

The problem is, inter-rater reliability can't distinguish between the two. It can't tell to what extent the divergent results are due to preferences or the source. All it detects is the divergence of results regardless of the reasons.

There is a broad diversity of results because there is a wide variety of preferences.

It is also due to divergent sources, divergent methodologies, and divergent applications of methodologies, etc..

The problem is not whether preferences contradict, it's whether these preferences are valid for determining what exists independently of our preference. I've yet to hear a convincing explanation for why preference = knowledge.

Whose arguing that preferences = knowledge? Preferences certainly influence what knowledge we may seek, the methods by which we seek that knowledge, our perceptions about the source of knowledge, the extent to which we pursue that knowledge, how that knowledge is weighted and employed and interpreted, etc. In other words, our varied preferences can factor heavily into varied outcomes when it comes to knowledge as well as beliefs and aspirations.

First of all, the end objective hasn't been established to exist.

For one, among religionists there isn't just one end objective. There are many variation on the theme. For another, a given end objective for LDS may not be objectively or definitively established to exist, but it is established to exist sufficiently to warrant pursuit thereof.

I can choose Door 1 because the host said that it has the best prize, but my desire to receive the best prize has nothing to do with whether the host is lying or misinformed.

It also has nothing to do with whether the host is spot on.

However, what you just said is beside the point that I made and to which you were responding. I wasn't speaking about assessing methodologies based on personal desire, but rather on the ability of the methodologies to achieve their designed objective. Such assessment consist of more than just whether the methodology ultimately achieves the end objective, but also whether it best moves one in the direction of the end objective.

This is such a fundamental means of assessment that I am puzzled that you aren't aware of it and even seem somewhat resistant to it.

We can't recognize that these methods lead to knowledge, yet we use them as basis for testifying of knowledge regardless. For what good reason?

Some of us can and do recognize that these methods lead to strong faith and "knowledge" (I am speaking informally and subjectively about knowledge) and can honestly testify thereof. That you may not be able to do so is another matter, which has no bearing on us. The good reason we have to testify of what we "know," is to chance touching those with open hearts and minds in the hopes of availing them the same benefits and opportunities of the gospel that we have and also hope to enjoy. Obviously.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Kevin Christensen]

The unreliability of this test can be illustrated in a couple of ways:

1) The fact that most people who take the test get different answers. SNIP

On this issue, I note the relevance of parable of the sower. Same seed. Different soil conditions, different nurture, different regard for cares of the world, or persecution, mockery, or whatever, and different efforts to cultivate and nurture. Result, different answers are not an anomaly, but the predicted and observed result.

"Know ye not this parable? and how then will ye know all parables?"(Mark 4:13).

Kevin Christensen

Pittsburgh, PA

[wenglund]

On this issue, I note the relevance of parable of the sower. Same seed. Different soil conditions, different nurture, different regard for cares of the world, or persecution, mockery, or whatever, and different efforts to cultivate and nurture. Result, different answers are not an anomaly, but the predicted and observed result.

"Know ye not this parable? and how then will ye know all parables?"(Mark 4:13).

Ya gotta love the uncommonly wise and timeless mind of Christ.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Edited July 1, 2011 by wenglund

[mfbukowski]

Montgomery and elguanteloko:

So far I have been answering each of you often repetitively and it seems that you both have similar questions so let me lay it out more directly.

Let's see if this post clarifies anything and if not then I will answer any remaining questions.

But I also want to lay some philosophical groundwork for anyone else interested.

In the last hundred years or so, most American and British philosophers have given up on metaphysics- given up on bothering to talk about what "underlies" our perceptions and experiences, because literally we cannot speak about such things. Philosophy in the last hundred years has instead concentrated on language and logic and what language can and cannot do.

One branch of this way of seeing things is represented by a school called Pragmatism, and one of the representatives of Pragmatism was Richard Rorty, who was an atheist, but who's philosophy finally convinced me to give up philosophy for other pursuits. Since that, I have seen some weakness in Rorty's lack of understanding of subjective experience- which I think is Nagel sees much more clearly. So if I were to describe the way I think about things, I would say it is a synthesis of Rorty and Nagel with a Mormon twist. A little odd, but what else is new?

Since I feel it is highly relevant to this discussion, I will copy a bit from Wikipedia about Rorty, and will underline what I think is important:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rorty#Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty argues that the central problems of modern epistemology depend upon a picture of the mind as trying to faithfully represent (or "mirror") a mind-independent, external reality. If we give up this metaphor, then the entire enterprise of foundationalist epistemology is misguided. A foundationalist believes that in order to avoid the regress inherent in claiming that all beliefs are justified by other beliefs, some beliefs must be self-justifying and form the foundations to all knowledge.

Montgomery, this applies to you, so listen up. El- I presume you already see the problem with mirroring nature.

There were two senses of "foundationalism" criticized in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In the epistemological sense, Rorty criticized the attempt to justify knowledge claims by tracing them to a set of foundations (e.g., self-evident premises or noninferential sensations); more broadly, he criticized the claim of philosophy to function foundationally within a culture. The former argument draws on Sellars's critique of the idea that there is a "given" in sensory perception, in combination with Quine's critique of the distinction between analytic sentences (sentences which are true solely in virtue of what they mean) and synthetic sentences (sentences made true by the world).

Summary: the criticism is about two types of knowledge claims- one, that some are about what can be observed as a "given" in nature (science), and the other is about what is "logically true"

Each critique, taken alone, provides a problem for a conception of how philosophy ought to proceed, yet leaves enough of the tradition intact to proceed with its former aspirations. Combined, Rorty claimed, the two critiques are devastating. With no privileged insight into the structure of belief and no privileged realm of truths of meaning, we have, instead, knowledge as those beliefs that pay their way. The only worthwhile description of the actual process of inquiry, Rorty claimed, was a Kuhnian account of the standard phases of the progress of disciplines, oscillating through normal and abnormal periods, between routine problem-solving and intellectual crises.

So Rorty claims that he shows with both his critiques, that all that is left is the view of propositions that they are all contingent- they are all "hypotheses" which work- and develop over time, and when no longer are useful, are abandoned. This implies a kind of "truth" which grows and develops and changes over time.

After eliminating foundationalism, Rorty argues that one of the few roles left for a philosopher is to act as an intellectual gadfly, attempting to induce a revolutionary break with previous practice, a role that Rorty was happy to take on himself. Rorty suggests that each generation tries to subject all disciplines to the model that the most successful discipline of the day employs. In Rorty's view, the success of modern science has led academics in philosophy and the humanities to mistakenly imitate scientific methods.

It is my belief that the Scientism being displayed in this thread is exactly the sort of thing Rorty is talking about. Incidentally, this is why I gave up academic philosophy and hang out on the internet.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature popularized and extended ideas of Wilfrid Sellars (the critique of the Myth of the given) and W. V. O. Quine (the critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction) and others who advocate the Wittgensteinian doctrine of "dissolving" rather than solving philosophical problems

By truly understanding the context of these alleged problems, they go away.

So on this view, there is no "given" sensory perception- there is no "out there" we can talk about, because we can only talk about what we all see and feel and perceive- in other words, we can only talk about experiences and nothing more.

"Knowledge" consists of those beliefs which "pay their way"; in other words, those beliefs which work in our lives. Science is "true" because it "pays its way"- it works. We can build spacecraft which take us to far away planets, and create complex computer systems which allow us to have this discussion though each of us is in a different part of the world.

So what is "reliable" or "justified" in belief is "what works" and produces results which enable us to do what we could not do otherwise; it is what gives order to our worlds and enables us to build a coherent belief system.

As far as the "causes" of preferences and subjective experience- those experiences we cannot really talk about- those belong in the realm of psychology- a notoriously "soft" science if it can be called "science" at all.

We are familiar with discussions on sexual preferences- and what "causes" one to have them- good luck on showing the "cause" of homosexuality- good luck on showing the "cause" of why one has any preference at all.

[mfbukowski]

On this issue, I note the relevance of parable of the sower. Same seed. Different soil conditions, different nurture, different regard for cares of the world, or persecution, mockery, or whatever, and different efforts to cultivate and nurture. Result, different answers are not an anomaly, but the predicted and observed result.

"Know ye not this parable? and how then will ye know all parables?"(Mark 4:13).

Kevin Christensen

Pittsburgh, PA

Thanks for bringing us all back to what it's all about.

Talk about Yin and Yang! A Tale of Two Kevins!

[elguanteloko]

mfbukowski:

I have minor problems with all you said but, again, I never even implied that our senses mirror the extramental reality AT ALL. Plus, "what works", for Rorty, is NOT "what works in our lives" in the sense that it gives us more pleasure and the like. What Rorty and the Pragmatists mean is that they work to solve problems. That is a huge difference. That is because we know of no "truth" except that which has stood tests and can solve problems. Take QM craziness. It has any credibility BECAUSE it can predict and calculate subatomic particles' behavior extremely accurately. That's different from "working in our lives", you make it sound like pragmatism is a self-motivational view (in the cheap sense of the term).

That said, YOU made several statements that I think are incongruent and so I made a little rough argument for why that is:

P0 Either you can infer something you don't experience or you can't. (I put this for clarity's sake)

P1 You say people have experiences similar to yours (so as to say the "objective", according to your definition, exists).

P2 If you say other people have experiences similar to yours (as required by your definition of "objectivity), then you have inferred the existence of things you are NOT experiencing.

P3 You can infer something you don't experience. (from P1 and P2)

C: Since you can infer things you do NOT experience (P3), then to say that "The "extramental or external world" is something one can't even infer the existence of BECAUSE one is not experiencing it" is an invalid objection (that is, an invalid objection against the existence or "infer-ability" of the extramental or external world).

Nothing in what you mentioned in that last post (#315) precludes the idea of an "external world", not that we can perceive it extramentally (since this IS excluded), and not that we can "measure up" our ideas in the mind with it so as to say we have "THE truth" (this is also excluded), but that we can deduce it's existence and move on (this is NOT excluded).

ETA: my position is useful, so you should accept it.

Edited July 1, 2011 by elguanteloko

[shalamabobbi]

The God we follow expects us to accept the scriptures because they persuade us to do good. In other words we are asked to acknowledge the existence of good and its opposite in our behavior.

We are told to repent.

Some do not choose to do so. I believe it was Amulek who said "I knew, but I would not know, and went on in the rebellion of my heart."

Conscience, like the liahona, works according to the diligence given to it.

A muscle is like this. Let it atrophy and it won't perform for you when needed.

When someone lets go of their sins, the feelings that accompany that decision to yield to the spirit are feelings of happiness and joy. Peace of conscience results from the process. Guilt disappears. Relief is found. Spiritual dissonance (analogous to cognitive dissonance) dissolves.

#82

That something makes you a good person is no witness to the reality of it.

What is important is the reality of feeling happy within oneself or living with remorse and regret.

It is no accident that there is a correlation between those who deny the reality of God and those who choose to deny the need for repentance.

#23 Because if we can establish that one test that many people rely on is not actually reliable, and they're wasting their lives... that is important.

If we aren't going to suggest a substitute activity for a group of people who waste all their time stacking rocks, I suppose we don't have anything more to discuss.

(see previous reply to previous comment as well)

What some accept as "inestimable and of great worth others trample under their feet".

What is there in scientism that makes any activity more significant than "stacking rocks"?

We are living in the luminiferous age of the universe. When all the lighter elements have fused together within the stars we will enter the heat death phase of the universe when the extraction of useful work from energy will no longer be possible.

[mfbukowski]

mfbukowski:

I have minor problems with all you said but, again, I never even implied that our senses mirror the extramental reality AT ALL. Plus, "what works", for Rorty, is NOT "what works in our lives" in the sense that it gives us more pleasure and the like. What Rorty and the Pragmatists mean is that they work to solve problems. That is a huge difference. That is because we know of no "truth" except that which has stood tests and can solve problems. Take QM craziness. It has any credibility BECAUSE it can predict and calculate subatomic particles' behavior extremely accurately. That's different from "working in our lives", you make it sound like pragmatism is a self-motivational view (in the cheap sense of the term).

For about the 80th time, you have confirmed that you know nothing about Pragmatism

Regarding William James- "The Varieties of Religious Experience" - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(my underlining added)

Varieties' classic chapter on “Mysticism” offers “four marks which, when an experience has them, may justify us in calling it mystical…” (V, 380). The first is ineffability: “it defies expression…its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others.” Second is a “noetic quality”: mystical states present themselves as states of knowledge. Thirdly, mystical states are transient; and, fourth, subjects are passive with respect to them: they cannot control their coming and going. Are these states, James ends the chapter by asking, “windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world[?]” (V, 428).

In chapters entitled “Philosophy” — devoted in large part to pragmatism — and “Conclusions,” James finds that religious experience is on the whole useful, even “amongst the most important biological functions of mankind,” but he concedes that this does not make it true. Nevertheless, James articulates his own belief — which he does not claim to prove — that religious experiences connect us with a greater, or further, reality not accessible in our normal cognitive relations to the world: “The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely ‘understandable’ world” (V, 515).

Sound familiar?

[mfbukowski]

mfbukowski:

I have minor problems with all you said but, again, I never even implied that our senses mirror the extramental reality AT ALL.

Then what are these?:

wow, mf, that's not what anyone means by "objective". We mean something that it does not independent of our feelings, emotions, ideas, etc to be what it is. That's quite shaky but that is FAR from being what you are saying. The perception of an apple is not the apple. The apple is what is said to be objective, not the experience of it even though you can only get the experience of it, not the thing that produces the sensations and experiences.

You are missing the point, mf. The point is that there is more to "the apple" than our mere experiences (even more than with your use of "objective"; IOW, there is more to the apple than the "subjective" + "objective" experiences of it). We may only get to know what our experiences tell us but that there is more is quite easily deducible.

[mfbukowski]

P0 Either you can infer something you don't experience or you can't. (I put this for clarity's sake)

P1 You say people have experiences similar to yours (so as to say the "objective", according to your definition, exists).

Of course it exists. When did I say it didn't? Objective experiences are the experiences we all share.

P2 If you say other people have experiences similar to yours (as required by your definition of "objectivity), then you have inferred the existence of things you are NOT experiencing.

Yes, of course. I have never been to Antarctica, but I know that others have experienced it- so?

P3 You can infer something you don't experience. (from P1 and P2)

Sure I can. They take pictures of Antarctica and write an article in National Geographic which I read and I have an "objective experience report" which I have no reason to doubt. The pool of human experience is objective experience.

C: Since you can infer things you do NOT experience (P3), then to say that "The "extramental or external world" is something one can't even infer the existence of BECAUSE one is not experiencing it" is an invalid objection (that is, an invalid objection against the existence or "infer-ability" of the extramental or external world).

You are not even close to understanding. The objective world is the pool of what we all as humans experience and verify by others repeating the experience- like science. I do not have to replicate every relevant scientific experiment ever done to know that my car will start when I turn the key.

For the billionth time, I am not a solipsist. Trust me, I think you are real and have experiences.

But yet that does not say there is something "beyond" what we all as humans have experienced that we can talk about. If we talk about it, someone has experienced it.

We cannot talk intelligibly about the subjective- it is literally unspeakable- see the William James quote above about mystical experience. It is like describing (dare I say it) ..... the taste of salt. No can do- cannot speak of it.

But you and I can agree the "chips are too salty" because we both have experienced the taste of salt. That makes the subjective experience of salt objective- because we agree on the description of the nature of the experience. They are "too salty" and we agree.

Edited July 1, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

Nevermind

Edited July 2, 2011 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

Even if you believe there is no basis for comparison, we can know that there must be some difference that exists between the two paths which explains the contradicting conclusions, even if we can't find it. I'm asking for someone to provide that specific element which allows one experience to be preferred over the other. So far, every element you wish to add is either circular or just nonsensical like suggesting that your crush Annie exist simply because you strongly prefer Annie over Ruth.

It is up to personal preference, about which you seem to have a problem. It is what fits best with your personality and what you think about reality, God etc, just as one may have a "type" one is attracted to above others, for no discernable reason. It makes sense to me, for example, that God would not punish his children for not having heard the gospel through no fault of their own- so I prefer Mormonism over a strong-hellfire Evangelical version of the gospel. Others may find that ridiculous- their conception of God would differ considerable from mine. Ultimately it is personal preference. I think they are wrong, they think I am wrong, and neither of us can prove anything empirically.

So what? It just makes sense to me- there is no possible way to determine which is correct objectively, so I get to choose what "works for me" and makes my life better. What's wrong with that? Ruth is my type, Annie is not. Annie is kinda dumb, and though she is beautiful, Ruth is much smarter and there is a certain way she holds her head that just drives me wild. I don't know what it is, but I like her voice, the way she talks, her hair etc. To quote the Beatles:

Something in the way she moves

Attracts me like no other lover

What is that "something"? Do you really think you can measure that scientifically?

The problem is that Mormonism holds that these spiritual experiences originate independently of our subjective experience and that these experiences are valid justification to then claim you "know" some objective spiritual truth.

Gosh. I haven't seen anything like that in the standard works- where is it?

But seriously, I believe that that statement is true. BUT IT CANNOT BE PROVEN OBJECTIVELY. Sorry for yelling, but I have said this so many times. In fact I would say "I know it's true", based on the effects of Mormonism in my life, but I can't prove it objectively. That's because it is not an objective truth we each can verify independently, about the other person, just like you cannot verify that Annie is the girl for you so that I can verify that.

This is what Mormonism teaches and you seem to be completely ignoring how this creates a problem and go on to redefine "truth" as something you simply prefer but can't justify like a flavor of ice cream.

No, not at all. What I am saying is that I cannot PROVE one to better than another any better than I can prove one preference over another. I can give you my reasons for preferring one over the other, like the one above about the redemption of the dead- but I cannot prove objectively that this is "better" than another view.

Why should I care about that sort of truth when I'm considering the claim to an objective truth?

Because you are mistaken that there exist "objective truths" about things like religion. All you can prove about your belief in Scientism is that it is "better" because it is "reliable". All that means is that everyone can agree that it can be proven. What is that fact important? Why is it important to you to believe only things which everyone else believes? Suppose what everyone else believes leaves out an important fact that everyone else is missing?

How strongly you "know" you prefer something gives you no basis for declaring you have "knowledge" of the objective source in question... so why are you talking about whether a preference can be "true" in a sense unrelated to objectivity? It's not in question and is not useful to the discussion. Seriously, get over it.

Individual paths lead to incompatible conclusions. By this we can therefore know that there are differences in the paths which explain this contradiction. If we can't find that difference that allows us to prefer one claim to objective knowledge over a contradictory claim, then the only reasonable action is to take no action.

How does claiming that God will teach us the best path help us to decide between contradictory paths that are all reported as being preferred by God? If we know there is a contradiction, we know there is a difference... and in what way can we expose the crucial differences in these paths without comparison? As long as the difference remains hidden and unexplained, you have no basis for claiming any objective knowledge based on your experiences. You admit this, yet miss how this causes an enormous problem for Mormonism.

Not in the slightest.

John Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty"- underlining added

The situation would strike us as a curious one were it not so familiar. Practical activity is dismissed to a world of low grade reality. Desire is found only where something is lacking and hence its existence is a sign of imperfection of Being. Hence one must go to passionless reason to find perfect reality and complete certitude. But nevertheless the chief philosophic interest is to prove that the essential properties of the reality that is the object of pure knowledge are precisely those characteristics which have meaning in connection with affection, desire and choice. After degrading practical affairs in order to exalt knowledge, the chief task of knowledge turns out to be to demonstrate the absolutely assured and permanent reality of the values with which practical activity is concerned! Can we fall to see the irony in a situation wherein desire and emotion are relegated to a position inferior in every way to that of knowledge, while at the same time the chief problem of that which is termed the highest and most perfect knowledge is taken to be the existence of evil-that is, of desires errant and frustrated?

The contradiction involved, however, is much more than a purely intellectual one-which if purely theoretical would be innocuously lacking in practical consequences. The thing which concerns all of us as human beings is precisely the greatest attainable security of values in concrete existence. The thought that the values which are unstable and wavering in the world in which we live are eternally secure in a higher realm (which reason demonstrates but which we cannot experience), that all the goods which are defeated here are triumphant there, may give consolation to the depressed. But it does not change the existential situation in the least. The separation that has been instituted between theory and practice, with its consequent substitution of cognitive quest for absolute assurance for practical endeavour to make the existence of good more secure in experience, has had the effect of distracting attention and diverting energy from a task whose performance would yield definite results.

The chief consideration in achieving concrete security of values lies in the perfecting of methods of action. More activity, blind striving, gets nothing forward. Regulation of conditions upon which results depend is possible only by doing, yet only by doing which has intelligent direction, which take cognisance of conditions, observes relations of sequence, and which plans and executes in the light of this knowledge. The notion that thought, apart from action, can warrant complete certitude as to the status of supreme good, makes no contribution to the central problem of development of intelligent methods of regulation. It rather depresses and deadens effort in that direction. That is the chief indictment to be brought against the classic philosophic tradition. Its import raises the question of the relation which action sustains to knowledge in fact, and whether the quest for certainty by other means than those of intelligent action does not mark a baneful diversion of thought from its proper office. It raises the question whether mankind has not now achieved a sufficient degree of control of methods of knowing and of the arts of practical action so that a radical change in our conceptions of knowledge and practice is rendered both possible and necessary.

That knowing, as judged from the actual procedures of scientific inquiry, has completely abandoned in fact the traditional separation of knowing and doing, that the experimental procedure is one that installs doing as the heart of knowing, is a theme that will occupy our attention in later chapters. What would happen to philosophy if it whole-heartedly made a similar surrender? What would be its office if it ceased to deal with the problem of reality and knowledge at large? In effect, its function would be to facilitate the fruitful interaction of our cognitive beliefs, our beliefs resting upon the most dependable methods of inquiry, with our practical beliefs about the values, the ends and purposes, that should control human action in the things of large and liberal human import.

In other words, Alma 32.

Edited July 2, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Montgomery Price]

However, I have found it useful in discussions such as this to distinguish between epistemic tests as a means for discerning what is the "truth" and epistemic tests as a means for deciding where one wishes to go and how best to get there. The former is educationally oriented, whereas the later is operationally oriented. The former is more about what is right, whereas the later is more about what works.

Wrong. First, testimony bearers use the word "know" in a subjective sense. They are making a statement of personal faith, not general fact. They are expressing informally what is in their hearts and minds, and not formally presenting scholastic philosophic papers (I mentioned this last point so as to avoid the common trap of over-precision of language).

Second, quite often, if not most often, believing members say they "know" the restored gospel is true because of what they have experienced and how their lives have been positively influenced through living the gospel. They "know" the gospel is "true" precisely because of the outcomes in their lives.

I'm challenging the former (educational truth), not the latter (operational). Unless you're suggesting that the later somehow establishes the former, it's irrelevant to a discussion to about the literal truth claims that Mormonism makes. Obviously, you don't simply believe in Jesus Christ because it "works", but also because you believe Jesus to be a literal divine being.

Whether you can know these sorts of things are literally true based on personal experiences is in question. You can't skirt around this and confuse the conversation by using an unclear and apparently irrelevant definition of truth.

You are mistaken.

It doesn't get us closer to objective/definitive truths in this life, but that is not a reasonable expectation in matters of faith, nor does it make sense for personal decision-making where differing preferences are a factor and where ultimate outcomes may be uncertain or even unknown.

Yes, it doesn't get us closer to objective truth.

No, it is a reasonable expectation that some method actually works given that doctrine makes claims to objective truth and knowledge.

It eliminates a nonsensical impediment to viable means for getting there.

Nonsensical impediment for which definition of truth? If it's an impediment to the operational or "what works" definition, then I don't care. Why is it nonsensical to consider the reliability of our epistemic tests when discussing how to determine objective truth?

We have repeatedly answered you. Either you haven't understood, or you aren't listening.

I don't seem to understand because we've been talking about two different types of truth. Each answer given has been about the irrelevant definition of truth. I should be obvious that this is not what the the critics are asking about. Sure, you may think that the contradiction between faiths doesn't matter when you consider operational "truth"... no one is claiming it does. What is being claimed is there is a contradiction in the reports of objective truth. Barely anyone has even attempted to resolve the objective contradiction, and have simply interpreted my argument with an irrelevant definition. It's an obvious non sequitur, yet not so obvious when you highjack the definitions of words that are necessary to the argument. Seems to be causing a lot of confusion. So let's be absolutely clear from now on.

But, there are methods for comparative analysis in matters of faith. They just don't include inter-rater reliability--for good reason (though they may include test-retest reliability, inter-method reliability, and internal consistency). Rather, they include things like workability, suitability, cost/benefit analysis (non-monetary), fruits, etc., and other such things commonly employed in the marketplace of ideas.

These methods are used quite often, as attested by numerous conversions from faiths to faiths.

Why should I care that they're used often or used at all when discussing whether the objective truth claims of Mormonism can be preferred over incompatible claims?

Whose arguing that preferences = knowledge? Preferences certainly influence what knowledge we may seek, the methods by which we seek that knowledge, our perceptions about the source of knowledge, the extent to which we pursue that knowledge, how that knowledge is weighted and employed and interpreted, etc. In other words, our varied preferences can factor heavily into varied outcomes when it comes to knowledge as well as beliefs and aspirations.

The idea that preference equal knowledge is apparently created by the confusion when someone responds only considering the operational "truth" instead of a response considering what is obviously in question, objective truth.

For one, among religionists there isn't just one end objective. There are many variation on the theme. For another, a given end objective for LDS may not be objectively or definitively established to exist, but it is established to exist sufficiently to warrant pursuit thereof.

Ok, so what exactly justifies the pursuit of a specific, literal afterlife but not another?

If your answer has nothing to do with attempting to determine which after life actually exists, but instead with operational truth, you're not responding to the question I'm actually asking?

It also has nothing to do with whether the host is spot on.

However, what you just said is beside the point that I made and to which you were responding. I wasn't speaking about assessing methodologies based on personal desire, but rather on the ability of the methodologies to achieve their designed objective. Such assessment consist of more than just whether the methodology ultimately achieves the end objective, but also whether it best moves one in the direction of the end objective.

This is such a fundamental means of assessment that I am puzzled that you aren't aware of it and even seem somewhat resistant to it.

It's a fundamental means of assessment considering operation truth, but hasn't been shown to be relevant when considering objective truth.

Some of us can and do recognize that these methods lead to strong faith and "knowledge" (I am speaking informally and subjectively about knowledge) and can honestly testify thereof. That you may not be able to do so is another matter, which has no bearing on us. The good reason we have to testify of what we "know," is to chance touching those with open hearts and minds in the hopes of availing them the same benefits and opportunities of the gospel that we have and also hope to enjoy. Obviously.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

...and it's obvious that your alternative definitions of "knowledge" and "truth" don't apply to the questions being asked by critics. They're not valid replacements for the words in our arguments. I'd appreciate it if you answered my questions with the relevant definitions.

[Montgomery Price]

It is up to personal preference, about which you seem to have a problem. It is what fits best with your personality and what you think about reality, God etc, just as one may have a "type" one is attracted to above others, for no discernable reason. It makes sense to me, for example, that God would not punish his children for not having heard the gospel through no fault of their own- so I prefer Mormonism over a strong-hellfire Evangelical version of the gospel. Others may find that ridiculous- their conception of God would differ considerable from mine. Ultimately it is personal preference. I think they are wrong, they think I am wrong, and neither of us can prove anything empirically.

If it's not up to personal preference to determine objective truth, then it's an irrelevant response to my questions which are obviously about whether some claims to objective truth can be preferred over others.

So what? It just makes sense to me- there is no possible way to determine which is correct objectively, so I get to choose what "works for me" and makes my life better. What's wrong with that?

That there is no possible way to determine which of contradicting claims are objectively correct doesn't make the standard of "what works for you" any more reasonable.

There's nothing wrong with it as long as you don't care about whether you believe false things, I guess. I then presume that there could be no literal existence of an afterlife, miracles, revelations, the holy spirit, God, etc. and you wouldn't care?

What a silly thing to say... Proposing that you have valid reason to pursue something simply because it "works for you" can't be the only relevant standard for action. Such a standard could justify the pursuit of anything, extant or not...

Aren't you worried about the consequences of believing something objectively false? If so, why do you base your beliefs on something that you've admitted has nothing to do with determining what is objectively true?

Gosh. I haven't seen anything like that in the standard works- where is it?

How do you know that Moroni's Promise has your definition of truth in mind and not mine?

But seriously, I believe that that statement is true. BUT IT CANNOT BE PROVEN OBJECTIVELY. Sorry for yelling, but I have said this so many times. In fact I would say "I know it's true", based on the effects of Mormonism in my life, but I can't prove it objectively. That's because it is not an objective truth we each can verify independently, about the other person, just like you cannot verify that Annie is the girl for you so that I can verify that.

No, not at all. What I am saying is that I cannot PROVE one to better than another any better than I can prove one preference over another. I can give you my reasons for preferring one over the other, like the one above about the redemption of the dead- but I cannot prove objectively that this is "better" than another view.

Because you are mistaken that there exist "objective truths" about things like religion. All you can prove about your belief in Scientism is that it is "better" because it is "reliable". All that means is that everyone can agree that it can be proven. What is that fact important? Why is it important to you to believe only things which everyone else believes? Suppose what everyone else believes leaves out an important fact that everyone else is missing?

Establishing something as "reliable" is not based on the agreement of several people, but on the individual's evaluation and comparison of the reports of those people and whether their arguments are convincing.

But frankly, I could just claim that establishing reliability is what "works for me"... In fact, I could say that I shouldn't follow the straight and narrow path proposed by Mormonism because it doesn't "work for me".

Now, granting that the Mormon model is correct, my behavior is, objectively, not the best choice. It won't lead me to the most optimal end result as described by Mormonism. How can I determine this crucial fact if my only standard for action is to do what "works for me"? I can't. I find this an issue given I care about the consequences of my actions.

Not in the slightest.

John Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty"- underlining added

In other words, Alma 32.

So, I know you'll correct me if I've misunderstood (fairly thick writing), but put simply... Our attempts to discern what is objectively true about the universe is to ultimately better fulfill our desires. This is ironic considering we believe that desire is inferior to knowledge...

Well, yes. Desire is inferior to knowledge when we are attempting to attain knowledge. Because we wish to attain knowledge to fulfill our desires doesn't mean that the best way to fulfill our desires is to simply follow them wherever they lead. This is because what you may believe "works for you" is not actually as you perceive it. If you don't attempt to find the most reliable method for discerning objective truth, then how do you know that what you believe "works for you" actually will. For example, you may feel that what "works for you" is to attain Celestial glory, yet if there exists no such thing, it doesn't really "work for you" now does it?

Given these things, it is still important to attempt and establish reliable methods of inquiry into the objective world. This allows us to better direct ourselves to the objective objects of our desires. So when it comes to discerning between the objective truth claims made by different faiths, if we can't tell which truth claims are substantiated, then you therefore don't know that any perceived object of your desire will actually "work for you". So, why do you gamble otherwise?