Serious Implications of Creation Ex Nihilo

[Zakuska]

It is you, then, who apparently doesn't understand what it means to "sustain something in existence." It means that God is ultimately responsible in some way for the energy, coherence, natural-law matrix, etc., that enables real things to continue existing over time, to be real enduring things.

How can they "endure" if the whole of creation is in a constant state of Decay?

Rom 8

21 Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.

And only will be made imortal in some future time.

[Nofear]

If I can conceive of something that could exist, a winged oyster for example, then God must actively keep this winged oyster uncreated moment to moment as well. Makes a rather big job of the whole thing, and I am sure he has a much simpler way of handling this sort of thing.

Non-existence is not a property unique to God and so not contingent upon him. If, however, existence of an object does depend on God and not a property internal to itself, then it will cease once its sustenance fails. But, like you, I propose that God can will continued existence without active causation in precisely the same way God willed motion to continue without active causation (see disclaimer below).

And IMO, the eternal nature of the spirit is something that lends strength to the concept of free will. Haven't developed that concept much in my mind, but it seems to make since to me. I may try to flesh that out a bit, when I have more time.

The concept of free will is rich subject, heavy, heavy with much commentary - historical and contemporary. So much so there are individuals whose entire profession is on the subject (too much for me). A quick perusal of some of the material will demonstrate that the weight of human thinking on the matter, historical and contemporary, is against your opinion.

Disclaimer: I personally deny creatio ex nihilo. I also actively deny that inertia is a property instituted by God but property of reality co-existent with God and fully independent of him. This, as I understand it, puts me at variance with Ostler's stance on physical law and God.

[Rob Bowman]

Zakuska,

I said "endure," not "endure forever." In order for creatures to endure forever, God will need to transform them supernaturally to endow them with immortality. Nevertheless, creatures without immortality can endure for periods of time, in some cases extremely long periods of time.

How can they "endure" if the whole of creation is in a constant state of Decay?

Rom 8

21 Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.

And only will be made imortal in some future time.

[Zakuska]

Zakuska,

I said "endure," not "endure forever." In order for creatures to endure forever, God will need to transform them supernaturally to endow them with immortality. Nevertheless, creatures without immortality can endure for periods of time, in some cases extremely long periods of time.

If it had a beginning it will have an end. For something to be imortal it can't have a beginning.

[Rob Bowman]

Zakuska,

You wrote:

If it had a beginning it will have an end. For something to be imortal it can't have a beginning.

Those of us who believe that an omnipotent God exists and can impart immortality to creatures if he so pleases, respectfully disagree with you.

[Blake]

NoFear: But, does the argument apply to esse? Sure, why not. We can simply posit that God created the property of "esse inertia". Thus, once a substance is created, it will simply continue its created status without any active causal power just as motion can continue without any active causal power.

The easy response is that you are not seeing what is entailed by the notion that something is caused to exist by another contingently. What kind of property would this inertia be? It would be a property given to a thing to create itself and hold istelf in existence. But in order to have this property, the thing in question must be uncreated and in fact have the property of necessary existence -- otherwise it is necessary (a necessity of the consequent) that the thing in question has only contingent existence and depends on another for its existence because it doesn't have -- and cannot have of logical necesseity -- the property of self-existence. As I stated above, such a property is self contradictory. It entails saying that God created a created thing such that it is not created and not a created thing. Even God cannot confer such a power because he cannot do the logically impossible. It is this contradiciton: "This thing that requires an active causal power to exist can be created by God so that it isn't a thing that requires an active causal power to exist."

Another part of the problem is that we intuitively bring to this question our assumptions about the natural world given assumption of naturalism and not of theistic creation out of nothing. What is the nature of a created thing? I cannot remember who stated above that we ought to ask the question: what is your view if God ceased to exist; what would happen to the natural universe in that event? The answer is that the universe is sustained by God moment to moment if he creates ex nihilo and it would cease to exist along with God. (I know perfectly well that classical theists will claim that God's non-existence is logically impossible because of the ontological argument -- so this is a thought experiment for such folks per impossibile).

Rob Bowman: You assume, for example, that God's act of causing a specific creature C to exist at time t1 is a separate act from his act of causing C to exist at t2. I don't see why this assumption must be true. Why cannot God will that C exists for a specified period of time?

Rob, such an act would require God to give a created entity the property of having power to endure through a period of time without an active cause underlying its existence and thus requires conferring on it a power of self-creation or self-sustenance. If Ce exists at t1 what could keep CE in existence at t2 if it is not CE's nature to exist? You see, conntingent things don't have it as part of their nature to exist. Only necessarily existing things can have existence as part of their (or its) nature. But of course no created thing can create itself ex nihilo nor does it have a power of self-sustenance since it must be sustained itself from moment to moiment without a the necessary property of self-sustenance or self-existence and thus cannot have such a power by definition of what it means to be created. What you propose was attempted in aniquity under the name of perdurance and it had almost no takers because of the logical problems associated with perdurance. That is why creation out of nothing has the consequence that created things must be sustained in existence from one moment to the next -- and thus entails occasionalism. I know that you won't accept that fact no matter how clearly and logically it follows because it renders your belief system unacceptable.

[cksalmon]

Hi Mr. Ostler:

You wrote:

Rob, such an act would require God to give a created entity the property of having power to endure through a period of time without an active cause underlying its existence and thus requires conferring on it a power of self-creation or self-sustenance. If Ce exists at t1 what could keep CE in existence at t2 if it is not CE's nature to exist? You see, conntingent things don't have it as part of their nature to exist. Only necessarily existing things can have existence as part of their (or its) nature. But of course no created thing can create itself ex nihilo nor does it have a power of self-sustenance since it must be sustained itself from moment to moiment without a the necessary property of self-sustenance or self-existence and thus cannot have such a power by definition of what it means to be created.

A brief sidebar:

I'd already assumed you reject the non-canonical, but much-revered KFD (much-revered by some, at least, e.g., Handy supra), but the above would seem to seal the deal. Or, have I been misreading you all this time? At one time, I was convinced you only rejected BY's "eternal progression," but as Smith states that Elohim "was once like we are now" (one assumes a being without ss), but "is an exalted man," and that he wished to refute the false belief "that God was God from all eternity," it seems your rejection might be more primary than I once assumed.

Best.

cks

EDIT: I've read the next chapter, of course, but couldn't make much of it (that is, it wasn't clear to me why you would reject the official version of KFD, along with Richards and Woodruff's account at "I will refute that idea"; moreover, the following defense of [1]--"there was a period of time during which the Father was mortal and not divine" [p. 441]--strikes me as ad hoc).

[Vance]

<SNIP>

What does the KFD have to CEN?

Thanks for adding some clarification to your statement.

[cksalmon]

Hi Vance:

You asked:

What does the KFD have to CEN?

Quite a bit, actually. Think it through if you're interested. Specifically here, however, I'm obviously interested in ss as it relates to the Elohim of KFD. It's not often you get a chance to ask an admired author a direct question. Shoot me.

cks

[Vance]

Hi Vance:

You asked:

Quite a bit, actually. Think it through if you're interested. Specifically here, however, I'm obviously interested in ss as it relates to the Elohim of KFD. It's not often you get a chance to ask an admired author a direct question. Shoot me.

cks

So you are wanting to withhold Self Sustenance from a being that has always existed (but in a different organizational state)?

[cksalmon]

Hi Mudcat:

You wrote:

I follow you here. If God makes X and God equally has the power to unmake X, then X contingently exists upon the will of God not to unmake it. However, what I am driving, bold mine, is that to me it makes better since that X continues to exist unless God purposefully wills it nonexistence.

Sounds a bit semantic, but as I see it, if God makes X then X exists. From that point forward, it would seem to me that the continued existence of X would require no special effort of will on behalf of its creator. I don't think I am articulating the thought very well... and perhaps there is a good word for the concept. I suppose I see it like that physical law about and object staying in motion until acted upon by another force.

Ostler is building on (or, rather digging beneath) the Christian belief in God's necessarily continuing act of preserving universe in existence. I would disagree with you here that the universe's continued existence requires "no special effort of will on behalf of its creator." (See, for example, Nehemiah 9.6, Col. 1.17, Heb. 1.3 [verses cited by Erickson in his Christian Theology].) It seems clear that God does act to sustain the universe in existence.

Best to you, friend.

cks

[Nofear]

Blake: A contingent thing requires an active causal power to maintain it in existence.

Nofear: But, does the argument apply to esse? Sure, why not. We can simply posit that God created the property of "esse inertia". Thus, once a substance is created, it will simply continue its created status without any active causal power just as motion can continue without any active causal power.

The easy response is that you are not seeing what is entailed by the notion that something is caused to exist by another contingently. What kind of property would this inertia be? It would be a property given to a thing to create itself and hold istelf in existence. But in order to have this property, the thing in question must be uncreated and in fact have the property of necessary existence -- otherwise it is necessary (a necessity of the consequent) that the thing in question has only contingent existence and depends on another for its existence because it doesn't have -- and cannot have of logical necesseity -- the property of self-existence. As I stated above, such a property is self contradictory. It entails saying that God created a created thing such that it is not created and not a created thing. Even God cannot confer such a power because he cannot do the logically impossible. It is this contradiciton: "This thing that requires an active causal power to exist can be created by God so that it isn't a thing that requires an active causal power to exist."

Again, playing devil's advocate. I insist on a distinction between "things" which are material (or spirit) and "things" which are rules/properties/laws. Your argument applies not only to existence, but to all the fundamental properties/laws of nature (gravity, time, space, electromagnetism, inertia, existence, etc).

I cannot argue that these relational properties must not be maintained via active causation. But it does not necessarily follow that objects must necessarily have active causation to continue to participate in those relations. Thus a rock can have a position in space not because God "holds" it there, but because God actively allows position to exist. The rock can exert gravity on other rocks, not because God actively gives the influence of gravity to the rock, but because God actively maintains that gravitational relationships shall exist. A substance can exist, not because God actively maintains the existence of that specific object, but because he maintains the property "esse inertia". Rock A can exist with the precisely the same "effort" as every other rock in the universe.

But, I confess I have little vested interested in playing devil's advocate since I quite dislike creatio ex nihilo.

[Zakuska]

Definition:

Ex nihilo

[Mudcat]

Hi Mudcat:

You wrote:

Ostler is building on (or, rather digging beneath) the Christian belief in God's necessarily continuing act of preserving universe in existence. I would disagree with you here that the universe's continued existence requires "no special effort of will on behalf of its creator." (See, for example, Nehemiah 9.6, Col. 1.17, Heb. 1.3 [verses cited by Erickson in his Christian Theology].) It seems clear that God does act to sustain the universe in existence.

Best to you, friend.

cks

Hi CK,

I see your point. I may have overstated my thoughts a bit... still thinking on it though.

I have a big problem with Ostler's language on 6

(6) Therefore, god must create any created entity CE in existence in each moment of its existence. (from 4 and 5)

From your citations, we could derive some action of "preservation" to life, the universe and everything. Even so, preserving something that has been created and creating something in every single moment of its existence seem to be different to me. I just don't get the concept that preservation and creation are synonymous.

I think Gen 2:1 and John 1:3 both point to the completion of creation, not some sort of ongoing process that something must continually be created from moment to moment to exist.

Good to hear from CK, hope things all well with you.

Regards,

Mudcat

[cksalmon]

I have a big problem with Ostler's language on 6

I do, too!

From your citations, we could derive some action of "preservation" to life, the universe and everything. Even so, preserving something that has been created and creating something in every single moment of its existence seem to be different to me. I just don't get the concept that preservation and creation are synonymous.

I don't, either. Particularly problematic is this statement: "The position you are asserting is nonsense. If you believe that God could sustain something in existence without re-creating it in each moment, then you fail to grasp the meaning of 'sustain.'" I don't believe Ostler has demonstrated his assertion that "sustaining" X in existence just is identical with creating X anew at every subsequent time t.

As an aside, I don't have Ostler's vol. 3 yet, but it may well be that he holds that all entities in the universe have the property of ss inherently. Or, I could be completely jumping to the wrong conclusion.

Best.

cks

EDIT: Added sentence starting: Particularly problematic.

[handys003]

What does the KFD have to CEN?

Thanks for adding some clarification to your statement.

You don't understand KFD to CEN? I posted in #47.

Basically from KFD from JS:

Meaning of the Word Create

"You ask the learned doctors why they say the world was made out of nothing; and they will answer, "Doesn't the Bible say He created the world?" And they infer, from the word create, that it must have been made out of nothing. Now, the word create came from the baurau which does not mean to create out of nothing; it means to organize; the same as a man would organize materials and build a ship.[5] Hence, we infer that God had materials to organize the world out of chaos -- chaotic matter, which is element, and in which dwells all the glory. Element had an existence from the time he had. The pure principles of element are principles which can never be destroyed; they may be organized and re-organized, but not destroyed. They had no beginning, and can have no end".[6]

It means we organized the universe out of matter and the said can be said of our HF universe and so on. No beginning and no end it goes on and on.

[Blake]

Hi Mr. Ostler:

You wrote:

A brief sidebar:

I'd already assumed you reject the non-canonical, but much-revered KFD (much-revered by some, at least, e.g., Handy supra), but the above would seem to seal the deal. Or, have I been misreading you all this time? At one time, I was convinced you only rejected BY's "eternal progression," but as Smith states that Elohim "was once like we are now" (one assumes a being without ss), but "is an exalted man," and that he wished to refute the false belief "that God was God from all eternity," it seems your rejection might be more primary than I once assumed.

Best.

cks

EDIT: I've read the next chapter, of course, but couldn't make much of it (that is, it wasn't clear to me why you would reject the official version of KFD, along with Richards and Woodruff's account at "I will refute that idea"; moreover, the following defense of [1]--"there was a period of time during which the Father was mortal and not divine" [p. 441]--strikes me as ad hoc).

I reject neither the King Follett Discourse nor eternal progression. I simply believe that as the KFD does entail that God progressed from being less than fully divine and a mere mortal for all eternity to being fully divine at some first time. God is eternally God (fully divine) on my view -- and that is how I read the KFD as well.

[Blake]

Again, playing devil's advocate. I insist on a distinction between "things" which are material (or spirit) and "things" which are rules/properties/laws. Your argument applies not only to existence, but to all the fundamental properties/laws of nature (gravity, time, space, electromagnetism, inertia, existence, etc).

I cannot argue that these relational properties must not be maintained via active causation. But it does not necessarily follow that objects must necessarily have active causation to continue to participate in those relations. Thus a rock can have a position in space not because God "holds" it there, but because God actively allows position to exist. The rock can exert gravity on other rocks, not because God actively gives the influence of gravity to the rock, but because God actively maintains that gravitational relationships shall exist. A substance can exist, not because God actively maintains the existence of that specific object, but because he maintains the property "esse inertia". Rock A can exist with the precisely the same "effort" as every other rock in the universe.

But, I confess I have little vested interested in playing devil's advocate since I quite dislike creatio ex nihilo.

You are entirely correct that as a matte of first order logic there is nothing in the concept of rock that requires that the fundamental matter must be either created or sustained in existence. Indeed, that happens to be my view of the way things actually are! However, if the matter of the rock is created out of nothing, then this matter has contingent existence and cannot continue to exist unless it is sustained in existence from moment to moment by the very power that created it out of nothing in the first place. For given CEN, it follows that the matter must be caused to exist and it is not its nature to just exist.

[cksalmon]

Hi Mr. Ostler:

You wrote:

I reject neither the King Follett Discourse nor eternal progression.

Okay. Thanks.

I simply believe that as the KFD does entail that God progressed from being less than fully divine and [?] a mere mortal for all eternity to being fully divine at some first time, [me: then...].

I don't understand your grammar here. I think something has been unintentionally elided. I assume something like:

I simply believe [in line with KFD], [that KFD] does entail that God progressed from being less than fully divine and a mere mortal for all eternity to being fully divine at some first time.

Is that right? Frankly, I don't get my proposed elucidation of your point, either. So, I'm obviously open to your correction at that point.

God is eternally God (fully divine) on my view -- and that is how I read the KFD as well.

This is the main sticking point, however.

I want to consider your rejection W. Richards and W. Woodruff, here.

The reasons I question your jettisoning of Willard Richards and Wilford Woodruff's notes here are:

(a) that W. Richards, Woodruff, and S. W. Richards agree against Bullock that Smith stated something like "God was not God from all eternity."

(b) Woodruff and Clayton agree against Bullock that Smith spoke of a common imagined idea or supposition [to be refuted, per Woodruff] that: "God was God from eternity."

( c ) Woodruff and Clayton agree against Bullock that Smith spoke of "how God came to be God," which agreement is quite consistent with the agreement among W. Richards, Woodruff, and S. W. Richards against Bullock that Smith stated something like "God was not God from all eternity."

Here's the relevant graphic (format adapted from here):

That is, to put it more explicitly:

(d) Bullock is outnumbered 3:1 re: that God was not God from eternity.

(e) Bullock is outnumbered 2:1 re: that Smith intended to state how God came to be God.

(f) Bullock is outnumbered 2:1 re: his silence vis-a-vis Woodruff and Clayton's arguably synonymous statements "We suppose that God was God from eternity"/"We have imagined that God was God from all eternity," respectively.

It's not at all clear to me, on any objective evaluation of the extant sources (and, to be sure, the justification you provide for privileging Bullock's account [viz., "{he} made what appears to be the closest to a word-for-word rendition of the discourse" {p. 441}], doesn't strike me as very compelling when viewed in light of what the other sources affirm against Bullock) why you would privilege Bullock's notes over against the notes of the other four witnesses, whose notes substantially agree with each other but differ from Bullock's in quite relevant ways.

Your statement that "[bullock] made what appears to be the closest to a word-for-word rendition of the discourse" sounds a cracked bell, and, to be sure, strikes me as more than a bit subjective, here, when compared to what Bulllock fails to include (see above: from W. Richards, Woodruff, S. W. Richards, and Clayton).

If by "[is] most complete" (re: Bullock), you mean "has higher word count," I wouldn't argue. But, surely you mean something more important that that. You must mean something like, "disagrees at fundamental points with W. Richards, Woodruff, S. W. Richards, and Clayton, but, all told, is closer to the original." I don't see that, yet.

But, you referred to "two other sources with a very different reading," one of which is obviously Bullock. I confess my ignorance, at this point. I don't know the other source who, like Bullock, has a "very different reading" at this point, and perhaps that other source might vanquish my objections above.

Best.

cks

----------

[1] Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Salt Lake City, Ut.: Bookcraft, 1980), 341.

[2] Ibid., 361.

[3] Ibid., 350 (I believe; it's unclear from the digital edition I'm referencing).

[4] Ibid., 344.

[5] Ibid., 357 (I believe; again, it's unclear from the digital edition I'm referencing).

-----

EDIT: I wrote: "As an aside, I don't have Ostler's vol. 3 yet, but it may well be that he holds that all entities in the universe have the property of ss inherently. Or, I could be completely jumping to the wrong conclusion."

Have I completely jumped past the deep end here?

cks

EDIT: I have no idea why my original graphic was replaced by a photobucket notification of violation of terms. I have re-uploaded it.

[Blake]

Hi Mr. Ostler:

You wrote:

Okay. Thanks.

I don't understand your grammar here. I think something has been unintentionally elided. I assume something like:

Is that right? Frankly, I don't get my proposed elucidation of your point, either. So, I'm obviously open to your correction at that point.

This is the main sticking point, however.

I want to consider your rejection W. Richards and W. Woodruff, here.

The reasons I question your jettisoning of Willard Richards and Wilford Woodruff's notes here are:

(a) that W. Richards, Woodruff, and S. W. Richards agree against Bullock that Smith stated something like "God was not God from all eternity."

(b) Woodruff and Clayton agree against Bullock that Smith spoke of a common imagined idea or supposition [to be refuted, per Woodruff] that: "God was God from eternity."

( c ) Woodruff and Clayton agree against Bullock that Smith spoke of "how God came to be God," which agreement is quite consistent with the agreement among W. Richards, Woodruff, and S. W. Richards against Bullock that Smith stated something like "God was not God from all eternity."

Here's the relevant graphic (format adapted from here):

That is, to put it more explicitly:

(d) Bullock is outnumbered 3:1 re: that God was not God from eternity.

(e) Bullock is outnumbered 2:1 re: that Smith intended to state how God came to be God.

(f) Bullock is outnumbered 2:1 re: his silence vis-a-vis Woodruff and Clayton's arguably synonymous statements "We suppose that God was God from eternity"/"We have imagined that God was God from all eternity," respectively.

It's not at all clear to me, on any objective evaluation of the extant sources (and, to be sure, the justification you provide for privileging Bullock's account [viz., "{he} made what appears to be the closest to a word-for-word rendition of the discourse" {p. 441}], doesn't strike me as very compelling when viewed in light of what the other sources affirm against Bullock) why you would privilege Bullock's notes over against the notes of the other four witnesses, whose notes substantially agree with each other but differ from Bullock's in quite relevant ways.

Your statement that "[bullock] made what appears to be the closest to a word-for-word rendition of the discourse" sounds a cracked bell, and, to be sure, strikes me as more than a bit subjective, here, when compared to what Bulllock fails to include (see above: from W. Richards, Woodruff, S. W. Richards, and Clayton).

If by "[is] most complete" (re: Bullock), you mean "has higher word count," I wouldn't argue. But, surely you mean something more important that that. You must mean something like, "disagrees at fundamental points with W. Richards, Woodruff, S. W. Richards, and Clayton, but, all told, is closer to the original." I don't see that, yet.

But, you referred to "two other sources with a very different reading," one of which is obviously Bullock. I confess my ignorance, at this point. I don't know the other source who, like Bullock, has a "very different reading" at this point, and perhaps that other source might vanquish my objections above.

Best.

cks

----------

[1] Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Salt Lake City, Ut.: Bookcraft, 1980), 341.

[2] Ibid., 361.

[3] Ibid., 350 (I believe; it's unclear from the digital edition I'm referencing).

[4] Ibid., 344.

[5] Ibid., 357 (I believe; again, it's unclear from the digital edition I'm referencing).

-----

EDIT: I wrote: "As an aside, I don't have Ostler's vol. 3 yet, but it may well be that he holds that all entities in the universe have the property of ss inherently. Or, I could be completely jumping to the wrong conclusion."

Have I completely jumped past the deep end here?

cks

Read my 3rd vol. The notion that the Father became human but was fully divine before coming human is consistent with all of the statement from the various sources of the KFD. The Son only did what he saw the Father do -- and the Son was fully divine before becoming human. It follows that the Father was also fully divine before he became human. He condescended like the Son to empty himself of a fullness of divinity to become mortal. He "became God again" by doing what only an already fully divine person could do -- take up his life again after death.

[Vance]

You don't understand KFD to CEN? I posted in #47.

Basically from KFD from JS:

Meaning of the Word Create

"You ask the learned doctors why they say the world was made out of nothing; and they will answer, "Doesn't the Bible say He created the world?" And they infer, from the word create, that it must have been made out of nothing. Now, the word create came from the baurau which does not mean to create out of nothing; it means to organize; the same as a man would organize materials and build a ship.[5] Hence, we infer that God had materials to organize the world out of chaos -- chaotic matter, which is element, and in which dwells all the glory. Element had an existence from the time he had. The pure principles of element are principles which can never be destroyed; they may be organized and re-organized, but not destroyed. They had no beginning, and can have no end".[6]

It means we organized the universe out of matter and the said can be said of our HF universe and so on. No beginning and no end it goes on and on.

That is why I asked the question. It is obvious to me that KFD and CEN (Creation Ex Nihilo) are mutually exclusive doctrines/theologies.

Perhaps I could have been more clear.

[saemo]

Seems to me the original argument does not take into account an important aspect. God created us as rational beings. He conferred on us the dignity to initiate and control our own actions. Does God sustain this creation, us? Most certainly. And so he sustains us as He created us, rational, and free to act.

[Rob Bowman]

Blake,

I wrote:

You assume, for example, that God's act of causing a specific creature C to exist at time t1 is a separate act from his act of causing C to exist at t2. I don't see why this assumption must be true. Why cannot God will that C exists for a specified period of time?

You replied:

Rob, such an act would require God to give a created entity the property of having power to endure through a period of time without an active cause underlying its existence and thus requires conferring on it a power of self-creation or self-sustenance.

Your argument presupposes that if a thing exists, it must somehow be "kept existing" by some incessant direct cause at every moment. There is and remains "an active cause underlying its existence," namely, whatever caused it to begin existing in the first place. Once it comes into existence, the role of causation in its existence is complete, just as once an object is caused to begin moving, no additional cause is needed to keep it moving at each moment. My mother does not need to keep giving birth to me every moment of my life; the Big Bang does not need to keep occurring at every moment of time in the universe (good thing, too!); and God does not need to keep creating me at every moment of my life. When God wills something to exist, he wills it (an actual object, a contingently existing thing) to exist. If that thing that God wills to exist is something that has the potential to continue existing, to endure, for some period of time, then it will do so. To assert that God cannot create the universe ex nihilo without re-creating it and everything in it at each moment is nonsense.

You wrote:

If Ce exists at t1 what could keep CE in existence at t2 if it is not CE's nature to exist? You see, conntingent things don't have it as part of their nature to exist. Only necessarily existing things can have existence as part of their (or its) nature.

You keep saying this, but if you presented an argument for it (other than the questionable appeal to the authority of medieval philosophers) I missed it. The classic metaphysical distinction is that a necessary being is one in which existence is essential to the very idea or concept of that being, whereas a contingent being is one in which existence is not essential to the idea of that being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the essence/existence distinction as follows:

"According to this distinction, one can say what something is (i.e. its essence), prior to knowing whether it exists. So, for example, one can define what a horse is

[Ahab]

This discussion is inspired by Blake Ostler's treatment of it in vol. 2 of his series "Exploring Mormon Thought."

The doctrine of creation ex nihilo seems to be incompatible with any notion of significant free will. Here are the premises of this discussion, which I believe are accurate representations of orthodox Christianity (but not of Mormonism):

1. God is the only entity in the universe that has the property of self-existence. It is impossible for God to

not

exist.

2. All other objects, be it living things or non-living things, do not have the property of self-existence. It is their nature to not exist.

God created all things besides himself ex nihilo, bringing them from their natural state of non-existence into a state of existence. If left to their own devices, all things besides God would immediately blink out of existence, because it is their nature to not exist. In every moment their existence is necessarily sustained by God. In effect, God re-creates ex nihilo all things in every moment. If God did not do this, all things besides God would blink out of existence immediately after the first moment of their existence.

The implications of this are astounding. This effectively makes God responsible for everything that occurs.

I don't believe that conclusion is valid, even if only within the paradigm your're describing.

I can see how someone could conclude God would responsible for the existence of everything, but the idea that God allows everything to exist and even upholds everything in existence doesn't logically lead to the conclusion that God is responsible for everything that happens by everything he upholds in existence.

[Blake]

Blake,

I wrote:

You assume, for example, that God's act of causing a specific creature C to exist at time t1 is a separate act from his act of causing C to exist at t2. I don't see why this assumption must be true. Why cannot God will that C exists for a specified period of time?

You replied:

Your argument presupposes that if a thing exists, it must somehow be "kept existing" by some incessant direct cause at every moment. There is and remains "an active cause underlying its existence," namely, whatever caused it to begin existing in the first place. Once it comes into existence, the role of causation in its existence is complete, just as once an object is caused to begin moving, no additional cause is needed to keep it moving at each moment. My mother does not need to keep giving birth to me every moment of my life; the Big Bang does not need to keep occurring at every moment of time in the universe (good thing, too!); and God does not need to keep creating me at every moment of my life. When God wills something to exist, he wills it (an actual object, a contingently existing thing) to exist. If that thing that God wills to exist is something that has the potential to continue existing, to endure, for some period of time, then it will do so. To assert that God cannot create the universe ex nihilo without re-creating it and everything in it at each moment is nonsense.

Rob: You are right that the view that the view that the universe is recreated every moment is nonsense -- but it is a nonsense with which you are stuck. Your assertion that the Big Bang doesn't have to happen over and over is quite correct -- but it is a massive category mistake for you to engage. Remember that I believe that matter is not created and that it can endure precisely because its nature is to exist. However, you cannot compare the properties of matter given naturalism or the view that things just exist and continue to do with with the theistic view of creation out of nothing. The properties of matter are very different on the two different views and it is a category mistake for you to conflate the two view. You have said nothing to respond to the basic fact that if matter is created it exists contingently and in dependence on the actions of another. It is contingent by its nature and does not have the property of existence or continued to existence because only God can have the power to create ex nihilo or to sustain in existence. What you assert in fact goes against the nearly unanimous view of theologians who adopted concurrence and occasionalism precisely for the reasons I have given.

God cannot give a thing the power to endure because that means God gives a property to an entity CE to cause its own continued existence if it doesn't depend on him. However, if the thing in questions (basic matter) has contingent existence then it cannot have the power to create itself or sustain its own existence because by its very nature it does not -- and cannot -- have natural existence as a property. God cannot confer on a created thing the power to create itself any more than he can create uncreated matter.

You wrote:

You keep saying this, but if you presented an argument for it (other than the questionable appeal to the authority of medieval philosophers) I missed it. The classic metaphysical distinction is that a necessary being is one in which existence is essential to the very idea or concept of that being, whereas a contingent being is one in which existence is not essential to the idea of that being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the essence/existence distinction as follows:

"According to this distinction, one can say what something is (i.e. its essence), prior to knowing whether it exists. So, for example, one can define what a horse is