Why Do You Think Murder Is Wrong?

[RenegadeOfPhunk]

Ya, i could be hung up on that-and i don't know that much about it all. It just seems, from the very little that i have studied, that things like this (instincts or whatever we want to call them) didn't just form out of no where and serve no purpose at all.

http://www.epjournal.net/filestore/ep054751.pdf

It's a bit technical, but the top part of page 2 gives a pretty good summary of what I'm talking about.

Again, from what i understand (which isn't a lot) there was always a reason for an instinct, even if it didn't make sense to people observing it and even if it didn't necessarily do the species which had it any good in the long term.

Most behaviours / traits that manage to survive over millions of years must either be beneficial to survivial or - at the very least - can't waste TOO much energy. At the extreme end of this scale, there can be some behaviours that can appear 'irrelavent' to survival, and even some that are deteremental, but are 'kept in check' either by frequency, or some conflicting drive.

I'll have to spend some time looking. I don't have any specific examples to hand. But I know I've heard of a few... Maybe some of the more knowledgeble biologists can help me out. (Or tell me I'm dead wrong, which wouldn't be a great surprise. Either way )

EDIT: Here's one example - a link to a study that seems to point to a by-product behaviour in Starlings in relation to 'symmetry preference'.

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bril...000004/art00005

It all comes back to the fact that what develops at any one time is essentially random.

It's what get's to stick around that isn't.

We've only had 'moral laws' for a few thousand years. In evolutionary terms, the 'experiement' has barely started...

The only way to really know if moral laws are truly a 'good idea' (or at the very least, not a disasterous idea) for survival is if humans are still around in a million years time. (And the humans that are still around still construct moral laws of course)

...the way were heading, I wouldn't count on it.

I do agree that there are other explanations for the moral law that most humans acknowledge exists among us. No doubt about it.

Yeah. I'm happy to leave it at possibilities. Just wanted to make sure I get my 'guess' across properly....

Bah - let's not fight to the death on this one Not very romantic, but less messy...!

[Vex]

Besides the moral, mental, and physical aspects of murder, I think two combination of three words may shed light on my stance:

Kantian virtue ethics/ Law of nature.

If everyone murdered everyone would die--or be alone. Hence murder fails.

[bluebell]

http://www.epjournal.net/filestore/ep054751.pdf

It's a bit technical, but the top part of page 2 gives a pretty good summary of what I'm talking about.

Most behaviours / traits that manage to survive over millions of years must either be beneficial to survivial or - at the very least - can't waste TOO much energy. At the extreme end of this scale, there can be some behaviours that can appear 'irrelavent' to survival, and even some that are deteremental, but are 'kept in check' either by frequency, or some conflicting drive.

I'll have to spend some time looking. I don't have any specific examples to hand. But I know I've heard of a few... Maybe some of the more knowledgeble biologists can help me out. (Or tell me I'm dead wrong, which wouldn't be a great surprise. Either way )

EDIT: Here's one example - a link to a study that seems to point to a by-product behaviour in Starlings in relation to 'symmetry preference'.

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bril...000004/art00005

It all comes back to the fact that what develops at any one time is essentially random.

It's what get's to stick around that isn't.

We've only had 'moral laws' for a few thousand years. In evolutionary terms, the 'experiement' has barely started...

The only way to really know if moral laws are truly a 'good idea' (or at the very least, not a disasterous idea) for survival is if humans are still around in a million years time. (And the humans that are still around still construct moral laws of course)

...the way were heading, I wouldn't count on it.

Yeah. I'm happy to leave it at possibilities. Just wanted to make sure I get my 'guess' across properly....

Bah - let's not fight to the death on this one Not very romantic, but less messy...!

thanks renegade, for the references, i'll try and check them out as soon as i have any time to actually use my brain.

Until then, i'm happy to call this duel a draw-i have enough messes to clean up with my kids, i don't need any more.

[Bach]

This makes a lot of sense-

But, is it a statement of why murder is inherently wrong-or just an acknowledgement that it's bad for society?

I'm not sure.

What's bad for society is inherently wrong, according to utilitarians. A belief that murder is inherently wrong is available to All-Seeing-Eye.

[bluebell]

What's bad for society is inherently wrong, according to utilitarians. A belief that murder is inherently wrong is available to All-Seeing-Eye.

that's definitely one way to look at it-but i'm thinking more of the difference between laws we humans give ourselves to make society better verses laws we have simply because they are morally correct (in our eyes) to put in place.

For example-driving laws are good for our society-but i'm not sure anyone would claim that driving without insurance is morally wrong.

Would utilitarians believe so? I don't know much about that belief system.

Likewise-is murder only wrong because it is detrimental to society or it is just wrong regardless of it's impact on society?

[Anijen]

Okay lets look at the light of Christ, Holy Ghost, or consciousness or devil and angel on our shoulder or Jimmny the cricket telling us right from wrong. Whatever label you want to put on it we know the basic mores and values instilled into us as humans. If you think we don't have this, ask your self this one question;

Why is there a word for sin in every language?

[Bach]

For the same reason that there are words for "nose" and "water" in every language -- they reflect universal features of natural human existence. There is no human society that would function well if wanton killing were permitted. Utilitarians would see no criticism here, I'd think.

[Anijen]

For the same reason that there are words for "nose" and "water" in every language -- they reflect universal features of natural human existence. There is no human society that would function well if wanton killing were permitted. Utilitarians would see no criticism here, I'd think.

precisely my point. They know its wrong.

[Bach]

Sure, but how do they get to that conclusion? Very differently than you, I'd wager.

[Bill “Papa” Lee]

Because God says it is wrong...he is the only source of truth!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Pa Pa

[Bach]

I don't think that virtue ethicists would necessarily agree with that, Pa Pa. Nor would utilitarians. Same for Kantians. Rawlsians. Relativists. Hedonists. Nihilists.

I'm sure there are some I'm forgetting.

[Helmuth]

Because God says it is wrong...

Pa Pa, "Because God said so" may be the only decisive moral argument against murder and other property infringements for some other Christian traditions. Mormonism, on the other hand, theologically supports individual rights very strongly, as I explained in my previous post (on page 4). Individual natural rights gives a much stronger (and exception-less) argument against murder than either divine mandate or utilitarianism.

he is the only source of truth!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Remember "all truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it" as we learn in D&C 93.

[Oracle]

Okay lets look at the light of Christ, Holy Ghost, or consciousness or devil and angel on our shoulder or Jimmny the cricket telling us right from wrong. Whatever label you want to put on it we know the basic mores and values instilled into us as humans. If you think we don't have this, ask your self this one question;

Why is there a word for sin in every language?

Because man just can't help imposing his standards on others. Sin is a descriptive word used to denigrate behaviors they do not like. Attributing origin to God is just adding an exclamation point to the end of it.

[Bach]

Individual natural rights gives a much stronger (and exception-less) argument against murder than either divine mandate or utilitarianism.

I think followers of John Stuart Mill would disagree with you on that assessment of utilitarianism. Individual natural rights aren't inconsistent with quasi-rule utilitarianism, and in fact, the latter may provide crucial underpinnings for the former.

[Hammer]

Because man just can't help imposing his standards on others. Sin is a descriptive word used to denigrate behaviors they do not like. Attributing origin to God is just adding an exclamation point to the end of it.

No. God does exist just as planets you can't see or influence exist. Denial of God's existence is the sign of a desperate position.

[Helmuth]

I think followers of John Stuart Mill would disagree with you on that assessment of utilitarianism.

He, he he. Mill himself would probably disagree with himself on whatever you would present as his thoughts on the issue! The man contradicted himself at every turn, throughout his life of prolific writing.

And how exactly does one follow someone like Mill? Hmmm. He was pretty clear on one thing I can think of: not liking the English sensibilities against having affairs. So really, probably the best way to "follow" John Stuart Mill would be to have an affair and then spend lots of ink justifying yourself.

Yes, you can get to natural law from a utilitarian perspective, I just think it's weaker because it allows exceptions. Like, if you determine that everyone on earth's happiness level will go way way up if you kill all left-handed redheads, so much so that it way outweighs the "disutility" of the redheads in getting killed, utilitarianism might conceivably say go for it. If you can improve the lot of billions by killing a few thousand, wouldn't that be worth it? It could be. Just depends who's counting the "Utils".

On the other hand, if you base your natural law/libertarianism on moral derivation, i.e. considerations of rightness and wrongness, then there can be no exceptions like this. It is "wrong" to agressively kill redheads, and even an overwhelmingly positive, wonderful, and utilitarian outcome doesn't change the "wrongness" of the action. That's why I say it's stronger. It enforces the standard more rigorously. Now some would say that exceptions to the standard *should* be made (for warfare, building highways, or whatever), and so the weaker position is better. That's their opinion.

[Bach]

He, he he. Mill himself would probably disagree with himself on whatever you would present as his thoughts on the issue! The man contradicted himself at every turn, throughout his life of prolific writing.

And how exactly does one follow someone like Mill? Hmmm. He was pretty clear on one thing I can think of: not liking the English sensibilities against having affairs. So really, probably the best way to "follow" John Stuart Mill would be to have an affair and then spend lots of ink justifying yourself.

Not that I think that ad hominem attacks against Mill could possibly be a successful argument against utilitarianism, but the record should be set straight here: Mill never had an affair with Harriet Taylor. He wrote forcefully, not against those who look down on extramarital affairs, but against those who deemed it improper to have a completely platonic relationship with a married woman of the type that he had with her. I have never heard from a credible source that the two were physically intimate while her husband was still alive, and in fact know of some strong evidence that implies that they were not.

Yes, you can get to natural law from a utilitarian perspective, I just think it's weaker because it allows exceptions. Like, if you determine that everyone on earth's happiness level will go way way up if you kill all left-handed redheads, so much so that it way outweighs the "disutility" of the redheads in getting killed, utilitarianism might conceivably say go for it. If you can improve the lot of billions by killing a few thousand, wouldn't that be worth it? It could be. Just depends who's counting the "Utils".

Again, I think you're setting up an act utilitarian strawman to represent utilitarianism as a whole. Chapter V of Mill's book Utilitarianism deals with these justice/rights oriented criticisms of utilitarianism very well. You can probably pick it up at a bookstore for less than $5. I recommend doing so if you don't have the book already.

On the other hand, if you base your natural law/libertarianism on moral derivation, i.e. considerations of rightness and wrongness, then there can be no exceptions like this. It is "wrong" to agressively kill redheads, and even an overwhelmingly positive, wonderful, and utilitarian outcome doesn't change the "wrongness" of the action. That's why I say it's stronger. It enforces the standard more rigorously. Now some would say that exceptions to the standard *should* be made (for warfare, building highways, or whatever), and so the weaker position is better. That's their opinion.

I don't accept that any axiomatic natural law argument against killing innocents would be stronger (or weaker, for that matter) than a quasi-rule utilitarian argument of the type Mill could make. Natural law/libertarian justifications are inferior to utilitarian justifications, I believe, because they aren't fundamental enough -- they don't answer the deep questions that are the province of ethical theories. Why do people have rights? Where do natural rights come from? Which rights are properly called universal and natural, and which are not? How do we even decide these questions? Utilitarianism can undergird and support conceptions of natural rights, and -- even more importantly -- clarify our thoughts about them.

[Helmuth]

Not that I think that ad hominem attacks against Mill could possibly be a successful argument against utilitarianism, but the record should be set straight here: Mill never had an affair with Harriet Taylor.

OK, I have cursorily examined the literature, and other than Wikipedia everyone seems to agree it was a Platonic relationship until they were married. So I retract my statement. I had confused and conflated some things in my mind. Nevertheless, he certainly had a very deep, unconventional, and intimate friendship with a married woman (Taylor) and his father strongly disapproved of this relationship.

He wrote forcefully, not against those who look down on extramarital affairs, but against those who deemed it improper to have a completely platonic relationship with a married woman of the type that he had with her.

Yes, I think his relationship with Taylor and others' (especially his father's) disapproval were the impetus for much of his political philosophy deriding traditions and social morays as somehow anti-liberty. However, though his relationship may not have been adulterous, he certainly advocated alternative experimential... "social arrangements". As David Stove writes:

"Mill pleaded in On Liberty for the widest variety of what he chose to call "experiments in living." The phrase was a sickeningly dishonest attempt to capture some of the deserved prestige of science for things which had not the remotest connection with science; principally-need I say-certain sexual and domestic arrangements of a then "novel kind" (David Stove, Cricket Versus Republicanism, p. 61)

Again, I think you're setting up an act utilitarian strawman to represent utilitarianism as a whole. [referring to my proposed left-handed redhead elimination]

Not really. Utilitarianism, in a broad sense, really does argue for the greatest good for the greatest number. Would you contest that? So in what sense is it setting up a straw man to present a hypothetical in which this guiding star could cause what is, to me, an undesirable outcome? A straw man is a *fake* position *weaker* than the real position. Is not "the greatest good for the greatest number" the *real* position of utilitarianism? And could not, in principle, an imposition on a few result in a disproportionate benefit for many? In fact, not only in principle -- I can think of several instances where in real life this very thing occurs. Certainly there are utilitarian ways around allowing this, but my point is that it's a shaky foundation.

I don't accept that any axiomatic natural law argument against killing innocents would be stronger (or weaker, for that matter) than a quasi-rule utilitarian argument of the type Mill could make. Natural law/libertarian justifications are inferior to utilitarian justifications, I believe, because they aren't fundamental enough -- they don't answer the deep questions that are the province of ethical theories. Why do people have rights? Where do natural rights come from? Which rights are properly called universal and natural, and which are not? How do we even decide these questions? Utilitarianism can undergird and support conceptions of natural rights, and -- even more importantly -- clarify our thoughts about them.

Utilitarianism is not the only ethical theory in town. Read Murray Rothbard's "Ethics of Liberty" for example. Available free online. It answers "Why do people have rights?" "Where do natural rights come from?", etc.

I want you to understand I think utilitarianism is great in many ways (though I do think Mill was a trainwreck). One of my heroes, Ludwig von Mises, was an utilitarian. David Friedman (Milton's son) came to all the right conclusions by way of utilitarianism. And people of all persuasions (political, religious, and otherwise) of course use utilitarian arguments frequently. We're very practical people and want to do things that work and are effective (synonym: utilitarian). But I just don't think it's a good foudation to build an ethical system on. I see it as the parable of the house on the rock and the house on the sand. You can get to the same house (sound principles like "Do not murder people") either way, but I prefer to build on the rock of natural rights theory rather than the sandy mores of utilitarianism.