Benjamin McGuire Posted February 5, 2025 Author Posted February 5, 2025 On 2/3/2025 at 8:17 PM, JarMan said: I think you are using the term fiction more narrowly then I normally use it. I would consider allegory to be fictional. But if you want to consider it as something different, then for the purposes of this discussion that's fine. Grotius does have at least three works that are allegory (if that's the term we want to use). They are The Exile of Adam, The Passion of Christ, and Joseph (in Egypt). So allegory is not outside of Grotius' wheelhouse. Interestingly, all three of these things make an appearance in the BOM. I agree that I am using the term more narrowly - but - when we are discussing a theory of literature, then there is a need to have technical definitions. Perhaps we have to move back a step and have you explain what, in the Book of Mormon, you believe reflects Grotius's beliefs and intentions, and what we can simply ignore because it is nothing more than fiction. I agree with you that term allegory is being used very loosely here - but I think it's just as effective as suggesting that there are places in the narrative where we can discern a rhetorical strategy on the part of the author that engages the text in both a literal and non-literal way. Anyways, if you think that we have areas of the text that are within Grotius's wheelhouse, and where you believe you can see the intentionality of Grotius, then why aren't we starting in those places instead of trying to engage the warfare narratives? I think that this might be a particularly important shift because on some level, you also believe that Grotius lifted parts of the text from sources he was using (and this complicates the landscape created when we ask what in the text reflects Grotius's point of view and what does not). 1
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 5, 2025 Author Posted February 5, 2025 On 2/3/2025 at 9:33 PM, JarMan said: Your are making an apples to oranges comparison so you haven't shown an inconsistency. In order for this to be apples to apples, Nephi would have to justify killing Laban based on reason, without being commanded by God. I agree. And this is what creates the problem. If we cannot find in Grotius an apples to apples comparison, the suggestion ought to be that Grotius is not the author of the narrative - this was my point about it being a novel discussion by Grotius - it creates a circular argument, and this cannot be used as evidence. On 2/3/2025 at 9:33 PM, JarMan said: And you go too far in saying that Grotius' natural law transcends God. Grotius believes that natural law can be derived using reason without appealing to God. This is different than saying that God must follow the same rules of conduct as man. Grotius clearly does not believe that to be the case. More on this later. I think you misunderstand me (and that may be my fault - I don't always explain things well). Grotius believed that while God created the natural order, that this order could be rationally observed. And so this natural order (and the morality that it creates) exists through that rational observation whether or not we believe that God exists. This is the basis for the idea that Grotius believes that the morality that can be found in natural law transcends [the belief in] God. On the second point however, natural law is something that Grotius believed that God had to be consistent with. And it is tied to this rational conception of both Natural Law and the understanding of God. If we go back to the text, here is an excerpt from Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 10: Quote The law of nature, again, is unchangeable – even in the sense that it cannot be changed by God. Measureless as is the power of God, nevertheless, it can be said that there are certain things over which that power does not extend; for things of which this is said are spoken only, having no sense corresponding with reality and being mutually contradictory.31 Just as even God, then, cannot cause that two times two should not make four, so He cannot cause that that which is intrinsically evil be not evil. What is Grotius saying here? That Natural Law (created by God) creates a base-line of good and evil (morality). God cannot change that base-line. And the way that Grotius seems to understand this is that God cannot do something which is morally against Natural Law because then God would be doing something evil. Grotius fits a certain line of thought about the nature of God and Natural Law and denies another line of thinking in which whatever God dictates must be considered Good simply because God demanded it. And this is relevant to the discussion about Nephi and the potential demand from God because of the way that the narrative makes that demand interact with Grotius's view of natural law. It seems to me absurd that we would have a narrative written by Grotius (that reflects Grotius's point of view) in which God is commanding someone to do something that violates the morality of Natural Law. And this is why the individual points showing how Nephi's actions violate Grotius's understanding of Natural Law are significant. On 2/3/2025 at 9:33 PM, JarMan said: None of this is relevant here because Nephi's justification for killing Laban was that he was commanded by God. So, as I just pointed out, it is all significant. On 2/3/2025 at 9:33 PM, JarMan said: I'm not claiming Grotius was a utilitarian. I'm saying that he granted that God could act for whatever purposes he wants to, which would include utilitarian purposes. I'm also not claiming that Grotius believed it was proper for men to punish stealing or attempted murder with the death penalty. But this is not what the BOM is claiming either. Nephi isn't punishing Laban per se, he is simply God's hand. God is inflicting the punishment. The challenge is that Grotius doesn't believe what you are putting into his mouth. You are just cherry picking comments without looking at the context of the entire system that Grotius has put together. This would make Grotius's God irrational from his point of view. On 2/3/2025 at 9:33 PM, JarMan said: No, this is the Platonic position, which Grotius explicitly rejects. We see this in Book 2, Chapter 20, Paragraph 4 with the following heading: "That punishment having in view some advantage must among men be inflicted differently than by God; and why". No, it isn't. Section 4 here makes one argument - Grotius says that punishment needs to be motivated by some good that can be achieved: Quote Now, these things are true in the case of men who inflict punishment, for one man is so bound to another by ties of common blood that he ought not to do harm to another save for the sake of attaining some good.With God, the case is otherwise. As Leo Strauss points out: "God may punish without a concern for any common future good because he is the Lord." While this does touch on the narrative in the Book of Mormon, it doesn't touch on it the way that you are suggesting that it does. The argument by Grotius here is prefaced by 2.1.14, where Grotius discusses instances where God allows a death penalty in the Old Testament, and confirms that God can command this in certain instances. Grotius also affirms that the death penalty may be appropriate for God to command - but that is the absolute limit - where the Old Testament does not allow the death penalty, it should not be given: Quote The question is raised by some whether the civil law at any rate, since it contains the right of life and death, in permitting that a thief be killed by a private individual, does not at the same time free the act from all guilt. In my judgement this ought by no means to be conceded. In the first place, the law does not have the right of death over all citizens for any offence whatever, but only for offences so serious that they deserve death. Altogether worthy of approval is the opinion of Scotus, that it is not right to condemn anyone to death except for the crimes which the law of Moses punished with death, or, in addition, for crimes which, judged by a fair standard, are equally heinous. For in this so serious matter it seems possible to obtain a knowledge of the divine will, which alone gives peace of mind, from no other source than from that law, which does not with certainty appoint for the thief the penalty of death. Grotius explicitly identifies theft as not being one of those things. Attempted murder (while not mentioned) is also not one of those things. So while God can command a death penalty (because God is not required to consider the future good), Grotius has some very specific requirement in mind when he says this. The struggle we have in reading the narrative in the Book of Mormon as Grotius is that the assertions that the Book of Mormon makes in its narrative continue to resist Grotius and not to support him. It's almost as if Nephi is channeling Hobbes much more than Grotius. We can say that the Book of Mormon fits with the idea that God can command someone to be killed for their crimes. But the problem is that the Book of Mormon explicitly lays out those crimes and they fall into categories that Grotius would not accept. 1
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 5, 2025 Author Posted February 5, 2025 (edited) 15 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: QED ?? This discussion is about whether Grotius was the author. That is the crux. I don't believe he was, but that is not a conclusion which everyone has reached. This part of the discussion isn't about the conclusions or the proposals but about what would constitute evidence in such an argument. How do we tell if an unattributed text belongs to a specific author? Genre labels are important for multiple reasons. One of those reasons is that the way that we read a text (and the way we understand it) is predicated on our perception of the genre of the text. We read the Book of Mormon very differently if we start from the assumption that the genre is fiction than we do if we start from the assumption that it is a translation of an historical record. We may read it differently if we believe it is a text with historicity than we would if we believe the text is allegorical (in which historicity means nothing). These decisions are made of necessity apriori to our interpreting the text. We may change our perception of the genre as we read (and this will affect any subsequent reading) but we read with expectations. So we have this genre issue when we read. In a similar way, the genre can affect our attempts to identify an author. At the very least, the assumption that a text is autobiographical (a question of significant relevance to portions of the Book of Mormon) changes the way that we attempt to define authorship - much more so than when we assume that a text is a work of fiction. The literature has changed in recent years - in the shift from non-computational methods to computational methods. This shift is important in its own right because it looks for a more objective identification - but computational models of authorship attribution really pay very little attention to the narrative of the text (except for the ways in which it may adhere to an identifiable profile in a Large Language Model). Even in a highly computational environment, this problem remains. Consider this discussion. That study breaks down roles in authorship (much like I did in my translation presentation). But points out that when analyzing narrative texts, identifying roles within the text is both difficult and subjective. Can an algorithm do a better job at this task? I don't think so - but even if it can, it illustrates the problem that would occur when looking at a complex text like the Book of Mormon. To engage the discussion of authorship attribution on the basis of narrative content, we would first have to identify the various voices in the text to determine which are associated with the author (as opposed to various other identifiable real or imaginary people). Only then do we produce a model of the author's voice that can be compared to potential known authors. This level of complexity has generally left those who study authorship attribution to conclude that narrative studies are always going to be less reliable than computational models focused on more clearly objective metrics. But this brings us to the problem of the Book of Mormon. The Book of Mormon can be analyzed computationally (and this has been done several times) - but only by using a set of basic assumptions - most importantly that its production is narrowly identified in time (near the publication date of the Book of Mormon). The general argument is the same for both critics and believers that use this sort of analysis. For critics there is an effort to find the closest statistical match in the hopes that this creates an effective authorship claim. For believers, the effort is largely an effort to prove the negative (to the extent that it can be proven) that the text resembles no known author sufficiently to make the claim of authorship identification (and certainly that it shouldn't be associated on an authorial level with anyone who helped produce the text as we have it). This sort of analysis is effectively impossible when we try to compare the Book of Mormon to an author like Grotius. The textual history of the Book of Mormon - published in 1830 in English does not match up well enough to an alleged authorship by Grotius (in the early 17th century) who would have written in Dutch or Latin. The differences at these very basic levels are attributed to a translational layer (from Dutch/Latin into English) and at least one redaction layer (updating the language of the text to account for its contemporary modern language features at its publication in 1830. To make the comparison using a computational model we would first have to reverse this problem to rebuild the hypothetical urtext - first reversing the late editorial changes (which would have to be identified), and then reverse translate the text back into a Latin or Dutch original - and only then could we train the statistical models and do our comparison using a computational model. Our models and technology are simply not this good - the results would be so unreliable that no one would be able to use it for much of anything. All of this means that the only route we have to examine the relationship between the Book of Mormon and Grotius's writings is through this sort of narrative content and narrative style comparison - of the sort we see in pre-computational periods. The moment that we decide that the text is purely fictional - that it doesn't offer us anything that we can identify specifically as its author's voice - is the moment that we must concede that the authorship comparison cannot be made in any way that can provide us meaningful results. So, to allow for a meaningful discussion, I am accepting the premise that Grotius was the author of the text, and that the text is not strictly fictional - but that it shows its intention through rhetorical strategies on a macro-scale. I say that this is necessary on the larger scale because we run into the same problems if we assert that the text is mostly fiction with only the occasional rhetorical section - how do we differentiate between fiction and allegory? Finally, this is why I suggested that this sort of piecemeal effort is not really the best way to approach this - because it has this same problem. Does Nephi really reflect Grotius's thought? How do we annotate the text if we assume that Grotius is the author - what parts reflect his voice and what parts do not? Any effort to identify the voice of Grotius in the text should be established by making some effort to identify the illoctionary meaning of the text - and then using that to identify the rhetorical strategy, which will finally lead to us identifying which parts of the text are the voice of Grotius. On some level, finding the similarities to Grotius and using that as evidence for authorship is a circular argument. We are in effect saying we believe Grotius is the author. Everything in the text that sounds like Grotius must be in his voice - and everything that doesn't is not in his voice. There is no predictiveness to this argument. As long as Jarman is willing to suggest similarities though, I am willing to look at those similarities and compare them to Grotius - because this is the only way in which engagement happens. Edited February 5, 2025 by Benjamin McGuire 2
Robert F. Smith Posted February 5, 2025 Posted February 5, 2025 7 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: This part of the discussion isn't about the conclusions or the proposals but about what would constitute evidence in such an argument. How do we tell if an unattributed text belongs to a specific author? .............................. Even if all of what you say here is on point, I see no advantage to placing Grotius in a straitjacket in your analysis. We cannot say apriori that Grotius can only be allowed to stay in some lane based solely on his published and very serious writings. If he took his hand to fiction, we are not permitted to restrain him to only academic writing style or genre. We must not predetermine our conclusion. We must cast a much wider net.
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 5, 2025 Author Posted February 5, 2025 23 minutes ago, Robert F. Smith said: Even if all of what you say here is on point, I see no advantage to placing Grotius in a straitjacket in your analysis. We cannot say apriori that Grotius can only be allowed to stay in some lane based solely on his published and very serious writings. If he took his hand to fiction, we are not permitted to restrain him to only academic writing style or genre. We must not predetermine our conclusion. We must cast a much wider net. And you are wrong. To put it in a different way, what you are suggesting is that we could argue that Grotius could have written any work of fiction. And I agree that you could argue that - however, there is nothing that would rise to the level of evidence for such an argument. If we unmoor Grotius from his existing corpus, then what basis do we have for comparison? This isn't a predetermination of the conclusion - we are still putting together the rules for comparison. It isn't about restricting Grotius, or restraining him, it's about the falsifiability of the argument. Why not argue that Grotius wrote the Memoirs of a Russian Princess? 1
Robert F. Smith Posted February 6, 2025 Posted February 6, 2025 20 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: And you are wrong. To put it in a different way, what you are suggesting is that we could argue that Grotius could have written any work of fiction. And I agree that you could argue that - however, there is nothing that would rise to the level of evidence for such an argument. If we unmoor Grotius from his existing corpus, then what basis do we have for comparison? This isn't a predetermination of the conclusion - we are still putting together the rules for comparison. It isn't about restricting Grotius, or restraining him, it's about the falsifiability of the argument. Why not argue that Grotius wrote the Memoirs of a Russian Princess? My late friend Hugh Nibley wrote a great deal of very serious academic work, and we could analyze him solely on that basis. Especially if we knew nothing else about him. It turns out, however, that young Hugh had other talents. He was an extraordinary poet. His mother put together an entire book of his poetry. He was also a piano player like his brother Reed. He was also a warrior, being top man in his Jr ROTC class, in addition to being a great outdoorsman and swimmer. You undoubtedly know that he was a M/Sgt in the 101st Airborne in WW II, an expert in order of battle intel. The only reason he joined the faculty at BYU is because Elder Widtsoe asked him to. Hugh might just as well have been a professional novelist, poet, or musician. Even if it is only theoretical, real talent must not be hemmed in by our apriori assumptions. I don't believe that Grotius had anything to do with the BofM, but I am open to a demonstration of same. And this also applies to any other credible candidates.
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 6, 2025 Author Posted February 6, 2025 7 minutes ago, Robert F. Smith said: Even if it is only theoretical, real talent must not be hemmed in by our apriori assumptions. You are still missing the point. I am not making any assertions about Grotius. What I am asserting is that we cannot establish a text as belonging to an author without something to compare it with. Without the ability to make a meaningful comparison, we could assert that any text could have been written by anyone. If we find ourselves in that position, clearly we cannot draw any meaningful information out. You seem to think that we should allow Grotius to have written things that are nothing at all like what we have that he has written - I don't have any problems with this. But to make an argument about authorship involving comparison, you actually have to make the comparison. There has to be real data and not imaginary data. So the hypothetical, nonexistent text is completely meaningless to a discussion about author attribution made using comparisons. I am not sure why this is so difficult for you to wrap your head around ... You say that you are open to a demonstration of how Grotius might have had something to do with the Book of Mormon - but that demonstration has to be made with something other than a figment of the imagination. There has to be real texts to compare. This is my first point. My other points focus in on what that comparison should look like. If we are trying to compare a text of unknown authorship to a work by a known author, we make the comparison in different ways depending on the genre of the text. Fiction is the most difficult sort of text to compare because we are largely reduced to a comparison at the level of the language of the text. Texts that use the author's voice, and carry an intention on the part of the author in the text, can be compared in ways that fiction can not. So if we start from the position that the Book of Mormon is a work of fiction, then we are limited in the types of comparison that we can make to it in terms of identifying the unknown author. Those limitations (as I described earlier) limit the ways that we can compare the Book of Mormon to the work of Grotius. If the Book of Mormon was written as a text that is not pure fiction but which can contain the voice of an author - then we can compare that voice to the voice of Grotius in his work. This is an area where a reasonable amount of comparison can be made because both Grotius and the Book of Mormon engage in discussions about political philosophy and theology - areas where the voice of the author is quite important. It isn't about what may have really happened - it's about what we can demonstrate with any degree of certainty. At the same time, we do have to be concerned about likelihoods. After all, it is quite possible that a monkey, sitting at a typewriter, punching keys randomly could produce the complete works of Shakespeare. We could define this likelihood mathematically. And that likelihood effectively precludes it from happening. We can make the same sorts of conclusions about Grotius - if our evidence points to a really low likelihood, then there isn't any reason to accept the proposition that an anonymous text was authored by him. We don't have to include the uncertainty in our calculations about some theoretical work that Grotius might have authored that would create a stronger connection between the two. That sort of suggestion seems patently absurd. What you seem to be suggesting is that we can't rule Grotius out as the author of the Book of Mormon. And I am not sure how you come to this conclusion. What is the basis that you think exists for this notion that you offer of a "credible" candidate? What is the evidence that would indicate that one candidate is credible while another is not? What would exclude Grotius from consideration? 1
Robert F. Smith Posted February 9, 2025 Posted February 9, 2025 On 2/6/2025 at 1:59 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: You are still missing the point. I am not making any assertions about Grotius. What I am asserting is that we cannot establish a text as belonging to an author without something to compare it with. Without the ability to make a meaningful comparison, we could assert that any text could have been written by anyone. If we find ourselves in that position, clearly we cannot draw any meaningful information out. You seem to think that we should allow Grotius to have written things that are nothing at all like what we have that he has written - I don't have any problems with this. But to make an argument about authorship involving comparison, you actually have to make the comparison. There has to be real data and not imaginary data. So the hypothetical, nonexistent text is completely meaningless to a discussion about author attribution made using comparisons. I am not sure why this is so difficult for you to wrap your head around ... .................................. It isn't about what may have really happened - it's about what we can demonstrate with any degree of certainty. You are still placing the cart before the horse. A detective taking your approach to a case would be following conventional technique, but is far less likely to be able to solve a difficult case. Why? Because he has already foreclosed any possibility of an unconventional conclusion. Even if it is there, he will not see it. On 2/6/2025 at 1:59 PM, Benjamin McGuire said: At the same time, we do have to be concerned about likelihoods. ...................... What you seem to be suggesting is that we can't rule Grotius out as the author of the Book of Mormon. And I am not sure how you come to this conclusion. What is the basis that you think exists for this notion that you offer of a "credible" candidate? What is the evidence that would indicate that one candidate is credible while another is not? What would exclude Grotius from consideration? I do not currently believe that Grotius was the author or translator of the BofM, and have never thought so. Yet my mind is open, and yours is closed.
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 9, 2025 Author Posted February 9, 2025 (edited) 8 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: You are still placing the cart before the horse. A detective taking your approach to a case would be following conventional technique, but is far less likely to be able to solve a difficult case. Why? Because he has already foreclosed any possibility of an unconventional conclusion. Even if it is there, he will not see it. Except that I am not, Robert. I don't think that you have any idea what the conventional technique is in this instance. You are just making stuff up at this point. Perhaps you would like to provide an example of whatever it is that you are talking about playing out in a non-hypothetical academic discussion about authorship attribution. 8 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: I do not currently believe that Grotius was the author or translator of the BofM, and have never thought so. Yet my mind is open, and yours is closed. And I think that you have no idea what you are talking about - and I really mean this - not in some sort of flippant way, but in a very real sense. You aren't making any sense here. It isn't about being open to the question of whether or not Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon - its about being open to examining evidence that Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon. There is a lot of difference between the two points. There isn't any need to worry about whether or not Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon until we have some actual evidence to suggest that he did. That is the purpose of this discussion here - it is not to discuss whether or not Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon but to try to evaluate evidence that might suggest that Grotius wrote it. As a side note, until you made this comment, the number of people who have suggested that Grotius "translated" the Book of Mormon was zero. Why? Because the assertion makes no sense. I really have no idea what you are looking at in there - Grotius didn't write in English - he wrote in Latin and Dutch. So I'll recap what the discussion is about - 1: The idea that Grotius was the author of the Book of Mormon is a suggestion that he wrote a text that became the Book of Mormon some time in the early 17th century, and that he wrote it in either Dutch or Latin. Now, without an original text of the Book of Mormon in Latin or Dutch dating to Grotius's lifetime, our only recourse to evidence that Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon is to look at the text of the Book of Mormon and use that text for evidence. 2: Mechanical (algorithmic) comparisons between Grotius as author and the unknown author of the Book of Mormon are very difficult. The normal process for this sort of comparison would be to examine the Book of Mormon as a translation from a Dutch or Latin text and to produce an urtext that the translation was taken from. This is difficult but not unheard of. From the side of believers, efforts have been made regularly to discuss the potential urtext as a Hebrew or Egyptian text (or some combination of the two). Once a Dutch or Latin original language was determines, and an urtext produced, that urtext could be compared to the extent writings of Grotius to provide an authorship analysis using statistical modeling (stylometry). 3: However, there is a complicating factor in Jarman's arguments about the text. Jarman has closely identified with Skousen's conclusions about the EME language in the text (something that I have consistently contested for a long time now). Jarman, recognizing the problem that occurs within the text of its LME components, has made the argument that there was a first English translation made by someone who was a near contemporary of Grotius, and then a much later redaction made by a second unknown person that was near contemporary to the publication of the Book of Mormon in 1830. To address this issue in the mechanical comparison, you would first need to assign word choices to each layer of the text so that we could reverse the process and acquire as much of an urtext as possible. We would need to identify which parts of the text should be attributed partially or entirely to the late redactor, and which parts should be attributed to the early translator. This is especially important when we are working with text that can be identified with a specific source, like the lengthy quotes and paraphrases taken from the King James translation of the Bible. 4: The mechanical process can be replaced when (and only when) we can identify a non-fictional genre for the text. It cannot be skipped when the genre is fiction because there is nothing in the text which necessarily has to reflect the voice of the author. This statement is generally true no matter what text we are talking about, and no matter who the proposed authors are - it is a text-independent issue. So if the Book of Mormon is a work of fiction, then the proposal that it was written by Grotius is no different than claiming it was written by John Locke, or Thomas Aquinas, or by Thomas Hobbes. There are things that can be done to eliminate potential authors from the mix - and most of those are done at this mechanical level of language. Language changes - and so we can sometimes determine the earliest that language could appear in the way that it does. But in the case of the Book of Mormon in the context of this discussion, we have this problem (again) of both a translator and a redactor. It is easy to take all of the late language and assign it to the late redactor - but if we do this in a non-predictive way, it cannot qualify as evidence (it becomes a circular argument). To make it evidence (to make it predictive) we first have to come up with some way of distinguishing between early translator and late redactor that can be made into a predictive model and then used in such a way on the text. Because of all of this, if the Book of Mormon is being proposed as a work of fiction, without the mechanical/algorithmic process that I generally outline, there is nothing that can be determined - any claims are simply preferences and can neither be proven nor disproven. And from my perspective that doesn't mean that they are wrong - it means that they are no longer interesting. We cannot learn anything from them about the text. It's not about having an open mind or not - the claims aren't able to provide understanding to us, so we stop caring about them. 5: If, on the other hand, a text is not entirely fictional - that is, it has some other genre, then we can use that information and the rhetoric of the text to pull out the voice of the author - and we can compare what the author is trying to communicate with what the author communicates in the larger body of his work. If they are the same, we can move forward with an argument from evidence that the authorship is the same. If they are substantially different, there is very little evidence that the authorship is the same. This is the basis of the discussion I am having with Jarman over the question of Grotius and the Book of Mormon. The pathway to evidence (since we are not going to make a mechanical/algorithmic comparison) is through the potential voice of the author. Some of the same complexities exist. Because we have both a translation layer and a redaction layer, we have to identify where those two layers effectively hide or replace the voice of the original author. Also, since the text isn't biographical or potentially historical (assuming for the argument that Grotius is the author of the text), we have to identify which voices in the text represent the voice of alleged author (Grotius). This is certainly easier in some places than others. We don't expect to see Grotius putting Laman or Lemuel as his voice. Is it Mormon or Pahoran? Well you get the idea. From where I usually work, this would be determined predictively by first identifying the genre and then looking at the message of the text as a whole - which would create a framework through which to differentiate the parts. However, since Jarman hasn't (and I suspect won't), I am perfectly willing in the context of this discussion to allow Jarman to do this backwards - to identify those voices he believes most closely match what he thinks is Grotius's voice - this will at least give us something to compare. I am willing to do this because, after having read quite a bit of Grotius over the past several years (that this conversation has been going on) and having a broad understanding in which to place Grotius (having read Hobbes, and Locke, and Taylor, and Butler, and Hooker, and so on), I have some sense not only of what Grotius is discussing, but how it fits into the larger body of contemporary thought with which he is interacting. I have also spent decades working with the text of the Book of Mormon. This experience gives me some confidence in my arguments that the Book of Mormon doesn't share a voice with Grotius - and I am willing to contest that through the evidence provided by the texts. So, no open mind? I am open to whatever evidence Jarman is willing to bring to the table - and I am more than willing to go through the texts and anlyze them, and present my close readings to compare with Jarman's. Am I closed to the idea that the Book of Mormon is a work of fiction by Grotius? Not at all. I am just completely disinterested in it in the argument - because such a claim cannot be proven or disproven except possibly through a mechanical process that no one will ever go through. The claim that the Book of Mormon could have been a fiction written by Grotius would place it on the same level (value-wise) as a harlequin romance (which is not to dish on those romances - my mother helped support the family for a few rough years in my childhood by writing them). So perhaps, since your mind is so open, what would evidence that Grotius wrote or translated the Book of Mormon actually look like in your opinion? Edited February 9, 2025 by Benjamin McGuire 3
Robert F. Smith Posted February 10, 2025 Posted February 10, 2025 10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: Except that I am not, Robert. I don't think that you have any idea what the conventional technique is in this instance. You are just making stuff up at this point. Perhaps you would like to provide an example of whatever it is that you are talking about playing out in a non-hypothetical academic discussion about authorship attribution. And I think that you have no idea what you are talking about - and I really mean this - not in some sort of flippant way, but in a very real sense. You aren't making any sense here. It isn't about being open to the question of whether or not Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon - its about being open to examining evidence that Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon. There is a lot of difference between the two points. There isn't any need to worry about whether or not Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon until we have some actual evidence to suggest that he did. That is the purpose of this discussion here - it is not to discuss whether or not Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon but to try to evaluate evidence that might suggest that Grotius wrote it. As a side note, until you made this comment, the number of people who have suggested that Grotius "translated" the Book of Mormon was zero. Why? Because the assertion makes no sense. I really have no idea what you are looking at in there - Grotius didn't write in English - he wrote in Latin and Dutch. Zero? Excluding even the possibility of an early translation seems odd, and I appreciate the fact that you do mention this possibility immediately below. Grotius would not have to do such a translation into English. A Latin or Dutch translation could be translated into English at any time which fits what we know about EME or LME, etc. Foreclosing such possibilities is the problem. 10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: ............... Jarman has closely identified with Skousen's conclusions about the EME language in the text (something that I have consistently contested for a long time now). Jarman, recognizing the problem that occurs within the text of its LME components, has made the argument that there was a first English translation made by someone who was a near contemporary of Grotius, and then a much later redaction made by a second unknown person that was near contemporary to the publication of the Book of Mormon in 1830. To address this issue in the mechanical comparison, you would first need to assign word choices to each layer of the text so that we could reverse the process and acquire as much of an urtext as possible. We would need to identify which parts of the text should be attributed partially or entirely to the late redactor, and which parts should be attributed to the early translator. This is especially important when we are working with text that can be identified with a specific source, like the lengthy quotes and paraphrases taken from the King James translation of the Bible. I am with Skousen and Carmack on the notion of EME and LME elements dominating the BofM text, and I don't mind a claim of layering, which is dealt with by biblical scholars on a regular basis. As for the KJV, it is not a translation so much as a revision of earlier versions -- while retaining most of what those versions contained. What is remarkable is the degree to which the KJV sports EME grammatical usage statistics not shared by the BofM. Something important took place, and we need to get to the bottom of it, leaving no stone unturned. 10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: .................... It's not about having an open mind or not - the claims aren't able to provide understanding to us, so we stop caring about them. .............. I am willing to contest that through the evidence provided by the texts. .........I am open to whatever evidence Jarman is willing to bring to the table - and I am more than willing to go through the texts and anlyze them, and present my close readings to compare with Jarman's. Am I closed to the idea that the Book of Mormon is a work of fiction by Grotius? Not at all. I am just completely disinterested in it in the argument - because such a claim cannot be proven or disproven except possibly through a mechanical process that no one will ever go through............... So perhaps, since your mind is so open, what would evidence that Grotius wrote or translated the Book of Mormon actually look like in your opinion? I don't know, and we should be very cautious in our apriori determinations, even when we don't currently see how to solve a dilemma. Perhaps a fully developed AI system could help in a couple of years. We must be open. I tend to go my own way, while others tend to prefer something staid. That sometimes means that I disagree with Royal Skousen: For example, the Original MS of the BofM sometimes uses specious and spesious (I Ne 8:26, 11:35-36) to refer to that great building, representing variously the pride of the world, the vain imaginations and pride of men, and the world and wisdom thereof. The meaning of specious in EME is “visually pleasing” (1513 “showy,” now obsolete, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/specious#word-history ). Royal thinks specious a mistake for spacious. I disagree, and cite Lord Coke (1552-1634), who used the following phrase to refer to the magnificent London Charterhouse as "the spacious and specious House." The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). Vol. 1, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/shepherd-selected-writings-of-sir-edward-coke-vol-i?html=true#Coke_0462-01_845 . Lord Coke even refers to the Charterhouse as “tanquam Orbis in Urbe [‘as a world within a world’],” reminiscent of Lehi's words "as if it had been a world" (I Ne 8:20), in the case of the "large and specious field." Being open requires some familiarity with the material. For example, in the Autumn of 1969, when I was a student at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, on a Saturday (the LDS Sabbath), i was alone in the living room of the LDS Branch President's home in east Jerusalem. I saw a copy of Rene Labat's cuneiform sign list on the dining table (the Branch President's wife was taking a course in Akkadian at the Hebrew Univ), and I casually leafed through it. I was surprised to find an Akkadian word šeum meaning "grain," and immediately recognized it as the same as a Zeniffite food plant in Mosiah 9:9, sheum. The late John Tvedtnes and I had been working on the BofM onomasticon, so I was familiar with the material, even though I had not considered any Sumero-Akkadian background for BofM names. Some of my colleagues are still lukewarm to that approach. “In the 19th century, a vision of Ouroboros gave the German chemist Friedrich August Kekule von Stradonitz the idea of linked carbon atoms forming the benzene ring.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., 9:13. We must be open.
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 10, 2025 Author Posted February 10, 2025 6 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: Zero? Excluding even the possibility of an early translation seems odd, and I appreciate the fact that you do mention this possibility immediately below. Grotius would not have to do such a translation into English. A Latin or Dutch translation could be translated into English at any time which fits what we know about EME or LME, etc. Foreclosing such possibilities is the problem. This is too rich ... so let me see if I understand you here. What you are really saying is that my dismissal of Grotius is a problem for you because of my previous problems with EME. That is, you seem to be wanting to introduce the argument that 1: we have the gold plates. 2: They are translated into Dutch or Latin by someone who might have been a contemporary of Grotius. 3: And after that ... well it doesn't matter. This is not that discussion. If you want to have that discussion, start a new thread. I am not particularly interested in litigating the EME theory in this thread with you. The arguments against this idea are generally purely linguistic (mechanical) and while perhaps interesting, are not going to happen here. 6 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: I am with Skousen and Carmack on the notion of EME and LME elements dominating the BofM text, and I don't mind a claim of layering, which is dealt with by biblical scholars on a regular basis. As for the KJV, it is not a translation so much as a revision of earlier versions -- while retaining most of what those versions contained. What is remarkable is the degree to which the KJV sports EME grammatical usage statistics not shared by the BofM. Something important took place, and we need to get to the bottom of it, leaving no stone unturned. This statement shows a real disconnect. LME is Late Modern English - which is the English we use today, and which was in use in 1830. And, as I said, you are more than welcome to start a thread in which you put your theory forward of how the text should be understood as layered - what the authorship model is, and so on. But, I have no interest here in the question of Grotius as an author. Nor am I particularly interested in engaging with the overwhelming problem of a Grotius, who having discovered an ancient text, translated it, and made no mention of it in any of his other writings ... I am interested in this thread with the question of whether or not Grotius is the author of an original text that became the Book of Mormon. 6 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: I don't know, and we should be very cautious in our apriori determinations, even when we don't currently see how to solve a dilemma. Perhaps a fully developed AI system could help in a couple of years. We must be open. When that happens, we can reassess. But, I am not particularly interested in trying to save a flawed theory by arguing that we cannot move forward without certainty. As I said, when these arguments are forwarded in the discussion about Grotius, they are not interesting at all - and they are neither provable or falsifiable. So why worry about it now. For the record, I am convinced that the EME theory is untenable. I have spoken to this issue in the past. Trying to make this a question of being open or closed doesn't work here with me because I am not making decisions based on a general inclination but on my understanding of language and the way that language works. 7 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: For example, the Original MS of the BofM sometimes uses specious and spesious (I Ne 8:26, 11:35-36) to refer to that great building, representing variously the pride of the world, the vain imaginations and pride of men, and the world and wisdom thereof. The meaning of specious in EME is “visually pleasing” (1513 “showy,” now obsolete, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/specious#word-history ). Royal thinks specious a mistake for spacious. I disagree, and cite Lord Coke (1552-1634), who used the following phrase to refer to the magnificent London Charterhouse as "the spacious and specious House." The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). Vol. 1, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/shepherd-selected-writings-of-sir-edward-coke-vol-i?html=true#Coke_0462-01_845 . Lord Coke even refers to the Charterhouse as “tanquam Orbis in Urbe [‘as a world within a world’],” reminiscent of Lehi's words "as if it had been a world" (I Ne 8:20), in the case of the "large and specious field." This is, of course, the problem with digital search engines. We can all use them. Here, for example, is a short passage from George Ellingon's The Women of New York, discussing the concert saloons in New York City: Quote Take a map of the city and draw an oval, including Fourteenth and Leonard streets by its ends, with the eastern bulge taking in the farther side of the Bowery, and the western clutching at the foul skirts of Thompson street, and narrowing in Church street of infamous fame as it curves south-eastward, to connect the line. With probably one exception, the enclosure will (with many of the viler kinds, however) comprise the least unsightly concert-saloons; the single exception being the most specious and brilliant of all - the "Louvre," as it is called, at the Fifth avenue and Broadway corners of Twenty-third street. The grosser and more loathsome varieties incubate and edge within the egg-shaped line, and include the foul dens of Canal street, West Broadway, William, Cherry, Water and Roosevelt streets, and the "sailors' dance-houses," skirting the two rivers and the Battery verge. Who is right? We could argue that point - but the issue is that "specious" isn't, in any sort of strict sense, an EME word. If it is a specious building, it fits right into the common language in the mid to late 19th century, well into the Late Modern English period, and comfortably beyond the publication of the Book of Mormon. It is a mistake to think that this as evidence for an EME text. By the way, for those who are wondering which building is referred to here as the specious building, it would be easy to think of it as the Flatiron building that sits at that address. But, that wasn't build until the first decade of the 20th century. Ellington gives a detailed description of this saloon: Quote Under the nose of Madison Square, in the locality of the big marble hotels, flourishes the gigantic "Louvre." Undermining the better part of the block, its spacious saloons stretch away to the right and left, saloon beyond saloon. Substantial columns, massive as the Park gates, divide hall from hall. That room to the left is the billiard-room; this middle apartment the grand drinking-hall with its great bar; and under the alcoves, there at the end, on the right, are more retired tippling-places. The walls are frescoed and painted with the rarest of artistic skill. Broad bands of gold, great panels of deep emerald, baskets of luscious fruit, purple grapes in heavy clusters, golden apples and sunny flowers all but fragrant. In the centre of the middle hall a statue-fountain shoots its cooling spray, and the myriads of lights gleaming on it turn its showers into a cascade of sparkles. Gold and silver fish sport at its base, and green mosses encircle its big white basin. The great bar is very rich with varied colored cut-glass and silverware, and numerous mirrors reflecting the bright lights, the gay walks and the motley crowd, hanging in every conspicuous corner. ... (464-465). And while the OED does mention that the word is obsolete for the definition you point to, it also list examples through the end of the 19th century. By the way, the 1828 Webster's dictionary entry for specious is: "1. Showy; pleasing to the view. The rest, far greater part will deem in outward rites and specious form religion satisfied." So perhaps it is obsolete today - but it was in regular use at the time of the Book of Mormon's publication. Was it a mistake? Perhaps, but if, as you suggest, it should have been kept as specious, the meaning of the text would not have been particularly linked to EME. And this is the problem - your example here isn't evidence that the Book of Mormon was written/translated earlier than 1829. It doesn't help with the idea that the text was written in EME. And, to come back to the beginning, the question of EME is completely irrelevant to the discussion here about whether or not the narrative of the Book of Mormon reflects the voice of Grotius (which is what this thread is really about). We can debate the EME issue if you want - but not in this thread. 2
Robert F. Smith Posted February 10, 2025 Posted February 10, 2025 3 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: ............................ And, to come back to the beginning, the question of EME is completely irrelevant to the discussion here about whether or not the narrative of the Book of Mormon reflects the voice of Grotius (which is what this thread is really about). We can debate the EME issue if you want - but not in this thread. Your points are well taken, Ben, and I'm glad I raised those issues -- helps me clarify my own position, but only because I am open to it. So, thank you.
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 10, 2025 Author Posted February 10, 2025 2 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said: but only because I am open to it. I have a reading recommendation for you. You keep going on about having an open mind - I am not sure that you really understand what that means. There is a good explanation of the challenge that come with this claim here: Quote Misuse of the term "open-minded" Exchanges that include constant references to how open people's minds are can be quite common in debates and can be very frustrating to those on the receiving end. This is because we generally regard open-mindedness to be a virtue, so any suggestion we're not open-minded is taken as a personal slur or attack – which it is. An attempt to win a debate by attacking the person rather than their argument is, of course, simply a fallacious ad Hominem. A deeper problem with this issue, however, is that the term “open minded” is wrongly characterised as simply meaning “accepting claims”, or worse, “accepting claims without good reason or evidence”. This is not open-mindedness. The actual word for a person who is too willing to believe things is: credulous. The appeal to open-mindedness, when used in this context, is really an appeal to relinquish one's rational integrity. It's an appeal to accept something without good reason under the guise that it is virtuous to do so. Of course, once it's realised that the virtue of being open-minded has been substituted with the folly of being credulous, the absurdity of doing so is clear. For what its worth ... Don't get me wrong - I am open to rational arguments. I am willing to have my own arguments overturned with good counter-arguments and supporting evidence. I am certainly open to adopting good arguments supported by good evidence. However, I am not particularly interested in being constantly told that I am simply not being open minded when I am asked to look at things that come completely without evidence or that run contrary to what I know and have experienced. If you want to convince me of something, use an evidence based argument. Without that, my rejection, especially in areas where I have some knowledge and experience, isn't evidence of having a closed mind. That term used in such a way is no more than a weapon in the discussion meant to avoid having to make such arguments. 2
Robert F. Smith Posted February 11, 2025 Posted February 11, 2025 23 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: I have a reading recommendation for you. You keep going on about having an open mind - I am not sure that you really understand what that means. There is a good explanation of the challenge that come with this claim here: ..................................... .........- I am open to rational arguments. I am willing to have my own arguments overturned with good counter-arguments and supporting evidence. I am certainly open to adopting good arguments supported by good evidence. However, I am not particularly interested in being constantly told that I am simply not being open minded when I am asked to look at things that come completely without evidence or that run contrary to what I know and have experienced. If you want to convince me of something, use an evidence based argument. Without that, my rejection, especially in areas where I have some knowledge and experience, isn't evidence of having a closed mind. That term used in such a way is no more than a weapon in the discussion meant to avoid having to make such arguments. Always good counsel.
Robert F. Smith Posted February 11, 2025 Posted February 11, 2025 @Benjamin McGuire Ben, do you have a brief bibliography of your views or response to the Skousen-Carmack claims about EME in the BofM? I am attempting to write a summary on that issue, and am very interested in opposing views. I tried to message you, but was not allowed. Thanks, Bob
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 12, 2025 Author Posted February 12, 2025 I have no idea why you couldn't message me. If you want, I can try to message you and send you one of my e-mails. 1 hour ago, Robert F. Smith said: Ben, do you have a brief bibliography of your views or response to the Skousen-Carmack claims about EME in the BofM? I am attempting to write a summary on that issue, and am very interested in opposing views. I tried to message you, but was not allowed. The only formal contribution was this presentation here (in this presentation I discuss Skousen and Carmack directly): https://www.fairlatterdaysaints.org/conference/august-2016/book-mormon-communicative-act I touch on several issues in that presentation, which gets more to the broader problems and not the specifics of individual examples in the text. The three major issues for me with Skousen-Carmack from a macro-perspective are as follows (and these are covered in that presentation): 1: There difference between loose and tight translation models is actually very large - but not in a way that helps with the understanding of the text. I don't actually have a significant preference one way or the other here - I think (and this was part of the main focus of this presentation) that to describe the text in terms of tight and loose translation is something of a limiter in terms of understanding the text. The dichotomy isn't particularly helpful because it forces us to view the question in terms of two very different paradigms instead of trying to find a place in between that might be more accurate. Most of the features in the text can, I believe, be described equally well in either paradigm, which means that the paradigms themselves are not terribly useful in understanding the text. Because of this, arguments tend to rely on various testimony describing the translation - and this isn't helpful for textual interpretation. We have to move beyond this dichotomy to discuss the Book of Mormon as a communication rather than as mere translation (whatever we mean by that) - and in that way engage the text on its own terms instead of through these external lenses. 2: By connecting the archaic language as Skousen-Carmack do, to a specific model of translation, it also provides limits on how that archaic language can function in the text. I believe that the archaic language in the text can be understood in a loose translation model if we recognize that the archaic language itself may be a rhetorical strategy in the text. If the archaic text is a rhetorical device - even if it is merely an aesthetic of the text - then it is no longer terribly helpful to see in the text some earlier language model like EME (it levels the playing field so to speak for these features in the text). 3: Another part of the Skousen-Carmack approach is also driven by the assumption of the Book of Mormon as a tight translation. When the text-as-it-is is a revealed text, in theory it replaces the source as the most important text (or at least is equal to the original text). We no longer really need to concern ourselves with the urtext of the gold plates or the language that might have been on it. When this occurs, there is a shift in the significance of using text critical tools applied to the Book of Mormon - that is, the most important text becomes the original text that was transcribed by the scribes, and understanding the English of that original manuscript becomes far more important than trying to argue (as I did with Nephi and Goliath) about whether Nephi uses the Hebrew innah from Exodus instead of the more common cagar. Every text after that original manuscript is secondary - and so we use text critical tools to produce a manuscript history - much like a New Testament scholar would attempt to produce that original New Testament manuscript by working backwards through all of the extant manuscripts - evaluating and grading all known differences in the manuscript. This is precisely what we have seen Skousen do in his critical edition. Don't get me wrong, I am deeply grateful for that work - I wouldn't want to do it - and I use it regularly. But it tends to be based on the idea that the Book of Mormon isn't so much a translation (no matter how we want to define it) as it is a revelation. Efforts to harmonize the text with the parallel passages of the Old and New Testament are of interest only when they can be reasonably accomplished without altering significantly the original manuscript of the Book of Mormon. I also argue that at least in the context of 1830, the Book of Mormon is a poor translation (unless we assume that some of the feature that make it so are deliberate and serve a rhetorical function). Also, if I were to update this presentation today, I would have a fair amount to say about ChatGPT and other predictive LMMs in it. They are the ultimate examples of authorless (or non-principaled) texts that can seem quite meaningful - but ultimately are nothing more than aesthetic arrangements of words. My essay on the postmodern Nephi was a prelude in some ways to this piece. It applies narrative theory to the Book of Mormon. The Book of Mormon contains a philosophy of language and the creation of meaning from language that suggests that the search for the original text should always take a back seat to the interpretive recontextualization of the text into our own experience. In that sense, our search for original meaning is already recognized as problematic - especially for a text for which we not only have no original language version, but also for a text whose real world context is generally lost. We have no idea to what extent the text has already been recontextualized through its 'translation'. We get far more mileage, in my opinion, when we examine the text dialogically than we ever will in trying to recover the original text written by the scribes. My thoughts have moved beyond this, but not in anything I have published. One additional reflection is the fact that within Biblical Studies, when the focus was entirely on the original text, David Clines noted that there was and is a consistent and sustained push to support attested readings above conjectural emendations. This is strongly reflected in both the critical text work and the EME work of Skousen-Carmack who, when confronted with difficult orthographic readings prefer to look for viable examples of the text-as-it-is in other contexts rather than trying to construct reasonable emendations of the text. These are philosophical decisions that are made - and are problematic for those of us who find the philosophical basis problematic. While Skousen-Carmack can find examples of difficult readings in EME, there isn't a pattern to this, and the discovery does not create something that is particularly predictive, which mimics some of the problems explained by Clines with reading the biblical texts. I also have an unpublished manuscript of an article on the use of Psalm 95 as a framing device in the Book of Jacob. This essay has a section on the way that the text of Jacob in the Book of Mormon unexpectedly both uses the language of the King James in several places and also updates it in other places (the text both quotes the King James and has citations that much more closely resemble much more recent translations). This has implications for these questions.
JarMan Posted February 15, 2025 Posted February 15, 2025 On 2/5/2025 at 5:19 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: I agree that I am using the term more narrowly - but - when we are discussing a theory of literature, then there is a need to have technical definitions. Perhaps we have to move back a step and have you explain what, in the Book of Mormon, you believe reflects Grotius's beliefs and intentions, and what we can simply ignore because it is nothing more than fiction. I agree with you that term allegory is being used very loosely here - but I think it's just as effective as suggesting that there are places in the narrative where we can discern a rhetorical strategy on the part of the author that engages the text in both a literal and non-literal way. Anyways, if you think that we have areas of the text that are within Grotius's wheelhouse, and where you believe you can see the intentionality of Grotius, then why aren't we starting in those places instead of trying to engage the warfare narratives? I think that this might be a particularly important shift because on some level, you also believe that Grotius lifted parts of the text from sources he was using (and this complicates the landscape created when we ask what in the text reflects Grotius's point of view and what does not). Sorry for the delayed response...been dealing with some serious medical issues. In general, I think our protagonists represent the beliefs of the author of the Book of Mormon. The antagonists, on the other hand, are foils representing the perspectives the author wants to dispute. But even the antagonist views are important since their analogs can potentially be identified in the author's world. These becomes weightier when we find them in clear juxtaposition to the author in his lifetime. On 2/5/2025 at 6:30 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: I agree. And this is what creates the problem. If we cannot find in Grotius an apples to apples comparison, the suggestion ought to be that Grotius is not the author of the narrative - this was my point about it being a novel discussion by Grotius - it creates a circular argument, and this cannot be used as evidence. Without an apples to apples comparison I agree there isn't supporting evidence. But this isn't really a problem. It simply indicates that there is no evidence moving the scale in either direction. We should should expect plenty of those types of thing in this type of comparison. On 2/5/2025 at 6:30 AM, Benjamin McGuire said: I think you misunderstand me (and that may be my fault - I don't always explain things well). Grotius believed that while God created the natural order, that this order could be rationally observed. And so this natural order (and the morality that it creates) exists through that rational observation whether or not we believe that God exists. This is the basis for the idea that Grotius believes that the morality that can be found in natural law transcends [the belief in] God. On the second point however, natural law is something that Grotius believed that God had to be consistent with. And it is tied to this rational conception of both Natural Law and the understanding of God. If we go back to the text, here is an excerpt from Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 10: What is Grotius saying here? That Natural Law (created by God) creates a base-line of good and evil (morality). God cannot change that base-line. And the way that Grotius seems to understand this is that God cannot do something which is morally against Natural Law because then God would be doing something evil. Grotius fits a certain line of thought about the nature of God and Natural Law and denies another line of thinking in which whatever God dictates must be considered Good simply because God demanded it. And this is relevant to the discussion about Nephi and the potential demand from God because of the way that the narrative makes that demand interact with Grotius's view of natural law. It seems to me absurd that we would have a narrative written by Grotius (that reflects Grotius's point of view) in which God is commanding someone to do something that violates the morality of Natural Law. And this is why the individual points showing how Nephi's actions violate Grotius's understanding of Natural Law are significant. You are cherry-picking from Grotius without considering other things that add further light and knowledge regarding his views. I agree that he believes God must be consistent with the laws of nature and that he believes there is an objective definition of evil. It's tempting to think think that these necessarily lead to the conclusion that God cannot or will not act in a way which would be considered evil if done by man. I see how you could get there. Apparently that's where Plato's reasoning took him as well. But Grotius specifically tells us this reasoning is wrong. (Whether we agree with him or not is irrelevant.) We need to look at Grotius' theory of punishment to hopefully unravel what's going on here. He has a lot to say about what punishments are appropriate for humans to inflict. In the end he presents quite a modern view on this. It's definitely not an-eye-for-an-eye. And the severity of punishments should consider lots of factors such as social background, general character, motive, mental capacity, and extenuating circumstances. However, if God is doing the punishment, Grotius allows him almost infinite reign to do whatever he pleases, as we see from Book 2, Chapter 20, Paragraph 4, Section 2. 2. These Things indeed are true of Punishments amongst Men: Because one Man is so linked in Bonds of Consanguinity to another,4 that he ought never to do him harm, but for the Sake of some Good; but it is otherwise with GOD, to whom Plato falsely extends the aforesaid Maxims.5 For his Actions may be grounded on the sole Right of his sovereign Dominion and Jurisdiction over us,6 especially when there is any Demerit in us, tho’ they propose no End to themselves beyond themselves. And thus do some Hebrews explain that of Solomon, which is pertinent enough to the present Purpose,a The LORD hath made all Things for himself, even the Wicked for the Day of Wrath: That is, even then when he punisheth the Wicked, he does it for no other End but only to punish them. And altho’ we do admit of the more common Acceptation,7 yet it will return to the same Thing, viz. that GOD may be said to have made all Things for himself, that is, by the Right of that transcendent Liberty and Perfection, which is inherent in him, without seeking or regarding any Thing without him; as GOD is called Ἀυτοϕυὴς, A Being of himself, because not born or created of any. The holy Scriptures, at least, do testify that GOD inflicts Punishment sometimes upon profligate abandoned Sinners, for no other Reason but to punish them. As when he is saidb To rejoice at their Calamity, and to mock when their Fear cometh. Besides too, the last Judgment, after which there is no Place or Hopes of Amendment; nay, and some Punishments which in this Life are imperceptible, that is, do not appear to the Eyes of Men, but are only felt by the Mind of the Sufferer, such as Obduration, do clearly evince the Truth of what we assert against Plato. One more relevant note here, this regarding Grotius' discussion about revenge. Grotius does not believe punishment can rightly be inflicted for the sake of revenge (Book 2, Chapter 20, Paragraph 5). This is consistent with the view of Nephi who didn't want to kill Laban even while acknowledging he had stolen their stuff and tried to kill them. So we have Nephi acting as Grotius would have wanted him to.
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 15, 2025 Author Posted February 15, 2025 10 hours ago, JarMan said: Sorry for the delayed response...been dealing with some serious medical issues. In general, I think our protagonists represent the beliefs of the author of the Book of Mormon. The antagonists, on the other hand, are foils representing the perspectives the author wants to dispute. But even the antagonist views are important since their analogs can potentially be identified in the author's world. These becomes weightier when we find them in clear juxtaposition to the author in his lifetime. This was what I was thought you believed. I think its as good an approach as any from your position. 10 hours ago, JarMan said: You are cherry-picking from Grotius without considering other things that add further light and knowledge regarding his views. No, I'm not. I'll tell you what - rather than a simple back and forth, what would you accept as a reasonable academic buttress to my interpretation? 10 hours ago, JarMan said: We need to look at Grotius' theory of punishment to hopefully unravel what's going on here. He has a lot to say about what punishments are appropriate for humans to inflict. In the end he presents quite a modern view on this. It's definitely not an-eye-for-an-eye. And the severity of punishments should consider lots of factors such as social background, general character, motive, mental capacity, and extenuating circumstances. However, if God is doing the punishment, Grotius allows him almost infinite reign to do whatever he pleases, as we see from Book 2, Chapter 20, Paragraph 4, Section 2. Everyone at that point in time has a lot to say about punishment. It is at the core of John Locke's views of natural rights. This is from his Second Treatise of Government: Quote And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature. Locke was one of the two most influential thinkers on the American constitution. And it is this tradition that makes it all seem relevant to certain modern views. 10 hours ago, JarMan said: 2. These Things indeed are true of Punishments amongst Men: Because one Man is so linked in Bonds of Consanguinity to another,4 that he ought never to do him harm, but for the Sake of some Good; but it is otherwise with GOD, to whom Plato falsely extends the aforesaid Maxims.5 For his Actions may be grounded on the sole Right of his sovereign Dominion and Jurisdiction over us,6 especially when there is any Demerit in us, tho’ they propose no End to themselves beyond themselves. And thus do some Hebrews explain that of Solomon, which is pertinent enough to the present Purpose,a The LORD hath made all Things for himself, even the Wicked for the Day of Wrath: That is, even then when he punisheth the Wicked, he does it for no other End but only to punish them. And altho’ we do admit of the more common Acceptation,7 yet it will return to the same Thing, viz. that GOD may be said to have made all Things for himself, that is, by the Right of that transcendent Liberty and Perfection, which is inherent in him, without seeking or regarding any Thing without him; as GOD is called Ἀυτοϕυὴς, A Being of himself, because not born or created of any. The holy Scriptures, at least, do testify that GOD inflicts Punishment sometimes upon profligate abandoned Sinners, for no other Reason but to punish them. As when he is saidb To rejoice at their Calamity, and to mock when their Fear cometh. Besides too, the last Judgment, after which there is no Place or Hopes of Amendment; nay, and some Punishments which in this Life are imperceptible, that is, do not appear to the Eyes of Men, but are only felt by the Mind of the Sufferer, such as Obduration, do clearly evince the Truth of what we assert against Plato. You aren't responding to what I wrote about this section. And I certainly don't think that you read footnote 6 in the text that you quote. God can certainly do whatever God wants. And Grotius believes that if God wants it, it becomes justified. But this is Nephi here. And the problems all still exist - why would Grotius want to push the boundaries by suggesting that even though Laban should not be killed for all of these different reasons (he is helpless, there is no immediate threat to Nephi's life, the proper channels for the theft have yet to be explored, and so on), only to say that God needs no reason at all to kill Laban and so kill him. This would make more sense if the text didn't lay out specific reasons - unrelated to any of Laban's past actions - that demanded his death. It would make more sense if we didn't turn Nephi into a thief (and he certainly is a thief). It would make more sense if Nephi himself didn't, in his actions, commit crimes worthy of capital punishment under the law. This is where the problem lies. How do Nephi's actions align with Grotius's views on both civil and natural law? You are in a sense saying - here in this one spot in Grotius's text, Grotius allows God to transcend the law - and so we can throw out every other thing that Grotius has written - because this is the only thing that matters. But the problem is that the Book of Mormon text doesn't do that. The text doesn't say that God is punishing Laban through Nephi's action. If this had been Grotius writing, wouldn't we much more likely see a scene in which Laban isn't just passed out, but has died to falling unconscious and hitting his head on a rock? That would be God's actions, and Nephi wouldn't have to experience the guilt of killing an innocent man. 11 hours ago, JarMan said: One more relevant note here, this regarding Grotius' discussion about revenge. Grotius does not believe punishment can rightly be inflicted for the sake of revenge (Book 2, Chapter 20, Paragraph 5). This is consistent with the view of Nephi who didn't want to kill Laban even while acknowledging he had stolen their stuff and tried to kill them. So we have Nephi acting as Grotius would have wanted him to. No. You have misread Grotius. Grotius denies that revenge is, of itself, justification for killing someone - this is from the section you reference: Quote [A] desire [simply to see a wrongdoer suffer], taken by itself, is incompatible with the faculty of reason, whose function is to govern the desires. It is, furthermore, incompatible with the law of nature, because that is the dictate of nature in so far as it is governed by reason and takes account of society; and reason forbids a man to do anything whereby another may be harmed, unless this action has some good end in view. ... And so the less each man employs his reason, the more apt he is to seek vengeance. . . . From this, it is clear that man cannot rightly be punished by man merely for the sake of punishing. Let us, therefore, try to see what useful ends render punishment just. So revenge is not spoken of favorably - Grotius calls it an abandonment of reason. But, he does go through, as he suggests, the next several paragraphs in an attempt to show when punishment (and of what sort) might be just. And again, when we get down into it, we don't find anything resembling Nephi's situation. Rather we find the opposite of it. So, for example, in section 7, Grotius tells us: Quote The punishment which serves this end is by nature permitted to any one of sound judgement who is not subject to vices of the same kind or of equal seriousness So Nephi has a right to punish Laban for the theft of his property, you argue, but then what does Nephi do? He steals Laban's property. That's not what Grotius thinks is just. Even if we could work Nephi into the position of being able to apply justice here - because, Grotius suggests, perhaps Laban is a serial offender and so it isn't simple a revenge for Nephi himself, Grotius argues that such a situation places limits on the punishment: Quote This form of punishment, nevertheless, cannot be made to include the death penalty. But Nephi was harmed, and so Grotius in Section 8 outlines how Nephi might go about getting Laban punished (so that it doesn't happen again): Quote The advantage of him to whose disadvantage the wrong was committed consists in this, that subsequently he may not suffer any such thing from the same man or from others. To secure a man who has been wronged from suffering harm at the hands of the same person is possible in three ways: first, by the removal of the wrong-doer; second, by depriving him of the power to do harm; finally, by teaching him to cease from his evil ways, which is closely allied with the reformation that we have already discussed. He who has been wronged may be secured from harm by others, not by an ordinary punishment, but by one that is public and conspicuous in the nature of an example. And we can see right away how this would have to be completely taken out of context with Nephi. What else is Laban going to steal from him? And what of the public and conspicuous punishment as an example? Yes, this is why Nephi kills him, while he is passed out drunk, in an alley, at night, with no witnesses. What Grotius is speaking of is the justification used in earlier times for public beatings, or putting someone into stocks. But, Grotius goes on, this cannot be done by the victim - because there is too often the inclination to punish more than necessary: Quote But since, in our private affairs and those of our kinsmen, we are liable to partiality, as soon as numerous families were united at a common point, judges were appointed, and to them alone was given the power to avenge the injured, while others are deprived of the freedom of action wherewith nature endowed them. So, Nephi doesn't do this either. And Grotius does identify conditions in which this wouldn't apply - but they are when the individuals are both outside of societal setting with laws and judges: Quote Nevertheless, the old natural liberty remains, especially in places where there are no courts, as, for example, on the sea. ... The same right will exist in desert places, or where men lead a nomadic life. And again, this is where the Nephi narrative is complicated. Because Grotius could have had this happen in the wilderness. He could have had the fears that Nephi expresses when his brothers flee into the wilderness of Laban chasing after them - and then it all would have been just fine - whatever they did. But, no. Nephi comes back into the city, and kills the helpless, passed out, Laban, steals his belongings, takes his servant, leaves behind his own property, and then heads back into the wilderness to avoid his own culpability in the matter. And so, finally, in section 14, Grotius concludes with this: Quote From what we have said up to this point, one may gather how unsafe it is for a Christian in a private capacity to exact punishment, especially capital punishment, from any wicked person whatsoever, either for his own or for the public good, So while there are conditions where Grotius might find actions appropriate, the problem is that the Book of Mormon tends to be completely ignorant of all of the conditions that Grotius puts on capital punishment. And this is significantly odd if in fact Grotius is the author of the narrative, and if, as you suggest, Nephi is supposed to reflect Grotius's point of view. Now, having said that, we run into the other problem. Do you think that my reading of this narrative is correct? This is an important question because this argument discusses the implications of authorship for this narrative.
Calm Posted February 15, 2025 Posted February 15, 2025 6 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: 18 hours ago, JarMan said: Grotius does not believe punishment can rightly be inflicted for the sake of revenge (Book 2, Chapter 20, Paragraph 5). This is consistent with the view of Nephi who didn't want to kill Laban even while acknowledging he had stolen their stuff and tried to kill them. So we have Nephi acting as Grotius would have wanted him to. No. You have misread Grotius. Grotius denies that revenge is, of itself, justification for killing someone - this is from the section you reference: Are you both not saying the same thing here?
Benjamin McGuire Posted February 15, 2025 Author Posted February 15, 2025 13 minutes ago, Calm said: Are you both not saying the same thing here? Yes. I misread Jarman. What is different is that Nephi is not acting like Grotius would have wanted him to - because Nephi kills Laban. This isn't allowable for Grotius. In this setting, Nephi is the thief, acting at night, in the darkness. So there is no justification for Nephi to kill Laban in Grotius. The only thing that Jarman can claim is that Nephi is acting because God wants him to act. But it is puzzling why Grotius would have God wanting this. Couldn't Nephi's needs have been met without Laban dying? Why does Grotius need for Laban to die? 1
JarMan Posted February 15, 2025 Posted February 15, 2025 8 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: No, I'm not. I'll tell you what - rather than a simple back and forth, what would you accept as a reasonable academic buttress to my interpretation? I don't disagree with your interpretation of Grotius' view of natural law, so there's nothing to convince me of here. I don't even necessarily disagree with the logic you, and also apparently Plato, use to develop your position. In the context of Grotius' explanation of natural law I think it's reasonable to draw the conclusion that God would not do something which would not be moral for man under natural law. The issue is that Grotius disagrees with this conclusion. He explicitly tells us this is wrong. According to Grotius, God is sovereign over his own creations and can punish people as he sees fit. 8 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: This was what I was thought you believed. I think its as good an approach as any from your position. No, I'm not. I'll tell you what - rather than a simple back and forth, what would you accept as a reasonable academic buttress to my interpretation? Everyone at that point in time has a lot to say about punishment. It is at the core of John Locke's views of natural rights. This is from his Second Treatise of Government: Locke was one of the two most influential thinkers on the American constitution. And it is this tradition that makes it all seem relevant to certain modern views. You aren't responding to what I wrote about this section. And I certainly don't think that you read footnote 6 in the text that you quote. God can certainly do whatever God wants. And Grotius believes that if God wants it, it becomes justified. But this is Nephi here. And the problems all still exist - why would Grotius want to push the boundaries by suggesting that even though Laban should not be killed for all of these different reasons (he is helpless, there is no immediate threat to Nephi's life, the proper channels for the theft have yet to be explored, and so on), only to say that God needs no reason at all to kill Laban and so kill him. This would make more sense if the text didn't lay out specific reasons - unrelated to any of Laban's past actions - that demanded his death. It would make more sense if we didn't turn Nephi into a thief (and he certainly is a thief). It would make more sense if Nephi himself didn't, in his actions, commit crimes worthy of capital punishment under the law. This is where the problem lies. How do Nephi's actions align with Grotius's views on both civil and natural law? You are in a sense saying - here in this one spot in Grotius's text, Grotius allows God to transcend the law - and so we can throw out every other thing that Grotius has written - because this is the only thing that matters. But the problem is that the Book of Mormon text doesn't do that. The text doesn't say that God is punishing Laban through Nephi's action. If this had been Grotius writing, wouldn't we much more likely see a scene in which Laban isn't just passed out, but has died to falling unconscious and hitting his head on a rock? That would be God's actions, and Nephi wouldn't have to experience the guilt of killing an innocent man. No. You have misread Grotius. Grotius denies that revenge is, of itself, justification for killing someone - this is from the section you reference: So revenge is not spoken of favorably - Grotius calls it an abandonment of reason. But, he does go through, as he suggests, the next several paragraphs in an attempt to show when punishment (and of what sort) might be just. And again, when we get down into it, we don't find anything resembling Nephi's situation. Rather we find the opposite of it. So, for example, in section 7, Grotius tells us: So Nephi has a right to punish Laban for the theft of his property, you argue, but then what does Nephi do? He steals Laban's property. That's not what Grotius thinks is just. Even if we could work Nephi into the position of being able to apply justice here - because, Grotius suggests, perhaps Laban is a serial offender and so it isn't simple a revenge for Nephi himself, Grotius argues that such a situation places limits on the punishment: But Nephi was harmed, and so Grotius in Section 8 outlines how Nephi might go about getting Laban punished (so that it doesn't happen again): And we can see right away how this would have to be completely taken out of context with Nephi. What else is Laban going to steal from him? And what of the public and conspicuous punishment as an example? Yes, this is why Nephi kills him, while he is passed out drunk, in an alley, at night, with no witnesses. What Grotius is speaking of is the justification used in earlier times for public beatings, or putting someone into stocks. But, Grotius goes on, this cannot be done by the victim - because there is too often the inclination to punish more than necessary: So, Nephi doesn't do this either. And Grotius does identify conditions in which this wouldn't apply - but they are when the individuals are both outside of societal setting with laws and judges: And again, this is where the Nephi narrative is complicated. Because Grotius could have had this happen in the wilderness. He could have had the fears that Nephi expresses when his brothers flee into the wilderness of Laban chasing after them - and then it all would have been just fine - whatever they did. But, no. Nephi comes back into the city, and kills the helpless, passed out, Laban, steals his belongings, takes his servant, leaves behind his own property, and then heads back into the wilderness to avoid his own culpability in the matter. And so, finally, in section 14, Grotius concludes with this: So while there are conditions where Grotius might find actions appropriate, the problem is that the Book of Mormon tends to be completely ignorant of all of the conditions that Grotius puts on capital punishment. And this is significantly odd if in fact Grotius is the author of the narrative, and if, as you suggest, Nephi is supposed to reflect Grotius's point of view. Now, having said that, we run into the other problem. Do you think that my reading of this narrative is correct? This is an important question because this argument discusses the implications of authorship for this narrative. In order to focus the discussion a little bit, let me explain my view of the major themes of the Laban story and how I think they fit into a Grotian paradigm. Obedience to God We learn the importance of obeying God, even when we can't understand how it will be possible. If God commands us, he will provide a way. If Nephi had been morally justified in killing Laban or if he had been seeking revenge, it would have weakened this point. The fact that Nephi has a Grotian sense of morality (don't kill a helpless man, even if he has wronged you) adds significant weight to the theme of obedience. Nephi, as a protagonist, is acting just as Grotius would have wanted him to--he has his moral compass pointing in the right direction, he obeys God when the odds are severely stacked against him, and he recognizes that God is sovereign over his own creations. God's purpose and power God is in charge. God is sovereign. God will help those that follow him. God will punish the wicked. This story teaches us all of these things. "Behold, the Lord slayeth the wicked to bring forth his righteous purposes." All of this is Grotius 101. The importance of scripture The scriptures contain God's commandments and covenants. A people without scripture cannot follow God faithfully, making them foundational for a righteous and successful society. Grotius agrees with all of this. I could go on, but I think this is enough to demonstrate that the themes of this story are in harmony with Grotius' thinking. I don't see anything, in fact, that isn't, which is what you need to show. A lot of your comments on this story, though interesting and useful in the right context, aren't relevant to the core issue.
webbles Posted February 15, 2025 Posted February 15, 2025 48 minutes ago, JarMan said: The fact that Nephi has a Grotian sense of morality (don't kill a helpless man, even if he has wronged you) adds significant weight to the theme of obedience. The way I read the story, it seems like the reason Nephi won't slay Laban is because he has never slain someone before. Then the angel says "Behold the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands." and then Nephi thinks "Yea, and I also knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord; and he also had taken away our property." That's Nephi's personal explanation on why he should kill Laban. Per the discussion, none of those are in Grotus' sense of morality. Am I missing something here? 1
JarMan Posted February 16, 2025 Posted February 16, 2025 3 hours ago, webbles said: The way I read the story, it seems like the reason Nephi won't slay Laban is because he has never slain someone before. Then the angel says "Behold the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands." and then Nephi thinks "Yea, and I also knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord; and he also had taken away our property." That's Nephi's personal explanation on why he should kill Laban. Per the discussion, none of those are in Grotus' sense of morality. Am I missing something here? I don't think you're considering the subtext. It's clear Nephi wouldn't have killed Laban without being prompted (3 times) by the Spirit. I don't think it was inexperience that held him back. I think it was his innate sense of morality. "Never at any time have I shed the blood of man" to me means something along the lines of: I'm not a killer, I'm a man of God. Finally he concludes that because he is a man of God he must kill him, both to obey God and to help fulfill his divine purposes.
JarMan Posted February 16, 2025 Posted February 16, 2025 14 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said: Now, having said that, we run into the other problem. Do you think that my reading of this narrative is correct? This is an important question because this argument discusses the implications of authorship for this narrative. I just got through reading this and quite enjoyed it. Well done. I do generally agree with your reading of the narrative. I think the only things I would quibble with are some of your speculations in the Conclusion and Discoveries Section.
webbles Posted February 16, 2025 Posted February 16, 2025 1 hour ago, JarMan said: I don't think you're considering the subtext. It's clear Nephi wouldn't have killed Laban without being prompted (3 times) by the Spirit. I don't think it was inexperience that held him back. I think it was his innate sense of morality. "Never at any time have I shed the blood of man" to me means something along the lines of: I'm not a killer, I'm a man of God. Finally he concludes that because he is a man of God he must kill him, both to obey God and to help fulfill his divine purposes. Yes, it is clear that Nephi wouldn't have killed Laban, but the phrase that I quoted shows Nephi's morals. Nephi says "Yea, and I also knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord; and he also had taken away our property.". That is his own morals. The first and third don't appear to be from Grotius' morality. Neither of those are reasons for killing a person, per Grotius. Yet Nephi thinks of those when he is trying to convince himself that he can kill Laban. There were other things said by the Spirit that finally convinced Nephi, but when Nephi came up with some reasons, he didn't follow Grotius.
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