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The Non-Imperative for a historical Book of Mormon


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Posted
21 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

I think my point was within his lifetime he changed what he meant by paradigms and so appealing to Kuhn as authority is problematic because it's self refuting. It wasn't stable. 

Because you take stability as the criterion for truth and "authority".  From that point we should not take the prophets as "authorities".

Your point begs the question.

Posted (edited)
44 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Because you take stability as the criterion for truth and "authority".  From that point we should not take the prophets as "authorities".

Your point begs the question.

I was making a point about the type of argument you were making about Kuhn. Just that appealing to Kuhn is intrinsically problematic since the appeal is to treat Kuhn as an authority which is undermined by Kuhn's argument. Not really much more than that. Of course I find some elements of Kuhn's critique quite persuasive. I think for instance that science is in part a social endeavor and that social aspect needs to be kept in mind. I think elements of how that social group functions is tied to exemplars - whether experiments or the other sense in terms of practices, strategies and so forth. I don't think paradigms undermines truth though - and from what I can tell the later Kuhn is going much more in a Kantian direction looking for innate structures that precondition experience.

Edited by clarkgoble
Posted (edited)
1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

I was making a point about the type of argument you were making about Kuhn. Just that appealing to Kuhn is intrinsically problematic since the appeal is to treat Kuhn as an authority which is undermined by Kuhn's argument. Not really much more than that. Of course I find some elements of Kuhn's critique quite persuasive. I think for instance that science is in part a social endeavor and that social aspect needs to be kept in mind. I think elements of how that social group functions is tied to exemplars - whether experiments or the other sense in terms of practices, strategies and so forth. I don't think paradigms undermines truth though - and from what I can tell the later Kuhn is going much more in a Kantian direction looking for innate structures that precondition experience.

Kant sounds good to me. All I believe philosophically is based on the synthetic a priori.

Those innate structures are biology. Pretty ubiquitous for humans. 

I can still hear Robert Solomon teaching. UCLA 1968.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_C._Solomon

  • From Hegel to Existentialism (Oxford, 1987) p 18

590195a238bbc_solomonp18capture.JPG.e7edf5b0417e0684d009b847347db142.JPG

Edited by mfbukowski
Posted
1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

I was making a point about the type of argument you were making about Kuhn. Just that appealing to Kuhn is intrinsically problematic since the appeal is to treat Kuhn as an authority which is undermined by Kuhn's argument. Not really much more than that.

Yes but that's quite enough!

Like I said he cannot be an "authority" because he teaches that nothing is stable?

I rest my case.  Heraclitus is rolling in his grave. You are definitely begging the question.

Posted
2 hours ago, Bernard Gui said:

Would the relativist be telling the truth?

Do we now see through a glass darkly?  Is that true?  ;)

Why then do we walk by faith?

Posted
12 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Yes but that's quite enough!

Like I said he cannot be an "authority" because he teaches that nothing is stable?

I rest my case.  Heraclitus is rolling in his grave. You are definitely begging the question.

You'll have to explain how that's begging the question. I don't see it.

Posted
1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

I understand your point, but the trade off becomes that Joseph did not write a "true" translation of the BOA, and is therefore a "liar", prophets are infallible, the Sun actually stood still when Joshua raised his arms, donkeys talk and deliver messages from God and evolution is a filthy lie based on Satan.

This whole thread in fact is about whether or not the BOM "corresponds to history" whatever those words mean- and that ambiguity is in fact the problem.  And if it so doesn't "correspond" it is a fraud, a lie, and Joseph was a liar.  That is exactly what you see right here in this thread.

I don't feel at all like that is the trade off. I'm not sure what logic necessitates those types of conclusions. But the way I understand truth, as far as I can tell, doesn't lead me to those conclusions. 

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

We are post-Postmodern and the Church needs a way of explaining "truth" in a way it has not adoopted when it would help immeasurably in the prevailing postmodern culture.

Perpetuating that perpetuates error and instead of seeing secularism as freedom of religion we see it as the enemy- when it could be a VERY useful ally.

Except that most everyday people are still largely stuck in logical positivism, which actually makes a lot of sense to me. Most of us wake up and expect the world to be a certain way--and usually it is. For every surprise, there are a thousand consistencies. The sun comes up in predictable fashion. The food is still in the fridge. Bills keep coming in the mail. The neighbors still speak the same language. Most of the varieties around us have precedent and are rather expected. Getting sick from time to time is unfortunate, but not really all that remarkable. And so on and so forth.

And then the big bad postmodern wolf comes and threatens to unplug them from their matrix cave. Whether people believe the wolf's threats or not, most of them continue to act like their perceptions correspond to an external reality. While it can't exactly be proven that what they are experiencing is reality, neither can it be proven that what they are experiencing isn't reality--or at least a close enough approximation of it that any differences are essentially inconsequential. 

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

And all of this is caused by the belief in what cannot be known or experienced- "objective truth".  By definition "objective truth" is beyond description - because we can only know how it "appears to us".   And so we have the great Cartesian gulf between our silly perceptions and "objective truth"

On the other hand we have something very much observable to many people- and that is the feeling that they are actually speaking to a BEING when they pray.  Billions believe that- they just have a different paradigm about who this Being is- and my vote is that WE- little old us guys who used to be called "Mormons" have the best answer in an immanent God who is one of our Species but exalted far beyond what we are now.

And none of this can possibly BE "objective truth" because it is based on faith and subjective feelings!

So by insisting on "objective truth" you make our Church impossible to be "true" or to believe, because our church is based on  "subjective" feelings which others discount as "useless emotions".   Burning in the bosom?  It's heartburn!  It's all in your head!

On the contrary, many of our perceived experiences could indeed BE close enough to "objective truth" that it is perfectly reasonable to treat them, for all intents and purposes, as if they reliably correspond to "objective truth." Sure, it takes varying degrees of faith to trust that various subjective perceptions meaningfully correspond to an objective reality. But that fact alone doesn't preclude one's perceptions from actually having a meaningful correspondence.

Choosing to have faith in an objective reality doesn't necessitate that the Church is impossible to be "true." As I said earlier, ALL perceptions are subjective, including spiritual experiences. But we shouldn't confuse their general subjective nature with their varying degrees of reliability. Logic helps us discern which propositions are more likely to correspond to objective reality than others. 

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

What i actually experience is a PERSON, not a "being".  There is a PERSON out there with whom I communicate.  I havent seen him yet but I hope to.

I suppose I hope that there is more than just a PERSON out there. I hope that there is a person who lives in a reality that is stable enough to have the eternal happiness that he promises us. I hope there is a PERSON that is more than just an arbitrary subjective creation, or a god made after my own subjective image instead of me being made after his objective image. 

Posted
2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Just that appealing to Kuhn is intrinsically problematic since the appeal is to treat Kuhn as an authority which is undermined by Kuhn's argument. Not really much more than that.

 

33 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

You'll have to explain how that's begging the question. I don't see it.

Please explain better how Kuhn's authority is undermined by his argument.

It appears to me that your point hinges on his "argument" being about "instability"

The idea that any argument which hinges on relativism or "instability" cannot be "true" because somehow truth is ASSUMED to be "stable".

It appears to me that you have said this a few different ways,  and I have characterized that kind of argument as the kind that essentially Boghossian  made in  "Fear of Knowledge" which has been roundly criticized by those who advocate it, and that is based on a quote by Nietzsche to said "There are no facts, only interpretations, and this is itself an interpretation"

That means that Nietzsche was not an "authority" though obviously he has been vastly influential.

In other words, their argument is "Relativism cannot be true because they do not believe in truth".  Yes that is the point.  No it is not "true" because truth is undefinable.  Relativists have no problem with that notion because they do not discuss "truth" in a philosophical context, but perhaps use the word all the time at home and in other contexts.

It seems that you are making the same argument when you say

Quote

Just that appealing to Kuhn is intrinsically problematic since the appeal is to treat Kuhn as an authority which is undermined by Kuhn's argument.

And you cite "stability"

Quote

I think my point was within his lifetime he changed what he meant by paradigms and so appealing to Kuhn as authority is problematic because it's self refuting. It wasn't stable. 

So the assumption you appear to make is that a theory about the "instability" of objective truth de facto makes it unable to be taken as "authoritative".

I see no basis for this belief, and find that because you ASSUME that a theory that shows objective truth to be "unstable" then it cannot be "authoritative"

I would disagree- I think that new ways of seeing things can be considered as "authoritative" even if they are provisional steps to future theories which are more "authoritative" and work better for their context.  I see your point as analogous to saying that Newton was not "authoritative" because his theory was later superseded by Einstein and therefore not "stable".

You appear to be ASSUMING such a position before you draw your conclusion which makes your statement "question begging"

I am using what you have termed "scare quotes" because we are talking about words and expressions and such quotes are taken as standard English usage.

Posted
1 hour ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I don't feel at all like that is the trade off. I'm not sure what logic necessitates those types of conclusions. But the way I understand truth, as far as I can tell, doesn't lead me to those conclusions. 

Except that most everyday people are still largely stuck in logical positivism, which actually makes a lot of sense to me. Most of us wake up and expect the world to be a certain way--and usually it is. For every surprise, there are a thousand consistencies. The sun comes up in predictable fashion. The food is still in the fridge. Bills keep coming in the mail. The neighbors still speak the same language. Most of the varieties around us have precedent and are rather expected. Getting sick from time to time is unfortunate, but not really all that remarkable. And so on and so forth.

And then the big bad postmodern wolf comes and threatens to unplug them from their matrix cave. Whether people believe the wolf's threats or not, most of them continue to act like their perceptions correspond to an external reality. While it can't exactly be proven that what they are experiencing is reality, neither can it be proven that what they are experiencing isn't reality--or at least a close enough approximation of it that any differences are essentially inconsequential. 

On the contrary, many of our perceived experiences could indeed BE close enough to "objective truth" that it is perfectly reasonable to treat them, for all intents and purposes, as if they reliably correspond to "objective truth." Sure, it takes varying degrees of faith to trust that various subjective perceptions meaningfully correspond to an objective reality. But that fact alone doesn't preclude one's perceptions from actually having a meaningful correspondence.

Choosing to have faith in an objective reality doesn't necessitate that the Church is impossible to be "true." As I said earlier, ALL perceptions are subjective, including spiritual experiences. But we shouldn't confuse their general subjective nature with their varying degrees of reliability. Logic helps us discern which propositions are more likely to correspond to objective reality than others. 

I suppose I hope that there is more than just a PERSON out there. I hope that there is a person who lives in a reality that is stable enough to have the eternal happiness that he promises us. I hope there is a PERSON that is more than just an arbitrary subjective creation, or a god made after my own subjective image instead of me being made after his objective image. 

Yes I hope so too, and that is why we go by "faith" and not "objective truth" right?

We don't have objective truth about these matters - surely you do not disagree with that do you?

Posted
8 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Yes I hope so too, and that is why we go by "faith" and not "objective truth" right?

We don't have objective truth about these matters - surely you do not disagree with that do you?

Our subjective perceptions may or may not meaningfully correspond to objective realities. I certainly don't think we can prove that any of them do. But it seems that some of them have a much better chance of being meaningfully accurate than others. These are the ones that seem worth placing our faith in.

So, I would say that we go by "faith" in our ability to meaningfully discern "objective truth." I don't know what else is worth believing in.  

Posted (edited)
47 minutes ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Our subjective perceptions may or may not meaningfully correspond to objective realities. I certainly don't think we can prove that any of them do. But it seems that some of them have a much better chance of being meaningfully accurate than others. These are the ones that seem worth placing our faith in.

So, I would say that we go by "faith" in our ability to meaningfully discern "objective truth." I don't know what else is worth believing in.  

I have found that when I give up that crutch of objectivity, the spirit floods in.

For me, pure atheism proved the existence of God.  I just couldn't believe something so out of phase with my actual experience. 

I would rather rely on what I knew for sure than worry about some world perpetually outside my experience.

That is James' Radical Empiricism.

What does" meaningfully accurate" mean?

A meaning that WE ascribe to some phenomenon and decide to call it "accurate". 

That is an unwarranted assumption, because as you yourself say it cannot be proven to be  "accurate"

Accuracy is a myth in this context.

 

 

Edited by mfbukowski
Posted (edited)
12 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Except that most everyday people are still largely stuck in logical positivism, which actually makes a lot of sense to me.

Most people don't even search for evidence let alone evaluate it. They're not positivists. Also those who find evidence important aren't being positivists either. One can easily think verification is important without accepting the foibles of positivism.

BTW - for those interested there's a new article up at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Pragmatic Theories of Truth. I'm rather partial to Peirce's conception and find James' more than a little problematic.

10 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Please explain better how Kuhn's authority is undermined by his argument.

I didn't claim Kuhn was an authority. I was talking about your use of Kuhn. I was saying how your using Kuhn in the  way you do as a kind of trump is self-refuting.

When someone comes in, say Dan Vogel, who thinks differently you usually play the Kuhn canard as if that explains everything. However to use Kuhn in that fashion is to say your approach is right because Kuhn is an authority. However Kuhn can't be an authority that can be appealed to given what he says about paradigms. Paradigms can't be decided between by an appeal to authority nor can they be "proved" in a strong sense. So to appeal to Kuhn as if that appeal could do this is to go against what Kuhn actually argues. That's why it's self refuting. All someone like Vogel need do is say that he's following a different paradigm (which he as done explicitly in discussions with myself and Alan Goff). So what does raising Kuhn do?  Absolutely nothing. It's defeated upon the terms of Kuhn's own work.

What you have to do is leave Kuhn out of it and explain why your position is more fruitful in terms of what Kuhn argues actually decides between paradigms.

10 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

It appears to me that your point hinges on his "argument" being about "instability"

No, my point hinges upon his not being a stable authority, something he would deny given his commitments with paradigms and the fact that his positions changed rather significantly between Structures and the end of his life when he was much more of a Kantian.

10 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

The idea that any argument which hinges on relativism or "instability" cannot be "true" because somehow truth is ASSUMED to be "stable".

No the idea is that an argument for things being unstable can't depend upon an appeal to a stable authority. Kuhn doesn't make that kind of argument. 

10 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

I see your point as analogous to saying that Newton was not "authoritative" because his theory was later superseded by Einstein and therefore not "stable".

No physicist would say something is true because a scientist said it. They'd give arguments that would verify the claims. So of course any appeal to Newton would be deeply problematic due to the fact things have changed. Appealing to the arguments and mathematics on the other hand would be completely different.

Again this is an issue of your appealing to these figures as authorities.

10 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

You appear to be ASSUMING such a position before you draw your conclusion which makes your statement "question begging"

Hopefully I've clarified that's not what I am assuming. Whether or not things are stable is irrelevant for the argument. Rather the issue is that the appeal to Kuhn as an authority is undermined by Kuhn's views.

Now of course I'd argue truth is stable, based upon its meaning as discerned by the pragmatic maxim. But that's really not part of the argument.

Edited by clarkgoble
Posted

Personally, I find Kuhn extremely helpful, especially when I make full use of the structure he describes to cast light on the debates I examine.   Treating it all as a lofty abstraction, far removed from ongoing human behavior and details of ongoing discussions, misses the immediate practical relevance to what goes on everywhere every day.  I'm specific about the details of Kuhn's structure and how it is accurately represented in debates about things LDS. 

Paradigms are defined by standard examples of scientific work that embody and define a problem field, method, background assumptions, and standards of solution that is adopted by a community of scientists.  

Quote

For Kuhn, scientific paradigms are defined by “standard examples of scientific work that embody a set of conceptual, methodological and metaphysical assumptions.”8 In the sciences, according to Kuhn, such works as Aristotle’s Physica, Newton’s Principia and Opticks, and Franklin’s Electricity define “the legitimate problems and methods of a research field.”9 They represent unprecedented achievements that attract researchers away from competing theoretical frameworks.

What Franklin's Electricity provided for scientists, Arrington's Great Basin Kingdom provided for LDS historians.   So whose approach do we follow in approaching the Book of Mormon.  Alexander Campbell and Brodie and Vogel and Metcalfe?  Or Nibley, Sorenson, Gardner and Givens?  Do we explore historicity for the benefit of believers, or do we do Religious Studies using secular methods approaches, questions, and answers, so that we can rub shoulders with Secular Academia (and thereby further our professional careers)?  Do I consider Margaret Barker's work carefully?  Or is it enough to say, "She's not mainstream."

Quote

In the sciences the [paradigm] testing situation never consists, as puzzle-solving does, simply in the comparison of a single paradigm with nature. Instead, testing occurs as part of the competition between two rival paradigms for the allegiance of the scientific community.

Sure, in Kuhn's second edition, he admits that he used several definitions of paradigm.  That is something he addressed in the second edition.  And I always refer to Ian Barbour's definition.

The most interesting problem in paradigm debate is that of self-reference.

Quote

To the extent . . . that two scientific schools disagree about what is a problem and what is a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent.

And that is why I see it as crucial that Kuhn identifies a set of values that permit a way to make paradigm choices that are not completely self referential.  Such a choice involves comparison, asking which of two competing paradigms is better, which problems are more significant to have solved? and doing so in terms of criteria that are not completely paradigm dependent.   There is a huge difference between dismissing a paradigm because it is "Not us!" and seriously asking "Why us?" and therefore, as least considering the arguments and observations made by the opposition, and weighing them in a way that introduces risk.  It involves checking one's own eye for beams, that we might see clearly.  It involves considering different wines and wine bottles, rather than just saying, "The old is better."

Testability, accuracy of key predictions, comprehensiveness and coherence, fruitfulness, simplicity and aesthetics, and future promise.  (It's a bonus that these correlate with what Alma 32 offers.)

Quote

The issue is which paradigm should in the future guide research on problems many of which neither competitor can yet claim to resolve completely. A decision between alternate ways of practicing science is called for, and in the circumstances that decision must be based less on past achievement than on future promise. . . . A decision of that kind can only be made on faith.

For this sort of thing,

https://publications.mi.byu.edu/fullscreen/?pub=1436&index=8

FWIW

Kevin Christensen

Canonsburg, PA

Posted
17 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

What does" meaningfully accurate" mean?

A meaning that WE ascribe to some phenomenon and decide to call it "accurate". 

That is an unwarranted assumption.

Well, when I sit at my kitchen table every day, I assume that it exists independent of myself. I may not have a complete knowledge of the table. I don't understand its existence on the quantum level, nor do I understand its absolute location on the macro level, nor do I understand its spiritual properties, whatever they may be. There are many levels on which I don't understand the table. For example, it is apparently revolving on the surface of a planet that is orbiting a star that is spinning in a galaxy that is itself hurtling through space. So I certainly don't know the table's absolute location at any given time in relation to all other items in the known universe. I only know its location relative to other items that are moving together through space in a mostly fixed relationship, at least for the time being. In other words, I recognize that my understanding of the table's properties and location is limited and contextual. 

However, I do understand that there is in object in my kitchen that is stable as far as my ability to perceive it goes. Everyone who has been in my kitchen seems to be aware that there is table there. They seem to place stuff on it, as if it will hold up other items that seem to be similarly real. If I asked guests if they felt the table was real, they would probably stare back blankly at me, wondering why I would ask a question that seems self evident to anyone who had experienced the table. I expect that table to be there every day when I wake up. I depend upon it being there every time I sit down to eat. It functions essentially the same way every time I use it. It doesn't all of a sudden turn into water or air or granite, as far as I can tell. It appears to be made of wood. I tell our kids not to gouge it because my experience with wood tells me that it can be scuffed and dented by hard or sharp objects. And indeed, it does have scuffs on it, as expected. And so on and so forth. I have literally had thousands of experiences with this table. My memory could be faulty on this matter, but I don't believe it is. 

I can't prove that the the table really exists, independent of my perceptions. But should that stop me from believing that my perception of its reality (as limited and contextual as that perception may be) meaningfully corresponds to its actual reality? I don't see why it should. 

 

  

 

Posted
11 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I don't feel at all like that is the trade off. I'm not sure what logic necessitates those types of conclusions. But the way I understand truth, as far as I can tell, doesn't lead me to those conclusions. 

I agree- but that is what we see on this board every day- precisely those arguments!!  Do we want to have answers for them or not regardless of their "logic"?

Quote

Except that most everyday people are still largely stuck in logical positivism, which actually makes a lot of sense to me. Most of us wake up and expect the world to be a certain way--and usually it is. For every surprise, there are a thousand consistencies. The sun comes up in predictable fashion. The food is still in the fridge. Bills keep coming in the mail. The neighbors still speak the same language. Most of the varieties around us have precedent and are rather expected. Getting sick from time to time is unfortunate, but not really all that remarkable. And so on and so forth.

No you cannot be a logical positivist and be LDS because LDS folks believe in God.  Logical positivists believe that any statement which cannot be verified by science is meaning-less.  No meaning. Jibberish!!

I also know all those regularities happen!  But how do I know that? Through my own EXPERIENCE!!  I too have bills and keep things in the fridge and the sun has come up every single day of my life.  Do you really think I was denying that? 

Quote

And then the big bad postmodern wolf comes and threatens to unplug them from their matrix cave. Whether people believe the wolf's threats or not, most of them continue to act like their perceptions correspond to an external reality. While it can't exactly be proven that what they are experiencing is reality, neither can it be proven that what they are experiencing isn't reality--or at least a close enough approximation of it that any differences are essentially inconsequential. 

No the big bad postmodern wolf gives you the only available option for believing in God- an alleged being who's very existence cannot be proven scientifically, much less a justification of morality or any reason whatsoever for such beliefs!!!

And yes those who have not thought about it do tend to go on believing in a reality they cannot see or feel and yet have faith that a world they cannot experience actually exists!!  

For me the world is the world I experience on a daily basis with all its regularities and predictabilities.  Please read the quote in my siggy from Rorty.  

Quote

On the contrary, many of our perceived experiences could indeed BE close enough to "objective truth" that it is perfectly reasonable to treat them, for all intents and purposes, as if they reliably correspond to "objective truth." Sure, it takes varying degrees of faith to trust that various subjective perceptions meaningfully correspond to an objective reality. But that fact alone doesn't preclude one's perceptions from actually having a meaningful correspondence.

Sure it is reasonable- but where is God in your objective truth?  Is he something you see and can weigh?  Or do you experience him in your heart?  How do you justify that in objective truth?  You can't!  Period. End of story.

Everyone here who preaches objective truth logically should be atheists.  You can't see God and he does not exist objectively.  Remember Plan of Salvation 101??  "We come to walk by faith"?  Why ???  Because we cannot see God and experience Him in our hearts.

NO objective reality to it!!!

Quote

Choosing to have faith in an objective reality doesn't necessitate that the Church is impossible to be "true." As I said earlier, ALL perceptions are subjective, including spiritual experiences. But we shouldn't confuse their general subjective nature with their varying degrees of reliability. Logic helps us discern which propositions are more likely to correspond to objective reality than others. 

No it doesn't and that is precisely the problem.  Logical positivism would say the above statement is jibberish.  It is not verifiable through objective evidence.  And where is your empirical data for inductive logic to work to prove God exists?  Without a theory of metaphysics- of a world "out there" we cannot see there IS no logic that can prove God!

To believe in God one must understand that feelings are part of "reason"- and that is where the Romanticism which developed into postmodernism came from.

Quote

I suppose I hope that there is more than just a PERSON out there. I hope that there is a person who lives in a reality that is stable enough to have the eternal happiness that he promises us. I hope there is a PERSON that is more than just an arbitrary subjective creation, or a god made after my own subjective image instead of me being made after his objective image. 

Yeah me too- but that is totally without objective evidence - so if you are a logical positivist why do you even HOPE for such a thing?

It is jibberish.  A person in a stable but invisible reality who promises us happiness?   Seriously?  as a logical positivisit??

If reality is all objective where is your evidence for such a ....  being? person?

You can't be LDS and a logical positivist.  

Posted
14 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Most people don't even search for evidence let alone evaluate it. They're not positivists.

I'm not saying positivists in the formal sense of holding to precise positivistic views advocated by philosophers of the 20th century. I simply mean in the general sense of believing that humans and science can be truly objective and discern the facts of the universe with absolute certainty. 

Posted (edited)
26 minutes ago, Kevin Christensen said:

Personally, I find Kuhn extremely helpful, especially when I make full use of the structure he describes to cast light on the debates I examine. 

To be clear I do too. I just find the use of Kuhn in apologetics to often be a bit problematic in that it's not really engaging in the argument at hand. 

But certainly I think that the key difference between apologists and critics is over naturalism - whether ontological or methodological. That is to what degree do private experiences matter in an argument. I think appealing to paradigm obscures that fundamental difference. 

Now it is certainly true that one of Kuhn's senses of paradigm (the set of approved methods, criteria and so forth for problem solving) is what is in question. I just think most papers that argue that end up going over the heads of those we are trying to reach. But of course as just scholarship it's a fine discussion and usually I agree with the key points. Even as argument with our interlocutors I think it has problems as I outlined to Mark. Even assuming they accept Kuhn (and heaven knows there's lots of philosophers of science who don't) all they need do is accept the premises and say they're using a different paradigm and ours is a bad one.

Just now, Ryan Dahle said:

I'm not saying positivists in the formal sense of holding to precise positivistic views advocated by philosophers of the 20th century. I simply mean in the general sense of believing that humans and science can be truly objective and discern the facts of the universe with absolute certainty. 

Ah. OK. Thanks for the clarification.

I'll admit that I think the terms "objective" and "subjective" cause more problems than they help. That's why I typically try to use the words "stable" and "private." After all some subjective judgments like, "I am in pain," are treated as "objective" in the sense of stable. And such experiences frequently aren't private (you can see someone gasping or showing other physical signs of pain we recognize). Also private can simply mean there's no one else around to confirm a judgment - such as my typing on my keyboard alone in my office. I think making these things explicit helps clarify better the real problems at hand. 

 

Edited by clarkgoble
Posted
6 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Yeah me too- but that is totally without objective evidence - so if you are a logical positivist why do you even HOPE for such a thing?

I think you are drastically misreading me. I didn't say I was a logical positivist. I'm not.

I said I understand why others are positivists (maybe not positivists in a formal or all-inclusive sense, but at least why they latch on to some assumptions of positivism, at least in certain contexts).  

Posted
13 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Ah. OK. Thanks for the clarification.

I'll admit that I think the terms "objective" and "subjective" cause more problems than they help. That's why I typically try to use the words "stable" and "private." After all some subjective judgments like, "I am in pain," are treated as "objective" in the sense of stable. And such experiences frequently aren't private (you can see someone gasping or showing other physical signs of pain we recognize). Also private can simply mean there's no one else around to confirm a judgment - such as my typing on my keyboard alone in my office. I think making these things explicit helps clarify better the real problems at hand.

I agree. The terms are confusing, sort of like the loose/tight dichotomy for the translation. No one can quite figure out what others are talking about. 

Posted (edited)
25 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

No you cannot be a logical positivist and be LDS because LDS folks believe in God.  Logical positivists believe that any statement which cannot be verified by science is meaning-less.  No meaning. Jibberish!!

This gets at an important distinction that should be raised. We must keep clear what could one day be verified from what can now be verified. That is a Latter-day Saint positivist (and there certainly such self-identified positivists) could simply say that while science hasn't yet verified God in theory it could.

This is an important point since in the 1950's we had the predictions of a black hole within general relativity which hadn't then been verified according to the criteria of the positivists. Yet would a positivist say in the 1950s that a black hole was meaningless? Maybe some would. But many would not. Typically the more mature positivists (say the latter Carnap) would say that we have to look at all possible observers not any particular observer. (This is a distinction Peirce makes as well in his verification criteria)

Since with the Latter-day Saint theology God is material, there's really nothing keeping a logical positivist member from thinking God is meaningful. Fundamentally most of the elements of our theology are physical not metaphysical.

25 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Sure it is reasonable- but where is God in your objective truth?  Is he something you see and can weigh?  Or do you experience him in your heart?  How do you justify that in objective truth?  You can't!  Period. End of story.

I think the Latter-day Saint theology does entail God is something we can see and weigh. Now maybe I haven't seen him or weighed him. But that's true of my communication with most people on this forum as well. Again I don't like the word "objective" as I think it tends to lead to equivocations, but I think for most uses of the word in common speech the existence of the people I discuss things with here is objective.

Edited by clarkgoble
Posted
34 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Most people don't even search for evidence let alone evaluate it. They're not positivists. Also those who find evidence important aren't being positivists either. One can easily think verification is important without accepting the foibles of positivism.

BTW - for those interested there's a new article up at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Pragmatic Theories of Truth. I'm rather partial to Peirce's conception and find James' more than a little problematic.

I didn't claim Kuhn was an authority. I was talking about your use of Kuhn. I was saying how your using Kuhn in the  way you do as a kind of trump is self-refuting.

When someone comes in, say Dan Vogel, who thinks differently you usually play the Kuhn canard as if that explains everything. However to use Kuhn in that fashion is to say your approach is right because Kuhn is an authority. However Kuhn can't be an authority that can be appealed to given what he says about paradigms. Paradigms can't be decided between by an appeal to authority nor can they be "proved" in a strong sense. So to appeal to Kuhn as if that appeal could do this is to go against what Kuhn actually argues. That's why it's self refuting. All someone like Vogel need do is say that he's following a different paradigm (which he as done explicitly in discussions with myself and Alan Goff). So what does raising Kuhn do?  Absolutely nothing. It's defeated upon the terms of Kuhn's own work.

What you have to do is leave Kuhn out of it and explain why your position is more fruitful in terms of what Kuhn argues actually decides between paradigms.

No, my point hinges upon his not being a stable authority, something he would deny given his commitments with paradigms and the fact that his positions changed rather significantly between Structures and the end of his life when he was much more of a Kantian.

No the idea is that an argument for things being unstable can't depend upon an appeal to a stable authority. Kuhn doesn't make that kind of argument. 

No physicist would say something is true because a scientist said it. They'd give arguments that would verify the claims. So of course any appeal to Newton would be deeply problematic due to the fact things have changed. Appealing to the arguments and mathematics on the other hand would be completely different.

Again this is an issue of your appealing to these figures as authorities.

Hopefully I've clarified that's not what I am assuming. Whether or not things are stable is irrelevant for the argument. Rather the issue is that the appeal to Kuhn as an authority is undermined by Kuhn's views.

Now of course I'd argue truth is stable, based upon its meaning as discerned by the pragmatic maxim. But that's really not part of the argument.

I will let the reader decide if this is the argument you made or not.  You repeatedly made reference to undefined "stability"- whatever that means.  There is no point in re-hashing it all again and again.

I do not see any philosopher as an "authority"- I simply say that if you can refute his position- try.

And yes Vogel has his own paradigm- but that paradigm is long dead.  It is logical positivism.  No one takes it seriously, and it is death to any religious position.

Yet again you are using the Boghossian argument, and yet again Nietzsche knew that "There are no facts, only interpretations" was itself "only an interpretation".

Relativists know that their position is only relatively true but it is the only game in town that works.

Posted
5 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

This gets at an important distinction that should be raised. We must keep clear what could one day be verified from what can now be verified. That is a Latter-day Saint positivist (and there certainly such self-identified positivists) could simply say that while science hasn't yet verified God in theory it could.

This is an important point since in the 1950's we had the predictions of a black hole within relativist which hadn't been verified according to the criteria of the positivists. Yet would a positivist say in 1950 that a black hole was meaningless? Maybe some would. But many would not. Typically the more mature positivists (say the latter Carnap) would say that we have to look at all possible observers not any particular observer. (This is a distinction Peirce makes as well in his verification criteria)

Since with the Latter-day Saint theology God is material, there's really nothing keeping a logical positivist member from thinking God is meaningful.

I think the Latter-day Saint theology does entail God is something we can see and weigh. Now maybe I haven't seen him or weighed him. But that's true of my communication with most people on this forum as well. Again I don't like the word "objective" as I think it tends to lead to equivocations, but I think for most uses of the word in common speech the existence of the people I discuss things with here is objective.

I would suggest that the discussion here do not meet standards for peer-reviewed philosophy

If that's the standard you accept, then that is the standard you accept.

Posted (edited)
1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

To be clear I do too. I just find the use of Kuhn in apologetics to often be a bit problematic in that it's not really engaging in the argument at hand. 

But certainly I think that the key difference between apologists and critics is over naturalism - whether ontological or methodological. That is to what degree do private experiences matter in an argument. I think appealing to paradigm obscures that fundamental difference.

I agree with this quite a bit. Pointing out an ideological opponent's epistemological naivete is useful in some respects and sometimes directly relevant to his or her arguments, but in many cases it is somewhat tangential to the core issues being debated, which usually have to do with specific methodologies employed in specific ways in specific disciplines.

I would say that it isn't even necessarily a debate about how much private experiences matter, but about what those private experiences are really like. If we can't agree upon or meaningfully communicate their true nature, it is hard to discuss their value in the context of related or dependent evidences and arguments.  

Edited by Ryan Dahle
Posted
54 minutes ago, Kevin Christensen said:

Personally, I find Kuhn extremely helpful, especially when I make full use of the structure he describes to cast light on the debates I examine.   Treating it all as a lofty abstraction, far removed from ongoing human behavior and details of ongoing discussions, misses the immediate practical relevance to what goes on everywhere every day.  I'm specific about the details of Kuhn's structure and how it is accurately represented in debates about things LDS. 

Paradigms are defined by standard examples of scientific work that embody and define a problem field, method, background assumptions, and standards of solution that is adopted by a community of scientists.  

What Franklin's Electricity provided for scientists, Arrington's Great Basin Kingdom provided for LDS historians.   So whose approach do we follow in approaching the Book of Mormon.  Alexander Campbell and Brodie and Vogel and Metcalfe?  Or Nibley, Sorenson, Gardner and Givens?  Do we explore historicity for the benefit of believers, or do we do Religious Studies using secular methods approaches, questions, and answers, so that we can rub shoulders with Secular Academia (and thereby further our professional careers)?  Do I consider Margaret Barker's work carefully?  Or is it enough to say, "She's not mainstream."

Sure, in Kuhn's second edition, he admits that he used several definitions of paradigm.  That is something he addressed in the second edition.  And I always refer to Ian Barbour's definition.

The most interesting problem in paradigm debate is that of self-reference.

And that is why I see it as crucial that Kuhn identifies a set of values that permit a way to make paradigm choices that are not completely self referential.  Such a choice involves comparison, asking which of two competing paradigms is better, which problems are more significant to have solved? and doing so in terms of criteria that are not completely paradigm dependent.   There is a huge difference between dismissing a paradigm because it is "Not us!" and seriously asking "Why us?" and therefore, as least considering the arguments and observations made by the opposition, and weighing them in a way that introduces risk.  It involves checking one's own eye for beams, that we might see clearly.  It involves considering different wines and wine bottles, rather than just saying, "The old is better."

Testability, accuracy of key predictions, comprehensiveness and coherence, fruitfulness, simplicity and aesthetics, and future promise.  (It's a bonus that these correlate with what Alma 32 offers.)

For this sort of thing,

https://publications.mi.byu.edu/fullscreen/?pub=1436&index=8

FWIW

Kevin Christensen

Canonsburg, PA

Thanks Kevin for being the voice of reason and thanks for the link.  I have not read this article before and it will take some study.

Posted
24 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

I would suggest that the discussion here do not meet standards for peer-reviewed philosophy

If that's the standard you accept, then that is the standard you accept.

I'm not quite sure of the relationship of this to what I wrote I confess. I certainly agree we're not doing peer reviewed philosophy. I'm not at all sure how that's relevant since no one was claiming we were. The idea that an argument is self-refuting is not only an issue in peer reviewed philosophy.

30 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

And yes Vogel has his own paradigm- but that paradigm is long dead.  It is logical positivism.  No one takes it seriously, and it is death to any religious position.

Naturalism != logical positivism

And it's far, far from dead. It's by far the dominant position in philosophy, science and so forth. Admittedly in some of the very soft sciences, English departments and other such things it's not really used. But in many ways that's a bug not a feature.

32 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

I will let the reader decide if this is the argument you made or not.  You repeatedly made reference to undefined "stability"- whatever that means.  There is no point in re-hashing it all again and again.

I just mean by "stability" the normal sense of the word. But I'll drop it and let others decide as you note.

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