The Non-Imperative for a historical Book of Mormon

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

This gets at an important distinction that should be raised. We must keep clear what could one day be verified from what can now be verified. That is a Latter-day Saint positivist (and there certainly such self-identified positivists) could simply say that while science hasn't yet verified God in theory it could.

Yes in theory pigs could fly as well - in the future with enough genetic engineering.

I do not consider this as any kind of "verification" that pigs can fly.  I don't see it as a useful point.

It appears to me that almost anything could "simply say" about anything.

How is that supposed to advance the LDS claims?

[clarkgoble]

14 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Yes in theory pigs could fly as well - in the future with enough genetic engineering.

I do not consider this as any kind of "verification" that pigs can fly.  I don't see it as a useful point.

It appears to me that almost anything could "simply say" about anything.

How is that supposed to advance the LDS claims?

It doesn't advance LDS claims depending upon what you mean by that. It's just a point about being a positivist and whether one can be LDS and a positivist. So LDS claims aren't meaningless in a positivist conception.

It's important for understanding what the positivist critique was about. While I reject the narrowness of the positivist position I also think they're frequently treated unfairly. Further I think that if we broaden what's allowable under verification then we get a much more defensible position. We'd allow in some types of metaphysical claims, ethical claims, and not end up with the position many positivists found themselves in where art, ethics and music were meaningless.

While the positivists were problematic I think too many throw the baby out with the bathwater and reject too many things because of some resemblance to positivism. The choice simply isn't just between positivism or postmodernism.

Edited March 26, 2019 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I would say that it isn't even necessarily a debate about how much private experiences matter, but about what those private experiences are really like. If we can't agree upon or meaningfully communicate their true nature, it is hard to discuss their value in the context of related or dependent evidences and arguments.  

Their "true nature"?  Communicate what is private and cannot be communicated?  Give your spiritual experiences to your kids so they have the same ones?

In fact it is impossible to discuss- and that is the point.  So stop trying to do the impossible by making private experiences public and destroying their context in the attempt.

Leave to men the things that are of men and to God the things that are God's.

That's part of his plan after all.  You have to get your own testimony about the nature of the world as opposed to God's way of communicating directly with the heart.

You want to speak the unspeakable, and no it will never be "close enough" to convince anyone.  Direct experience IS reality, not words.

[mfbukowski]

3 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I think you are drastically misreading me. I didn't say I was a logical positivist. I'm not.

I said I understand why others are positivists (maybe not positivists in a formal or all-inclusive sense, but at least why they latch on to some assumptions of positivism, at least in certain contexts).  

So maybe yes, maybe no.  OK but then I miss the point of the post.

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

So LDS claims aren't meaningless in a positivist conception.

 

When you are sitting on a cloud with Carnap sometime in the possible future which might be verifiable some day, ask him if he thought that the idea that God had a body was a meaningful utterance.

Or heck throw in the truth of the Book of Mormon as well

Edited March 26, 2019 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

When you are sitting on a cloud with Carnap sometime in the possible future which might be verifiable some day, ask him if he thought that the idea that God had a body was a meaningful utterance.

Or heck throw in the truth of the Book of Mormon as well

He'd probably be much more open to it given his life after death. On the other hand I'm not sure it'd change his fundamental view of ontology. But who knows. That's a pretty big shock to an atheist and might lead to some serious reflection of philosophical method.

[Ryan Dahle]

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

5 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I think you are drastically misreading me. I didn't say I was a logical positivist. I'm not.

I said I understand why others are positivists (maybe not positivists in a formal or all-inclusive sense, but at least why they latch on to some assumptions of positivism, at least in certain contexts).  

So maybe yes, maybe no.  OK but then I miss the point of the post.

Spiritual experiences, like all other experiences, are subjective. We have to interpret them just like we interpret the meaning and cause of heartburn, just like a scientist has to interpret the data that he observes first-hand in nature, just like a young person has to interpret the feeling of falling in love for the first time. It is all subjectively filtered. So it must all be interpreted.

The second part of Nietzsche's quote that you often give seems to be absolutely true. We are forced to interpret. We can't get around that. The first part of Nietzsche's quote, however, is not self-evident. Are there objective facts out there that our subjective interpretation might meaningfully align with? I believe so. Are there methods of interpretation that have a better chance of reaching conclusions in alignment with objective facts? I believe so. 

Positivism, generally speaking, seems to have overreached. Its underlying claim to be able to verify reality through empiricism is flawed. However, empirical evidence, when properly employed, still seems to be the most reliable method of reaching accurate explanations or conclusions about reality. As long as the we tone down the certainty factor and make sure that we don't logically overreach the implications of directly observable phenomena, there is great value in the conclusions that can be reached via empirical evidence.

That is why the spiritual experiences predicted by the gospel are so valuable. They are directly observable phenomena that are meant to be tested over and over again by aspiring disciples of Christ. As people persistently approach God in faith, the consistency, predictability, uniqueness, and intrinsic value of their spiritual experiences strengthens their faith. It is not as simple as I feel X therefore Y is true. The difficulty of consistently receiving and interpreting spiritual experiences is often what leads many people to question their efficacy. 

In such situations, God invites people to seek learning by study and also by faith. In other words, God himself seems to recognize that the empirical spiritual experiences that are offered as a witness of the truth can be strengthened when they are contextualized by other related truths. Why did God call the Three and Eight Witnesses if all we need is our own spiritual witnesses? Well, because most people have learned that when multiple testimonies independently align, it is less likely that any of them are lying or mistaken. That piece of evidence, which must be researched and interpreted subjectively, can reinforce evidence from personal spiritual experiences that must also be pursued and interpreted subjectively.

Because there are inherent weaknesses and uncertainties in all types of evidence, it seems natural that people will want to triangulate evidences. I place spiritual experiences at the top of my list, but other evidences have helped strengthen my testimony in times of need.

 

Late Note: The above isn't really an explanation of my previous statements. I'm more building off of my previous statements and then responding to the general thrust of many of your comments.   

Edited March 26, 2019 by Ryan Dahle

[clarkgoble]

1 hour ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Spiritual experiences, like all other experiences, are subjective. We have to interpret them just like we interpret the meaning and cause of heartburn, just like a scientist has to interpret the data that he observes first-hand in nature, just like a young person has to interpret the feeling of falling in love for the first time. It is all subjectively filtered. So it must all be interpreted.

I'd probably put this a different way (beside my issues with subjectivity) and say our experiences include interpretations but we don't make the interpretation. When I see a dog I don't see a bunch of colors and decide it's a dog. I see it as a dog. It comes to consciousness pre-interpreted. This might not seem like an important difference, but I think it ends up being important relative to choice. There's not sense data and then interpretation as in most forms of empiricism. There's just experience.

This is important in understanding Mormon spiritual experience since when someone experiences something as trustworthy or certain. That experience of certainty (some people will say feeling but I prefer to say experience since it's broader than feeling) is thus not a judgment we make but something that happens to us. The reason I don't like the claim of subjectivity is that we can have a community experience the same thing, be critical of those experiences, yet have them in a shared fashion that goes beyond what we can call subjective.

1 hour ago, Ryan Dahle said:

The second part of Nietzsche's quote that you often give seems to be absolutely true. We are forced to interpret. We can't get around that. The first part of Nietzsche's quote, however, is not self-evident. Are there objective facts out there that our subjective interpretation might meaningfully align with? I believe so. Are there methods of interpretation that have a better chance of reaching conclusions in alignment with objective facts? I believe so. 

I think it's all interpretations although I don't think we select (although we can select an interpretation in response to the initial interpretation). I don't think there are "objective facts" and I think Nietzsche is right that facts shouldn't be treated as independent objects. Further I think Nietzsche's key insight of the relationship of power to truth is also correct. However I think this means power determines interpretation and over time manifests that power. That is power leads to certain types of interpretations. Where I think most of the postmodernists go wrong is that they see power only in terms of human power.

[Ryan Dahle]

7 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

I don't think there are "objective facts" and I think Nietzsche is right that facts shouldn't be treated as independent objects.

I think maybe we are just talking about different things. I don't believe in facts that are discerned "objectively"--as in a manner that verifies their absolute reality. I do believe, believe being the key word, in realities (i.e. facts) that are independent of subjective perceptions. 

9 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

I think it's all interpretations although I don't think we select (although we can select an interpretation in response to the initial interpretation). 

I agree with this nuance, I think. Whatever our experiences are as we initially perceive them, we still have to evaluate their significance and determine what, if anything, they mean.

13 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

Further I think Nietzsche's key insight of the relationship of power to truth is also correct. However I think this means power determines interpretation and over time manifests that power. That is power leads to certain types of interpretations. Where I think most of the postmodernists go wrong is that they see power only in terms of human power.

I'm not familiar enough with Nietzche to know what he really meant by his statement. I may easily have proof-texted his statement about facts.  

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

He'd probably be much more open to it given his life after death. On the other hand I'm not sure it'd change his fundamental view of ontology. But who knows. That's a pretty big shock to an atheist and might lead to some serious reflection of philosophical method.

The question was in past tense.

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

However, empirical evidence, when properly employed, still seems to be the most reliable method of reaching accurate explanations or conclusions about reality.

How does it show us anything but our own perceptions?

Can you answer the Rorty quote in my siggy?

How do we get outside our perceptions to check if they "correspond" to anything?

Especially in the case of reigious experience?

Edited March 26, 2019 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

27 minutes ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I think maybe we are just talking about different things. I don't believe in facts that are discerned "objectively"--as in a manner that verifies their absolute reality. I do believe, believe being the key word, in realities (i.e. facts) that are independent of subjective perceptions. 

I agree with this nuance, I think. Whatever our experiences are as we initially perceive them, we still have to evaluate their significance and determine what, if anything, they mean.

I'm not familiar enough with Nietzche to know what he really meant by his statement. I may easily have proof-texted his statement about facts.  

Incidentally I agree with this whole post except for the use of the word reality.

I prefer "causes of perceptions." 

Are mirages real? Yet they cause perceptions which may be mistaken

They certainly cause perceptions. But the perceptions do not predict what we anticipated we will experience when we investigate them.

[Ryan Dahle]

16 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

18 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

However, empirical evidence, when properly employed, still seems to be the most reliable method of reaching accurate explanations or conclusions about reality.

How does it show us anything but our own perceptions? 

By "show" I assume you mean "prove" (whatever that means). In other words, how does empirical evidence prove anything beyond our own perceptions? I already explained that I don't think it can. But that has never been my working assumption. Absolute proof is not needed for reasonable belief. We reach conclusions about what the world beyond perception is probably like through inductive reasoning. 

Quote

 " To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states.  To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences, there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.

     Truth cannot be out there- cannot exist independently of the human mind- because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there.  The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.  Only descriptions of the world can be true or false.  The world on its own- unaided by the describing activities of human beings- cannot."   Richard Rorty- Contingency Irony and Solidarity, P 5.

I think truth is often used in two different ways: (1) as a blanket description of the world out there and (2) to describe an accurate correlation between human perception and the world out there. (And, yes, the accuracy of any proposed correlation is a matter of faith and not proof, as stated above). 

Obviously the first definition simply bypasses Rorty's point because it defines truth differently than he does.

As for the second definition, I think Rorty is on the right track but is missing something important. Because perceptions exist independent of language, and because "the world out there" is believed to exist independent of language, then truth can potentially exist independent of language. Rorty treats language as a completely arbitrary human creation when in reality it is a sophisticated means of communicating perceptions and interpretations of perceptions (however imperfectly). Rorty says "only descriptions of the world can be true or false." Not so. Perceptions of the world can be true or false, whether or not they are articulated in language. However, something about Rorty's underlying rationale seems to be valid. If truth is strictly used to define a relationship between two things (perception and the world out there) then it cannot, itself, be one of those things. In that sense, when truth is defined in such a narrow way (as a relationship), it can't just be out there independently. 

 

 

Edited March 27, 2019 by Ryan Dahle

[clarkgoble]

1 hour ago, Ryan Dahle said:

By "show" I assume you mean "prove" (whatever that means). In other words, how does empirical evidence prove anything beyond our own perceptions? I already explained that I don't think it can. But that has never been my working assumption. Absolute proof is not needed for reasonable belief. We reach conclusions about what the world beyond perception is probably like through inductive reasoning. 

This gets into the issue of the social. Unfortunately the way epistemology - especially in the Cartesian tradition - is frequently conducted sees everything in terms of the individual. However knowing is intrinsically a social endeavor. (Even for Plato this was true where other people were the mirrors where we could see ourselves and know) Take science, which most recognize as intrinsically social. For nearly every type of experiment one is depending upon a theoretical apparatus that the experimenter has not themselves fully tested. They take it on faith that those testing such theories have done so accurately. That's not always the case (think of priming experiments in psychology where the key underlying experiments proved faulty thereby invalidating a lot of subsequent work that depended upon that theoretical scaffolding). Even the equipment used in an experiment, while calibrated, still depends upon a host of people doing their jobs. We can through careful examination of equipment, skepticism, and having multiple people conduct tests, try to minimize error, but there is always a kind of faith intrinsically due to the social nature of science.

Now of course I agree absolute proof isn't part of science. Rather we do verification and falsification (which is itself a kind of verification). We can minimize error but never fully removed it. Even the arenas where we use the word proof such as in mathematics our proofs are often so complex that they end up being closer to science than the types of short proofs we're used to in our math classes. (Think for example the four color problem proof)

2 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

As for the second definition, I think Rorty is on the right track but is missing something important. Because perceptions exist independent of language, and because "the world out there" is believed to exist independent of language, then truth can potentially exist independent of language. Rorty treats language as a completely arbitrary human creation when in reality it is a sophisticated means of communicating perceptions and interpretations of perceptions (however imperfectly). Rorty says "only descriptions of the world can be true or false." Not so. Perceptions of the world can be true or false, whether or not they are articulated in language. However, something about Rorty's underlying rationale seems to be valid. If truth is strictly used to define a relationship between two things (perception and the world out there) then it cannot, itself, be one of those things. In that sense, when truth is defined in such a narrow way (as a relationship), it can't just be out there independently. 

I think Rorty gets at something accurate with his notion of truth as social solidarity. I think where he goes astray is in not paying enough attention to truth as a process. That is as future directed towards ideal solidarity, to use his words. (For Rorty truth as solidarity arises because of social groups coming to agree on what they treat as true)

All that said, I don't think we can say perceptions exist independent of language. When I look at the sky I see it as the sky. I can't experience it or perceive it independent of the language I find myself in. Maybe I could as an infant although I suspect even there we had proto-languages. This is the idea I mentioned yesterday where we find ourselves already embedded in these structures. To perceive is not to just make interpretations of color blobs. That's all done by the brain prior to it forming as a perception. Rather to perceive is always to perceive things as things. Even when we don't have a word for something our brain still is drawing inferences and presenting it in that "as" structure. So we may see something that looks like an elephant while knowing it isn't an elephant. I may not know what to call it but the way the perception is given "like" something presupposes an experience "as" something. That is, I can't escape from my brain giving it to me in terms of language.

Now perceptions aren't only linguistical obviously. But I don't think we can escape the linguistical simply because language is part of how our brains work and present.

 

[Ryan Dahle]

58 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

I think Rorty gets at something accurate with his notion of truth as social solidarity. I think where he goes astray is in not paying enough attention to truth as a process. That is as future directed towards ideal solidarity, to use his words. (For Rorty truth as solidarity arises because of social groups coming to agree on what they treat as true)

All that said, I don't think we can say perceptions exist independent of language. When I look at the sky I see it as the sky. I can't experience it or perceive it independent of the language I find myself in. Maybe I could as an infant although I suspect even there we had proto-languages. This is the idea I mentioned yesterday where we find ourselves already embedded in these structures. To perceive is not to just make interpretations of color blobs. That's all done by the brain prior to it forming as a perception. Rather to perceive is always to perceive things as things. Even when we don't have a word for something our brain still is drawing inferences and presenting it in that "as" structure. So we may see something that looks like an elephant while knowing it isn't an elephant. I may not know what to call it but the way the perception is given "like" something presupposes an experience "as" something. That is, I can't escape from my brain giving it to me in terms of language.

Now perceptions aren't only linguistical obviously. But I don't think we can escape the linguistical simply because language is part of how our brains work and present.

Certainly language becomes part of our perceptions as we assimilate it into our thinking processes. But I think that is clearly a secondary process. 

 

58 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

This gets into the issue of the social. Unfortunately the way epistemology - especially in the Cartesian tradition - is frequently conducted sees everything in terms of the individual. However knowing is intrinsically a social endeavor. (Even for Plato this was true where other people were the mirrors where we could see ourselves and know) Take science, which most recognize as intrinsically social. For nearly every type of experiment one is depending upon a theoretical apparatus that the experimenter has not themselves fully tested. They take it on faith that those testing such theories have done so accurately. That's not always the case (think of priming experiments in psychology where the key underlying experiments proved faulty thereby invalidating a lot of subsequent work that depended upon that theoretical scaffolding). Even the equipment used in an experiment, while calibrated, still depends upon a host of people doing their jobs. We can through careful examination of equipment, skepticism, and having multiple people conduct tests, try to minimize error, but there is always a kind of faith intrinsically due to the social nature of science.

Now of course I agree absolute proof isn't part of science. Rather we do verification and falsification (which is itself a kind of verification). We can minimize error but never fully removed it. Even the arenas where we use the word proof such as in mathematics our proofs are often so complex that they end up being closer to science than the types of short proofs we're used to in our math classes. (Think for example the four color problem proof)

I agree quite a bit. That is why I'm not really all that concerned with whether or not we really know that there is anything beyond our perceptions. We take leaps of faith at almost every step anyways, even in the sciences. 

If I found myself on an island and had total amnesia of everything in my prior life; it would seem a lot more reasonable to question whether or not my experiences corresponded to anything beyond my own perceptions. It sort of helps, though, when there are billions of people who all seem to be living in a shared reality. Of course, they could all be sophisticated AI or we could all be plugged into a matrix world or some other explanation could be possible, but it is primarily social corroboration that leads people to implicitly adopt a correspondence theory of truth. 

Edited March 27, 2019 by Ryan Dahle

[clarkgoble]

28 minutes ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Certainly language becomes part of our perceptions as we assimilate it into our thinking processes. But I think that is clearly a secondary process. 

I think what I'm getting at is the distinction between conscious processes and unconscious processes. So what I outline really isn't secondary but it's unconscious. I don't choose when I see something so see it as something. That's just part of perception. What you say may be true of brain processes but that's all unconscious (and quite complicated with most of it still unknown).

Edited March 27, 2019 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

3 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

 Because perceptions exist independent of language, and because "the world out there" is believed to exist independent of language, then truth can potentially exist independent of language.

Well quite honestly I think this is a great insight- but I disagree a bit, because I presume you have not read much Rorty, but I think you make a good point.

Rorty's view - at least when those words were written- he changed somewhat later- is that there IS no such thing as a perception "independent of language" - which essentially means that we are conditioned  by language- meaning that we are conditioned by our cultures.  So there is this interplay between culture and language and we are all conditioned by both.  So he calls language "contingent"- meaning subject to evolution for lack of a better term- and therefore not at all "stable" to use Clark's word.  Essentially there is nothing that could possibly BE "stable" and unchanging because we ourselves and culture is constantly changing and therefore our views of the world are conditioned and inherently "unstable" as well- and there is a modern trend in hermeneutics that all that "exists" therefore is TEXT.  Text reflects back ourselves and our culture and in turn conditions us as we interact with language and change it and therefore change both culture and language, in this constant interplay of forces essentially beyond our control

And then the self- our own understanding of the world and indeed even our "selves" is also contigent - conditioned- by culture.

Yet the struggle is to somehow break out of this conditioning and - though we cannot describe "reality"- but only use text- achieve a NEW way of developing text which works better than previous "poems" about the world of text to achieve advancements and predict better the "causes" perhaps of our experience.  These people are called "Ironists" because they understand the Irony that they are conditioned by culture and yet able to see it in a new way

And so we have the title of the quoted book- "Contingency Irony and Solidarity"-  I have not gotten into the solidarity part but essentially it is about a kind of socialist view of almost a theistic culture dedicated to human solidarity as a kind of "religion" - as God becomes defined as a "friend" to humanity.  - that part is in later books and can be seen as a kind of humanistic proxy of Mormonism- Rorty's wife was LDS

That's a long story BUT the point is that you nailed the weakness of Rorty's argument- in that we DO have non-verbal perceptions and experiences and are therefore not fully contingent - conditioned- by culture and therefore have agency.

Chantal Bax has also written a great book precisely on this subject which I highly recommend but it's price probably is beyond what a casual reader on the subject would be willing to pay- but it is a ground breaking work.  I have never taken the discussion that far here but it solves the problem Rorty raises- in my opinion- and "saves" agency by giving a different account of the "self" which is coherent and works with both Rorty and Wittgenstein's understanding of the textual world.  One review:

Quote

Moving beyond Wittgenstein's much heralded responsibility for the "death of man" debate begun in the course of the previous century, Subjectivity after Wittgenstein constructs a positive Wittgensteinian account of subjectivity and human nature. Drawing on his later writings, the book ranges across Wittgenstein's writings on philosophy of psychology and religion to articulate his notion of the post-Cartesian subject. In addition, the book answers the oft-repeated arguments that the anti-Cartesian turn in continental thought on the subject has lead to a loss of a centre for both ethics and politics. By further exploring the implications of the Wittgensteinian account, Subjectivity after Wittgenstein makes clear that a non-Cartesian view on human being is not necessarily ethically and politically inert. It moreover argues that ethical and political arguments should not automatically take precedence in a debate about the nature of man. 

https://www.bookdepository.com/Subjectivity-After-Wittgenstein-Chantal-Bax/9781441144102

So yes you nailed the exact problem, but you do not know Rorty well of course.

Suffice it to say that Bax saves religion and agency- aren't you glad?  

But now let's get to your argument above- it doesn't work and Rorty is still right about the contingency of language- just not about contingency of the self.

Here is your statement again:

Quote

 

Because perceptions exist independent of language, and because "the world out there" is believed to exist independent of language, then truth can potentially exist independent of language.

 

The problem is with the logic.  It does not follow that BELIEF that the world is out there, independent of language,  makes it so.

That is tantamount to saying that truth exists because you believe it does.

Of course I agree with that- but that means that we agree or some other horrible conclusion that makes your correspondence view untenable.  If truth exists because we believe it does, there needs to be no correspondence with the "world", all we need is the belief it exists- as a belief!, but not "objectively so".  That is my whole point!  

But it does not make your point that it is so!!

But you nailed the problem with Rorty- that perceptions exist independent of language.   Often they are connected with surprise and sudden events, but that is another story.

Sorry for the long post.

[mfbukowski]

5 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

As for the second definition, I think Rorty is on the right track but is missing something important. Because perceptions exist independent of language, and because "the world out there" is believed to exist independent of language, then truth can potentially exist independent of language. Rorty treats language as a completely arbitrary human creation when in reality it is a sophisticated means of communicating perceptions and interpretations of perceptions (however imperfectly). Rorty says "only descriptions of the world can be true or false." Not so. Perceptions of the world can be true or false, whether or not they are articulated in language. However, something about Rorty's underlying rationale seems to be valid. If truth is strictly used to define a relationship between two things (perception and the world out there) then it cannot, itself, be one of those things. In that sense, when truth is defined in such a narrow way (as a relationship), it can't just be out there independently. 

 

One more step to make my point.

Rorty knows all the rest of what is underlined quite well- no he does not miss that at all.

That "something in his rationale that seems valid" is exactly his point.

Don't criticize the book until you read it.  Do you understand that truth is only about statements in language???  Don't confuse truth with reality- that is what you are doing.  The issue is whether if truth CORRESPONDS to reality- not IS reality.  Don't get that confused!!

You've got this but you keep fighting for Cartesianism.  

Cartesianism just doesn't work with the church.   The church cannot be "true" in Cartesianism.  We can't see God, all our evidence is based on subjective- not objective evidence.

We have to have a system where subjective experience of "reality" can be taken as REALITY

Edited March 27, 2019 by mfbukowski

[Ryan Dahle]

7 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

The problem is with the logic.  It does not follow that BELIEF that the world is out there, independent of language,  makes it so.

Except that I didn't say belief made it so. I intentionally equivocated. 😎 

See:

4 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Because perceptions exist independent of language, and because "the world out there" is believed to exist independent of language, then truth can potentially exist independent of language.

The reality of the world out there can neither be proven or disproven. 

15 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Of course I agree with that- but that means that we agree or some other horrible conclusion that makes your correspondence view untenable.  If truth exists because we believe it does, there needs to be no correspondence with the "world", all we need is the belief it exists- as a belief!, but not "objectively so".  That is my whole point!  

I've never accepted that truth exists because of belief. I think the belief in an external reality is ultimately based on inductive logic. 

[Ryan Dahle]

12 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Don't criticize the book until you read it.  Do you understand that truth is only about statements in language???  Don't confuse truth with reality- that is what you are doing.  The issue is whether if truth CORRESPONDS to reality- not IS reality.  Don't get that confused!!

I thought I gave two definitions of truth and then explored the one Rorty was using on its own terms, as best as I can understand it. Yes, I think I get that Rorty sees truth as a linguistic concept. And I thought I was essentially agreeing with Rorty's point, which makes your warning to me about not getting confused, well, rather confusing

12 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Cartesianism just doesn't work with the church.   The church cannot be "true" in Cartesianism.  We can't see God, all our evidence is based on subjective- not objective evidence

I consider all perception as subjective, even sight. 

12 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

We have to have a system where subjective experience of "reality" can be taken as REALITY

Oh, I think subjective experience is definitely part of reality. I just happen to believe in something more than the bounds of my own experience or imagination. 

Edited March 27, 2019 by Ryan Dahle

[mfbukowski]

34 minutes ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Except that I didn't say belief made it so. I intentionally equivocated. 😎 

See:

The reality of the world out there can neither be proven or disproven. 

I've never accepted that truth exists because of belief. I think the belief in an external reality is ultimately based on inductive logic. 

Ok, good.

IF you see inductive logic as strictly human experience not connected, necessarily, to "the world" since all we can know about is our perceptions of what we call the world.

I've got no problem with that.

But truth is always about a statement about the world. Or even perceptions of the world. Truth is always tied to a sentence or a linguistic assertion. 

Only statements can be true or false. We don't talk about a true chair or a true table.

Only statements about the table or chair can be true or false. Is the chair white? Either that is true or false.

is the chair comfortable? That would be a question about your subjective experience of the chair which still could be true or false. That are all cases truth and falsity is about a statement, not about the world.

Edited March 27, 2019 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

21 minutes ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I thought I gave two definitions of truth and then explored the one Rorty was using on its own terms, as best as I can understand it. Yes, I think I get that Rorty sees truth as a linguistic concept. And I thought I was essentially agreeing with Rorty's point, which makes your warning to me about not getting confused, well, rather confusing

I consider all perception as subjective, even sight. 

Oh, I think subjective experience is definitely part of reality. I just happen to believe in something more than the bounds of my own experience or imagination. 

In my reckoning no one ever said that!

That would make you a solipsist and you should be in a funny farm!!

Rorty certainly doesn't say that,  I certainly don't say that.

[mfbukowski]

So I think we are on the same page it's just a question of semantics. Of course that is always the case. But in this case it's more about philosophical vocabulary. I am speaking philosophy and you are speaking ordinary language. No problem with that. As long as we translate occasionally. !

 

[Ryan Dahle]

4 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

But truth is always about a statement not about the world. Or even perceptions of the world. Truth is always tied to a sentence or a linguistic assertion.

I'm fine if that is used as a working definition of the term. But, as I've stated before, I think the concept has significant utility beyond social agreement. 

 

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

I think what I'm getting at is the distinction between conscious processes and unconscious processes. So what I outline really isn't secondary but it's unconscious. I don't choose when I see something so see it as something. That's just part of perception. What you say may be true of brain processes but that's all unconscious (and quite complicated with most of it still unknown).

The existence of Freud's "unconscious" is highly debatable.