Evidence for the Book of Abraham

[Ryan Dahle]

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

I'm trying to participate in a discussion is all.  I have no platform, not sure what that even means.  It doesn't sound very charitable though. 

Seriously? This again? You have a notorious habit of responding to critiques and disagreements by casting doubt on others' core motives/character? I'm not sure why you can't see the blatant hypocrisy in such behavior. I would invite you to stop it. It isn't conducive to mature and healthy discourse.

As for "platform," see the bullet point under the second definition in a quick google search of the term: "an opportunity to voice one's views or initiate action." I know, very uncharitable of me to go about using a word like "platform" in such a context as this. 

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

For my point about Abraham, I'm just pointing out what I've read from modern biblical scholars about the historicity question on Abraham.  I'm not aware of any compelling scholarly evidence that supports a historical Abraham.  I also said that he might have existed and that we don't know.  But we don't have any evidence that any of the stories about Abraham have even a shred of historical evidence to them.  Do you have any evidence to the contrary that you can point me towards?

Your response evades the substance of my critique. You did leave room for the possibility of Abraham's existence. Yet you clearly went beyond arguing for a mere lack of evidence and entered into an argument that Abraham was likely not a real person. That was the only aspect of your argument I was critiquing. 

 

 

[hope_for_things]

2 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Seriously? This again? You have a notorious habit of responding to critiques and disagreements by casting doubt on others' core motives/character? I'm not sure why you can't see the blatant hypocrisy in such behavior. I would invite you to stop it. It isn't conducive to mature and healthy discourse.

As for "platform," see the bullet point under the second definition in a quick google search of the term: "an opportunity to voice one's views or initiate action." I know, very uncharitable of me to go about using a word like "platform" in such a context as this. 

I admit that I’m far from perfect, but I don’t think your characterization of me here is at all accurate or fair.  If I’ve done something you find egregious in another thread, please call it out there.  This is really bad form on your part to make a general allegation like this about me.  

As for the definition you found for platform, that sounds really broad, as it sounds like anyone making any statement of opinion is “voicing one’s views”.  In that case everyone in this message board including yourself is guilty.  

2 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Your response evades the substance of my critique. You did leave room for the possibility of Abraham's existence. Yet you clearly went beyond arguing for a mere lack of evidence and entered into an argument that Abraham was likely not a real person. That was the only aspect of your argument I was critiquing. 

Seems logical that if we don’t have compelling scholarly evidence that someone was a real person that it’s fair to assume they weren’t until there is evidence to support the claim.  I’m merely following mainstream biblical scholarship here.  Your dispute would be more appropriately directed towards the scholars and not at me. 

Edited January 5, 2019 by hope_for_things

[mfbukowski]

5 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

The answer there is that it doesn't matter if it's true or fiction. So you're basically conceding my point. I'd add that while that might be an adequate description of historic Christianity, I don't think it's an adequate description of Mormon thought where there is a huge emphasis on truth. More or less what you're saying is that's a mistake. Which is of course fine, but I think you'd acknowledge that for the typical member they do believe in historic Nephites and a historic Abraham and it really would matter to them if it wasn't true. To the degree I'm following you're argument you're just saying this is a mistake and they shouldn't see it like that.

You really do enjoy re-writing what I said " more or less", "basically" what "you think" "adequately" represents my "mistakes" about "truth".  I'm not wasting any more time correcting you.

"More or less. "

I respectfully suggest that you read more Wittgenstein. 

 

Edited January 5, 2019 by mfbukowski

[hope_for_things]

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

I will comment when I get a chance. I have read a fair amount of Ricoeur, but it was long ago but I'm sure that it influenced my thinking. that was before I moved out of Continental philosophy and got more into analytical philosophy, where I had to be in US universities to get degrees in philosophy in those days.

I think Wittgenstein nailed it. I just quoted a good statement from him exactly on this just a couple hours ago up thread.

I live as if the Book of Mormon is historical, and that is all that matters to me. This whole concept of" seeing" as " is very important in W.  Essentially I see the Book of Mormon as W's rabbit duck figure. just as one can flip between the two perspectives in that illustration one can flip it between a faithful historical view and a fully spiritual view. Which is true is it a rabbit or a duck? It is both at once. Google paraconsistent logic.

"

I think you confuse categories when you do this.  To the scholarly question of historicity, it’s either historical or not.  In math 2+2 = 4, but never something else.  

Something can be true in another sense of the word truth even if it’s not literally factual.  But it can’t be both historical and not historical at the same time.  At least that makes no sense to me.  

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

I think you confuse categories when you do this.  To the scholarly question of historicity, it’s either historical or not.  In math 2+2 = 4, but never something else.  

Something can be true in another sense of the word truth even if it’s not literally factual.  But it can’t be both historical and not historical at the same time.  At least that makes no sense to me.  

"To the scholarly question of historicity"....

Yeah this is not historicity.  Did you read about paraconsistency?

Of course not.

Did you read the Wittgenstein quote?

Of course not. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

Quote

 

Dialetheism (from Greek δίς dís ‘twice’ and ἀλήθεια alḗtheia ‘truth’) is the view that there are statements which are both true and false. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called "true contradictions", dialetheia, or nondualisms.

Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis about truth that influences the construction of a formal logic, often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is introduced. A common mistake resulting from this is to reject dialetheism on the basis that, in traditional systems of logic (e.g., classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes false if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom.^[1] Other logical systems, however, do not explode in this manner when contradictions are introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as paraconsistent logics. Dialetheists who do not want to allow that every statement is true are free to favour these over traditional, explosive logics.

Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true contradictions.^[2] Jc Beall is another advocate; his position differs from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological) deflationism regarding the truth predicate.^[3]

 

 

And here is the Wittgenstein quote

Quote

Christianity is not based on historical truth rather it offers us a historical narrative and says: now believe! But not believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather believe through thick and thin which you can do only as the result of a life. Here you having narrative don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives make quite a place in your life for it there is nothing paradoxical about that

If W didn't find it paradoxical, that's fine with me.

You just don't understand the implications of deflationism.

Edited January 5, 2019 by mfbukowski

[hope_for_things]

12 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

"To the scholarly question of historicity"....

Yeah this is not historicity.  Did you read about paraconsistency?

Of course not.

Did you read the Wittgenstein quote?

Of course not. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

 

And here is the Wittgenstein quote

If W didn't find it paradoxical, that's fine with me.

You just don't understand the implications of deflationism.

I read both these quotes earlier.  I was really asking you to respond to this idea of post critical naïveté that I’ve learned from progressive Christian theologians like Borg and others.  As it seems a little different than how I’ve heard you articulate your position.  

See, I’m searching still for something that works for me and resonates with my sensibilities both scientifically and religiously.  Just wanted to know if you were familiar with that line of thinking and if you could explain how your views might be similar or different.  Thanks 

Edited January 5, 2019 by hope_for_things

[Ryan Dahle]

16 hours ago, hope_for_things said:

I admit that I’m far from perfect, but I don’t think your characterization of me here is at all accurate or fair.  If I’ve done something you find egregious in another thread, please call it out there.  This is really bad form on your part to make a general allegation like this about me.

Actually I have called it out on previous occasions. For instance, in our most recent exchange you ended up calling me "uncharitable" and "arrogant" simply for stating a proposition you disagreed with:

Quote

 

  On 12/17/2018 at 4:45 PM, Ryan Dahle said:

In a more general, less uniquely Latter-day Saint, perspective, our emotions often come in response to our thought processes, and our natural impulse is often to justify our emotions rather than question our thought processes. I think we all have become angry or frustrated based on misunderstandings. I'm suggesting this is what is largely happening in cases where people get upset about unusual moral inconsistencies in the Church's doctrines, practices, history, or policies. They recognize what appears to be a moral inconsistency, but they don't have enough information, in the first place, to really make a good decision. 

Hope for Things: The problem I have with this characterization is it seems awfully judgmental and uncharitable.  To think that everyone who has problems with church doctrines is just lacking information and unable to make a good decision is quite arrogant. 

 

And then I responded:

Quote

Unfortunately, I don't find this redundant digression to really be all that helpful to testing my main ideas. I've seen you have this same conversation over and over with people. In each case, they try to explain the inherent and virtually inevitable hypocrisy of your position, but you never quite seem to get it. And it usually starts with you labeling them in a negative way, simply because they disagree with you. You may want to rethink this strategy. It isn't conducive to mature and healthy discourse. It takes the conversation away from the substance of an argument and focuses it on the moral integrity of the person you disagree with, for no other reason than the fact that they disagreed with you without first validating your right to subjectively view the world.

 

Edited January 5, 2019 by Ryan Dahle

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

I read both these quotes earlier.  I was really asking you to respond to this idea of post critical naïveté that I’ve learned from progressive Christian theologians like Borg and others.  As it seems a little different than how I’ve heard you articulate your position.  

See, I’m searching still for something that works for me and resonates with my sensibilities both scientifically and religiously.  Just wanted to know if you were familiar with that line of thinking and if you could explain how your views might be similar or different.  Thanks 

Didn't have a chance to do that, but will look at it this weekend.

[Ryan Dahle]

15 hours ago, hope_for_things said:

As for the definition you found for platform, that sounds really broad, as it sounds like anyone making any statement of opinion is “voicing one’s views”.  In that case everyone in this message board including yourself is guilty.

I wasn't accusing you of being "guilty" of simply having a platform. Read the rest of the sentence for context.

15 hours ago, hope_for_things said:

Seems logical that if we don’t have compelling scholarly evidence that someone was a real person that it’s fair to assume they weren’t until there is evidence to support the claim.  I’m merely following mainstream biblical scholarship here.  Your dispute would be more appropriately directed towards the scholars and not at me. 

I think you are misrepresenting the scholarly view. I don't think there is any consensus about whether or not Abraham was a real person. There simply isn't enough secular evidence to make a responsible decision one way or another. Having a base assumption that one leans toward is different than being able to proclaim what is truly likely, based on actual evidence.

Can you provide even one solid piece of evidence (not merely assumption) that Abraham didn't exist? (Simply pointing to alleged anachronisms in extant texts really does nothing to argue against the reality of the person himself, simply because of the uncertainties involved in textual origins and transmission.)

Edited January 5, 2019 by Ryan Dahle

[CA Steve]

4 minutes ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Can you provide even one solid piece of evidence (not merely assumption) that Abraham didn't exist? (Simply pointing to alleged anachronisms in extant texts really does nothing to argue against the reality of the person himself, simply because of the uncertainties involved in textual origins and transmission.)

Hi Ryan,

I hope you don't mind me interjecting here.

I think the conversations about whether Abraham existed or not are fruitless. Rather than you demanding that HFT provide evidence that Abraham didn't exist or him demanding you provide evidence he did, both of which, as far as I know, are not possible, the conversation might be much better served delving into what it is we actually know from texts that were created a thousand years or more after his purported existence. I think both Robert and Clarke in the other thread on Abraham  have demonstrated that anything we have on such a figure, outside of the Book of Abraham, would at best be pseudographical.

Of course, depending on how you believe that Joseph Smith translated the Book of Abraham, one might argue that text actually represents the words of someone who lived 4000± years ago, but even then at best you can only show how the Book of Abraham text aligns with known texts from a 1000 years after Abraham was supposed to exist. I am not sure how that can be considered proof of an actual Abraham.

[hope_for_things]

2 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Actually I have called it out on previous occasions. For instance, in our most recent exchange you ended up calling me "uncharitable" and "arrogant" simply for stating a proposition you disagreed with:

And then I responded:

 

I know we've had some disagreements in the past, and I'm sorry if you felt like I was attacking you personally when I was offering criticism of a post.  One of my goals with respect to participating on message boards is to not make things personal.  I have had many times on this message board where I feel like I'm being ganged up on, just go look at the current thread on the MI for a case in point example, and I know that doesn't feel good.  But I also know that my opinions on this message board in particular might not be shared by the majority, so I expect some push back, but I'm human and I have reacted at times.  I sincerely apologize if you felt that I was attacking you personally on another thread as I really didn't intend to do that.  

I'm open to continuing to address the topic on this thread if you're interested in discussing the relevant Abraham issues with me.  If not, that is ok too.  I have some back and forth with MFB that I would like to continue engaging in however.  

[hope_for_things]

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Didn't have a chance to do that, but will look at it this weekend.

Sounds good, thanks.  

[cdowis]

2 hours ago, CA Steve said:

I think the conversations about whether Abraham existed or not are fruitless.

OK, and such a discussion belongs in another thread == e.g. was Joseph Smith a prophet.  The BASIC premise here is that he did exist but whether the BOA is an authentic record written by him.  Taking ownership of this thread, I am requesting that we stay on topic.

Edited January 5, 2019 by cdowis

[mfbukowski]

On 1/5/2019 at 8:37 AM, hope_for_things said:

I read both these quotes earlier.  I was really asking you to respond to this idea of post critical naïveté that I’ve learned from progressive Christian theologians like Borg and others.  As it seems a little different than how I’ve heard you articulate your position.  

See, I’m searching still for something that works for me and resonates with my sensibilities both scientifically and religiously.  Just wanted to know if you were familiar with that line of thinking and if you could explain how your views might be similar or different.  Thanks 

I read the portion of the thread on the progressive Christian website.

That sounds exactly like what I'm talking about. It is also essentially what Fowler is talking about with his stages. And is also like what Kevin talks about with his Perry's scheme.  it also sounds like Kuhn and Rorty and Wittgenstein, every other contemporary philosopher who thinks positivism is dead.

Each makes up his own scheme but each eventually is following the same logic:

"Grow up" and see the world as an adult and not like a child. It is about living in a world where there are no easy straightforward answers to anything. Embrace uncertainty and deal with it and get from it all that you can learn.

Nietzsche" There are no facts, only interpretations"

I don't mean this applies to you personally- it is what I am saying THEY are saying with this idea of "growing up"! 

Edited January 7, 2019 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

I'll drop the Wittgenstein topic. I didn't mean to imply in the least that he (or Mark) was a fideist. Although heaven knows he's accused of that a lot. Rather my point was more about how empirical data affects religion. I fully admit that I have a trouble with both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on religion - whether in the fideist readings or the more accurate complicated takes. To me faith is an anticipation towards some future empirical knowledge. I think that's how Alma 32 uses it, as I've argued many times before. I think that's how we use it. However that also means that it is intrinsically tied to evidence. What that evidence is, matters. 

Worth reading is Aeon's article today on Wittgenstein & religion. The topic there is more atheists and religion but I think it gets at what I've been saying. And with that I'll say no more and just stick to other topics.

On 1/5/2019 at 12:04 PM, CA Steve said:

I think the conversations about whether Abraham existed or not are fruitless. Rather than you demanding that HFT provide evidence that Abraham didn't exist or him demanding you provide evidence he did, both of which, as far as I know, are not possible, the conversation might be much better served delving into what it is we actually know from texts that were created a thousand years or more after his purported existence. I think both Robert and Clarke in the other thread on Abraham  have demonstrated that anything we have on such a figure, outside of the Book of Abraham, would at best be pseudographical.

Of course, depending on how you believe that Joseph Smith translated the Book of Abraham, one might argue that text actually represents the words of someone who lived 4000± years ago, but even then at best you can only show how the Book of Abraham text aligns with known texts from a 1000 years after Abraham was supposed to exist. I am not sure how that can be considered proof of an actual Abraham.

Speaking only for myself, I think the conversations aren't fruitless even if they can't be resolved empirically. If nothing else they highlight the assumptions we bring to bear in analyzing the public data. And that is useful.

I'd also disagree that "anything we have on such a figure, outside of the Book of Abraham, would at best be pseudographical." Instead I'd say that we'd have no way of knowing whether any text we had was pseudopigraphal or not. A subtle but important difference. (And why these kinds of discussions are helpful)

Of course if we did find some 1st century "pseudepigrapha" that matched reasonably well our Book of Abraham I think that'd be compelling evidence for a real Abraham if not conclusive evidence. If only because of the means it came about. 

On 1/4/2019 at 3:40 PM, hope_for_things said:

1.  If we found all the missing papyri pieces, we should expect that they will be consistent with the pieces we already have, meaning that they won't have anything to do with Abraham. 

2.  Abraham likely didn't exist as a real human, perhaps he did, but even if a real human named Abraham did exist we have no evidence to support that any of the stories about Abraham had even a shred of historicity to them.  Therefore, we shouldn't expect that anything Joseph imagined about Abraham would conform to an actual historical event.  

3.  No, everything about the accounts written in Genesis came so many years after the man Abraham was supposed to have existed, that we shouldn't expect that anything written in Genesis conforms to anything historical.  We also have all the textual and literary evidence that ties the stories in Genesis to the context of the times and the authors that wrote them.   The Documentary Hypothesis is our best scholarly explanation for how these accounts came to be.  

All of the above being said, I think there is a way to approach scripture as symbolic myth that has a lot of value.  Its a post critical naivete view towards God and scripture.  Its a little different than how MFB describes his approach in my opinion.  Its an approach I've read Marcus Borg articulate quite well, and I think its compatible with a rigorous intellectual evaluation and an appreciation for the spiritual component of life at the same time. 

Regarding (1) I'm not sure that's correct given, as Robert noted, books of breathing with other texts on them. Certainly it's not what I asserted.

Regarding (2) this seems an odd claim since it more or less is just a burden of proof argument. I mean I agree that's the expectations of those who don't think Joseph is a prophet. So I completely agree with you there. However for those who do think he's a prophet I think we expect some connection with Abraham - except for the pure catalyst theory people. But I don't know how many of those there actually are. Now it might be very little. I'd be fine if it just turns out to be some magic spell drawing on Abraham that the U&T could then deconstruct to go back to the original reference. But it may also have extensively more on it. 

Regarding (3) again that's the normal expectation. Again I'd disagree but that's fine. I'd say that while they clearly are old an may have been oral traditions there's also reasons to think that there was a written Hebrew tradition just not written in Hebrew. (Which would make sense if Moses was an educated upper class Egyptian)

As for the symbolic element, I think that ends up just being a catalyst for thought rather than a ground for belief. Which is what I think someone like Ricouer ends up doing. Which is fine. It can be quite productive that way. I'm just not sure it's religion anymore, despite what Ricouer and others say. I think Derrida's more accurate when he describes it as religion without religion. (I'd say it relates to the above too but I've dropped that)

• It can be said...that a certain Kant and a certain Hegel, Kierkegaard of course,...Heidegger also, belong to this tradition that consists of proposing a non dogmatic doublet of dogma, a philosophical and metaphysical doublet, in any case a thinking that repeats the possibility of religion without religion. — Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death

 

On 1/4/2019 at 4:58 PM, hope_for_things said:

Are you familiar with Marcus Borg and other progressive Christians who advocate a metaphorical approach to God & scripture?  He calls this a post critical naivete.  I've heard Boyd Peterson talk about this a bit referencing Paul Ricoeur who calls this the Second Naivete, but I haven't read any Ricoeur yet.  I haven't found many Mormons who really articulate a position in the same way that some of the Christian scholars approach things.  

Ricouer is a huge influence on my thought. However ultimately what I find is that the broad post-structuralist approach to all this fails with respect to ethics. That's as true of Ricouer as it is Derrida.* They give it a great try. Derrida perhaps a bit better as he takes on Levinas.  But it's never very convincing which is why I things move more interestingly towards a virtue ethic. But how do you ground a virtue ethic in such matters? I think Derrida can point the way via Peirce. Derrida talks of a Messiah always coming yet not yet come. By which he means we're learning about being good but we can't say what we hold to now is the good. We can just try to do as well as we can, always trying to do better. (This is basically Peirce's idea of truth corresponding to what an ideal community of inquirers would believe if they continued inquiry on indefinitely)

I think Ricouer is interesting to read here, both his The Symbolism of Evil but more profoundly his Oneself as An Other. (Sadly neither available as ebooks but they're well worth reading)

Ricouer is very influential among many Mormon thinkers. He was one of the key authors people discussed at LDS-Herm back in its heyday for instance. But I certainly agree most of them don't read him the way more secularist figures who tend to dismiss the reality of most of Christianity and Judaism. 

 * They are actually very similar philosophers in content, although definitely not in style - the differences between them are quite subtle. There are several books that go through this. The one I'm most familiar with is Leonard Lawlor's excellent Imagination and Chance.

Edited January 7, 2019 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

I'll drop the Wittgenstein topic. I didn't mean to imply in the least that he (or Mark) was a fideist. Although heaven knows he's accused of that a lot. Rather my point was more about how empirical data affects religion. I fully admit that I have a trouble with both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on religion - whether in the fideist readings or the more accurate complicated takes. To me faith is an anticipation towards some future empirical knowledge. I think that's how Alma 32 uses it, as I've argued many times before. I think that's how we use it. However that also means that it is intrinsically tied to evidence. What that evidence is, matters. 

Worth reading is Aeon's article today on Wittgenstein & religion. The topic there is more atheists and religion but I think it gets at what I've been saying. And with that I'll say no more and just stick to other topics.

Speaking only for myself, I think the conversations aren't fruitless even if they can't be resolved empirically. If nothing else they highlight the assumptions we bring to bear in analyzing the public data. And that is useful.

I'd also disagree that "anything we have on such a figure, outside of the Book of Abraham, would at best be pseudographical." Instead I'd say that we'd have no way of knowing whether any text we had was pseudopigraphal or not. A subtle but important difference. (And why these kinds of discussions are helpful)

Of course if we did find some 1st century "pseudepigrapha" that matched reasonably well our Book of Abraham I think that'd be compelling evidence for a real Abraham if not conclusive evidence. If only because of the means it came about. 

Regarding (1) I'm not sure that's correct given, as Robert noted, books of breathing with other texts on them. Certainly it's not what I asserted.

Regarding (2) this seems an odd claim since it more or less is just a burden of proof argument. I mean I agree that's the expectations of those who don't think Joseph is a prophet. So I completely agree with you there. However for those who do think he's a prophet I think we expect some connection with Abraham - except for the pure catalyst theory people. But I don't know how many of those there actually are. Now it might be very little. I'd be fine if it just turns out to be some magic spell drawing on Abraham that the U&T could then deconstruct to go back to the original reference. But it may also have extensively more on it. 

Regarding (3) again that's the normal expectation. Again I'd disagree but that's fine. I'd say that while they clearly are old an may have been oral traditions there's also reasons to think that there was a written Hebrew tradition just not written in Hebrew. (Which would make sense if Moses was an educated upper class Egyptian)

As for the symbolic element, I think that ends up just being a catalyst for thought rather than a ground for belief. Which is what I think someone like Ricouer ends up doing. Which is fine. It can be quite productive that way. I'm just not sure it's religion anymore, despite what Ricouer and others say. I think Derrida's more accurate when he describes it as religion without religion. (I'd say it relates to the above too but I've dropped that)

• It can be said...that a certain Kant and a certain Hegel, Kierkegaard of course,...Heidegger also, belong to this tradition that consists of proposing a non dogmatic doublet of dogma, a philosophical and metaphysical doublet, in any case a thinking that repeats the possibility of religion without religion. — Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death

 

Ricouer is a huge influence on my thought. However ultimately what I find is that the broad post-structuralist approach to all this fails with respect to ethics. That's as true of Ricouer as it is Derrida.* They give it a great try. Derrida perhaps a bit better as he takes on Levinas.  But it's never very convincing which is why I things move more interestingly towards a virtue ethic. But how do you ground a virtue ethic in such matters? I think Derrida can point the way via Peirce. Derrida talks of a Messiah always coming yet not yet come. By which he means we're learning about being good but we can't say what we hold to now is the good. We can just try to do as well as we can, always trying to do better. (This is basically Peirce's idea of truth corresponding to what an ideal community of inquirers would believe if they continued inquiry on indefinitely)

I think Ricouer is interesting to read here, both his The Symbolism of Evil but more profoundly his Oneself as An Other. (Sadly neither available as ebooks but they're well worth reading)

Ricouer is very influential among many Mormon thinkers. He was one of the key authors people discussed at LDS-Herm back in its heyday for instance. But I certainly agree most of them don't read him the way more secularist figures who tend to dismiss the reality of most of Christianity and Judaism. 

 * They are actually very similar philosophers in content, although definitely not in style - the differences between them are quite subtle. There are several books that go through this. The one I'm most familiar with is Leonard Lawlor's excellent Imagination and Chance.

Sigh

I am proudly a fideist- honestly it is not a dirty word.

Faith based in action is what Alma is speaking about and I find it the "sweetest" possible way to live at least for me.  I have no problem with any of these folks.  But of course you are the historian of philosophy

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fideism/

Quote

Today the term “fideism” is perhaps most commonly associated with four philosophers: Pascal, Kierkegaard, James, and Wittgenstein. In order to assess how well the label fits, it will be helpful to discuss their respective views in slightly more detail. Note, however, that each is also treated at greater length elsewhere in this encyclopedia.

Quote

A crucial premise in Bishop’s argument is what he terms the “thesis of evidential ambiguity,” which holds that, under “rational empiricist evidential practice,” our overall experience of the world is equally plausibly interpreted on either a theistic or an atheistic reading, thereby leaving open the question of God’s existence (70–1). He argues that under appropriate conditions—essentially those comprising what James called a “genuine option,” together with evidential indeterminacy, on the one hand, and the satisfaction of certain moral constraints on one’s passional motivations and the content of one’s faith-commitment, on the other—it is morally permissible to make a “doxastic faith-venture”—that is, to take belief in God to be true in one’s practical reasoning, while recognizing that it is not certified by one’s total available evidence (147). The brand of fideism for which Bishop argues is thus ‘supra-evidential’ in the sense that it defends the permissibility of reasoning on the basis of commitments that outrun what is warranted on purely evidential grounds. Like Evans, and in keeping with James and Pascal, however, Bishop is careful to distinguish supra-evidential fideism from counter-evidential fideism: unlike the latter, the former, he argues, cannot be shown to violate any epistemic obligations. Although, unlike some putative fideists, Bishop does not regard evidentialism as incoherent or epistemically irresponsible, he argues that fideism of the kind he defends is preferable on broadly moral grounds, suggesting, for instance, that fideism’s tolerance for passional commitments conduces to a more balanced acceptance of human nature as more than purely rational (216–220).

 

Edited January 7, 2019 by mfbukowski

[hope_for_things]

9 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Regarding (1) I'm not sure that's correct given, as Robert noted, books of breathing with other texts on them. Certainly it's not what I asserted.

Regarding (2) this seems an odd claim since it more or less is just a burden of proof argument. I mean I agree that's the expectations of those who don't think Joseph is a prophet. So I completely agree with you there. However for those who do think he's a prophet I think we expect some connection with Abraham - except for the pure catalyst theory people. But I don't know how many of those there actually are. Now it might be very little. I'd be fine if it just turns out to be some magic spell drawing on Abraham that the U&T could then deconstruct to go back to the original reference. But it may also have extensively more on it. 

Regarding (3) again that's the normal expectation. Again I'd disagree but that's fine. I'd say that while they clearly are old an may have been oral traditions there's also reasons to think that there was a written Hebrew tradition just not written in Hebrew. (Which would make sense if Moses was an educated upper class Egyptian)

1 - How would you approach the likelihood that another unrelated text was attached to the book of breathings?  There could be a statistical approach, so if this occurred in 10% of known samples out there then we should expect a 10% probability of it also occurring in this situation.  However, we have other evidence that could give us reason to doubt that another text existed.  For one, we have absolutely no evidence that Joseph Smith actually had an ability to translate anything from one language to another.  So adding additional evidence like this would decrease its likelihood.  

2.  My point on this rests on the idea that we don't know anything about Abraham historically speaking, so we shouldn't start with the premise than any narratives about Abraham have historical components.  To give an example, lets say that Joseph Smith created a text about Zeus.  Then you ask a question of how much of Joseph narrative about Zeus should we expect to conform to actual historical events in the life of Zeus.  Well, we have no evidence that Zeus ever existed historically speaking, so this whole line of thinking isn't based on anything that could be evaluated other than to say we don't know anything about Abraham historically speaking, so how can we know if anything Joseph's narrative said about him was accurate history?  

3. We have the same problem with Moses in that scholars haven't found any evidence to support his life historically speaking either.  Is it possible that either Abraham or Moses were actual humans that lived at some time?  Yes, you're telling me there's a chance!  We can't with 100% confidence remove that possibility.  Zeus might also have been a real person as well.  But whether any of these people were real people, we don't have any evidence to support that the stories about these people have any historical core to them.  

9 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

As for the symbolic element, I think that ends up just being a catalyst for thought rather than a ground for belief. Which is what I think someone like Ricouer ends up doing. Which is fine. It can be quite productive that way. I'm just not sure it's religion anymore, despite what Ricouer and others say. I think Derrida's more accurate when he describes it as religion without religion. (I'd say it relates to the above too but I've dropped that)

• It can be said...that a certain Kant and a certain Hegel, Kierkegaard of course,...Heidegger also, belong to this tradition that consists of proposing a non dogmatic doublet of dogma, a philosophical and metaphysical doublet, in any case a thinking that repeats the possibility of religion without religion. — Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death

I'd like to know a little more about this line of thinking if its possible to distill it down for a novice like myself without the philosophical education.  I could check out the Derrida book sometime if you think that it wouldn't be over my head, any other suggestions would be helpful, this is an important area of thought as I'm trying to explore what feels authentic for myself and my recent approach to religion.  

Can you explain what he meant by religion without religion?  If its religion without supernaturalism, then that works really well for me as I don't believe in the supernatural anymore.  Also, can you expound on the "catalyst for thought rather than a ground for belief" comment.  Sorry if I'm just not following you here.  When I've read Borg express this idea of a post critical naivete, I don't see him talking about it as a way of avoiding the empirical or comprising the way we look at science and history.  I read him as saying that he can approach the clearly mythical/non-literal stories found in religious texts through a metaphorical lens and mine them for symbolic truth instead of getting caught up focusing solely on their literal/historical truth.  

This would work for looking at the myths of any culture and seeking truths about life from these narratives, and essentially putting the arguments about historicity to the side while this is done.  At the same time acknowledging value in historical analysis, not discounting the empirical and scholarly approach at all.  To me, both of these methods are important paradigms to approach narrative evaluation.   

10 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Ricouer is a huge influence on my thought. However ultimately what I find is that the broad post-structuralist approach to all this fails with respect to ethics. That's as true of Ricouer as it is Derrida.* They give it a great try. Derrida perhaps a bit better as he takes on Levinas.  But it's never very convincing which is why I things move more interestingly towards a virtue ethic. But how do you ground a virtue ethic in such matters? I think Derrida can point the way via Peirce. Derrida talks of a Messiah always coming yet not yet come. By which he means we're learning about being good but we can't say what we hold to now is the good. We can just try to do as well as we can, always trying to do better. (This is basically Peirce's idea of truth corresponding to what an ideal community of inquirers would believe if they continued inquiry on indefinitely)

I think Ricouer is interesting to read here, both his The Symbolism of Evil but more profoundly his Oneself as An Other. (Sadly neither available as ebooks but they're well worth reading)

Ricouer is very influential among many Mormon thinkers. He was one of the key authors people discussed at LDS-Herm back in its heyday for instance. But I certainly agree most of them don't read him the way more secularist figures who tend to dismiss the reality of most of Christianity and Judaism. 

 * They are actually very similar philosophers in content, although definitely not in style - the differences between them are quite subtle. There are several books that go through this. The one I'm most familiar with is Leonard Lawlor's excellent Imagination and Chance.

Sorry, but you're going way over my head as I haven't read all these texts.  I'm planning to get the Symbolism of Evil, that is the one Ricouer text that Peterson recommended to me as well.  

I worry though with some of these thinkers, if they try to get too wonky how they take theological concepts.  Whenever I hear people trying to blend something being literally true with something being just symbolically true, they start to lose me.  For example, some people that I respect a lot in progressive Christian circles get me pretty lost when they start to talk about the resurrection being true in some kind of metaphysical sense.  Maybe I'll start to understand if I read them more thoroughly, but for where I'm at right now, I'd just prefer to say that Jesus was a person, and that is all we know.  And I don't believe in the supernatural, so Jesus died just like everyone else does, and that is my basic assumption.  Everything about birth, death and the resurrection, I'm comfortable approaching as metaphors for life. 

[clarkgoble]

8 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Sigh

I am proudly a fideist- honestly it is not a dirty word.

Faith based in action is what Alma is speaking about and I find it the "sweetest" possible way to live at least for me.  I have no problem with any of these folks.  But of course you are the historian of philosophy

I'm not a philosopher although I was only one class shy of a major in college. I think of myself primarily as a physicist although I'll be the first to admit that being out of the field for so long now my physics is embarrassingly rusty. I like philosophy but go in spouts with it. I tend to get pretty annoyed with it every 5-6 years and throw up my hands and think it's all a waste. But it is useful if only for bringing out our hidden assumptions. It's just that when outside of academia it's much easier to keep up with philosophy than physics.

That said, I confess I'm even more confused by your objections if you're actually embracing the fideist positions. I figured you'd been taking me as criticizing fideism when I was fully aware of the problems of reading Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein as fideists. But that appears to be precisely how you're reading them I guess. But yeah, to me fideism is a hugely problematic position. It seems like my criticisms apply ten fold for that. I'll drop it though. I just don't think fideism does justice to Alma 32 at all and runs aground on many other scriptures. I take both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein to be arguing something more subtle against a certain Kantian approach to knowledge. But while I agree with them that Kant is wrong, I think their solution is also wrong. For an interesting counterargument (for other readers) which embraces the Kierkegaard "correction" to Kant in a Mormon context (although in his book the Mormonism isn't explicit), Keith Lane's Kierkegaard and the Concept of Religious Authorship is quite interesting. Keith's a friend of mine (although I confess we've not talked in a while) and used to be a regular contributor at LDS-Herm - he teaches at BYU Hawaii. (Lucky dog) He engages with Wittgenstein as well.

Edited January 7, 2019 by clarkgoble

[Steve J]

1 minute ago, clarkgoble said:

I'm not a philosopher although I was only one class shy of a major in college. I think of myself primarily as a physicist although I'll be the first to admit that being out of the field for so long now my physics is embarrassingly rusty. I like philosophy but go in spouts with it. I tend to get pretty annoyed with it every 5-6 years and throw up my hands and think it's all a waste. But it is useful if only for bringing out our hidden assumptions. It's just that when outside of academia it's much easier to keep up with philosophy than physics.

That said, I confess I'm even more confused by your objections if you're embracing the fideist positions. I figured you'd been taking me as criticizing fideism when I was fully aware of the problems of reading Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein as fideists. But that appears to be precisely how you're reading them I guess. But yeah, to me fideism is a hugely problematic position. It seems like my criticisms apply ten fold for that. I'll drop it though. I just don't think fideism does justice to Alma 32 at all and runs aground on many other scriptures. I take both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein to be arguing something more subtle against a certain Kantian approach to knowledge. But while I agree with them that Kant is wrong, I think their solution is also wrong. For an interesting counterargument (for other readers) who embraces the Kierkegaard "correction" to Kant in a Mormon context (although in his book the Mormonism isn't explicit), Keith Lane's Kierkegaard and the Concept of Religious Authorship is quite interesting.

Just curious, why didn't you just complete the 1 class to get the major? Not here or there, but I heard stories like these before

[hope_for_things]

19 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

I read the portion of the thread on the progressive Christian website.

That sounds exactly like what I'm talking about. It is also essentially what Fowler is talking about with his stages. And is also like what Kevin talks about with his Perry's scheme.  it also sounds like Kuhn and Rorty and Wittgenstein, every other contemporary philosopher who thinks positivism is dead.

Each makes up his own scheme but each eventually is following the same logic:

"Grow up" and see the world as an adult and not like a child. It is about living in a world where there are no easy straightforward answers to anything. Embrace uncertainty and deal with it and get from it all that you can learn.

Nietzsche" There are no facts, only interpretations"

I don't mean this applies to you personally- it is what I am saying THEY are saying with this idea of "growing up"! 

Thanks, I'm glad to hear that it sounds very much in the same sphere of thinking.  I also agree that they typically talk about this as a step in human development and understanding from a maturity perspective.  

I do have one more question for you though about your approach, and it goes back to the way you answer questions about historicity in the specific Mormon context.  You see, I don't hear people like Marcus Borg saying that aspects of the bible are historically true, he's very tuned into the scholarship and supporting the scholarly approach as well as this metaphorical approach and I don't see him mixing the two.  

I believe if Borg were a Mormon, that he would clearly acknowledge that we have no evidence to support the BoM as a historical text.  I guess I still don't understand why you use the language you do to talk about these questions in the Mormon context.  You know that when most people are talking about historicity they are speaking in a scholarly sense.  So why do you explain things in terms that you know will be interpreted differently by your audience?  When you tell them that you believe the BoM is historical, they interpret that as being in a scholarly sense.  Why not just say that you don't believe it is historical in a scholarly sense, but that you do believe it is true in a religious sense.  That would be so much clearer and effective communication.  

[mfbukowski]

10 minutes ago, hope_for_things said:

Thanks, I'm glad to hear that it sounds very much in the same sphere of thinking.  I also agree that they typically talk about this as a step in human development and understanding from a maturity perspective.  

I do have one more question for you though about your approach, and it goes back to the way you answer questions about historicity in the specific Mormon context.  You see, I don't hear people like Marcus Borg saying that aspects of the bible are historically true, he's very tuned into the scholarship and supporting the scholarly approach as well as this metaphorical approach and I don't see him mixing the two.  

I believe if Borg were a Mormon, that he would clearly acknowledge that we have no evidence to support the BoM as a historical text.  I guess I still don't understand why you use the language you do to talk about these questions in the Mormon context.  You know that when most people are talking about historicity they are speaking in a scholarly sense.  So why do you explain things in terms that you know will be interpreted differently by your audience?  When you tell them that you believe the BoM is historical, they interpret that as being in a scholarly sense.  Why not just say that you don't believe it is historical in a scholarly sense, but that you do believe it is true in a religious sense.  That would be so much clearer and effective communication.  

Good idea, I thought I did that, but apparently not .

[clarkgoble]

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

1 - How would you approach the likelihood that another unrelated text was attached to the book of breathings?  There could be a statistical approach, so if this occurred in 10% of known samples out there then we should expect a 10% probability of it also occurring in this situation.  However, we have other evidence that could give us reason to doubt that another text existed.  For one, we have absolutely no evidence that Joseph Smith actually had an ability to translate anything from one language to another.  So adding additional evidence like this would decrease its likelihood.  

Well I'm a big skeptic of formally calculating likelihood. It just seems that books of breathings with semi-unrelated texts aren't that uncommon. How common they actually are I don't know. As I try to go to pains to point out this is just not an area I'm well read on so I'm somewhat loath to go into the weeds too far. 

To the other point, I think that for a non-Mormon skepticism towards Joseph makes complete sense. Those writing in an academic situation also have to deal with the presumption of secular assumptions - although in some fields one can bracket that somewhat. (Such as in Rough Stone Rolling) I hope you see though that for a believer the calculus is quite different. If I was the sort to give much credence to formalized likelihoods this is more or less the question of ones initial probability in a bayesian approach. The non-Mormon and the typical Mormon will simply have very different prior probabilities. Mormons is various faith crises likewise will have a different prior. Again though I'm not sure that's an useful approach.

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

2.  My point on this rests on the idea that we don't know anything about Abraham historically speaking, so we shouldn't start with the premise than any narratives about Abraham have historical components.  To give an example, lets say that Joseph Smith created a text about Zeus.  Then you ask a question of how much of Joseph narrative about Zeus should we expect to conform to actual historical events in the life of Zeus.  Well, we have no evidence that Zeus ever existed historically speaking, so this whole line of thinking isn't based on anything that could be evaluated other than to say we don't know anything about Abraham historically speaking, so how can we know if anything Joseph's narrative said about him was accurate history?  

Oh, I understand. I'm just not sure I agree simply because of the place of Abraham in scripture. While I fully embrace a "hermeneutics of suspicion" particularly towards the Old Testament, I'm also not sure that leads us to completely throwing Abraham out. But that in large part is due to the place of the Book of Abraham in scripture and my experiences reading it. So I'd be the first to admit a certain circularity in my reasoning. Of course a hermeneutic circle is not necessarily a vicious circle.

But from a purely secular perspective of course you're correct. But that then again gets us to the question of our priors.

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

Can you explain what he meant by religion without religion?  If its religion without supernaturalism, then that works really well for me as I don't believe in the supernatural anymore.  Also, can you expound on the "catalyst for thought rather than a ground for belief" comment.  Sorry if I'm just not following you here.  When I've read Borg express this idea of a post critical naivete, I don't see him talking about it as a way of avoiding the empirical or comprising the way we look at science and history.  I read him as saying that he can approach the clearly mythical/non-literal stories found in religious texts through a metaphorical lens and mine them for symbolic truth instead of getting caught up focusing solely on their literal/historical truth.  

More or less a lot of atheists in post-war continental philosophy ended up embracing a lot of religious thinking and terminology - partially due to works like Ricouer's. Negative theology is a very good example of this. But there are others - particularly in how post-structural phenomenology embraced a lot of platonic elements of certain elements of Judaic and Christian thought. It gets a bit complicated as by that point continental philosophy had become fair complicated, unnecessarily filled with jargon and metaphors, and frankly a whole lot of unnecessarily opaque language. Pretty much to even begin talking about it all one has to have a pretty thorough background in Heidegger, Husserl and Hegel. 

More or less the idea is that God "gives" phenomena. So they pick up on the Trinitarian idea of God as creating everything and the Platonic idea of God as Being itself. Being is what lets things be in consciousness and thus is the source of the very nature of consciousness. However these are all atheists so they're appropriating religious language to talk about something fundamentally secular. At a certain point though things become blurry - as I've noted many times the difference between a very liberal theological Christian and an atheist is not much. So Derrida tends to joke that they are all theologians who've embrace religion, but without religion because they're all atheists. 

The ability to do this goes way back to around the time of Augustine when Greek philosophy and Christian theology really became fully entwined. (Elements of this were always there - John and The Epistle to the Hebrews both have strong platonic elements) With Augustine he basically takes his neoplatonic beliefs from before his conversion to Christianity and adjusts them for his Christianity. This leads to two fundamental breaks. Instead of the One, the Dyad and so forth in neoplatonism you end up with The Trinity of Christianity. The second element is that instead of a continuity of emanations from the One to this world we have an absolute break with creation ex nihilo. Thus God as the source of Being is fundamentally other to creation itself.  In historic philosophy this is sometimes called the unification of the God of Athens and the God of Jerusalem with the latter typically being seen as the more anthropomorphic and interventionist aspects of Christian thought. What's typical and what became dominant in the 19th century among academic Christians is skepticism toward the God of Jerusalem and really just thinking Christianity in terms of the God of Athens. However in practice this ends up just being various types of platonism with various oddities due to trying to merge neoplatonism in with Christianity. Unsurprisingly in continental philosophy many of the major influences tend to by Christian mystics who were on the cusp of being called heretics such as Meister Eckhart. That's because in the medieval era they tended to embrace this platonic elements of Christianity more than the historic elements. Even figures like Duns Scotus tend to be very influential. The main reason for this is their arguments and approaches to certain problems.

That's probably more explanation than you wanted, but it's more or less the background for Ricouer. He's at the beginning of the period of when all this emerges, although elements are there in earlier figures like Heidegger.

1 hour ago, hope_for_things said:

Sorry, but you're going way over my head as I haven't read all these texts.  I'm planning to get the Symbolism of Evil, that is the one Ricouer text that Peterson recommended to me as well.  

I wouldn't worry about the broader issues. They're really only interesting if you deep dive into continental thought - particularly phenomenology. That's a complex topic. If you are interested I'd start with a basic introduction like Dermot Moran's Introduction to Phenomenology. He goes into the necessary background with Husserl and Heidegger and then briefly covers figures like Derrida or others. (I can't recall if he covers Ricouer but I know he covers Gadamer and Derrida who have a similar place and function historically)

If you are curious, in addition to Moran Janicaud's Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn" is a nice reader and includes the main papers relevant in the debate in the 90's when the theological turn was in full gear. Things have largely moved on since then, although this is still a strain in phenomenological thought. However continental philosophy no longer is dominated by phenomenology. (Although it's still important) So in more contemporary figures (and this includes Mormon philosophers like Adam Miller) you see a very different approach.

Anyway, Symbolism of Evil is a great book and you can read it without worrying about all these broader issues. He has several individual papers as well. You might also enjoy Partially Examined Life's podcast on Ricouer and religion. Unfortunately the online versions of the papers they read aren't live links anymore except for "The Language of Faith." (Which is itself well worth reading and perhaps right up the alley of what you're interested in) 

Edited January 7, 2019 by clarkgoble

[clarkgoble]

1 hour ago, Steve J said:

Just curious, why didn't you just complete the 1 class to get the major? Not here or there, but I heard stories like these before

When you have too many credits BYU gets quite upset and more or less demands you graduate. I was doing a triple major of physics, math and philosophy plus for a while an honors degree. Physics starts off with more necessary classes than any other major other than perhaps music. Luckily many crossover with mathematics. I was basically one semester shy of completing everything and BYU sent me a letter saying I had to graduate to make room for other students. Which was actually fine. I was pretty burnt out on school for various reasons by then and had also just decided not to make physics my occupation - a decision I'm very glad I did. Most of my friends who continued on didn't get their first job until they were nearly 40 and several strongly regret taking the academic path. (Ben Huff's definitely commented along those lines even though he was lucky and got a professorship)

After I graduated I got a job doing IT and spent lots of fun times I don't regret in the least. I spent my free time doing rock climbing, mountaineering, skiing, mountain biking and a lot else I otherwise couldn't have done to the same degree. Plus I actually had money rather than living on ramen and vitamin pills. I then started up a software company and the rest is history I guess. I was very lucky that Dennis Potter (now Kelli Potter) started up LDS-Phil and invited me to join. (I'd TAed him in some philosophy classes) Several professors took me under their wing and more or less gave me the equivalent of graduate classes and lots of critiques and corrections. So I was able to keep up my academics in philosophy in a semi-robust and intense fashion. (Made easier by being single) Most of my work on phenomenology came in that era. Tons of thanks to Jim Faulconer, Mark Wrathall and others for that decade of continued education. I was also fortunate in that the mailing list Peirce-L was at its prime and I was able to be taught by the top scholars in that field and have lots of debate with people correcting me and challenging me. It's too bad that those sorts of resources just aren't available anymore. (Peirce-L is still there with some of the figures still active - but in the late 90's and naughts it was in a class of its own)

Edited January 7, 2019 by clarkgoble
Corrected the name of the former Dennis Potter. She'd changed her name and I hadn't known that.

[mfbukowski]

57 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

I'm not a philosopher although I was only one class shy of a major in college. I think of myself primarily as a physicist although I'll be the first to admit that being out of the field for so long now my physics is embarrassingly rusty. I like philosophy but go in spouts with it. I tend to get pretty annoyed with it every 5-6 years and throw up my hands and think it's all a waste. But it is useful if only for bringing out our hidden assumptions. It's just that when outside of academia it's much easier to keep up with philosophy than physics.

That said, I confess I'm even more confused by your objections if you're actually embracing the fideist positions. I figured you'd been taking me as criticizing fideism when I was fully aware of the problems of reading Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein as fideists. But that appears to be precisely how you're reading them I guess. But yeah, to me fideism is a hugely problematic position. It seems like my criticisms apply ten fold for that. I'll drop it though. I just don't think fideism does justice to Alma 32 at all and runs aground on many other scriptures. I take both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein to be arguing something more subtle against a certain Kantian approach to knowledge. But while I agree with them that Kant is wrong, I think their solution is also wrong. For an interesting counterargument (for other readers) which embraces the Kierkegaard "correction" to Kant in a Mormon context (although in his book the Mormonism isn't explicit), Keith Lane's Kierkegaard and the Concept of Religious Authorship is quite interesting. Keith's a friend of mine (although I confess we've not talked in a while) and used to be a regular contributor at LDS-Herm - he teaches at BYU Hawaii. (Lucky dog) He engages with Wittgenstein as well.

I get it then. Thanks for the link!

I am a Radical Empiricism ala James who is also a Fideist - there are no problems with that. I take feelings like  Alma's "sweetness" as empirical evidence in the religious sphere, predicting growing sweetness. Everyone knows there are obvious connections between James and Mormonism, perhaps you should check it out a little more. No conflict there at all if observed evidence includes feelings, as it does for James, in discussing religion, religion IS sweetness, what makes your  "bosom burn"

There is no conflict in the philosophy, the conflict lies in the classification, which is always subjective to each classifier. 

I think all the conflicting "isms" are the problem, resulting from reading secondary sources which conflict when each author has their own definition for any particular "ism". You already acknowledged that with you quoting conflict between the classifiers in the phrase above, about "reading X philosopher as a Y" where Y is a classification for philosophers.

But that just shows how right Wittgenstein was about "seeing as" a rabbit or a duck.

Reading as, seeing as 

The problem is who's as we are talking about

 

Edited January 7, 2019 by mfbukowski

[hope_for_things]

18 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

I wouldn't worry about the broader issues. They're really only interesting if you deep dive into continental thought - particularly phenomenology. That's a complex topic. If you are interested I'd start with a basic introduction like Dermot Moran's Introduction to Phenomenology. He goes into the necessary background with Husserl and Heidegger and then briefly covers figures like Derrida or others. (I can't recall if he covers Ricouer but I know he covers Gadamer and Derrida who have a similar place and function historically)

If you are curious, in addition to Moran Janicaud's Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn" is a nice reader and includes the main papers relevant in the debate in the 90's when the theological turn was in full gear. Things have largely moved on since then, although this is still a strain in phenomenological thought. However continental philosophy no longer is dominated by phenomenology. (Although it's still important)

Thanks Clark, for the very detailed answer, it does help and although I don't follow everything, it gives me some additional context and I learned some things.  Hoping to continue that growth and learning going forward.

When it comes to concepts for what God is and how we describe the beliefs of an atheist or a progressive Christian, its all quite interesting to look at how all these beliefs intersect and what that means exactly.  There are so many very complicated and different perspectives about God throughout culture and time.  Even these labels of progressive, fundamentalist, theist, atheist, all of these labels have a variability that is also connected to culture and time.  

I have been interested in finding language concepts that connect with my sensibilities, and its been really refreshing and affirming to find particular views that resonate with me personally.  However, even my views are elastic and are influenced by my environment, and I also feel a certain resistance towards attaching any label to my own beliefs today because I know that they will change with time.  

I was feeling yesterday like I might bear my testimony in church for the first time in a few years and the first time since my recent adventures in reactivity, but I just couldn't get myself to do it.  One of the competing thoughts in my head that kept me from going up was this discomfort with putting any stake in the sand or declaring that I have any particular view on something.  I just feel like my ideas are constantly changing and being updated, and the whole tradition of testimony bearing has such a sense of knowing and declaring rather than just sharing thoughts that are fleeting.  Hopefully I can get past that and share in a future meeting as I do think I had some positive feelings that would have been productive to share.  Putting those worries aside can be challenging for me sometimes.